PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARCH 25th, 2023

In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon

For the County of Clackamas

TYLER ALLEN LOFALL

Petitioners

Vs.

CLACKAMAS COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY REBECCA PORTLOCK
CLACKAMAS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT
CLACKAMAS COUNTY JAIL
WEST LINN POLICE DEPARTMENT
DANA GUNNARSON
CATLIN BLYTH
Respondents
. __________
Petition for reconsideration of appointment of Pro Bono Counsel

Motion for evidentiary hearing

Request for Fact Finding & Judicial Notice

Motion for Summary Judgement

PETITIONER TYLER ALLEN LOFALL PRO SE

MAILING ADDRESS
6880 NW 271st AVE
HILLSBORO, OR 97124
[email protected]
(386) 262-3322

Eliot D. Thompson LEWIS, NWEZE & STABLER

[email protected] By: William E. Stabler
Senior Assistant Attorney General William E. Stabler, OSB No. 124624
Oregon Dept. of Justice [email protected]
1162 Court Street NE David C. Lewis, OSB No. 953348
Salem, OR 97301-4096
[email protected]
Attorney for: Of Attorneys for Defendants
Clackamas County DA Rebecca Portlock West Linn Police Department,
Dana Gunnarson,
Catlin Blyth

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

US SUPREME COURT CASES

Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223; 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) .......................................................................................... passim

129 S. Ct. 8084............................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.

Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1971) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 64

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242 (1986) ........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 46, 47

Ashcroft v.,
563 U.S. 731 (2011) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 49, 62

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,

532 U.S. 318 (2001) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 64

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397 (1997) .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Bd. of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564 (1972) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544; 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ....................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1964 ....................... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364; 102 S.Ct. 700; 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) ................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

Brandon v. Holt,
469 U.S. 464.......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 51

Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,

506 U.S. 263 (1993) .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160 (1949) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 64

Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194 (2004) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49

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Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259 (1993) ......... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 60

Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478 (1991) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 60, 61

Carey v. Piphus,
435 U. S. 247 (1978) ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 32

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378 (1989) ...............................................Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 60, 107, 108

City of Canton,
489 U.S. 3887.................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41; 78 S. .Ct. 99; 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 43, 47

78 S.Ct. 99 ............................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51 (2011) ...............................................Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 107, 108, 108

Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319; 92 S. Ct. 1079; 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972) .............. Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co.,

391 U.S. 253; 88 S.Ct. 1575 (1968) ............................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 56

Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 54

Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971) ............................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 105, 106

Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519; 92 S.Ct. 594; 30 L.Ed.2d 652 ..... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark
not defined., 43

Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250 (2006) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 59

Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U. S. 477 (1994) ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 32

Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49

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Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 59

Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 118; 118 S. Ct. 502; 139 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1997) ...... Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 61

Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) ................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 54

Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) ................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 45

Lewis,
518 U.S. 353................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574.......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46, 56

v. Zenith Radio Corp., et. al.,

475 U.S. 547; 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986) .......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 52

Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,

445 U.S. 622.......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 51

Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765 (2014) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 51, 54

Rehberg v. Paulk,
566 U. S. 356 (2012) ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 32

Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557 (2009) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001) .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 61, 62

Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48

Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97.................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

97 S.Ct. 285; 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) .................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

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Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650 (2014) .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45

United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,

463 U.S. 825 (1983) .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Wallace v. Kato,
549 U. S. 384 (2007) ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 32

Wood v. Moss,
572 U.S. 744 (2014) .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 49, 62

Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) ................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 54

West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42 (1988) ...................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

v. JOLIETs’ Opinion of the Supreme Court,

580 U.S. 12 (2017) ...................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 32

142 S. Ct. 900 (2022) .................................................................................................................................. 60

Conn v. Gabbert,
526 U.S. 286 (1999) .......................................................................................................................... 61

142 S. Ct. 337 (2021) ................................................................................................................................ 105

FEDERAL CASES

Inouye v. Kemna,
504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007) . Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 48,
49, 62

Avalos v. Baca,
596 F.3d 583.......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46, 57

B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp.,

245 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

Ballentine v. Tucker,
28 F.4th 54 (9th Cir. 2022)........................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 50, 52

Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ.,

330 F.3d 888 (6th Cir. 2003) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 56

Bardzik v. Cnty. of Orange,

635 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 51

Barnett v. Centoni,
31 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1994) ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

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Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego,

993 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2021) ..................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 107, 108

Berg v. Kincheloe,
794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Berry v. Baca,
379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 108

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,

485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) . Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 58,
107, 108

Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis,

526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Botello,
413 F.3d 9774; Botello, ..................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Bramlet v. Wilson,
495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Brodheim v. Cry,
584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 65

Butler v. Elle,
281 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Camarillo v. McCarthy,
998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus,

641 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1981) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 109

Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes,

169 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 1999) . Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 59,
60

Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,

502 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Cousins v. Lockyer,
568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 60

Cruz v. Kauai Cnty.,

279 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 61

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Demery v. Kupperman,
735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1984) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 60, 61

Dunn v. Castro,
621 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 51

Entler v. Gregoire,
872 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2017) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 65

Erickson v. United States,

67 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1995) ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer,

301 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 62

Ewing,
588 F.3d 1232.............................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 61

Fairley v. Luman,
281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

758 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Gabbert v. Conn,
131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 61

Garcia v. Cnty. of Merced,

639 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 49

Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

828 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2016) ....................................Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 60, 61, 107

Gillespie v. Civiletti,
629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 105

Gobel v. Maricopa Cnty.,

867 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1989) ..... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined.,
60, 60, 61

Hallstrom v. City of Garden City,

991 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 51

Harper v. City of Los Angeles,

533 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57, 58

Harper v. Wallingford,
877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 46, 47

Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta,

137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 108

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Hernandez v. City of San Jose,

897 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 49, 62

Hernandez v. Johnston,
833 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1987) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Hervey v. Estes,
65 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 51

Holgate v. Baldwin,
425 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2005) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Hydrick v. Hunter,
669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 47, 62

Ioane v. Hodges,
939 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 48, 51, 61

Jackson v. Carey,
353 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Johnson v. Hawe,
388 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 107, 108

Jones v. Williams,
791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 65

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t,

839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Kelley v. Borg,
60 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 1995) ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield,

439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 62

Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe,

843 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2016) ....................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 108, 108

KRL,
384 F.3d 1112........................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 60, 61

L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates,

995 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1993) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 47, 62

Lacey,
693 F.3d 9314.................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Leer v. Murphy,
844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

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Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

726 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Liberal v. Estrada,
632 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 51

Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange,

351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45

Long v. County of Los Angeles,

442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) ..... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined.,
57, 107, 108

Madrid,
190 F.3d 9956.................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Martinez v. Stanford,
323 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45

May v. Baldwin,
109 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 46

Maynard v. City of San Jose,

37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

McDowell v. Delaware State Police,

88 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 1996) ........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

McKenzie v. Lamb,
738 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1984) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 64

Merritt v. Canty. of Los Angeles,

875 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1989) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 58, 108

Milstein v. Cooley,
257 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 61, 61

Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev.,

319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Morales v. Fry,
873 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2017) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 54

Morley v. Walker,
175 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 61

Morrison v. Hall,
261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

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Neal v. Shimoda,
131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Newell v. Sauser,
79 F.3d 115 (9th Cir. 1996) ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.,

113 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1996) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Oviatt v. Pearce,
954 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992) ..................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58, 108, 109

Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,

589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr.,

985 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2021) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 105

Patterson v. Van Arsdel,

883 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 61

Peck v. Montoya,
51 F.4th 877 (9th Cir. 2022)........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises,

99 F.Supp.2d 502 (D.N.J. 2000) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Pratt v. Rowland,
65 F.3d 8025...................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Price v. Sery,
513 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 107

Reed v. Lieurance,
863 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento,

888 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2018) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 49, 54, 62

Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner,

969 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2020) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

Rhodes v. Robinson,
408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 65

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,

307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Rodis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

558 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 49

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Roe v. City of San Francisco,

109 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1997) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 60

S.E.C. v. Elliott,
953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1992) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles by &,

974 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) ......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 50

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana,

936 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1991) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Sanchez v. Vild,
891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Schultz v. Sundberg,
759 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1985) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 106

Scott v. Cnty. of San Bernardino,

903 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2018) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 51

Seidner v. de Vries,
39 F.4th 591 (9th Cir. 2022)............................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 48, 49, 62

Serrano v. Francis,
345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 54

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 105, 106

Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara,

868 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2017) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 51

Shepard v. Quillen,
840 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2016) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 66

Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct.,

318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 97

Sorrels v. McKee,
290 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 48

Stapley v. Pestalozzi,
733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 59

Tanner v. Heise,
879 F.2d 572................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 47

Taylor v. List,
880 F.2d 1040........................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 46, 46

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Tellis v. Godinez,
5 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46, 97

Then v. I.N.S.,
58 F.Supp.2d 422 (D.N.J. 1999) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

Thomas v. Ponder,
611 F.3d 1144........................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 46

Torres v. City of Madera,

648 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Torres v. Goddard,
793 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 60, 61

Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58

U.S. v. Sanchez,
88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

United States v. Day,

969 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1992) ........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 43

United States v. Miller,

197 F.3d 644 (3rd Cir. 1999)....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,

865 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1989) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 65

Fry v. Melaragno,
939 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1991) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 60

Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich,

92 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1996) ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 58

Vander v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

268 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Vega v. Johnson,
149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 44

Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Wash.,

594 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 59, 60

Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal.,

145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1998) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 55

White v. Bloom,
621 F.2d 2764.................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

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White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer,

29 F.3d 229 (6th Cir.1994) .......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 56

Wilk v. Neven,
956 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2020) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 46

Wilkins v. City of Oakland,

350 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 45

Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist,
699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 42

Wood v. Yordy,
753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 66

Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill.,

723 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1984) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 60

Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo,

850 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 45, 46

Beck v. City of Upland,

527 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2008) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

889 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

Smiddy v. Varney,
665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981) ....................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 57

Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,

556 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 52, 54

White v. Bloom,
621 F.2d 276...................................................................................................................................... 43

L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates,

907 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1990) ....................................................................................................... 45, 51

Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie,

932 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1991) ....................................................................................................... 47, 62

Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange,

6 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021).......................................................................................................... 50, 54

Genzler,
410 F.3d 636................................................................................................................................ 59, 60

Lacey,
693 F.3d 931...................................................................................................................................... 60

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Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,

554 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................................. 60

Lund v. Cowan,
5 F.4th 964 (9th Cir. 2021)................................................................................................................ 60

Pratt v. Rowland,
65 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................................................... 66

Madrid,
190 F.3d 995...................................................................................................................................... 97

Schroeder v. McDonald,
55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................................................... 97

Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 108, 109

Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe,

290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) ......................................................................................................... 109

STATE CASES

Hall v. May Dept. Stores Co.,

292 Or 131; 637 P2d 126 (1981)................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 66

Lindland v. United Business Investments, Inc.,

298 Or 318; 693 P2d 20 (1984)................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 67

Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,

301 Or 117; 719 P2d 854 (1986)................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 66

Schiele v. Montes,
231 Or App 43; 218 P3d 141 (2009) ........................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 66

67 B 2 .......................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

OTHER CASES

Oatman v. Potter, 92 Fed.Appx. 133, 137,

2004 WL 68537 (C.A.6,2004) .................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 56

FEDERAL STATUTES

Title 18, U.S. Code

§ 1001 .......................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 77

Title 28, U.S.C.

§ 1915 ................................................................................................................................................ 24

Title 42, USC

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§ 1983 ................................................................................................................................................ 52

Title 42, U.S.C.

§ 1983 ........................................................................................................................................ 56, 107

Title 42, U.S. Code

§ 1983 ................................................................................................................................................ 56

Title 18, U.S.C.

§ 241 .................................................................................................................................................. 78

STATE STATUTES

Oregon
Stat. § 3853 ................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 56
ORS 161.209 ............................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 52
ORS 161.229 ............................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., 74
ORS 30.270 ....................................................................................................................................... 23
statute, § 9 ......................................................................................................................................... 58
ORS 164.365 ..................................................................................................................................... 83
ORS 192.415 ................................................................................................................................... 112

Washington
Statute 161.229.................................................................................................................................. 52
Statute 5.10........................................................................................................................................ 94

FEDERAL RULES

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 56 ....................... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined., 44, 46, 55
Rule 4 ........................................... Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined.

STATE RULES

Oregon Civil Procedure

Rule 14 ........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 24
Rule 15 .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 26, 38
Rule 17 ........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined., 24
Rule 362 ............................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
Rule 46 .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 24, 28
Rule 36 .............................................................................................................................................. 24
Rule 67 .............................................................................................................................................. 24
Rule 43 .............................................................................................................................................. 28
Rule 21 .................................................................................................................................. 31, 38, 47

Oregon Court Rules

Rule 1.1002 ....................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Rule 5.010 ............................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined., 26, 36
Rule 1.100 ......................................................................................................................................... 26
Rule 5.020 ......................................................................................................................................... 38

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Oregon Supreme Court

Rule 808 ............................................................................................................................................ 50
Rule 984 ............................................................................................................................................ 59

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................. 4-37
1994's Heck v. Humphrey ....................................................................................................................................... 6-91
42 U.S. Code § 1983 ................................................................................................................................................ 4-45
555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. 808 ............................................................................................................................... 4-39
93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104-317, title III, § 309(c) .................................................................................................... 4-46
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1971) ........................................................................................................ 5-54
Am. ............................................................................................................................................................... 4-37, 4-52
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) ................................................................................... 4-34
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ....................................................................................................................................... 4-36
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 ....................................................................................................................................... 4-35
Ashby v. White ........................................................................................................................................................ 2-18
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)........................................................................................................ 4-38
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743 .............................................................................................................. 4-38, 4-51
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista ................................................................................................................................... 5-54
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ....................................................................................... 5-54
Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010 ......................................................................................... 4-35, 4-46
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 4-45
Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022) .............................................................................................. 4-37
Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61....................................................................................................................... 4-38, 4-39, 4-41
Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 4-45
Bardzik v. Cnty. of Orange, 635 F.3d 1138, 1145 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................... 4-40
Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) .............................................................................................. 4-35
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409–10 (1997) ............................................................................. 7-98
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) .................................................................................................. 6-88
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ............................................ 4-36
Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021) ........................................................... 7-98
Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153–54 .................................................................................................................... 4-47, 7-99
Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) ............................................................................................ 4-35
Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 7-99
Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 7-99
Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484– 85 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 7-98
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) ........................................................... 4-32
Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) ............................................................ 4-33
Botello, 413 F.3d at 977 .......................................................................................................................................... 4-49
Botello, 413 F.3d at 977–78 .................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974) ............................................................................................ 4-33
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473 (1985 ..................................................................................................... 4-34, 4-40
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993).................................................................. 7-97
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) .............................................................................................. 5-53
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)........................................................................................... 5-55
Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 .................................................................................................................................... 5-56
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) ....................................................................................................... 4-37
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199–201 ................................................................................................................................ 4-38
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271–73 (1993) .......................................................................................... 4-48
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274–76 (1993) .......................................................................................... 4-50
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 ......................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277–78 ................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487, 491–92 (1991) .................................................................................................. 4-49

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Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 ............................................................................................................................................. 4-50

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 7-97
Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................... 4-44
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720 (9th Cir. 1981) ............................................. 7-97
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978) .................................................................................................... 3-20
Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 7-100
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ................................................................................................ 4-35
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23 .......................................................................................................................... 4-35
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999) ....................................................................... 4-49
City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 391-92 (1989) .................................................................................................. 4-48
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 ............................................................................................................................... 7-99
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) .............................................................................................. 4-49
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–91 (1989) ................................................................................ 7-98
Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) ......................................... 4-36
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. .Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ............................................................. 4-36
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ............................................................... 4-32
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) ....................................................................................................... 7-98
Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................... 4-48
Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1068–69 ................................................................................................................................. 4-49
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972) ................................................... 4-32
Cruz v. Kauai Cnty., 279 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................................................................................... 4-50
Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................. 4-49
Demery, 735 F.2d at 1144. ...................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Devenpeck v. Alford.............................................................................................................................................. 7-102
Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................. 4-41
Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017)......................................................................................... 5-55
Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................... 6-88
Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................ 4-37
Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 .............................................................................................................................. 4-51
Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1232–34 .................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................. 7-98
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56..................................................................................................................................................... 4-35
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ................................................................................................................................................... 4-44
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ................................................................................................................................................... 4-45
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968) .................. 4-45
Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 7-98
Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................... 4-50
Garcia v. Cnty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 4-38
Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................... 7-98
Garmon, 828 F.3d at 845 ......................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Gerstein and Albright .............................................................................................................................................. 3-20
Gideon v. Wainwright ........................................................................................................................................... 7-112
Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................................... 7-96
Gobel v. Maricopa Cnty., 867 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 4-49
Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1203 n.6 .................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ......................................................................................................... 4-43
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971) ............................................................................................. 7-96
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 ........................................................................................................................................... 7-97
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972 .................................................................... 4-32
Hall v. May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 135, 137, 637 P2d 126 (1981) ............................................................. 5-56
Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992); ....................................................... 4-34, 4-40
Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 4-47
Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................... 4-35

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Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261–62 n.8 (2006) ............................................................................................. 4-48
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261–62 .................................................................................................................................. 4-49
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483–487 (1994). .............................................................................................. 3-20
Heck, 512 U. S., at 484, 489 .................................................................................................................................... 3-21
Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 137 F.3d 1372, 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................. 7-99
Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 642–43 ......................................................................................................... 4-50
Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 643 ............................................................................................................... 4-50
Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018); .................................................................... 4-38
Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................. 4-36
Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................... 4-34, 4-40
Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005); ......................................................................................... 7-97
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002) ............................................................................................................... 4-37
Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.............................................................................................................................................. 4-38
Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................. 4-37, 4-52
I.A.2.b.(6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 7-97
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) ....................................................................................................... 4-48
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 .................................................................................................................................... 4-49
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–73 (1977) ................................................................................................. 6-88
Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712 n.6 ..................................................................................................................................... 4-51
Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 4-37, 4-51
Ioane, 939 F.3d at 950 ........................................................................................................................... 4-37, 4-38, 4-51
Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................. 6-88
Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................. 7-98
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................... 5-55
Jones, 791 F.3d at 1035–36 ..................................................................................................................................... 5-56
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131, 118 S. Ct. 502, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1997)................................................... 4-48
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31...................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................. 7-97
Katz v. United States ............................................................................................................................................... 6-76
Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 4-44
Kelley, 60 F.3d at 667 ............................................................................................................................................. 4-44
Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 4-37
Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061 ...................................................................................................................................... 4-51
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) ......................................................................................... 4-43
Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 4-48, 7-99
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) ............................................................................................................... 4-34
KRL, 384 F.3d at 1112–13 ...................................................................................................................................... 4-49
L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) .............................................. 4-37, 4-52
Lacey, 693 F.3d at 931 ............................................................................................................................................ 4-49
lankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................... 4-47
Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................ 4-35
Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 4-35
Leo Feist v. Young (1943) ....................................................................................................................................... 2-18
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3....................................................................................................................................... 6-87
Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................... 4-40
Lindland v. United Business Investments, Inc., 298 Or 318, 327, 693 P2d 20 (1984) ............................................ 5-57
Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003); .................................................................................. 4-34
Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................ 7-98
Long, 442 F.3d at 1186–87 ...................................................................................................................................... 7-99
Madrid, 190 F.3d at 995 .......................................................................................................................................... 6-87
Manuel v. Joliet ....................................................................................................................................................... 3-19
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) ........................................................................................ 2-16
Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 4-34

