AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES TO PEACEBUILDING?

: REFLECTIONS ON
NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES AND PARADIGMATIC IMPERATIVES IN
RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION
KENNETH OMEJE

AFRICAN PEACEBUILDING NETWORK

APN LECTURE SERIES NO. 15
 ABOUT THE PROGRAM

Launched in March 2012, the African Peacebuilding Network

(APN) supports independent African research on ­conflict-affected
countries and neighboring regions of the continent, as well as the
integration of high-quality African research-based knowledge into
global policy communities. In order to advance African ­debates on
peacebuilding and promote African perspectives, the APN offers
competitive research grants and fellowships, and it funds other
forms of targeted support, including strategy ­meetings, ­seminars,
grantee workshops, commissioned studies, and the publication
and dissemination of research findings. In doing so, the APN
also promotes the visibility of African peacebuilding knowledge
among global and regional centers of scholarly analysis and
practical ­action and makes it accessible to key policymakers at
the United Nations and other multilateral, regional, and national
­policymaking institutions.

ABOUT THE SERIES

The APN Lecture Series provides an avenue for influential think-

ers, practitioners, policy makers, and activists to reflect on and
speak to the critical issues and challenges facing African peace-
building. This publication series documents lectures given on
the platform of the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) pro-
gram, and its institutional partners. These lectures provide an
analysis of processes, institutions, and mechanisms for, as well
as the politics of peacebuilding on the continent, and contribute
towards broadening debates and knowledge about the trajecto-
ries of conflict and peace in conflict-affected African countries
and regions. The APN Lecture series seeks to address knowl-
edge gaps in African peace and security, including its links to lo-
cal, national, and global structures and processes. These publi-
cations also provide critical overviews and innovative reflections
on the state of the field, including new thinking critical to knowl-
edge production and dissemination in overlooked or emerging
areas of African peacebuilding.
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES TO PEACEBUILDING?:
REFLECTIONS ON NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES AND
PARADIGMATIC IMPERATIVES IN RESEARCH AND
PUBLICATION
KENNETH OMEJE
MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (MIU)

SEPTEMBER 2024

Introduction: Remembering the Ancestors

This lecture explores African perspectives to peacebuilding. Is there an African

perspective to peacebuilding different from the leading international perspec-
tive(s)? What are the defining characteristics of the African perspective? What
normative principles and paradigmatic imperatives should undergird peace-
building research in the African context, and why? In attempting to answer
these important questions, this presentation partly adopts an anecdotal ap-
proach, but without compromising the impersonal imperatives of scholarly
inquiry and analysis in advancing the frontiers of social knowledge. I will inten-
tionally use this opportunity to reflect on some of the things I have learned in
my 30 years of academic engagement in the field of peace, conflict resolution,
security, and peacebuilding, which started with two turning point events at the
early stage of my professional career.

The first turning point in my career was my holding the SSRC Visiting Scholar
Research Fellowship in African Peace and Security in 1992 at the Center for Af-
rican Studies, University of Florida in Gainesville (February – May 1992). That
prestigious research fellowship helped me to attend a few international confer-
ences and seminars in the United States, and also to learn more about further
career development opportunities in peace and security studies around the
world. In those pre-internet years, information about fully-funded international
career development opportunities were scarce for most early-career scholars
in Africa.

The second turning point event was in the spring of 1993, with my securing the
Austrian government/UNESCO scholarship to attend the International Civil-
ian Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Training program at the Austrian Study
Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) in Stadtschlaining, Austria.
This culminated in my eventually taking a master’s degree course in Peace
and Conflict Studies at the European Peace University (EPU) also located in

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Stadtschlaining, both between 1993 and 1994. I was privileged enough to be

taught by some experts in the field of peace and security studies, including
the likes of professors Hakan Wiberg, Dennis Sandole, Anatol Rapoport, Bjørn
Møller, Simon Fisher, and the world-renowned Johan Galtung, who is widely
regarded as the founder of modern peace studies. Prior to the two professional
courses in Austria, my personal and academic perception of the world were
heavily shaped by the contending ideological perspectives of the Cold War era,
where I was heavily leaning to the left of the ideological spectrum. The Austri-
an programs, among other experiences, exposed me to diverse new security
theories that were emerging after the Cold War, which helped me to interro-
gate and unlearn some of my fixated ideological views of the world.

Prior to participating in these scholarly programs, I was originally trained

in political science, sociology, and anthropology at the University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, at the undergraduate level, and trained in international relations at
the master’s degree level. Much later in the early 2000s, I completed a doctor-
ate degree program in Peace and Security Studies at the University of Brad-
ford, UK. Subsequently, I worked with the university as a research fellow in
African Peace and Conflict Studies for many years. In between my graduate
studies in Austria and Bradford, I worked as a Research Fellow in Development
Studies at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, which offered me the opportunity
to apply some of the intellectual knowledge and skills I acquired from Austria
in action research and peacebuilding problem-solving interventions at grass-
roots community level.

Principally, studying and working at the University of Bradford gave me the

extraordinary opportunity to partake in designing soft security sector and
peace education programs (often in partnership with local stakeholders), which
we implemented in a number of war-affected countries and regions of Africa,
notably Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and north-
ern Uganda. In a broad sense, I was nurtured in peace and conflict research in
Austria. Bradford essentially offered me a significant international opportunity
to link academic theory with practice.

We had extensive seminal debates about peacebuilding in Austria in those

early years, which centred heavily on the critical interrogation of Boutros
Boutros-Ghali’s re-conception of peacebuilding in his famous 1992 report to
the UN General Assembly and Security Council, An Agenda for Peace, which
had then just been recently published. Suffice to say, my understanding and
perspectives on peacebuilding have not changed significantly from the intellec-
tual convictions and perspective I developed in Austria.

The Concept and Context of Peacebuilding: The Intellectual and

Policy Debate

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Galtung’s Irenology

The conceptualisation and theories of peace, violence, conflict, and peacebuild-

ing were among the core subjects I learnt from the 1993 and 1994 classes of
Johan Galtung, who profoundly re-theorised peace, violence and conflict, and
further enunciated the concept of peacebuilding (Galtung, 1964; 1969; 1976).1
Without delving into Galtung’s theories of peace, conflict and violence in detail
(as they lie outside the purview of this paper), we can sufficiently conclude that
Galtung is of the view that while peace and conflict are closely interrelated, –
two sides of the same coin – the meaning and value of peace must go beyond
the absence of physical conflict or direct violence as noted experts such as
Quincy Wright (1890-1970), Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968) and Lewis Richardson
(1881-1953) had previously defined it. Galtung (1996) believes that peace can
be defined qua peace, having its own intrinsic values, and pursued and built
within society by peaceful means. The intrinsic values of peace can be found in
its ontological nature, characterized best by features and processes like amity,
cooperation, harmony, tranquillity, serenity, cultural co-existence, and social
integration. Therefore, peace in Galtung’s view cannot be derived from the
nature of conflict or the absence of it.

Galtung coined the concept of peacebuilding in his 1976 pioneering study titled,
“Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuild-
ing.” In this essay, Galtung (1976:299) defines peacebuilding as “the process of
establishing structures of sustainable peace by eliminating root causes of war
and offering alternatives to war in situations where war might occur.”2 By em-
phasizing the issue of “eliminating root causes of war and offering alternatives
to war in situations where war might occur,” Galtung was more concerned with
using peacebuilding to address the interconnected issues of “structural vio-
lence” and “negative peace,” which are major discursive pillars in the pioneer-
ing scholar’s irenology. More fundamentally, Galtung’s original conception of
peacebuilding as an activity aimed at eradicating or deconstructing the embed-
ded structures of “structural violence” and “negative peace” was intended as
a pre-conflict affair “in situations where war might occur.” Galtung was much
more concerned with using peacebuilding as a force for good in transformative
conflict prevention, as opposed to the orthodox paradigm of conflict prevention
that is more superficially aimed at averting the outbreak of imminent hostilities
essentially from a negative peace perspective.

