1

PART I
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS

UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Analytic Philosophy
1.3 Continental Philosophy
UNIT 2: KARL MARX
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Life and
2.3 Historical Background
2.4 Classical German Philosophy
2.5 Socialism
2.6 Economics
2.7 Historical Materialism
2.8 Class and Class Struggle
2.9 Alienation
2.10 Alienated Labour
2.11 Communism
UNIT 3: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Life
3.3 Main Works
3.4 Nietzsche’s Philosophy
3.5 Nihilism
3.5.1 Passive Nihilism:
3.5.2 Active Nihilism:
3.6 Will to Power
3.6.1 Will to Power as Drive
3.6.2 Obeying the Will to Power
3.6.3 Will to Power between Nobles and Slaves
3.7 The ‘Death of God’
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3.7.1 Death of God and Nihilism

3.7.2 Death of God and Morality
3. 8 The Overman or Superman
3.8.1 Man and Overman
3.8.2 Characteristics of Overman
UNIT 4: SIGMUND FREUD
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Life
4.3 Works
4.4 The Psychosexual Stages of Development
4.5 The Structural Model of Personality (Id, Ego and Superego)
4.6 The Oedipus Crisis
4.7 Psychoanalytic Theory
4.8 Theory of the Unconscious

PART II
EARLY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

UNIT 1: HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

1.1 Edmund Husserl
1.2 Fundamental Concepts
1.3 Development of Husserlian Phenomenology
1.3.1 Pre-Phenomenological Period
1.3.2 Phenomenological Period
1.3.3 Intentionality Consciousness
1.3.4 Doctrine of Essence
1.3.5 Eidetic Reduction
1.3.6 Bracketing (Epoche)
1.3.7 Period of Pure Phenomenology
UNIT 2: HEIDEGGER
2.1 Heidegger’s Thought and Life
2.2 Earlier Philosophy
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2.2.1 Fundamental Ontology

2.2.2 Preliminary Analysis of Dasein
2.2.3Primordial Interpretation
2.3 Later Philosophy
2.3.1 The ‘Turn’ and his Critique of Western Metaphysics
2.3.2 Thinking of Being
2.3.3 The Divine
UNIT 3: THEISTIC EXISTENTIALISTS
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Soren Kierkegaard
3.2.1 The Background: Personal Life and Western Tradition
3.2.2 Existence: the Whence and the Whither of Philosophizing
3.2.3 The Three Stages of Existence
3.2.4 The Philosophy of Leap: Faith and Truth
3.3 Martin Buber (1878-1965)
3.3.1 Important works
3.3.2 Basic Intution of Buber’s Thought
3.3.3 I and Thou
3.3.4 The Concept of God
3.3.5 Conclusion
3.4 Gabriel Marcel
3.4.1 Experiential Background to His
Philosophy 3.4.2Twofold Approach to Reality
3.4.3 Incarnation and Freedom
3.4.4 Philosophy of Relation
3.4.5 Relation to the Finite Other: Intersubjectivity
3.4.6 Relation to the Absolute Other: Faith and Hope
UNIT 4: ATHEISTIC EXISTENTIALISTS
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980)
4.2.1 Analysis of Being
4.2.2 The Destroying Presence of the Other
4.2.3 Human Condemned to Freedom
4.2.4 Impossibility of God and of Moral Values
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4.3 Albert Camus (1913-60)

4.3.1 Absurdity and Rebellion: Camus-I
4.3.2 Absurdity and the Responses to It
4.3.3 Moderation and Reconciliation: Camus-II
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UNIT 1
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
1.1 Introduction
Contemporary Western philosophy is a piece of technical terminology in philosophy that
refers to a specific period in the history of Western philosophy. Contemporary philosophy may
be described as the present period in the history of Western philosophy beginning at the end of
the nineteenth century with the rise of analytic and Continental philosophy. Continental
philosophy began with the work of Brentano, Husserl, and Reinach on the development of the
philosophical method of phenomenology. This development was roughly contemporaneous with
the work by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell inaugurating a new philosophical method based
on analysis of language via modern logic, hence the term ‘analytic philosophy’. The relationship
between philosophers who label themselves ‘analytic’ and those who label themselves
‘continental’ is often a hostile one, but there are some Contemporary philosophers who have
argued that this division is harmful to philosophy and attempt a combined approach.
1.2 Analytic Philosophy
Analytic philosophy is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate
English-speaking countries in the twentieth century. It is ordinarily dated to the work of English
philosophers Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. They turned away
from the then-dominant forms of Hegelian objectives in particular to its idealism and purported
obscurity and then began to develop a new sort of conceptual analysis, based on new
development in logic.
The Contemporary philosophers who self-identify themselves as analytic have widely
divergent interests, assumptions and methods. In its Contemporary state analytic philosophy is
usually taken to be defined by a particular style characterized by precision and thoroughness
about a narrow topic. In the opinion of Michael E. Rosen, the term analytic philosophy can refer
to:
Later analytic philosophers like Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein focused on creating an
ideala)language
A tradition
for of doing philosophy
philosophical characterized
analysis, by anbe
which would emphasis on clarity
free from and argument,
the ambiguities of ordinary
language that often got philosophers into trouble. This philosophical trend can the
often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language, and a respect for be called
natural language.
formalism.
b) The positivist view that there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the object
1.3 Continental Philosophy
of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. As a result, many analytic
philosophers have considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those
Continental
of the naturalphilosophy
sciences. in Contemporary usage refers to a set of traditions of ninetieth
and c)
twentieth
The viewcentury
that thephilosophy from mainland
logical clarification Europe.
of thoughts Thebemain
can only branches
achieved of Continental
by analysis of
the logical form of philosophical propositions. The logical form of a proposition is a
way of representing it often using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical
system to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type.
 6

philosophy are German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics,

structuralism, and post-structuralism.
The history of Continental philosophy is usually thought to begin with German idealism
led by figures like Fichte, Schelling, and later Hegel. German idealism developed out of the
work of Immanuel Kant. Edmund Husserl has been a canonical figure in Continental
philosophy. Continental philosophy is often characterized by its critics as lacking the rigor of
analytic philosophy.
Michael E. Rosen has identified certain common themes that typically characterize
Continental philosophy. They are the following:

a) Continental philosophers generally reject scientism, the view that the natural
sciences are the best or most accurate way of understanding all
phenomena. Continental philosophers UNIT 2 argue that science depends upon
often
conditions of possible experience, and that scientific methods are inadequate to
KARL MARX
understand such conditions of intelligibility.
b) Continental philosophy usually considers experience as determined at least by
2.1 Introduction
factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Thus
Continental philosophy
Undoubtedly Marx is one tends towards
of the historicism.
most important philosophers of all times. No one in the
c) Continental
20th century has beenphilosophy typically
more defended holds that
or vilified thanconscious
Karl Marx human agency can
for inspiring changeleft-wing
the many
socialistthe conditions of
or communist experience.
revolutions thatThus Continental
changed philosophers
the political landscape tend to take
of the 20 strong
th
century. Marx
interest in one
is also considered the of
unity
the of theory
fathers and practise,socialism
of democratic and tendthat
to since
see their philosophical
the fall of communism in
Eastern inquiries
Europe and as former
closely Soviet
relatedUnion
to personal,
is now moral or political
the principle formtransformation. This
of socialism throughout the
world. tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition, and it is also central in
existentialism and post-structuralism.
d) A final characteristic trait of Continental philosophy is an emphasis on meta-
philosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences,
Continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of
philosophy. In some cases such as German idealism or phenomenology,
this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first
foundational, a priori science. In other cases such as hermeneutics, critical
theory, or structuralism, it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is
irreducibly cultural or practical.
 7

2.2 Life and Works

Karl Heinrich Marx was born into a comfortable middle-class Jewish family in Trier in
Germany on May 5, 1818. His father Hirschel Marx was a lawyer and while Karl was still a
child decided to abandon his Jewish faith and become a Christian to escape anti-Semitism. After
finishing his schooling in Trier, Karl Marx entered Bonn University to study law. At Bonn he
became engaged to Jenny von Westphalen. Later Karl joined Berlin University and changed his
subject of specialization from Law to Philosophy. Here Marx came under the influence of the
philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, who had been the professor of philosophy at Berlin until his death
in 1831. Marx became a member of the Young Hegelian movement, a group, which included
Bruno Bauer, David Strauss and others who were involved in a radical critique of Christianity
and the Prussian autocracy. After obtaining his doctorate from the University of Jena, Marx
hoped to get a teaching post. However his radical political views and association with the Young
Hegelian movement made it impossible.
Marx immigrated to France, arriving in Paris at the end of 1843. It was also in Paris that
Marx developed his lifelong partnership with Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). While working on
their first book together, The Holy Family, the French government expelled Marx from the
country, and Marx moved to Brussels where he remained for the next three years. While in
Brussels Marx devoted himself to an intensive study of history and elaborated what came to be
known as the materialist conception of history, which was later published as The German
Ideology. In1847 he wrote The Communist Manifesto.
Due to various revolutionary movements Marx was forced to settle down in London in
May 1849 to begin the "long, sleepless night of exile" that was to last for the rest of his life. In
London Marx spent a lot of time in the British Museum reading books and journals that would
help him analyze the capitalist society. By 1857 he had produced a gigantic 800 page manuscript
on capital, landed property, wage labor, the state, foreign trade and the world market, The
Grundrisse (Outlines). In the early 1860s he composed three large volumes, Theories of Surplus
Value, which discussed the theoreticians of political economy. It was not until 1867 that Marx
was able to publish volume 1 of Capital. Volumes II and III were finished during the 1860s but
were published posthumously by Engels. He died on March 14, 1883 and was buried at Highgate
Cemetery in London.
2. 3 Historical Background
Marxism could be considered the continuation and culmination of German classical
philosophy, French Socialism and British Economics. To gain an understanding of Marx’s
philosophy and the socialist praxis he advocated, it is necessary that we look into each of these
fields of knowledge that formed the historical and academic background to Marx’s thinking.
2.4 Classical German Philosophy
Hegel was the most important philosopher of the time and he believed that Reality was
Spirit and that the human being is Spirit alienated from its objects and from itself. He believed
that this alienation can be overcome by knowledge, knowledge that there is nothing in the object
which was not put there by the subject spirit itself. During his university days Marx became a
member of a radical left wing group, the Young Hegelians. Marx accepted Hegel’s dialectic, but
for him history was not the dialectical manifestation of the Spirit but men and women
transforming the world through the creation of their means of existence. He drifted away from
the Young Hegelian movement and expressed his disagreements with their ideology in the Holy
Family, the Theses on Feuerbach and the German Ideology. The Theses on Feuerbach contain
one of Marx's most memorable remarks: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the
 8

point is to change it” (Thesis 11). Materialism of the time ignored the active role of the human
subject in creating the world we perceive. Idealism as developed by Hegel, understood the active
nature of the human subject, but confined it to thought or contemplation. Marx combined the
insights of both the traditions to propose a view in which human beings transform the world they
find themselves in. This transformation happens not in thought but in reality, through actual
material activity. This historical version of materialism is the foundation of Marx’s theory of
history; it was derived from his reflection on the history of philosophy, his experience of social
and economic realities of the time, and his encounter with the working class.
2.5 Socialism
Socialism as we know today is the product of modern industrial world. Millennial and
utopian thought before the modern era only existed as forms of Christian heresy. The word social
became secular especially during and after the French Revolution. The general connotation of
the word in 1830s was a system of society that stressed the social against the individual, the co-
operative against the competitive, sociability against individual self-sufficiency; and social
control on the accumulation and use of private property. Marxism emerged as a critique and
revolutionary transformation of the different schools of socialist thought and the political
emancipation movements.
2.6 Economics
Capitalism is an economic theory which stresses that the means of production should be
owned by private individuals. Capitalists believe that Private ownership and free enterprise will
lead to more efficiency, lower prices, and better products. Adam Smith believed that an
individual, by pursuing his/her own interest frequently promotes that of the society more
efficiently than when one intends to promote it. According to Capitalist thinking enlightened
self-interest and competition in the free market would benefit society as a whole by keeping
prices low, while providing incentive for the production of a wide variety of goods and services.
Modern capitalism had created unprecedented wealth. However the system made the workers,
the real producers of wealth alienated and poorer, the more they worked the less they became.
Marx felt that there was a need for a new economic and social system to liberate the vast
majority of the people, the working class or the proletariat from the chains of oppression.
2.7 Historical Materialism
The critique of Hegelian philosophy, different schools of socialism and capitalism made
Marx to search for a new philosophy that would be instrumental in making communism a reality.
He looked into history to see how societies had evolved from primitive communism to slave
economy, to feudalism and finally to contemporary capitalism. He believed that once we
understand the laws of the development of history we could also direct them to achieve the goal
we have. Marx’s concept of historical materialism was his attempt to explain the historical
process of development.
The materialistic interpretation of history holds that history is a product of human beings,
men and women make history but they make it under given conditions. The process of
development and change is as follows.
Human beings have needs and to satisfy these needs they enter into production. The
mode of production is the manner in which men and women produce their means of existence. In
the course of time, the modes of production become ossified into traditions and are handed
down. It is this dynamic relationship to nature that Marx meant by the term productive forces.
 9

Human beings do not produce as isolated individuals but as members of a community, the
relationship within which is determined to a great extent by the mode of production.
This economic structure constitutes the base of the society on which superstructures like
law, religion, and morality are built to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond.
Within the economic structure itself, the productive forces enjoy priority over relations of
production. The superstructures once risen can react on the base and can have certain autonomy.
Human beings themselves are the most important agents of change, human beings who
are aware What
of thetriggers
conflictssocial change can
and interests is the maturing
change the courseof the contradictions within a given
of history.
economic system: (i) conflict between new needs and old mode of production; (ii) conflict
2.8 Class the
between andterms
ClassinStuggle
relations of production; (iii) conflict between base and superstructure and
(vi) conflict between
A class is a groupsuperstructures.
of personsWhenwhothestand
conflicts mature
in the sameand the possibilities
relation to propertywithin a
or to
given systemto
nonproperty, arethe
exhausted,
factors ofone form of society
production such asgives
labourwaypower
to another.
and means of production. We
might say that a class is a group of people who by virtue of what they possess have to engage in
the same type of activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments. Marx was not
the first to discover the concepts of class and class struggle. But Marx was the first to see class
and class conflict as central categories in the unfolding of history.
In the Manifesto Marx says that history hitherto has been a history of class struggle. As
capitalismMarx showed and
developed (1) that the existence
the capitalists of classes
acquired more isandlinked
moretopower
predetermined
and wealthhistorical
it also
phases of the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily
created an impoverished proletariat. Two basic classes oppose each other in the capitalist system: leads to the
dictatorship
the owners ofofthe themeans
proletariat; and (3) that
of production, the dictatorship
the capitalists itself
and the is only
workers thehave
who transition leading
sold their to
labour
the abolition of all classes and the establishment of a classless society.
power. The conflict between the bourgeois who does not want to give up their privileges and the
proletariat who have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, of the inhuman situation in
which they live and work will create the conditions for a revolution. This revolution will be the
prelude to the establishment of communism.
2.9 ALIENATION
For the first time in history we live in a world where we have the technology and the
means to produce enough to satisfy the needs of everyone on the planet, yet millions of lives are
stunted by poverty and destroyed by disease. Vast numbers of people live their lives
characterized by feelings of desolation, loneliness and alienation. The situation is not natural or
inevitable but the product of the existing socio-economic system, contemporary capitalism. Marx
developed his theory of alienation to reveal the cause of these contradictions, namely alienated
human activity that lies behind the seemingly impersonal forces dominating the society. For
Marx, alienation was not rooted in the mind or in religion, as it was for his predecessors Hegel
and Feuerbach but something rooted in the material world. Alienation meant loss of control,
specifically the loss of control over worker’s labour power, the product of labour and its
commodification.
 10