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986 ........................................................ 4-36
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., td. et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp., et. al., 475 U.S. 547, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356
(1986) .................................................................................................................................................................. 4-45
May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................ 4-34
Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................... 7-97
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996) .................................................................. 4-32
McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984)....................................................................................... 5-53
McKenzie, 738 F.2d at 1008.................................................................................................................................... 5-54
Merritt v. Canty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) ..................................................................... 4-47
Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) ....................................................................... 7-99
Meyer v. Nebraska ................................................................................................................................................. 7-111
Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................ 4-49
Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1008 ....................................................................................................................................... 4-49
Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 ....................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1013; Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1205 .............................................................................................. 4-50
Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................... 7-98
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)..................................................................... 4-41
Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 4-43
Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................................. 4-49
Morley, 175 F.3d at 760 .......................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Morley, 175 F.3d at 760–61 .................................................................................................................................... 4-50
Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2001); .............................................................................................. 4-35
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................... 6-88
Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................ 4-44
Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................... 4-36
Oatman v. Potter, 92 Fed.Appx. 133, 137, 2004 WL 68537, 3 (C.A.6,2004) ......................................................... 4-45
Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853 .................................................................................................................................. 4-46
Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477–78 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................... 7-99
Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................ 4-48
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980 ...................................................................... 4-34, 4-40
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978) ........................................................................ 7-98
Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................................. 7-96
Pasadena Republican Club, 985 F.3d at 1171.......................................................................................................... 7-96
Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................... 4-48
Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................. 4-51
Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 301 Or 117, 122, 719 P2d 854 (1986) ................................................................... 5-56
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) .............................................................................................. 4-37, 4-51
Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................... 4-47
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014) ...................................................................................................... 4-40
Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000) ...................................................... 4-33
Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802 ................................................................................................................................. 5-55
Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................... 7-98
Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................ 4-33
Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018) .................................................... 4-38, 4-43, 4-51
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U. S. 356, 366 (2012) .......................................................................................................... 3-20
Reply Brief 10–11; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–25 ..................................................................... 3-21
Reply Brief 9; Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389–390........................................................................................................ 3-21
Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................................................... 4-47
Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) ......................................................................................... 5-55
Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 .......................................................................................................................................... 5-55
Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68 .................................................................................................................................... 5-56
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) ........................................................................................................ 4-36
RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002)............................................................. 7-97

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FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 20
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

Rodis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) ........................................................... 4-38
Roe v. City of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................... 4-49
S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................................... 4-33
Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles by & through Los Angeles Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 974 F.3d 1012,
1018 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................................................................ 4-37
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991) ....................................................................... 7-97
Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................ 4-35
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) ..................................................................................................... 4-37, 4-51
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 .......................................................................................................................................... 4-51
Schiele v. Montes, 231 Or App 43, 48, 218 P3d 141 (2009) ................................................................................... 5-56
Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................................................................................... 7-97
Scott v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 903 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................... 4-40
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) ............................................................................................................... 4-37
Seidner v. de Vries, 39 F.4th 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................ 4-37
Seidner, 39 F.4th at 595 .................................................................................................................................. 4-37, 4-38
Seiner v. de Vries, 39 F.4th 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2022) .............................................................................................. 4-51
Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 4-34
Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 4-43
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................... 7-96
Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) .................................................................. 4-40
Shepard v. Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 5-55
Shepard, 840 F.3d at 688 ......................................................................................................................................... 5-56
Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1159– 60 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................. 6-87
Slaughterhouse Cases ............................................................................................................................................ 7-110
Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................. 4-38
Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 4-48
stelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) .............................................................. 4-32
Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir. 1989 ................................................................................................. 4-36
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989 ................................................................................................. 4-35
Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993). .................................................................................... 4-35, 6-88
That every right, when withheld, must have a remedy. ........................................................................................... 2-18
Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).............................................................................................. 4-32
Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010 ................................................................................. 4-34, 4-35
Thompson v. Clark .................................................................................................................................................. 6-91
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) ............................................................................................................. 4-34
Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 4-34
Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................ 4-50
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 4-48
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 Pg ID 1132 .......................................................................................................... 4-36
U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................... 4-33
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983).............................................................. 7-97
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................ 4-32
United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................... 4-33
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir. 1989).............................. 5-54
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) ....................................................... 4-32
v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 1991) .............................................................................................. 4-49
Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341–43 .......................................................................................................................... 4-49
Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342–43 .......................................................................................................................... 4-49
Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). ......................................................................... 4-48
Vander v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 268 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 4-35
Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................................... 4-33
Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 710–11 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................ 4-48
Waggy, 594 F.3d at 709–13..................................................................................................................................... 4-49

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PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388–390 (2007) .................................................................................................... 3-20

Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1998) ........................................................... 4-44
White v. Bloom ....................................................................................................................................................... 4-33
White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 ................................................................................................................................ 4-32
White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir.1994) ............................................... 4-45
Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................................. 4-35
Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2003); ....................................................................... 4-34
Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) ..................................................................................... 3-31
Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) ...................................................................................................... 4-38, 4-51
Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2014)........................................................................................... 5-56
Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 678–79 (9th Cir. 1984) ....................................... 4-49
Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................. 4-34
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) ....................................................................................................... 4-43

STATUTES
"18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally" ........................................................................................ 6-67
(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96–170, § 1 ............................................................................................................................ 4-46
“Castle Doctrine,” .................................................................................................................................................... 6-64
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) ............................................................................................................................................ 2-12
Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................... 4-46
Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018) .................................................. 4-46
Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................... 4-46
OCRP 47 .................................................................................................................................................................. 2-12
ORCP 67 B .............................................................................................................................................................. 2-12
ORS 161.209-229 .................................................................................................................................................... 4-41
ORS 161.229 - Use of physical force in defense of property ................................................................................. 6-64
Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981) ............................................................................................ 4-46
Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................... 4-41
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) ................................................................................................................... 4-46

OTHER AUTHORITIES
“[T]hat Every Right, When Withheld, Must Have a Remedy.” ............................................................................... 2-18
61 B.C. L. REV. 129, 139 (2020) ............................................................................................................................ 2-18
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 914 (1999) ....... 2-18
Entrenchment of Legal Entitlements, 61 B.C. L. REV. 129, 139 (2020) ................................................................ 2-18
MANUEL v. JOLIETs’ Opinion of the Supreme Court, 580 U.S. at 12-14 (2017) ................................................ 3-20
Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium ..................................................................................................................................... 2-18
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES .................................................................................................. 2-16

RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................................................................................ 4-33
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.21 ........................................................................................................................ 5-52
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.23 ........................................................................................................................ 5-53
ORCP 14A ............................................................................................................................................................... 2-12
ORCP 15D ...................................................................................................................................................... 2-14, 3-26
ORCP 17A ............................................................................................................................................................... 2-12
ORCP 36 .................................................................................................................................................................. 2-12
ORCP 46A ............................................................................................................................................................... 2-12
UTCR 1.100 ............................................................................................................................................................ 2-14
UTCR 5.010, .................................................................................................................................................. 2-14, 3-24

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 22
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

REGULATIONS
expectation of privacy, ....................................................................................................................................... 6-76

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment XIV. Ratified on July 9, 1868 ........................................................................................................... 7-109
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses ....................................................................................... 6-88

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
USED ON CASE 22CR10908
SEE EXHIBIT 13 page 250-251
EVERY FILING AND REQUEST SUBMITTED ON THAT CASE WAS ISGNORED BY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY REBECCA PORTLOCK AND THE COURTS

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PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

• • • • • •

•
•
• YES YES YES YES
• YES YES YES YES YES

YES YES YES YES

• 1. UNLAWFUL DETAINMENT
YES YES YES YES YES
• 2. CONSPIRACY
YES
• 3. FAILURE TO PREVENT /
FAILURE TO TRAIN
YES YES
• 4. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
YES

YES YES YES YES

• 5. DENIAL OF NECESSARY
CARE
YES YES YES YES
• 6. FALSE ARREST

1 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

DEFENDANT DAMAGES
SEEKING
REBECCA PORTLOCK
WEST LINN POLICE DEPARTMENT

DANA GUNNARSON

CATLIN BLYTH

CLACKAMAS COUNTY JAIL

ORS Tort Liability limits in pursuant to ORS 30.270 LIMIT Damages TOTAL $2,418,100

Source: Verified Second Amended Complaint

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 24
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

Tyler A. Lofall
6880 NW 271st Avenue
Hillsboro, OR 97124
(386) 262 - 3322
[email protected]

IN THE CIRCUIT CURT IN THE STATE OF OREGON

FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS

TYLER A. LOFALL, Case No.: 22CV39627

PLAINTIFF,
STIPPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT
VS. (SECTION 6)
COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IF
DA REBECCA PORTLOCK,
WEST LINN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
APPROPRIATE
CLACKAMAS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
WEST LINN POLICE OFFICER DANA MAKE A JUDGEMENT ON FINDINGS
GUNNERSON, WEST LINN POLICE OFFICER OF FACT SO THAT PLAINTIFF CAN
CAITLIN BLYTH, CLACKAMAS COUNTY KNOW WHAT HE MUST DO TO
POLICE OFFICE #1, CLACKAMAS COUNTY
POLICE OFFICER #2 CLACKAMAS COUNTY
PREVIAL.
JAIL
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
DEFENDANTS,
RECONSIDERATION OF
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

2 INTRODUCTION

Comes now, the Plaintiff, brings to the court this Motion, pursuant to ORCP 14A,

ORCP 17A, ORCP 36, and ORCP 46A, and in a request for further consideration and support

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), submitted March 7th, 2023 (denied) Plaintiffs Motion to

Appoint Pro Bono Counsel. Simultaneously along with a OCRP 47, and/or ORCP 67 B, in

part[ial] determination as the court sees fit.

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
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PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

I, Tyler Lofall, am delivering these requests seeking both closure in some of the

elements already before the court, in hopes to be granted some much needed relief that only

assistance by Pro Bono Counsel, alternatively an advisor could bring… and in the good spirit

of fairness could use the help to repay what has been taken from me. I am seeking an evidentiary

hearing, with these stipulated facts and ask the court to Declaratory relief by deciding what shall

count as fact and what shall not, so that I have some light on how to proceed. I humbly thank

the court for the patience it takes to have a pro se plaintiff, I know there is nothing easy about

it.

I present this filing as a resource, to guide the court from section to section with

everything else is provided to the viewer, with all required information attached hereto incase

court would like to see where it came from, and what the laws, and policies used say, including

a narrative between the facts that is for understanding purposes only.

For [the courts] simplicity I suggest (1) after reading the introduction, Skip to the

“Statement of facts” on section 6.1, where actual-facts are numbered and referenced, and the

storyline fills the non-material facts, all evidence attached as exhibits. Order of analysis of

whether there was clearly established law although the immunity defense hasn’t been put forth,

yet in advance Plaintiff suggests, that no officer can possibly believe that they can manufacture

evidence, selectively leave out evidence that is an action contradicting law, and policy, and

frame evidence in a way to sway the guilty party. (2). With my ignorance to the court’s methods,

and current situation being more indigent than I ever have, I am seeking to become whole again.

Rendered homeless consequently due to the actions framed in these matters, (directly and

indirectly) I ask the court [and anyone that’s listening for that matter] for any guidance as proper,

as for my position has been rendered so that every step up is a battle, harmed to the point of

defenseless, although I am aware of that deficiency and I will make corrections and changes as

suggested as quickly as possible… just give me the chance to present what I hold.

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
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PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

In furtherance of prompt, legal, and equitable remedies, I the Plaintiff am requesting

this fact-finding determination to present facts sufficient to summery determination in some

claims, but not all, for the court to decide the sufficiency.

UTCR 1.100

I, the Plaintiff, am requesting UTCR 1.100, on all proceedings, in attempts bridge the

mistakes I know I will make, yet with all ability I will attempt to make as little as possible, and

I promise to follow the rules to the best of my ability with my limited knowledge. I have satisfied

the requirements of UTCR 5.010, with both Counsels on record for the defendants with no

objections. and have attempted to track the location down of the where the “wrong clerk”, of

the court, and not the “County Clerk”, that had been served. I also ask the Court to accept the

late filing in pursuant to ORCP 15D, in serving the Clackamas County Jail, I have been and it

was my, Not meaning to give excuses, but the day to day battle of being indigent makes every

step harder by tenfold, and after reviewing the evidence in my possession, I realized that they

their claim is as strong as any, and I believe it would be in the interest of justice and allow the

resurrection of a little faith in the judicial system, I doubt any would blame my personal lack

thereof, although faithful thus far still seek to halt future doubts in those around me; as those

I’ve recently witnessed. Separated from home, I’d love nothing more than to succeed, but as the

court knows, I am not the judge.

If I may point out to the court, the relationship that exists between my ability to hire

counsel, and the harm stemming from these actions I’m seeking reconciliation for. Prevented in

ability, estopped, to hire assistance blocking the only certain remedy. In other words, It’s the

same harms that that I’m seeking equity for, that have rendered my inability to obtain it… as

it’s been said:

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 27
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

“No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take

advantage of his own wrong, or to find any claim upon his own iniquity,
or to acquire property by his own crime.”

where one who cost the harms, cannot be the reason why remedy cannot be reached,

and currently the ability to hiring counsel, is the only thing preventing the injury from being

repaired, and if not for the misconduct of the defendants I would have no issue providing my

own counsel, None-the-less without assistance, I fear I am going to forfeit everything I have

worked for, I have already lost over $300,000 and I really find when it’s a parties actions,

that handicap the others ability to defend and properly mitigate the damages, intervention

would be proper. Crippled from the fraudulent, illegal actions of manufactured willful frauds,

for the one in the right to risk plunder for the wrongdoer prevail provided that the one already

harmed cannot foresee the pitfalls of civil procedures, when it’s the underdog that already didn’t

want to be involved, yet unrightfully was pulled in to face undeserving situation resembling

organized extortion against top quality lawyers, acting as gate keepers to stopped “constitutional

fairness”[?]. Moreover, an individual with a claim as solid as the one I am about to present to

you, with all elements required of the of multiple actions, is a for sure thing [if properly litigated],

Therefore, due to the harms invoked by the defendants, is the force that has prevented

the ability to seek help and take notice that my biggest hurdle un-leaped at this point has nothing

to do with fact, and everything to do with not tripping on a procedural standard; for this I Pray

that the court and have faith that it may grant without question…. And I say… “It is a settled

and invariable principle,” Chief Justice Marshall once wrote, “that every right, when withheld,

must have a remedy.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (citing

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109).

In the Momentous 1803 Case…

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 28
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

Justice Marshall Observed that the “Very essence of civil liberty

certainly Consists in the right of every Individual to Claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury” and warned that a
government cannot be called a “government of laws, and not of men….
If the laws furnished no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”

Bostin Review-

“When the government itself violates an idividuals rights, it is especially

important for courts to furnish a remedy. *** to be sure, providing
remedies to the victims unconstitutional conduct after the fact is often[,]
at best[,] an imperfect solution.”

From The Plaintiff, (Tyler Lofall)

I always knew that bad things could happen by accident, and good people could
end up getting screwed over or dropped between the cracks… But what I’ve experienced
in this, is that every step of the way the Government has tried to bury me, they have tried
to cover up their own mistakes, and they refuse to take credit for their actions.
These laws that are supposed to “Protect” the individual are worthless if there is
no real path to get to the remedy, and its unjust. If I cant find a way to get the harms fixed
when I was in court for while an attorney can flat out lie, destroy my property by pitching
it into the yard and steal $111,943.56 assignment of benefits from me when I miss court
because I was false arrested and in jail with covid, that I didn’t even have at the exact
time, to suit further damages from the state because they needed to bend the laws that
protected my rights that by this point are destroyed to the point of NEVER EVER
forgiving, and if the proper procedure means more than who’s in the right, yet I cannot
have one appointed to me? While these rights are undeniably constitutional violations
because I don’t know the right ways to present the facts, in the time frames granted….
Not only that but the governments wrongs are then protected by a team of lawyers… just
writing this makes me SOOO mad why doesn’t the government just skip the time and
money its going to have to use dealing with the laws I will break defending the rights its
outright robbing me from. Why can’t it just do what it leads people to believe it stands
for… and be fair, and do what’s right, not what it can get away with.

2.1 PLAINTIFF REQUESTS AS FOLLOWS:

1. THAT THE COURT TAKE NOTICE OF THESE FINDINGS OF FACTS IN SECTION 6 AND GIVE
JUDICIAL REMEDY SO THAT I [PLAINTIFF] MAY HAVE LIGHT ON HOW TO PROCEED.

2. PLAINTIFF ASK THE COURT TO STAY FUTURE PROCEEDINGS (INCLUDING WEST LINN
DEFENDANTS (“WLD”) MOTION TO DISMISS) UNTIL THE FOLLOWING OCCURES:
A. WEST LINN POLICE DISCOVERY UNDER ORCP 43 AND ORCP 46. REQ SENT 3/5/23.
I. MARCH 4TH, 5TH, 6TH, POLICE REPORTS

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PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

II. ALL REGULATIONS OR PROCEDURAL RULES THAT SET A STANDARD IN

THE AGENCIES RELATIONSHIP OR DUTY TO ANOTHER,
III. CHEST CAMERAS FROM MARCH 6, 2022, FOR BOTH OFFICERS CRUISER
CAM FROM MARCH 6TH
B. NEEDED COURT RECORDS.
I. JUNE 24TH WAIVER OF NO CONTACT HEARING
II. JUNE 10TH PRE TRIAL-START TIME 8:45 OR SO, AND AGAIN AT 9-9:04
MINUTES.
C. APPOINTMENT OF PRO BONO COUNSEL
I. IN ALTERNATIVELY AN ADVISOR; AND,
II. ADEQUATE TIME FOR THAT ADVISOR TO ASSIST IN A SOLUTION.

NOTE IN RESPECT TO JUDICIAL TIME

SKIP FROM HERE UNTIL SECTION 6.1

THERES DEFINITIONS, AND RELEVENT

TO OPPOSING COUNSEL. AND STANDARDS FOR
“PRO SE” & “SUMMARY JUDGEMENT”
FOR YOUR REFERENCE

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 30
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

The Fundamental Fairness Doctrine

requires the law and government must provide individuals with due process before

taking away their liberty, life or property. This doctrine is a rule that applies to the rule of due

process which is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.

Constitution.

‘Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium’

“[T]hat Every Right, When Withheld, Must Have a Remedy.” The Circuit Court

of Appeals of the United States of America in the case of Leo Feist v. Young (1943) observed

that “It is an elementary maxim of equity jurisprudence that there is no wrong without a remedy.”