Negative Peace, from Galtung’s (1967) perspective, is the absence of war or

organized violence between groups which can inflict human suffering at dif-
ferent levels of society. Galtung formulated the concept of negative peace as
a way of characterizing the inadequacies in the dominant conceptions and

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theories of peace, which in his view, do not go beyond “ending direct hostilities
or organized violence” to address the underlying root-causes of conflict. In
his view, neglecting the root causes of conflict would lead to a relapse to, or
resurgence of, armed conflict. In contradistinction to negative peace, Galtung
(1967:14) coined the concept of positive peace as part of his vision of going
beyond the superficial end of violent conflict to advance the cooperation be-
tween human societies in working towards the elimination of unjust structures
and inequitable relationships, which can exist at various levels: interpersonal,
group, national, regional and international. The primary goal of positive peace
is the elimination of structural violence, which Galtung (1969) defines as the
“systematic constraint on human potential due to economic and political struc-
tures, reproduced in unequal power distribution, unequal resource distribution
and unequal life chances.” In his threefold typology of violence, Galtung further
depicted the phenomenon of cultural violence which is often expressed by the
invocation of certain obnoxious norms, customs, and traditions in society to
justify or legitimise the violation of people’s rights and dignity, including brutal
harm and death (e.g. infanticide associated with fetish religion). In Galtung’s
conception, structural violence (which broadly encapsulates cultural violence)
is the key underpinning of negative peace in society.

Even though Galtung’s original conception of peacebuilding was aimed at

dealing with the related issues of structural violence and negative peace prior
to conflict escalating to a violent hostility phase, Galtung did foresee a place
for peacebuilding in the aftermath of armed conflict as a way of preventing
a relapse to armed struggle and violent engagement. The latter was mainly
implicit in his analysis, but less prominent in his original conception of peace-
building.

Boutros-Ghali’s Re-conception

The concept and practice of peacebuilding gained global publicity following

the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s promulgation of his policy
report to the General Assembly and Security Council, An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping3 in January 1992. In
the highly seminal policy report, Boutros-Ghali (1992:11) was more concerned
with “post-conflict peacebuilding,” which he defined as “action to identify and
support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid re-
lapse into conflict.” Linking peacebuilding to key preceding conflict intervention
activities in his analytical matrix, Boutros-Ghali (1992:11, 33) argued that: “Pre-
ventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-
making and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace
once it is attained…post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence of
crisis.”

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Adopting what seems like Galtung’s positive peace approach without explicitly
using the concept or acknowledging Galtung, Boutros-Ghali argued that in its
role as the central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and
the preservation of peace in the world, the aim of the UN must be:

• Identify, at the earliest possible stage, situations that could produce conflict
for the sake of trying (through diplomacy) to remove the sources of danger
before violence results
• Engage in peacemaking wherever conflict has erupted, to resolve the is-
sues that have led to conflict
• Preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to
assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers
• Assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions
and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building
bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war
• Address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice
and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common
moral perception that spans the world’s nations and peoples, and which is
finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the
work of this Organization (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:7-8).

While Boutros-Ghali redefined peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity, he

recognized that the UN must begin “to address the deepest causes of con-
flict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.” However,
Boutros-Ghali did not place this seemingly “conflict transformation” task within
the conceptual or operational purview of “peacebuilding.” He posited that
the latter, along with other key tasks of the UN, will “demand the concerted
attention and effort of individual States, of regional and non-governmental
organizations and of all of the United Nations’ system, with each of the princi-
pal organs functioning in the balance and harmony that the Charter requires”
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992:8).4

In our Austrian graduate school in the early 1990s, where we extensively

dissected Boutros-Ghali’s re-conception of peacebuilding, we had several
problems with his analysis, namely his appropriation of the concept of peace-
building without any citational acknowledgement of Johan Galtung, as re-
search tradition demands. If Boutros-Ghali’s policy report had been subjected
to the rigor of academic peer-review, he could have possibly been compelled
by specialist reviewers to duly acknowledge Galtung. Another significant
problem we had with Boutros-Ghali’s analysis was his restricted conception
of peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity, which most of us saw as an under-
developed application of the theory. Despite its shortcomings, it is remarkable
that most international organizations, including the UN Peacebuilding Commis-
sion (UNPBC, established in December 2005 and the Organisation for Economic

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Co-operation and Development (OECD), tend to adopt a minimalist definition of

peacebuilding, i.e., limiting peacebuilding to an essentially post-conflict activity
(OECD, 2010; UNPBC, 2023).5

In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace published in 1995,5 Boutros-Ghali

apparently responded to the barrage of criticisms indicting his restriction of
peacebuilding to a post-conflict activity by acknowledging that the vast range
of measures used in post-conflict peacebuilding “can also support preventive
diplomacy” or be “invaluable in preventing conflict,” measures such as “demil-
itarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and
judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social
and economic development” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: para. 47).)6 The supposedly
revisionist proposal of peacebuilding in practice by Boutros-Ghali has not been
significantly acknowledged in the discourses of peacebuilding as much as his
original 1992 definition.

A More Balanced Conceptualisation of Peacebuilding

A more balanced and acceptable definition of peacebuilding will be one that

integrates the conflict prevention approach of Johan Galtung that aims at deal-
ing with the related issues of structural violence and negative peace, and on
the other hand, integrate Boutros-Ghali’s post-conflict priorities of [re]building
institutions and infrastructures of sustainable peace. In this context, conflict
prevention is used as a pre-violence activity in a conflict-prone situation or
environment. In between the pre-violence and post-conflict phases, any dete-
rioration in the relationship between the conflict parties resulting in escalation
of hostilities will require mixed methods of conflict resolution, depending on an
accurate context-specific assessment of the situation and the marshalling of
the required technical and financial resources to address the situation. Some
of the measures of conflict resolutions recognised in the international system,
and by academic and policy practitioners, include shuttle diplomacy and peace-
making, negotiation and third-party mediation, peace enforcement; ceasefire
agreement, verification and monitoring; conflict control and conflict settlement,
peace support operation and peacekeeping, conflict stabilisation and transfor-
mation (Ginty & Wanis-St.-John, 2022; Zartman, 2022; Lederach, 2022).7 Typi-
cally, conflict resolution may or may not involve the use of force or a military
enforcement action. Peacebuilding, as a matter of necessity, is a non-violent
activity.

Based on the foregoing exposition, it suffices to define peacebuilding as a

“non-violent project designed to promote capacity-enhancing investments in
different aspects of people’s lives complemented by creating and strengthen-
ing the necessary conditions, institutions and infrastructures for sustainable
peace in societies prone to violent conflicts or grappling with the effects of

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past conflicts.” Fundamentally, peacebuilding must be people-centred and, for

meaningful impact, conceived as a long-term project. Peacebuilding interven-
tion projects could be designed and implemented at various levels of society,
such as the grassroots community level, sub-national provincial level, national
level, as well as trans-national and international levels.

