The Renaissance of Security Studies

Author(s): Stephen M. Walt

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 211-239
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International
StudiesQuarterly
(1991) 35, 211-239

Mershon Series:
Research Programsand Debates

"The Renaissanceof SecurityStudies" by Stephen M. Walt is the firstarticleto

appear in InternationalStudiesQuarterly's
"ResearchProgramsand Debates" series.
This occasionalseriesis intendedto bringtoISQ readersarticlesthatcritically
review
selectedareas of researchor currentdebatesover significantissuesrelatedto inter-
nationalstudies.Like all othermanuscripts,paperssolicitedforthisseriesare refer-
eed by membersof the editorialboard and guestreviewers.The editorswelcome
proposals for futurethemes and articlesfor this series. We wish to thank the
MershonCenter of The Ohio State Universityfor its supportof thisseries.-The
Editors

The Renaissance of SecurityStudies

STEPHEN M. WALT

University
ofChicago

This articleexaminesthe evolutionof securitystudies,focusingon recent

developmentsin the field.It providesa surveyof the field,a guide to the
currentresearchagenda,and some practicallessonsformanagingthefield
in theyearsahead. Securitystudiesremainsan interdisciplinary enterprise,
but itsearlierpreoccupationwithnuclearissueshas broadenedto include
topics such as grand strategy,conventionalwarfare,and the domestic
sourcesof international amongothers.Workin thefieldis increas-
conflict,
inglyrigorousand theoretically inclined,whichreflectsthe marriagebe-
tweensecuritystudiesand social scienceand itsimprovedstandingwithin
the academic world.Because nationalsecuritywillremaina problemfor
statesand because an independentscholarlycommunity contributes to ef-
fectivepublic policyin thisarea, the renaissanceof securitystudiesis an
importantpositivedevelopmentforthefieldof international relations.

In the mid-1970s,the fieldof securitystudiesbegan a dramaticresurgence.In

additionto a noticeableincrease in professionalactivityand publishedwork on
topics,securitystudiesbecame more rigorous,methodologically
security-related so-
phisticated, inclined.Scholarscontinuedto differon specificpolicy
and theoretically
issues,but competingviewswere increasinglybased on systematic social scientific

Author'snote:
I thankthefollowing fortheircomments
individuals on earlierdraftsof thispaper:Christopher
Achen,RichardBetts,Dale Copeland,MichaelDesch,GeorgeDowns,AlexanderGeorge,CharlesGlaser,Alicia
Levine,JackLevy,Sean Lynn-Jones,
JohnMearsheimer,AndrewMoravcsik, RobertPape,BarryPosen,Duncan
Snidal,JackSnyder,RebeccaStone,and StephenVan Evera.I am also gratefulto Owen Cote and Kennette
Benedictforusefuldiscussions,
and toJamesMarquardtforresearchassistance.

? 1991International
StudiesAssociation

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212 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

researchratherthan on unverifiedassertionsor argumentsby authority.These

developmentshelp explain the recentprominenceof the subfieldand its growing
acceptancewithinthe academic world,and theyestablisha firmfoundationfor
futurework.Giventhe continuedneed forindependentanalysesof securityissues,
the resurgenceof securitystudiesis an importantpositivedevelopmentforthefield
of internationalrelations.
This articleexamines thisrecentrenaissancewithseveralaims in mind. First,I
seek to providea surveyof the fieldand a guide to the currentresearchagenda.'
Second, by examiningthe evolutionof a particularsubfield,I hope to offersome
basicinsightsintothe sociologyof knowledgein international relations.Whatdeter-
minesthe prominenceof different fields,the attentionpaid to specifictopicswithin
them,and theirabilityto generatecumulativeknowledge?Finally,by tracingthe
rise,fall,and recoveryof securitystudies,I seekto identifysomepracticallessonsfor
managingthe fieldin the yearsahead.
This articleis dividedintofivesections.PartI offersa definitionof securitystudies
and describesits place withinthe broader fieldof internationalrelations.Part II
outlinesthecentralfeaturesof the so-calledGolden Age (1955-1965) and discusses
whythe fielddeclined in the late 1960s. Part III describesthe recentrenaissance,
examiningboth how the fieldhas changed and whythisrebirthoccurred.Part IV
summarizesthe currentresearchagenda and considerssome potentialpitfalls;Part
V offersseverallessonsand guidelinesforenhancingfutureprogress.

What is "SecurityStudies?"
The boundariesof intellectualdisciplinesare permeable;as a result,any effortto
delineatethe precisescope of securitystudiesis somewhatarbitrary. The mainfocus
of securitystudiesis easyto identify,however:itis thephenomenonof war.Security
studiesassumesthatconflictbetweenstatesis alwaysa possibility and thattheuse of
militaryforce has far-reachingeffectson statesand societies(Bull, 1968; Martin,
1980). Accordingly, securitystudiesmaybe definedas thestudyofthethreat, use,and
controlofmilitaryforce(Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988). It exploresthe conditionsthat
make the use of forcemorelikely,thewaysthattheuse of forceaffectsindividuals,
states,and societies,and thespecificpoliciesthatstatesadopt in orderto preparefor,
prevent,or engage in war.
The securitystudiesliteratureoftenoverlapswithmoregeneralworkson interna-
tionalrelations,and mostof it fitscomfortably withinthe familiarrealistparadigm.
In general,however,theresearchprogramof securitystudiesis usuallyinformedby
debatesover centralpolicyproblemsand tendsto address phenomenathatcan be
controlledby nationalleaders (Smoke, 1975:259).2As a result,scholarshiptendsto
concentrateon manipulable on relationships
variables, thatcan be alteredbydeliberate
actsof policy.Giventhe military poweris thecentralfocusof thefieldand is subject
to politicalcontrol,thistendencyis appropriate.3

This article is a personal and thereforesubjectiveassessmentof the field. I regretthe inevitableomissions;

givenlimitedspace, I have been forcedto omitmanyimportantworks.For otherrecentsurveysof securitystudies,
see Smoke (1975), Gray (1982), Jervis,Lederberg, North,Rosen, Steinbruner,and Zinnes (1986), Social Science
Research Council (1986), Nye and Lynn-Jones(1988), and Freedman (1989).
2
Worksof "pure" theoryreflectchangingpoliticalconcernsas well,but the connectionsare oftenless directand
the policy implicationsless evident.
3 Many internationalrelationstheoriescontainconceptsthatare not easilycontrolled,such as "polarity," "lateral
pressure," or "status inconsistency."By contrast,works in securitystudies tend to employ concepts that are
controllableby national leaders, such as militarydoctrineand strategy,the tools of statecraft(e.g., deterrence)or
the size and characterof armameints.

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 213

Militarypoweris not theonlysourceof nationalsecurity, and military threatsare

nottheonlydangersthatstatesface (thoughtheyare usuallythemostserious).As a
resultsecuritystudies also includes what is sometimestermed"statecraft"-arms
control,diplomacy,crisismanagement,forexample. These issues are clearlyrele-
vantto the main focusof the field,because theybear directlyon the likelihoodand
characterof war.
Because nonmilitary phenomena can also threatenstatesand individuals,some
writershave suggestedbroadeningtheconceptof "security" to includetopicssuchas
poverty,AIDS, environmental hazards,drug abuse, and the like (Buzan, 1983; N.
Brown,1989). Such proposalsremindus thatnonmilitary issues deservesustained
attentionfromscholarsand policymakers, and thatmilitary powerdoes notguaran-
tee well-being.But this prescriptionruns the riskof expanding"securitystudies"
excessively;by thislogic,issues such as pollution,disease,childabuse, or economic
recessionscould all be viewedas threatsto "security." Definingthe fieldin thisway
woulddestroyitsintellectual coherenceand makeitmoredifficult to devisesolutions
to any of theseimportantproblems.
Moreover,the factthatotherhazardsexistdoes notmean thatthedangerof war
has been eliminated.Howevermuchwe mayregretit,organizedviolencehas been a
centralpart of human existencefor milleniaand is likelyto remain so for the
foreseeablefuture.Not surprisingly, therefore,preparationsforwar have preoccu-
pied organizedpolitiesthroughouthistory(McNeill,1982). Anyattemptto under-
standthe evolutionof human society,let alone the prospectsfor peace, musttake
accountof theroleof military force.Indeed, giventhecostof military forcesand the
risksof modernwar,itwouldbe irresponsible forthescholarlycommunity to ignore
the centralquestionsthatformthe heartof the securitystudiesfield.4
Throughoutthisessay,I concentrateprimarily on worksthatmeetthe standards
of logicand evidencein thesocialsciences.It is importantto recognize,however,that
much of the published work on securitytopics does not meet these standards.5
Because nationalsecurityissuesare highlypoliticizedand theresourcesat stakeare
enormous,workon these topicsis oftenwrittenfor politicalratherthan scientific
goals (Walt, 1987a). This tendencyis exacerbatedby classification proceduresthat
limitpublicaccessto relevantinformation and is compoundedfurtherbytheexten-
sive networkof consultantsand "thinktanks"supportedby defensecontractors or
the Defense Departmentitself.Althoughsome of thisworkmeetsbasic scholarly
standards,muchof itshouldbe viewedas propagandaratherthanas seriousscholar-
ship. This is not true of all "policyanalysis,"whichoftenemployssophisticated
theoreticalconceptsand carefulempiricalresearch.But thereis a differencebe-
tweenthe scholarlyside of securitystudiesand worksthatare largelypoliticaladvo-
cacy,just as thereis a differencebetweenscholarshipin criminology and the public
debate on gun control.