The maxim also insinuates that Plaintiff whose rights have been/are being infringed upon, has

a right to enforce the infringed right through any action before a court.

In the leading case of Ashby v. White, the Court observed, “When the law clothes a

man with a right, he must have means to vindicate and maintain it and remedy if he is injured

in the exercise and enjoyment of it, and it is a vein thing to imagine a right without a remedy

for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.”

“That every right, when withheld, must have a remedy.” Although some view the idea

of a substantive constitutional right without a remedy as oxymoronic, See, e.g., Michael

Coenen, Right-Remedy Equilibration and the Asymmetric Entrenchment of Legal Entitlements,

61 B.C. L. REV. 129, 139 (2020) (defining “legal entitlement” to mean “remedy made available

in response to a particular violation of a substantive right” (emphasis omitted)); Daryl J.

Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 914

(1999) (“[R]ights and remedies operate as part of a single package.”).

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3 PLAINTIFFS CLARIFICATION FOR WEST LINN

DEFENDANTS
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS HAVE ABUSED THE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS
ALLOWED TO REMEDY SPECIFIC PAST DISCRIMINATION, EFFECTIVELY CREATING
A DISCRIMINATORY SPOIL THROUGHOUT ALL LEVELS OF OUR GOVERNMENT .

A. PRIOR TO THIS MOTION,

West Linn Defendants (“WLD”) moved the court to dismiss on the grounds that the

Plaintiff needed to clarify his complaint, and it was too long for counsel to sort the allegations.

Within 10 days Plaintiff came back with a “Second Amended Complaint” as an attachment to

his Plaintiffs Opposition to WLD’s ORCP 21 Motion to dismiss. However, WLD are still not

content stating some of the complaints may still be hard for WLD Counsel, William Stabler, to

comprehend for the following reasons:

B. TIME BARRED?
This is however untrue, the law states, that the notice needs to be so that someone has the

understanding that there is going to be a lawsuit, Plaintiff told your officers: (1) inside the cruiser, (2) In

addition to at least 6 times on the record, (3) sent that record to the Attorney General in April 2022 and

June 2022 (4) and directed in addition to a dozen unanswered requests to the DA during criminal litigation

(5), additionally there was a state of emergency memorandum extending all times on statutes of

Limitations. (Although the State of Emergency ending in April, while Plaintiff was unlawfully detained)

Either way, I suggest we make a deal (Mr. Stabler and Plaintiff), made where:

1. I will Answer all these questions, [you already know the answers to while homeless in winter]

but when this documents 100 pages long you don’t complain about it.

2. I will make a short cut, so the judge does not need to waist his valuable time.

3.1 STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

A. Manuel v. Joliet

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A Supreme Court had reviewed a very similar situation, in Manuel v. Joliet cited Gerstein and

Albright, as, both reflected and recognized that constitutional divisions, See supra at 6–8. In their words,

the Framers “drafted the Fourth Amendment” to address “the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty,”

Albright, 510 U. S., at 274 (emphasis added), and the Amendment thus provides “standards and

procedures” for “the detention of suspects pending trial,” Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 125, n. 27 (emphasis

added).

In MANUEL v. JOLIETs’ Opinion of the Supreme Court, 580 U.S. at 12-14 (2017) open with

the Issues directed at Statute of limitations specifically regarding an Unlawful Arrest, with a Malicious

Prosecution. It addresses only the threshold inquiry in a §1983 suit, which requires courts to “identify the

specific constitutional right” at issue. Albright, 510 U. S., at 271. After pinpointing that right, courts still

must determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation.

See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978). Here, the parties particularly disagree over the

accrual date of Manuel’s Fourth claim—that is, the date on which the applicable two-year statute of

limitations began to run. The timeliness of Manuel’s suit hinges on the choice between their proposed

dates. But with the following brief comments, we remand that issue to the court below. In defining the

contours and prerequisites of a §1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the

common law of torts. See ibid. (explaining that tort principles “provide the appropriate starting point” in

specifying the conditions for recovery under §1983); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388–390 (2007)

(same for accrual dates in particular). Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt

wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. See id., at 388–390; Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483–487 (1994). But not always. Common-law principles are meant to guide

rather than to control the definition of §1983 claims, serving “more as a source of inspired examples than

of prefabricated components.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S50, 258 (2006); see Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.

S. 356, 366 (2012) (noting that Ҥ1983 is [not] simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing

common-law claims”). In applying, selecting among, or adjusting common-law approaches, courts must

closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. With these precepts as

backdrop, Manuel and the City offer competing views about what accrual rule should govern a §1983 suit

challenging post-legal-process pretrial detention. According to Manuel, that Fourth Amendment claim

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accrues only upon the dismissal of criminal charges— here, on May 4, 2011, less than two years before

he brought his suit. See Reply Brief 2; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–25, n. 16 (taking the

same position). Relying on this Court’s caselaw, Manuel analogizes his claim to the common-law tort of

malicious prosecution. See Reply Brief 9; Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389–390. An element of that tort is the

“termination of the . . . proceeding in favor of the accused”; and accordingly, the statute of limitations

does not start to run until that termination takes place. Heck, 512 U. S., at 484, 489. Manuel argues that

following the same rule in suits like his will avoid “conflicting resolutions” in §1983 litigation and

criminal proceedings by “preclud[ing] the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after

having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.” Id., at 484, 486; see Reply Brief 10–11;

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–25, n. 16. In support of Manuel’s position, all but two of the

ten Courts of Appeals that have recognized a Fourth Amendment claim like his have incorporated a

“favorable termination” element and so pegged the statute of limitations to the dismissal of the criminal

case. See n. 4, supra.9 That means in the great majority of Circuits, Manuel’s claim would be timely.

3.2 [RESPONSE TO] FAIRNESS / SPECIAL TREATMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ response to Counsels Belief on Justice
Counsel, made a comment in his Reply, stating Plaintiff wishes to be treated differently in these

matters. Different than who? A lawyer following unpublished rules in court defending hundreds of

thousands of dollars that his clients cost me when they broke the law and false arrested me. Apparently,

Mr. Stabler needs to have an upper hand on the situation, my assumption is most of this is just your way

to derail the Plaintiff from success. Congratulations, going to law school for all those years helps while

we play law.

My understanding is that rights are the supreme protection, as constitution is the supreme or

counterpart so to say of Law… therefore an easy way to put this is me being in jail regardless of why or

how I got there, if I’m not charged, unless I made a deal, I was wrongfully detained. Now by your clients

violating my constitutional rights in the many areas for certain, on proof that the state has and is pointed

out herein (and being a lawyer, you can easily see those things, being sharp as a whip you are). How I see

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the ideal relationship between a “Right” and a “Law”, especially a one of the highest magnitudes… you

have to break a “Law”, to violate a “Right” to the Bill of Rights?

Right! However! you look at its Mr. Stabler’s, your clients Dana Gunnarson, and Catlin Blyth

(1.) took away rights, And WEST LINN PD failed in the supervision and training its officers, and there

has been a statistically high number of people that are publicly unsatisfied with it for the same reasons I

am:

1. in seizing my person without warrant or reason causing abandonment of my property.

2. in my freedom by attesting me and locking me in jail,

3. My Liberties then and now, still today I am so harmed I can’t defend myself…

and the big one, I had an active Assignment of Benefits, with help ready to assist me at

the court March 7th, consideration given in full for $111,943.56 (plus the tort for them

taking it)

4. The last thing the state needs is someone badgering someone who has already been

harmed, keeping them from their family and quick restitution. Additional harms are not an

option.

B. March 6 th West Linn Police Officers gave an unwarranted arrest…

The amount of turbulence I was faced with from many areas of the law leaves me dumbfounded,

from all angles and that is what I am presenting to the court! Left with only the T shirt on my back due

to these actions, to get let out and as a result I lost my property, my liberty, health ended up instantly with

hyperthermia so cold my toenails fell off… caught covid while incarcerated and for that I am seeking

compensation rightfully so…

C. PLAINTIFF IS WILLING TO GO THE DISTANCE FOR JUSTICE.

Counsel can cry, kick, scream, pout, try to evade, justify whatever but notice was given to

government officials, additionally on the record while in jail submitted 10 times See in Exhibit 13, They

Should Have Known being a description of the standard of notification. There is no way that Rebecca

Portlock wasn’t aware when she attempted to prosecute me hard because it would have prevented the

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state from being the Sate from liability… None the less it’s on the court record for it to be seen… I fought

then, I’m fighting now, and I will take this to the supreme court or prisons door. If you do not

understand your oath to honesty and what your OSB standards of truthfulness boils down to, then it’s

even more apparent why the country is struggling right now. You speak perfectly good English, as do I,

since our first point of contact when you called back-to-back times and then filed this motion to dismiss

an hour later, mentioning that “Intervention is required”, you have played the role of the lawyer that

leaves a bad taste in people’s mouth. Try speaking to me, send me an email, a call, tell me what it is that

would make things different.

D. Just asking for fairness, and for Counsel to follow his oath of truthfulness.
I am not asking for special Privilege, I’m asking for plain English on how you want this

presented, and what I need to do… do not point at 500 pages of rabbit holes and in an attempt to lose

me in the procedure. I got nothing left to lose your clients took it all when they overstepped their

authorities. Even if you say you do not break the law, you use it to leverage in your favor, and that in its

own is breaking it. For the integrity of our judicial system, God Bless the future of AI in the future of the

courts.

Rule 4.1 TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Rule 8.4: MISCONDUCT

Maintaining The Integrity of The Profession
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency
or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.

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3.3 DOES PLAINTIFF BELIEVE THAT [SPECIAL TREATMENT IS BEING MADE

WHOLE]
A. PLAINTIFF IS ONLY SEEKING FAIRNESS, FOR HARMS CAUSED BY COUNSELS
CLIENTS.
One person absolutely causes harm when knowingly, allowing, or enforcing the extortion

against innocent people who either don’t know, can’t fight it, either financially, emotionally,

physically exhausted, especially when the reason they can’t fight it is based on harms

intentionally caused by you or your clients, including through undue time delays, or any other

suffocation, subject to change by the personal situations that party. So, if 2023 English may be

used until that’s worked out, and if there is a need further, information or facts, please just

communicate, and let it translate into whatever law language says it needs to be after it leaves

my dictation. A person has rights whether they know the laws specifics or not. It’s bad enough

when the authority to enforce the law is breaking it, it is worse when the litigators are selectively

targeting the harmed opposition by using the rules of civil procedure to hide from someone

because of their now indigent status.

B. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST
So if there’s not an understanding then write it on the complaint and sent it to Plaintiff

as required in UTCR 5.010, and let him answer or rewrite it, and if there is still stipulations that

it lacks the requirements, Plaintiff would love to know what he needs to present to survive a

motion to dismiss, (1) , Plaintiff is curious if the ritualized banter is a must, because as fun as it

is from an ideal situation, however, Plaintiff is not there..

1
I’ll be honest, half of the things that are said to me are difficult to understand what is being asked – Tyler A. Lofall

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Plaintiff is equally as clueless about court filings as the WLD is about what they can do

when policing people, difference is, is one of us is restricted from controlling other people…

C. HISTORY OF THESE PATTERN, AND WHAT WE [SHOULDN’T WANT TO]

REPRESENT.
Violation of equal rights, has been called a lot of things throughout history (sexist,

raciest, bias),and forcing Innocent people before letting them litigate, (peonage, slavery,

tyranny), and when there is a specific group the judges and litigates and those rules are not

required beyond the scope of judging the elements… and when a lawyer recognizes that there

is Merit in the FACT AND LAW… and then intentional or not, makes sure that person cannot

prevail because of procedural issues is unjust and against the law. Please see PRO SE standard

of care located below because I’m choosing the jurisdiction of the country, I grew up believing

was fair.

D. PLAINTIFFS BELIEF [OF FAIR TREATMENT]

And to be clear to take an innocent citizen, who didn’t ask to be uprooted from one’s

home, and jailed; consequently, everything they own was taken. Yes, I believe that person either

(1.) Should be appointed a lawyer to litigate proper repayment of harms caused. (2.) Be given

less intrinsic and intrusive way to proceed (not a different set of laws to follow), where the

method of presentation is more rudimentary and forgiving, and not organized extortion, like

this is turning out to be.

The moment that dismissal happened, the state spoke in action, stating “it has no reason that it has

held plaintiff [me] for all that time, It’s got no reason that plaintiff [I] had to lose so much, without

saying in words, it said I was not guilty”. To get the “Not Guilty” and then be required to Prove

(now in harmed form) that the State is wrong is no different than double jeopardy when a lawyer

cannot be afforded. The state, through its Agents, under the color of law, took [my] rights away, and

it cost damages, and the state owes to make me whole.

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3.4 PLAINTIFF IS CONFUSED WHY MR. STABLER DOESN’T FOLLOW THE

RULES, OR MAKE ANY ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS METHODS TO DO WHAT’S
RIGHT?
A. PRO SE LITIGANT IS INDIGENT, COUNSEL IS NOT.
Mr. Stabler, there was some confusion in my reading law, does the word “MUST” right

here mean that if not included in this document, then the whole document is ineffective.

UTCR 5.020 AUTHORITIES IN MOTIONS AND OTHER

REQUIREMENTS (2) If a pleading is moved against in more than two
particulars under ORCP 21 D or E, there must be attached to the motion
a copy of the pages of the pleading moved against with the parts of the
pleading to be stricken shown in parentheses and the parts to be made
more definite and certain underlined.

Plaintiff is simply confused as to why Mr. Stabler did not attach to his motion, a copy of

the pages of the Complaint, where there is confusion. It’s understood that Plaintiffs response is

past due, however pursuant to ORCP 15D, may the court give Plaintiff relief from time delay,

and we scrap your motions like you wanted to scrap the complaint of someone that doesn’t

know better?

When Plaintiff has forgotten something in a motion, such as the most important part of

it, it’s been in his limited experience, that it gets stricken. And if there is something that gets

repeated throughout the entirety of the complaint, simply mark out an example and Plaintiff

would surlily handle it for you, like he did when the complaint was too long.

B. A COMMENT OF DISBELIEF CAME FROM THIS STATEMENT.

“To the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or

protected by the constitution or laws of the United States, ... Shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; Under title
18 U.S.C. section 242, any damage from any employee by violating a
constitutional right of that person, criminal choices can and may be
brought upon at government employee. Whoever, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in
any state, territory, commonwealth, possession, or district.”

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“In this case it is easy to see that not only every employee, but every
attorney here in this case would be a part of these causers of actions, as
long as they knew the facts of the case. Plaintiff asks the court why the
defendants do not get charged with a criminal violation? who decided
when that happens, Plaintiff had a UCC claim where he had $111,943.56
…“

(Page 6 at 1-9) Plaintiffs Opposition to the twenty-one motions.

What I do not find fair is for a police officer with authority from the government, to

make personal decisions that are not correct that interfere with literally years of someone’s life,

and then have hired attorney prevent that person from being made whole. Consequently, to the

amount of time that it takes for a human being to learn law to present it in coltlike manner under

top secret knowledge and a mystic judicial discretion (from the eyes of a non-litigator) it’s

completely outrageous. The fact that you are arguing a point that is contradictory to the oath

you took to become a bar member and you are representing the state to compete for a victory in

a constitutional right violation they did, is a kamikaze mission to the wellness of our country. A

police officer can commit a crime, get backed by a lawyer with immunity, and I was in the right,

I suffered the loss, and I am here on a debate with their attorney, no wonder your address iisnt

in the phonebook!

After you review this filing, and these set of facts, you will have no doubt as to if I was

made whole after, on that note. I will travel to the end of the world to make this right. I am

asking you nicely not to screw me, your bar rests upon a moto that is along the lines of always

do the right thing…

As far as your pro se litigants should get thrown to the wolves theory, and just lose

everything, apparently the higher courts agreed with me, and the hand full of topics that were

just backed up by law, leads me to believe that you are just attempting to cause issues in my

world for your personal gain… else you would either have to (1) claim you don’t know that you

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can’t promote dishonest facts as per your OSB oath, and you really don’t know any of this stuff

and you just automate everything. Or (2) you broke the law, and your insurance would then be

liable if it passed along to them, [or if the courts did anything about it]…

C. I AM HOPING TO JUST MAKE A DEAL AND END THIS MADNESS SOON ENOUGH. I
GOT FAMILY TO GO BACK TO AND THIS IS REALLY IN THE WAY.

Plaintiff initially was not going to respond to the Reply, but these arguments needed to be

addressed, and I do not want to make this too cumbersome, I know how busy everyone is, WLD has more

than just this MSJ to answer on, I saw Defendant Gunnarson has another one this week she’s battling

now. Who would have guessed, when there is a complete disregard to peoples constitutionally protected

rights, you end up spending a lot of time in litigation, None-the-less, I need some clarification on a

comment you made on the reply, (See Page 2 at 17-19)

Plaintiff does not know who made the decision to arrest him, he knows
Dana acted first, but from Plaintiffs point of view it doesn’t matter, he was
arrested, and West Linn Police officers did it, its documented most of
which was by the defendants, call it negligence or malice Plaintiff was
detained, and no one has any real argument as to it was the correct
decision.

Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss page 4 at 22-25

D. The Quick Scenarios

I have three quick scenarios to assist in my reasoning, I AM correct (response to WLD Reply pg. 2

at 24):

EXAMPLE 1: You pull up to a nice restaurant, with your wife, you have a
one of kind nonreplaceable AC cobra, you park Valet. You have tickets in
the sun visor, to the trailblazers after dinner, you are stoked… you finish
dinner, and go to get your car, you are going to, and they tell you…. “Sir
I’m sorry your car was stollen., and the guy drove it off the bridge “
do you care what the guy’s name is that stole it.? Or is that irrelevant and
you only care that that restaurant is going to compensate you for it?

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EXAMPLE 2: You’re working for your best friend, you’re working a

bigger job then you should, WAY INVESTED, you’re strapped thin and
just finished, and your behind on your bills, worse your wife needs a
surgery, or she doesn’t have long to live. and you kissed her goodbye and
are running out the door, and the check is in your best friend’s pocket…
and he’s coming to meet you, and your friend gets hit by a car and is in a
coma. And the hospital will tell you nothing, you have over a year of pay,
no way to cover your wife’s surgery, and no way to get it without it. The
Hospital will only let family into see him, and your best friend is
unconscious. His brother and his wife came and left, neither you had ever
met…
Someone picked the check and left a note…
Do you really care who wrote the note? besides possibly finding them, for
a remedy?

EXAMPLE 3: There is a dog that’s in your neighborhood, it’s a big mean

dog everyone knows to stay away from it. What is worse is there is a little
reckless owner who cannot control him and lets just imagine for a moment
this dog is like the Beast from Sandlot, and sure enough this negligent
owner let his dog get off the leash and he ran over and swallowed your kid
whole…

The dog doesn’t understand, are you going to speak to the Dog? Shooting
the dog doesn’t get your kid back, (it’s sad to think about compensation
like that), but you wouldn’t go ask the dog for anything, your frustrations
would be targeted at the owner.

