Child’s Inability to Elect Filiation:

William Liyao, Jr. (represented by his mother, Corazon Garcia) vs. Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, et al.​
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
●​ A child cannot choose their own filiation contrary to
the presumption of legitimacy. If the presumption
stands unchallenged by the legitimate father, the
child’s status is fixed.
Facts:​
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia,
filed a case seeking recognition as the illegitimate son and Testimony of Garcia’s Legitimate Children:
compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao. Corazon
Garcia alleged that she cohabited with William Liyao during the ●​ The testimonies of Corazon Garcia’s legitimate
period when William Jr. was conceived, and presented children with Ramon Yulo in support of William Jr. did
evidence such as birth and baptismal certificates, family not amount to a legal impugnation of legitimacy. There
pictures, and financial support documents. was no direct action by Ramon Yulo or his heirs to
challenge William Jr.’s legitimacy.
The trial court ruled in favor of William Jr., finding
preponderance of evidence proving paternity. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed this decision, citing insufficient
evidence and highlighting the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born within a valid marriage. The appellate court found
that William Liyao had no involvement in the preparation of the
documents presented and gave weight to witnesses who
attested to Corazon Garcia’s continued interactions with her
husband, Ramon Yulo, during the relevant period.

William Jr. elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1.​ Whether or not William Jr., born during the

subsistence of his mother’s valid marriage, can
impugn his own legitimacy to claim filiation with
William Liyao.
2.​ Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to
establish William Liyao’s paternity.

Held:​
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court
of Appeals' decision.

Ratio Decidendi:

Presumption of Legitimacy:

●​ Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, a child conceived

and born during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate. This presumption may only be rebutted by
evidence of the physical impossibility of the husband’s
access to the wife during conception. Such a
challenge can be initiated exclusively by the husband
or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
●​ William Jr. could not impugn his legitimacy as the right
to challenge legitimacy belongs strictly to the husband
or his heirs under limited circumstances. As Ramon
Yulo, Corazon Garcia’s husband, had not initiated
such a challenge, William Jr. remained presumed
legitimate.

Lack of Competent Evidence of Filiation:

●​ The evidence presented by William Jr., including birth

and baptismal certificates, family pictures, and a
passbook, did not conclusively establish William
Liyao’s acknowledgment of paternity. The absence of
William Liyao’s signature or clear involvement in these
documents further weakened the claim.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 1

Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte​ public policy and the child's welfare, protecting him
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
from the stigma of illegitimacy.
4.​ Visitation Rights and Surname: Gerardo’s claim to
visitation rights and to impose his surname lacks legal
Facts:​ basis since the child is presumed legitimate to Ma.
Gerardo B. Concepcion married Ma. Theresa Almonte on Theresa and Mario. The Family Code and public
December 29, 1989. On December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave policy do not recognize rights for a third party in this
birth to Jose Gerardo. Their relationship deteriorated, and context.
Gerardo filed for annulment of their marriage on December 19, 5.​ Conclusion: Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy as the child of
1991, on the ground of bigamy. He discovered Ma. Theresa Ma. Theresa and Mario cannot be compromised by
had an earlier marriage to Mario Gopiao in 1980, which was admissions or agreements of the parties. The
still valid and subsisting. presumption of legitimacy stands as a safeguard to
the child's best interests.
The trial court annulled Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s marriage
as bigamous, declared Jose Gerardo illegitimate, and awarded
custody of the child to Ma. Theresa while granting Gerardo
visitation rights. Ma. Theresa contested the decision, arguing
that there was no legal basis for visitation rights for an .
illegitimate child’s putative father and requested a change of
Jose Gerardo’s surname from "Concepcion" to her maiden
name "Almonte."

The trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion, citing the "best
interest of the child" policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision but later reversed itself, ruling that Jose
Gerardo was the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario
Gopiao because he was conceived during their subsisting
marriage. Consequently, the appellate court declared Gerardo
had no rights to visitation or to impose his surname on the
child. Gerardo appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1.​ Whether or not Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of

Ma. Theresa and her first husband, Mario Gopiao
2.​ Whether or not Gerardo has rights to visitation and to
impose his surname on Jose Gerardo.