“Peacebuilding activities that lack a long-term perspective differ somewhat

from quick-impact projects and cannot bring lasting peace” (Olonisakin, Ebo
& Kifle, 2020:72).8 It is pertinent to mention that most discussions about
peacebuilding are focused on the state level because being a long-term en-
gagement, peacebuilding comes with the requirements of local driving actors
and national ownership, capacity and responsibility (Khadiagala, 2021:200).9
Where the institutions and functional capacity of the state have been massively
destroyed by armed conflicts, as is often the case in many war-affected de-
veloping countries, the peacebuilding project would necessitate wide-ranging
activities aimed at rebuilding the institutional and governance capacities of the
state. Some of these post-conflict peacebuilding activities include the return of
refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the
design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; eco-
nomic rehabilitation and reconstruction, governance reform, the verification of
respect for human rights; security sector reform, development re-engineering
and public service delivery (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:21).10

War-affected States in the Developing World and Liberal Peace-

building

One of the cardinal features of peacebuilding in war-affected developing coun-

tries is its internationalisation tendency, a phenomenon that has resulted in
what is popularly known as “liberal peacebuilding” or what scholars like David
Chandler (2022:3)11 have alternatively describes as “international peacebuild-
ing.” The principal aim of international peacebuilding is to build [sustainable]
peace in fragile conflict-prone and war-affected states based on liberal insti-
tutional frameworks of constitutionalism, free market reforms, multi-party de-
mocracy, the rule of law and an active civil society (Chandler, 2022:3).12 Among
the key justifications of liberal peacebuilding is the idea that an open society
marked by democracy and free-market economy enables people to resolve
their differences peacefully, to accomplish their aspirations and make govern-
ments accountable and responsive to people’s basic needs (Tanabe, 2019:24).13
Working in concert with institutions of global governance such as the UN, EU,
and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF), the West has successfully foisted or imposed liberal
peacebuilding on many developing countries emerging from war in Africa and
beyond, including countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC,
Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia, Libya, and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the

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liberal peacebuilding project was eviscerated and reversed by the Islamist

Taliban regime after 20 years of American occupation of their country.

The transplantation of liberal peacebuilding to war-affected developing coun-

tries by the West and leading institutions of global governance has attracted
scathing criticisms in academic literature. Among other things, liberal peace-
building has been criticised for inadequate appreciation of how local conditions
and sociocultural realities may contradict the engrafted peacebuilding project,
inadequate consultation with local actors who are often arm-twisted to ac-
cept the peacebuilding package, and the imposition of Western values upon
post-conflict zones as a means to maintain the prevailing hierarchical global
structures reflecting Western dominance (Tanabe, 2019:26).14 Tieku (2021:67)15
has argued that liberal peacebuilding is neither a value neutral exercise nor
a purely technical project, but rather it is a political enterprise designed to
change post-war African societies to reflect the image and interests of peace-
builders, a process imbued with Western civilising intentions and moderni-
sation activities. Furthermore, the liberal peacebuilding project in Africa has
been criticised for promoting a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach to conflict
resolution and peacebuilding, which “often ignores local contexts, informal
actors, and initiatives, which if brought on board could lead to longer-term,
sustainable, context-specific programs that produce better outcomes” (Aubyn,
2021:21).16

Perhaps the most insidious but often overlooked problem with liberal peace-
building is in its jaundiced problematisation of the state in non-Western soci-
eties where the state is perceived as weak, corrupt, unaccountable, repressive
and not-fit-for-purpose. “The state has increasingly been cast as a problem”
and therefore cannot be trusted to be part of the solutions moving forward
(Chandler, 2022:72).17 The war-torn states in Africa and the non-Western world
are imagined from the structural pragmatism standpoint of Charles Tilly (1985)
as merely government-run “protection rackets” based on the repression and
exploitation of their citizens in the interest of criminal or self-interested elites.

This pathological characterisation of the war-torn or conflict-affected states

in the non-Western world, from the proponents’ standpoint, can only be chal-
lenged through the liberal peacebuilding agenda. It is for this reason that the
liberal peacebuilding agenda is predesigned as a state-building project – but
the nature of the state it seeks to build is a defective one, with utterly devalued
sovereignty. In summarising the depiction of critical theory literature on the
nature of the state immanent on the liberal peacebuilding process, Chandler
(2022:73)18 argues that the humanitarian and human rights interventions of the
international community, as early as the 1990s, has resulted in the “sucking
out” of the fragile state’s capacity as core state functions are taken over by UN
agencies, international institutions and international NGOs, undermining the

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legitimacy and authority of these non-Western states. Clearly, even if there are
some truths in the way liberal peacebuilding characterises the deeply belea-
guered and war-affected non-Western state, the remedy it proposes is defec-
tive. One is inclined to agree with the observation reported by Aubyn (2021:23)
that “liberal peacebuilding is better in ending wars than in fixing democracies
and building durable peace.”19

Are there African Perspectives to Peacebuilding?

From the preceding sections of this paper, two important points are notewor-
thy about peacebuilding. The first is that the whole idea of peacebuilding as
championed by the international community since the end of the Cold War
– thanks to Boutros-Ghali’s secretaryship of the UN – was conceived for the
purpose of helping to rebuild developing countries of the global South affected
and devastated by armed conflicts. The need for this post-conflict reconstruct-
ed strategy coincided with the emerging “the new war paradigm” at the end
of the Cold War which, among other things, meant that intra-state conflict and
civil wars had become a greater threat to regional and international peace and
security than the inter-state conflicts of the preceding dispensation (Kaldor,
1999).20 Over the past three decades of the international peacebuilding cam-
paign, the focus has largely been on the global South, and Africa has had a
preponderant share of it. Eight of the eleven developing countries prioritised
in the peacebuilding commitments of the UNPBC in 2022 - 2023 are in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa (SSA) - Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia,
The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, South
Sudan and Timor Leste (UNPBC, 2023). Similarly, all the six past and prospec-
tive commitments of the UNPBC to support regional peacebuilding activities in
2022 – 2023 are in the global South, four of them in SSA - Central Africa, Great
Lakes region, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad Basin, Sahel, and the Pacific Islands
(UNPBC, 2023).

The second noteworthy point is that even though peacebuilding was suppos-
edly conceived to serve the purpose of the war-affected fragile states of the
global South, the dominant philosophical perspective, values and interests that
shape and drive it are Western. In the African context, where most of the inter-
national peacebuilding activities have taken place in the past three decades,
the dominance of the Western liberal peacebuilding model has literally meant
that “peacebuilding is what the West does to Africa or in Africa.”

This begs the question: are there African perspectives to peacebuilding? To

answer this question in the singular form: There is an emerging African per-
spective to peacebuilding. The emerging African perspective is an amalgam
of thoughts that have crystallised from various schools of thought over a long
period of historical and political struggles, with the aim of achieving collective

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freedom from external subjugation and fostering peace and security on the
continent — all for the benefit of the African people. But most significantly, the
emerging African perspective has developed out of a more conscious response
by African researchers to the universalising tendency of liberal peacebuild-
ing theory and practices on the African continent, especially in the post-Cold
War dispensation. The various works we have done and still do under the
intellectual umbrella of the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) represent a
strong contribution to the emerging African perspective on peacebuilding. To
strengthen this perspective, we need to be more deliberate in our conceptu-
alisation and promotion of the core values and interests that drive it or that
ought to drive it.

To further elucidate the emerging African peacebuilding perspective, I wish to

adopt a more holistic or integrative approach that tends to view peacebuilding
in its complex interconnections with the broad issues of security, development,
and governance. This holistic perspective is important because what we call
liberal peacebuilding, which is the dominant paradigm of peacebuilding in
Africa, does not deal with peacebuilding in isolation but rather represents a
holistic package that extends to the specific nature of political institutions and
governance, economic reconstruction and development, the model of security
sector reforms, issues of sociocultural neoliberalism, and so forth. The liberal
peacebuilding model is a total package about state reformation, institutionism,
and governance direction.

I wish to highlight three important studies and one practice model that, in
my view, stand out in their articulation of the emerging African peacebuilding
perspective.

Three Schools of Thought on “African Solutions to African Prob-

lems”

The first is the paper by Ndubuisi C. Ani titled “Three Schools of Thought on
African Solutions to African Problems” published in Journal of Black Studies
(2019).21 Ani’s paper is not strictly focused on peacebuilding, but it explores
the rich intellectual foundation of African Solutions to African Problems (AfSol)
that dates back to the pan-Africanist movement and decolonization struggles
of the 20th century, the emergence of the post-colonial state, the scourge of
neo-colonialism, and what some of the founding fathers of modern Africa (like
Kwame Nkrumah) saw as the unfinished project of African liberation. Despite
all the internal socio-demographic differences shared by Africans and the pro-
found intellectual contentions about AfSol, both of which Ani’s paper brilliantly
address, it is important to that African peacebuilding is part of the discursive
inquiry of African scholars and policy intellectuals who are dissatisfied with
the prevailing status quo, and are determined to seek constructive African

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solutions to the conflict and security challenges on the African continent. “In
Africa,” Ani argues, “the shared geographical experiences, challenges, values,
interests, and concerns have engendered the prevailing idea of Africa’s col-
lective response to common challenges as indicated by the maxim “African
solutions to African problems” (Ani, 2018:139).22 African policy scholars may
disagree on what they perceive as “the content of African solutions” – and such
disagreement is both healthy and obtainable elsewhere – but we are unlike-
ly to have strong disagreement on the philosophical premise that we do not
necessarily need Western or Eastern solutions to African problems, but African
solutions. This does not imply that our African solutions may not have ele-
ments of what we may consider useful from the West, East, Middle East, and
other parts of the world.