So, you could put the dog down but that doesn’t get your kid back, and that’s what you

really wanted and missed… You don’t care who took your best friend’s money, you care that

you don’t have the cure for your wife, and whomever stole your car, you might wish you could

have five minutes with that guy, but the restaurants liable.

At some point (1) the owner of the dog would be liable for failure to train its dog not to

eat people, (although you can’t squeeze blood out of a turnup) (2) you would be entitled to your

money that ran away, (but where did it run away to) and (3) it would be pretty low of the

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restaurant if they litigated against you. Especially if you were not a lawyer. Now let us say you

are unable to retain counsel, due to them all interfering with each other, now every single thing

that happens you are unable to protect yourself, moreover, let’s say you were false arrested…

and your ability to seek remedy to all those things spoiled. How far would you go to make sure

you were made whole? What would you be willing to lose? (See Exhibit 13 page 141-143).

3.5 CONCLUSION OF RESPONSE TO THE MR. STABLERS QUESTIONNAIRE

People make mistakes, it happens, intentional mistakes are less forgiving and more

costly, when you know better, that mistake isn’t nearly as forgivable… There is difference in

someone that wins because the other person isn’t pursuing it and the person watching as

someone frantically attempts to resolve what he is rightfully owed and can’t correct the issue or

make it long enough till the remedy due to cannibalism of their own resources with day-to-day

life.

Although now that Mr. William Stabler sees my point, I do understand why it was

asked; See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (“An individual cannot be held

liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional

deprivation.”).Dana Put the hand cuffs on me, Catlin took me to the Jail, it says I was Dana

Gunnarson’s arrestee, on the discovery, yet Catlin allowed it to happen right in front of him,

and I believe Dana stayed with Massiel because it was a same sex thing (used in their favor

since Massiel and Dana both are feminists) and went along with it because he had a crush on

her. Dana Is the bad apple that has to be in the center of the pony show and gets upset if she’s

not driving the power train.

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4 STANDARDS OF REVIEW

4.1 PRO SE

SUPREME COURT SAYS THAT PRO SE LITIGANTS…

” Cannot Be Held to Same Standard as Pleadings Drafted By Attorneys”

“ Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the Court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to

dismiss, White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states: A court faced with a motion to

dismiss a pro se complaint must read the complaint's allegations expansively”, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), “and take them as true for purposes of deciding

whether they state a claim.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263

(1972).

“Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less

stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the

submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal

theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule

requirements.” Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982);

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189

(3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition

cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d

422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).

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“The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and

papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what

relief the party desires.” S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also,

United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has special obligation to

construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d

502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).

“Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be in

artfully drawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them.” See, Vega v. Johnson,

149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998).” Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against

consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.” U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d

1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).

Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the

allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526

F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).

“Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss this court would have to apply the

standards of White v. Bloom. “Furthermore, if there is any possible theory that would entitle

the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of the court cannot dismiss this

case.””

4.2 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDRGMENT

4.2.1 STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
“Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir.

2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Although both the “clearly established right” and “reasonableness”

inquiries are questions of law, where there are factual disputes as to the parties’ conduct or motives, the

case cannot be resolved at summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See Torres v. City of

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Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where the objective reasonableness of an officer’s

conduct turns on disputed issues of material fact, it is a question of fact best resolved by a jury, …, only

in the absence of material disputes is it a pure question of law.” (Internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003); Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350

F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2003); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003); Martinez v.

Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018)

(per curiam) (holding officer entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment, where officer’s use

of force did not violate clearly established law

“Summary judgment is appropriate when, with the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues
of material fact, so that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts should
construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and
should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v.
Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010

4.3 NO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

IN 1983 CLAIMS!

Local governmental units are not entitled to a qualified-immunity defense

to § 1983 liability. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473 (1985); Owen
v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Hallstrom v. City
of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992); L.A. Police
Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 889 (9th Cir. 1990). Local
governmental units are also unable to rely on the qualified-immunity
defense available to municipal employees as a defense to § 1983 claims.
See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court’s role is not to weigh the

evidence, but merely to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572

U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Zetwick

v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir.

1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion, the court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the

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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (in reviewing district court’s grant of summary

judgment the court determines “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied

the relevant substantive law”); Vander v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 268 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2001);

Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2001); May, 109 F.3d at 560; Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d

1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993).

“‘[C]ourts should construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and

should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.’” Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.

2020) (quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)).

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010);

Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989).

“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Harper, 877 F.2d at 731. To establish the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must make an adequate showing as to each

element of the claim on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23; see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Harper, 877 F.2d at 731. The opposing party may

not rest on conclusory allegations or mere assertions, see Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Leer v. Murphy,

844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986), but must

come forward with significant probative evidence, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249– 50; Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). The evidence set forth by the non-moving party must be sufficient,

taking the record as a whole, to allow a rational jury to find for the non-moving party. See Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 441; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Where “the factual context renders [the

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nonmoving party’s] claim implausible …, [that party] must come forward with more persuasive

evidence to support [its] claim than would otherwise be necessary” to show that there is a genuine issue

for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; see also Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577 (9th

Cir. 1989); Harper, 877 F.2d at 731. The materiality of facts is determined by looking to the substantive

law that defines the elements of the claim. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Nidds v. Schindler Elevator

Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (as amended); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318

(9th Cir. 1987).

“In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) [ORCP 21] motion, a plaintiff must provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief. This requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See also Association of Cleveland Fire

Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). In Twombly, the

Supreme Court emphasized that even though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual

allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Twombly,

127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 Pg ID 1132 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In so holding,

the Court disavowed the oft-quoted Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46, 78 S. .Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (recognizing “the accepted rule that a complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”), characterizing

that rule as one “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading

standard.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. in 1969.

A. THE RIGHT - Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is only an immunity from suit for damages, it is not an immunity

from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 940–41 (9th

Cir. 2012); L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993); Am.

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Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991). a. Basic

Principles (1) Eligibility “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 950

(9th Cir. 2018) (as amended). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part analysis for resolving

government officials’ qualified immunity claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),

overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

“[I]n deciding whether qualified immunity applies, [the court] ask[s] two questions: (1)

did the officer violate a constitutional right, and (2) was that right clearly established at the

time of the events at issue?” Seidner v. de Vries, 39 F.4th 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

First, the court must consider whether the facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury … show [that] the [defendant’s] conduct violated a constitutional

right[.]” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007); Brosseau

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002);

Seidner, 39 F.4th at 595; Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022); Sampson v. Cnty.

of Los Angeles by & through Los Angeles Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 974 F.3d 1012,

1018 (9th Cir. 2020); Ioane, 939 F.3d at 950; Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir.

2007); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006); Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969

(9th Cir. 2002). “If there is no constitutional violation, the inquiry ends, and the officer is entitled

to qualified immunity.” Ioane, 939 F.3d at 950.

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Second, the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time

of the alleged violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014)

(“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 48 2022 officials from liability for

civil damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.’”) (Quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at

199–201; Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Seidner, 39 F.4th at 595; Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61; Sampson,

974 F.3d at 1018; Ioane, 939 F.3d at 950; Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1132

(9th Cir. 2018); Garcia v. Cnty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011); Rodis v. City

& Cnty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712; Kennedy,

439 F.3d at 1060; Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050; Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 969. “When this test is

properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1132–33 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743); see also

Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018). Even if the violated right

was clearly established at the time of the violation, it may be “difficult for [the defendant] to

determine how the relevant legal doctrine … will apply to the factual situation the [defendant]

confronts…. [Therefore, If the [defendant’s] mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable ...

the [defendant] is entitled to the immunity defense.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Kennedy, 439

F.3d at 1061; Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050; cf. Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712 n.6 (explaining that

the inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s mistake is not the “third” step in the

Saucier analysis, but rather, is part of the second step of Saucier’s two-step analysis).

Note that Saucier’s framework should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (explaining the sequence, while “often appropriate,” “should no longer

be regarded as mandatory”). Rather, the “judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals

should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of

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the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.” Id. See also Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61 (“The two elements do not need

to be analyzed in any specific order, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion

in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed

first.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961,

968 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Either question may be addressed first, and if the answer to either is ‘no,’

then the state actor cannot be held liable for damages.”); Sampson, 974 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th

Cir. 2020) (“Lower courts have discretion to address the questions in reverse order.”). However,

the Saucier procedure “is often beneficial” because it “promotes the

development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable with
respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a
qualified immunity defense is unavailable.” 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct.
808. Pearson concluded that courts “have the discretion to decide whether
that [Saucier] procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.” Id. at 242,
129 S. Ct. 808.

In the matter here, Plaintiff, had prior to the arrival of the Defendant Blyth and

Gunnarson, had his property destroyed, in his residence, for no reason, was threatened with fire

where substantial action had been made showing that it wasn’t a blind threat, by means that

Massiel went to the store made purchases to get required assaulting tools. Massiel then returned

to the house broke out the windows to the basement (Of the home they both resided) Went to

the store and purchased in excess of 30 pounds of flour, took out the garden hose, and sprayed

water over all of the Plaintiffs property, poured the flour she intentionally purchased for this

event. And then repeated these actions three days in row (march 4th, 5th, and 6th ) with freezing

temperatures, shutting off the power, hot water, lights, heat, meanwhile demanding the

defendant to leave but holding on to his truck keys so that he could not. (See Exhibit 13 Page

27-30).

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Then with tenant rights violated, property rights violated, assault against Plaintiff all of

the officers privy of, they denied assisting Plaintiff, the first two days, yet acknowledged his

rights, all in front of minor children, and then on day three, after the third assault in a row he

grabbed a hose and hammer from her, for 15 seconds with no harm he goes to jail and none of

the previous information makes the arrest report? It was known, by anybody who could put a

uniform on by their self, that they were violating Plaintiffs rights. The false arrest was the not

the first right that was violated, equal rights, selective evidence, safety in my home, unfair

housing, all are issues the police knew about, intentionally tweaked to get the outcome they

wanted yet was not warranted.

4.3.1 “(CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT)”

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014); Ioane, 939 F.3d at 951
(“While we have discretion to begin our analysis with either part of the
test, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.[ Local governmental units are not entitled
to a qualified-immunity defense to § 1983 liability. See Brandon v. Holt,
469 U.S. 464, 473 (1985); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S.
622, 638 (1980); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482
(9th Cir. 1992); L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879,
889 (9th Cir. 1990). Local governmental units are also unable to rely on
the qualified-immunity defense available to municipal employees as a
defense to § 1983 claims. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir.
1995)
] it is nevertheless beneficial to begin with the first part of the test ….”);
Scott v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 903 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“‘These two prongs of the analysis need not be considered in any
particular order, and both prongs must be satisfied for a plaintiff to
overcome a qualified immunity defense.’” (Quoting Shafer v. Cnty. of
Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017)); Bardzik v. Cnty. of
Orange, 635 F.3d 1138, 1145 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing option to
address only the clearly-established step, but concluding that addressing
whether there was a constitutional violation was proper under the
circumstances); Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the court may exercise its discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs should be addressed first in light of the particular case’s
circumstances); Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing Pearson and addressing only the second prong of the
qualified immunity analysis, which was dispositive).

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT NOT COVERED BUY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

Claims arising under federal law Given the complexity of the topic, a few
points will have to suffice regarding lawsuits under 42 USC § 1983 for
deprivation of federal rights. Although the 11th Amendment to the United
States Constitution generally bars federal lawsuits against the states, local
governments are not considered an arm of the state and are therefore not
entitled to immunity from § 1983 actions. Monell v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Local governments may be sued for
federal constitutional violations attributable to their official policies or
customs. Individual local government officers and employees also may be
sued under § 1983. Legislative or judicial immunity – discussed below
– may shield public officials sued individually from liability for legislative,
judicial, or quasi‐ judicial acts. Other public officials may have a
qualified immunity/good faith defense, which means they are subject to
payment of monetary damages only if they knew or should have known
that their acts were unlawful.

[Mr. Lofall had a whole argument with the arresting officers who then communicated that they

did not have the proper “elements” for the charge of Harassment, leaving the Plaintiff to with an “*”

next to the statute as to hold a wildcard in case something new popped up as the weeks went by.

Also, as per ORS 161.209-229 states Mr. Lofall was allowed to defend his property when Massiel

was destroying it for the third day in a row. Statute 161.229 states, “A person is justified in using

physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that

the person reasonably believes it to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or

attempted commission by the other person of theft or criminal mischief of property. [1971 c.743

§26]]

“[W]hether a constitutional right was violated … is a question of fact.” Tortu v. Las Vegas

Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61 (in

assessing whether a constitutional right was violated, the court considers whether the facts show a

violation of a constitutional right).

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An obvious and more discretionary rights were violated in the following constitutional rights

Plaintiff was deprived of:

I. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a proposed amendment to the United States
Constitution designed to guarantee equal legal rights for all American citizens regardless of sex.
It seeks to end the legal distinctions between men and women in matters of divorce, property,
employment, and other matters.

II. The Right to Housing is the economic, social and cultural right to adequate housing and shelter.
It is recognized in some national constitutions and in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

a. Although the mental stability of Massiel wasn’t for some reason in a crisis, the Plaintiff had
not been the logical fault (if you ask Massiel, she will tell you any one of 100 things,) but
none of them justified an immediate move out, moreover Massiel wouldn’t give Plaintiff
back his keys to his truck that he needed in order to leave.

b. Police circumvented tenant law and removed him with an unlawful false arrest.

III. Fifth Amendment, amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the United States, part of
the Bill of Rights, that articulates procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights
of the criminally accused and to secure life, liberty, and property.

a. This is as ‘Clearly Established’ as it comes, to manufacture an arrest, and it

held for four months, before it was in absolute that the “alleged victim” was
on one of her tantrums at the time and would not lie in the further
prosecution of the Plaintiff, even when she was led to believe custody of her
children was at risk. (Another reason those body cams would be justified)
i. Def Rebecca Portlock
1. Not passing over exculpatory evidence (malicious
prosecution, violating his brady rights)
2. Denying discovery, and holding him without reason (false
arrest)
3. Lying and moving court dates back because she had no
witness.
4. Knowingly using false information even after the one who
supposedly stated it came on the record and said she was
wrong.
ii. Catlin Blyth
1. knowingly let Dana Arrest Plaintiff
2. and conspired against plaintiff in so many ways listed below.
iii. Dana Gunnarson
1. Manufactured evidence/testimony
2. Leveraged witnesses.
3. Bias in delivery of evidence
4. Conspired against plaintiff as shown below.
5. Circumvent tenant law.
iv. WEST LINN PD
1. Refused to remove Macy event ho she did so much damage the first 2
days.

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2. Refused to do anything about threat of arson.

3. Allowed Macy to abuse the plaintiff through destruction of property.
4. Not train the two officers above so that they could do those harms.
5. Supervisors then signed off on plaintiff’s arrest and they all knew.
6. Now are withho0lding evidence knowing that the info is detrimental to
this lawsuit.

IV. These “Clearly Established” rights, dispose the Qualified Immunity

“[T]he ‘clearly established’ inquiry is a question of law that only a judge can decide.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d
817, 821 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Gordon, 6 F.4th at 968; Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1037
(9th Cir. 2018); Tortu, 556 F.3d at 1085 (explaining that “whether a constitutional right was violated ... is a
question of fact” for the jury, while “whether the right was clearly established ... is a question of law” for the
judge); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (whether the law at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation was clearly established is a “purely legal” issue). However, a “bifurcation of duties is
unavoidable: only the jury can decide the disputed factual issues, while only the judge can decide whether the
right was clearly established once the factual issues are resolved.” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1037 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The reasonableness inquiry is objective: “the question is whether the officers’ actions are

‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). See also Ziglar

v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (“Whether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the

‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the official’s acts.”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,

2473 (2015) (stating objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and circumstances of each

particular case.); Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 775–76.

Florida Supreme court has concluded that in even in the absence of a similar case in
case law, it is clearly established if actions of the officers is contradictory to the
policy of that officer. In these cases and shown below the officers actions are clearly
establed in the West Linn Policy that is published online on the police officers
website.

Even with the light “NOT” on the injured party as the standard is stated above, and Plaintiff

being the Injured party; The officers Ignored a half dozen Agency Policy Rules as shown below.

There is no reasonableness involved, they unlawfully arrested and detained Plaintiff, their actions

cost him his property, and freedom, and then they unfairly framed the discovery to go to the

Prosecution without the proper facts required to prosecute and for some reason this took four months

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to figure out meanwhile discovery request after discovery request was ignored. Dana Gunnarson

and Catlin Blyth do not deserve to have Immunity against the Plaintiff, and as it states the judge

shall make that decision.

4.3.1.1 Identifying the Right

When identifying the right that was allegedly violated, a court must define the right more narrowly

than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than all of the factual

circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d

1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1998); Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995); Camarillo v.

McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993). For example, the statement that the Eighth

Amendment guarantees medical care without deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a

sufficiently narrow statement of the right for conducting the clearly established inquiry. See Kelley,

60 F.3d at 667; see also Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996).

“[a] party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted, or a declaratory judgment

is sought may, at any time, move without or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.”

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., td. et al.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., et. al., 475 U.S. 547, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); see also B.F.

Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears

the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving

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party has carried his burden, the party opposing the motion “must come forward with specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The

opposing party cannot merely rest upon the allegations contained in his pleadings. Rather, he must

submit evidence demonstrating that material issues of fact exist.

Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting

First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968)).

Summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for

discovery. Oatman v. Potter, 92 Fed.Appx. 133, 137, 2004 WL 68537, 3 (C.A.6,2004), citing

White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir.1994). Because the court,

in deciding this case, considers pleadings, the arguments of counsel and the pro se plaintiff, and the

exhibits attached, to the pleadings, the motion by defendants withholding evidence that only

strengthens Plaintiffs s case, that this case is essentially one for summary judgment.