The "Golden Age" of InternationalSecurityStudies

The fieldof securitystudiesis a relativelyrecentcreation.Priorto World War II,
interestin strategyand militaryaffairswas primarilylimitedto the professional
military,and scholarshipon military issueswas confinedto militaryand diplomatic
history.6Civiliancontributions
to the studyof strategywere discouraged,although

4 I am indebted to Michael Desch for discussion on these points.

5 Quasi-scholarlywork on securitytopics may be found in journals such as Strategic

Review,ArmedForcesJournal
International, DefenseReview,or in books such as Graham (1983), Caldicott(1984), or Tyroler(1984).
or International
6
Exceptions include studies of arms races (Richardson, 1960), the causes of war (Wright, 1942), and the
geopoliticsof U.S. grand strategy(Spykman, 1942).

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214 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

thehorrifying costsof WorldWar I demonstratedthatwarwas "tooimportantto be

leftto the generals."Civiliansbecame extensively involvedin military planningfor
the firsttimeduringWorldWar II, settingthe stageforthe "GoldenAge" or "first
wave" of securitystudies(Jervis,1979; Gray 1982:45-58).
As one wouldexpect,thenuclearrevolutioncasta largeshadowoverthefield,and
analystsin the "Golden Age" devoted most of theireffortsto understandingits
implications.7The revolutionary impactof nuclearweaponswas recognizedimmedi-
ately(Borden, 1946; Brodie, 1946) and the issues raised by the new technology
preoccupiedstrategists throughoutthisperiod(Kaplan, 1983; Trachtenberg,1989).
The centralquestion was straightforward: how could statesuse weapons of mass
destructionas instruments of policy,giventhe riskof any nuclearexchange?The
effortto grapplewiththisproblemproducedseminalworkson deterrence,coercion,
and escalation,along with numerous prescriptiveworkson alternativestrategies
(Kaufmann,1956; Kissinger1957; Brodie, 1959, 1966; Kahn, 1960, 1965; Schelling,
1960, 1966; Ellsberg, 1961; Snyder, 1961). Other worksexplored the causes of
stability(Wohlstetter,1959; Hoag, 1961), alternativetargetingpolicies(Knorrand
Read, 1962), the potentialvalue of armscontrol(Brennan,1961; Bull, 1961; Schel-
ling and Halperin, 1961; Singer, 1962), and the role of conventionalforcesand
limitedwar in the nuclearage (Osgood, 1957).
Significantly,these workswere the productof an eclecticand interdisciplinary
approachto specificreal-worldproblems.8Giventheyouthof thefieldand thenovel
problemsit faced, thisis hardlysurprising.Strategicthoughtfromthe prenuclear
era was only partlyrelevantto the issues raised by the nuclearrevolution,and the
lack of establishedscholarsallowedanalystswithverydiversebackgroundsto enter
the field (Trachtenberg,1989:309-11).9 Althoughsecuritystudies has generally
been centeredin politicalscience,it has alwaysbeen an interdisciplinaryenterprise.
Much of theseminalresearchduringtheGoldenAge wasconductedat thinktanks
liketheRAND Corporation(Smith,1966; Kaplan, 1983). Accessto information and
a supportiveinstitutionalsettingwereobviousassets,buttheircloserelationship with
theDefense Departmentmayhave encouragedthesescholarsto viewnationalsecu-
rityproblemsfroman excessively militaryperspective(Green,1966, 1968). In partic-
ular,thisfactormayexplainsome of thelimitations of thefirstwave of scholarship.

Limitationsand Lacunae in theGoldenAge

First,as many criticshave noted, the earlyworksin securitystudiesofferedlittle
empiricalsupportfortheirconclusionsand prescriptions (Green,1966; Georgeand
Smoke,1974; Jervis,1979). In general,theseworkscontainedlittlereliableinforma-
tion about the subjectstheyaddressed and no systematic evidencesupportingthe
authors'hypothesesor recommendations. Even a richlyhistoricalworklikeBernard
Brodie'sStrategyin theMissileAge(1959) becamevague and speculativewhendiscuss-
ing contemporaryissues. As a result,readers seeking to assess the adequacy of
existingforcesor thefeasibility
of a givenstrategyreceivedlittleguidancefromthese
works.

7According to Laurence Martin,"the problem of [nuclear] deterrencedid more than anythingelse to create the
modern academic field of strategicstudies" (1980:93).
8 For example, the concept of the "manipulationof risk"emerged fromthe application of game theoryto the

problem of deterrence, while "stabilitytheory"emerged from an empirical study of the vulnerabilityof U.S.
bomber bases. See Trachtenberg (1989:311-16) and Achen and Snidal (1989:153).
9 Major figuresin the Golden Age included economists(Thomas Schelling,Henry Rowen, Andrew Marshall,
James Schlesinger),physicists(Herman Kahn, Leo Szilard), sociologists(MorrisJanowitz,Hans Speier), psycholo-
gists(Paul Kecskemeti),mathematicians(Donald Brennan, Albert Wohistetter),and politicalscientists(Bernard
Brodie, William Kaufmann, Henry Kissinger,and Glenn Snyder).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 2 15

This problemwas somewhatunavoidable,of course. Much of the relevantinfor-

mationwas classified,and apartfromthebombingofJapan,therewas no historical
record of nuclear warfareupon whichto base conclusionsor recommendations.
Scholarswere forcedto relyheavilyon deductivetechniquessuch as game theory,
illustratedby analogies or evocativehistoricalanecdotes (Schelling,1960; Kahn,
1960).
The earlyliteraturein securitystudiesalso employeda rathernarrowdefinition of
politics.The fieldtendedto ignorenonmilitary sourcesof international tensionand
to focussolelyon militarybalances. For example,deterrencetheoryassumed the
existenceof a hostile"aggressor"(the SovietUnion) and concentratedon how one
made retaliatory threatscredible,withoutaskingwhyan opponentwould wantto
challengethestatusquo in thefirstplace. AlthoughSchellingand othersrecognized
thatbeliefsand perceptions(such as the perceivedriskof preemption)could affect
the likelihoodof war, the early worksfocused primarilyon how differentforce
posturescould alterthe incentiveto strikefirst.Thus, theearlyliteraturetendedto
slightthepoliticalsourcesof international or thepotentialrole of accommo-
conflict
dativediplomacy(Trachtenberg,1989:317-18).
This limitationwas partlya methodologicalartifact;the "rationalactor"assump-
tion that lay at the core of deterrencetheorydirectedattentionaway fromthe
organizational,psychological,and domesticpoliticalfactorsthat also shape state
behavior.The Cold War played a role here as well: because the Soviet desire to
expand was taken for granted,more attentionwas paid to deterringit than to
verifying the assumptionor explainingits origins.And, as Defense Department
employees,it is not surprisingthatthe "civilian"strategists
concentratedon military
problemsand downplayeddomesticpolitics,misperception, and diplomacy.
This tendencymay have also encouragedthe separationof securitystudiesfrom
otherscholarlyworkon war and peace. For example,warningsabout the dangerof
"conflict spirals"and the value of accomodationemergedprimarily fromacademic
scholarsin the fieldof "peace research"ratherthan fromthe "civilianstrategists"
(Etzioni,1962; Osgood, 1962; Jervis,1976:109). Similarly, the mostimportantgen-
eral critiquesof deterrencetheoryand much of the earlyinterestin arms control
came fromacademicsas well,althoughsome of themhad close tiesto government
agencies.'0Finally,the "behavioralrevolution"in the socialscienceshelped spawna
diversearrayof researchprogramson international conflict,such as the Correlates
of War Project at the Universityof Michigan." These programsmade a major
contribution to the methodologicalself-consciousnessof the international relations
profession(Singer, 1972; Vasquez, 1987; Gochmanand Sabrosky,1990), but they
were not designed to address questionsof directconcernto nationalleaders.'2In
sharp contrastto the earlyworksin securitystudies,therefore,these projectshad
littleimpacton public policyand wereoftendismissedas irrelevantby the security
studiesfield.

TheEnd oftheGoldenAge
The firstwave of securitystudiesended in the mid-1960s,and the fieldentereda
period of decline. Several different
causes were at work.
First,the researchprogramof securitystudieshad reached somethingof a dead

"On deterrence theory,see Green (1966) and George and Smoke (1974). On arms control,see the list of
contributorsin Brennan (1961).
11Other examples include the Dimensionalityof Nations (DON) project and the StanfordStudies in Interna-
tional Conflictand Integration.See Rosenau (1976).
12 Some of these scholars did work on policy issues, and some components of the larger projects had policy

relevance. See Singer (1962) and Holsti (1972).

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216 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

end by thistime.The centralquestionsidentifiedby the rationaldeterrencepara-

digmwere now well understoodif not yetfullyresolved,and the remainingissues,
such as the tradeoffbetweenthe alleged need for first-strike optionsto make ex-
tended deterrencecredible and the increased risk of war that these capabilities
created, seemed beyond resolution within the existing theoreticalframework
(Trachtenberg,1989:332). Althoughdoctrinesand weaponsprogramscould stillbe
and were debated, furtheradvances would requirenew conceptualapp-oaches or
more advanced analyticaltools.
A second problem was the failureof the firstwave of scholarsto produce a
significantgroup of Ph.D. students.AlthoughindividualslikeAlbertWohlstetter at
the Universityof Chicago and WilliamKaufmannat MIT did traina numberof
proteges,theywere more likelyto become consultantsor government officialsthan
to enteracademic departments.As a result,a large "successorgeneration"did not
emergeuntilrelativelyrecently.
A thirdreason for decline was the VietnamWar. Not only did the debacle in
Indochinacastdoubton someof theearlyworkin thefield(suchas thetechniquesof
"systemsanalysis"and theapplicationof bargainingtheoryto international conflict),
it also made the studyof securityaffairsunfashionablein manyuniversities. The
lattereffectwas bothironicand unfortunate, because thedebateon thewarwas first
and foremosta debate about basic securityissues.Was the "dominotheory"accu-
rate?Was U.S. credibility reallyat stake?Would usingmilitary forcein Indochinain
factmake the U.S. more secure?By neglectingthe seriousstudyof securityaffairs,
opponentsof the war could not effectively challengethe officialrationalesforU.S.
involvement.13The persistent beliefthatopponentsof warshouldnotstudynational
securityis like tryingto finda cure forcancerby refusingto studymedicinewhile
allowingresearchon the disease to be conductedsolelyby tobaccocompanies.
Externaleventsunderminedthe fieldin otherwaysas well. The emergenceof
U.S.-Soviet detentemade the studyof war seem less important,and the United
States'sdecliningeconomicpositionled to greaterinterestin the issuesof interna-
tionalpoliticaleconomy.Accordingly, scholarsbegan to questionthe utilityof mili-
taryforceand to emphasizethe role of economicissues. "Transnationalrelations"
and "interdependence"became thenewwatchwords, as partof an explicitchallenge
to therealistparadigm(Cooper 1968; Morse,1970; Keohane and Nye, 1972, 1977).
At roughlythesame time,however,scholarsin securitystudiesbegan to abandon
the relativelysimpleassumptionsthathad guided the firstwave. The main accom-
plishmentof thisperiodwas theapplicationof organizationtheoryto nationalsecu-
rityissues,primarily in studiesof weaponsprocurement and foreignpolicydecision-
making(Art,1968; Allison,1971; Halperin,1974; Steinbruner,1974; Beard, 1976).
Despiteitsobviouspolicyrelevance,however,thisliteraturefocusedon questionsof
implementation ratherthanthecentralquestionsof strategy, forcerequirements, or
thelikelihoodof war.As such,theseadvancesdid notreversethedeclineof thefield
as a whole.