Held:

1.​ The Supreme Court ruled that Jose Gerardo is the

legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo, having no legal standing as the father of the
child, has no right to visitation or to impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ Legitimacy of Jose Gerardo: Under Article 164 of

the Family Code, a child conceived or born during a
valid marriage is presumed legitimate. Article 167
further mandates that a child’s legitimacy cannot be
contested by a mere declaration of the mother or any
third party. Since Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao were
married and living in close proximity during the
relevant period, the presumption of legitimacy applies
to Jose Gerardo.
2.​ Standing to Question Legitimacy: Gerardo cannot
invoke Article 166 of the Family Code, which allows
the husband to contest legitimacy. As a void marriage
does not confer the status of "husband" on Gerardo,
only Mario or his heirs may impugn Jose Gerardo’s
legitimacy.
3.​ Best Interest of the Child: The law prioritizes a
child’s legitimate status as it confers full parental
support, inheritance rights, and the use of both
parents' surnames. Granting legitimacy aligns with
Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 2
In the Matter of the Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of ○​The Court emphasized the paramount
Yuhare Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan​
Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote vs. Republic of the Philippines, Ricky O.
interest of the children, ruling that incorrect
Tinitigan, and Local Civil Registrar of Davao City​ or unverified entries could lead to
G.R. No. 222095 complications affecting their identity and
legal rights.
2.​ On Procedural Law:
Facts:​ ○​ Although the petition was for cancellation,
Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote (petitioner) had two children, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court also governs
Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with correction of substantial errors. The Court
Ricky O. Tinitigan, a married man. To avoid complications, their deemed the petition sufficient to address
births were initially not registered. Later, Barcelote registered both cancellation and correction, considering
their births in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur, only to discover that the jurisdictional requirements were
Tinitigan had previously registered them in Davao City without complied with.
her knowledge, using erroneous names and details.
The cancellation of the subject birth certificates ensures
Barcelote filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificates compliance with applicable laws and protects the children’s
of live birth registered by Tinitigan, arguing they contained false rights, reflecting their true personal circumstances.
information and were registered unilaterally without her
consent. The RTC granted the petition, ruling the birth
certificates legally infirm under Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and
inconsistent with Article 176 of the Family Code. On appeal,
the CA reversed the decision, holding that the registration was
valid under Act No. 3753 and RA 9255, which allows
illegitimate children to use their father’s surname if expressly
recognized.

Issues

1.​ Substantive:
○​ Whether the certificates of live birth
registered by Ricky O. Tinitigan should be
canceled due to the lack of the mother’s
consent and alleged erroneous entries.
○​ Whether the children should use the
mother’s surname as per Article 176 of the
Family Code.
2.​ Procedural:
○​ Whether the petition should have been
treated as one for correction of entries under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court rather than a
cancellation.

Held

The petition was granted. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of

Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote, ordering the cancellation of the
certificates of live birth registered by Ricky O. Tinitigan.

Ratio Decidendi

1.​ On Substantive Law:

○​ Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by RA 9255, requires the consent of the
mother for the use of the father’s surname by
illegitimate children. While RA 9255 allows
an illegitimate child to use the father’s
surname if filiation is expressly recognized,
such recognition must comply with the law,
including the requirement for the mother’s
participation in registration.
○​ The unilateral registration by Tinitigan
violated Section 5 of Act No. 3753, which
mandates that the mother of an illegitimate
child sign and swear to the birth registration.
The certificates were therefore void.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 3

Virginia D. Calimag vs. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, represented by ○​The legitimacy of the respondents was
Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr.​
further supported by their birth certificates
G.R. No. 192370, March 6, 2013
indicating Anastacio Sr. and Fidela as their
parents. This gave the respondents legal
Facts:​ capacity to inherit from Silvestra as the
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned a 299-square-meter collateral relatives of the decedent.
property with Silvestra N. Macapaz. After Silvestra's death in 2.​ On Forgery and Deed of Sale:
2002, a deed of sale dated January 18, 2005 allegedly ○​ The deed of sale was declared void because
executed by Silvestra transferred her share of the property to it was executed after Silvestra’s death,
the petitioner. Based on this, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) rendering her signature on the document a
No. 183088 was canceled, and a new TCT No. 221466 was clear forgery.
issued solely in the petitioner’s name. ○​ The petitioner failed to refute the findings of
forgery and instead focused on disputing the
Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua respondents’ legal capacity, which was
(respondents), claiming to be Silvestra's legal heirs, filed an adequately proven.
action for annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the ○​ The principle of good faith and proper
title, asserting forgery as Silvestra had died three years before reliance on authentic documents was not
the deed's execution. The petitioner argued that the applicable due to the fraudulent nature of the
respondents, as illegitimate children of Anastacio Macapaz, deed and the petitioner’s failure to validate
Sr., Silvestra's brother, lacked legal capacity to inherit from its authenticity.
Silvestra under Article 992 of the Civil Code.
The Court emphasized that legal capacity to institute an action
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, finding the deed of is separate from the substantive claim over inheritance. As
sale void and ordering the reinstatement of TCT No. 183088. It heirs of Silvestra’s legitimate brother, the respondents had the
also held that the respondents were legitimate children of standing to challenge the alleged fraudulent transfer of
Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling but property.
reduced the award for moral and exemplary damages.
This case reaffirms the presumption of legitimacy of children
Issues: born within a valid marriage and the prohibition against
forgeries in property transactions.
1.​ Primary Issue: Whether the respondents, as alleged
illegitimate children of Anastacio Macapaz, Sr., have
legal capacity to institute an action involving the
estate of Silvestra Macapaz.
2.​ Whether the deed of sale and the subsequent
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 were valid.