4.3.2 42 U.S.C.1983 Primarily under the Fourth Amendment

42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96–170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub.
L. 104–317, title III, § 309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)

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4.4 WLPD LIABILITY

LOCAL GOVERNMENT NOT PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

4.4.1 Deliberate Fabrication

In deliberate fabrication cases, the filing of a criminal complaint usually immunizes the investigating
officers “‘because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent
judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused’s arrest exists at that time.’” Caldwell v.
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smiddy v. Varney, 665
F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865
(9th Cir. 2008)). However, the presumption can be overcome if a plaintiff establishes that officers “either
presented false evidence to or withheld crucial information from the prosecutor.” Id. at 1116. At that
point, “the analysis reverts back to a normal causation question” and the issue again becomes whether
the constitutional violation caused the plaintiff’s harm. Id.
Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant in Individual Capacity—
Elements and Burden of Proof In order to prevail on Mr. Lofall’s § 1983 claim against the defendants,
the plaintiff must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. the defendant acted under color of state law; and (not disputed)
2. the [act[s]] [failure to act] of the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his particular rights under
the United States Constitution. (Also not disputed)
Such an instruction should set forth the additional elements a plaintiff must establish to prove the
violation of the constitutional right or federal law at issue. The elements of a § 1983 claim is.
(1) the action occurred “under color of state law” and
(2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right. Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988)). In order to be individually liable under § 1983, an individual must personally participate in an
alleged rights deprivation. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010).
“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the
actionable cause of the claimed injury.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.
2008). “To meet this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causation in-fact and
proximate causation.” Id.
In Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2020), the Ninth Circuit
discussed, for the first time, the minimum level of involvement needed for § 1983 liability under the
integral-participant doctrine. An actor may be deemed to have caused a constitutional violation under
the “integral-participant doctrine,” “only if.
(1) the defendant knew about and acquiesced in the constitutionally defective conduct as part of
a common plan with those whose conduct constituted the violation, or
(2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts 131 by others which the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Peck v. Montoya,
51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022); see id. at 889-92 (holding that when non shooting officers did not
form plan with shooting officers to shoot suspect, did not set in motion acts by shooting officers, and
did not know or should have known constitutional violation would occur, non-shooting officers were

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not integral participants in constitutional violation). When liability is alleged against a defendant on this
basis, the model instruction stated above will need to be modified.

4.4.2 Liability -Failure to train.

With this many people from all angles of the county that make terrible decisions, and how bad of the
decisions that they make there is no way that it can be said that it doesn’t drive from a failure to train,
a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation;
(2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and
(3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their
employees. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153–54.
Such a showing depends on three elements:
(1) the training program must be inadequate “‘in relation to the tasks the officers must
perform’”.
(2) the city officials must have been deliberately indifferent “‘to the rights of persons with whom
the [local officials] come into contact’”; and
(3) the inadequacy of the training “must be shown to have ‘caused’ the constitutional deprivation
at issue.” Merritt v. Canty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (Internal citations
omitted); see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 61
A. (Stating, “To satisfy the statute, 9 2022 a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant

respect must amount to ‘DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE to the rights of persons with whom the

[untrained employees] come into contact.’ [] Only then ‘can such a shortcoming be properly

thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.’”) (Quoting City of Canton,

489 U.S. at 388)); lankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007); Merritt, 875

F.2d at 770. “Under this standard, a municipal defendant can be held liable because of a failure to

properly train its employees only if the failure reflects a “conscious” choice by the government.”

Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2016)

4.4.3 Monell Claims

“Under Monell, a plaintiff must also show that the policy at issue was the ‘actionable cause’ of the
constitutional violation, which requires showing both but for and proximate causation.” Tsao v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Harper, 533 F.3d at 1026). Regardless of what
theory the plaintiff employs to establish municipal liability— policy, custom, or failure to train— the
plaintiff must establish an affirmative causal link between the municipal policy or practice and the
alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 391-92 (1989); Van Ort v. Estate
of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). If the plaintiff relies on the theory of ratification, see
Instruction 9.7 (Section 1983 Claim Against Local Governing Body Defendants Based on Ratification—
Elements and Burden of Proof), which discusses ratification and causation. In Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d

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1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit approved the trial court’s “moving force” instruction on
causation in a § 1983 Monell claim as follows.

4.5 ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY / PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY:

Prosecutorial immunity applies to § 1983 claims. [Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)]. State prosecutors are absolutely immune from
§ 1983 actions when performing functions “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process,” id. at 430, 96 S. Ct. 984, or,
phrased differently, “when performing the traditional functions of an
advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131, 118 S. Ct. 502, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 471 (1997).

“[T]he functional nature of the activities being performed, not the status of the person performing them,
is the key to whether absolute immunity attaches.” Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir.
2013); see also Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We take a functional
approach when determining whether a given action is protected by prosecutorial immunity.”). “In
applying this approach, [the court] distinguish[es] between acts of advocacy, which are entitled to
absolute immunity, and administrative and ‘police-type’ investigative acts which are not. To qualify as
advocacy, an act must be ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”
Patterson, 883 F.3d at 830. See also Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342–43 (explaining that prosecutorial
immunity does not apply, for example, when prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal
investigation, makes statements to the press, or acts as a complaining witness in support of a
warrant application); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261–62 n.8 (2006); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 271–73 (1993); Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 710–11 (9th Cir. 2010);
Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009); Botello, 413 F.3d at 975– 76; Genzler, 410
F.3d at 636. When performing “administrative functions,” or “investigative functions normally
performed by a detective or police officer,” qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity,
applies. Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843.

4.5.1 THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH THE

JUDICIAL PHASE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS:
• seeking a grand jury indictment, dismissing claims, deciding whether and when to prosecute,
deciding what witnesses and what evidence to present, see Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261–62; Imbler,
424 U.S. at 431 n.33; Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001); Morley v. Walker,
175 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1999); Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d
636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999) (grand jury); see also Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342–43
(Absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding or appears in
court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application).

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• deciding not to prosecute a defendant, see Botello, 413 F.3d at 977; Roe v. City of San
Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997).
• making statements that are alleged misrepresentations and mischaracterizations during
hearings, during discovery, and in court papers, see Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837–38
(9th Cir. 1991); conferring with witnesses and allegedly inducing them to testify falsely, see
Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984).
• preparing a case for trial, see KRL, 384 F.3d at 1112–13; Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1008; Gobel v.
Maricopa Cnty., 867 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
• appearing and testifying at a hearing to obtain a search warrant, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 487, 491–92 (1991); 38 2022
• deciding to release previously secured evidence, see Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile
Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 678–79 (9th Cir. 1984).
• selecting a special prosecutor, see Lacey, 693 F.3d at 931 (“Decisions related to appointments
and removals in a particular matter will generally fall within the exercise of the judge’s or
prosecutor’s judicial and quasi-judicial roles and are shielded from suit by absolute immunity.”).
• supervising attorneys in their obligations to disclose evidence, where the decisions are linked
to the prosecution of the plaintiff and require legal knowledge and the exercise of related
discretion, see Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341–43; Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1068–69.
• submitting a motion for a bench warrant to court for arrestee’s failure to progress in court-
imposed treatment program, see Waggy, 594 F.3d at 709–13.
• making parole recommendations, because parole decisions are a continuation of the sentencing
process, see Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2009).
• preparing warrants, warrant applications and factual affidavits, see Torres, 793 F.3d at 1053–
54; and
• issuing subpoena duces tecum, where “it was issued in preparation for evaluating and
countering a defense witness’s testimony,” and it was clear the subpoena “subpoena was
directed at obtaining evidence in preparation for trial, see Garmon, 828 F.3d at 844.
• Lawyers have immunity for comments made during litigation. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964,
972 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 900 (2022).

4.5.2 THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES FALL OUTSIDE OF THE OFFICIAL ROLE OF

THE PROSECUTOR:

• performing acts which are generally considered functions of the police, see Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274–76 (1993); Torres, 793 F.3d at 1055–56 (serving and executing
seizure warrants); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638–43; Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011; Herb Hallman
Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 642; Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1204; 39 2022

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• advising police officers during the investigative phase of a criminal case, see Burns, 500 U.S.
at 493; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1232–34; Botello, 413 F.3d at 977–78.
• acting prior to having probable cause to arrest, see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274; Morley, 175 F.3d
at 760–61; Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 643.
• preparing a declaration to support an arrest warrant, see Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31; Morley,
175 F.3d at 760; Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 642–43, or bail revocation motion, see
Cruz v. Kauai Cnty., 279 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Garmon, 828 F.3d at 844–
45 (not entitled to absolute immunity for presenting a false statement in a declaration supporting
application for the subpoena duces tecum);
• holding arrestees in detention facilities where the conditions of confinement are
constitutionally Infirm, see Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1206.
• making statements to the public concerning criminal proceedings, see Buckley, 509 U.S. at
277–78; Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1013; Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1205.
• directing police officers to obtain a search warrant, serving a search warrant, and being present
during the search, see Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1997), rev would on other
grounds by Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999); see also KRL, 384 F.3d at 1113–14; and
• acquiring false statements from witnesses for use in a prosecution, Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011.
Prosecutorial immunity extends to actions during both the pre-trial and posttrial phase of a case.
See Demery, 735 F.2d at 1144.

“[A]bsolute immunity is available to prosecutors in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings.” Torres
v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). “Prosecutorial immunity only protects the defendants
from [§] 1983 damage claims; it does not protect them from suits for injunctive relief.” Gobel, 867 F.2d
at 1203 n.6. “An attorney supervising a trial prosecutor who is absolutely immune is also absolutely
immune. … So are prosecutors who conducted general office 40 2022 supervision or office training.”
Garmon, 828 F.3d at 845. However, the supervising attorney will only be immune to the same extent as
those he is supervising. Id. (explaining that nothing permits the court to grant a supervising prosecutor
absolute immunity for supervising an activity that is not protected by absolute immunity). The court has
held that a state pretrial release officer was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for submitting
a bare unsigned warrant for arrest in 1983 action. Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 830–31 (9th
Cir. 2018)

4.5.3 DEFENDANT WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Rebecca Portlock.

4.6 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (PART 2)

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
2018) (as amended). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part analysis for resolving
government officials’ qualified immunity claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

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(2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. “[I]n deciding whether
qualified immunity applies, [the court] ask[s] two questions: (1) did the officer violate a
constitutional right, and (2) was that right clearly established at the time of the events at
issue?” Seiner v. de Vries, 39 F.4th 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted)
A. First, the court must consider whether the facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury … show [that] the [defendant’s] conduct violated a constitutional right***
“If there is no constitutional violation, the inquiry ends, and the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity.” Ioane, 939 F.3d at 950.
B. Second, the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (“The
doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages
‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.’***.
“When this test is properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1132–33 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 743); see also Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018).
Even if the violated right was clearly established at the time of the violation, it may be
“difficult for [the defendant] to determine how the relevant legal doctrine … will apply to the
factual situation the [defendant] confronts…. [Therefore, i] f the [defendant’s] mistake as to
what the law requires is reasonable ... the [defendant] is entitled to the immunity defense.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061; Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050; cf.
Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712 n.6 (explaining that the inquiry into the reasonableness of the
defendant’s mistake is not the “third” step in the Saucier analysis, but rather, is part of the
second step of Saucier’s two-step analysis)

Qualified immunity is only an immunity from suit for damages, it is not an immunity
from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937,
940–41 (9th Cir. 2012); L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472
(9th Cir. 1993); Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d
816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991).

DEFENDANTS WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

West Linn Police Department
Dana Gunnarson
Catlin Blyth
Clackamas County Police Department
Clackamas County Jail
Clackamas County

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5 LEGAL STANDARDS [AND ELEMENTS]

5.1 UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND CONFINEMENT

At trial, to prove that an officer unreasonably detained a person, that person must show, more likely
than not, that the officer either:
(1) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the person; or
(2) that the length or scope of the stop was excessive.
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.21
To prove that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and to hold the officer liable, a person must
prove either of two negatives. One way to officer liability is by showing that no “particularized and
objective basis” existed for the officer to have suspected that the person was involved in criminal
activity. Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.21. As discussed above, “particularized” refers to facts
specific to that person; for example, reasonable suspicion generally cannot exist based on a person’s
merely standing near others suspected of criminal activity.
In assessing reasonable suspicion, officers are allowed to draw upon their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from, and deductions about, all of the facts that the particular
encounter presents them with. Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.21. Therefore, they may cite their
“training and experience” to add more “facts” to the group of facts leading to reasonable suspicion.
But an officer may not base reasonable suspicion on particularized facts to the person to be detained.
The second way to officer liability involves proving that the length or scope of the stop was
excessive, making it an unreasonable seizure. Through intrusive police actions, an otherwise
reasonable detention supported by reasonable suspicion may turn into an unreasonable arrest lacking
probable cause. At trial, the judge will instruct the jury to consider all of the circumstances of the
incident, including:
(1) the intrusiveness of the stop, such as the methods the police used, the restriction on the plaintiff’s
liberty, and the length of the stop;
(2) whether the methods used were reasonable under the circumstances; and
(3) other factors applicable to the particular case.
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.21
Generally, to prevail at trial, a person will need to show the jury that the officer’s use of force or
other coercion made the detention unreasonable.
5.1.1 SECTION 1983 UNREASONABLE ARREST CLAIM
Generally, if an officer arrested someone without a warrant, then to prove that the arrest was
unreasonable, the person arrested must prove, more likely than not, that the officer arrested her
without probable cause. Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.23.
Warrantless arrests not based on probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause is a
set of facts that would cause a reasonably careful and prudent person to have an honest and strong
belief that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime. An officer may base probable cause on many
kinds of facts, derived for example from:
• the officer’s observations or investigation;

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• circumstantial evidence; and

• statements from reliable sources.
In considering whether probable cause exists to arrest, the law expects officers to be “reasonable and
prudent men [and women], not legal technicians.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949). An officer, however, must base probable cause on objective facts. “Mere suspicion, common
rumor, or even strong reason to suspect are not enough[.]” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008
(9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Like reasonable suspicion, probable cause must be particularized
to the person to be arrested.
Probable cause does not take into account the arresting officer’s subjective beliefs about the crime
the officer thought about arresting for. Because the officer’s subjective intent doesn’t matter,
probable cause may exist to arrest for any crime, even if the arresting officer wasn’t thinking about
that particular crime when arresting. Even if an officer mistakenly thought she had probable cause to
arrest a person for a certain crime, if the facts would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that
probable cause existed for any other crime—even one the arresting officer was not thinking of—then
the arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Criminal laws are composed of elements, and to obtain a conviction at trial, the prosecution must
prove to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element. But officers in the field, who are often
making on-the-spot determinations in real time, do not have to be able to articulate facts going to
every element of a particular criminal offense before arresting a person. The law holds officers in the
field to a lower standard: “[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of
each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 149 (1971).
So, an officer does not need probable cause for every element of the crime—unless the crime
involves “specific intent,” in which case the officer must have probable cause, or facts, tending to
prove that element.
In a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, probable cause is for the jury to determine: where
“reasonable persons might reach different conclusions about the facts, the establishment of those
facts is for the jury, and the existence of probable cause is likewise for the jury, upon a proper
instruction about the law.”[62] If no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have
probable cause to arrest, then the court may determine the existence of probable cause as a matter of
law. McKenzie, 738 F.2d at 1008.
If an officer has probable cause to arrest someone for a very minor crime, then the officer may arrest
and transport that person to jail for booking without violating the Fourth Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that if “an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
For example, and as the Supreme Court held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, if state law requires
wearing a seatbelt while driving, and a police officer sees a person not wearing one while driving, the
officer may arrest the person and transport her for booking at a jail—without violating the Fourth
Amendment.

5.1 CONSPIRACY
“To prove a conspiracy between the state and private parties under [§] 1983, the [plaintiff] must show
an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights. To be liable, each participant in

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the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each must at least share the common
objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–
41 (9th Cir. 1989)
The four elements required for a criminal conspiracy charge are: one. An agreement between at least
two parties. 2. The Agreement is meant to achieve an illegal goal three. All Parties alleged to be involved
have to have knowledge of the conspiracy and participate in the conspiracy in some way and 4. at least
one person involved in the conspiracy has to make an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

5.2 REFUSING OR NEGLECTING TO PREVENT

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned
in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing
the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be
liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act,
which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered
in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be
joined as defendants in the action;

5.1 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

The Oregon Court of Appeals succinctly stated the elements of a malicious prosecution claim in Oregon
as follows: “(1) the institution or continuation of the original criminal proceedings; (2) by or at the
insistence of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) malice in
instituting the proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause for the proceeding; and (6) injury or damage
because of the prosecution.”

5.2 5.5 DENIAL OF NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE CARE AND

TREATMENT
You must prove two things to show that prison officials treated your serious medical needs with
“deliberate indifference” (and therefore violated your constitutional rights). You must first prove that
your medical needs were sufficiently serious (the “objective” part).8 Second, you must prove that
prison officials knew about and ignored “an excessive risk to [your] health or safety” (the “subjective”
part).

GRIEVENCES IN JAIL WITH RETALIATION

“The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison
authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d
1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The
most fundamental of the constitutional protections that prisoners retain are the First Amendment rights
to file prison grievances.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[P]risoners have a
First Amendment right to file prison grievances.”); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.

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2005). “Retaliation against prisoners for 150 2022 their exercise of this right is itself a constitutional
violation and prohibited as a matter of ‘clearly established law.’” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 (citing
Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 and Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also
Shepard v. Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “a corrections officer may not
retaliate against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right to report staff misconduct”).
There are five basic elements for a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation in the prison context:
(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68). See also Shepard, 840 F.3d at 688
(determining that fact issues remained as to whether officer retaliated against inmate); Jones, 791 F.3d
at 1035–36 (concluding that Jones made a showing in support of his retaliation claim sufficient to
overcome summary judgment); Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding inmate
failed to establish prison officials retaliated against him).

5.1 FALSE ARREST

The elements of a claim of false arrest are as follows: (1) The defendant must confine the plaintiff; (2)
The defendant must intend to confine the plaintiff; (3) The plaintiff must be aware of the confinement;
and Chapter 2 / False Arrest 2-12 2012 Revision (4) The confinement must be unlawful.

5.1 TORTIOUS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

To plead the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege facts showing
that: (1) The “defendant intended to inflict severe mental or emotional distress” or that the distress was
certain or substantially certain to result from the defendant’s conduct; Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress / Chapter 3 3-3 2012 Revision (2) The defendant’s acts “in fact cause[d] the
plaintiff severe mental or emotional distress”; and (3) The defendant’s acts consisted of “‘some
extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct’” or exceeded “‘any reasonable
limit of social toleration.’” Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 301 Or 117, 122, 719 P2d 854 (1986)
(quoting Hall v. May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 135, 137, 637 P2d 126 (1981)); Schiele v. Montes,
231 Or App 43, 48, 218 P3d 141 (2009) (stating elements of claim).

5.1 INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACTUAL

AGREEMENT/ECONOMIC RELATIONS
If the intentional tort claim is only for economic damages, rather than for emotional distress, different
rules apply. To prevail on a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff must
prove six elements: “(1) the existence of a professional or business relationship (which could include,
e.g., a contract or prospective economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that relationship,
(3) by a third party, (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose, (5) a causal
effect between the interference and damage to the economic relationship, and (6) damages.

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5.1 BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: • Lindland v. United Business Investments, Inc., 298 Or 318, 327, 693 P2d
20 (1984) (in claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff “must plead and prove the breach, and must
show that the breach caused an identifiable loss or resulted in injury to the party”).

5.1 CONVERSION/DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR PROPERTY LOST

IF THE OTHER CLAIMS MAY BE PLEAD PROPERLY AND THE BODY CAMERA OF THE
OFFICERS CAN BE REVEALED THIS CLAIM WILL NOT NECESSARILY NEED TO BE A
CLAIM OF ITS OWN.

