Gödel and the Limits of Logic

by John W Dawson Jr.

http://www.plus.maths.org/issue39/features/dawson/index.html
Jun-2006

T
he man in the photograph on the right looks
formal, reserved and somewhat undernourished.
His face and his writings are unfamiliar to most,
except for a few philosophers and mathematical
logicians. He was Kurt Gödel, celebrated for his incom-
pleteness theorems, the implications of which are far-
reaching for the foundations of mathematics and com-
puter science. The story of his life and work is that of a
persistent quest for rationality in all things, pursued
against a background of recurrent mental instability.

Gödel proved that the mathematical methods in place

since the time of Euclid (around 300 BC) were inadequate
for discovering all that is true about the natural numbers.
His discovery undercut the foundations on which mathe-
matics had been built up to the 20th century, stimulated
thinkers to seek alternatives and generated a lively phi-
losophical debate about the nature of truth. Gödel's inno-
vative techniques, which could readily be applied to algo-
rithms for computations, also laid the foundation for mod-
Kurt Gödel. Photograph by Alfred Eisen-
ern computer science. staedt, taken from the Gödel Papers.
Courtesy of Princeton University and
Institute for Advanced Study
Mr Why

Born on April 28, 1906, in Brno, Moravia, Gödel was the second of two children of Rudolf
and Marianne Gödel, expatriate Germans whose families were associated with the city's
textile industry. Gödel and his brother were both sent to private German language schools,
where they did very well in their studies.

Indeed, only once during his primary and secondary school career did young Kurt ever re-
ceive less than the highest mark in any subject (mathematics!). Yet he gave no early inti-
mation of genius. He was a highly inquisitive child, so much so that he was nicknamed der
Herr Warum ("Mr. Why"). But he was also introverted, sensitive and somewhat sickly. At
about the age of eight he contracted rheumatic fever, and although it seems not to have
caused lasting physical damage, it kept him out of school for some time and may have fos-
tered the exaggerated concern for his health and diet that was to become increasingly
prominent over the years.

The reticent genius

In 1924 Gödel left his homeland to enrol at the University of Vienna. At the time of his en-
rolment Gödel intended to seek a degree in physics. But after a short while, impressed by
 2

the lectures of professors Philipp Furtwängler and Hans Hahn, he switched to mathemat-
ics. His remarkable talents soon attracted attention — so much so that just two years after
his matriculation he was invited to attend sessions of a discussion group that Hahn and
philosopher Moritz Schlick had founded two years earlier. The group, which was later to
become famous as the Vienna Circle, was inspired by the writings of Ernst Mach, a cham-
pion of rationalism who believed that all things could be explained by logic and empirical
observation, without recourse to metaphysics.

The Circle brought Gödel into contact

with scholars such as philosopher of
science Rudolf Carnap and mathema-
tician Karl Menger and helped to ac-
quaint him with the literature of
mathematical logic and philosophy. In
particular, the Circle was immersed in
the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
whose concern about the extent to
which language can speak about lan-
guage may have prompted Gödel to
probe analogous questions about
mathematics.

Gödel did not, however, share the

positivistic philosophical outlook of the
Circle, which extended Mach's ideas.
Instead he was a Platonist: he believed
that in addition to objects, there exists
a world of concepts to which humans
have access by intuition. For Plato,
who lived around 400 BC, concepts Kurt Gödel (right) with his brother Rudolf around 1908.
Image courtesy J W Dawson.
such as truth were not products of the
human mind which can change according to the thinker's point of view, as some philoso-
phers believe, but existed independently of the human observer. Thus, a statement could
have a definite "truth value" — be true or not — whether or not it had been proved or could
be empirically confirmed or refuted by humans. Gödel subscribed to this philosophy, and,
in his own view, this was an aid to his remarkable mathematical insights.

Although Gödel was an attentive observer and clearly brilliant, he rarely contributed to the
Circle's discussions, unless they were about mathematics. Shy and reclusive, he had few
close friends. (He did, however, like the company of women and was apparently quite at-
tractive to them.) After 1928 he seldom attended the group's meetings but became active
instead in a mathematical colloquium organised by Menger.

Moment of impact

During this period, Gödel suddenly acquired international stature in mathematical logic.
Two papers in particular thrust him into prominence. One was his doctoral dissertation,
submitted to the University of Vienna in 1929 and published the next year. The other was
his treatise On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related
Systems, published in German in 1931 and submitted as his Habilitationsschrift (qualifying
dissertation for entrance into the teaching profession) in 1932.
 3

The dissertation, entitled The Completeness

of the Axioms of the First-Order Functional
Calculus, solved an open problem that David
Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann had posed in
their 1928 textbook Grundzüge der theore-
tischen Logik (Foundations of Theoretical
Logic). The problem concerned formalised
mathematical systems and the accepted rules
for logical reasoning, which were stated in the
book.