2.10 Alienated Labour

Marx considers human labour as one of the chief ways in which humans are
distinguished from non-human animals. Non-human animals do produce, but only for survival,
and only in an instinctual manner. In contrast, humans are creative and make their life-activity
and labour the object of their own wills and consciousness. Marx sees capitalism as an economic
and social system which has created and augmented productive forces greater than ever before in
human history, yet it thwarts, distorts, and limits human potential. There are four aspects to
alienated labour. The worker is alienated from:

The division of labour, wage labour and private property are expressions of alienation. In
order to1.end
thealienation,
products of one’s
it is own labour:
necessary Under
to abolish capitalism,
private property commodities
and abolishproduced
the relationship
by labour are taken away from the worker and sold, and labour
between private property and wage labour. Marx believed that through class struggle that itself becomes a would
commodity. This alienation produces riches and power for the capitalist
culminate in a revolution which leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, private property but
would beenslavement
abolished andandby degradation
implication, foralienation.
workers.
2. the process of production: Under capitalism, work is controlled by employers
2.11 Communism
and is external to the worker and is not experienced as part of one’s nature.
The
Whileaimworking,
of Marxism is to bring
the worker does about a communist
not have a sense of society, i.e., a classless society. The
fulfilment.
dictatorship of the proletariat and the nascent socialist society will be characterized by factors
such as 3.
thespecies:
abolition In
of capitalism individuals
private property act less
abolition and less like
of inheritance humanofbeings,
abolition divisionand
of labour
more and more like machines. In capitalism production is drudgery
universalization of education planned economy, rational and just allocation of the resources and merely a of
means to survive. In the process one is forced to sacrifice what is genuinely
the society.
human.
As socialism develops one could expect the “withering away of the state” and creation of
a society4. where
other persons:
the normHumansis “fromareeach
alsoaccording
alienated from
to hisother
abilityhuman
and to beings,
each because,
according to his
in capitalism human relations are reduced to market or exchange relationships.
need,” as mentioned in the Critique of Gotha Programme. It will be “An association in which
the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” (The Manifesto)
In a true communist society there will be no more a place for religion as the promise of
an illusory happiness in the world to come or as opium to alleviate the pain and misery the
masses suffer.
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UNIT 3
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)
3.1 Introduction
Nietzsche became a legend even before he died in 1900. He was an extremely complex
personality; he possessed great artistic talent and was one of the best of the modern German
writers. His style, in prose as well as in verse, is passionate, inspiring and of great literary beauty.
However, the central theme of his thought was man and human life, and therefore, he was
completely preoccupied with history and ethics.
3.2 Life
Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844, at Röcken, Prussian Saxony. His father,
Ludwig Nietzsche, was a Lutheran minister. Ludwig died in 1849. In 1858, he entered Pforta, a
famous boarding school near Naumberg. He was often at the head of the class and acquired an
excellent education. He studied theology and classical philology at the University of Bonn and
he graduated in 1864. But in 1865 he gave up theology and went to Leipzig. As a student at
Leipzig, Nietzsche discovered Arthur Schopenhauer (known for his pessimism) and Richard
Wagner (a great musician of that time), the two greatest influences on his early thought. After
reviewing his papers which were published in Rheinisches Museum, in 1869, the University of
Basel appointed him as the chair of philosophy even before he had even taken the doctorate.
He never married though he proposed to two women. He was for a period of time in
conflict with his sister Elizabeth because she married a fascist and went to live with him in
Argentina. But she returned later after the death of their mother and looked after Nietzsche. She
was very possessive of her brother, and it is understood that she falsified many of his
manuscripts to suit her own fascist ideology. Throughout his life Nietzsche’s health was poor.
He disregarded the advices of the doctors and fought severe migraine and gastric pains with long
walks and much writing and took pills and potions to purchase a little sleep. In 1889, the mental
tension became too much for Nietzsche. In January 1889, Nietzsche collapsed in a street in Turin
while embracing a horse that had been flogged by its coachman. He never recovered and he
vegetated until his death. On August 25, 1900, Nietzsche died as he approached his 56th year.
3.3 Main Works
The principal works of Nietzsche are named here. The Birth of Tragedy / from the Spirit
of Tragedy was written in 1872. In 1883-85 Nietzsche came out with his famous work, Thus
Spoke Zarathustra. Beyond Good and Evil in 1886 and A Genealogy of Morals, one of the
exceptional works on morality, in 1887, which together with Zarathustra, are probably
Nietzsche’s most important writings. In 1888 along with The Will to Power he had written The
Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ and Ecce Homo, a kind of autobiography (these works have
been published after the death of Nietzsche). These latest works show signs of his extreme
tension and mental instability.
3.4 Nietzsche’s Philosophy
Nietzsche was not content with the traditional mode of philosophizing and
conceptualizing. Nietzsche argued and presented his views quite differently from the traditional
way. First of all, his writings do not present a systematic account of his philosophical endeavor.
His dislike for a systematic presentation is symbolized in his writings. He had not written his
ideas in a systematic way so as to establish a system of his own. Nietzsche himself makes this
clear by saying that, “I mistrust all systems and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of
 12

integrity.” So, it is not easy to present his philosophy systematically; his philosophy cannot be
readily segregated into metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics and the like. In any case,
we make an attempt, for our practical purpose, to categorize his philosophy under the following
titles.
3.5 Nihilism
Nietzsche sees reality, the cosmos as valueless. Everything organic and inorganic is
reduced to be merely the product of matter, which has deterministic laws. The advancement of
science and technology, the renaissance thinkers, revolution against Christianity, Darwinian
Theory of evolution and many other reasons could be pointed out why the world was looked at
as valueless. A view that the world is nothing but a big machine was dominant and, Nietzsche
thinks that people do not realize the catastrophe. Nietzsche identifies this catastrophe with
nihilism. Western society was seen by him to have been captured by this horror.
Nietzsche describes nihilism as ‘ambiguous’ in that it can be symptomatic of either
strength or weakness. Nietzsche claims that nihilism is a necessary step in the transition to a
revaluation of all values. It is the most extreme form of pessimism. In simple terms, it is the
belief that everything is meaningless. It arises from weariness. Nihilism is a transitional stage
that accompanies human development, cleaning and clearing away outdated value systems so
that something new can arise in their place. Nietzsche speaks of two kinds of nihilism: passive
nihilism or incomplete nihilism and active nihilism or perfect nihilism. Passive nihilism is
characterized by a weak will and active nihilism by a strong will.
3.5.1 Passive Nihilism: Passive nihilism is more the traditional belief that ‘all is meaningless.’ It
is the result of what happened in our thinking. According to Nietzsche, “the highest values
devaluate themselves.” The aim is lacking; ‘the why’ finds no answer. The highest values so far
had been God and other metaphysical or otherworldly realities. The other world was considered
the real world while this world was considered only an apparent one. The role of God is now put
in question and ‘experience’ turns out to be the sole basis of acquiring knowledge. Hence, what
happens is the fact that anything, which is considered holy and unquestionable, is under
skepticism. The result is nihilism. We are confronted with the naked reality as something aimless
and valueless. The world looks valueless because those things that oriented in giving meanings
are taken off. One of the main reasons could be the end of Christian thinking, we mean from the
point of view of keeping God as the lawgiver, as the source of life, as the source of value and as
the source of meaning of our existence. Now everything is related to positivistic or scientific
approach, which is devoid of any value attached to the world and thus we are confronted with
nihilism. This kind of nihilism is said to be incomplete or the passive.
It is incomplete or passive because even after denouncing the existence of other worldly
virtues, the human being still finds meaning in something else. This something is viewed as
giving value and purpose to our existence even in the midst of valuelessness. That is nothing but
morality. The denial of God does not necessarily lead to the denial of morality, which played a
dominant role in the justification of the world. The human being posits the meaning of existence
in the acceptance of the existing moral system. Therefore, what we need to do is even to go
beyond this status of justifying our existence with the existing moral system.
3.5.2 Active Nihilism: Nietzsche tries to be a perfect or active nihilist. He understands very well
that morality serves as the great ‘antidote’ for the nihilism that one is faced with. Nietzsche
argues that “every purely moral value system ends in nihilism. One still hopes to get along with a
moralism without religious background but that necessarily leads to nihilism.” Hence, it is not
enough that we try to be non-metaphysicians but it is necessary to be also active nihilists. If we
 13

are confronted with nihilism, we should face it actively and affirmatively. One should not try to
valuate something that is not there as passive nihilists do. Rather we need to face actively the
baseless, valueless world. This would indicate active or perfect nihilism.
To sum up, while most of his contemporaries looked on the late nineteenth century with
unbridled optimism, confident in the progress of science and the rise of the German state,
Nietzsche saw his age facing a fundamental crisis in values. He ends up with identifying nihilism
which others have failed to realize and respond to it actively. “Nihilism literally has only one
truth to declare, namely, that ultimately nothingness prevails and the world is meaningless.”
3.6 Will to Power
To understand the will to power, one must first of all take into account Nietzsche's
background and criticism of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer posited a ‘will to live,’ in
which living things were motivated by sustaining and developing their own lives. Nietzsche
instead posited a ‘will to power,’ a significant point of contrast to Schopenhauer’s idea, in which
living things are not just driven by the mere need to stay alive, but in fact by a greater need to
use power, to grow, to expand their strength, and, possibly, to subsume other ‘wills’ in the
process. Thus, Nietzsche regarded such a ‘will to live’ as meaningless while ‘will to power’
alone as primary.
3.6.1 Will to Power as Drive: In his writings, he makes the ‘will to power’ as the fundamental
drive to explain life’s activities. The ‘will to power’ is treated as the drive of a being to
‘overcome’ itself, or in simple terms, to better oneself or to become more than what it is at
present. To better oneself, one must be able to overcome both the limitations of oneself and
external things; “That it must be a struggle and a becoming.” In overcoming these, one can guess
what a being feels: satisfaction and pleasure. In striving to better oneself, one certainly has a will
that causes them to face the limitations. In facing and triumphing over those things one gains
pleasure. But of course, if one does not succeed, then they certainly will feel dissatisfied, but
does not one also notice the strengthening of a will thereafter, perhaps to even say a will
becoming more ‘determined’ and the cycle continues.
3.6.2 Obeying the Will to Power: As said above, the ‘will to power’ is closely associated with
the fundamental drive of willing beings, we shall look at how Nietzsche characterizes several
aspects of human doings as actions that can be viewed as obeying the ‘will to power’ as
characterized above. First, there is the pursuit of knowledge or the “will to truth” as Nietzsche
calls it. In Human, All Too Human, he gives three effects of seeking knowledge that are tied to a
gain in the sense of power. One effect is that by gaining knowledge, one gains an awareness of
one’s power, analogous to “gymnastic exercises are pleasurable even without spectators.” The
second effect is that by bettering our knowledge, we also gain the ability to ‘defeat’ and become
‘victors’ over older ideas (or at least we believe so), thus a sense of power over other’s ideas.
Lastly, in finding new ‘truths’ one can become affected with a sense of superiority and
uniqueness since one feels they understand something better than others which can feed a sense
of power over others. Nietzsche claims “Their ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is a
legislation, their will to truth is – will to power.”
3.6.3 Will to Power between Nobles and Slaves: Nietzsche saw the ‘will to power’ as that
which drove the priests to moralize upon the world and recreate the concepts of ‘good’ and
‘evil.’ This is seen best in the work The Genealogy of Morals in which Nietzsche discusses his
idea of an interplay based on the philological analysis of words between the ‘noble’ class
Romans and the ‘slave’ class Jews. While the Romans were painted as strong, rich, and
powerful, the Jews were weak, poor, and lacking in power. However, this dichotomy of power
 14

caused deep seated hatred to brew within the Jewish class, led by the priests; “It is their
impotence which makes their hate so violent and sinister, so cerebral and poisonous.”
The Romans were powerful in a superficial manner relying on money and weapons. The
priests were the “most intelligent haters.” Driven by hatred and keen intellects, the Jews came to
overpower the Romans not with weapons and money, but with morality. Whatever the Romans
were, termed ‘evil’ or sinful and anything that was Jewish was made ‘good.’ The masses, or the
“herd” as Nietzsche refers to them, fell in sway with this morality and thus the Jews came to
dominate the Romans. For, to be Jewish was to be good, and to be otherwise made one into “the
‘evil enemy,’ the Evil One.” This will to dominate, spurred by hatred, and led by priests, strong
with a ‘will to power,’ allowed the Jews to triumph over Rome. We should not be misled by this
conclusion because this (of the Jews, of the slaves) is not the will to power that Nietzsche aims
at. The example is to show the force or the power of the will to power. He stands with the will to
power of the masters.
To sum up, let us attempt to congeal the above to state what ‘will to power’ is according
to Nietzsche. ‘Will to power’ is that which explains the fundamental will of living beings which
makes beings strive for growth, overcoming subjective and objective obstacles, and the
satisfaction of gaining a sense of volition. It is important to note that in Nietzsche’s writings,
there is no other will besides the ‘will to power.’ The ‘will to power empowers one and makes
the weak stronger than ever. Though, there is always a discussion whether there are ‘wills to
power’ (several wills that empower) or just ‘will to power,’ we are content with ‘will to power.’
3.7 The ‘Death of God’
The announcement of the ‘death of God’ by the madman occurs in The Gay Science. Let
us have an extract from the passage that we might be able to draw some important conclusions to
show how this announcement serves as the devaluation of all morality, including Christian,
Kantian and utilitarian.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is God?”
he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him – you and I. all of us are his murderers… Are we
not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space…? God is
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. (The Gay Science, 125)
The message of the ‘death of God’ is not merely an announcement for the extinction of
religion. It includes the non-believers too to have a broader understanding going beyond mere
announcement of the decline of religion which bases itself on God. Let us analyze.
3.7.1 Death of God and Nihilism: As we have seen earlier, the first moment of evaluation of the
19th century Europe shows us to be confronted with nihilism. The announcement of ‘death of
God’ shows us the emptiness and the nihilistic elements of the society. Walter Kaufmann says
that Nietzsche represents himself to be the madman in the text. He says, ‘to have lost God means
madness; and when mankind will discover that it has lost God, universal madness will break
out.” The madman accuses the audience saying, “We have killed him”. That means now the
whole world looks baseless again. There is nothing beyond to ensure us comfort. Through this
announcement Nietzsche confronts us with the naked reality again trying to show how we feel
now without God. Kaufmann says, “That is an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary
civilization, not a metaphysical speculation about the ultimate reality.” Martin Heidegger
explains that “The statement ‘God is dead’ contains the realization that nothing is spreading.
Nothing means here: absence of Supersensory, binding world.”
 15