The Renaissance
The renaissanceof securitystudiesbegan in the mid-1970s,signaledby the end of
the VietnamWar, the Ford Foundation'sdecisionto sponsorseveralacademiccen-
ters in securityaffairs,and the founding of InternationalSecurity,which became the

13 An exception was the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, which produced a

varietyof pu-blications
outlining the case againistU.S. involvementin Indochina. Among scholars of inter-national
politics,important
statementsagainst the war include Waltz (1967) anid Morgenthaui(1969).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 217

main scholarlyforumforthe field.Althoughthe fieldretaineditsinterdisciplinary

characterand a close connectionto real-worldissues,the"newwave"differedfrom
the Golden Age in severalimportantrespects.

New Developmentsin SecurityStudies

The Use of History.Among the mostimportantdevelopmentsin securitystudies
was greaterrelianceon history.Aided byincreasedaccessto relevantarchivalmate-
rial, historiansconducted increasinglydetailed investigationsof nationalsecurity
policy.These efforts ofimportanthistoricaleventsand
led to revisedinterpretations
a growingpartnershipbetween historiansand politicalscientists(Gaddis, 1987,
1990). Even moreimportant, scholarsbegan to relymoreheavilyon historicalcases
as a means of generating,testing,and refiningtheories.Althoughcase studieshad
been used forthesepurposesin the past,the methodof "structured, focusedcom-
parison"refinedbyAlexanderGeorgeand hisassociatesencouragedscholarsto use
thehistoricalrecordin a moredisciplinedfashion(Georgeand Smoke,1974; Smoke
1977; George 1979).'14
The comparativecase studymethodwas explicitly designedto countertheahistor-
icalapproachesthathad characterizedthefirstwave.By focusingon concretehistor-
ical events,the methodsoughta more nuanced, "policy-relevant" theory(George
and Smoke, 1974:616-42). Comparativecase studieswerenota panacea,of course;
case selectionremaineda crucialissue,causal inferencesweredifficult to makewith
confidence,and thesestudiesoftenproducedrathermodest"contingent generaliza-
tions"insteadof powerfulgeneraltheories.But as evenitscriticsadmit,thecompar-
ativecase methodexpanded the set of relevanthypothesesand helped expose the
limitations of existingtheories(Achen and Snidal, 1989).

The Challenge to Rational DeterrenceTheory.The use of historywas especiallyevi-

dent in the wide-rangingassaulton deterrencetheory.Drawingupon psychology,
organizationtheory,and a host of historicalstudies,these worksquestioned the
assumptionsof perfectinformation and rationalcalculationthatlay at the heartof
the rationaldeterrenceparadigm.'5The resulthas been a livelydebate on the re-
quirementsof deterrence,the utilityof the rationaldeterrenceframework, and the
appropriatestrategiesfor evaluatingit (George and Smoke, 1974, 1989; Stein-
bruner, 1976; Jervis,1979, 1989; Lebow, 1981; Jervis,Lebow, and Stein, 1985;
Orme, 1987; Huth, 1988; Achen and Snidal, 1989; Downs, 1989; Lebow and Stein,
1989, 1990; Huth and Russett,1990).

Nuclear Weapons Policy. New ideas and information transformed the analysisof
nuclearweaponspolicyas well.As therecurringdebatesoverstrategic nuclearpolicy
revealed,civiliananalystswere increasinglycapable of analyzingcomplextechnical
issuesbecause the necessarydata and analyticalmethodswerenow widelyavailable
(Davis and Schilling,1973). The debate over nuclearstrategyand armscontrolwas
closelylinkedto concernsabout alleged Sovietsuperiority, the progressof various
armscontrolnegotiations, or newweaponsproposalssuchas theM-Xmissileand the
StrategicDefense Initiative(Gray,1979,Jervis,1984; Millerand Van Evera, 1986).

14 Works thatemployed the comparativecase-studymethod include Snyder and Diesing (1977), Lebow (1981),

Betts (1982, 1987), Mearsheimer (1983), Posen (1984), Snyder (1984, forthcoming),Levite (1987), Walt (1987b),
Evangelista(1988), George, Farley,Dallin (1988), Huth (1988), and Shimshoni(1988).
15 Advances in game theoryhave enabled scholars to relax the assumptionsof the original deterrencemodel,

althoughthesenew techniquesrequire otherrestrictions to achieve formalsolutions.See O'Neill (1989) and Powell

(1990).

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218 TheRenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

These disputeshavebecomeincreasingly sophisticatedand wellinformed,reflecting

thegreaterexpertiseand information availableoutsideofficialcircles(Epstein,1987;
May,Bing and Steinbruner,1988; Eden and Miller,1989; Glaser,1990).16
As noted,the combinationof organizationtheoryand carefulempiricalresearch
also produced significant innovationsin deterrencetheory.Where earlyworkon
nuclearstrategyhad assumed thateach side's military forceswould respondobedi-
entlyto the commandsof nationalauthorities, scholarsbegan to questionthiscom-
fortablebeliefthroughsophisticatedanalysesof nuclearcommandand controlsys-
tems (Steinbruner, 1978; Ball, 1981; Bracken, 1983; Blair, 1985; Carter,
Steinbruner,and Zraket,1987) and carefulhistoricalstudiesof past nuclearcrises
(Sagen, 1985; Betts, 1987; Bundy, 1988). These analysessuggestedthat civilian
authoritieshad limitedknowledgeof and controlover U.S. nuclearoperations,and
that the precise state of the strategicnuclear balance had littledirecteffecton
internationalpoliticsin generalor crisisbehaviorin particular.
Finally,increasedaccessto thedocumentary recordenabledhistoriansto demolish
a varietyof mythsabout the historyof nuclear weapons policy.These studiesre-
vealed the strongcounterforcebias of U.S. strategicdoctrineand reinforcedthe
conclusionthat limitednuclear exchangeswould be difficult if not impossibleto
control(Rosenberg,1979, 1983; Friedberg,1980; Ball, 1981; Schilling,1981; Ball
and Richelson,1986; Sagan, 1989). In short,wherescholarshipin the Golden Age
was necessarilyabstractand "data-free,"thestudyof nuclearweaponspolicyduring
the renaissancerestedon a much firmerbase of empiricalsupport.

Conventional Warfare.Apart fromthe "limitedwar" debate in the 1950s and a

flurryof interestin counterinsurgencyduringthe VietnamWar,conventionalwar-
farewas downplayedduringtheGoldenAge. This tendencywas reversedduringthe
renaissance;the emergenceof strategicparityand a concernover the conventional
balance in Europe afterVietnamsparkedrenewedinterestin the role of conven-
tionalmilitarypower.Althoughsome of thisworkwas straightforward policyanaly-
sis,manyof thesestudieswerebased on new theoreticalapproachesand empirically
testedpropositionsabout conventionalwarfare.Even whenflawed,such workslaid
the foundationfor subsequentrefinements. In additionto a livelydebate on the
conventionalbalance and the appropriatetechniquesfor measuringit (Fischer,
1976; Mako, 1983; Posen, 1984-85, 1989; Biddle, 1988; Cohen, 1988; Thomson,
1988; Epstein, 1989; Kupchan, 1989b; Mearsheimer,1989), scholarsexplored the
requirementsof conventionaldeterrence(Mearsheimer,1983; Betts,1985; Shim-
shoni,1988), the lessonsof Vietnam(Thies, 1980; Rosen, 1982; Krepinevich,1986;
Shafer, 1988; Clodfelter,1989; Pape, 1990), the danger of surpriseattack(Betts,
1982; Levite, 1987; Kam, 1988), and the meritsof alternativeforceposturesand
doctrines(Luttwak,1980-81; Mearsheimer,1981-82; Betts,1983). Other studies
debatedstrategiesfortheRapid DeploymentForce (Waltz,1981; Epstein,1981) and
the U.S. Navy(Posen, 1982; Epstein,1983-84; Brooks,1986; Mearsheimer,1986).
In short,althoughnuclearweapons policycontinuedto receiveattention,the study
of conventionalwarfarefiguredprominently in the renaissance.

U.S. Grand Strategy. Grand strategyis a state's "theory"for creatingsecurity

throughmilitaryand diplomaticmeans (Posen, 1984:13). Increased interestin the
subjectwas especiallyevidentin the UnitedStates,sparkedby a growingsense that
theUnitedStateswas over-commited and needed to rethinkitsstrategic In
priorities.