A formalised mathematical system is de-

scribed by a set of axioms. These are pre-
determined truths that define the objects in
the system and are never called into question.
The ancient mathematician Euclid, for exam-
ple, based his theory of plane geometry on
five axioms. The statements "any two points can be joined by a straight line segment" (fig
1), and "any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely" (fig 2), are two of these
axioms.

They are taken to be true from the outset, and

any other statement about plane geometry
has to be derived from the five axioms using
only the rules of logic — no intuition or knowl-
edge that comes from outside the system are
allowed.

Hilbert and Ackermann's question was: if you

have a set of axioms describing a mathemati-
cal system, do the rules for logical reasoning
which they gave in their book allow you to de-
rive every true statement about the system,
and do they ensure that only true statements
can be derived?
Euclid's five axioms for plane geometry
— read more in the Plus article The origins of proof.
The expected answer was "yes", and Gödel
confirmed that it was. His dissertation established that the principles of logic developed up
to that time were adequate for their intended purpose, which was to prove everything that
was true on the basis of a given set of axioms. It did not show, however, that every true
statement concerning the natural numbers, that is the numbers 0,1,2, ... , could be proved
on the basis of the accepted axioms of number theory.

The problem with number theory

The axioms of number theory were based on those laid out by the Italian mathematician
Giuseppe Peano in 1889. The first four of his axioms are

• 0 is a natural number,
• every natural number has a successor,
• no natural number has 0 as its successor,
• distinct natural numbers have distinct successors.
 4

The successor of 0 is what we call 1, the successor of 1 is what we call 2, etc. In this way,
all the natural numbers are defined, and so is the operation of addition: 16+4, for example
means "take the number 16 and move on 4 places in the sequence of successors".

The fifth and final of Peano's axioms is known as the principle of induction, and this axiom
proved to be the sticking point. It states:

Suppose that a property holds for 0, and suppose you can prove that if this property holds
for another natural number, then it also holds for the successor of that number. Then the
property holds for all natural numbers.

This is sometimes called the domino A simple proof by induction

principle: if you knock one over, the rest
will topple. It might seem self-evident, We will prove by induction that
but mathematicians found it problematic,
because rather than talking about natu- 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + .... + n = n(n+1)/2
ral numbers themselves, it talks about for any positive whole number n.
properties of natural numbers. Such a
"second-order" statement was thought First, we verify that the statement is true for n = 0:
too vague and ill defined to serve as a
basis for the theory of natural numbers. 0 = (0 × 1)/2,
so it is.
To circumvent that problem, the induc-
tion axiom was translated into an infinite Now we assume that the statement is true for a
positive whole number k and see if we can show
schema of similar axioms that refer to
that it is also true for k+1:
specific formulas rather than to general
properties of numbers. Unfortunately, 1 + 2 + ... + k + k+1
however, those axioms no longer
uniquely characterize the natural num- = k(k+1)/2 + k+1
bers. Indeed, as Norwegian logician
= (k(k+1)+2k+2)/2 = (k2+3k+2)/2
Thoralf Skolem demonstrated a few
years after Gödel's work, even if all = (k+1)(k+2)/2.
statements that are true of the natural
numbers are taken as axioms, there will Thus, whenever the statement is true for a number
still be other structures, essentially dif- k, it is also true for k+1, the next number along.
ferent from the natural numbers, that
also satisfy the axioms. So, since we have verified the statement for 0, it fol-
lows that it must be true for 1, which means it must
be true for 2 and in turn for 3, etc. We can reach any
Now Gödel's completeness theorem positive whole number n in this way, so we have
states that whatever propositions are proved that the statement is true for all positive
taken as axioms, one can prove all (and whole numbers, as required. QED
only) those statements that hold in all structures satisfying the axioms. But if some state-
ment is true of the natural numbers but is not true of another system of entities that also
satisfies the axioms, then it cannot be proved. At first, that did not seem to be a serious
problem, because mathematicians hoped that entities that masqueraded as numbers but
were essentially different from them did not exist. So Gödel's next theorem came as a
shock.