Further on establishing the philosophical premise of an African peacebuild-

ing perspective, Ani (2019:146) 23 makes a pertinent point that fundamentally
speaks to who we are as Africans by extrapolating or highlighting relevant
literature about how “the African system accords greater value to social net-
works in the comprehension, analysis, and resolution of conflicts, as opposed
to individualistic approaches that privilege the interests and views of individ-
ual elites.” In buttressing his argument that despite the onslaught of colonial
conquest of African indigenous institutions and values, there persists a dom-
inant leaning of African conflict resolution and peacebuilding to the preser-
vation of the community and holistic principles, Ani makes the following sub-
mission: “Indeed, concepts such as ‘Kparakpor’ (Yoruba-Nigeria), ‘Igwebuike’
(Igbo-Nigeria), ‘Ubuntu’ (Zulu-South Africa), ‘Harambee’ (Swahili-Kenya), and
‘Ujamaa’ (Swahili-Tanzania)— which simply refer to the notion of group solidar-
ity and power - “I am because we are”— have become trending terminologies
that denote the value of communal relationships in African systems” (Ani,
2019:146).24 From Ani’s paper, the recognition of the African community-cen-
tredness as a worthy philosophical value in peacebuilding research and policy
interventions comes out quite strongly.

An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on

Peacebuilding

The second publication is the chapter by Festus K. Aubyn, titled “An Overview
of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on Peacebuilding,” published in
the edited volume by Ismail Rashid and Amy Niang (2021).25 Aubyn’s paper ad-
dresses three important issues. Firstly, it presents a comprehensive literature
review of the key trends, themes, and debates in African peacebuilding. Sec-
ondly, the paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the peacebuilding
literature produced by African scholars, including their contributions to the
global peacebuilding scholarship. Thirdly, the paper makes a set of recommen-
dations aimed at addressing some of the gaps and weaknesses identified in

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African scholarly writings on peacebuilding.

The paper traces the evolution of peace research globally and in the African
context, tracing the former to the Cold War security threats in the ideologically
polarised global system, and the latter to the proliferation of armed conflicts
in Africa both during and after the Cold War. As a field of study, peacebuilding
scholarship is largely post-Cold War, having been greatly influenced by the
landmark report of the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s report of 1992,
An Agenda for Peace.26 Aubyn pays tribute to the leading African research
institutions, policy think tanks, and scholarly journals that helped to pioneer
peace and peacebuilding research on the continent, including CODESRIA in
Dakar-Senegal, ACCORD in Durban-South Africa, ISS in Pretoria-South Africa,
and so forth, highlighting their various periodicals and discussing some of the
seminal works they have published over the years.

Regarding the substantive issue of distinctive contributions of African schol-

ars to the global peacebuilding debate, Aubyn (2021:28)27 argues that “African
scholars have not offered anything qualitatively different from their counter-
parts elsewhere in the world,” even though their works have apparently made
“incremental contributions to the formulation of national, regional, and global
policies and practices of peacebuilding.” He attributes the apparent lack of
pathbreaking creativity in the African peacebuilding literature to the fact that
most of the African experts are trained in Western scholarship and depend on
Western literature for research. But quite remarkably, the author highlights
“the significant level of convergence that exists between African research and
global discourses on a number of peacebuilding issues,” as follows:

First, there is some level of convergence about certain key principles of building
peace, such as national and local ownership. National ownership is seen as a vital
element of the success and sustainability of peacebuilding activities, as it ensures that
processes are nationally driven…one of the important issues advocated by a number
of African researchers and institutions, like the AU, is local ownership of peacebuild-
ing processes. Thankfully, among the overarching recommendations in the report of
the advisory group of experts for the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architec-
ture was the need to foster “inclusive national ownership.”

Second, another connection between African peacebuilding research and global dis-
courses is the strong emphasis placed on gender, women, peace, and security. Over
the past decade, African researchers, policymakers, multilateral organizations, and ex-
ternal partners have emphasized the goal of gender equality and women’s empower-
ment in Africa to address key challenges such as poverty, inequality, violence against
women and girls, and the under-representation of women in politics, leadership, and
management level positions in the public and private sectors.

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Third, criticism of current liberal peacebuilding approaches that emphasize political

liberalization (democracy building) and economic liberalization (market economics) as
the surest foundations for peace is another similarity between African peacebuilding
research and global discourses (Aubyn, 2021:28-29). 28

Aubyn (2021:30) 29 argues that one of the key weaknesses of African peace-
building literature is that “despite criticizing Western peacebuilding policy
prescriptions, scholarship, and practices, African researchers have not been
able to clearly articulate strong countervailing normative frameworks.” There
persists “a paucity of conceptual and theoretical research on African approach-
es to peacebuilding that can inform regional and international peacebuilding
agendas.” Aubyn’s research findings underscore the need for greater philo-
sophical and conceptual creativity in researching peacebuilding from an Afri-
can perspective.

The Economics of Peacebuilding

The third publication is the chapter by Vera Songwe, titled “The Economics of
Peacebuilding: International Organizations for Dealing with Victor and Van-
quished,” published in a co-edited volume by Terence McNamee and Monde
Muyangwa (2021).30 As an intellectual perspective, the economics of peace-
building is concerned with how to mobilize resources for a carefully planned
economic reconstruction and development after violent conflicts, justifiably
because, as proponents argue, most conflicts are caused by economic-relat-
ed grievances (Collier, 2008, 2009; Songwe, 2021).31 Some of the economic
grievances believed to be at the root of armed conflicts in developing regions
include issues of economic deprivation and exclusion, development deficits and
marginalisation, exploitation, high level of inflation, extreme poverty, and youth
unemployment.

Contrary to the conventional sequence practised today, Songwe (2021:34)32

argues that economic development must be central to peacebuilding, asserting
that “economic development has to be part of peacebuilding from Day One.”
This implies that conflict settlement and peace agreements must have a com-
prehensive economic development agenda, and a funding and implementation
plan as was the case in Europe at the end of World War II. Conventional prac-
tice is to focus on economic development when peace is fully restored, which
could take a couple of years after the peace agreement, an approach that Son-
gwe (2021:34)33 faults as being “clearly contrary to all successful experiences.”