16
For example, it is now commonplace to use dynamic campaign models to measure the effectivenessof
alternativestrategicforce postures.

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 219

additionto severalhistoricalstudies(Gaddis, 1982; Leffler,1984), a hostof books

and articlesdebated the scope of U.S. interests,the utilityof militaryforce for
defendingthem,and the likelyresponsesof otherstatesto alternativeU.S. policies
(Huntington,1982; Calleo, 1987; Posen and Van Evera, 1987; Gray 1988; David,
1989; Desch, 1989; Walt, 1989; Van Evera, 1990). Althougha consensuson U.S.
grand strategyremained elusive,the debate illustratedthe growingtendencyfor
scholarsto base theirrecommendations on testableempiricaland theoreticalclaims.

SecurityStudiesand InternationalRelationsTheory.The renaissanceofsecurity studies

also sawthereturnof nationalsecurityissuesto thescholarlyagenda amongtheorists
of international politics.At themostgenerallevel,KennethWaltz'sTheoryofInterna-
tionalPolitics(1979) presenteda powerfulreformulation of the realistsperspective,
aided by spiriteddefensesof realismwithininternational politicaleconomy(Gilpin,
1975; Lake, 1987; Grieco,1990).17 In contrastto theliberaltheoriespopularduring
theera of detente,theseworksemphasizedtheenduringimportanceof anarchyand
waras constraints on statebehavior.Not surprisingly, renewedinterestin thecauses
of war was evidentas well. Importantstudiesby RobertJervisand George Quester
sparked a livelyexchange on the effectsof offensiveand defensiveadvantages
(Quester, 1977; Jervis,1978; Levy, 1984; Posen, 1984; Snyder,1984; Van Evera,
1984; Sagan, 1986; Shimshoni,1990-91), whileBruce Bueno de Mesquita'scontro-
versial"expectedutility"theoryof war promptedan equallyintensedebate (Bueno
de Mesquita,1981; Majeskiand Sylvan,1984; Wagner,1984). Scholarsalso explored
theeffectof domesticpolitics,misperception, and systemstructure on thelikelihood
of war (foran excellentsurveyof thisliterature, see Levy,1990). Other theoretical
workswithdirect relevance for securityaffairsincluded studies of alliances (G.
Snyder,1984; Walt,1987b),detente(Lynn-Jones, 1986),and thestrategiesforcoop-
erationbetweenadversaries(Oye, 1986; George, Farley,and Dallin, 1988; Rock,
1989). In short,the renaissanceof securitystudieswas not limitedto narrowpolicy
research.Explicittheoreticalstudiesformeda large part of the field,and scholars
consciouslysoughtto apply theseresultsto specificpolicyproblems.

separatingtheGoldenAge from
TheRole oftheIvoryTower. The finalcharacteristic
the recentrenaissanceis the growthof securitystudieswithinthe academic world.
Althoughseveralof themajorfiguresof thefirstwaveheld university positions,they
did theirmostinfluentialworkat thinktankslikeRAND. Althoughanalystsoutside
the ivorytowerremain important,the centerof gravityhas clearlyshiftedback
towardacademe.'8 Since 1980,forexample,membershipin the InternationalSecu-
ritysectionof the InternationalStudiesAssociationhas grownnearlytwiceas fastas
overallmembership.The creationof the InternationalSecurityand ArmsControl
sectionwithinthe AmericanPoliticalScience Associationin 1988 reflectsa similar
trend.19

17 By the 1980s, the perspectiveof some liberal theor-ists

had moved suLbstantially
closer to the realistposition,
withoutembracingitentirely.Compare Keohane and Nye (1972, 1977) withKeohane (1984) and Nye (1988). For a
summaryof thistr-end,see Gr-ieco(1990).
18 Since 1982, the Mershon Center at Ohio State
Universityhas awarded an annual prize forthebest firstbook in
national securityaffairs.As of this writing,four of the recipientsare universityprofessors(John Mearsheimer,
Barry Posen, the presentauthor, and Aaron Friedberg),and two of the other winners(Bruce Blair and Andrew
Krepinevich)received the award for books based on Ph.D. dissertations.
19Membership in the InternationalSecuritysection of the ISA increased from316 to 683 between 1980 and
1990 (an increase of 116 percent),whiletotalISA membershipincreased from1892 to roughly3000 over the same
period (a 59 percent increase).

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220 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

Explaining theRenaissance
As this discussionsuggests,the emergenceof new policy problemsand specific
theoreticaland empiricalpuzzlesplayedtheprimaryrolein sparkingtherenaissance
of securitystudies. The resurgenceof the fieldwas reinforcedby several other
developmentsas well.

The End of theVietnamWar. The U.S. withdrawalfromIndochina made it easier

for studentsto studynationalsecurityissues withoutbeing ostracized,and it may
have reduced the suspicionwithwhichscholarsin securitystudieswere viewedby
academic departments.The defectalso encourageda reassessmentof U.S. foreign
and defense policy; as a result,youngerscholarswere inspiredto studysecurity
issuesin orderto learnfrompastmistakes.If theVietnamWar underminedsecurity
studiesin the 1960s, it helped reviveit once the war was over.

The CollapseofDetente. Interestin security

affairswas also revivedbythedeteriora-
tion of U.S.-Soviet relationsin the late 1970s and early 1980s. Althoughpublic
concernforAmerica'sinternational positionwas exaggerated,theIranianand Nica-
raguan revolutions,the SALT II treaty,and Sovietintervention in Africaand Af-
ghanistanhelped place national securityissues back on the public and academic
agenda. The Reagan Administration's dramaticdefense build-up reinforcedthis
trendby provokingfearsthatU.S. nationalsecuritypolicywas extravagantat best
and provocativeat worst.Justas theCold War launchedtheGoldenAge and detente
caused securitystudiesto languish,increasedinternational tensionshelped reinvigo-
rate the field.

IncreasedAccesstoData. Anothermajorcause of therenaissancewas the increased

qualityand quantityof information availableto scholarsworkingoutsidetheofficial
national securityestablishment.In addition to the growingpartnershipbetween
historiansand politicalscientists
and the increaseduse of archivalmaterial,security
studiesprofitedfromgreateraccess to data on contemporary securityissues. This
developmentwas part of the general campaign againstgovernmentalsecrecyin-
spiredby Vietnamand Watergate,and by the mid-1970sauthoritative data on de-
fense policywere available fromorganizationssuch as the CongressionalBudget
Officeand the Officeof TechnologyAssessment,along withtheAnnual Reportof the
SecretaryofDefenseand a varietyof Congressionalhearingsand committee reports.20
These officialsourcesweresupplementedbypublicationsfromprivateorganizations
suchas theInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS), theBrookingsInstitu-
tion,the InstituteforDefenseand DisarmamentStudies(IDDS), and theStockholm
InternationalPeace Research Institute(SIPRI).21 Like the officialsources upon
whichtheywere based, some of these publicationscontainedinevitableerrorsand
biases (Brzoska, 1981; Blackabyand Ohlson, 1982). Exposure to public scrutiny
helped correctthese problemsover time,however,and civiliananalystsbecame
increasinglyadept in analyzingcontemporarydefense issues. In short,improved
access to informationwas a necessaryconditionforthe growthof the field.

IncreasedOutletsforPublishing. New outletsforscholarlypublishingwerea boon to

the fieldas well. In the past,the lack of refereedjournals in securityaffairswas an
obstacleto youngerscholarsin theacademicworldand mayhave contributedto the

20
For examples, see Congr-essionalBudget Office(1977) and Carter (1984).
21
For examples of these publications,see Cochran, Arkinand Hoenig (1984), Epstein (1987), the IISS Military
Balance and the SIPRI WorldArmaments and DisarmamentYearbook.

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 221

partialisolationof securitystudiesfromtheuniversity community.22 But thecreation

of InternationalSecurityin 1976 and the Journal of StrategicStudiesin 1978, the im-
provedqualityof publicationssuchas Survival and TheAdelphiPapers,and thefound-
ing of the Cornell Studies in SecurityAffairsin the early 1980s encouragedmore
ambitiousand rigorousworkson security topics.23
EvenInternationalOrganization,the
premierjournal in the fieldof internationalpoliticaleconomy,issued an explicit
invitationfor articleson securityaffairsduringthisperiod,whichfurtherunder-
scoredthe enhanced legitimacyof the field.

Financial Support. Like its medievalnamesake,the renaissanceof securitystudies

was fueled by wealth. The Ford Foundation'searly commitmentto establishing
researchcentersat Harvard,MIT, Stanford,Cornelland UCLA had an exception-
ally strongimpact,togetherwithits long-standingcommitmentto the IISS. In-
creased publicconcernabout nationalsecurityissuesencouragedgeneroussupport
frominstitutions such as the CarnegieCorporationof New York,the Ford Founda-
tion,the MacArthurFoundation,theJohnM. Olin Foundation,the NationalAcad-
emy of Sciences,the Pew CharitableTrusts,the U.S. Instituteof Peace, and the
Smith-Richardson Foundation,among others.24The programsthese funds sup-
portedenable scholarsto conductresearchfreefromofficial pressures,helpedyoun-
ger scholarscompletetheirtraining,and allowednew membersof thefieldto forge
valuable professionalnetworkswithinthe diverseintellectualatmosphereof a uni-
versity.It is not surprising,therefore,that many prominentyoungerscholarsin
securitystudiesspent partof theircareersin one of theseprograms.