Held:

1.​ On Legal Capacity: Yes, the respondents have the

legal capacity to file the action as legitimate children
of Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
2.​ On the Validity of the Deed of Sale: The deed of
sale and the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 were
invalid due to forgery.

The petition was denied.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ On Legal Capacity:

○​ The RTC and CA found sufficient evidence
to establish that the respondents were
legitimate children of Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
The marriage between Anastacio Sr. and
Fidela Poblete was proven through a
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage and other
supporting evidence.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 4

Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero, and Amalia Rivero vs. Court of Appeals, Mary 3.​ Conflicts of Interest:
Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, and Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., represented by his
uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao​
○​ Atty. Simando, who notarized the SPA
G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005 allowing Mary Jane to represent her
brothers, later became Benedick’s counsel
and subsequently represented Mary Jane.
Facts:​ This raised serious ethical concerns about
This case involves a dispute over the estate of Benito Dy the impartiality of legal representation and
Chiao, Sr. The petitioners, Rivero siblings, challenged the the validity of the agreement.
validity of a compromise agreement executed between Mary 4.​ Incompetence of the Dy Chiao Brothers:
Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman and Benedick Arevalo, who ○​ The trial court ignored motions and evidence
claimed to be Benito Sr.'s illegitimate son. The compromise pointing to the brothers’ mental incapacity
agreement allocated a portion of the estate to Benedick in and failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, a
exchange for him dropping his claims. At the time of execution, violation of procedural due process.
Mary Jane acted on behalf of her brothers, Benito Jr. and 5.​ Consequences of Invalidity:
Benson Dy Chiao, who were confined in a mental institution. ○​ Since the RTC decision was void, all
subsequent actions, including the writ of
Benedick filed motions questioning Mary Jane’s capacity to execution and the auction sale of estate
represent the estate, alleging that she was a drug addict and a properties, were likewise null and void.
spendthrift. Additionally, he questioned the mental competence
of the Dy Chiao brothers and sought the appointment of a Conclusion:​
guardian ad litem for them. Despite these allegations, The petition was denied, and the RTC decision approving the
Benedick later sought Mary Jane's appointment as special compromise agreement was invalidated. The actions taken
administratrix of the estate and guardian ad litem for her pursuant to the void decision were similarly declared null and
brothers. void. Costs were assessed against the petitioners.

Mary Jane executed the compromise agreement, not only in

her name but also on behalf of her brothers, using an SPA from
1995, which was notarized by Benedick's counsel. This
agreement was approved by the RTC with unusual haste.
Following its approval, Benedick received P6,000,000 from the
estate and later filed for the settlement of the estate as Mary
Jane’s counsel.

The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in approving the

agreement without resolving the allegations of incompetency of
the Dy Chiao brothers and the need for a guardian ad litem.

Issues:

1.​ Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion

in approving the compromise agreement.
2.​ Whether the compromise agreement and subsequent
RTC decision were valid.
3.​ Whether the writ of execution and subsequent sale of
estate properties were valid.

Held:​
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents,
declaring the compromise agreement, the RTC decision, and
the subsequent writ of execution null and void.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ Grave Abuse of Discretion:

○​ The RTC approved the compromise
agreement with undue haste, disregarding
serious allegations of Mary Jane’s incapacity
and the incompetency of the Dy Chiao
brothers. These issues should have been
resolved before approving the agreement.
2.​ Validity of the Compromise Agreement:
○​ Mary Jane acted beyond her authority in
representing her brothers, who were
confined in a mental hospital. There was no
clear judicial determination of their capacity
or the necessity of a guardian ad litem.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 5