Songwe uses the classic example of post-World War II reconstruction of Eu-

rope to demonstrate a successful economics-centred peacebuilding experi-
ence. To rebuild war-torn Europe, US prioritized mutually beneficial trade with
Europe as part of the recovery and development plan, the European Recovery

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Program [ERP, popularly known as the Marshall Plan, named after the then
US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who vigorously advanced the plan
(Songwe, 2021; Pogue, 2023).34 Under the US-sponsored ERP, 16 European
countries received $14 billion of soft reconstruction and development loans
between 1948 – 1951 (today’s equivalent of $217 billion) (Songwe, 2021:38).35
The post-war period witnessed an unprecedented speed of recovery from the
inflicted devastations due to the role of the Marshall Plan in stimulating pro-
duction and employment in Europe, as well as the role of the newly formed
Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank & IMF) in eliminating foreign exchange
restrictions and stabilising international trade (WESS, 2017:26).36

Songwe (2021:34)37 argues that the challenge of responding to more internal

conflicts in the case of Africa, also requires an alternative response that is
underpinned by economic imperatives rather than by an established sequence
of political negotiations. But unfortunately, in her view, the “institutional archi-
tectures” of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions today do not allow them to
play rightful roles in peacebuilding in Africa. In particular, the Bretton Woods
Institutions often condition their assistance on the willingness of each African
country to undertake necessary structural and monetarist reforms, notably a
reduction in the public sector, devaluation of the national currency, deregula-
tion of the foreign trade sector, and more reliance on markets for the allocation
of resources (Akinola, 2021).38

In her policy recommendations, Songwe (2021:44)39 advocates inter alia that

for contemporary conflict intervention and post-conflict peacebuilding in Afri-
ca to be effective, there is the need for an Economic Reconstruction Program
(ERP) asserting that the US-funded Marshall Plan approach is an imperfect but
important model. Like in the example of post-war Europe, committed invest-
ment partners and institutions are essential for African post-war recovery
and peacebuilding. She submits that post-war Cote d’Ivoire was able to make
rapid economic recovery progress because France decided to underwrite an
important part of the peacebuilding plan, albeit the author did not provide the
necessary facts and figures to substantiate her claim that France’s bilateral
investment aided post-war recovery in Cote d’Ivoire.

Songwe doubtlessly makes an important contribution, not least through her

recognition that peacebuilding is resource intensive and that in planning
post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa (the major concern of her paper), serious
thoughts and consideration must be given to the funding aspects - the cost
involved, funding source(s), the economic and development activities to be
funded, accountability measures, and the terms of funding.

Equitable systems of international collaboration

Decolonizing knowledge production in Africa necessitates a paradigm shift.

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Some thoughts and consideration must be given to the funding aspects - the cost
involved, funding source(s), the economic and development activities to be funded,
accountability measures, and the terms of funding.

The Borno Model of Peacebuilding: Integrating International Discourses

with Local Realism

As an African scholar that partly studied in the West in the early post-Cold War era
(some 30 years ago), one of the intriguing experiences from my Austrian graduate
class, which was predominated by Western [Caucasian] students, perspectives
and case studies, was that the few of us from Africa always strived to inject Afri-
can perspectives in all class discussions. We frequently raised questions about the
relevance of mainstream approaches, such as liberal peacebuilding to the African
context. Interestingly, Johan Galtung would always respond to questions about
post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa from a holistic perspective, too often integrating
international discourses of peacebuilding with local realism. In doing so, he would
constructively blend academic theories with practice. Galtung would also always
win our admiration by his adroit coalescing of the diverse themes that cut across
his global expertise to elucidate what should be the key priorities for post-conflict
reconstruction and peacebuilding in Africa, most notably: meeting basic human
needs through poverty alleviation programs, human capital development, justice
and human rights protection, sustainable development, gender equality, environ-
mental security, context-relevant democratic governance, regional security and
equitable international cooperation. Galtung’s approach privileges the constructive
blending of international discourses with local realism to eliminate structural vio-
lence and establish structures of positive peace capable of meeting people’s human
development needs.

The Borno State Model of Peacebuilding in the north-east Nigeria (known as “the
Borno Model” for short), implemented by the state government under the leader-
ship of Governor Babagana U. Zulum since 2020, is an impressive people-centred
approach to eliminate structures of Islamist insurgency and build sustainable peace
by constructively advancing the security, governance, and peacebuilding nexus.
Borno is one of the three major states in North-east Nigeria extremely devastated
by the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency since the groups’ radicalisation and the
spread of its insurgency from 2009 onwards. Among other devastating effects, the
Boko Haram insurgency has caused more than 38,000 deaths, left 3.5 million people
food insecure in the most conflict-affected north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa
and Yobe, and has also left more than 2 million people displaced, the majority of
them in Borno state (Delgado, 2022; Sasu, 2023).40

The Borno Model of Peacebuilding is a multi-sectoral and inter-agency driven

peacebuilding program, comprehensively spelt out in the state government’s 25
Year Development framework and 10 Year Strategic Transformation Plan pro-

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mulgated in June 2020. The long-term vision of the government’s peacebuild-

ing approach is to achieve “a secure, competitive, agri-business and commer-
cial hub anchored on prosperous people and sustainable development” (BSG,
2020).41 The five drivers of the strategic pillars for achieving this goal are:
human capital development, leadership in agriculture, healthy citizenry, sustain-
able environment, and regional trade hub, while the four enabling transforma-
tive pillars are: reconstruct, rehabilitate, and resettle; purposeful infrastructure,
accountable governance, and peace and security.

Among the key areas where the government’s peacebuilding program has made
a remarkable impact on people’s lives include:

1. The Disarmament, Demobilization, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Rein-

tegration (DDDRRR) program, designed to provide a “root and branch” approach to ending
the Boko Haram insurgency.
2. Closing of most IDP camps in the state, resettling of IDPs, and returning refugees from
neighbouring countries in their ancestral communities.
3. Distribution of food palliatives and other humanitarian relief items to tens of thousands of
people in rural, peri-urban, and urban settlements to offset the harsh economic circum-
stances faced by the people.
4. Promoting of rural development and sustainable livelihood through citizens’ empowerment
to engage in sustainable livelihoods in the agricultural value chain, cottage industry, and
small businesses.
5. Distribution of hundreds of patrol vehicles and motorcycles to the Nigerian military and vol-
unteers from the ‘Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)’ and local hunters involved with securing
communities across Borno State.
6. Establishment of five Vocational Training Institutes and rehabilitation of 19 small Technical
Skills Centres across the state, including those owned by some “community-based organi-
sations” (CBOs). The training center consists of dozens of workshops equipped with mod-
ern training facilities and designed to train thousands of young people per annum in areas
such as tailoring and fashion design, hairdressing and cosmetology, welding, plumbing and
pipefitting, carpentry, and joinery, building technology, electrical works, solar panel and
installation, automobile and mechatronics, agricultural technology, knitting and crocheting,
aluminium fabrication, and ICT training facilities.
7. Partnership with the federal government’s security forces, local civil defence forces, and
non-state security providers to ensure protection of grassroots communities. The state
government provides funding support and logistical facilities to all security services in the
state, and also ensures accountability.
8. Inauguration of an ambitious tree planting campaign aimed at planting 10 million trees by
2024 across the 27 local government areas of the state to mitigate desertification and other
environmental problems.

Fostering meaningful partnerships

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To mobilise the necessary financial and material resources to implement this

multi-billion dollar long-term peacebuilding program, the Borno state gov-
ernment works in partnership with the Nigerian federal government and its
relevant agencies, UN agencies (UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNODC),
international NGOs, international development agencies, and financial institu-
tions, regional bodies, local civil societies, and voluntary organisations. Some
of the major external financiers of the peacebuilding include UNDP and other
UN agencies, European Union (EU), African Development Bank (AfDB), and the
Islamic Development Bank (World Bank, 2021; ABC News 13/10/2023).42 The
UNDP Administrator and Vice Chair of the UN Sustainable Development Group,
Achim Steiner, while receiving the Borno State governor Babagana Zulum and
his delegation in his office in Geneva in June 2023 remarked that the UN was
considering the adoption of the Borno State’s successful humanitarian inter-
vention model as a template to guide UN humanitarian crisis management
programs (Ardo, 18/06/2023).43

Evidently, the Borno Model of Peacebuilding has recorded impressive achieve-

ments since its inception, but that is mainly due to the dogged leadership of
the state governor, Babagana Zulum. The governors before him and those in
the other two states devastated by Boko Haram have not shown similar leader-
ship strength and capability. This raises the challenge of sustainability because
under Nigerian democratic arrangement, the governor can only serve for a
maximum two-term tenure of eight years. To achieve sustainable peacebuild-
ing in the Boko Haram insurgency-affected area requires a comprehensive
long-term plan over the entire Nigerian North-east region, and possibly the
larger Lake Chad Basin. But without doubt, in the Borno model, one could see a
far-sighted blend of international discourses and local realism.