SecurityStudies and Social Science. Last but not least,the resurrectionof security
studieswas facilitatedbyitsadoptionof thenormsand objectivesof socialscience.As
a social science,securitystudiesseeks to develop generalexplanatorypropositions
about the use of force in internationalpolitics,and to apply this knowledgeto
importantcontemporaryissues. Like othersocial scientists, scholarsin securityaf-
fairsengage in threemain activities:1) theorycreation,the developmentof logically
relatedcausal propositionsexplaininga particularphenomenonof interest;2) theory
testing,attemptsto verify,falsify,and refinecompetingtheoriesby testingtheir
predictionsagainsta scientifically selectedbodyof evidence;and 3) theory application,
the use of existingknowledgeto illuminatea specificpolicyproblem.The firsttwo
categoriesare oftenlinked-the creationof new theoriesis usuallyaccompaniedby
effortsto testthem-while "policyanalysis"in securityaffairsconsistsprimarilyof
the third.25

22 Prior to 1976, scholarlyarticleson securityaffairswere confin-edprimarilyto WorldPolitics,International

Stuidies
Quarterly,or theJournalofConflict Resolution.These jouLrnalsdevoted much of theirspace to other topics,however,
whichreduced opportunitiesforscholarsconductingserious analyticalworkin securitystudies.ForeignAffairs and
ForeignPolicypublished importantscholarlyarticleson occasion, but theywere more likelyto publish undocuL-
mented policy advocacy by governmentofficials,jouLrnalists, or academics.
23 This developmentwas obviouslyboth cause and effect;the growthof publishingopportuLnities
itselfreflected
growinginterestin the field.JouLrnalssuch as International helped improve the qualityof scholarshipby
Security
emphasizingcumulativeresearch,carefuldocumentation,policyrelevance,and theoreticalor historicaloriginality.
24 The MacArthur Foundation alone allocated $65 millionfor research on peace and securityissues between

1984 and 1992, and it fun-dedover-350 graduate studentsan-d140 facultymembersbetween 1985 and 1988 alon-e.
See Benedict (1989).
25 As in other areas of pUblic policy,policyrecomm-ien-datiolnsin secuLrity abouLt the
affairsr-estonivaguLeinotionis
impactof alter-native policies. Making these "folktheories,"e.g., the "domino theory,"the "windowof vulnerabil-
ity,"explicitan-dtestingthem-- is a key par-tof academic research in the fielcd.

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222 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

Securitystudiesseeks cumulative knowledgeabout the role of militaryforce.To

obtainit,thefieldmustfollowthestandardcanonsof scientific research:carefuland
consistentuse of terms,unbiasedmeasurementof criticalconcepts,and publicdocu-
mentationof theoreticaland empiricalclaims.Althoughno researchenterpriseever
livesup to thesestandardscompletely,theyare theprinciplesthatmake cumulative
researchpossible.The increasedsophistication of the securitystudiesfieldand its
growingprominencewithinthe scholarlycommunityis due in large part to the
endorsementof theseprinciplesby mostmembersof the field.
To summarize:The renaissanceof securitystudieswas over-determined. It re-
flecteda politicalclimatein whichtheimportanceof nationalsecurityproblemswas
increasinglyappreciatedand in whichacademicinstitutions became morereceptive
to workin this area. Althoughthe renaissancebegan beforethe recentsurge in
financialsupport,thesegrantssustaineditsgrowth.Increasedaccessto information
and civilianexpertisewere bothcause and effect,along withthe marriagebetween
securitystudiesand social science.The resultwas the reemergenceof an important
subfieldof internationalrelationsin a new and improvedform.

Problemsand ProspectsforSecurityStudies
Whatliesahead forsecuritystudies?On theone hand,thewidespreadbeliefthatthe
end of the Cold War has decreased the riskof war maytemporarily divertfinancial
supportand researchenergiesin otherdirections.On theotherhand, a permanent
decline is unlikelyfor at least three reasons. First,as the war in the Persian Gulf
remindsus, militarypower remainsa centralelementof international politics,and
failureto appreciate its importanceinvariablyleads to costlyreminders.Second,
securitystudieshas been institutionalized withinmanyuniversity departments;in-
deed, a graduateprogramlackingqualifiedexpertsin thisarea mustnow be consid-
ered incomplete.Thus, new Ph.D.s willemergein due course and willenjoy ade-
quate professionalopportunities. Mostimportantof all,thecollapseof theCold War
orderwillcreatenew policyproblemsand new researchpuzzles.In short,theschol-
arlyagenda in securitystudiesis expanding,not shrinking, and securitystudieswill
remainan active-sub-field forsome timeto come.

PotentialProblems
Despite these groundsfor optimism,severaldangerscould underminethe future
developmentof the field.As noted earlier,the resourcesat stakein debates over
defenseand foreignpolicycreatea strongtemptationto focuson short-term policy
analysis.Moreover,as Hans Morgenthauonce warned,activeinvolvement in policy
forthe sake of
debatesinevitablytemptsparticipantsto sacrificescholarlyintegrity
(Morgenthau,1970; Walt,1987a:146-60). At
personalgain or politicaleffectiveness
the veryleast,thereare powerfulincentivesto concentrateon consultingworkand
policyanalysisratherthan on cumulativescholarlyresearch.If securitystudiesne-
glectslong-termresearchquestionsand focusessolelyon immediatepolicyissues,a
declinein rigorand qualitywillbe difficult to avoid.
Yet the oppositetendencymaypose an even greaterdanger.On thewhole,secu-
ritystudieshave profitedfromitsconnectionto real-worldissues;themainadvances
of the past four decades have emerged fromeffortsto solve importantpractical
questions.If securitystudiessuccumbsto the tendencyforacademicdisciplinesto
pursue "the trivial,the formal,the methodological,the purelytheoretical,the re-
motelyhistorical-inshort,thepoliticallyirrelevent"(Morgenthau,1966:73),itstheo-
reticalprogressand its practicalvalue willinevitably decline.

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 223

In short,securitystudiesmuststeerbetweenthe Scyllaof politicalopportunism

and theCharybdisof academicirrelevance.Whatdoes thismeanin practice?Among
otherthings,it means thatsecuritystudiesshould remainwaryof the counterpro-
ductivetangentsthathave seduced otherareas of international
studies,mostnotably
the"post-modern" approach to international
affairs(Ashley,1984; Der Derian and
Shapiro, 1989; Lapid, 1989). Contraryto theirproponents'claims,post-modern
approacheshave yetto demonstratemuchvalue forcomprehendingworldpolitics;
to date,theseworksare mostlycriticismand notmuchtheory.26 As RobertKeohane
has noted, until these writers"have delineated . . . a research program and shown
. . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics,they will remain on the
marginsofthefield"(Keohane, 1988:392). In particular, issuesofwarand peace are
too importantforthe fieldto be divertedintoa prolixand self-indulgent discourse
thatis divorcedfromthe real world.
The use of formalmodelsshould also be viewedwithsome caution,thoughtheir
potentialvalue is greater.Formalmethodspossessobviousvirtues:analyticassump-
tionstend to be statedmore explicitly,gaps in evidencecan be handled through
systematic sensitivityanalyses,and advanced mathematicaltechniquescan identify
deductivesolutionsto previouslyintractableproblems(for recentexamples, see
O'Neill, 1989; Downs and Rocke, 1990; Powell, 1990). Formal analysiscan also
depicta theory'slogicalstructurewithprecision,generatingcounterintuitive propo-
sitionsand identifying inconsistencies.
Yet despite these strengths, recentformalapplicationshave had relativelylittle
impacton otherworkin the field.This situationstandsin sharp contrastto earlier
formalworks(Schelling,1960; Olson and Zeckhauser,1966),whichhad a broad and
lastinginfluence.One reasonis thetendencyforrecentworksto relyon increasingly
heroic assumptions,which render these models both impossibleto test and less
applicableto importantreal-worldproblems.The danger,as Schellingwarned,is
"thewillingness of socialscientists
to treatthesubject[ofstrategy]as thoughitwere,
or should be, solelya branchof mathematics" (1960:10).
Obviously,scholarshipin social science need not have immediate"policyrele-
vance."But tolerancefordiverseapproachesis not a licenseto pursue a technique
regardlessof itsultimatepayoff;thevalue of anysocialsciencetoolliesin whatitcan
tellus about real humanbehavior.Formalmodelsare usefulwhentheydo this,but
theyshouldnotbe viewedas ends in themselves.Unfortunately, despitetheimpres-
sivetechnicalfirepowerdisplayedin manyrecentformalworks,theirabilityto illu-
minateimportantnationalsecurityproblemshas been disappointing.
Because scientific disciplinesadvance throughcompetition, we should not tryto
impose a single methodologicalmonolithupon the field.To insistthat a single
methodconstitutes theonlyproperapproachis likesayingthata hammeris theonly
propertool forbuildinga house. The above strictures are no morethana warning,
therefore;progresswill be best served by increased dialogue between different
methodologicalapproaches (Downs, 1989).27

26
AlthoughYosef Lapid citesImre Lakatos's critiqueof naive positivismapprovingly(Lapid, 1989:239, 245), he
neglects Lakatos's key argument: theories are only overturned by the development of a superior alternative
(Lakatos, 1970).
27
In the past,forexample, securitystudiestended to dismissquantitativeresearchon conflictas irrelevant,while
the lattertended to view securitystudies as unscientific"policyanalysis."Both charges are undoubtedlytrue in
some cases, but a blanket dismissal is increasinglyinappropriate. Instead, encouraging both groups to become
more familiarwithalternativeapproaches would improve both enterprises.For example, wheneverthese litera-
tures reach differentconclusions-such as on the impact of domesticconflictor regime typeon the likelihoodof
war-there is an obvious opportunityfor furtherwork.

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224 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

A ResearchAgendafor SecurityStudies
Any attempt to define a research agenda will invariably omit important or unfore-
seen possibilities. Nevertheless, several subjects clearly merit furtherattention.