De Jesus vs. The Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, et al.​ written acknowledgment of filiation by another party does not
G.R. No. 139853. September 05, 2000
alter this status. The acknowledgment may be used to
establish an illegitimate relationship but cannot automatically
Facts:​ invalidate the presumption of legitimacy without due legal
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus were married process.
on August 23, 1964, and had two daughters, Jacqueline (born
March 1, 1979) and Jinkie Christie (born July 6, 1982). On Doctrine:
June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon executed a notarized document
acknowledging Jacqueline and Jinkie as his illegitimate 1.​ The presumption of legitimacy for children born during
children. Juan Dizon died intestate on March 12, 1992, leaving a valid marriage is conclusive unless impugned in a
behind assets such as real property and shares of stock. direct proceeding by the father or his heirs under
Based on the notarized acknowledgment, Jacqueline and Articles 166 to 171 of the Family Code.
Jinkie filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and 2.​ Written acknowledgment of filiation, while admissible
Accounting" to claim inheritance from Dizon’s estate. as proof of paternity, does not override the legal
presumption of legitimacy without proper procedural
The legitimate heirs of Dizon opposed the claim, arguing that challenge.
the sisters were legitimate children of Danilo and Carolina and 3.​ Legitimacy cannot be contested collaterally or
that their legitimacy could not be contested in the partition case indirectly in a case such as partition and must be
without a separate action to determine paternity. The RTC addressed through a separate direct action.
denied the motions to dismiss, and the case proceeded to trial.
However, in 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action, concluding that the acknowledgment could not
establish their illegitimacy. The De Jesus sisters appealed to
the Supreme Court, arguing that the acknowledgment
constituted sufficient proof of filiation under jurisprudence.

Issues:

1.​ Can the legitimacy of Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus

be contested in a partition case based on the
acknowledgment executed by Juan G. Dizon?
2.​ Is a separate direct action required to impugn the
legitimacy of children born during a valid marriage?

Held:

1.​ No, the legitimacy of Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus

cannot be contested in a partition case.
2.​ Yes, a separate direct action is required to impugn the
legitimacy of children born during a valid marriage.

Ratio Decidendi:​
The Supreme Court held that the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code applies to Jacqueline and
Jinkie as they were born during the valid marriage of Danilo
and Carolina. This presumption is conclusive unless
successfully challenged in a direct proceeding by the husband
or his heirs under Articles 166 to 171 of the Family Code.

The acknowledgment executed by Juan G. Dizon cannot

displace their legitimate status without following the proper
legal procedure to contest legitimacy. A partition case is not the
proper venue to impugn legitimacy, as legitimacy cannot be
challenged collaterally. Any such challenge must meet the
stringent requirements set by law and must be raised in a
separate direct action.

The Court emphasized that the legitimacy conferred by law on

children born within a valid marriage is deeply protected, and
Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 6
Rodolfo Fernandez vs. Heirs of Generosa de Venecia​ 2.​ Legal Heirship and Succession:​
G.R. No. 122545, November 13, 2000
The Court also addressed the issue of inheritance,
specifically the share of Generosa de Venecia as the
widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez. The Court held that
Facts: Generosa, as the surviving spouse, was entitled to ¾
pro indiviso of the conjugal property, consisting of ½
Petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez filed a case for the declaration of as her share of the conjugal estate and ½ of Dr. Jose
the validity of an Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Fernandez's estate. Respondents, who were the
Sale, executed by him and Generosa de Venecia, pertaining to nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose Fernandez, were
the estate of the deceased Dr. Jose Fernandez, his alleged entitled to inherit only the ½ share of the decedent’s
father. The respondents, who are the nephews and nieces of estate.
Dr. Jose Fernandez, contested the validity of the partition, 3.​ Validity of Partition:​
claiming that Rodolfo Fernandez was not the legitimate child of Since Rodolfo Fernandez was not able to prove his
the deceased, and as such, had no right to the estate. filiation to the deceased, the deed of extra-judicial
partition was invalid as it included him as an heir. The
The issue of Rodolfo's legitimacy was contested during trial. partition was declared void as to him, in accordance
Petitioners presented various documents including a baptismal with the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically
certificate and a public document (an application for back pay), Article 1105, which states that a partition is void with
to prove Rodolfo's filiation to Dr. Jose Fernandez. However, respect to a person not an heir.
there was no record of his birth in the National Archives, and
the authenticity of the documents presented was questioned. Thus, the Court ruled that the respondents, as the legitimate
The trial court found Rodolfo failed to establish his filiation, and heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez, were entitled to inherit his share
therefore, ruled the partition null and void as to him. of the conjugal property, and the action of reconveying the
property to them was proper.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
prompting the filing of this petition for review.