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6 STATEMENT OF FACTS
WHY THE ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL
With everything said herein this memorandum, propose to the court that it was insufficient for
the state to prosecute based on the alleged crime of harassment. The accusatory instrument, on its face
was unsatisfactory for meeting even the statute [166.065[*]] requirements. The charges were bogus,
and the “access to the court” was inadequate.
Additionally, the methods and tactics used where bias and only selected evidence that was not
only untrue but completely ignored all Plaintiffs supporting facts that he would use as exculpatory
evidence. Then Further violation constitutional law in deprivation of freedom, property, circumventing
tenant law…. And absolutely did it on purpose.
It was one big sham from arrest to release, and they were all coordinated with each-other. The
DA even opposed Plaintiffs Demurrer with the wrong motion, and they still took her side and for the
following reasons backed by caselaw:
(1) simply repeating what allegations and naming no specific facts is not sufficient.
(2) There must be signature of the accuser.
(3) The charge must be clear and concisely alleged with the acts, so the defendant knows how to
defend his self and courts know if the acts constituted crime;
(4) The charging instrument contains an "*" Used as wildcard furthering the inability to
determine what charges are being alleged.
With identical caselaw these points were shut down repeatedly, discovery was ignored over a dozen
times, and never once did Plaintiff have facts that he did present to him that consisted of the crime of
Harassment.
Mr. Lofall further alleges that the state had to meet three elements; and due to the "*" in some
cases fourth element depending upon the use of the "wildcard" stated in the charge in order to, charge
someone with the offense of Harassment:
(1) An Intent to Harass or Annoy another person.
(2) Physical Contact with that person Direct or Indirect.
(3) Offensive In Nature, Judged by an objective standard.
(Multiple incidents)
Plaintiff alleges that these key words need further investigation for an accurate meaning of these
charges:
"Objective Standard"
(1) Based upon the facts not influenced by feelings.
(2) Limited to fixed alternatives Reducing subjective factors to minimum.

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"Physical Offensive Contact"

As a Reasonable person would regard offensive which would include:

(1) Slapping,
(2) Striking,
(3) Shoving
The "Victim"
Person or persons who has suffered: (1) Financial Harm, (2) Social Harm, (3) Psychological Harm, or
(4) Physical Harm, As Result of the crime.

With an in-depth search of case law for harassment the Plaintiff has found offensive physical contact
to include Slapping, Striking, Shoving, Spitting, Kicking, Bruising, leaving marks, and even one
where the defendant put his dogs privates to his daughter’s face. The state seems to want the plaintiff
to believe they have some proof of actions that didn’t exist, and that’s because (1). Dana Made them
up, (2). Massiel was being leveraged for her kid’s custody and although she said what people wanted
to hear, she wasn’t going to false testify against the plaintiff.
None the less not a single incident could be found in case law for the charge of harassment that
involved the defendant in defense of his property to be charged for simply putting his arms around
their significant other in order to prevent them from irrationally destroying their property by means of
spraying and pouring flour all over their valuables. MOREOVER without "Harm" (and stated no harm
no fear to in the report where she questioned Macy before arresting Plaintiff) as described herein this
Memorandum there is no "Victim" and therefore there cannot be HARASSMENT as described by the
statute ORS 166.065[*]. Which even with the facts in the officer discovery Defendant Rebecca
Portlock didn’t do her job on investigating, sharing the discovery, and since no more evidence showed
up the entire time Plaintiff was in jail, it can be assumed none more came? Yet they wait four months
to be dismissed.

There was no reasonable belief that the Defendants actually believed that
Plaintiff committed these series of events. The first of the elements stating
"Intent" [to harass or annoy another person] fails on the face, by the
simple facts brought forth in both the States discovery and of the Plaintiffs
declarations. In order to have INTENT one must be the "Cause",
"Reason", Or "Action" not the "Reaction". "Physical Offensive Contact":
As Reasonable person would regard offensive which would include: (1)
Slapping, (2) striking, (3) shoving. "Victim": Person or persons who has
suffered: (1) Financial Harm, (2) Social Harm, (3) Psychological Harm,
or (4) Physical Harm, As Result of the crime.

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(See Exhibit 13 Page 86 at 1)

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STIPULATED MATERIAL FACTS

6.1 UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND CONFINEMENT

1. Dana Gunnarson, and Catlin Blyth Arrested Plaintiff on March 6th, 2022, at His Place of

Residence at 2535 Sunset Ave West Linn, Oregon 97068. (See Exhibit 1 page 1).

2. Plaintiff was arrested with a charge of Harassment, and that charge was dismissed July 13th,

2022. (See Exhibit 13 page 257-258).

3. Defendant Dana Gunnarson, and Catlin Blyth Acted under the color of law on March 6 th,

2022.See EXHIBIT 17 at 5.

4. Officer Gunnerson and Officer Blyth did not have a warrant to Arrest Plaintiff. (See Exhibit 13

Page 53, dated March 7th).

5. (Two Days Prior, March 4th 2022 ) Plaintiffs’ prior girlfriend ‘Massiel Galla” was having a

mental health breakdown, and broke out the windows to the basement and started to damage some of

Plaintiffs property, by means of pounding out the windows with a hammer, taking a garden hose,

pouring intentionally purchased flour on Plaintiffs wet property, and continuing to spray Plaintiffs

property until the entire basement turned into a giant goopy (pancake like) mess. (See Exhibit 13 Pg

20 at 2).

6. The morning of March 5th 2022, Massiel shut off the power to the basement, plaintiff was

freezing cold without his car keys, because Massiel had them in her possession, and soaking wet

plaintiff woke up to Officer Goode who was just called by Massiel and he had just took the 5 gallons

of gas that Massiel intentionally purchased in order to intimidate Plaintiff, Who was perfectly willing

to leave, but he wanted his keys to do it. When Officer Goode Talked to Plaintiff, he was told that he

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informed her that she cannot just start destroying Plaintiffs property, and Plaintiff was a resident he

could not enforce him to leave. (See Exhibit 17 page 1 at 1-5).

7. On March 4th Plaintiff had called 911 when Massiel started spraying water inside the broke out

windows that she pounded out over Plaintiffs head, (See Exhibit 17 at 2)

8. At this time Plaintiff notified WLPD that “she needed a hospital because in 5 years Plaintiff had

known her, she was never like this, something was wrong” (civ) none the less she did not need to be

threatening to burn down the house with two kids in it. (See Exhibit 17 at 23-25)

9. March 6th Plaintiff had cleaned the messes off his property and began to load it into his

Expedition. (See Exhibit 17 at 16)

10. Most of which was out in the driveway, where plaintiff had 2 trailers and a majority of his stuff

was cleaned of flour in tubs and plaintiff was preparing to pack it inside the vehicle.(Id)

11. (See Exhibit 13 page 239 at 5) On the third day when Massiel began to go on a rampage for a

third day in a row, Plaintiff knew where this was headed, just like the prior two days yet with another

purchased bag of flour. This time Plaintiff was struck initially in the side of the head with the hose

while inside the basement, and she went from window to window some more broke out then others,

she hit them all out. Plaintiff still having stuff within the house, getting wet yet again, with an ear full

of water, he went to Massiel and in an attempt to take the hammer and the hose… held her for a few

seconds from swinging it, (See Exhibit 13 Page 30-33) when she went to struggle after maybe 15

seconds, Plaintiff let go, she left with the hose, hammer and flour and went inside.

12. She was completely unharmed, and Plaintiff had never harmed her in the past. (Stated in Officer

statements in withheld discovery; See Exhibit 13 Page )

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13. Both Arresting Officers, concurred to this in their discovery that they were aware. (Arresting

discovery is being shielded from Plaintiff by a DHS seal, however in the criminal proceeding in 2022,

Plaintiff did have access to their arrest reports while in jail).

14. Massiel was clearly the aggressor in these three days, and As told in the arrest report, Macy was

not fearful, she was not harmed, and excluded from their reports, but undeniable and reported in the

two prior days, Massiel was destroying Plaintiffs property. See Exhibit 17 at 2).

15. This can also be read between the lines by looking at the pictures where Massiel has a hammer,

hose and flour, and she is located on the side of the house with only sand on it, yes Officer Dana staged

the situation for a false arrest. See Pictures Exhibit 13 page 30-33 & exhibit 17)

16. In support of this is both the arresting officers’ reports withheld. Where she interviewed Massiel

stating she was not fearful, Plaintiff had never hurt her, and by ignoring the significant amount of glass

and destruction completely missing discovery violated her employment policy and the law. (See

Exhibit 13 page 27 at 4-8)

17. Dana additionally commented on “Squatters rights” even though that was never said by plaintiff,

it tells the subject matter of that conversation was in tenant law, and Plaintiff alleges that’s what he

was told, and he alleges that’s what Macy told him after the fact. (See Exhibit 13 page 29 at 25).

6.2 CONSPIRACY
18. Both officer Gunnarson, and officer Blyth knew plaintiff had pointed out the missing elements

on the statute for harassment. (See exhibit 13 page 21 at 8) and they covered it up with “Plaintiff was

just being (cis) argumentative”, saying nothing about all the broke out windows, threatened to burn

down the house, the flour nor the hose that she had now used to damage Plaintiffs property three

days in a row.

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19. Nothing about the five gallons of gas that Plaintiff had attempted to get from her when she

tried to burn down the house.

20. The elements were insufficient to include harassment and, Plaintiff debated with Catlin, he

looked it up, he very well noticed it there was no “Offensive” provoked aggression, there was only

self-defense where there was zero harm before plaintiff went to jail.

21. plaintiff is allowed to protect himself and his property in similar situations. (See ORS 161.

209/229)

ORS 161.229 - Use of physical force in defense of property

A person is justified in using physical force, other than deadly physical
force, upon another person when and to the extent that the person
reasonably believes it to be necessary to prevent or terminate the
commission or attempted commission by the other person of theft or
criminal mischief of property. [1971 c.743 §26]

None-the-less: Under what is commonly known as the “Castle Doctrine,”

Oregon allows for use of deadly force if you reasonably believe it is
necessary to prevent arson or a felony by force and violence by someone
who has trespassed onto your property.
The key thing to keep in mind is that you cannot use deadly force to defend
your property.

22. in the officer testimony, it was stated that Macy was “watering her plants”, and considering

there is only sand on that side of the house and just a few days prior was also the coldest day of the

year. Macy being in a robe with Leather Gloves and a hammer in her hands… Sounds like a Dana

Story (See Exhibit 13 Page 28 at 5)

23. Macy never persuades from a passive perception, she owned doing her damage the prior two

days when Plaintiff heard her, Plaintiff states that’s a doctored characteristic of Dana Gunnarson

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24. Plaintiff pointed these facts out to the officers.

25. The pictures were in the possession of the officers, and in the pictures, you could tell Macy

wasn’t watering plants, No one waters their plants with leather work gloves and a hammer in their

hands. Plaintiff Alleges that the officer’s duty to remain unbiased is fading fast. (See EXHIBIT 13

page 28 at 5)

26. Officer Dana Gunnarson and Catlin Blyth state identical false statements when stating Massiel

looks “uncomfortable” from the pictures, Since the pictures are of the back of her head… Plaintiff is

again alleging bias! (SEE EXHIBIT 13 page 31-33 pictures)

27. These actions are against their Policy by means of selectively picking the one sides story, by

not including anything exculpatory, they testified they knew of the two previous days and yet they

took someone’s side anyways that just did $10,000 worth of damage and committed crimes to the

Plaintiff who did nothing illegal at all.

28. Additionally, Plaintiff States that that Defendant Gunnarson twisted his words around to create

an “Issue” of Integrity with a premeditated response to a question she had asked. (See complaint page

31 at 145),

29. , Plaintiff states that he was told by Massiel that Defendant Gunnarson came back inside and

told her “They needed to come up with another ‘incident’”. In other words, that they had to come up

with something else because they didn’t meet the burden required of the crime Plaintiff was charged

with and the statutes requirement needed something manufactures. (See Second verified amended

Complaint at ‘par 41)

30. . Plaintiff knew the statute well, by the time Macy told this to him, and he knew Massiel,

wouldn’t have recited one of two of the missing critical issues, and a statute key word in its language,

if it had not come from Defendant Gunnarson’s mouth. Not only was it another event, but it was also

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another “incident” as key case law states it needed to be a repeated event, and it used “Incident” same

as Macy rehearsed it. (see verified second amended complaint at par 114 and 115)

31. Plaintiff alleges he never said that statement “you know you love me, and you want this”, That

is simply a lie to make Plaintiff look bad, and filling in statutory requirements for a crime plaintiff did

not commit. Plaintiff experienced similar characteristics from defendant Gunnarson in person when

she twisted plaintiffs’ statement right in front of him with a negative intention to add negative color to

the framed discovery report and he caught it and called it out. (See complaint page 31 at 145), increases

the importance of requesting with-held discovery.

32. Considering intent and multiple incidences that’s the word choice used on that statute, Plaintiff

is requesting that due to repeated dishonesty from Officer Dana Gunnerson, where she already had

used this arrest to circumvent tenant law. See EXHIBIT 1 page 5 for an example and the testimony

stating she was uncomfortable from the back of her head pictures, and that she was very scared,

when in her report she said she already told her she wasn’t scared, and “wasn’t really” afraid of

Plaintiff.

33. Plaintiff alleges that Massiel also was told by officer Gunnerson to not touch Plaintiffs property

that was outside by the road, that was in the basement all soggy and damaged, that Officer Gunnerson

“Laughed.” (See Exhibit 13 Page 77 at 49)

34. Defendant Gunnarson put the county on the hook for a lot of liability with her actions, and with

Massiel having zero harm, and stating she “wasn’t really” (in Gunnarsons report) afraid of Plaintiff

and considering she damaged Plaintiff’s property and sprayed him in the head with the hose for the 3rd

day in a row, while home alone, logical sense leads a logical individual to believe that to be true. And

if Dana felt intervention was required, Plaintiff was not the one who aggressed anything.

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"18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally". a) Except as otherwise

provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves
international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more
than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B,
110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this
section shall be not more than 8 years.

35. Miss Gunnarson’s conducted herself not of a police officer, sworn to fairness, but her fraudulent

misrepresentation was contradicting to law, and policy. (Policy Attached here to See Exhibit 15)

36. Defendant Gunnarson had a lawsuit commence last week where she is being said from someone

else in federal court. showing this conduct isn’t isolated. (SEE Exhibit 17 DEC OF TAL)

37. As obvious as it is to spot once shown from someone in Plaintiffs shoes, it’s even more obvious

when the two officers stories match, and the also both officers stories tell on their selves from the

initial reports, as they develop into the reports turned over on the front page for the DA. And the

Pictures monument it when they are blown up and clear.

38. Catlin Blyth and Dana Conspired against Plaintiff by matching their stories., and unfortunately

that he followed, her command.

39. Dana further caused harm by continuing the framed baseless claim over to the District

Attorney’s office, and had Defendant Rebecca followed through with her job and investigated it would

have ended there,

40. Yet she didn’t and the harm continued from a conspired false arrest to a malicious prosecution.

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41. Even after 3 months when Rebecca Portlock was called a liar and told that her facts where wrong

and at her testimony was full of “half-truths” in open court on the record, by Macy, the only witness

besides Plaintiff. (See Exhibit 13 Page 77 at 49) on June 24th 2022.

42. Gunnarson used word spin to get her false probable cause. (See Second Verified Complaint

page 9 at 30):

“Moreover, Defendants Dana Gunnarson, and Catlin Blyth’s Simple

twisting of words, resaying them to the Plaintiff while he was being
arrested, changed when he explained why he was reaching for the hose.
Plaintiff had said he let his girlfriend go when she was fighting back, and
he heard someone yell “let her go” yet in a pre-planned word spin,
Gunnarson said it back to Plaintiff but added the words “Only ”, [so you]
“Only let her go because someone was there yelling]”, insinuating that if
no one was there yelling Plaintiff would cause a serious issue to the
alleged victim/girlfriend.”
Second Amended Complaint page 10 at 30

43. Plaintiff believes that the court has a duty to do something with someone in her case. at

the least order the discovery to prove the fact that bias discovery tactics are detrimental to

someone’s freedom, and those are easily proven.

44. , To investigate and file charges on the bad apple, she has caused a serious crime here, her and

her testimony is deserving of criminal charges, and she should be impeached, and no further testimony

be useable from her. And Plaintiff would request that she be charged under the equal protections of

the law, under 18 U.S.C. 241, and 242 as well as any other prevision that the courts deems proper.

45. If the courts have any doubts, subpoena the tapes! Or if not Plaintiff asks they call three people

to the stand and pull her police files. She contradicts her own story in it from her testimony to Massiel

to what she says to Rebecca…. And funny thing is both officers agree and both told on their self and

don’t know why because that info seemed extra to them at the moment… that’s probably why West

Linn is adequately attempting to withhold:

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1. Massiel Galla,

2. Tia Galla,

3. Rebecca Portlock.

4. Or enforce the discovery requests for both Defendant Gunnarson and Blyth’s Camera
that has been requested over a Dozen times (See Exhibit 13 Page in its entirety).

46. Dana Gunnerson kept an active text messaging communication with Miss Tia,

tampering with her young mind and created a false sense of fear that Tia would not have had of the

plaintiff.

47. Defendant Gunnarson realized the mental state condition at some point of Massiel, and

she helped navigate the removal of Massiel to her first of 3 trips to the mental hospital, all three

times Plaintiff was not around, resulting in the loss of her children.

48. When someone has authority over someone else’s constitutional rights, they must be of

sound mind, and be able to make decisions without bias influences taking control. Defendant

Gunnarson Failed to do this when she arrested Plaintiff with everything going against that decision.

He committed no crime, and she knew it. Catlin knew it and if the court pulls the cameras, the courts

can know it. This would have saved the embarrassment of the of the City, The Liability of the County,

the Time of the Plaintiff and would have saved Mr. Blyth’s from having a harmful mark on his name.

Although no more innocent people will have their constitutional rights diminished by the deliberate

indifference and poor decisions of these two young violators. (See argument section for the

conclusion of count 1-3, and accomplice on 4, 6, 7, 9,10)

49. The West Linn officers teamed plaintiff with one cop inside (girl) talking to Massiel

and Blyth talked to plaintiff in the cruiser, committed the following other harms to Plaintiff:

Dana Gunnarson

A. Convinced Massiel to produce another “Incident.”

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B. Tampered with the witness, and turned Tia Against Massiel (daughter and
mother)

C. Leaving the child to have leverage over the mother, causing much added friction.

D. This also added confusion to the plaintiff when Massiel tracked Plaintiff down and this
ended up in a violation of No Contact order.

E. Defendant Gunnarson’s self-interjection into a the Galla’s family life was a

major assistance in the loss of two of Massiel’s children.