3.7.2 Death of God and Morality: The announcement of the ‘death of God’ devalues religion
and everything connected with religion. It is here we situate Nietzsche’s critique of religion as
essentially linked to morality. As ‘death of God’ contains three structural moments: an arrow
shot to devalue the Christian, Kantian and other foundations of morality. Christian morality has
its foundation in God. The Kantian foundation of morality is different at the start but at the end
with the postulation of God it becomes essentially related to Christianity. The utilitarian
principles keeping the morality of the community have a direct link with the herd (Christian
morality): the norm of altruism is nothing but the ‘love of neighbor’ – the central theme of
Christianity. Hence Nietzsche sees all morality to be related to Christian morality. Now the
proclamation of ‘death of God’ shakes the foundation of morality itself.
From 1880, Nietzsche begins his vehement attack on Christianity. The announcement of
the ‘death of God’ is to insist that the morality of Christianity can no more base itself on God. In
the text where the announcement is made, the madman says, “What after all are these churches
now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?” This reference is related to the death of a
Christian God. And thus the foundation of morality is shaken. R.J. Hollingdale’s explanation is
the following: the ‘death of God’ is intended to imply all that ever has been or ever could be
subsumed on the name of ‘God’ including all the substitutes of God, other worlds, ultimate
realities, things-in-themselves, nominal planes and the wills to live – the entire ‘metaphysical
need.’” That leads then to a world purposeless and hence morality has nothing to offer – a future
happiness or redemption or salvation. Hence Kantian morality too is doomed to be valueless.
We shall move to the utilitarianism. The same attitude of Christianity is seen to be
present outside of religion too. Nietzsche says, “Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy)
criticizes the origin of moral evaluations, but it believes them just as the Christian does.” The
utilitarian principle is nihilistic, because it has the conception of ‘good and evil’ of the priestly
class, of Christianity. By destroying the Christian values Nietzsche destroys that of the utilitarian
too. Hence the ‘death of God’ is not mere evaluation but it is the announcement of the denial of
God. For Nietzsche regards God “not as a mere error, but a ‘crime’ against life. We deny that
God is God. By denying God Nietzsche wants to ‘unearth’ the theological instincts wherever
they are present. So we conclude, by destroying the basis of the herd morality he destroys that of
the other foundations too. The ‘death of God,’ according to Nietzsche, urges us to be ‘true to
earth’ and reevaluate the whole of values. The ‘death of God’ breaks off with all that are illusory
and other worldly. It brings an end to the dualities.
3. 8 The Overman or Superman
The term ‘Overman’ (Übermensch) carries two meanings crucial to Nietzsche’s
revaluation of values. ‘Über’ signifies ‘over’ in the sense of height and self-transformation. It
suggests the elevation of mankind’s highest self into an experience of being that has no trace of
moralism or the fiction of free will. It can also suggest ‘across’ or ‘beyond’ and Nietzsche
employs this second resonance to characterize ‘man’ as a bridge we must pass across toward a
life free of resentment and negativity. The term is never applied to an individual, and Nietzsche
plainly considered neither himself nor Zarathustra, whom he often ridiculed, an Overman. The
transformation of man into Overman cannot take place without a ‘going-down’ or the destruction
of man’s reactive beliefs. The Overman is not the ‘end’ of mankind but a process that transforms
reactive values into the active affirmation of power.
3.8.1 Man and Overman: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra preaches the advent of the Overman.
Nietzsche proposes this word “As the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed
to ‘modern’ man, to ‘good’ man, to Christians and other nihilists.” This means that the Overman
is the possibility of a powerful human being of the future. In fact he is the goal of man. The
 16

present man of decadence needs to be overcome. Nietzsche explains: “What is the ape to man? A
laughing stock or a painful embarrassment.” And just so shall man be to the superman: a
laughing stock or painful embarrassment. It means that the man is an animal to be overcome by
the Overman as man has overcome the ape. The present man is expected to pave way for the
Overman, be like a bridge between animal and Superman.
3.8.2 Characteristics of Overman: If the Overman is the goal what are his characteristics? How
does he differ from present man? To answer these questions we shall use an image that
Nietzsche describes. One of the images that he uses to explain about the Overman is the image of
the sea. The present man is like a river that is contaminated. He is corrupt to the core. The
Overman is like a ‘sea’ to receive polluted water and not be defiled. The image shows that man
is nothing compared to the Overman and explains that any happenings or occurrences of life do
not defile the Overman. Whatever comes on his way, be it suffering, or pleasant occurrences, he
is not affected by the situation rather he affirms himself and establishes himself. He will be
beyond ‘good and evil.’ Overman is not only the embodiment of all the ardent affirmations of
life, but the fusion of all that is macho and beautiful. He will cast aside all aspirations towards
other worldliness and immerse himself joyfully in the creative task of here and now. Society will
and must produce superman, and production of genius is the aim of culture to which, all races
will contribute their blood and the body.
Nietzsche concludes that there is no meaning in life except that which a man gives and the aims
of most men have no surpassing dignity. To raise ourselves above the senseless flux, we must
cease being merely human, all-too human. We must be hard against ourselves and overcome
ourselves; we must become creators instead of remaining mere creatures. This dimension of
Overman takes us to the next concept, namely, ‘Eternal Recurrence.’ Though we do not discuss
it in a detailed manner, it has its own importance to be explained briefly.

UNIT 4
SIGMUND FREUD
4.1 Introduction

Sigmund Freud, the physiologist, medical doctor and father of psychoanalysis, is

generally recognized as one of the most influential and authoritative thinkers of the twentieth
century. He revolutionized the ideas on how human mind works and established the theory that
unconscious motives control much of human behavior. His work has helped millions of mentally
ill patients. His theories have brought new approaches in child rearing, education and sociology,
and have provided new themes for many authors and artists. Most people in Western society
view human behavior in Freudian terms.
4.2 Life
Sigmund Freud was born on 6th May, 1856 in a small town Frieberg, Moravia in Austria.
Being the first of their eight children and having a precocious intellect, his parents favored him
over other siblings from the early stages of his childhood. As Freud was a brilliant student he
joined the medical faculty in the University of Vienna. He received his medical degree in 1881
and worked as a medical doctor at Vienna General Hospital. In 1886 he married Martha Bernays
and had six children, the youngest of whom, Anna, was herself to become a distinguished
psychoanalyst. Freud emigrated to England just before World War II when Vienna became an
increasingly dangerous place for the Jews, especially for the ones as famous as Freud. After a
life
 17

of remarkable vigour and creative productivity, he died of cancer in England on 23rd September,
1939.
4.3 Works
“The Interpretation of Dreams”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, New York: Macmillan, 1953 (vols.4 & 5).
“Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, New York: Macmillan, 1953 (vol.7, pp. 123-245).
“The Unconscious”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, New York: Macmillan, 1953 (vol.14, pp. 159-216).
“Beyond the Pleasure Principles”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, New York: Macmillan, 1955 (vol.18, pp. 7-66).
“The Ego and the Id”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, New York: Macmillan, 1961 (vol.19, pp. 12-63).
4.4 The Psychosexual Stages of Development
The concept of psychosexual stages of development, as envisioned by Sigmund Freud is
the central element in his sexual drive theory. For him, the sex drive is the most important
motivating force in man, including children and even infants. Man’s capacity for orgasm or
sexuality is neurologically present from birth. Sexuality, for Freud, is not only intercourse, but
all pleasurable sensation from the skin. At different times in our lives, different parts of our
skin give us greatest pleasure. For example, an infant finds greatest pleasure in sucking,
especially at the breast. Freud had the making of psychosexual stages of development in man
with regard to pleasurable sensation. Each stage is characterized by the erogenous zone that is
the source of the libidinal drive during that stage. These stages are, in order: oral, anal, phallic,
latency and genital.
1. Oral stage (from the beginning of one’s life till (about) the 18 th
month): During this stage the gratifying activities are nursling, eating, as well as
mouth movement, including sucking, gumming biting and swallowing. Here, the
mothers’ breast is the only source of food and drink, which also represents her
love. In this stage, the gratification of needs will lead to the formation of
independence and trust.
2. Anal stage (from about 18th month till three or four years old): In this
stage, the focus of drive energy moves from the upper digestive tract to the
lower end and the anus. The gratifying activities are bowel movement and the
withholding of such movement. In this stage, children are taught when, where
and how excretion is appropriate by the society. Thus, children discover their
own ability to control and adjust such movements.
3. Phallic stage (from three or four years till the fifth or sixth year): Here
the gratification is focused on the genital fondling, but not in the form of adult
sexuality, since the children are physically immature. Children become
increasingly aware of their body and are curious about the bodies of other
children. This is probably the most challenging stage in a person’s psychosexual
development. The key event at this stage, according to Freud, is the child’s
feeling of attraction toward the parent of the opposite sex, together with envy
and fear of the same-sex parent.
 18

4. Latency stage (from five or six years old till puberty): During this
stage, sexual feelings are suppressed in children and for the sake of other aspects
of life, like learning, hobbies, adjusting to the social environment outside home,
forming beliefs and values, developing same-sex friendship, etc. Problems
however might occur during this stage on account of the inability of the child
(ego) to redirect the drive energy to activities accepted by the social
environment.
5. Genital stage (from puberty onwards until development stops, which
is ideally when adulthood starts): The gratifying activities during this stage are
masturbation and heterosexual relationships. This stage is marked by a renewed
sexual interest and desire without any fixation. It includes the formation of love
relationships and families, or acceptance of responsibilities associated with
adulthood. If people experience difficulties at this stage, it is because the damage

4.5 The Structural Model of Personality (Id, Ego and Superego)

According to Sigmund Freud, human personality has three aspects or structures, which
work together to produce all of our complex behaviors: the id, the ego and the superego. This
three-tier structure of human personality needs to be well-balanced in order to have good amount
of psychological energy available and to have reasonable mental health. The ego has a difficult
time dealing with the competing demands of the super ego and id. This conflict, according to
psychoanalytic view, is an intrinsic and pervasive part of human experience.
According to Freud, we are born with our id. The id is an important part of our
personality because as newborns, it allows us to get our basic needs met. It works in keeping
track with the pleasure principle, which can be understood as a demand to take care of needs
immediately with no consideration for the reality of the situation. It is focused on selfishness and
instant self-gratification. If you think about it, babies are not really considerate of their parent’s
wishes. At birth a baby’s mind is all id – want, want and want. They have no care for time, and
do not consider whether their parents are sleeping or relaxing. When the id wants something,
nothing else is important. Hence, the id functions in the irrational and emotional part of the mind.
The ego, unlike the id, functions according to the reality principle, which says “take care
of a need as soon as an appropriate object is found.” It deals with the demands of reality. The ego
is called the executive branch of personality because it uses reasoning to make decisions.
However, as the ego struggles to keep the id happy, it meets with obstacles in the world. The ego
understands that other people also have needs and desires and that sometimes being impulsive or
selfish can hurt us in the long run. Therefore, the ego functions with the rational part of the mind.
It realizes the need for compromise and negotiates between the id and the super ego. In other
words, the ego is the mediator between the id and the super ego, trying to ensure that the needs
of both the id and the super ego are satisfied. The ego’s job is to get the id’s pleasures met but by
being reasonable and bearing the long term consequences in mind. Therefore, the ego comprises
that organized part of the personality structure which includes defensive, perceptual, intellectual-
cognitive, and executive functions.
It is at this point that Freud introduces his concept of the ‘super ego’ – a term that has
since passed into everyday discourse. The super ego in the Freudian structure of personality is
the moral part of us and develops due to the moral and ethical restraints placed on us by our
caregivers. It takes into account whether something is right or wrong. The super ego can be
thought of as a type of conscience that punishes misbehavior with feelings of guilt (for example:
 19

having extra-marital affairs). It acts as the conscience, maintaining our sense of morality and
proscription from taboos. It tends to stand in opposition to the desires of the id because of their
conflicting objectives. It strives to act in a socially appropriate manner, whereas the id just wants
instant self-gratification. It helps us to fit into society by getting us to act in socially acceptable
ways.
In a healthy person, according to Freud, the ego is the strongest so that it can satisfy the
needs of the id and not upset the super ego, and still take into consideration the reality of every
situation. If the id gets too strong, impulse and self-gratification take over the person’s life. If the
super ego becomes too strong, the person would be driven by rigid morals and unbending in his
or her interactions with the world.
4.6 The Oedipus Crisis
Each psychosexual stage has certain difficult tasks associated with it where problems are
more likely to arise. For the oral stage, this is weaning. For the anal stage, it’s toilet training. For
the phallic stage, it is the oedipal crisis, named after the ancient Greek story of king Oedipus,
who killed his father and married his mother. According to Freud, the Oedipus complex is a
universal phenomenon and is responsible for much unconscious guilt. It is the attachment of the
child to the parent of the opposite sex, accompanied by envious and aggressive feelings toward
the parent of the same sex. These feelings are largely repressed (i.e., made unconscious) because
of the fear of displeasure or punishment by the parent of the same sex. And also Freud says that
these drives are derived from our primitive ancestry and are hidden within our subconscious.
Resolution of the Oedipus complex is believed to occur by identification with the parent
of the same sex and by the renunciation of sexual interest in the parent of the opposite sex. Freud
considered this complex to be the cornerstone of the superego and the nucleus of all human
relationships. Many psychiatrists, while acknowledging the significance of the Oedipal
relationships to personality development in our culture, ascribe love and attractions toward one
parent and hatred and antagonism toward the other not necessarily to sexual rivalry but to
resentment of parental authoritarian power.
4.7 Psychoanalytic Theory
Psychoanalysis is a body of ideas developed by Freud and continued by others. It is
primarily devoted to the study of human psychological functioning and behavior, although it also
can be applied to societies. Under the broad umbrella of psychoanalysis there are different
theoretical orientations regarding the underlying theory of understanding of human mental setup,
human development and human disorders. The various approaches in treatment called
“psychoanalytic” vary as much as the different theories. The most fundamental concept of
psychoanalysis is the notion of the unconscious mind as a reservoir for repressed memories of
traumatic events which continually influence conscious thought and behavior.
Freud’s account of the sexual genesis and nature of neurosis led him naturally to develop
a clinical treatment for treating human disorders. This has become so influential today that when
people speak of “psychoanalysis” they frequently refer exclusively to the clinical treatment;
however, the term properly designates both the clinical treatment and the theory which underlies
it. The aim of the method may be stated simply in general terms to re-establish a harmonious
relationship between the three elements (id, ego and super ego) which constitute the mind by
excavating and resolving unconscious repressed conflicts. Freud believed that the repressed
conflicts were buried in the deepest recesses of the unconscious mind. Here the unconscious does
not include all that is not conscious, rather only what is actively repressed from conscious
thought or what the person is averse to knowing consciously. In a sense this view places the self
 20

in relationship to their unconscious as an adversary, warring with itself to keep hidden what is
unconscious. The therapist is then a mediator trying to allow the unspoken or unspeakable to
reveal itself using the tools of psychoanalysis. Accordingly, he gets his patients to relax in a
position in which they are deprived of strong sensory stimulation, even of keen awareness of the
presence of the analyst, and then encourages them to speak freely and uninhibitedly, preferably
without forethought, in the belief that he can thereby discern the unconscious forces lying behind
what is said.
The process is necessarily a difficult and protracted one, and it is therefore one of the
primary tasks of the analyst to help the patient recognize and overcome his own natural
resistances, which may exhibit themselves as hostility towards the analyst. Freud always took the
occurrence of resistance as a sign that he was on the right track in his assessment of the
underlying unconscious causes of the patient’s condition. The correct interpretation of the
patient’s dreams, slips of tongue, free-associations and responses to carefully selected questions
lead the analyst to a point where he can locate the unconscious repressions producing the
neurotic symptoms, invariably in terms of the patient’s passage through the sexual
developmental process, the manner in which the conflicts implicit in this process were handled,
and the libidinal content of his family relationships. To effect a cure, he must facilitate the
patient himself to become conscious of unresolved conflicts buried in the deep recesses of the
unconscious mind, and to confront and engage with them directly.
Therefore, the object of psychoanalytic treatment may be said to be a form of self-
understanding, which once acquired, it is up to the patient, in consultation with the analyst, to
determine how he shall handle this newly-acquired understanding of the unconscious forces
which motivate him. One possibility is the channeling of the sexual energy into the achievement
of social, artistic and scientific goals. Another would be of suppression, that is to say, the
conscious and rational control of the formerly repressed drives.
Hence, Freudian psychoanalysis refers to a specific type of treatment in which the
analytic patient verbalizes thoughts, including free associations, fantasies and dreams, from
which the analyst formulates the unconscious conflicts causing the patient’s symptoms and
character problems, and interprets them for the patient to create insight for resolution of the
problems. Psychoanalytic treatment can clarify how patients unconsciously become their own
worst enemies: how unconscious and symbolic reactions that have been stimulated by experience
are causing symptoms of human disorder.
4.8 Theory of the Unconscious
The notion of an unconscious or subconscious has been defined in a variety of ways over
time, but in psychology it is considered to be the deepest level of consciousness, a part of which
we are not directly aware, but still contains elements that affect conscious behavior. For Freud,
the psyche is composed of different levels of consciousness, often defined in three parts as the
consciousness, pre-consciousness (which can be recalled with effort), and beneath both these, the
unconscious (which is beyond the reach of voluntary recall).
Freud didn’t exactly invent the idea of the conscious versus unconscious mind, but he
certainly was responsible for making it popular. The conscious mind is what you are aware of at
any particular moment, your present perceptions, memories, thoughts, fantasies, feelings, those
you have now. Working closely with the conscious mind is what Freud called the preconscious,
what we might today call “available memory”, anything that can easily be made conscious, the
memories you are not thinking about at the moment but can readily bring back to mind. Now one
 21

has a problem with these two layers of mind. But Freud suggested that these are the smallest
parts.
The largest part by far is the unconscious. It includes all the things that are not easily
available to awareness, including many things that have their origins there, such as our drives or
instincts, and things that are put there because we can’t bear to look at them, such as the
memories and emotions with trauma. According to Freud, the unconscious is the source of our
motivations, whether they be simple desires for food or sex, neurotic compulsions, or the
motives for an artist or scientist. And yet, we are often driven to deny or resist becoming
conscious of these motives, and they are often available to us only in disguised form.