Issues:

1.​ Whether the petitioner, Rodolfo Fernandez, was able

to prove his filiation to Dr. Jose Fernandez.
2.​ Whether the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed between Rodolfo Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia was valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals, which upheld the trial court's finding that Rodolfo
Fernandez failed to prove his filiation to Dr. Jose Fernandez.
As a result, the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia were declared null and void insofar as Rodolfo was
concerned.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ Filiation and Proof:​

The Court ruled that Rodolfo Fernandez failed to
substantiate his claim of filiation with the late Dr. Jose
Fernandez. Despite presenting a baptismal certificate
and a public document (Application for Back Pay
Rights), the Court found these documents insufficient
to establish Rodolfo's legitimacy. The lack of birth
records and the doubtful authenticity of the baptismal
certificate were crucial in the Court's determination
that Rodolfo could not prove his status as the
legitimate son of the deceased.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 7

Mariano Andal, assisted by Maria Dueñas vs. Eduvigis Macaraig​ husband to have had access to the wife during the
G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951
first one hundred and twenty days preceding the birth
of the child.
2.​ Rebuttal of Presumption:​
Facts: The Court found that there was no evidence to prove
that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother, Maria Dueñas had access to his wife, even though he was suffering
(as guardian ad litem), filed a case for the recovery of from tuberculosis at the time. While Emiliano’s illness
ownership and possession of a parcel of land in Calabanga, severely weakened him, the Court noted that
Camarines Sur. The land had originally been donated to his tuberculosis does not necessarily render a person
father, Emiliano Andal, by his grandmother, Eduvigis Macaraig, incapable of engaging in sexual intercourse.
through a donation propter nuptias on the occasion of his Furthermore, there was no evidence of impotence or
marriage to Maria Dueñas. The donation made Emiliano the imprisonment that could rebut the presumption of
rightful owner of the property. legitimacy.
3.​ Impact of Infidelity:​
Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, and Eduvigis
The Court emphasized that the infidelity of Maria
Macaraig, the donor, later took possession of the property.
Dueñas, who eloped with Felix, did not affect the
Mariano, born on June 17, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate
legitimacy of Mariano. The presumption of legitimacy
son of Emiliano Andal. The legitimacy of Mariano's status was
under the law cannot be overcome by evidence of
challenged due to his mother’s infidelity—Maria Dueñas eloped
adultery unless it can be shown that physical
with Felix, Emiliano's brother, in September 1942, and lived
impossibility existed for the husband to access his
with him while Emiliano was suffering from tuberculosis. The
wife.
main issue in the case revolved around whether Mariano could
4.​ Application of Legal Presumptions:​
be considered Emiliano’s legitimate son under the law.
The Court relied on both the Civil Code and Rule 123,
Section 68 of the Rules of Court, which supports the
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring Mariano
presumption of legitimacy when the child is born
the legitimate son of Emiliano and entitled to inherit the land.
within 300 days after the dissolution of the marriage.
Eduvigis Macaraig, the defendant, appealed, arguing that
Since Mariano was born within this time frame and
Mariano could not be considered legitimate because of the
there was no evidence to dispute the possibility of
circumstances surrounding his conception.
marital access, the Court concluded that he was
indeed the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and
Issues: entitled to inherit the property.

1.​ Whether Mariano Andal is the legitimate son of Thus, the Court ruled that Mariano Andal was legally
Emiliano Andal, given the circumstances surrounding recognized as Emiliano’s son and entitled to inherit the
his conception and the infidelity of his mother, Maria property under the donation propter nuptias, affirming the lower
Dueñas. court's decision.
2.​ Whether Mariano is entitled to inherit the land from his
father, Emiliano Andal.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court,

declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal
and entitled to inherit the land in question.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ Legitimacy of Children:​