F. The psychological damages that her actions caused or arguably could have
caused may have been life lasting and she does not have an education to make that call.

G. Defendant Dana Gunnarson knew that the elements were not met, and instead of
releasing the Plaintiff, she made jokes about it to Massiel and manufactured the missing
elements.

H. Defendant Gunnarson’s actions were deliberate, willful, and reckless.

I. Defendant Gunnarson and Blyth’s actions ended up costing Plaintiff over $300,000 and
4 months in jail, and those losses were not only foreseeable but specifically said to each of them
and can be proven on the body and car cams.

Catlin Blyth

J. Defendant Blyth relayed the debated information about lack of elements to Defendant
Dana Gunnarson,

K. Blyth was following Dana’s lead, regardless of him knowing that there was missing
elements.

50. The defendant West Linn Police Officers willing participation in the alleged conspiracy resulting

in Plaintiffs detainment, is reflected on both Officers in Officers altered the events for the Key

language required by statute, yet was not a part of the true actions of this case such as:

1. Plaintiff was not upset about spraying “At” his windows, he was upset about Massiel

Smashing them out with the hammer, pouring flour all over his property and getting

everything wet 3 days in a row.

2. He didn’t “ONLY” let her go because the Massiel’s kids showed up, he was only

pointing the hose off his property.

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3. The event that was used as “The other incident” claiming Plaintiff “Slammed” Massiel,

Plaintiff woke up to getting beat with keys on a lanyard and got up to walk outside

and Massiel was trying to prevent him from going out the door, and wrapped his arms

around her turned sideways let go calmly yet annoyed to walk passed her.

4. Officers had boxes checked like “Violent” and 2+ felonies, yet both are untrue, and

Plaintiff has never had a violent charge in his life. Nor a single charge prior in the state

of Oregon and has lived here for 7 years (with a DUI 10 years ago) nothing since.

5. Defendants Promised Plaintiff that all of his property outside would be put inside of

Plaintiffs expedition, and the door would be locked, and Plaintiff relied on this promise.

6. They failed to do so.

7. Defendant Gunnarson, then went back and laughed with Massiel., and Plaintiff was

told by her that she told her not to touch his property and to leave it where it be.

8. By the time Plaintiff got out of jail ALL of his property had spoiled and the tubs were

full of water, his trailers were missing, his computers were submerged, his power tools

were stollen, and his Expedition was unlocked and pillaged.

9. Officer Gunnarson and Blyth had a duty to Plaintiff when they accepted that they

would put his stuff away, that reliance prevented Plaintiff from making other

arrangements, and their actions cost Plaintiff over $20,000 in personal property, and

the ability to litigate his Civil Claim for an estimated $180,000 (See Claim 21CV02575)

51. Defendant Gunnarson and Blyth ignoring a series of events material to the case,

showing a clear trail of bias.

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52. Both officers having parallel manufactured and twisted quotes, proves that they

manufactured them together.

53. yet both officers claim Plaintiff was running his mouth for an extended period of

time.

54. In the pictures the officers used to arrest Plaintiff, both officers ignored the fact that the

“alleged Victim” was holding the hammer, covered in the flower and spraying the hose inside the

window she just busted out with the hammer.

55. Both officers said “the alleged victim” looked uncomfortable and it was from her back,

you cannot even see her face.

56. Both officers stepped into the basement door on the broken glass and saw all Plaintiffs

property damaged.

57. Both officers knew Massiel did it all

58. None of this is mentioned, and by not mentioning it it is a clear violation of the West

Linn Policy shown below.

59. When Plaintiff argued and told them they did not have the claim, they went back and

got “another incident”, they thought the “alleged victim” would be okay with it because Plaintiff

was gone.

60. She was mad at Plaintiff, but she knew he did not do anything to go to jail.

61. The officers both said she was “watering her garden” and sprayed “at his windows” …

yet there is only sand on that side of the house… and the officers knew what she was doing.

62. Massiel States this on a letter to the court labeled June 9th2022 (See Exhibit 13 Page

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63. These actions by West Linn PD are against official policy (See Exhibit 2: Pages

64. Massiel Galla had a matching story to the Plaintiffs Obvious explanation alleged.

6.3 REFUSING OR NEGLECTING TO PREVENT

PLAINTIFF HAS A QUESTION WHY DID THE PROSECUTION TRY SO HARD TO BYRY
HIM, HE DID NOTHING WRONG…

ORS 164.365 - CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A PERSON COMMITS THE CRIME OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN THE FIRST
DEGREE WHO, WITH INTENT TO DAMAGE PROPERTY, AND HAVING NO RIGHT
TO DO SO NOR REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON HAS
SUCH RIGHT:
DAMAGES OR DESTROYS PROPERTY OF ANOTHER:
IN AN AMOUNT EXCEEDING $1,000.

65. Knowing of the Officers, and West Linn Police Department, when it takes three days in

a row of someone destroying someone’s property and threatening to burn their house down before

something gets done?

66. And when it does you arrest the person who can’t leave because the perpetrator is

holding his keys and breaking his property.

OF COURSE, PLAINTIFF IS GOING TO STOP HER FROM BREAKING HIS STUFF

BY DAY 3, WEST LINN POLICE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT
PLAINTIFF A MEDAL FOR TAKING THAT LONG TO TOUCH HER.

67. By the Defendant Officers not stating that there weren’t the elements, and then

furthering the malicious prosecution by sending the information that was framed and without merit

along to the District Attorney Rebecca Portlock, continuous and compounded harm struck the

Plaintiff. (See Exhibit 13 page 27 at 1 – page 29 at 29)

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68. Rebecca Portlock, as a DA is required to do her own investigations on the defendants,

Instead, she too completely ignored what the plaintiff was claiming, and quickly overlooked the

following situation in order find guilt where it often doesn’t belong:

A. Offered a probation deal at 5 days and done.

B. the photos that validated that Massiel was not “Watering her garden.” (See Exhibit 13

page 30-33) were withheld for weeks.

C. Further Validation came on the stand when Massiel on the record told Rebecca Portlock

that her allegations were false. (REF hearing on June 24th, 2022)

D. and at that time over (100) one hundred days had passed, Plaintiff was still being

pursued without any discovery responded to, nor any answers given, Yet She made sure she got

some violations of no contact by going back to Plaintiffs mothers calls two months prior.

69. With Massiel being the only real witness, she had no other witness except a minor child

that wasn’t there until the exact moments Plaintiff grabbed the hose, therefore she could not verify

that Plaintiff was in self-defense, but she could verify that Plaintiff was non-reactive the first several

days.

70. None the less, as law states, and shown above Plaintiff had all the right in the world to

prevent her from damaging his property… even in all the light in the world he was not the offender,

nor the aggressor, he reacted not acted. Moreover, there was no harm therefore there is no victim.

71. Massiel at this time was being leveraged the return of her kids over testify falsely against

Plaintiff since he put notice for this lawsuit, and for him to be charged was the only way that was

going to be prevented.

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Fifth amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

72. Plaintiff had over $300,000.00 lost or spoiled when he was in jail, he lost property in

three other locations, he lost his claim rights, he lost his liberty, his freedom, and time.

73. Then he was released with nothing but the shirt on his back… and caught hyperthermia,

(See Exhibit 13 Page 212-214).

74. Plaintiff’s emergency contact was Massiel on record. And when the Doctor called her

to let her know he was at the hospital, because TIA knew, and Dana Gunnarson interjected her way

into a private world before Plaintiff ever left the hospital, he violated again and went right back to

jail. ID

75. Ironically, Plaintiff did not know that Massiel’s daughter was “Overseeing” Massiel

almost like probation and Massiel was hiding her attempts to contact Plaintiff, ultimately resulting

in a no contact order, yet without said communication, the faulty actions of the Defendant officers,

and the leverage of the DA and Advocate would not have been discovered.

To claim violation of Fourth Amendment as the basis for suppressing a

relevant evidence, the court had long required that the claimant must
prove that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy to have a
valid standing to claim protection under the Fourth Amendment.
However, the Supreme Court has departed from such requirement, issue
of exclusion is to be determined solely upon a resolution of the substantive
question whether the claimant's Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated, which in turn requires that the claimant demonstrates a

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justifiable expectation of privacy, which was arbitrarily violated by the

government.

The expectation of privacy is a legal test, originated from Katz v.

United States and is a key component of Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Fourth Amendment protects people from warrantless searches of
places or seizures of persons or objects, in which they have a
subjective expectation of privacy that is deemed reasonable. The test
determines whether an action by the government has violated an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
In Katz, Justice Harlan created the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Test in his concurring opinion. Although it was not formulated by the
majority, this test has been the main takeaway of the case. Justice Harlan
created a two-part test:

1. The individual has exhibited an actual (subjective)

expectation of privacy.
2. The expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.

If both requirements have been met, and the government has taken an
action which violates this "expectation," then the government's action has
violated the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.

76. With well above average violations in Clackamas County, Moreover, West Linn leading the

country in lawsuits at the moment, it is plain to see that there is a failure to train and supervise.

77. The DA has a duty to find exculpatory evidence as well as prosecutorial, with the amount of

times Plaintiff and (Then Macy) on the record seeking answers, and telling her that her facts were

wrong and her facts not being verifiable, and both of ours were, as we were the only two witnesses…

she need see skepticism in the officer testimony. (it’s understandable that domestic violence cases

have people change their mind or position, but these facts Plaintiff and Macy were complaining about,

many of them were in the officer’s testimony, and the DA refused to look) Contained in the evidence

she herself gave for the court file.

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78. West Linn Police Department has allowed its employees to commit the following obvious policy

violations (noticed withing minutes of investigations) without punishments. SEE EXHIBIT 15:

POLICY CODE VIOLATION WITH PROOF WITHIN THIS FILING VIOLATOR

A. 319.4 K (2), (3), (4) / (11), (12) (Discriminatory Policy)

B. 319.3 - (B) Dana Gunnarson

C. 321.5 - Documentation Dana Gunnarson

D. 321.5 - Failure to protect property Catlin Blyth.

E. 339.4 – Standards Dana Gunnarson

F. 339.4.1 - Failure to intervene. Catlin Blyth

G. 339.5.2 Ethics (B) WLD

H. 339.5.3 - Discrimination Dana Gunnarson

I. 339.5.4 - (C) Dana Gunnarson

J. 339.5.7 - (C) Dana Gunnarson

K. 339.5.8 - (A), (B), (C) Dana Gunnarson

L. 339.59 - (A), (C), (F), (H), (I), (K), (M) Dana Gunnarson

6.4 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

DISTRICT ATTORNEY REBECCA PORTLOCK
79. Directly ignored the absolute possibility of Plaintiffs innocence. See list in closing Malicious

Prosecution section)

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80. Failed to investigate exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff never once got evidence from the DA.

81. Unanswered all his requests, over a dozen discovery requests.

82. Denied Plaintiff the ability to prepare, and the court finally messaged Rebecca for me who had

ignored me for months… (See Exhibit 13 page 40-41)

83. Maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff and never once investigated to see his innocence. (Id).

84. Kept Plaintiff in jailed for twenty-five times longer than his initial plea offer because he

wouldn’t admit guilt. Plea was offered for 5 days.

85. Lied to the court about plaintiff having covid, after she hurried him out of the court room “before

the judge sees him” because she was unprepared, At Trial. (See Exhibit 13 page 92 at 2)

86. Moving Plaintiffs Court back without conferring, and he was pro se. (Id at 4).

87. Having the only witness tell her that she had lies in court and on the record yet continued to

keep plaintiff incarcerated. (See Exhibit 13 Page 91 – State unprepared & page 92 at 4).

88. Used a victim advocate to leverage child custody the “alleged victim’s” children over

prosecution of Plaintiff, leading her to believe they would be more freely given had she made

statements she already told her were false.

1. Proof of violating the Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights in which raise substantial issues are

already reached, therefore Plaintiff’s indigent status should be irrelevant due to the likely hood of

success on the matters moreover the damages that are immobilizing Plaintiff’s ability to defend are

directly from the actions of the government. (See Exhibit 13 page 28 at 6 to 15 (they knew))

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89. Pressured the Alleged Victim to testify at trial even after the Alleged Victim told Defendant

Rebecca Portlock on the record that her facts were full of “half-truths”. (See Exhibit 13 Page 77 at 49

and validated at 2pm hearing on June 24th, 2022)

2. Request to Defendant Rebecca Portlock as to answer what was the reasoning behind Plaintiff

being detained . (See Exhibit 13 page 27 at 1 – page 29 at 29)

3. Gave a framed discovery backed by false and misleading information to the DA. (Id)

4. When Officer Dana Gunnarson realized they did not have the proper elements for the charge,

Officer Gunnarson and Blyth went back to the “alleged Victim” who already testified that, there no

fear, no harm, and Dana Gunnerson claimed to need to “come up with another incident”, this

information was alleged by the “Victim” herself.

90. That language is identical to that which the statute uses, it was one of two reasons

Plaintiff had the almost immediately previous debate with Catlin, (the other being he was not

offensive and she resolved that with the quotes she twisted around and selective facts illuminating

the self defense aspect) therefor its likelihood of being true is extremely high. (See Exhibit 13 page

27 at 1 – page 29 at 29)

91. Dana Gunnarsson, and Catlin Blyth Conspired falsified information. (See Exhibit 13

page 27 at 1 – page 29 at 29).

5. After Plaintiffs release, West Linn Police Department’s continuation of using Police Drones

was a further encroachment of Plaintiffs Privacy.

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6.5 DENIAL OF NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE AND

TREATMENT
CLACKAMAS COUNTY JAIL
6. Refused Plaintiff accesses to the court,

7. Staff deleted sixty-two of Plaintiffs court documents 10 days before trial. Files and retaliated

when he wrote grievances See EXHIBIT 1 page 170, 175.

8. Denied him Law Library (See Exhibit 1 Page 170, 175, 187, 188, 218, 256, 258,)

9. Jail Negligence caused covid outbreaks, and Plaintiff caught Covid, making him miss civil trial

and lose $180,000,

10. Plaintiff is Legally Blind, and the Jail knew this.

11. Plaintiff has a -11.00 eye Prescription, and he spent weeks blind. (See Exhibit 1 page 152, 156,

157, 168, 202) - -11.00 is like taking a 20x lens from a telescope and putting it to your eyes it balances

and -11.00 in other words, -11.00 can’t see how many fingers they are holding up. The jail staff forced

Plaintiff to endure weeks blind and would tell him things like “just get some readers” … complete

disregard to anyone’s needs.

12. Plaintiff had Grievances over inadequate health care when he was ignored for days in isolation

with covid without medication, those grievances took five weeks to answer. (See Page 256), Plaintiff

was also ignored by guard Tate when Plaintiff caught covid, and Plaintiff was in Quarantine initially

with new inmates, and Plaintiff was ignored for 2 days without meds because on the first day Tate

refused, and Plaintiff got lippy with him over needing a nurse, so he refused for a substantial length of

time by skipping him the next day (May 26th, May 27th, tested Positive on the 28th) Officer Tate put

Plaintiffs life in danger by his actions. Covid kills 5 times as many people in jail as out. Grievance

wasn’t answered for 5 weeks!

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6.6 FALSE IMPRISONMENT

JAILS MALICIOUS DAY ADDING
13. The Jail kept plaintiff 15 un-accounted for days, and they knew they were doing it as they did

it.

14. These days were after the court told the jail to release plaintiff.

15. They knew there was a mistake that one of their staff made intentionally, or should have known

there was a mistake their staff made intentionally.

16. Their Staff Constantly acted with malicious intent to Mr. Lofall.

17. 7 contempt SEE EXHIBIT 1 page 121, Plaintiff states they didn’t want him to uncover all their

corruption that if him and the “alleged victim” did that their corruption was going to be revealed. SEE

Exhibit 16)

18. SEE EXHIBIT 1 (Page 130, 132, 134) It shows the contempt of courts he was charged with. He

was charged with 7, guilty of 4 of those 7. And then sentenced to 5 of them. (Extra sentence)

19. See Exhibit 1 Pages 124, 125, 126, 128. 129 for sentences sheets they add as follows.

A. #1 - page 124 date May 24th-June 2nd

B. #7 – page 125 date June 6th – June 15th

C. #2 – Page 126 date June 15th – June 24th

D. #3 – Page 129 date June 24th – July 3rd (release date that day) July 1, 2022

E. #4 – Page 128 date July3rd – July 11th

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Ironically the last one ran, was one counted guilty for, when I was innocent SEE COUNT 3/4/5/

on Exhibit 1 Page 132. (4 counts found guilty on 5 counts charged) moreover see that Plaintiff

had already served over double that amount of time… ALSO see NEXT PARAGRAPH.

20. Jail also argued with Plaintiff on the Tablets and that can be seen in EXHIBIT 1 Pages 151, 159,

160, 163, 164, 165, 246) Staff is Absolutely adamant about Plaintiffs cutoff date, had the court copies

and showed them as well as they had the documents provided in EXHIBIT 1, for that report came

from them. There is no way that Plaintiff talked to 6 different people, and they all individually had

accidents, they knew or should have known BUT FOR their negligence and corruption they failed to

release Plaintiff and disobey the court orders. In addition to the last spurt when the court told them to

count from (May 24th, they added 10 days on from July 1st to July 11th, and they didn’t include June

2-june 6th for 5 additional days.

21. Also, if the court would notice how there is no release date on the beginning time extensions

but there is one on #3, and #4 as if the #3 was the original cutoff date, to that date and then #4 was

added after the fact. If it was made at one time, (those two counts are the same case number, they

would not have separate ending dates.)

22. The Documents viewed as Exhibit 1, were from the Clackamas County Jail, and this is the Copy

that was ordered through Clackamas County when the Jail refused when Plaintiff went to the Jail in

person. (Plaintiff had ordered the documents online and in person and received a one page print out

without any useful and requested information.

23. Plaintiff was charged with contempt of court, (Although these issues in the prosecution wouldn’t

have been found, the allegations were false, and it took communication to figure out the corruption

being used. (1) Communications happened when Plaintiff went to the Hospital when he lost

everything due to this arrest and was put in freezing sleeting rain in a t-shirt with nothing (Doctor

called Plaintiffs Emergency Contact), (2) Macy contacted Plaintiffs Mother, and Plaintiff responded

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to Macy as she tracked Plaintiff down through his friend Mike, who Mike came and found Plaintiff on

the streets. (3). At the first court date May 6th 2022 Plaintiffs release was revoked because of the

hospital contact was reported – Macy Bailed Plaintiff out on May 10th then the arraignment of that

same issue from the hospital had a court date for several days later, and that court date was removed

from the docket before court, and Plaintiff was picked back up and put back in jail again without being

given the chance to speak on May 24th. The Arresting Police officers gave the car keys to someone

Plaintiff had just recovered his friends stollen car, and was dropping the people in the car that didn’t

know off, and the Arresting officers then regardless to Plaintiffs demands not to give them the keys,

gave them anyways, and they again stole the car, and Plaintiff for being the last in control of the car,

had all his stuff from Clackamas then Stollen in retaliation. Those arresting officers were told on

cruiser footage, that Plaintiff has in his possession to not give them the keys, and to stop them, and

they allowed it to happen.