PART II
EARLY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
UNIT 1
HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

1.1 Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl was born in Moravia (then in Austria, now part of
Czechoslovakia) on 8th April 1859, of Jewish parents. After finishing his basic schooling, he
joined the university of Leipzig and then university of Berlin, where he was trained under the
leading mathematicians of the time in rigorous and disciplined way of thinking. His interest was
gradually turned to philosophy. In Vienna he did his doctorate on: “Contributions to the theory of
Calculus of Variations.” It is in Vienna that he met and attended the lectures of Franz Brentano,
who impressed him by the way in which philosophy and science were linked. Husserl taught in
three universities. At the university of Halle (1887-1901) he was Assistant to Prof. Stumpf. Here
he published his Philosophy of Arithmetic and the first part of Logical Investigations. This period
corresponds to his pre-phenomenological phase. From 1901-16 he was at Göttingen as
extraordinary professor. Here he wrote Lectures on Phenomeno1ogy, Idea of Phenomenology
and Ideas-I. This period corresponds to the phenomenological phase. In 1916 he was called to
Freiburg as a full-fledged professor. Here he completed ldeas-II, First Philosophy,
Phenomenological Psychology and Cartesian Meditations etc. This period corresponds to that of
pure phenomenology. He died in 1938.
Before we launch ourselves into Husserlian phenomenology, it is good to have a pre-view
of phenomenological method. The term ‘phenomenology’ reminds us of Kant’s distinction
between phenomenon and noumenon. Husserl was opposed to the dualism of Kant. He agrees
that only phenomenon is given, but in it is given the very essence of that which is. When one has
described the phenomena, one has described all that can be described. But what is this
phenomenon, something purely objective, or purely subjective? It is neither of them, but Husserl
locates it in the reconciling of reality and thought. The history of philosophy is a series of
attempts at reconciliation. The difference in reconciling occurs due to the more or less emphasis
on the subjective or the objective. Husserlian phenomenology is an attempt at reconciling them;
but he too experienced in himself this difference of emphasis in his reconciling consciousness
and reality. Phenomenology is a return to the things themselves, as opposed to mental
constructions, illusions etc. The ‘thing’ is the direct object of consciousness in its purified form;
hence it is never arbitrary, being conditioned subjectively. The phenomenologist is convinced
 22

that an analysis of the things themselves can be made by a return to the pure consciousness.
Phenomenology, thus, is the methodical attempt to reach the phenomenon through an
investigation of the pure consciousness, the objective content of which is the phenomenon.
1.2 Fundamental Concepts
Husserl wanted his philosophy to have the scientific rigour and philosophical radicalism.
For the modern man scientific ideal is considered as the highest ideal. According to Husserl,
Philosophy, being the greatest of the sciences, should employ the ideal of rigorous science. This
does not mean that philosophy has to blindly imitate empirical sciences which deal with objects
as facts that are measurable. Philosophy is not factual, but ideal or essential (eidos = essence).
Philosophy can be a rigorous science, since it is possible to reach truly scientific knowledge of
ideal objects, or essences of things. When he speaks of scientific rigour, he had in mind the
deductive sciences like mathematics. Science for him is a system of knowledge wherein each
step is built upon its precedent in a necessary sequence. Such a rigorous connection requires
ultimate clarity in basic insights, and systematic order in building up further on them.
Although philosophy claims to be a rigorous science, it has never been so. It can become
a radical science by means of critical reflection and profound methodological investigations. For
this, it is necessary to have ultimate clarity and systematic order. Together with the scientific
rigour, Husserl craves for philosophical radicalism. It necessitates a return to the roots or
foundations of all knowledge. The ultimate foundation of all knowledge is to be found in the
things themselves, the original phenomena to which all our ideas refer ultimately. Going deeper
into the things, he was convinced that these roots must be sought in the very consciousness of the
knowing subject, to whom the phenomena appear.
1.3 Development of Husserlian Phenomenology
Historians of philosophy distinguish three periods in the development of Husserl’s
philosophy, and this distinction is based on the varying emphasis he placed on the subject or on
the object.
1.3.1 Pre-Phenomenological Period
This was the period of his philosophical infancy, during which he came to a slightly
greater emphasis on the ‘objective’. This was occasioned by certain events and persons. A
chance-listening to the lectures by Brentano aroused in Husserl interest in scientific psychology
and philosophy. Following Brentano, Husserl had given in his Philosophy of Arithmetic a
psychological foundation to the concept of number. It developed the idea that the concept of
number originated in consciousness as a result of the acts of connecting and collecting ‘contents
of consciousness’. Thus numbers are entirely of psychical nature. They have only an intentional
being. Gottlob Frege, in his review of this book, criticized it, saying that it was a form of
psychologism. Husserl took seriously the critique made by Frege. Hence in his Logical
Investigations part I, Husserl refuted psychologism. ‘Psychologism’ is the view that the
theoretical foundation of maths and logic is supplied by psychology, especially by psychology of
know1edge. According to this theory, the laws of mathematics and logic have existence and
validity only because they have occurred to some consciousness.
Thus, realizing his mistake, Husserl came to the conclusion, i.e., the untenability of
psychologism. In his critique he shows the absurdity of its consequences, and the prejudices on
which it is based. The axioms and principles of mathematics and logic are true, not because man
thinks of them, but valid in themselves. Besides, if logical laws are dependent on the
psycho1ogical characteristics of human thinkers, we make them relative to these thinkers.
 23

Psychologism is now seen as a form of skeptical relativism and anthropologism in philosophy.

Relativism is self-contradictory, as it denies the possibility of all knowledge, while asserting its
own truth. Mathematics is concerned with numbers, and not with the operation of counting them.
Two plus two is four, even if I do not know or think about it. The mathematical and logical
objects are ideal objects, and are beyond the limitations of time; whereas psychical acts are real
and temporal in nature. Ideal objects are what they are independently of our knowledge about
them. Thus during the pre-phenomenological period Husserl could not come to a clear
philosophical stand; rather he was looking for a place to stand as a phenomenologist, which he
was able to find during the phenomenological period.
1.3.2 Phenomenological Period
It is at this period that Husserl reached a philosophical maturity; and he achieved the
reconciliation between the subjective and the objective. He had to look for some reconciliation
since the problem posed itself as to how the ‘ideal’ objects are given to consciousness. He takes
up this task in Vol.1I of Logical Investigations. Some thought that it was a lapse into
‘psychologism’ rejected in Vol. I. He made use of the theory of ‘intentionality’ to work out this
reconciliation.
1.3.3 Intentionality Consciousness
In Vol.11 of Logical Investigations, Husserl holds that a separation between logic and
psychological phenomena is inadmissible and impossible. Ideal logical entities are given to us in
experiences. The relationship between the ‘ideal objects’ of pure logic and the subjective
experiences corresponding to them, illustrates an insight into what pervades whole of his
philosophy, i.e., ‘intentionality’. According to this, there is a parallelism between the subjective
act and the objective correlate. This parallelism forms the basis for a correlative investigation
under which both the aspects of any phenomenon are to be studied and described in conjunction.
To study one without the other would be an artificial abstraction. In Husserl’s terms this
parallelism came to be known as that between the ‘noetic’ (act) and ‘noematic (content). (Noesis
is abstract noun, and noema is concrete noun). His aim has been a reconciliation of the
objectivity of truth with the subjectivity of the act of knowledge.
The central insight in phenomenological analysis is the theory of intentionality. He owed
to Brentano for this theory. According to Brentano, all psychical phenomena intentionally
contain an object. Husserl objects to this conception of the immanence of the intentional object
to consciousness. For him intentionality means the directedness of the act of consciousness to
some object. This object is not immanent to the consciousness itself, but remains transcendent to
it. For phenomenology it is not of importance whether or not the object of consciousness actually
exists. The object is considered from a special point of view, namely as the objective correlate of
an intentional act. Thus for Husserl, intentionality means this: consciousness is directedness to an
object, as expressed in: conscious of…, joyful at…, desirous of….. etc. All ‘cogito’ contains a
‘cogitatum’. Husserl’s notion of intentionality can be clarified with the help of its four
characteristics.
1. Intentionality objectivates: It presents the given data in such a way that the
whole object is presented to our consciousness. The various acts of
consciousness are referred to the same intentional object. The sameness of the
object is compatible with the various ways of referring to it such as: love, doubt,
thought, which are the qualities of ‘intention’ as opposed to the object. When
one gives thought to one’s mother, it is the person of one’s mother that is
the objective
 24

correlate. It is not the fragmentary aspects, like the kindness or generosity of the
mother, but the mother as kind or generous is the objective correlate.
2. Intentionality identifies: It allows us to assign a variety of successive data to
the same referent of meaning. Without an identifying function, there would be
nothing but a stream of perceptions, similar but never identical. Intentionality
supplies the synthetic function by which the various aspects, perspectives and
stages of an object are all focused upon and integrated into the identical core.
For instance, the various intentional experiences of one’s mother do not take one
to different referents, but to the identical referent: one’s mother.
3. Intentionality connects: Each aspect of the identical object refers to the
related aspects, which form its horizon. An object is apprehended only within
the context, or horizon that consists of the possible apprehensions. The actual
intentional experience of an object does not stand in isolation, but links itself to
the other possible intentional experiences. To give an example from the real m
of sense experience: the frontal aspect of the statue refers to the lateral, and the
lateral to the rear. Because of this ‘connecting’ function are we able to perceive
the ‘statue’.
4. Intentionality constitutes: It constitutes the intentional object. The
intentional object is not conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the
intending act refers as something already given, but as something which
originates (is constituted) in the act. The snake as fearsome is constituted in the
act of one’s getting frightened.

Husserl, as a phenomenologist, is not interested in the object in itself, but in the

intentional object, constituted in the act consciousness. The intentional object is not immanent to
consciousness (as Brentano held), but transcendent to it.
1.3.4 Doctrine of Essence
The core of Husserl’s philosophy is the notion of essence, as the Husserlian
phenomenology tries to attain the knowledge of ‘essence’ of reality. Natural science begins with
experience and remains therein. They are sciences of facts. The world is not exhausted by ‘facts’,
having a spatio-temporal existence, as something existing here and now. Every individual being
is contingent, insofar as it is such and such, but essentially could be other than what it is. It
belongs to the meaning of every contingent thing and event to have an essential being, an eidos,
that can be apprehended in all its purity.
In order to come to the knowledge of essences, Husserl proceeds step by step. He
distinguishes between ordinary experience and transcendental experience or intuition. The first is
the accurate apprehension of the individual fact. In the ordinary experience, man finds himself as
a unique person, the empirical ego. The phenomenologist is not interested in the ordinary, but in
the transcendental experience, which is the essential intuition proper. In the transcendental
experience, one brackets all reference to existence. For the phenomenological reduction of
essences, Husserl proposes to use ‘inductive generalization’ and ‘imaginative variation’ that
enable one to eliminate the inessential features in order to come to the essential. Inductive
generalization is not anything typically phenomenological; it means nothing other than
universalizing from the various particular experiences. ‘Imaginative variation’ can be understood
only in the light of the Husserlian notion of ‘horizon’. An object is actually experienced or
 25

apprehended only within a setting or horizon, which is the context of the possible apprehensions.
It is by imaginative variation that one can move from the limitation of the actual perception to
the indeterminacy of what can be perceived. The horizon or the setting of the ‘can be perceived’
is the objective correlate of the ‘can perceive’ or the un-actualized capacity of the perceiver.
Thus by a varied and systematic process, Husserlian phenomenology claims to attain a ‘direct
essential insight’ or transcendental reduction into the pure eidetic sphere. The essence is the
objective content of my transcendentally reduced conscious experience. Looking at the object of
consciousness, I reach the essence by a method of variation. I can vary the various view-points.
The essence is what remains invariable when I vary the various view-points.
1.3.5 Eidetic Reduction
The act of grasping the essence has two aspects: one positive, and the other negative.
Eidetic reduction is the positive aspect. It is the gradual penetration into the purified essential
residue, gradually revealing the pure subjectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity.
Reduction to objectivity is one of the most difficult notions in Husserl, who has not clearly dealt
with it in his published works. In his Ideas, he makes a distinction between two types of
reductions that are complementary. They are eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction.
Eidetic reduction refers to the distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘essence’: factual (particular,
historical, existential) is converted into essential (ideal, universal and timeless). This is done by
keeping away the ‘this-ness’ or ‘suchness’ from the particular object. The transcendental
reduction refers to the distinction between the real and the non-real. Essences as the pure
noemata of pure consciousness are real, whether or not it is reduced from an existent or non-
existent object. Thus the intentional presence can be reduced from a situation of physical
absence. Husserl speaks of several levels of reduction, on each of which we have a subject of
greater purity. When the subject is at its purest form, we have the strict science of
phenomenology. Only when the subjectivity is absolutely pure, can it be the universal a priori
source of objectivity. To know the subjectivity that has the function of ‘constitution’ is to know
one, which is transcendentally related to the objects, i.e, intentionality.
1.3.6 Bracketing (Epoche)
Bracketing is the negative aspect in grasping the essence. It is the radical and universal
elimination of any aspect of factual existence. The factual or the existentia1 is kept in parenthesis
or in bracket. Things under consideration may have existence, but it has no significance
whatsoever with regard to the essence of things. Besides the elimination of ‘existence’, to
describe the phenomena correctly, the phenomenologist too must be free from all cultural and
philosophical bias. It requires an ascetic neutrality in one’s attitude to the phenomenon of one’s
awareness. Phenomenology deals with the insight into the essences, without regard to the
empirical conditions of their perceptibility, nor even their existence. It is not a question of
making it appear in its factual reality or in its existence, but in its intentional presence as
transcendent to consciousness. There is a similarity between Husserl’s epoché and Descartes’
methodological doubt. Descartes doubted everything; only the ego indubitably exists. In Husserl
the world is not doubted, but the judgements about it are suspended. The epoche demands that
the philosopher takes a distance from the various solutions, which in the course of history have
been proposed for different philosophical problems. It aims at eliminating the factuality, the root
of all ‘contingency’. Thus, during the ‘phenomenological period’ Husserl developed the
phenomenological method, and succeeded in reaching a reconciliation between the subjective
and the objective.
 26