Under Article 108 of the Civil Code, children born
within three hundred days following the dissolution of
the marriage are presumed to be legitimate. Mariano
was born within this period (300 days) following the
death of his father, Emiliano, and thus, according to
the Civil Code, he was presumed legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by
proving that it was physically impossible for the
Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 8
Carlos T. Go, Sr. et al. vs. Luis T. Ramos et al​ 4.​ Due process was observed in the deportation
G.R. No. 167569. September 04, 2009
proceedings, as they were given an opportunity to
present their case.
Facts:​ 5.​ The petition for habeas corpus was not the
The case revolves around a deportation complaint filed by Luis appropriate remedy for questioning the deportation
T. Ramos against Jimmy T. Go, alleging that Jimmy, although order after deportation proceedings had been
claiming to be a Filipino citizen, was an illegal and undesirable initiated.
alien. This complaint led the Bureau of Immigration to initiate
deportation proceedings based on various evidence, including Ratio Decidendi:
a birth certificate indicating Jimmy's “FChinese” citizenship and
1.​ Prescription of Action: Citizenship cases, due to
allegations of fraudulent acquisition of a Philippine passport.
their constitutional significance, are treated as
Jimmy countered that he was a natural-born Filipino, arguing
exceptions to time limitations for filing actions. The
that his father, Carlos, had elected Philippine citizenship under
resolution of such matters takes precedence over any
the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625.
prescribed period.
Despite Jimmy’s defense, the Board of Commissioners
2.​ Indispensable Party: A party is considered
reversed an initial dismissal and continued with the deportation
indispensable in a legal action if the judgment would
charges, citing that Carlos' election of Philippine citizenship
directly affect their interests or rights. In this case,
was untimely.
Carlos' citizenship status was not directly in dispute,
Both Jimmy and Carlos filed a petition for certiorari and so his presence was not essential.
prohibition against the Board’s resolution and charge sheet, 3.​ Evidence and Jurisdiction: Insufficient evidence
challenging the Board’s jurisdiction over the case. They presented by the petitioners failed to challenge the
contested the legality of the deportation proceedings and the Board's jurisdiction. The evidence presented was not
recognition of their Filipino citizenship. strong enough to override the administrative body's
authority to continue the deportation proceedings.
Issues: 4.​ Due Process: The deportation proceedings met the
standards of due process, as the petitioners were
1.​ Whether the cause of action against Carlos and given an opportunity to present their defenses.
Jimmy had prescribed. 5.​ Habeas Corpus: Habeas corpus is not the proper
2.​ Whether the deportation proceedings were null and remedy to contest deportation orders after deportation
void for failing to implead Carlos as an indispensable proceedings have commenced. Alternative legal
party. processes should be followed for challenges to such
3.​ Whether the evidence presented by Carlos and orders.
Jimmy was sufficient to oust the Board of its
jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This case emphasizes the importance of resolving citizenship
4.​ Whether due process was observed in the deportation disputes expeditiously and underscores the need for
proceedings. adherence to due process in administrative proceedings such
5.​ Whether the petition for habeas corpus was the as deportation. It also clarifies the criteria for determining
proper remedy to challenge the deportation order. indispensable parties and highlights that challenges to
deportation orders must follow the appropriate legal channels.
Held:​
The Supreme Court denied the petitions filed by Carlos and
Jimmy and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The
Court ruled as follows:

1.​ The cause of action against Carlos and Jimmy had

not prescribed, as citizenship issues must be resolved
regardless of any time lapse in filing actions.
2.​ Carlos was not an indispensable party in the
deportation proceedings because the determination of
Jimmy’s citizenship did not directly benefit or harm
Carlos.
3.​ The evidence presented by Carlos and Jimmy was
insufficient to justify depriving the Board of jurisdiction
over the deportation proceedings.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 9

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles​ applied retroactively to affect the petition for adoption
G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992
that was filed under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code. At the time of the filing, the law in effect
Facts:​ permitted a single spouse to file for adoption. The
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition right to file the adoption petition was vested in
to adopt the minor Jason Condat, who had been living with her Zenaida Bobiles under the applicable law at the time
family since he was four months old. The petition was filed of filing. The Court emphasized that a vested right is
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, which one that cannot be impaired by a subsequent change
was assigned Special Proceeding No. 1386. The court, upon in law unless it involves procedural matters.
finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance, Therefore, the adoption petition was valid under the
scheduled a hearing for March 28, 1988. The hearing order law in effect when it was filed.
was duly published and served to the necessary parties, 2.​ Substantial Compliance with Adoption
including the Solicitor General and the Department of Social Requirements:​
Welfare and Development. No one opposed the petition. The Court found that despite the failure to formally
include Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner in the
After considering the testimonies of Zenaida, her husband adoption petition, his affidavit of consent was
Dioscoro Bobiles, and a social worker from the Department of sufficient to make him a co-petitioner in the adoption
Social Welfare, the RTC rendered a judgment on March 20, process. The Court emphasized that adoption
1988, granting the adoption of Jason Condat by Zenaida and statutes should be liberally construed to further the
Dioscoro Bobiles. The adoption decree legally freed the child beneficial purpose of adoption. It noted that the legal
from all obligations to his natural parents and granted him the requirements for adoption are not meant to be strictly
surname "Bobiles." procedural but to ensure that the child’s welfare is
prioritized. Since Dioscoro’s consent was evidenced
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic, appealed the both in the affidavit and in his testimony, the Court
decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that the petition was valid, and his absence as a
affirmed the RTC’s decision. The Republic then filed a petition formal co-petitioner did not invalidate the adoption.
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising two
main points: the retroactive application of the Family Code and In conclusion, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision
the propriety of granting the adoption despite Zenaida filing the granting the adoption, focusing on the substantial compliance
petition alone. with legal requirements, and emphasizing the importance of
ensuring the child’s welfare in adoption proceedings.
Issues:

1.​ Whether the Family Code, which took effect on

August 3, 1988, should apply retroactively to the
petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles in
February 1988, thereby requiring the joint adoption of
both spouses.
2.​ Whether the trial court’s decision granting the
adoption in favor of Zenaida alone (without her
husband as a co-petitioner) is valid.