The Normative Principles and Paradigmatic Imperatives that

Should Guide African Peacebuilding Research: An Applied Social
Policy Perspective

In social research, normative principles are prescriptions of moral codes in-

tended to help to minimize risks and harm in the research process and out-
comes, while at the same time maximising benefits for society (UKRI, 2023).44
The term paradigm was popularised in the human sciences by Thomas Kuhn
in his famous book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962.
However, it was only in the postscript to the 1969 edition of the book that Kuhn
clarified his concept of paradigm, giving it two core meanings, which I do not
intend to explore in this paper.45 A paradigm can be generally defined as “a
system of beliefs, ideas, values, or principles that form the basis for a way of
thinking about the world;” it is “an analytic lens, a way of viewing the world
and a framework from which to understand the human experience” (Mauldin,

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2020; Proofed, 2023).46 There are different philosophical paradigms in social re-
search, although two seem to be dominant, positivism and post-positivism, and
each subsumes a cluster of explanatory theories. Furthermore, paradigms, in
a large sense, subsume normative principles in research.

Fundamentally, peacebuilding research is applied to social policy research

geared towards producing empirically valid and reputable knowledge that is
potentially useful to policy makers and conflict intervention practitioners, all
for the purpose of solving real problems that affect people in their societal sys-
tems. Some of the “normative principles and paradigmatic imperatives” that
should guide African peacebuilding research and publications could be easily
extrapolated from the three studies and one practice model discussed in the
preceding section, but they also go beyond the four references.

Let me first summarize the principles and paradigmatic imperatives of African

peacebuilding derivable from the four reviewed contributions as follows:

1. From the paper by Ndubuisi C. Ani: The community spirit or a community-centric approach
– This concerns the principle of prioritising the public good and the interests of the community
over and above the self-serving interests of the political elites. The neoliberal economic and
political governance system that Africa has embraced tend to prioritise the individualization of
things, which is a contradiction to the African spirit of community-centredness, a philosophical
worldview that has already been dealt a devastating blow by the thraldom of coloniality and
the misguided tendencies of post-coloniality.

2. From the paper by Festus K. Aubyn: A creative problem-solving approach rooted in African
realism – This is about the need for deeper philosophical creativity in research rooted in Afri-
can realism, further necessitating a systematic and sustained decolonisation of peacebuilding
research on the continent.

3. From the paper by Vera Songwe: A thoughtful funding framework captured in an Economic
Reconstruction Program (ERP) – This concerns the need to seriously consider the funding as-
pects of peacebuilding in our research and publications - the cost involved, or the cost of simi-
lar projects completed elsewhere, funding source(s), the economic and development activities
to be funded, accountability measures, and the terms of funding. A fundamental requirement of
the funding aspect is enhancing the capacity for generating African funding (e.g. through public
& private initiatives, as well as the African Diaspora), which is essential for strengthening
African ownership of the peacebuilding project.

4. From “The Borno Model of Peacebuilding:” An integrative blend of international discourses

and local realism with strong commitment to advancing the security, governance, and peace-
building nexus. – Significantly, this must be steered by local leadership and committed to
meeting the human development needs of the mass populations.

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Beyond these four foregoing principles, Gilbert Khadiagala (2021:204-210),47 in

evaluating “The African Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)”
policy of the African Union (AU) identifies three underlying principles proposed
by PCRD, namely:

1. African leadership – strong political will and determination by African stakeholders to lead
the planning and execution of the peacebuilding process and mobilise African resources to
support and sustain it.
2. National and local ownership - creative efforts by national leaders in building governance
systems that are inclusive, participatory, and restore trust across communities.
3. Capacity-building for sustainability – deliberate and structured investment to build the
local capacity to prevent the outbreak of conflicts, manage violent conflicts and prevent
the recurrence of armed conflicts, building and strengthening the multi-sectoral infra-
structures for peace.

Adopted in July 2006, PCRD is the AU’s peacebuilding initiative formulated to

complement the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in promoting
peace and sustainable development in countries emerging from war, albeit
both mechanisms have struggled with limited resources, expertise, and capaci-
ty, especially the former (AU, 2006; Khadiagala, 2021).48

Strengthening Triangulation

So much has been written about the need for triangulation as one of the par-
adigmatic imperatives in qualitative social research, including in researching
peacebuilding in Africa (Rashid & Niang, 2021; Omeje, 2021a).49 Triangulation is
largely understood as the mechanism of adopting mixed methods, multiple in-
vestigators, and transdisciplinary perspectives in research to help improve the
credibility of one’s research processes and findings. In mainstream literature,
four types of triangulation are often expounded, namely:

(1) data triangulation, which includes matters such as periods of time, space and people; (2)
investigator triangulation, which includes the use of several researchers in a study; (3) theory
triangulation, which encourages several theoretical schemes to enable interpretation of a
phenomenon and (4) methodological triangulation, which promotes the use of several data
collection methods, such as interviews and observations (Noble and Heale, 2019:67).50

All these methods of triangulation are important, but the emphasis of their
application in peacebuilding research do not seem to have yielded much of
the desired results in terms of the quality of research produced by scholars
and their applied policy dimensions. In most African peacebuilding research
and publications, the data presentation and analysis are often weak while the
policy recommendations are superficial, which is partly why Aubyn (2021:28)51

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argues that “African scholars have not offered anything qualitatively different
or pathbreaking in peacebuilding research.” There are two weak or perfunc-
tory links in most researchers’ application of the principle of triangulation to
qualitative data and policy recommendations with regard to the field of peace-
building, in my view. The first is “the poverty of historical context and import in
data presentation and analysis,” while the second is “inadequate grasp of the
political economy of peacebuilding in policy recommendations.” The following
section is devoted to exploring the two shortcomings, and highlighting how
they could be redressed.

Towards Strengthening Triangulation in African Peacebuilding

Research

(a) “The Poverty of Historical Context and Import” in Data Presentation

and Analysis

Regarding data presentation and analysis in African peacebuilding research,

the perfunctory link that needs to be overcome is what I have called “the
poverty of historical context and import.”52 I cautiously use this phraseology
in a manner completely different from Karl Popper’s “poverty of historicism”
in which the famous Austrian philosophy rebuked mainstream historicists for
wrongly believing that genuine social science must be a kind of “theoretical
history” in which the aim is to uncover laws of historical development that ex-
plain and predict the course of history (Gorton, n.d.).53 Popper argues that this
version of historicism, among other mainstream versions found in the social
sciences, is inclined towards utopianism. In poverty of historicism, Karl Popper
repudiates the use of historicism in a classical positivist or structuralist sense
in social research because of his rationalist predilection that scientific knowl-
edge is provisional – i.e. the best we can do at the moment – and that there is
no unique methodology specific to science; rather, science, like virtually every
other organic activity, consists largely of problem-solving oriented inquiry
(Thornton, 2022; Guy-Evans, 2023).54

I venture to use “the poverty of historical context and import” in a post-struc-

turalist sense to simply imply that most of our research and publications in Af-
rican peacebuilding are not anchored on a thorough investigation and analysis
of the underlying historical context and dynamics, with a view to learning from
the past to enrichen our understanding of the present, and designing how we
can shape or reshape the future. History is highly invaluable because it is from
history that we learn and know who we are individually and as a people, as
well as what has happened to us in the past to produce the problems we are
trying to solve in the present. It is from history that we learn what has shaped
our various societies and people, including the social contradictions and con-
flicts that have characterised their internal and external relations. adaptive

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flicts that have characterised their internal and external relations.