The Incompleteness Theorem

In his 1931 paper Gödel showed that, no matter how you formulate the axioms for number
theory, there will always be some statement that is true of the natural numbers, but that
 5

can't be proved. (That is, objects that obey the axioms of number theory but fail to behave
like the natural numbers in some other respects do exist.)

But why not just turn such a true but unprovable statement into an axiom? After all, axioms
are precisely those statements which we accept to be true without proof. But here lies the
true bite of the incompleteness theorem: Gödel showed that whenever the axioms can be
characterized by a set of mechanical rules, it does not matter which statements are taken
to be axioms: some other true statements about the natural numbers will remain unprov-
able. It's like an ill-designed jigsaw puzzle. No matter how you arrange the pieces, you'll
always end up with some that won't fit in the end.

The incomplete puzzle of the natural numbers: no

matter what you try, some pieces will never fit.

Although Gödel's work irrefutably proves that "undecidable" statements do exist within
number theory, not many examples of such statements have been found. One example
comes from the sentence:

This statement is unprovable

You can see why this is a prime candidate: if you could prove this statement to be true,
then it would be false! It is true only if it is unprovable, and unprovable only if it is true. As it
stands, this is not a statement about the natural numbers. But Gödel had devised an in-
genious way to assign numbers to English-language phrases like this one, so that finding
whether the statement is true or not translates to solving numerical equations. He proved
that, within the axioms of number theory, it is impossible to prove whether or not the equa-
tion corresponding to the sentence above holds true, thus confirming our "common-sense"
analysis.

In a similar way, Gödel translated the statement

 6

The axioms of this theory do not contradict each other

into numerical code, and again proved that the translation is unprovable. Any proof that the
axioms do not contradict each other — that they are consistent — must therefore appeal to
stronger principles than the axioms themselves.

The latter result greatly dismayed David Hilbert, who had envisioned a program for secur-
ing the foundations of mathematics through a "bootstrapping" process, by which the con-
sistency of complex mathematical theories could be derived from that of simpler, more
evident theories. Gödel, on the other hand, saw his incompleteness theorems not as dem-
onstrating the inadequacy of the axiomatic method but as showing that the derivation of
theorems cannot be completely mechanized. He believed they justified the role of intuition
in mathematical research.

The concepts and methods Gödel introduced in his incompleteness paper are central to all
of modern computer science. This is not surprising, since computers are forced to use
logical rules mechanically without recourse to intuition or a "birds-eye view" that allows
them to see the systems they are using from the outside. Extensions of Gödel's ideas have
allowed the derivation of several results about the limits of computational procedures. One
is the unsolvability of the halting problem. If you have ever written a computer program,
you will know that a programming mistake can cause it to enter an infinite loop: it will run
forever and never end. The question is if there can be an algorithm that can examine any
computer program and decide whether it will eventually halt or whether it will keep running
forever. This is the halting problem and the answer is "no".

Another result that derives from Gödel's ideas is the demonstration that no program that
does not alter a computer's operating system can detect all programs that do. In other
words, no program can find all the viruses on your computer, unless it interferes with and
alters the operating system.

He's behind you!

No program can find all the viruses on your computer,
unless it interferes with the operating system itself.
 7

Matters of heart and mind

Gödel spent the 1933-34 academic year in Princeton, New Jersey, at the newly founded
Institute for Advanced Study, where he lectured on his incompleteness results. He was in-
vited to come there the next year as well but suffered a mental breakdown shortly after his
return to Vienna. He recovered in time to return to Princeton in the fall of 1935, but a
month after his arrival he experienced a relapse and did not return to lecturing until the
spring of 1937 in Vienna.

His problems seem to have started with hypochondria: he was obsessive about his diet
and bowel habits and kept a daily record for two decades or more of his body temperature
and milk of magnesia consumption. He had a fear of accidental and, in later years, delib-
erate poisoning. This phobia led him to avoid eating food, so that he became malnour-
ished. At the same time, though, he ingested a variety of pills for an imaginary heart prob-
lem.

Except in times of crisis, Gödel's mental problems

hampered his work surprisingly little. The person
who kept him going was Adele Porkert, whom he
had met at a Viennese nightclub during his student
years. Porkert was a Catholic divorcée six years
older than Gödel, who worked as a dancer and
whose face was disfigured by a birthmark. His
parents regarded her as a scandalous person. But
the two were devoted to each other, and more
than once, by serving as his food taster, she
helped to allay Gödel's growing fears that some-
one was trying to poison him. The two were mar-
ried in September 1938, just before Gödel re-
turned once more to America.