The Role of DomesticPolitics. Some of the most interesting advances in security

studies have come from scholars focusing on differentaspects of domestic politics.
What unites these disparate theories is the belief that domestic politics is a powerful
determinant of national securitypolicy. For example, several prominent studies have
argued that liberal democracies do not fighteach other (Small and Singer, 1976;
Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984; Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989); given the impor-
tance of this claim, further research is needed to resolve the remaining theoretical
and empirical puzzles.28 Similarly,the long-standingdebate over the military'srole as
a cause of war remains unresolved (Huntington, 1957; Vagts, 1959; Betts, 1977;
Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1984), along with the validityof the so-called scapegoat
and diversionarytheories of war (Levy, 1988, 1990). Other recent works suggest that
regime change or revolution is a potent cause of conflictas well (Maoz, 1989; Walt,
1990), but further research to measure and explain this effectis still needed. Stu-
dents of arms races have long stressed the role of domestic factors (York, 1970;
Kurth, 1971; Senghaas, 1972; Evangelista, 1988), and Jack Snyder's recent work
(1991) on empires argues that the internal politics of rapidly industrializingsocieties
encourages "log-rolled" domestic coalitions to unite behind highly expansionist for-
eign policies. Given the recent shiftsin the domestic politics of the Soviet Union and
its Eastern European allies, furtherwork on these differentapproaches is clearly in
order.

The Causes of Peace and Cooperation.Another potential growth area is in greater

attentionto the causes of peace and cooperation. To be sure, most theories about the
causes of war are also theories about peace (Van Evera, 1984; Blainey, 1988), and
exploring ways to reduce the risk of war has been part of the field since its incep-
tion.29In the past, however, securitystudies tended to view explicit research on peace
as utopian or naive, perhaps based on a belief that realistsshould not be diverted into
such idealistic pursuits. For their part, peace researchers tended to assume that the
use of force was always irrational, that arms races were a powerful cause of conflict
rather than a symptom, and that war was always the result of misperception. The
tendency for some peace researchers to view capitalism as a powerful engine of
conflict (despite the abundant evidence against this belief) divided the two fields
even further.30
Over time, however, the two perspectives have begun to converge. As discussed
above, scholars in securitystudies have devoted considerable attentionto mispercep-
tion and domestic politics as causes of war, while some peace researchers have begun
to address issues of militarystrategyand defense policy in a more sophisticated and
well-informedway. This trend is perhaps most evident in the literature on "nonof-
fensive" defense: many of these writingsacknowledge the need for militarypower
while investigating alternative force structures that could ameliorate the security

28
In addition to problems of definition(were England and Germany liberal states in 1812 and 1914 respec-
tively?)and the lack of independence between cases (many liberal states were formerlyunited in the British
empire), these stuLdieshave yet to offera persuasive explanation for the "liberal peace."
29
For example, deterrence theory identifiesthe conditions that make decisions for war irrational,surely a
worthygoal for opponents of war.
30 For surveysof peace research from a varietyof perspectives,see Singer (1976), BouLlding(1978), Wiberg

(1981), and QuLester-

(1989).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 225

dilemma between states (Ahfeldt, 1983; Alternative Defense Commission, 1983;

Agrell, 1987; Gates, 1987; Saperstein, 1987; Flanagan, 1988). Although primarilya
product of the peace research community,these works bear a strong resemblance to
the offense/defenseliterature in securitystudies.
Increased interest in peace and cooperation is evident in other ways as well. For
example, scholars of securityaffairshave been understandably skeptical of "security
regimes" in the past (Jervis, 1983), but more recent studies suggest that international
regimes can have modest positive effects on the ability of states to cooperate on
specific security issues (Lynn-Jones, 1985; Nye, 1987; George, Farley, and Dallin,
1988). Although self-help remains the primary imperative in international politics,
institutionalarrangements could stillcontributeto peace, particularlyif theydirectly
address the primary controllable causes of war identified by previous scholarly
work.3'
Far from being a utopian ideal, effortsto reduce the danger of war are consistent
with the central focus of security studies and with realism's traditional pessimism
about the prospects for a durable peace. Moreover, preserving peace contributes
directly to national security, at least for most states most of the time. Given their
belief that war is always a possibility,realists should be especially interested in devis-
ing ways to ensure that it does not occur. In short,well-informedresearch on peace is
a realistic response to anarchy and should be part of securitystudies.

The Power of Ideas. Finally, interest in the "autonomous power of ideas" has also
grown in recent years. The role of "strategicbeliefs" in foreign and militarypolicy
has been stressed by historians (Howard, 1984), by scholars drawing upon psychol-
ogy (Jervis, 1976; Kull, 1988), and by studies of militaryorganizations and domestic
politics (Snyder, 1984, 1991; Van Evera, 1984; Thomson, 1990). More generally,
John Mueller (1989) and James L. Ray (1990) have argued that war is a fading
institutionamong advanced industrial societies,just as dueling and slavery become
obsolete in the 19th century. Significantly,their arguments are not based on the
dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Instead, they claim that the horrors of conven-
tional war have discredited the earlier belief thatit was a noble or heroic activity.This
argument remains incomplete, however, for we lack a theory to account for the
observed change in attitudes (Kaysen, 1990). Mueller attributes the shift to the
dehumanizing experience of World War I, but this does not explain why earlier wars
failed to produce a similar result. Without a theory of attitude change, we cannot
estimate the durabilityof current antiwar attitudes or devise a workable strategyfor
reinforcingthem. And as Mueller admits, the outbreak of World War II shows that if
most but not all states believe war is too horrible to contemplate, those that do not
share this view will be more likely to use force precisely because they expect oppo-
nents to acquiesce rather than fight.Unless popular revulsion against war becomes
universal and permanent, it provides no guarantee that inter-stateviolence would
end. Despite these limitations,the impact of changing attitudeson warfare remains a
fascinating question, as part of the general subject of how states learn.

TheEnd oftheCold War. For the past fortyyears, the two superpowers defined their
securitypolicies primarilyin response to each other, and the rivalrybetween them
shaped the conduct of most other states as well. Accordingly, the waning of U.S.-
Soviet rivalrywill have a significantimpact on securitystudies.

31 Examples include offensivemilitaryimbalances,territorialdisputes,xenophobia, and hypernationalism.The

U.S.-Soviet arms controlnegotiationshelped stabilizetheirdeterrentrelationshipby limitinganti-ballisticmissile
systems,and the United Nations Educational, Scientificand Ctulttural
Organization (UNESCO) led a largelysuc-
cessfulcampaign to eliminate national biases withinEtiropean textbooks(Dance, 1960).

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226 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

First,the studyof grand strategywill be increasinglyimportant.As discussed

earlier,interestin U.S. grand strategyrevivedduringthe renaissanceof security
studies,but thereare stillno theoreticalor comparativeworkson grandstrategy and
relativelyfewstudiesof othercases.32Because bothgreatand lesserpowerswillneed
newsecurityarrangementsonce theCold War is over,researchon alternative grand
strategieswillbe of obvious interest.Under whatconditionsshould statesemploy
militaryforceand forwhat purposes?Withthe waningof the Sovietthreat,what
interestswillthe othergreat powersseek to defend?Can the UnitedStatesand its
alliesnowreducetheirmilitary forces,or shouldtheybe configuredforothercontin-
gencies?These issues are certainto receiveconsiderableattention,and some of it
should come fromexpertswithouta professionalinterestin the outcome.
Second, theend of theCold War raisesbasic issuesabout the prospectsforpeace.
Will the waningof U.S.-Soviet rivalryreduce the danger of war or allow familiar
sourcesof conflictto reemerge?Willregionalpowerstakemoreaggressiveactionsto
improvetheir positions-as Iraq sought to do by invadingKuwait-or will they
behave morecautiouslyin the absence of superpowersupport?Attemptsto answer
theseand otherquestionswillnecessarily buildon theexistingknowledgebase in the
field,but willalso stimulatenew empiricalstudiesand theoreticalinnovations.
These concernsare already evidentin the scholarlydebate over the futureof
Europe. At leastfourmainviewscan be identified. "Third-imagepessimists"33argue
thatthere-emergenceof a multipolarEurope willrestoretheconditionsthatfueled
war in Europe in the past; forthisreason,theend of theCold War willincreasethe
danger of war. They recommendthat U.S. militaryforcesremain in Europe to
dampen these effectsand favorthe managed spread of nuclearweapons (to Ger-
manyin particular)to alleviatethe securityfearstheybelievewill accompanythe
superpowers'withdrawalfromEurope (Mearsheimer,1990). "Second-imagepessi-
mists"downplaysystemiccauses and emphasizethe dangersarisingfromthe weak
democraticinstitutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They fear that
competinginterestgroups will use foreignpolicyto enhance theirdomesticposi-
tions;in the worstcase, severalfactionswould unitein a coalitioncombiningtheir
separateexpansionistagendas, as occurredin Germanyand Japan beforethe two
worldwars. The recommendedantidoteis Westernassistanceto supportthe new
democraciesin EasternEurope, and the rapid integrationof these statesinto the
European Community(EC) (Snyder,1990).
Rejectingthesepessimistic views,"second-imageoptimists" argue thattheleveling
of European societies,the dampeningof militarism, and the extensiverewriting of
nationalisthistoryin Europe haveremovedthemaincausesofearlierwars.This view
sees the possibledissolutionof the SovietUnion as the main threatto peace, and
favorsWesterneffortsto encourage a peaceful transitionand to preventthe re-
emergenceof the domesticforcesthat fueled aggressionin the past (Van Evera,
1990-91). Finally,"institutional optimists"suggestthateconomicintegrationand
international (suchas NATO, theEC, or theConferenceon Securityand
institutions
Cooperationin Europe) willbe strongenough to safeguardpeace in Europe. A full
scholarlypresentationof this view is not yet available-though Snyder (1990)
presentselementsof one-but itimpliesusingexistinginstitutions arms
to facilitate
controland to manage economicand politicaltensionsin an independentand in-
creasinglyunitedEurope (Hoffmann,1990; Keohane, 1990).