1.3.7 Period of Pure Phenomenology

After having come to a more or less satisfactory method of phenomenology, Husserl
continued his philosophical thinking and reflection. This ended up in a transcendental (pure)
phenomenology. It is called ‘pure’ in order to differentiate it from other pseudo
phenomenologies. The distinction is based on the subject matter. The subject matter of pure
phenomenology is pure phenomena. The pure phenomena are reached by means of the pure
consciousness. Since the publication of Ideas, pure phenomenology goes by the name,
‘transcendental phenomenology’. In Ideas ‘transcendental’ meant that the phenomenologist
suspends all assertion about reality other than that of consciousness itself. Later on it meant,
reaching back to the ultimate source of all knowledge, the subjectivity. Emphasis on the pure
subjectivity as the source of all objectivity is the characteristic of this phase.
During the phase of pure phenomenology, Husserl speaks of a universal phenomenology,
conceived as the ultimate foundation of all knowledge. His intention was to achieve phenomena
in its pure and indubitable form; and for this he bracketed all accidental and incidental aspects,
all judgments and interpretations of reality. Husserl started his career with a cry for ‘scientific
philosophy’. Phenomenology claims to fulfill the need of a scientific philosophy with ultimate
clarity in basic insights and systematic order in building up on them. Such a philosophy must be
the foundation of all sciences. Since these are found realized in Husserl’s phenomenology, it
claims to be the ‘first philosophy’.
As Husserl moved more towards the subjective, his critics gave him the label of an
‘idealist’, which he hesitatingly accepted; but he insists that his ‘idealism’ must be distinguished
from the subjective idealism of Berkeley, that makes all being dependent on the psychological
consciousness. By contrast, Husserl ties up Being with the transcendentally reduced
consciousness. Being is nothing apart from the ‘meaning’ which it receives in the bestowing act
of consciousness. Husserl gives two arguments for his idealism: the self-contradictory nature of
realism, and the direct phenomenological evidence, supplied by the analysis of transcendental
constitution. According to him, Being, by its very meaning, refers us back to acts which assign
such being. In other words, being derives its meaning from consciousness. The idea of reality as
unrelated to consciousness is self-contradictory. The next argument is related to the first, i.e., the
doctrine of transcendental constitution. ‘Constitution’ does not refer to a static structure of an
object, but the dynamic process by which it is built up as an object. It is the intentional
consciousness that actively achieves this constitution. Objects exist for me only as objects of
consciousness. In his idealism, reality is extra-mental, but the meaning of reality is in the mind.
His philosophy is called ‘idealism’ also because it is a search into the eidos (essence, meaning).
It is transcendental idealism in the sense that the real world is reduced to its pure, transcendental
significance.
Towards the end of his career, Husserl gradually wanted to develop a phenomenological
philosophy by applying the method to some of the realities. In this context Husserl developed the
idea of a ‘life-world’—the world of our immediate experience in our everyday life, a world of
our concrete experience. The scientist conceals the world as our world. It is a vast domain of
subjective phenomena, as they are immediately experienced in all colours and practical meaning.
Sciences left out the subjective and the practical aspect of the world, and took only the objective
aspect. A life-world is to be conceived as an oriented world, with an experiencing self at its
centre, designated as such by personal pronouns. Thus the world becomes the one related to life
and to the humans, with his human values and aspirations. He tried to make a phenomenological
reflection on ‘time’ as well. The inner consciousness of time shows the following structure: a
primal impression of a streaming present, surrounded by a horizon of immediate retention of the
 27

past (to be distinguished from active recollection) and of immediate protention (to be
distinguished from active expectation). Describing retention, Husserl shows how the
consciousness of the present sinks off steadily below the surface, and becomes sedimented in
such a way that it is accessible only to acts of recollection. He has not given us any evidence of
an active ‘constitution’ of time, but only of a passive synthetic genesis.
Thirdly Husserl was forced to consider the ‘Other’, as he was criticized that
phenomenology is a purely solipsistic explanation of the intentional constitution. For, when
phenomenological reduction brackets, even the belief in the existence of the other subjects too is
suspended. In his Cartesian Meditations he shows the difficulty of transcendental ego
constituting other egos, as equal partners in an inter-subjective community. If the other subjects
are to be meaningful, they are to be constituted. But it is not possible, since if the constitution is
subjective, it is a constitution of one’s own self; if it is objective, others as subjects cannot be
constituted. This problem remains unsolved in his published works. For a phenomenological
evidence for the knowledge of others, Husserl makes use of ‘empathy’ giving his own
interpretation to it. It is a kind of intentional category, by which I experience another’s
experience. When we perceive a body other than our own, as there rather than here, we
apperceive it as the body of an ‘alter ego’ by way of an assimilative analogy with our own ego.
In this process, the analogizing ego and the analogized ‘alter ego’ are paired in a characteristic
‘coupling’. While the other ego is not accessible as directly as his body, it can be understood as a
modification of our own ‘pure ego’, by which we put ourselves into his, as if we were in his
place. The other egos are thus constituted as transcendental, and these form a community, and
thus communication is possible. Finally, he gives a thought about God in his phenomenological
structure. When Husserl started his philosophical career, although he was a Jew, he kept the
Bible away from him. For, he wanted to start a philosophy absolutely presuppositionless. He was
not much concerned about bringing God into his philosophy, nor was there a place for God in his
philosophy. His philosophy needed only intentional experience, subjectivity and objectivity.
Remaining a bit away from his philosophical method, God is placed in between the ego and the
world, who creatively constitutes the world, while my subjectivity meaningfully constitutes the
world. Since God is the absolutely absolute, he cannot be comprehended within the focus of my
ego.

UNIT 2
MARTIN HEIDEGGER
2.1 Heidegger’s Thought and
Life

Martin Heidegger is widely acclaimed as the most outstanding and creative philosopher
of 20th century, not merely for the novelty of his thought, but mainly for having brought
about a ‘revolution’ in Western philosophy. His thought has been so fundamental and pivotal,
that its influence is seen not only in the various branches of Western philosophy and the different
disciplines of knowledge, but it takes into its embrace both Eastern and Western way of
philosophizing. Besides, his philosophy is built on phenomenology and existentialism, and
has built up hermeneutics and postmodernism.
Heidegger was born at Meßkirch (South Germany) on 26 Sept. 1889 of Catholic parents.
His familial background of natural environment and agrarian community may have contributed
towards retaining an earthliness in his philosophy, preventing him to fly to the distant realms of
abstraction unrelated to concrete existence. He had the opportunity directly to get to know the
 28

phenomenological method developed by Husserl who had the single greatest influence on
Heidegger. From being a privatdozent at Freiburg, Heidegger was invited to the university
of Marburg, where he published his most famous work, Being and Time. Through this work
phenomenology got a new formulation, and he came to be known in the philosophical
world. At the retirement of Husserl, Heidegger was chosen to occupy the Chair of Philosophy in
1928. He died in 1976; and his life can be summed up in a sentence: "He was always a seeker,
and always on the way."
Heidegger has to his credit numerous works, most of which were published during his
life. Now all his works and lectures are being edited and published under the enormous
Gesamtausgabe which is expected to cover 57 volumes. The English translations of some of
the important works of Heidegger are the following: Being and Time; What Is Metaphysics?;
Basic Writings; Discourse on Thinking; Identity and Difference; On the Way to Language;
Poetry, Language and Thought; The Question of Technology and Other Essays; What Is Called
Thinking?; Basic Problems of Phenomenology; On Time and Being; etc.
2.2 Earlier Philosophy
2.2.1 Fundamental Ontology
The problem of Being, that has inspired the whole western philosophy, has
remained forgotten in the history of western philosophy. It was this 'forgottenness of Being'
(Seinsvergessenheit) which motivated Heidegger to launch a new thinking. His philosophy is
the most consistent attempt to break away from the traditional domination of Western
thought by the category of ‘substance’ or 'thinghood'. He carefully avoids falling into
the old error of reifying ‘Being’. Hence he says that Being (Sein) is to be differentiated
from entity (Seiendes). Since Being is the being of some entity. In order to clarify the
meaning of Being we must start with some entity. And he finds that Dasein—the
ontological term for man—is the privileged entity to start with, as it is gifted with an
ontological transcendence—its ability to go beyond the entities to their Being. Thus he
takes the analysis of Dasein as the point of departure to the clarification of the meaning of
Being in general. This project of looking into the meaning of Being from the perspective of the ontic
pole, Dasein, is called `fundamental ontology'.
To work out the question of Being, Heidegger proposes a twofold task: one positive, the
other negative. The positive task consists in the ontological analysis of Dasein in view of the
meaning of Being, and the negative task, in the destruction of the history of ontology.
The existential analysis of Dasein, according to Heidegger, must begin with an account of
Dasein in its everydayness, which will reveal ontologically significant structures, called
‘existentials’—essential ways of Dasein's Being. The existential analysis of Dasein brings
out ‘care' as its Being, leading to the primordial interpretation of its meaning as
temporality. With this we will have prepared the ground for the clarification of the
meaning of Being in general. By the ‘destruction of the history of ontology' Heidegger
intends to dig into the past to extract the primordial meaning of Being, frozen and petrified by
tradition. With this project in view Heidegger started his Being and Time, but in the midway of
his philosophical journey, he changed his approach, resulting in a Heidegger-II.
The method that Heidegger employs in his existential analysis of Dasein is
hermeneutical phenomenology. Phenomenology is associated with Husserl who developed it as
a method and gave it a systematic expression. Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl,
but departed from him radically by developing phenomenology into hermeneutical
 29

phenomenology. In Heidegger's Being and time the method of hermeneutical phenomenology

gradually unfolds itself.
2.2.2 Preliminary Analysis of Dasein
Heidegger begins with the analysis of Dasein in its everydayness, which shows itself
primarily as Being-in-the-world, which is the fundamental way of its Being. The various other
ways of its Being (existentials) refer to the ‘how' of its Being-in-the-world. Although 'Being-in-
the-world' is a unitary phenomenon, in the phenomenological language it consists of two
complementary aspects: ‘Being-in’ and ‘the world’. Heidegger clarifies that Dasein's relation
to the world is ontological, rather than epistemological. We shall consider ‘the world’ and
'Being-in' separately, in order to arrive at the being of Dasein.
Heidegger considers ‘world’ neither cosmologically as an objective entity, nor
epistemologically as the object of knowledge, nor theologically as opposed to God, but
ontologically as the horizon of Dasein's existence as Being-in-the-world. Since world is to be
seen in relation to Dasein, we can distinguish between the environmental and communal
world, according as Dasein relates itself to it.
Dasein's ordinary relation to the entities within the world can be either one of theoretical
cognition or one of practical dealings. According to Heidegger, the practical or existential
dealings are more basic than theoretical observation. In circumspective dealings the entities
show themselves as ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and in theoretical observation as present-at-hand
(vorhanden). Only in relation to some Dasein can an entity show itself as such a thing, and
in this relation entities show themselves as for the sake of Dasein. In Dasein's existential Being-
in-the-world it relates itself to the communal world of other Daseins. Dasein is essentially Being-
with (Mitsein), even in factual loneliness. As Being-with, Dasein is essentially for the sake of
others. Dasein, thus, is related to the environmental entities and communal entities (persons). Its
relation to the former is guided by `practical concern' (Besorgen) and to the latter, by ‘personal
concern' or solicitude (Fürsorge). World as the horizon or relation enables the humans to be
related environmentally and communally.
‘Being-in’ refers to Dasein’s disclosedness (Erschloßenheit). Dasein is disclosive in
three basic ways: as thrown, as projective and as falling. The inevitable and irrevocable character
of Dasein is its 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit). It is also called Dasein's ‘situationality’ or 'facticity'
(Fakticität). Situationality (Befindlichkeit) as an essential mode of disclosedness points to the
facticity of Dasein. Dasein discloses itself also projecting or understanding, which pertains to
Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen) in the world. It refers to Dasein’s choosing of
possibilities. The projective character of Dasein represents more of the active dimension of
disclosedness. In its everydayness Dasein shows itself to be `falling' from its ownmost self.
Instead of revealing the unique self that Dasein is, it tends to be the `one', the `they' (das
Man). As thrown, projecting and falling, Dasein is its 'there'—its disclosedness; and it is the
way Dasein is essentially.
The analysis of Dasein in its everydayness that began with its basic state (being-in- the-
world) culminates itself in ‘care', the unity and Being of Dasein in its everydayness. The unifying
notion of care consists of its three structural constituents: existentiality, facticity and
fallenness. Care stands for the existential totality of Dasin's ontological structural whole. It is
because Dasein's Being is ‘care' (Sorge) that it can relate itself to things by concern (Besorgen)
and to persons by solicitude (Fürsorge). In the phenomenon of care we have arrived at the
peak-point of the existential analysis of Dasein in its everydayness.
 30

2.2.3Primordial Interpretation
In order to make the ontological analysis more primordial, the hermeneutical
situation or the fore-structure of Dasein has to be considered. Clarification of the fore-structure
implies that we bring into our consideration the whole of Dasein, and in what way it can be
authentic. These hitherto lacked aspects of totality and authenticity of Dasein are unfolded on a
two-level interpretation: on ontological and ontic levels in the analysis of death and
conscience respectively.
As long as it is, there is in Dasein something ahead-of-itself, some not-yet. The
ultimate not-yet of Dasein is its death. Once the not-yet is no more, there is no more a Dasein.
Death as the 'not-yet' is already always present as soon as and as long as Dasein is. Dasein faces
death as a possibility which is its ultimate, exclusive, inevitable, most certain, and uncertain
regarding, making it a constant certainty. Death is inauthentically considered as an occurrence
of a moment in the distant future. Dasein's authentic Being-towards-death is `anticipation'. In
the anticipation of death we have the ontological characterization of Dasein's totality and
authenticity: totality, because anticipation refers to Dasein's total Being, and authenticity,
because it refers to Dasein's genuine (authentic) Being, permeated with finitude.
Heidegger shows, through the analysis of conscience, as to how the ontological
possibility of Dasein’s totality and authenticity becomes ontically concrete. Conscience is
presented as a ‘call’ addressed to Dasein to come back to its own self—to its total and
authentic Being. The call of conscience comes from itself, is addressed to itself and is a
summons to be itself—a call from itself to itself to be itself. The call points to Dasein's
ontological Being-guilty—the permeating nullity (Nichtigkeit) of Dasein. The authentic
response by Dasein to the presence of nullity in its Being is its ‘resoluteness’
(Entschlossenheit). It is in this context that the radical finitude of Dasein is presented by
Heidegger.
As constantly faced with its ultimate possibility and ultimate facticity, Dasein is
confronted with the constant and closest presence of the ‘not’ in its Being. What Dasein
authentically projects towards is that into which it has already been irrevocably thrown. The
ultimate possibility and facticity of Dasein—the boundary-line—encircle and demarcate its
wholeness, which is but its limit situation. Dasein's finitude is nothing but its permeating
presence of the limit in its Being. Thus the Being of Dasein, as total, and authentic, is radically
finite.
The question that arises now is this: what enables Dasein to exist as anticipatory
resoluteness? The answer will provide the meaning of its finite Being. Heidegger shows that
temporality is the meaning and ground of Dasein's finite Being, and temporality is concretized in
historicality. Dasein, as existence, is ecstatic—standing out. It stands out into its possibility by coming
towards itself, it stands out into its facticity insofar as its ‘coming towards' is a `coming
back' to itself. This two-fold standing-out is a standing out into the present, into its limit-
situation. This three-fold standing-out is the single process of temporalizing. By appropriating
the ultimate ahead and the ultimate already, Dasein authentically exists. In such a notion of
temporality, the future is already present, the past is still present, as different from the ‘not
yet’ and ‘no more’ of the objective conception. Historicality belongs essentially to
temporality. Just as primordial time cannot be taken as a linear succession of 'nows', so also
historicality cannot be taken as a record or dead deposit of the past events. Dasein historizes by a
choosing and living of the existential possibilities. Such a choosing is not a fragmented
happening, but a single stretching out. The possibilities are rooted in the past (already), though
projected to the future (the ahead). In historizing, Dasein repeats (reclaims) its inherited
 31