It is, for instance, the poverty of historical knowledge that has made so many
African countries literally “copy and paste” the British style of Parliamentary
democracy as a political system. When it doesn’t work, they jettison it and then
“copy and paste” the American presidential model, which may still prove disas-
trous.55 I am not by any means implying that Western democratic models can-
not work anywhere outside the West. Of course, they have worked in a number
of non-Western countries, but not without adapting parts of the Western model
to suit the country’s historical experiences, national priorities and the dynam-
ics of national elite consensus (e.g. Japan, Singapore, India, and Botswana).
But by and large, the British parliamentary system works well in the United
Kingdom because it is a product of the British’s internal political struggles for
individual and collective freedom from monarchical despotism. The American
presidential system works well in America, despite all its challenges, because
it evolved historically as a product of the internal struggles of the various
ethno-racial communities comprised in America for freedom. Externally, the
Caucasian Americans of European descent waged a struggle for freedom from
European imperial overlords, while internally the different subaltern commu-
nities in America have historically waged formidable struggles against ethnic
cleansing, slavery, institutional racism, and collective degradation and injus-
tice.

In researching peacebuilding in Africa, it is imperative that we look back his-

torically to research and understand who we are, including the socio-political
forces that have shaped our contemporary existence and identities. Fundamen-
tally, Africans are a post-colonial people, and our various states are post-colo-
nial states. From an institutionalist perspective, the post-colonial states inher-
ited top-down colonial institutions designed by the colonial powers to control
the populations and protect the state against the people instead of protecting
the people (Dia, 1996; Omeje, 2021b).56

From a neopatrimonial perspective, the post-colonial state institutions are his-

torically artificial, top-down, anti-people, transactional and therefore too often
bypassed by the state officials and citizens, who prefer to use informal societal
networks [ethnic, religious, and clannish networks] to address many formal
issues (Bach, 2011).57 In several instances in the African context, the society
has strong governance institutions while the state has weak transactional
institutions. In many ways, the post-colonial state institutions dysfunction due
to overwhelming contestations over transactional and distributive issues (not
necessarily economic production and governance issues), leading to armed
conflicts, military coups, and instability. It is remarkable to note that the two
African states that were not formally colonized (Ethiopia and Liberia) inad-
vertently developed political structures and institutional behaviours similar

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to other post-colonial states, thereby making their politics to become overly

post-colonial.

In researching peacebuilding in Africa, it is important that we thoroughly

investigate and understand how coloniality and post-coloniality have impacted
our various African states, sub-national identities, and grassroots communi-
ties. This phenomenon is at the root of so many conflicts we have been trying
to solve and build peace on the continent. In some African countries like Kenya,
Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, many academic experts and politicians have come to
the realisation that in order to resolve recurrent political conflicts and build
peace, there is the need to revisit and address the grave issues of historical
injustice. In the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, these are issues from the co-
lonial and post-colonial past. The policy interventions made by the defunct
Robert Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe to redress the issues of historical injustice
in land ownership and administration in the country were a total failure that
ended up aggravating the problem, further provoking unjustified international
sanctions from the West. The issues of historical injustice in the Zimbabwe-
an land economy are still festering. In Ethiopia, which had no colonial legacy
since the country was not really colonized, the issues of historical injustice
have to do with the legacies of imperial rule, and the contentious political and
economic governance legacies of the defunct Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime, including the subsequent efforts that have
been made to address them, which have greatly polarised the various ethnic
nationalities and regional states in the country. In my view, the recognition of
the potent and divisive issues of historical injustice that need to be addressed
in any of the African postcolonial states is a step in the right direction. How
these problems can be constructively addressed or redressed are debateable
issues in conflict and peacebuilding research. Unfortunately, there are many
states in Africa that tend to sweep the legacy of violent conflicts and historical
injustice in their colonial and post-colonial histories under the carpet, making
them flounder into “a conflict trap,” “a poverty trap” or in “a no war no peace”
quagmire. Hence, investigating our colonial and post-colonial histories, dealing
with legacies of conflict and injustice inherent in them, and also learning from
those experiences, are important for sustainable conflict resolution and peace-
building.

Furthermore, there are also some African countries that did make significant
political and economic progress during the first one or two decades of attaining
political independence before the onset of the primary commodity crisis and
political instability that swept through the continent in the 1980s and 1990s –
a devastation from which most countries are yet to make a full recovery (cf.
Omeje, 2021b; Chelwa, 2023).58 Part of the intellectual enterprise of embracing
“historical contexts and imports” as researchers is to meaningfully understand
and reflect on the specific post-independence development history of the coun-

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try concerned to see what could be learned from it— and possibly reinvented it
in a better fashion in order to move the country forward (Chelwa, 2023).59

Liberal peacebuilding, which has emerged as the conventional model of

state-building, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Africa is a
continuation of what I have in another publication called “the crises of post-co-
loniality” (Omeje, 2015).60 The liberal peace project is part of what coloniality
and post-coloniality have done and continue to do to Africa and both need to be
profoundly dissected and interrogated.

The Inadequate Grasp of the Political Economy of Peacebuilding in

Policy Recommendations

Regarding policy recommendations, the perfunctory link that seems to inun-

date African peacebuilding research is the lack of understanding of what Vera
Songwe (2021)61 calls “the economics of peacebuilding.” I will prefer to call it
“the political economy of peacebuilding.” With considerable caution, both con-
cepts can be used interchangeably. According to Songwe (2021), the economics
of peacebuilding is about marshalling out resources for a carefully planned
economic reconstruction and development after violent conflicts because most
conflicts are caused by economic-related grievances - e.g. issues of exclusion,
marginalisation, development deficits, exploitation, high level of inflation, hard-
ship, and youth unemployment, etc. Peacebuilding is resource-intensive and
one of the greatest challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the aftermath
of violent conflicts in Africa is the question of “where will the money come
from?” Who will fund the peacebuilding project, and under what terms and
conditions? Hence, when we are making policy recommendations about peace-
building at any level of state and society in Africa it is important to always
consider the cost and funding implications. Even peacebuilding at grassroots
levels does require some measure of resources and funding. How will the bril-
liant policy recommendations you have crafted be funded?

The political economy of peacebuilding, which I have said is my preferred ter-

minology, helps us to analytically explore and understand the complex interre-
lationships between the economics of peacebuilding and the mosaic of vested
political interests (local and external) in the peacebuilding project. How do we
ensure as researchers that the various competing interests and agendas in the
peacebuilding project do not simply gravitate towards principally addressing
the interests of the local political elites, and the international or external stake-
holders to the disadvantage of the African people and grassroots populations?
In practice, peacebuilding is largely interest-driven, and it is important that any
constructive and viable peacebuilding project in Africa is not structured in such
a way that the masses are disadvantaged.

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SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | LECTURE SERIES OMEJE | AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEBUILDING

From the standpoint of critical theory, there is no neutral theory concern-

ing human affairs. Furthermore, to be relevant, social theory must be prob-
lem-solving oriented, but historicised from “a world order perspective” to
uncover the purposes that the problem-solving theories and knowledge within
such an order serve to uphold (Jones, 1999; Cox, 1981, 2001; Malik, 2021).62 So-
cial theories and their immanent policies, states and inter-state institutions in-
variably embody and promote diverse interests. What ultimately matters about
social theory is whose interests it tends to maximise by the specific problems
it prioritises to solve. Neo-Gramscian left-leaning proponents of Critical Theo-
ry like Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair (1996; Sinclair, 2016)63 are of the view
that the most beneficial social theories are those that prioritise the needs and
problems of the underprivileged in society and the international system – i.e.
the underprivileged states in the comity of states and the underprivileged indi-
viduals, groups, and communities within the domestic state systems. If social
theories and policies are not neutral but are always meant for someone and for
some purpose, Cox (1981)64 reasons that “organic intellectuals” representing
the interests of the subalterns have a crucial role in articulating and fostering
a transformational agenda in society through their research and publications.

Concluding Remarks

This presentation has tried to explore the emerging African perspective to

peacebuilding, its defining characteristics, and the key normative principles
and paradigmatic imperatives that will guide scholars engaged in peacebuild-
ing research. As stakeholders in African peacebuilding, we all have a responsi-
bility to make quality contributions through research, publications, and where
possible, policy interventions, with the ultimate object of African transforma-
tion.