Back in the states, Gödel lectured at the Institute

for Advanced Study and the University of Notre
Dame on exciting new results in set theory, which
answered another question of Hilbert's. These re- Kurt Gödel and his wife, Adele.
Photograph by Oskar Morgenstern.
sults represented another major achievement, but Courtesy of the Archives of the
they were still not enough to earn him a perma- Institute for Advanced Study.
nent academic position. During his year at the Institute for Advanced Study and Notre
Dame, his authorization to teach at Austrian universities lapsed. When he returned to Vi-
enna to be reunited with his wife in the summer of 1939, he was summoned for a military
physical and declared fit for service in the Nazi armed forces.

Shelter in America

Until then, Gödel appears to have been aloof to the frightening developments in Europe.
His lack of emotional engagement with people may have kept him from appreciating the
significance of what was happening. He seemed oblivious to the fates befalling his col-
leagues and professors, many of whom were Jewish: he stayed immersed in his work
while the world around him fell apart. Finally, he realized it was taking him down as well.
 8

In that desperate situation he enlisted the support of the Institute for Advanced Study to
help secure exit visas for himself and his wife. His efforts were successful, and in January
1940 the two of them began a long journey to Princeton.

Gödel never again left the

U.S. He was made a perma-
nent member of the institute
faculty in 1946. Two years
later he acquired American
citizenship (on which occa-
sion the judge who swore him
in made the unfortunate error
of asking his opinion of the
U.S. Constitution, and thereby
unleashed a pent-up lecture
on its inconsistencies.) But
Gödel was not promoted to
professor until 1953 — the
same year he was elected to
membership in the National Kurt Gödel and Albert Einstein.
Academy of Sciences — in Photographed by Oskar Morgenstern.
Courtesy of the Archives of the Institute for Advanced Study
part because his expressed
fear that poison gases were escaping from his refrigerator aroused continuing concern
about his mental stability. During those years, his friend Albert Einstein took it on himself to
look after Gödel as best he could, taking a walk with him every day. Their conversations
seem to have had a calming effect on Gödel.

After his emigration Gödel turned to philosophy and relativity theory. In 1949 he demon-
strated that universes in which time travel into the past is possible were compatible with
Einstein's equations.

Deepening fears

Gödel's last published paper appeared in 1958. After that he withdrew more and more into
himself, becoming increasingly emaciated, paranoid and hypochondriacal. He last ap-
peared in public in 1972, when the Rockefeller University granted him an honorary doctor-
ate. Three years later he was awarded the National Medal of Science but declined to at-
tend the awards ceremony on grounds of ill health.

On July 1, 1976, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 70, Gödel became pro-
fessor emeritus at the institute. His responsibilities did not lessen, though, because his
wife, who for so many years had nurtured and protected him, had suffered an incapacitat-
ing stroke a few months before. It was his turn to care for her. He did so, devotedly, until
July 1977, when she underwent emergency surgery and was hospitalized for nearly six
months.

At about that time Oskar Morgenstern, the friend who had helped to look after Gödel in the
years after Einstein's death in 1955, died of cancer. Gödel was thus left to fend for himself
against his growing paranoia. In the face of that, he declined rapidly. His fear of poisoning
led to self-starvation, from which he died on January 14, 1978.
 9

Adele Gödel survived her husband by three years. At her death, on February 4, 1981, she
bequeathed rights to Gödel's papers to the Institute for Advanced Study.

Gödel published remarkably few papers during his lifetime, but their impact has been
enormous. They have affected virtually every branch of modern logic. During the past dec-
ade, other papers of his have been translated and published posthumously in the third vol-
ume of his Collected Works. Their contents, including his formalization of the so-called on-
tological argument for the existence of God, have now begun to attract attention as well. At
last, the breadth of his work is becoming known to those outside the mathematical com-
munity.

Further reading

Read more about mathematical proof in past Plus articles, including our series on
the origins of proof from Euclid to Gödel to the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem.

About this article

This article was adapted from Gödel and the limits of logic
by JW Dawson. Copyright © June 1999 by Scientific Ameri-
can, Inc. All rights reserved.

John W Dawson is Professor of Mathematics at the York

campus of Pennsylvania State University. Trained as a logi-
cian, during the years 1982-84 he catalogued Gödel's pa-
pers at the Institute for Advanced Study, work that provided
the basis for his 1997 biography Logical Dilemmas: The Life
and Work of Kurt Gödel.

Dawson's book Logical dilemmas: The life and work of Kurt

Gödel is reviewed in this issue of Plus.