possibilities. Historizing Dasein sees the past consisting, not of dead factualities, but of
repeatable possibilities. Gandhiji's life of ahimsa and satya emits possibilities to be reclaimed,
rather than dead ideas to be reflected upon. History has thus primarily a futural character, as
it has to do with possibilities.
2.3 Later Philosophy
After having published Being and Time in its present form, Heidegger could not
continue in the same line of thought, as there was a ‘turn’ in his thought.
2.3.1 The ‘Turn’ and his Critique of Western Metaphysics
The forgottenness of Being in the history of philosophy inspired Heidegger to think
the question of Being anew. But the way he carried it out in his Being and Time was still
contaminated by the metaphysical tradition that represents entities in their Being, relating them
to transcendental subjectivity. In his changed vision, Being is not clarified in its relation to
man, rather man is looked at in the light of Being. Thus the change from the transcendental
inquiry of Being from the perspective of the human being to an authentic thinking of Being as
the happening of truth is the so-called ‘turn' in Heidegger.
Metaphysical thinking begins with Plato and Aristotle, culminates itself in German
idealism, and becomes complete in Nietzsche. This monolithic growth is characterized by its
forgetfulness of Being, since it remained, ever since its inception, onto-theological in
character. Instead of considering 'Being' metaphysics has been considering the ‘unity' of
entities in its universality and ultimacy. Insofar as metaphysics considers the unity of
entities in their abstracted universal trait, beingness, it is ontology. Insofar as it looks into the
unity of entities as grounded in the highest entity, God, it is theology. Onto-theo-logical tendency
of metaphysics was kept nurtured during the two millennia, reaching upto Nietzsche. With
modem philosophy, metaphysics became epistemology with the emphasis on subject-object
polarity. Man becomes the arbiter of truth. This reached the climax in the absolute idealism
of Hegel. The extreme expression of human domination over Being is modem technology. The
scientific attitude of representation and objectification becomes one of manipulation of reality for
total power by the technological man.
2.3.2 Thinking of Being
In characterizing the 'thinking of Being' (Seinsdenken) Heidegger moves into a
language that is more poetic and less metaphysical in character. Thinking comes to pass in
the belonging together of Being and man, as a call and as a response. It is to be specially noted
that thinking here is not an intellectual activity as in metaphysical thinking.
Heidegger explains in a variety of ways that Being presences or un-conceals itself to the
receptive humans finitely. In the various explanations, the following seems to be the most
important, as it brings Being and time together. In order to clarify the presencing of Being,
Heidegger exploits an impersonal verb like ‘it rains’, which refers to the subject-less ‘activity of
raining’. Being, thus, is not the subject, but the activity of presencing or un-concealing. There is a
‘giving' only insofar as there is a ‘given' (gift) and a ‘receiver'. Hence to be complete in its
meaning we must say: Being is the giving itself in the entities to the humans. In the history of
metaphysics Being has been considered as the given or the gift, that is, the entity. But the giving
of the gift was not given thought to. The un-concealing of Being takes place in the mode of
time. When Being was thought as presence, an ‘idea' without any reference to time, it
showed itself as a static, eternal and infinite presence. The time-character speaks for its finite
presencing. As mentioned above, the presencing of Being takes place only insofar as there is a
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receiving from the part of the humans. Heidegger characterizes the openness or receptivity from
the part of man variously as dwelling, releasement, shepherding, listening, thanking, responding,
gathering, seeing, etc. Heidegger finds that poets, mystics and thinkers listen to the voice of
Being. For them the greatest wonder is: that something is! They see the coming-to-be of
entities, the process of un-concealment.
After having considered Being as historical presencing and man as receptive opening,
Heidegger takes his thought to a higher realm—the event of appropriation or ‘event-ing’
(Ereignis), and towards the fag end of his thinking, he preferred to use the term, Ereignis,
instead of the metaphysically saturated term, Being. Event-ing shows itself as the ‘difference'
between Being and entities, the difference between the verbal and the nominal sense of
Being, the difference between concealing and revealing. This difference is the coming-to-be of
entities, the process of 'un-concealment'.
2.3.3 The Divine
Despite Heidegger's strong resolve to keep his philosophical thinking free from
theological contamination, the question of God crept into his thought especially at its later
phase. Heidegger’s thinking of the Divine has to be seen in togetherness with his critique of
the metaphysical conception of God, which is but a corollary to his critique of Western
metaphysics. With the adoption of Greek philosophy by Christianity, the metaphysical notion of
God found a fertile soil. The two-world doctrine of Plato got baptized as the theory of the
natural and the supernatural realms. God is confined to the supernatural realm, and is
superimposed with metaphysical attributes of superlative degree. Thus ‘God’ was reduced to an
object of human estimation. Metaphysics thus nurtures a pseudo-God, a product of human
representation in the innumerable theological books. Aligning himself with the Nietzschean
proclamation of the death of God, Heidegger shows the caricature of the metaphysical God.
In keeping with his way of thinking Heidegger does not take us to a concept of God, but
directs our thought to the presencing (Wesen, Being) of the Divine—a much preferred term than
the metaphysically pregnant term, God. The Divine can be thought only in the light of the
truth of Being. As Being is thought as a process of presencing and absencing, so also the
Divine presencing is marked by absencing. Heidegger speaks of the absencing of the Divine
in terms such as ‘flight of gods', ‘destitute time', `darkening of the world, etc. The divine
absencing is a mode of presencing. The world's night of the Divine absence is to be taken as
the Holy Night of Divine presence. The divine presencing is very much ‘worldly' and
‘historical'. This is in clear contrast to the metaphysical God as the ‘absolute other' secured in a
supra-sensory realm, untouched by time and space. Authentic thinking of Being is at the same
time a thinking of the Divine. When one's disposition is more receptive, one's wondering at the
coming-to-be of things is an experiencing of the presencing of the Divine. Heideggerian
thinking of the Divine is a cosmic thinking beyond the distinction between philosophy and
theology, and beyond the barriers of religions and cultures. In the eminently purified disposition
of receptive thinking, the Divine gives itself to be thought; and this open disposition is
authentic thinking, primordial poetizing, aesthetic contemplation and genuine mysticism.
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UNIT 3
THEISTIC EXISTENTIALISTS
3.1 Introduction
Existentialism got developed in the 20th century in continental Europe. Although it is
primarily a philosophical movement, we can find its ‘roots’ and ‘branches’ (basis and influence)
in various fields. Traditional philosophy did not bother about the problem of concrete existence,
like death, love, despair, body, finitude, anxiety, hope, etc. Man became more and more aware of
his naked existence, and he could not get away to an ideal and abstract realm. In such a situation
Existentialism made its appearance not as a stroke of chance but of necessity. The luxury of
philosophizing was not limited to the few arm-chair philosophers; existentialism brought
philosophy to the appeal of the ordinary man. Existentialism is an elusive notion, escaping all
definitions. It is not a system of philosophy, rather a way of philosophizing. It is a type of
philosophizing that looks into human existence, calling the individuals to an awareness of their
existence in its essential freedom. Existentialism, instead of retreating to a realm of eternal
truths, hugs close to the terrain of ordinary living.
No rigid classification of existentialists is possible. All the same, historians, in spite of
the fact that some of the existentialists cannot be placed in any of these two groups, divide the
existentialists into two groups: theistic existentialists who admit the existence of God in their
philosophy, and atheistic existentialists who deny the existence of God. Although existentialism
traces its origins to the strongly theistic Christian polemics of Kierkegaard—what it means to be
a Christian—the atheistic stance of Sartre and Camus has become more popular, and
existentialism got identified mostly with their philosophy. We shall consider from each group
two representative thinkers; and in this Unit we focus our attention on the philosophies of
Kiekegaard and Marcel.
3.2 Soren Kierkegaard
3.2.1 The Background: Personal Life and Western Tradition
Soren Kierkegaard was born in Kopenhagen in 1813 in a wealthy family of extreme
religious views. He was physically frail and melancholic in temperament. A gloomy atmosphere
of religiosity prevailed in the house. A philosophically important event in his life was a love
affair he had with Regina Olsen. Although they were engaged, he experienced the difficulty of
making a choice for her as his life-partner. He was not sure whether he, with his temperament,
would be able to live with her as a family; and thus he experienced the struggle of decision.
Kierkegaard also experienced gossip from the society, which made him withdraw more to
himself away from the society. In his mature years he turned to Religion, different from the
existing stereotyped and rationalistic one. He lived a lonely life, died a lonely death in 1855.
Some of the important works of his are the following: Either/or, Fear and Trembling, Concept of
Dread, Stages on Lfe’s Way, etc.
Kierkegaard’s personal life and his philosophy cannot be separated. His philosophical
problem arose from some of the touching experiences of his life. Thus his philosophy is a
reflection and universalization based on his personal experience. The struggle of choice, the call
to be an individual, the need to be distanced from the anonymous crowd, the yearning for a
genuine Religion and God of personal commitment and choice, etc., are some of the personally
experienced themes that prominently reflected in his philosophy. Thus in his philosophical
thoughts, one who speaks is the ‘actor’, rather than the ‘spectator’. He calls himself a subjective
thinker rather than an objective theorist. His philosophy is incidental to his main purpose,
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namely, the search as to what it means to be a human being? What it means to be a Christian?
The questions are presented in the form of alternatives for his choice, rather than for an
intellectual solution. Thus his philosophy is very much centred on choice or decision.
Kierkegaard found that both western philosophy and Christian Religion were engaged in
making life easy and comfortable by abstract thinking and superficial living, as both were
centred on reason. Kierkegaard did not want religion and philosophy to be matters to be
intellectually known, but to be lived personally by a choice. Just as Socrates who disturbed the
conscience of the Athenians by making them aware of their ignorance through his questioning
approach, Kierkegaard found it his duty to disturb the easy conscience of an age that was smug
in the conviction of its own material progress and intellectual enlightenment. He would be the
modern Christian ‘gadfly’ who would make people think regarding their individual Christian
existence. In opposition to Hegel who was the main spokesman for the universal and the rational,
Kierkegaard stood for his exaltation of the individual existence.
3.2.2 Existence: the Whence and the Whither of Philosophizing
Philosophy has to start with existence which is not to be proved from reason, and thus it
is the whence of philosophizing. Thinking has to begin from existence, since it is a response to
the irruption of existence in our subjectivity. Hence, unlike Descartes, he holds that ‘one exists
and thinks’ as a single personal enity. Existence is an indubitable truth. It is the attainment of
self-possession in the self-directed life of the individual. To exist is not merely to be or to live. It
is in choosing one’s true self that one exists. Those who persist through life do not necessarily
exist; they drift along without becoming individuals. Thus existence has to be won by choice. It
means thus to become an individual.
The philosophy of Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of the individual. His
excessive emphasis on individuality is negatively influenced by Hegel’s excessive universalism.
Man has the tendency to escape in the ‘crowd’, just as Adam under evil conscience tried to hide
himself among the trees. Man today is lost in the crowd, and are at a loss without the crowd.
Kierkegaard wants to deliver the human being from the crowd and make him aware of himself as
the centre of responsibilities. When one sinks into the crowd, one becomes demoralized by
evading responsibilities. It is only by a choice that man can deliver himself from the crowd, and
become an individual. Man truly can exist only insofar as he becomes an individual. Kierkegaard
challenges man to this end. Looking at the whole of his philosophy, we notice that we have to
start philosophizing from existence; and we have to move towards existence, insofar as his
philosophy is nothing but keeping on growing in our existence. Thus existence is not only the
whence, but the whither of philosophizing as well.
3.2.3 The Three Stages of Existence
The three stages of existence, that Kierkegaard speaks of, had its basis in his life. By his
personal choice he moved from a life of sensuality to ethical integrity, and thence to a life of
religious commitment. That was the picture of the journey of his life. Hegel’s dialectics and
Kierkegaard’s three stages have similarities and dissimilarities. Both speak of a movement
through three stages. But they are very much different. According to Hegel, the process takes
place in the universal (humanity), for Kierkegaard it takes place in the individual. In the former
case the movement takes place necessarily and logically (dialectical process), in the latter, by a
personal choice. If one does not make a choice one will continue to remain in the same stage.
Once a choice is made for the higher stage, the dethroned stage does not disappear fully;
according to Kierkegaard, the lower can be incorporated into the higher.
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1. Aesthetic Stage (The Stage of the lone individual): This stage is