Held:​
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and upheld the adoption. The Court held that the
Family Code does not apply retroactively to the petition for
adoption, which was filed under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (Presidential Decree No. 603), and that the petition filed
by Zenaida Bobiles alone was valid. Additionally, the Court
ruled that Dioscoro Bobiles’ affidavit of consent to the adoption
served as substantial compliance with the requirement of joint
adoption.

Ratio Decidendi:

1.​ Retroactive Application of the Family Code:​

The Court ruled that the Family Code could not be
Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 10
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim​ reinforcing the importance of compliance with the law's clear
G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009​
provisions.

Facts:​
Monina P. Lim, an optometrist, and her husband, Primo Lim,
were entrusted with the care of two minor children, Michelle P.
Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim, by Lucia Ayuban, with their
parentage unknown. Desiring children of their own, the Lims
registered the minors as their own. After Primo Lim’s death,
Monina remarried Angel Olario, an American citizen. Monina
sought to formally adopt Michelle and Michael under Republic
Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), which allows amnesty for those who
have simulated a child’s birth. At the time of the petition,
Michelle was 25 and married, while Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Despite the consent of all parties involved,
including Olario, the Regional Trial Court in General Santos
City dismissed the petitions. The court ruled that Monina failed
to jointly file for adoption with Olario, as required by RA 8552
and the Family Code for married petitioners.

Issues:

1.​ Can a remarried petitioner adopt a child singly under

RA 8552 and the Family Code?
2.​ Is joint adoption by a husband and wife mandatory
under RA 8552 and the Family Code?
3.​ Does RA 8552 apply to non-Filipino petitioners,
particularly in the case of a foreign spouse?
4.​ What are the legal effects of adoption, particularly
concerning parental authority and the legal ties
between adoptees and biological parents?

Held:​
The Supreme Court denied Monina Lim’s petition and upheld
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the adoption petitions. The
Court ruled that joint adoption by a married couple is
mandatory under RA 8552 and the Family Code, with no
applicable exceptions in Lim’s case. Additionally, the Court
emphasized that Angel Olario, being a non-Filipino citizen, did
not meet the necessary statutory requirements for the adoption
to proceed. Furthermore, the Court clarified that adoption's
legal effects extend beyond parental authority, impacting
issues of succession and the child’s legal status.

Ratio Decidendi:​
The Supreme Court reiterated the mandatory nature of joint
adoption for married couples under RA 8552 and the Family
Code, which is intended to safeguard the welfare of children in
adoption processes. The law’s provisions require both spouses
to file jointly for adoption, reflecting a broader policy promoting
the child’s best interests. The Court also emphasized that
adoption has profound legal effects, severing the child's ties
with biological parents (unless one is the spouse of the
adopter) and conferring rights such as legitimacy and
succession. The statutory requirements for Filipino and
non-Filipino petitioners were underscored as critical,

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 11

Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia: Middle Name Usage of an middle name usage in adoption cases is not explicitly
Illegitimate Child​
addressed by law.
G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005
2.​ Customary Filipino Naming Convention: It is
customary in the Philippines for a child to use the
Facts:​ mother’s surname as the middle name.
Honorato B. Catindig (petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his 3.​ Liberal Construction of Adoption Laws: Adoption
illegitimate daughter, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, born on laws should be liberally interpreted to favor the
June 26, 1994, to Gemma Astorga Garcia. Before the welfare of the adopted child, including preserving
adoption, Stephanie used her mother’s surname and middle connections to the biological family where
name. After the petitioner's adoption request was granted by appropriate.
the trial court on March 23, 2001, Stephanie was declared the 1.​
legitimate child of Honorato, and her surname was changed to
“Catindig.” However, the trial court did not allow Stephanie to
retain her biological mother's surname, “Garcia,” as her middle
name. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on April
20, 2001, requesting that Stephanie retain “Garcia” as her
middle name, but this was denied on May 28, 2001. The
petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning if
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father could
continue using the natural mother’s surname as her middle
name.