It is important to emphasis the point that societal conflicts, whether “violent

or latent” are “multi-dimensional social phenomena” (International Alert,
2004:1).65 To adequately understand, analyse, and solve the various conflicts
that affect different parts of the African continent, and ultimately build sustain-
able peace, there is the need to adopt a multi-faceted holistic approach. Our
approach to both conflict resolution and peacebuilding must of necessity be
“conflict-sensitive.” A conflict-sensitive approach is one that understands the
peculiar context in which the researcher, interlocutor or intervener operates,
the interaction between the proposed interventions and the operational context
and acting upon this well-grounded understanding to aim at measures that
will maximize positive impacts and mitigate negative outcomes (International
Alert, 2004; UNESCO, 2023).66

Finally, to strengthen the emerging African peacebuilding perspective, there is

24
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | LECTURE SERIES OMEJE | AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEBUILDING

the need for viable social policy think tanks and university departments or
schools to grow more peacebuilding-related journals on the continent. The
test for institutional viability in founding and growing a new journal would be
sufficient financial resources and incubation capacity – including adequate and
effective ICT infrastructure, organisational efficiency and predictability, and a
critical core team of committed multidisciplinary staff with technical compe-
tence, professional reputation, and ethical discipline. Rigorous technical plan-
ning and capacity-building workshops involving local stakeholders, external
partners, and accomplished experts in academic journal management, index-
ing, publishing, and dissemination are required before launching such journals.
Ultimately, to enhance the journal’s credibility, the core management team
driving the journal, such as the editorial staff should not all come from the
host institution and must be committed to operate within clearly defined ethical
guidelines.

25
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | LECTURE SERIES OMEJE | AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEBUILDING

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NOTES

1. Galtung, J. (1964). ‘What is peace research?’ Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1–4; Galtung,
J. (1967). Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking. Oslo: Internation-
al Peace Research Institute; Galtung, J. 1976, Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping,
Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. In Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research,
Vol. II, 297-298. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.
2. Galtung, J. 1976, Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuild-
ing. In Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. II, 297-298. Copenhagen:
Christian Ejlers.
3. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping. New York: UN Department of Public Information.
4. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping. New York: UN Department of Public Information.
5. OECD (2010) The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Contribution by
the Government of South Sudan, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Juba, March (http://www.oecd.org/countries/sudan/44924610.pdf); UNPBC (2023), “Pro-
visional Annual Program of Work of the Peacebuilding Commission 2023” https://www.un-
.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2023_pbc_work_
plan_approved.pdf#:~:text=Consultations%20are%20ongoing%20for%20continuation%20
of%20engagements%20on,Guinea%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20South%20Sudan%20
and%20Timor%20Leste
6. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995) Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60–S/1995/1), United
Nations Secretary-General, 25 January. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N95/080/95/PDF/N9508095.pdf?OpenElement.
7. Ginty Mac Roger & Anthony Wanis-St. John (2022) “Introduction.” In Roger Mac Ginty & An-
thony Wanis-St. John (eds.) Contemporary Peacemaking: Peace Processes, Peacebuilding
and Conflict. Third Edition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp1-22; Zartman I. William (2022)
“Understanding Ripeness: Making and Using Hurting Stalemates.” In Roger Mac Ginty &
Anthony Wanis-St. John (eds.) Contemporary Peacemaking: Peace Processes, Peacebuild-
ing and Conflict. Third Edition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.23-42; Lederach John Paul
(2022) “Cultivating Peace: A Practitioners View of Deadly Conflict and Negotiation.” In Roger
Mac Ginty & Anthony Wanis-St. John (eds.) Contemporary Peacemaking: Peace Processes,
Peacebuilding and Conflict. Third Edition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.43-54
8. Olonisakin Funmi, Adedeji Ebo & Alagaw Ababu Kifle (2020) “From Peacebuilding to Sus-
taining Peace and Preventing Conflict: What Role for SSR?” In Adedeji Ebo, Heiner Hänggi
(eds.) The United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Policy and Practice. Zürich: LIT VER-
LAG, pp.63-78
9. Khadiagala, G. M. 2021, The African Union and Peacebuilding in Africa. In T. McNamee and
M. Muyangwa (eds.) The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policy Makers
and Practitioners. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.197-213
10. 20. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995) Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60–S/1995/1),
United Nations Secretary-General, 25 January. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-

32
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | LECTURE SERIES OMEJE | AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEBUILDING

DOC/GEN/N95/080/95/PDF/N9508095.pdf?OpenElement
11. Chandler David (2022) Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years Crisis, 1997-2019. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan.
12. Chandler David (2022) Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years Crisis, 1997-2019. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan
13. Tanabe Juichiro (2019) “Beyond liberal peace: Critique of liberal Peacebuilding and Explor-
ing a Post-liberal Hybrid Model of Peacebuilding for a More Humane World.” Social Ethics
Society Journal of Applied Philosophy. Vol. 5, No 1, April, pp. 19-42
14. Tanabe Juichiro (2019) “Beyond liberal peace: Critique of liberal Peacebuilding and Explor-
ing a Post-liberal Hybrid Model of Peacebuilding for a More Humane World.” Social Ethics
Society Journal of Applied Philosophy. Vol. 5, No 1, April, pp. 19-42
15. Tieku K. Thomas (2021) “A Mission to Civilise: The Liberal Idea of Peacebuilding in Africa.”
In Ismail Rashid & Amy Niang (eds.) Researching Peacebuilding in Africa: Reflections on
Theory, Fieldwork and Context. London: Routledge, pp.56-71
16. Aubyn K. Festus (2021) “An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on
Peacebuilding.” In Ismail Rashid & Amy Niang (eds.) Researching Peacebuilding in Africa:
Reflections on Theory, Fieldwork and Context. London: Routledge, pp.15-37
17. Chandler David (2022) Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years Crisis, 1997-2019. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan
18. Chandler David (2022) Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years Crisis, 1997-2019. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan
19. Aubyn K. Festus (2021) “An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on
Peacebuilding.” In Ismail Rashid & Amy Niang (eds.) Researching Peacebuilding in Africa:
Reflections on Theory, Fieldwork and Context. London: Routledge, pp.15-37
20. Kaldor Mary (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford Uni-
versity Press
21. Ani Christian Ndubisi (2019) “Three Schools of Thought on African Solutions to African Prob-
lems.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 50(2) pp.135–155
22. Ani Christian Ndubisi (2019) “Three Schools of Thought on African Solutions to African Prob-
lems.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 50(2) pp.135–155.
23. Ani Christian Ndubisi (2019) “Three Schools of Thought on African Solutions to African Prob-
lems.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 50(2) pp.135–155
24. Ani Christian Ndubisi (2019) “Three Schools of Thought on African Solutions to African Prob-
lems.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 50(2) pp.135–155
25. Aubyn K. Festus (2021) “An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on
Peacebuilding.” In Ismail Rashid & Amy Niang (eds.) Researching Peacebuilding in Africa:
Reflections on Theory, Fieldwork and Context. London: Routledge, pp.15-37
26. Aubyn K. Festus (2021) “An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on
Peacebuilding.” In Ismail Rashid & Amy Niang (eds.) Researching Peacebuilding in Africa:
Reflections on Theory, Fieldwork and Context. London: Routledge, pp.15-37
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 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Kenneth Omeje is the Vice President for Academic Affairs

of Management International University (MIU), London and
Extraordinary Professor at the School of Government Studies,
North-West University (NWU) in South Africa. He is also a Visiting
Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Addis
Ababa University, Ethiopia, and the University for Peace (UPEACE)
Africa Programme in Addis Ababa, among others. Kenneth holds
an MA degree in Peace & Conflict Studies from the European
Peace University in Stadtschlaining, Austria and a PhD degree
in Peace & Security Studies from the University of Bradford, UK.
He has previously held the positions of Professor of International
Relations (Peacebuilding & Security Studies) at the United States
International University in Nairobi, Kenya; Senior Research Fellow
at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and
the Georg Arnhold Visiting Research Professor on Education
for Sustainable Peace at the Georg Eckert Institute (GEI) in
Braunschweig, Germany.