characterized by an attitude in which one has no continuity or commitment in
one’s life. It is called the Don Juan stage, which includes not merely a life of
sensuality, but an attitude of not wanting anything ‘fixed’, and of desiring to taste
all experiences. The man of this stage wants to sample the nectar from every
flower. The man in this stage is governed by sense-impulse and emotion; he hates
all that limits his field of choice. There is no constancy in his life, as he lives for
the moment. There is nothing for him to cling or relate himself to: neither to God
nor to other people, nor again to the past or to the future. Thus it is a stage of the
lone individual.
2. Ethical Stage (the stage of the individual and society): This stage is
marked by some constancy and consistency since man in this stage makes a
choice for a determinate moral standard. He turns away from the lure and glamour
of aesthetic stage, and decides to ‘settle down’ in life with its obligations. The
presence of the other or the society has an influence on him. The shapeless
individualism is changed, and he is able to relate himself to the past and the
future, as a result of which there is a continuity in his life. By being ethical, one
misses the category of the ‘exceptional’: i.e., being a ‘saint’ or a ‘sinner’. Holding
fast to a moral standard, one is protected from deviating to be a sinner and to be a
saint. Socrates is given as an example for the ‘ethical man’. In this stage my
individual fancies are subordinated to the social and the legal. Life gets a
rootedness and a shape.
3. Religious Stage (the stage of the individual before God). From one’s
commitment to the impersonal law, man takes a leap to a personal Absolute. Only
in this stage the sense of sin makes its presence. A wrong behaviour is not merely
a violation of law; rather it is expressive of man’s option against God. Man attains
the genuine selfhood as he makes a leap of faith, a leap into the dark. In this leap
as long as one believes, one is carried along; as long as one despairs one sinks.
The more man accepts his weakness, the stronger will be the presence of God in
him. The leap of faith—the choice to move away from the ethical stage—cuts
across the ethical demands, as it is evident in the case of Abraham’s preparedness
to sacrifice his son at God’s demand. Only one who has been faithful to the
ethical laws can transcend them in the religious stage. This stage is characterized
by essential suffering, fear and trembling, guilt and dread.
3.2.4 The Philosophy of Leap: Faith and Truth
Kierkegaard’s is a philosophy of choice or leap, the structure of which remains
basically the same. But it can be best explained in relation to man’s leap to the Absolute. The
central problem in Kierkegaard’s philosophy has been the question as to how to be a Christian.
Thus he reflected on the relationship between God and man. The existence of God is an
indubitable fact for him. As God is infinite, there is an impassable gulf between God and man
who is finite. Bridging this gulf is not possible with rational systems, but only with a leap of faith
—not with a theory of knowledge, but with an act of commitment or choice. Such a leap is a self
commitment to the ‘objective uncertainty’, a leap into the unknown. Man is as though sitting on
a precipice, with an attraction and repulsion to take the leap—repulsion because of the objective
uncertainty, and attraction because of the subjective certainty. He is in a situation of dread,
wherein attraction and repulsion, sympathy and antipathy, are interwoven. Dread is the struggle
of choice, the alarming possibility of freedom! Faith as the leap links the objective
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uncertainty and subjective certainty. Such a leap is a venture, a challenge, which I have to
struggle to make. Faith is both a gift and a choice; a gift, as man is given the capacity to make
the choice; a choice, as it has to be appropriated by oneself.
The truth to which I commit myself by a leap of faith is not same as the objective truth of
creed or belief, as Religion is not a system of intellectual propositions to which a believer
assents. We ordinarily speak of ‘objective truth’, the knowledge of which is highly impersonal.
For example, two + two = four. Once I know it, I know it; I do not have to make it my own
constantly. Kierkegaard doesn’t deny the validity of such truths. But he gives priority to the
existential truth or truth as subjectivity. It is that on which I stake my whole being. It is so
important for me; still I can doubt it. If I accept it, I do so with a passionate self commitment. I
make a choice for it. It is in a sense my truth. I have to renew such truth constantly to make it my
own. To hold to such a truth is a venture, which chooses an objective uncertainty. I make a
choice for the existential truths, and I have to maintain them as it were over a fathomless sea by
the passionate appropriation of the objectively uncertain. Thus, Kierkegaard reiterates the
centrality of ‘choice’ in faith and truth, in religion and life.
3.3 Martin Buber (1878-1965)
Martin Buber was born in 1878 in Vienna and had most of his studies there. But in 1923
he went to Frankfurt in Germany to teach Jewish History in the university. In 1933, he was
deprived of his post by the Nazis, but he bravely continued to remain in Germany. In 1938, he
went to Palestine to be the professor of Sociology at the Hebrew university of Jerusalem. At the
age of 73, he retired from his post. He died in 1965.
3.3.1 Important works
I and Thou; Between man and Man; Eclipse of God; Good and Evil etc.
3.3.2 Basic Intution of Buber’s Thought
The most basic intuition of Buber’s works is the approach to everything that he teaches
is the realization that there are two ways of approaching any reality, be it a thing, an animal or a
person. The first is an ‘I-thou’ relationship and the second is an ‘I-It ‘relationship. The I-thou
relationship is the only thing that can heal the ravages perpetrated by the two great errors of our
time namely, individualism and collectivism. Both these have ruined man. Individualism relates
man only to himself, makes man isolated, makes him a monad which is not bound to others and
to glorify oneself as an individual. Solitariness leads to despair. Instead of accepting this tragedy,
man tries to glorify individualism.
On the other hand, in a collectivity, man is not man. It promises or tries to give him
security and takes care of his needs, but prevents him from communing with other human beings.
It only succeeds in neutralizing, devaluating, reducing every bond with living beings. To heal
this we need a personal approach to man and a a community approach to society. A community
is not given by a collectivity which only bundles men together but does not bind them. We must
smash the false alternative, either individualism or collectivism. There is a third alternative
which represents the true relation of man with man, where the individual knows the other in all
his otherness as himself as man. This is the ‘between’, the genuine community which has to be
recreated every time two human beings meet. This is only possible when they treat each other
with a I-thou relationship and not with a I-it relationship.
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3.3.3 I and Thou

With persons we should have always an I-thou relationship. The person should always be
a thou that addresses me and to whose address I respond. Things are handled and watched, but
human beings are spoken to or addressed to. But the great tragedy is that we can reduce persons
to things by viewing them as mere material things. By this a person is no more a ‘thou’, but
reduced to an ‘it’ and my relationship with that person becomes a mere ‘I-It’ relationship.
I-It is no genuine relationship because I remain outside the relationship. I gaze at the
other person, I view him from every direction somewhat as a thing to be bought. But when I treat
him as a man, my view is different. Here I engage myself in a genuine inter-personal
relationship with the other. I concentrate my total being on the interest and needs of the other. In
the I-thou relationship, the other is not one more thing in the universe. The following are the
main differences between I-thou relationship and I-It relationship.
1. In the I-thou relationship one’s whole being is involved and one meets the whole
person of the other. In the I-It relationship, we generally keep part of ourselves uninvolved.
There is always a part in I-It relationship that remains outside the encounter. We stand aloof and
view everything from a vantage point. On the contrary, in the I-thou relationship, our whole
being must be involved. This means that I-thou relationship carries with it much greater risk than
the I-It relationship since there is no withholding of any part of self in the I-thou relationship.
2. The I-thou world is present. The I-It world is only of the past. When we have an I-It
relationship, I am treating him as a thing. We are thinking what he has been than what he is to
me now in this moment of encounter. Hence in the I-thou relationship we completely break with
the past. Therefore, the present moment is one of genuine novelty to me. In the I-thou
relationship we are genuinely living in the present because we are prepared for any response or
reaction to our address, the unexpected or the expected. This attitude alone will lead us to
genuine listening.
3.The I-thou relationship is direct. The thou is not a means to an end, but an end in itself.
Hence no mediation of sense, idea or fancy is necessary.
4. The I-thou relationship demands the sacrificing of other possibilities to this
relationship. The thou must be encountered in its ‘wholeness’.
5. The I-It relationship is related more to the Eros and I-thou to Agape. The former
concerns itself with the sensible and the sensual.
6. In the I-It relationship, there is no necessary involvement or obligation. The I-thou
involves genuine responsibility. There is mutual obligation, pledge, binding and loyalty. The
world of the I-thou relation thus involves an openness, a wholeness and directness. All its
relations presuppose an authentic love with an accompanying responsibility. Man has become a
mere number or a chart. He has actually become a commodity to be exploited by modern
industry, politics or technology. There is little place for his personal initiative and creativity in
any one of these spheres.
3.3.4 The Concept of God
God is the Absolute thou. He alone can in no way be reduced to a thing, to a bundle of
qualities. Yet sometimes we try to establish an I-It relationship with God with our utilitarian
prayers and devotions. Buber says that God can be found only through the Other. God is the
foundation and basis for all I-thou relationship.
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3.3.5 Conclusion
Buber’s insight has fine applications to counselling and psychotherapy. We should not go
to advise others taking with us the a priori ideas of our ‘school of thought’ or books and size up
a man even before he opens his mouth. Buber has beautiful applications of this to states in which
people have to live in a community. Speech is a vehicle. But speechless communion sometimes
may be higher. We can enter into an I-thou relationship even with animals and things.
3.4 Gabriel Marcel
Among the theistic existentialists, Gabriel Marcel occupies an important place.
3.4.1 Experiential Background to His Philosophy
Gabriel Marcel was born in 1889 in a Catholic family; his mother died when he was just
four years old. Thereafter he was brought up by his aunt, who became his step-mother. He
experienced an a-religious attitude in the family. After his secondary schooling, he was awarded
a fellowship in philosophy by Sorbonne-university. He taught philosophy in different places.
During the First World War, he served as a Red-Cross official. In the second half of his life, he
began to move closer to religion, especially Catholicism. Thereafter his life was a journey of
thought and commitment. Some of the important works of his are the following: Metaphysical
Journal, The Mystery of Being, Being and Having, Homo Viator, etc. In 1973 Gabriel Marcel
died at the age of eighty-three.
Certain experiences in his life stand out in contributing towards his thought: (1) the
difference of temperament made him realize that some of the incompatibilities of life cannot be
reconciled by intellectual formulae. People cannot be regimented into a group, without
consideration of their uniqueness. 2) The spiritual aridity at home set him forth on a spiritual
quest that culminated in his faith in God. He did not inherit a religion of passionate commitment,
and this absence set him forth towards a genuine religion. 3) His mother’s early death made him
develop a phenomenology of presence from his experience of physical absence of his mother. 4)
His experience at the war-field took him away from abstract dialectics to anxious meditations on
life and being. He started reflecting on life and death, personal relations and encounters, pain and
suffering. In the light of these experiences, he looked at the prevalent academic life, which he
found to be very dissatisfying, since it has been stifling all creativity. Thus he began his own
philosophical reflection.
3.4.2Twofold Approach to Reality
Marcel, before he begins his philosophizing, looks into the two ways of looking at reality:
the way reality has been looked at traditionally, and the new way that he proposes in his
philosophy. This new ‘way’ is not exclusively of Marcel, but that which emerged with
existentialism. But Marcel has given a precise expression to it, by showing the contrast with the
traditional approach. First of all, he makes a distinction between the primary and the secondary
reflection. The primary reflection is analytical and dissective, and it has a place in scientific
research. It looks at the reality, part by part. The reflecting subject here is an ‘impersonal
anyone’; and here the subject-object dichotomy is maintained. The secondary reflection, on the
other hand, is synthetical and recuperative; it takes a holistic approach. This has greater role to
play in philosophy. Another corresponding distinction that Marcel makes is that between
problem and mystery. The object of scientific knowledge is ‘problem’ and of philosophical
reflection is ‘mystery’. Problems are open to solution. Once the solution is reached, the problem
is no more. For the problems I am an epistemological subject, grappling with an object as a
problem. The mystery is a question in which the being of the questioner is involved. No solution
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is aimed at in a mystery. I cannot stand apart from the mystery; it is in me, and I am in it. The
third distinction that Marcel makes is that between ‘being’ and ‘having’. The mystery deals with
being, and the problem with having. In ‘having’ the relation between the possessor and the
possessed, between the ‘who’ and ‘what’ is external, and in ‘being’ the bond is internal, as
between I and thou. My relation to ‘having’ is such that what I ‘have’ is at my disposal, and I can
dispose it off as and when I want without ceasing to be myself. It is not constitutive of my being.
3.4.3 Incarnation and Freedom
While clarifying the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’, Marcel gives two instances
of ‘having’: secret and body. Secret is the pure type of having, since it is fully under my control
and disposal. Body is not a having as normally understood, since I cannot dispose of my body
and be myself. As a phenomenological existentialist, Marcel speaks of the ‘mine-character’ of
body, and in this context and tone Marcel speaks of ‘incarnation’ or man as ‘incarnate’ or
‘bodily’. Body cannot be considered as an object, as the body, rather as my body—body preceded
by a possessive personal pronoun. Although body is not a having, it is the prototype of all kinds
of having—condition for all possessions. I can possess many things because of my bodily
character. If body is not a having, is then being? No, I can neither say I have my body, nor can I
say that I am my body. It has an ambivalent position of being and having. My relation to my
body best expressed by the expression: I am bodily, just as I am spiritual. It is the ‘I’ that is the
centre of all actions and thoughts: I am hungry, I know, I decide, I have pain. etc., instead of my
body is hungry, my body has pain, my soul knows, etc. There is a constant tension between
being having. Bible speaks of ‘gaining the whole world’ (having) and ‘losing one’s soul’ (being).
The ‘having-centred man’ sees the others as ‘having’ (at his disposal). Man has to keep the right
priority, and balance them both. The notion of incarnation has to be seen against the dualistic
conception of body and soul, and that of man and world. To be bodily and to be worldly
essentially belong to man. In other words, through my incarnation, I am in the world.
Marcel considers freedom, not as a condemnation, but as a grace, as an invocation to be
free. The free act is creative of the personal subject; the anonymous persons do not act in
freedom, and thus, they do not create themselves. It is in and through freedom that I create
myself. It is a creative response to the appeal of my being. Freedom is primarily a freedom for
the project of self-fulfilment, which is to be realized through one’s freedom for or commitment
to God and others. I create myself in my committing myself to others and to God. Man has the
capacity for commitment or betrayal. Freedom is not merely the choice between these two
alternatives. By choosing to be committed, one fulfils and creates oneself; when one does not
make a choice to be oneself, one is in captivity. Freedom is a conquest: it has to be won from the
situation of captivity. The free activity is marked by both ‘receptivity’ and ‘creativity’,
thrownness and possibility: in one word, ‘finite freedom’. Thus Marcel’s notion of freedom rests
on an act of ‘ontological humility’—the recognition that man is a created being, and not an
autonomous God.
3.4.4 Philosophy of Relation
Marcel’s is a philosophy of relation—totally different from the philosophy, propagated
by Sartre, his compatriot and contemporary. While speaking of the two-directional relations,
Marcel differentiates them, showing their complementarity. The two-directional relations are
directed to the finite others and to the absolute other.
3.4.5 Relation to the Finite Other: Intersubjectivity
Marcel is known primarily for his theory of inter-subjectivity which he developed, basing
himself on the theory of intentionality in phenomenology, applied to the notion of ‘availability’.
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The act of being available is directed necessarily to other persons. The very act through which ‘I
am’ implies an allusion to other people: an I to a thou. Although inter-subjectivity is presented as
the authentic mode of existence, people have the leaning towards living an inauthentic existence
of faceless anonymity, living a self-enclosed existence. In this case, the other is seen, not as a
‘thou’, but as an ‘it’—a functionary, an instrument, an object, … I may start my relation to the
other, taking the other as a s/he; but gradually the barrier disappears, and we together form an
‘us’. The relation becomes inter-subjective or I-thou relation—the relation between subjects.
From The narrowness of the initial subject-object relation (I-it relation) I move to an I-thou
relation or intersubjectivity, in which we become mutually available, we accept each other as
subjects.
It is in the intersubjective relation that there takes place presence and encounter
(meeting). Only a personal subject can be present to me, and we encounter each other. An object
cannot be present to me, nor can I encounter an object. It is on the plane of secondary reflection
and mystery that the other is present to me. Thus encountering and presence have deep
metaphysical nuances. There is present here an unconditional mutuality that affects the very
being of the individuals. The mutually encountering subjects are available to each other.
Availability and unavailability (disponibilit and indisponibilit)—the typically Marcelian
notions—become meaningful in the context of his explanation of inter-subjectivity. The notion
of ‘availability’ carries with it a stance which is characterized by a readiness to respond, an
openness, being at the service of the other, a welcoming, etc. Through one’s ‘creative fidelity’—
responding to the other in a creative manner—one grows in one’s inter-subjective relation.
3.4.6 Relation to the Absolute Other: Faith and Hope
When I enter into communion with the other, I transcend the level of ‘having’ (object) to
that of ‘being’. But here too I want to go beyond to the Absolute. My exigency for commitment,
fidelity and transcendence is only partially fulfilled in human interrelationships. Hence I aspire
towards a self-commitment towards the Absolute. But it is through the finite ‘thous’ that I can
transcend to the Absolute Thou. In my existential relation to the finite thous, I become aware of
my orientation to the Absolute Thou (God). Through my spiritual orientation of love and fidelity
to others, we begin to participate in the Absolute Other. It is in the Absolute Thou that the
universal human fraternity has attained its total actualization. All the finite thous are solidly
grounded in the Absolute Thou. My openness to Being passes through the transcending of
egoism in the communion with others, to a personal self-transcending to God. God is not to be
proved objectively, but to be encountered as the ‘absolute Thou’. It is specifically through faith
that I relate myself to the Absolute Thou. Faith implies a personal commitment. Marcel
distinguishes between personal and propositional faith: believing in and believing that
respectively. Man has the freedom for commitment or betrayal of the covenant with God. Faith
and freedom disclose the need for transcendence to the horizontal and thence to the vertical:
through the finite thous to the absolute Thou.
Faith goes with its concomitant love and hope. A relation of commitment is a relation of
inter-subjectivity and hope. The threefold gift of faith, hope and love has to be won by freedom.
The evils that disable my freedom can be summed up in the category of ‘death’. Death is the
meeting of life in time, and life beyond time. Here Marcel introduces the notion of ‘hope’. It is
the active reaction against the state of captivity, exile and meaninglessness. It is directed to an
absolute end, unlike desire which is directed to finite ends. Just as faith, hope too can be
distinguished between ‘hoping in’ and ‘hoping that’; the former is the genuine hope in a person.
Finally in a profoundly religious tone, Marcel says that salvation is not a static state, but a
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continued entering into that universal community grounded in God. Marcel’s philosophy thus is
based on the indispensability of faith, hope and love in a concrete ontology.
To conclude, the two most fmous contemporary schools of philosophy, phenomenoogy
and existentialism, have different attitudes towards the concet of essence. According to the
phenomenologists, the rimary purpose of philosophy is to investigate the essence of things. The
main method in this investigation is a direct intuition, by which the human min at once grasps the
essence, for instance, of a colour, of sequences, of friendship. But among the existentialists,
especially those who follow Sartre, deny the reality of essence, at least for the objects in nature.
If a carpenter wishes to make a table, he may draw a sketch of it first, and this would be some
sort of essence of the table, but nothing of the kind exists for man and other living beings. If man
has an essence, it is rather of hisown making. Existence is previous to essence.