32 Studies of grand strategyfor non-U.S. cases include Handel (1973), Luttwak(1976), Ben-Horin and Posen
(1981), Friedberg (1988), and Mandelbaum (1988).
33 "Third-image" theories view war as a result of the anarchic internationalsystem,"second-image" theories
focus on the internal character of states,and "first-image"theoriesaddress causes found in human nature. See
Waltz (1959).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 227

A briefsummarycannotdo justice to the subtletyand powerof thesecompeting

views.It is worthnoting,however,thatall of themrelyon scholarshipdevelopedor
refinedduringtherenaissanceof securitystudies:thescholarlydebateon thefuture
of Europe is verymucha contestbetweenrivaltheoreticalvisions.It is also an issue
withfar-reaching implicationsfordefensebudgets,alliancecommitments, and the
likelihoodof war. Far fromsignalinga decliningrole forsecuritystudies,in short,
theend of theCold War willkeep securityissueson thefrontburnerforsome time
to come.

Economicsand Security.The relationshipbetweeneconomicsand securityis of

growinginterestas well. One obviousdimensionis theconnectionbetweenmilitary
spendingand economic performance;the debate sparkedby Paul Kennedy'sThe
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers illustratesthe continueddissensuson thisquestion
(Kennedy,1987; Adams and Gold, 1987; Huntington,1988-89; Friedberg,1989;
Kupchan, 1989a; Nye, 1990). Second, despite the attentionthat resource issues
received after the 1973 oil shocks,disputes persiston the strategicimportance
of economicresourcesand theirrole as potentialcauses of internationalconflict
(Shafer, 1982; Maull, 1984; Finlaysonand Haglund, 1987; Johnson,1989). The
recentwarin thePersianGulfhighlights thecontinuedrelevanceof thisissue,as well
as the potentialeffectiveness of economicsanctionsas a diplomaticinstrument.
A thirdissue linkingeconomicsand securityis the politicalinfluenceof the mili-
tary-industrial complex (MIC). Althoughseveral recentworkshave analyzed the
procurementprocessin detail (Gansler,1982, 1989; Stubbing,1986; McNaugher,
1989), therehas been littleresearchon the MIC's politicalrole in shapingnational
policy.Even our historicalknowledgeis deficient;thereis stillno adequate successor
to Huntington'sThe CommonDefense(1961), Schilling,Hammond,and Snyder'sStrat-
egy,Politics,and DefenseBudgets(1962),and Enthovenand Smith'sHow Much is
Enough? (1971). Indeed, thereis no authoritative scholarlyanalysisof the U.S. de-
fensebuildupin the 1980s.34Cross-nationalcomparisonswould be valuableas well,
to supplementthefewstudiesnowavailable(Evangelista,1988). Giventheresources
at stake,investigating how such decisionsare made seems well worththe effortof
economistsand securityexpertsalike.

RefiningExisting Theories. The discussionin this sectionunderscoreshow new

theoriesand approaches have sparked livelyscholarlyexchangesthroughoutthe
renaissanceof securitystudies,on topicssuch as theimpactof offensiveand defen-
siveadvantages,the effectof domesticpoliticson war,thecauses and consequences
of arms races, the requirementsof extended deterrence,the sources of military
innovation,and the prospectsfor securitycooperation.In most cases, however,
competinghypotheseshave notbeen subjectedto systematic empiricaltests.In addi-
tionto theusual effortsto devisenew theories,therefore, and testingexist-
refining
ing hypothesesthroughwell-designedempiricalstudiesshould forma centralpart
of futurework.

ProtectingtheData Base. As noted earlier,the renaissanceof securitystudieswas

facilitatedby greateraccess to relevantinformation.Unfortunately, severalrecent
developmentssuggestthatthe information so necessaryforscholarshipand foran
informedpublicdebate is beingseriouslycurtailed.The Annual Reportsproducedby
the Defense Departmentduringthe Reagan Administration were less informative

34 Instead, mostrecentwritingson U.S. defense policyare journalistic,polemical,or narrowlyfocused (Fallows,

1982; Stubbing, 1986; or Kotz, 1988).

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228 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

than earlierversions,and thistrendhas continuedunder PresidentBush.35The

Reagan Administration was also moreaggressivein prosecutingallegedleaks and in
manipulatingmedia coverage,therebyinhibiting journalistsfrominvestigative re-
portingand reducingtherawdata availableforuse byscholars(Hertsgaard,1988).36
Even moreworrisome,a recentvolumeof theForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,the
StateDepartment'sofficialrecordof U.S. diplomacy,containedsuch seriousdistor-
tionsthattheChairmanof itsAdvisoryCommitteeresignedin protest,accompanied
by widespreadcondemnationfromthe Historicalprofession(Cohen, 1990; Kuni-
holm, 1990; Societyof Historiansof AmericanForeignRelations,1990).37
Effortsto shieldgovernmentpolicyfromoutsideevaluationpose a gravethreatto
scholarshipin the field. No doubt some governmentofficialswould like to deny
ordinarycitizenstheopportunity to scrutinizetheirconduct;as a centralpartof that
evaluativeprocess,the scholarlyprofessionshould resistthiseffortwholeheartedly.
The dangergoes beyondtheinterestsof anyparticularsubfield;restricting informa-
tionthreatensthe publicdebate thatis centralto democracyand essentialto sound
policy.Eventsas diverseas the Bay of Pigs invasion,the Iran/contraaffair,and the
troubleddevelopmentof theB-2 bomberremindus thatexcessivesecrecyallowsill-
conceivedprogramsto surviveuncorrected.Insteadof limitingthestudyof security
issues to a select group of official"experts,"therefore,open debate on national
securitymattersmustbe preserved.Such a debaterequiresthatscholarsretainaccess
to a reliableand completedata base.

Conclusion: Some Lessons for the Future

The rise,fall,and recoveryof securitystudiesofferseveralguidelinesforthefuture
conductof the field.To encourage continuedprogress,I conclude thisessay by
considering(1) the evolutionof knowledgein the field,(2) the place of security
studiesin the academic world,(3) the role of researchsupport,and (4) the norms
and ethosof the field.

The EvolutionofKnowledge
The historyof securitystudiesrevealsseveralfeaturesabout theevolutionof social
science.First,it illustrateshow externaleventsinfluencethe scholarlyagenda: as
notedthroughoutthisessay,researchin securitystudieshas been heavilyshaped by
changinginternational conditions.Obviously,an excessivefocuson immediatepol-
icyissuescan stiflelong-term progressand increasethedangerthatresearchsupport
will be subjectto a "feastor famine"cycleas internationaltensionsrise and fall
(Jerviset al., 1986:60; Nye & Lynn-Jones,1988:21). On the whole,however,the
attentionpaid to policyissues has positiveeffects:it is the main source of new
researchquestionsand discouragesany drifttowardacademicirrelevance.

35 The Defense Department seems proud of its failureto informus: its 1990 AnnualReportboasts thatit saved

$121,800 by "tailoringthe reportdirectlyto statutoryrequirements. . . and eliminatingunnecessaryno-charge

distribution."In other words, SecretaryCheney's staffincluded only what was absolutelyrequired by law and
reduced public access to its report!
36 The Bush Administration'shandling of the Panama invasionand the Gull War suggeststhatit is followinga
similarapproach, aided by a compliantmedia (Cook and Cohen, 1990).

3 Specifically,
Volume X in the 1952-1954 series,coveringU.S. policyin Iran, niakes no mentioniof Operation
AJAX,the U.S.-backed coup thatousted the Mossadegh governmentin 1953. Accordingto Bruce Kuniholni,an
historianof U.S.-Iranian relationsand formerState Departnientermiployee withaccess to the complete account:
"the misleading impressionof U.S. non-involvementconveyed in the pages of this voluLnleconstitutesa gross
misrepresentationof the historicalrecord sufficientto deserve the label of fraud" (Kuniholni, 1990:12).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 229

Second, the historyof securitystudiesalso illustratesthe mechanismsby which

socialscienceadvances.One avenue is borrowingfromotherdisciplines:liketherest
ofinternational relations,securitystudieshas profitedbydrawingupon otherbodies
of knowledge.The othersource of progressis competitionbetweenrivaltheories.
Competitionencouragescontendingapproaches to refinetheirargumentsand to
seek betterempiricalsupport,and it usuallyleads themto incorporateeach other's
ideas as well. As noted earlier,the past decade has seen a partialconvergencebe-
tweenthe subfieldsof securitystudies,peace research,and internationalpolitical
economy,a developmentthatis likelyto benefitall three.The end of the Cold War
willreinforcethistrendbyremovingsomeof thesubstantive divisionsbetweenthese
The lesson,of course,is thatwhilecompetitionis essentialforscientific
subfields.38
progress,scholarswithdifferent can learna greatdeal from
theoreticalperspectives
each other.39

SecurityStudiesand theIvoryTower
A recurringthemeof thisessayhas been thetwindangersof separatingthestudyof
securityaffairsfromtheacademicworldor of shifting thefocusof academicscholar-
shiptoo farfromreal-worldissues.The dangerof warwillbe withus forsome time
to come,and stateswillcontinueto acquiremilitaryforcesfora varietyof purposes.
Unless one believesthatignoranceis preferableto expertise,thevalue of indepen-
dent nationalsecurityscholarsshould be apparent. Indeed, historysuggeststhat
countriesthatsuppressdebate on nationalsecuritymattersare morelikelyto blun-
der into disaster,because misguidedpoliciescannotbe evaluatedand stopped in
time.40
As in otherareas of publicpolicy,academicexpertsin securitystudiescan help in
severalways.In the shortterm,academicsare well placed to evaluatecurrentpro-
grams,because theyface less pressureto supportofficialpolicy.4'The long-term
effectsof academic involvementmaybe even more significant: academic research
can help stateslearn frompast mistakesand can providethetheoreticalinnovations
thatproducebetterpolicychoicesin the future.Furthermore, theirrole in training
the new generationof expertsgives academicsan additionalavenue of influence.
Assumingtheyperformthese tasksresponsibly,academicswill have a positive-
albeitgradual-impact on how statesdeal withthe problemof war in the future.