Issues:

1.​ Whether an illegitimate child adopted by her natural

father may use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name.
2.​ What are the legal implications relating to the middle
name usage in adoption cases?

Held:​
The Supreme Court granted the petition, modifying the trial
court's decision, and allowed Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
to retain “Garcia” as her middle name.

Ratio Decidendi:​
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no law explicitly
prohibiting an adopted child from using the surname of their
natural mother as a middle name. The Court emphasized that
while the Civil Code and the Family Code govern surname
usage, these laws do not contain specific provisions
concerning the use of a middle name in adoption cases. The
Court referred to the Filipino tradition of using the mother’s
surname as the child’s middle name and considered the
practical implications of allowing such usage, such as
upholding the maternal lineage and mitigating the stigma often
associated with being an illegitimate child. Furthermore, the
Court highlighted that adoption laws should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the adopted child’s welfare. By allowing
Stephanie to retain “Garcia” as her middle name, the Court
aimed to promote the child’s well-being and protect her identity.

Doctrine:

1.​ Substantive Rules for Surnames: Surname usage

is regulated by Articles 364-380 of the Civil Code, but

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 12

Bartolome v. Social Security System and Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.​ Ratio Decidendi:​
G.R. No. 192531. November 12, 2014

The Supreme Court held that the term “dependent parents”

under PD 626 should be broadly construed to include both
Facts:​
biological and adoptive parents, regardless of their legitimacy
Bernardina P. Bartolome (petitioner) sought death benefits as
status, as long as they are dependent on the deceased
the surviving biological parent of her son, John Colcol (John),
employee. The Court emphasized that administrative
who died in a work-related incident aboard the vessel Maersk
regulations must align with statutory laws and the Constitution,
Danville in 2008. John was employed by Scanmar Maritime
particularly regarding the equal protection of rights. The Court
Services, Inc., and was enrolled in the Employees’
concluded that the ECC’s restrictive interpretation, which
Compensation Program (ECP). He died after steel plates fell
excluded non-legitimate parents, was unconstitutional, as it
on him. At the time of his death, John was childless,
discriminated against them without a valid justification.
unmarried, and had been legally adopted by his
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that parental rights might
great-grandfather, Cornelio Colcol, in 1985.
revert to the biological parent upon the death of the adoptive
parent if the child is still a minor.
Bernardina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential
Decree (PD) 626 with the Social Security System (SSS),
Doctrine:
asserting that she was the rightful beneficiary. However, her
claim was initially denied by SSS on the grounds that
1.​ Dependent Parents under PD 626: The term
Cornelio’s adoption of John had transferred Bernardina’s right
“dependent parents” includes all parents—biological,
to claim benefits to Cornelio as the adoptive parent. Bernardina
adoptive, legitimate, or illegitimate—provided they are
appealed the denial to the Employees' Compensation
dependent on the employee, without discrimination
Commission (ECC), which upheld the decision, stating that
based on the legitimacy of the parental relationship.
Cornelio, as the adoptive parent, was the presumed living
2.​ Equal Protection Clause: The interpretation and
beneficiary. This decision was based on the mistaken
application of administrative regulations must not
assumption that Cornelio was still alive. Upon discovering
discriminate against similarly situated individuals,
Cornelio’s death in 1987, Bernardina’s motion for
particularly with respect to parental rights and
reconsideration was still dismissed by the ECC. Bernardina
benefits.
then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court under
3.​ Administrative Regulations: Regulations and
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
interpretations that contradict statutory provisions or
constitutional principles, such as the equal protection
Issues:
clause, are invalid.

1.​ Whether Bernardina, as John’s biological but

non-legal parent due to adoption, qualifies as a
secondary beneficiary eligible for ECP death benefits.
2.​ The validity of the ECC’s interpretation that only
legitimate parents can be considered as secondary
beneficiaries under the Employees' Compensation
Program.

Held:​
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bernardina, reversing the
ECC's decision. The Court held that the ECC’s interpretation of
"dependent parents" under PD 626, which limited the term to
"legitimate parents," was incorrect. The Court ruled that the
phrase “dependent parents” should encompass all parents,
whether biological, adoptive, legitimate, or illegitimate, as long
as they are dependent on the employee. Furthermore, the
Court found the ECC's restriction unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause, as it unfairly discriminated
against non-legitimate parents. The Court also ruled that
Bernardina’s parental authority was likely reinstated upon
Cornelio's death, especially since John was still a minor at the
time, making Bernardina eligible to claim the death benefits
under PD 626.

Persons and Family [Cases for Finals] • 13