UNIT 4
ATHEISTIC EXISTENTIALISTS
4.1 Introduction

The short General Introduction given at the beginning of the Unit on ‘Theistic
Existentialists,” is equally valid for this Unit to situate Sartre and Camus, the two atheistic
existentialists we are considering. The first atheistic existentialist we consider is Jean Paul Sartre,
with whom contemporary atheism is almost identified. His philosophy is centred on the
exaltation of human existence. Camus’ philosophy got developed from his concrete experience
of injustice; and he gave expression to it in two ways: a violent expression (Camus-I) and a
moderate expression (Camus-II). Although, for the believing people with a positive frame of
mind, their philosophy may appear to be negatively exaggerated, it is quite useful that the
students are introduced to it, so that they can purify and develop their philosophy of life.
4.2 Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980)
“God is impossible; reality is absurd; man is absolutely free; he makes his morals and
destiny; he lives in anguish and despair; hell is other people; man is a useless passion; death is
the end of his absurd existence; …” These few sentences sum up and point to the philosophy of
Sartre, one of the most popular of contemporary philosophers. He became popular due mainly to
two reasons: the content of his philosophy and the mode of communication. The content of his
thought was quite appealing to the people at that period of history—a time of the struggles of
wars and the after-effects of wars, a time of people of under oppression of colonization
challenging the colonizers, a time of the cold-war dividing the world into two socio-economic
systems, a time when people began asking questions about the meaning of their existence. Such a
juncture of history was the ripe time for his leftist-leaning, negative-centred and atheistic
philosophy to be sold out. Besides, Sartre put forward his thought the popular means of novels
and plays, as a result of which his philosophy was easily accessible and available even to people
of academically and economically lower standing. His philosophy had a good market in the
independent India with a newly awakened hatred towards all structure of exploitation and
injustice.
Jean Paul Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris; his father died when he was only two years
old. His mother married a second time, when he was eleven years old and hence he was brought
up in his uncle’s house. His life was a bundle of bitter experiences; he became unsociable and
lonely and he spent much of his time in libraries and cafes. “Cafe,” he says, “has an immense
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advantage of indifference.” He rejected all honours, including the ‘Nobel Prize’ for literature, as
he did not want to be tied down to any institution. Some of his important works are: Being and
Nothingness, Nausea, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Existentialism and Humanism, Troubled
Sleep, etc.
4.2.1 Analysis of Being
Sartre distinguished reality into two opposing modes: Being-in-itself (tre-en-soi) and
Being-for-itself (tre-pour-soi). The object of consciousness which is non-conscious is
called ‘Being-in-itself. It is always material. All that we can say about it is this: it is there;
opaque, compact density; without aspiration, hope or fear, meaning or relation. It is uncreated; it
is there without any reason for its being; it is superfluous, unjustifiable, contingent and absurd.
Such an absurd being-in-itself generates in us a disgust, a nausea. The existence as unmasked in
being-in- itself, and revealed in its terrifying obscene nudity is absurdity—there is no necessary
reason for it to be with this particular ‘suchness,’ it just happened to be! It is superfluous. The
superfluity of the in-itself is found true also of myself, the conscious being. There is no reason
for me to exist either. Even doing away with my life would be superfluous as well. Thus
existence for Sartre is nauseating, absurd and contingent.
Reality is not exhausted by the compact material things, there is also ‘consciousness’,
through which there exist similarity, meaning, difference, etc. The ‘sea’ gets different meanings
according to the consciousness that encounters it: for the swimmers, a place of adventure; for the
fishermen, a source of livelihood; for the artists and poets, a source of inspiration; etc.
Consciousness is being-for-itself. It is vacuous, and is characterized by potency and
incompleteness. It is based on the ‘in-itself’ which alone is being in the proper sense. The ‘for-
itself’ is nothingness. It is through the conscious being or man that ‘nothingness’ enters into the
world. A piece of chalk is complete in itself, but man finds it as incomplete or half; an arch is
found to be an incomplete circle. Consciousness finds absence, incompleteness and lacks. My
being conscious of my watch goes with my consciousness of its not being my pen. The source
nothingness must itself be nothing. Sartre shows that nothingness exists, just as gap, silence,
hole, darkness, none, etc. Man is the oppositional unity of the in-itself and the for-itself, body
and consciousness; man is the struggle to bridge them, which is bound to fail.
4.2.2 The Destroying Presence of the Other
As I observe the in-itself entities, I become aware of other people observing me.
Awareness of myself as acting (subject) goes with the awareness of myself as being acted upon
(object). There is nothing more remarkable in Sartre’s philosophy than his phenomenological
analysis of the other as staring. Sartre clarifies it with an example. Suppose, I am peeping and
eavesdropping through the key-hole of another’s room. Then I realize that someone else is
observing me. This awareness ‘nails me to the spot’; I am petrified and immobilized in the act. I
become ashamed. Shame is the recognition that I am as the other sees me. To be ashamed is to
be aware of the presence of someone else. It is at the expense of my subjectivity that the
existence of the other is revealed. In the stare of the other—which is always hateful—I am
reduced to an ‘object’; the other is revealed as the one who hatefully stares at me. My freedom is
frozen under his stare. To regain my subjectivity, I try to reduce the other to an object by my
stare. Thus each one is trying to enslave the other; the result is the inevitable conflict. If a third
person looks at ‘us in conflict’, we become objectified for the third person, and ‘we’ become
ashamed. To love another means to hate the common enemy. Love, for Sartre, is an
impossibility. Out of the futile effort to love is born hatred which annihilates the freedom of the
other in mortal combat.
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4.2.3 Human Condemned to Freedom

The essence of man is consciousness or nothingness. To fill in this emptiness, man makes
free choices. Man is necessarily free; the only necessity of man is his freedom. He is absolutely
free: he is so free that he is not free not to be free. According to Sartre, freedom is a curse, a
horrible yoke, a condemnation. The terrible responsibility attached to freedom fills man with
anguish. “I am responsible for everything, and I am condemned to be so. I find myself alone with
my heavy responsibility, from which I cannot get out, nor can I throw it onto someone else.
Anguish is the awareness that everything is upto me. To evade from this responsibility of
freedom man devices ‘bad_faith’—pretending to oneself and to others that one is bound or
obliged to act in a particular way, namely, by duty, law, or temperament. In bad faith, unlike in
lying, truth is hidden even from oneself. Even sincerity can be a form of bad faith.
4.2.4 Impossibility of God and of Moral Values
Sartre is the most ardent atheist in existentialism. He gives several proofs for the
impossibility of God. (I) The existence of a God will make man dependent on God. But man is
absolutely free. Hence there cannot be a God. (2) If there is a God, he will be the other, who will
be reducing me to an object. I will not be able to stare back because of his transcendence. For
man to be perpetually unfree is impossible. Hence there cannot be a God, (3) If there is a God, he
has to be the fullness of being (in-itself) and consciousness (for-itself). It is an impossibility to
identify being and nothingness. Hence God is an impossibility. According to Sartre, God is not
merely dead, but there cannot be a God. Man and God cannot co-exist. Just as there cannot be a
God because of man’s freedom, so also there cannot be a system of moral values. Man creates
values in his freedom. Every act is concrete, and it is performed in a definite situation. Hence
there cannot be any pre-set moral principles. The only sin that man can commit is to act in bad
faith, deceiving oneself with the ought of eternal values, or with the hope of a reward or fear of
punishment.
4.3 Albert Camus (1913-60)
Albert Camus was born in 1913 in Algeria; his father died in the war, when Albert was
only one year old. He experienced extreme poverty during the childhood. He was a great lover of
nature, which is evidently present in his writings. Together with poverty he experienced illness
as well (Tuberculosis); during II world war, he worked with resistance group. In 1957 he
received nobel prize for literature. In 1960 died in a car accident. His main works are: The Myth
of Sisyphus, The Stranger, The Rebel, The Plague, etc.
The North African background of Camus must have had a role to play in his “Neo-
paganism and love for nature.” There is in every Algerian, an earthly navit by which he lives
the present life to the full – the sensual empirical life world. Camus is critical of the European
approach—an attitude that is more “future oriented”. They, says Camus, turn their back to the
concretenss of the here and now, and turn to the delusion of power; they reject the misery of the
slums in preference to the mirage of an eternal city, ordinary justice for a promised land. Hence
he refuses to repudiate the pleasures, joys and beauties of the world.
4.3.1 Absurdity and Rebellion: Camus-I
The theme of absurdity is an old as the book of Ecclesiastes, but Camus has expressed it
so accurately as the mood of his time. The setting was ideal, and he epitomized the prevalent
climate of France under German occupation. He does not equate absurdity with meaninglessness,
as life has still some meaning, though absurd.
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Contributing Factors : There are many contributing factors for his development of
absurdity in the world. Man seeks reasons and explanations, but he is frustrated as no
explanation is forthcoming. The following are presented as the contributing factors for this
frustration.
(1) Science: Despite its dogmatic claims, science ends in hypothesis, and
thus inadequate. Science has made the world and reality a bundle of atoms. When
he looks for understanding and clarity, he finds irrationality and opacity of the
world.
(2) Monotony of life: Life goes on in an orderly and systematic way: the
daily time–table, the weekly programme, the monthly schedule, the yearly
plans… all these go on in an uninterrupted way. They suddenly become
monotonous, when we become conscious of it. The ‘awakening’ of the humans
gives use to ‘monotony’.
(3) Time: Man suddenly becomes aware that time is his worst enemy. We
are being carried by time, and suddenly it destroys us, as it takes us to the “no
further.” This too begets absurdity.
(4) World: The darkness, opacity and hostility of the world, which mostly
remain dormant, suddenly show themselves; and the humans are thrown into
absurdity.
(5) Inhumanity: Camus says: “men too secrete the ‘inhuman’. We perform
meaningless actions, and utter formal words; but they remain purely external
show, without any inner basis of conviction. When we pause and look, we find
the ‘absurdity of it.
(6) Death: The inevitability of death puts an end to all of man’s plans and
ambitions. The futility of man’s life comes to the forefront, and we are thrown
into absurdity.

4.3.2 Absurdity and the Responses to It

The world is neither rational not absurd in itself; only in relation to human consciousness
(awareness) it becomes absurd. The absurd is born of the confrontation between the human need
and the unreasonable silence of the world to give reason. The absurd is neither exclusively in the
humans nor in the world, but in their confrontation. This confrontation can be between one’s
intentions and the given possibilities, between an action and the world not in accord with that
action.
The Myth of Sisyphus quite dramatically presents the absurd hero. Based on this,
absurdity can be explained as the “awareness of oneself as condemned to tragic
purposelessness.” Sisyphus was the personification of it as he had, without purpose, to roll the
huge stone up the hill to allow it to roll down. Sisyphus was punished for disobeying the gods by
refusing to return to the underworld. He was forcibly taken to the underworld where the stone
was awaiting him. His scorn of gods, hatred of death, passion for life, brought about this
punishment. There is happiness in him in his refusal to give in, in his resentful stubbornness to
remain in this struggle. In his The Stranger Camus presents ‘indifference’ to everything as the
meaning of absurdity. The world is indifferent to the humans, and the humans are indifferent to
everything in his life and death.
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Responses to Absurdity: One of the common responses to absurdity is that of escaping

from it either by physical suicide or by philosophical suicide. Physical suicide is the voluntary
termination of life. Philosophical suicide is a taking refuge in faith and religion to escape the
absurd. According to Camus, neither physical suicide nor hope (philosophical suicide) is the
authentic response to absurdity. Suicide is a cowardly act, by which absurdity is destroyed. It is
not an expression of revolt. These are ‘facile solutions’ in the face of absurdity. Both physical
and philosophical suicide lacks a fundamental honesty, since they represent a refusal to face the
situation of absurdity. It is a cowardly compromise.
After rejecting physical and philosophical suicide as a way out, Camus opts to face the
absurd squarely by constant confrontation. Man has to engage in an ongoing struggle, although
he knows that he can never win the struggle. It is a confrontation between man and his own
absurdity. The sight of such a struggle is an example of human pride in action. There is Majesty
in this relentless struggle. According to Camus, “it is essential to die un-reconciled”. His ‘absurd
man’ can be said to be without hope only in terms of the two human dreams of eternity and total
understanding.
Man’s revolt against the absurd results in a new freedom. He begins to experience
genuine freedom. There are no restraints in his actions. This freedom is owing to his having no
future and no superior being. He is his own master. The truly liberated man is completely
indifferent to the future, and thus rejects all scales of values. That is, he rejects the ‘ethics of
quality’ and accepts an ‘ethics of quantity’. What is important for the ‘absurd man’ is not the
‘best’ way of living, but the ‘most’ living. He strives to live more, and not better. Every action is
of equal value. Man can live with the ‘irresponsibility of the condemned criminal,’ who has
nothing to lose.
4.3.3 Moderation and Reconciliation: Camus-II
After the World War II, Camus began to show signs of moderation from his
philosophical extremity. The Myth of Sisyphus conclusions were in agreement with Hitler’s
atrocities. Camus became convinced of a change, since the Nazi atrocities were the logical
outcome of an ‘ethics of quantity’ that admits of no distinction between right and wrong. In his
letters to a German friend he openly confessed his inability to continue his Sisyphus thought-
pattern. Camus opts for some sort of values in life and limit in freedom.
In the later works of Camus, he gradually expressed his changed thought. In his The
Plague (1947) Camus argues that we must extend a helping hand to our brothers in combating
the ‘plague’ of the irrational absurdity. But it falls short of the Judeo-Christian attitude to
suffering. In the common struggle against the oppressive plague, men have discovered their
solidarity. And with this, they have learned meaning of compassion. Man has an obligation to
keep the human solidarity alive. But in spite of man’s solidarity and love for each other, there is
still a collective impotence, i.e., despite his fight against the absurd, man’s ultimate end is defeat
and death. Thus no victory over the absurd is possible. Still Camus has now opted for an ‘ethics
of quality’.
In his The Rebel (1951) Camus makes the penetrating analysis of ‘rebellion’. He takes the
rejection of suicide as the foundational principle in this work; man has decided to live since our
personal existence has some value. Camus distinguishes between metaphysical and historical
rebellion. Metaphysical rebellion denies absolute freedom, and acknowledges existence with
some limits. When the slave says ‘no’ to his master, he means to say ‘up to now “yes” but
‘beyond it, “no”. He chooses to fight for justice rather than for his own life. It is not an
interchange of roles, rather an affirmation of the value of humanity, a value shared by others as
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well. Revolt is based on a belief in a common human dignity. Camus also looks at the way some
of the historical figures, under the guise of defense of human rights became notorious oppressors
of humanity. All dreamers of utopians have ended in failure, as they lost sight of ‘limit’
(mesure).
In his last two works, The Fall (1956) and Exile and Kingdom, Camus enters into a state
of repentance. Man is presented not as the ‘innocent rebel’ but as ‘the guilty other’. He cannot
live with his conscience. He looks for a judge who will condemn him and then pardon him, but
there is neither condemnation nor pardon in sight. “Who would dare condemn me in a world
without judge, where no one is innocent?”