The Role ofResearchSupport

The renaissanceof securitystudieswas facilitatedby increasedfinancialsupport
fromseveral sources, especiallyprivatefoundations.Managing the allocationof
researchsupportis an imposingchallenge:among otherthings,thereare no per-

38 In the past, securitystudies tended to focus primarilyon East-Westissues, while internationalpoliticalecon-

omyconcentratedon West-Westand, to a lesserextent,North-Southissues.The end of the Cold War willlead both
subfieldsto address similarissues, such as the futureof Europe; the resultwillbe a fruitfulcompetitionbetween
contendingtheories.I am indebted to John Mearsheimerfor discussionon thispoint.
39 Scholars in securitystudieswould also profitfromgreaterattentionto some of the findingsof peace research-

ers, whilethe lattercould learn much fromthe formerabout identifying importanttheoreticaland practicalissues.
40
Examples include Germany'sSchlieffenPlan, theJapanese campaign of expansion in Asia in the 1930s, the
Argentinejunta's attemptto seize the Falkland Islands in 1981, and Israel's ill-fatedinvasionof Lebanon in 1982.
In each of these cases, public discussionof strategyand foreignpolicywas suppressed,and the basic flawsin each
strategywere not discussed openly. On thisgeneral problem,see Van Evera (1984, 1987) and Walt (1987a: 146-
54).
41
Recent examples are Mearsheimer (1986) and Brown (1989).

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230 The RenaissanceofSecurity
Studies

fectlyreliablecriteriaforassessingthemeritsof competingproposalsor thebenefits

of earlierdecisions.Outside reviewcommittees can help,butanyattemptto evaluate
the role of outsidesupportshould acknowledgetheinherentproblemsdonors face
and the laudable aims thatmanyof themseek.
The renaissanceof securitystudiessuggestsseverallessonsin thisregard.Support
for "scholarlyinfrastructure" has been the mosteffectiveway for privatefounda-
tionsto contributeto long-termprogress.As discussedabove,theFord Foundation's
supportforseveralacademicresearchcenterswas essentialin resurrecting thefield.
Since then,theMacArthurFoundation'ssupportforInternational itsinstitu-
Security,
tional grantsto a numberof academic and researchorganizations,and the Ford
Foundation'scontinuedsupportforthe IISS have providedforumsforthe publica-
tionof seriousacademicresearchand fortheairingof scholarlydisputes,along with
directsupportforindividualscholars.42 The Pew CharitableTrustsand theJohnM.
Olin Foundation have also provided extensivesupportfor researchprogramsin
securitystudies.If groupssuch as thesecontinuetoofferadequate financialbacking,
the momentumgained duringthe renaissanceshould continue.
The recenteffortto enrichsecuritystudiesbydrawingscholarsfromotherdisci-
plines into the field(for example, throughthe MacArthur/SSRC"dual expertise"
program)has had more mixed results.Althoughsome "retooling"programswere
valuable(especiallyforlanguagetrainingand to encouragenaturalscientists to learn
about securityissues),thebeliefthatsecuritystudieswas intellectually
impoverished
paid insufficientattentionto the interdisciplinary
approach thathad characterized
thefieldsinceitsinception.Furthermore, makinga majorcontribution to anydisci-
plinerequiresseriousand time-consuming preparation;thenecessaryexpertisecan-
notbe acquiredin a yearor two.Securitystudiesis no exceptionto thisrule,and itis
thereforenot surprisingthatprogressduringthe renaissancehas come primarily
fromscholarswithinthe fieldwho drew upon otherdisciplinesratherthan from
expertsfromotherfieldswho suddenlyturnedtheirattentionto securityissues.
Foundationsshould takeriskson occasion,of course,and theultimatebenefitof a
particularinitiativecannotbe knownin advance.Over thelongerterm,however,itis
mostimportantto maintainan activegroup of expertswhose primaryinterestis
securitystudies itself(Lebow, 1988:515). Because these individualswill have the
greatestimpacton futuredebates over nationalsecurity,foundationsthathope to
influencethesedebates should ensure thattheseexpertsare adequatelysupported.
Accordingly, importingscholarsfromotherfieldsshouldbe no morethana supple-
mentto supportfor thosewitha demonstratedinterestand a solid backgroundin
the field.43
A moreseriousdangeris thepoliticization of researchsupport.In thepastdecade,
a numberof foundationswithdistinctideologicalpositionshave enteredthe field.44
If access to researchsupportbecomes contingenton "correct"politicalviews,the
integrity of securitystudieswillbe gravelythreatened.In the shortterm,the pres-
ence of severalideologicallyvariedfoundationsand the existenceof manyseparate
researchcentershas ensured thatno singleset of viewshas come to dominatethe

42
In this respect, the MacArthur Foundation's recent decision to end its financialsupport for International
Securitythreatensthe health of the field,unless alternativesources of support can be found.
43 It should be noted that"dual expertise"programshave been a relatively
small part of foundationactivity;the
bulk of recent funding in securitystudies has gone to establishedprogramsand topics.
44 Withinthe field,the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation are usually seen as left-wing in
orientation,the Ford Foundation is centrist,and the Olin Foundation, Pew CharitableTrusts,Scaife Foundation,
and Smith-RichardsonFoundation are seen as right-wing.For background on the second group, see Morgan
(1981) and Blumenthal (1986).

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 STEPHEN M. WALT 231

field.But science is not a contestthatthe loudest or mostlavishlyfunded forces

should win; the qualityof scholarshipshould be the dominantconsideration.Over
the longer term,foundationsshould support scholarshipthat followsthe basic
normsof scienceratherthan researchthatconformsto particularpoliticalprefer-
ences. The goal is to encourage talentedscholarsto attackimportantquestions,
regardlessof theirultimateconclusions.In short,keepingideologicallitmustestsout
of thefundingprocessis essentialto preservingthelegitimacyof securitystudiesas a
scholarlyenterprise.

Normsand Ethos of theSecurityStudiesCommunity

The finalset of lessonsconcernstherole of severalinformalnormswithinthe field.
These normsare neitherunique to securitystudiesnor universalamong academic
disciplines.Althougha numberof seniorscholarsprovidedimportantrole models,
thesenormshave been especiallyevidentamong youngermembers.Three princi-
ples meritspecial mention.
First,securitystudieshas profitedfroma collaborative ethos.Membersof thefield
are encouragedto exchangeideas, evidence,and criticism freelydespitesignificant
substantive disagreements.Admittedly, thisnormis morean aspirationthana uni-
versally-accepted reality,but thespiritof cooperativecriticismhas helped individual
scholarsbe more productiveand enabled the fieldto advance more quickly.
This achievementis all themoreremarkablegiventherangeof opinionwithinthe
field.Far frombeing a clique of like-mindedcronies,securitystudieshas displayed
extraordinary diversityover the past decade, punctuatedby episodes of intense
debate.One need onlybe familiarwiththedisputesalreadydiscussed(on deterrence
theory,U.S. grandstrategy, navalstrategy, strategicweaponspolicy,surpriseattack,
theoriginsofWorldWar I, and so on) to realizethatthesecurity studiesfieldis nota
unifiedgroup eithermethodologically, substantively,or politically.Yet withbut a
fewnotableexceptions,the fieldhas avoided destructive professionalrivalries.
Whatunitesthefieldis a desireto increaseour understanding of therole of force
in internationalpolitics.Recurringdebatestestify to thestrength of thefieldand are
a major engine foritscontinuedprogress.As one participanthas noted: "Scholar-
ship on nationalsecuritymattersis, like all scholarship,a collectiveenterprise. . .
[Individuals]publishtheirfindings;thisinvitescriticism fromtheircolleagues,[and]
provides foundations and inputs for the work of others. . . . By this method the
community as a whole advances our understandingof specificmethodologicaland
substantive issues and of the fieldas a whole"(Posen, 1989:145).
A second norm is relevance,a beliefthat even highlyabstractlines of inquiry
shouldbe guided bythe goal of solvingreal-worldproblems.Because thevalue of a
givenapproach may not be apparentat the beginning-game theoryis an obvious
example-we cannot insistthat a new approach be immediatelyapplicable to a
specificresearchpuzzle. On the whole,however,thebeliefthatscholarshipin secu-
rityaffairsshouldbe linkedto real-worldissueshas preventedthefieldfromdegen-
erating into self-indulgentintellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the
present,securitystudieshas probablyhad more real-worldimpact,forgood or ill,
thanmostareas of social science.
Finally,the renaissanceof securitystudieshas been guided by a commitment to
democraticdiscourse.Ratherthanconfiningdiscussionof securityissuesto an elite
groupof thebestand brightest, scholarsin therenaissancehave generallywelcomed
a morefullyinformeddebate. To paraphraseClemenceau,issuesof war and peace
are too importantto be leftsolelyto insiderswitha vestedinterestin the outcome.
The growthof securitystudieswithinuniversities is one sign of broaderparticipa-
tion,along withincreasedavailabilityof information and more accessiblepublica-

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232 Studies
The RenaissanceofSecurity

tionsforinterestedcitizens.Althoughthisviewis byno meansuniversal,therenais-

sance of securitystudieshas been shaped bythebeliefthata well-informeddebateis
thebestwayto avoid thedisastersthatare likelywhennationalpolicyis monopolized
by a fewself-interested parties.
Viewed as a whole,therefore,the renaissanceof securitystudieshas been a valu-
able developmentforinternationalrelations.As we are enteringan era wherenew
securityproblemswillariseand newstrategies fordealingwiththemwillbe required,
observethenormsthat
theimportanceof securitystudiesis manifest.If participants
have guided the field in recent years and if adequate researchsupport remains
available,prospectsforcontinuedadvancesare good. And iffutureworkbothbuilds
upon and challengesthe resultsof the recentrenaissance,thatwillbe convincing
evidenceof the continuedhealthof the field.

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