24. Contempt of court, would not have occurred without the false chase held over Plaintiffs head,

These no contact orders forced Plaintiff to hyperthermia when he couldn’t get any property, and lose

everything, yet was let out now homeless in a T-shirt, and even got hyperthermia before he had his

doctor reach out to his “emergency contact” who was his long term girlfriend until his arrest, and so

if he respected the courts orders until he almost died, and the courts were more worried about arresting

him, than his health they should answer to the constitutional rights violations…. His actions were not

involuntary over the “alleged victim” … she tracked him down but the inappropriate tampering with

the child victim, created turmoil and created the violation when the 14-year-old held power over the

mother due to the faults actions of DANA GUNNARSON. Massiel the “Alleged Victim” bailed

Plaintiff out on May 10th, contested the waiver June 9th and 24th, and left the country for a month to go

to Mexico because she was over the shady leverage. (See EXHIBIT 16 Macy text messages to

Plaintiffs Mother)

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6.7 INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL

AGREEMENT
In arresting the Plaintiff and the creating an inevitable confinement to, where Plaintiff was unable to
continue life as he did prior to being arrested Plaintiff. Had Plaintiff not been arrested and confined in
CCJ plaintiff would have not had the following harms Consequentially to previous the previous
agreement, and his claim rights would have been so that he would have been able to approach his
freedoms and rights differently.
1. Plaintiff was unable to complete his civil claim, and receive owed fruits to the AOB:

2. Plaintiff was not allowed use the law library for civil actions,

3. Plaintiff had an assignment of benefits; it was set in stone.

4. Plaintiff had help to meet him to finish the process the day after he was arrested.

5. Plaintiff caught covid in jail (See Exhibit 1 page 64 &72.)

6. Plaintiff then missed his own trial for the civil claim, he would not have caught covid and missed his

trial had he not been in jail exposed to poor health management.

7. Plaintiff had e-filed 7 motions the first week of march, they were all lost due to being in jail.

8. The assignment was given full consideration for $111,94356

9. There was also a tort penalty for the person taking it, an estimated total value of $180,000.

10. Instead, Plaintiff didn’t even get to contest his own assignment.

11. Plaintiff waited 2 years for trial and now it passed the statutes of limitation.

Plaintiff lost the rest of his property mentioned in section 5.10 as a direct cause of this incarceration.

6.8 (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

6.9 CAUSATION TEST “BUT FOR” THE DEFENDANTS ACTIONS

Blame put forth on the Defendants in this Filing has been used in the universal method of investigation.

These harms requesting reconciliation on would not have occurred “but for” the Defendants actions

they did, occur and xyz losses occurred to the Plaintiff and he is owed to be made whole because these

harms would not have existed without the deprivation of Constitutional rights that the defendants had

no authority to interject with.

6.10 CONVERSION / DUTY TO PLAINTIFF FOR PROPERTY

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I WAS PUT IN HAND CUFFS, ARRESTED, TAKEN TO JAIL, NOT ALLOUD TO SPEAK,
CONTEST, OR FIGHT… THEN ONCE IN JAIL DENIED LAW LIBRARY, THE ABILITY
TO RESEARCH, AND WHEN I FINELLY GOT TO USE THE COMPUTER AND FILE MY
COMPLAINTS… NOT A SINGLE ONE WAS LISTENED TO, READ, OR AWKNOWLEDGED.
WHAT GOOD ARE RIGHTS IF NOT FOLLOWING THEM BEARS NO PUNISHMENT, AND
TO HAVE THOSE RIGHTS VIOLATED HAS NO REMEDY!!!

A. PLAINTIFFS LOSSES WHILE FALSE ARRESTED

25. Plaintiff was not allowed to assist his claim with the law library and lost options while

he was jailed for a criminal charge.2

26. Plaintiff abandoned property in four locations he estimates the value at $109,500. (See

verified second amended complaint)

27. Plaintiff had an Assignment of Benefits 3 for $111,943.56 that he was only able to

collect $33,835.97. If Plaintiff would have not been interrupted, he would have prevailed, Plaintiff

estimation is he lost $180,000.00.

B. THE CONSTITUTION is supposed to be “CONSTITUTIONAL.”

28. The Constitution was drafted with the intent to protect vulnerable people such as the

plaintiff in this situation, it was not designed to only protect those who can afford guidance in the

process to properly present the harms presented to them.

29. Through equal rights, when one party is uneducated in regard to the procedural steps

necessary to protect their rights especially when the harms were so large to not be made whole

causes further constitutional harms, the Government not stepping in is allowing those harms to

happen to one citizen and not to another. This creates a new constitutional inequality, and violation

2
See Exhibit 1 Page 246, Sgt Woosie Reply
3
See Exhibit 2

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of equal rights that is owed reconciliation. and then beat them on a procedural error, while protecting

the wrongdoers with counsel from the Attorney General, and a team of lawyers.

C. SO MANY PEOPLE DON’T WANT TO FIGHT THE LIES, THE “SYSTEM”

JUST SCEWS THEM EVERY SINGLE DAY

1. Only absolute innocent would not be able to be extorted this way, it creates a situation

where only a small percentage of the misconduct to be debated, due to the guilty plea any time

within the maximum amount of time of those charges being a possibility, and extremely lopsided

plea bargain deals offered, Plaintiff alleges that many inmates approached Plaintiff seeing he was

Pro se with similar stories who ended up taking a plea just to get out.4

2. Plaintiff had given a motion to dismiss – State unprepared, to Ruben Medina, Plaintiffs

advisor, and his advisor and Defendant Rebecca complete disregard to Plaintiff being Pro se, without

conferring left Plaintiff incarcerated 6 more weeks and then dismissed the case.

3. Defendant Rebecca claimed to have witnesses, Plaintiff would love to know who they

are.

4. Plaintiff has many questions that take so much time to investigate when Plaintiff does

not understand the proper fundamental structures to “why” things get put together the way they do,

making it impossible to know how specific rules get put together in order for him to prevail on a

claim. It is unfair to jeopardize Plaintiffs rights to claim, it is a gamble the Plaintiff doesn’t want to

take for his future… when had the damages caused by the defendants, and but for their actions

Plaintiff wouldn’t have the issue with hiring counsel.

4
Plaintiff was offered 5 days and probation to admit guilt, yet he was incarcerated 4 months, then the case
was dismissed the day before trial without explanation.

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5. The right of access to the courts is limited to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals,

habeas corpus proceedings, and § 1983 actions. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3, 354–55; Simmons

v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1159– 60 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “a prisoner

has no constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate an unrelated civil claim.”); Madrid, 190

F.3d at 995. And Plaintiff lost his claim while in Clackamas County Jail.

6. The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process

Clauses apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–73 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569

(1972); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827

(9th Cir. 1997); Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald,

55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995); Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993).

7. Plaintiff has been denied repeatedly for assistance, and he has consequently had his

constitutional rights violated and stripped.

8. Plaintiff has sent fourteen requests at present time to the defendants for discovery, and

the only response to said requests, was a denial of information, excused by Defendant West Linn

Police Department5 alleging there was “Child Abuse” in case no. 22CR10908 (Plaintiffs Dismissed

Claim). (So far, all other discovery requests have previously been ignored.)

5
This is an unacceptable method of procedure - to have the agency responsible for the harm caused be
the agency to be responsible to turn over the evidence that is critical to plaintiffs case, this is the
Executive branch of the state government the judicial powers because if they can control the evidence by
means of procedures, and denials, by influencing twisting of information and facts to skew any fact into
desired elements yet unlike the Judicial Branch, the Executive Branch will seek out the facts alleging the
elements, where the Judicial Branch will sit and wait for them to come up.
The Difference is that the Executive Branch will quickly synchronize in competition and false direct the
prosecution, litigation. And other judicial processes suseptipal man’s worst features, “ego” … [Plaintiffs
own forecast] this over time puts the police, and prosecution into an “us vs. them” mentality, and man
takes an irreversible plumbite when mankind seeks to capitalize on the suffrage of another.

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9. Funny thing is there is no child involved in Plaintiffs claim and West Linn Police

Department, and the County of Clackamas have used that excuse to cover up their misconduct.

10. The “executive branch” having complete control over the:

11. arrest incarceration, plaintiffs’ property, decision of sidestepping tenant law and now

what evidence gets used both criminally and civilly is unconstitutional. And completely negates the

point of the separation of powers in most cases. These actions have and will cause revolutions in the

past and should not be taken lightly, or aloud for any reason. The States obvious credibility with the

Judicial branch although deserving of the utmost respect, becomes a constitutional violation to the

people when the Executive branch is given that freedom to make alternative actions to circumvent

official procedure because they do not have the elements to satisfy the desired route… moreover.

the Judicial branch entrusts and believes the proper procedures have been followed yet often times

they have not, and, in those cases, Executive Branch is responsible for harms done, and it is

unconstitutional to allow this power to remain in the hands of those it was not entitled to.

12. The delays are a violation in Plaintiff’s constitutional rights on their own and are a clear

reflection of how the Defendants handled this entire matter and such delays spoil evidence and

timing ultimately harming the faith and efficiency of the judicial system. Due to the arguably broken

system, constitutional rights are deprived routinely, forcing the obvious violations to be covered up

by more discrete constitutional violations that are harder to blueprint. Plaintiff was only one of many,

and he remained in jail for over a 100 days, and still is being denied the access to the documents and

video that he has now been requesting for 11 months, court intervention is requested.

13. What does the court expect someone to do when they have to chose between fighting

for their rights, and surviving… some will give up their rights, and take the loss, some will get drug

through the mud, but one thing is undeniable, everyone has to eat, and it’s the courts, and the

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government that are increasing crime when they are making a harmed citizen choose and they wont

let go. Because before they die of starvation, crimes will occur.

14. The defendants first had acted “knowingly” of the high probability that the Plaintiff was

not Guilty in this underlying matter and BOTH arresting officers were aware of a high probability

that that there was (1) self-defense of personal property, and that defense was justifiable due to the

facts of the three concurrent days with the alleged victim causing damage to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs

property. Second, the defendants deliberate avoidance in learning the truth, both on the part of the

Police Officers, and then again from the perspective of the District Attorney’s Office.

15. As mentioned above, when a supervisory agency gets to decide on its own discretion

the procedure and supervise its own quality assurance, in its own chain of commands, leaving this

chain extremely vulnerable to malicious procedure. When a Police officer makes a decision based

on immediate exceptions to the standard rule, and that exception involves a third party, often that

third party will have a deprivation of some right, and it that deprivation is not warranted by law, the

officer is setting his self-up for liability.

16. Exceptions are all too common in Clackamas County, and due to the lack over

separation in the Separation of powers where the Police, answer to the Police City Department, city

Police department answers to the county Police Department, County Police Department to the

County, and the District Attorney is the legal authority in a blanket procedure. There is an extensive

amount of self-reviewing of agency; When there is self-review of agency as shown in these matters,

that attempt to be the “Cool Guy” or “savior” the police officers violated an undeserving Citizen,

(Plaintiff) and Plaintiff just so happened to know a few of his rights and that the police are in the

wrong.

17. Another thing that happens once the first exception is made, is that now the Prosecution

is on the hook for a conviction or they become liable for the false arrest and Malicious prosecution.

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As stated in The Supreme Court recently making it a little easier to bring a malicious prosecution

claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Thompson v. Clark arose when the father of a newborn was arrested and
criminally charged for events stemming from his child's diaper rash. The father,
Larry Thompson, claimed the state charged him even though prosecutors had no
reason to think he committed a crime. In a 6-3 decision, the justices decided in
favor of the father. In doing so, they clarified the elements needed to bring
successful civil rights claim against law enforcement who knowingly and
wrongfully charge someone with committing a crime.

The Supreme Court established the favorable termination rule in 1994's Heck v.
Humphrey. The idea is that a defendant must have been found not guilty in a
jury trial, had a guilty verdict overturned on appeal, or otherwise show that they
"won" the case. But this rule involves some gray areas. Prosecutors have a lot of
discretion. They can choose to drop charges against any defendant without
giving a reason. If a prosecutor drops a case without explanation, is it resolved
in the defendant's favor?

This was the key issue in Thompson v. Clark, which SCOTUS decided on
April 4. The Justices held that dropping charges without explanation is,
indeed, a win for the defendant, at least for purpose of bringing a
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

18. When one group connected to another branch of that same group, will tend to favor

outsides and insiders, as an “Us Vs, them” where the Executive Branch will favor others, of the

same group of agencies, make its own justifications in order for the “Us” to prevail in competition

that otherwise wouldn’t exist. The Difficult thing (in Plaintiffs personal Opinion, having an

education in psychology) the officer actually believes they are doing the right thing, and they

probably justified the fact that the plaintiff actually was in the wrong, and Plaintiff would be evicted

and the arresting officers were actually doing the judicial system a favor with hurrying him up…

Problem is that as time goes on their error in judgement would start to reveal as they start to paint

the picture further: they walked past all the broken glass, Plaintiff was completely innocent the

previous two days, the elements aren’t there, etc.. So the arresting officers begin to protect their own

decision… and start stretching the facts as far as to create a decision that was correct by modifying

the incident reports, by building a report with the “victim”, using a child, going back to the “alleged

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victim” and laughing at her mess she made of Plaintiffs property, then slipping in the “We need

another incident”… and then as time went on Plaintiff quickly revealed that he was holding the

Defendants financially liable, and was not taking a deal because of that liability.

19. Now it gets more and more in depth, when the Prosecutor is willing to release someone

innocent or guilty in 5 days if they admit guilt, yet keep them in jail for four months to fight it, the

defendants were willing to leverage custody of someone’s children, force unwanted no contact

orders, and as time goes on in order to avoid the initial wrong justification that seemed right, now

is making the defendants really violate the rights of the Plaintiff and in these matters.

20. In these matters the defendants cost Plaintiff everything he owns (over $300,000), his

name is now run through the mud, he’s been homeless now, trying to present these here matters

while on the streets living out of a backpack. and it’s the actions of the defendants that is keeping

the Plaintiff from being able to hire counsel.

21. Regardless of it being a deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs rights, or is the defendant

seeking for the truth? But by ignoring the debates with the Plaintiff it is hard to imagine you find

that the defendant actually had no doubts that would inspire further investigations and that there is

not a fairly good probability that he was innocent, and therefore the defendants (especially Dana

Gunnerson) cannot claim that they were simply negligent, careless, or foolish.

22. Everyone of their actions built on the next, they do it time and time again and something

needs to change before this whole system comes crumbling down.

23. All these cases are public knowledge, what is the government going to when AI filters

everything and finds that 50% or more of incarcerated inmates had their rights violated? What will

the country do with them? You think there are riots now… you just wait until the corruption of this

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system that we grew up relying on falls with a force of 1000 volcanoes…. Because its actions like

this that are going to fuel that fire.

24. The Public defenders are slow and overworked, and Plaintiffs would only try and set a

deal not fight for Plaintiff so he went pro se, he was denied law library, had his files deleted,

discovery ignored, and then the “Judicial Branch” agrees with the “Executive Branch” un

questionably and in this case denial of evidence is withheld by the liable party for damages who

already held plaintiffs exculpatory evidence adding to plaintiffs concern that helpful discovery will

“Conveniently” disappear.

25. This whole experience has been an absolute nightmare attempting to litigate. From the

comforts of my home, with a phone, or computer without problems, where I could research freely,

and without bother, and I had the options to ask someone critical questions that were stumping me,

because so far those few questions are taking up most of my efforts. Moreover, if I had money for

the simple things, like mailing and printing, and a place I could lay it all out and know it will be

there in the morning.

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6.11 WEST LINN POILICY MANUAL

PAGE 105
COPY FROM ACTUAL POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

6.12
(k) Officers should take appropriate enforcement action when there is probable cause to believe an offense

has occurred. Factors that should not be used as sole justification for declining to take enforcement action

include:
IT was obvious, not
even denied by Macy 1. Whether the suspect lives on the premises with the victim.
that she was not a
“Victim” she wanted
Plaintiff to leave 2. Claims by the suspect that the victim provoked or perpetuated the violence.
during her break
down, and 2 days
wasn’t fast enough, 3. The potential financial or child custody consequences of arrest.
you Officers stated
they knew the 4. The physical or emotional state of either party.
situation as did all
the West Linn Police,
it wasn’t Plaintiffs 5. Use of drugs or alcohol by either party.
crises it was Macy’s
So Officer Dana 6. Denial that the abuse occurred where evidence indicates otherwise.
Lied, twisted facts,
left facts out, didn’t
mention the self 7. A request by the victim not to arrest the suspect.
defense or no harm.
None the less 8. Location of the incident (public/private).
Rebecca Portlock had
a duty to further 9. Speculation that the complainant may not follow through with the prosecution.
investigate and flat
out refused.
10. Actual or perceived characteristics such as race, ethnicity, national origin,

religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, economic status,

age, cultural group, disability, or marital status of the victim or suspect.

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7 ARGUMENT

7.1 UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND CONFINEMENT

1. Defendant Blyth and Defendant Gunnarson, unlawfully detained Plaintiff when Defendant Dana

Gunnarson conformed the evidence, that Catlin then knowingly removed Plaintiff from the Property

where they did have to manufacture elements. They knew of this, they looked it up, and that can be

seen on the cruiser camera footage, that has been requested and being withheld. They then Unlawfully

took Plaintiff to Jail, returned to the house where Macy was and attempted to further fill the

requirements. It was withheld that there were photographs for the plaintiff to see prior to having

received them three weeks after the arrest, when Plaintiff fired his lawyer. Statements that the back of

someone’s head looked uncomfortable, to an “Alleged” victim and with statements of her saying she

has never had harm, is bias. Preceding to convincing her that you need another “incident”, after the

fact is wrong, and arresting plaintiff with intentionally leaving out anything on the side of his story is

Against West Linn Police Departments Policy. Moreover, Dana Gunnarson did it to circumvent

tenant law.

2. Defendant Blyth and Defendant Gunnarson also violated Plaintiffs equal rights by treating this

situation with bias, looking past the broken glass, the two previous police reports that West Linn had

conducted the two previous days, ignored the fact there was a hammer in Massiel’s hand, and gloves

on work gloves on her hands, in a robe, watering the sand, and twisted it around to Plaintiff attacked

her. (See Exhibit 13 page 27 at 1-4)

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3. Plaintiff was not the aggressor, his actions were not offensive, he was defending his property, and all

the clues were there yet none of that made the report. Word spin tainted this case, and it waisted time,

money. With Leather work gloves on her hands, hammer in her hand hose in the other not “spraying

at” Plaintiffs windows (Massiel is the most “intitled” person alive, in her home (and rightfully so),

nothing on that house is “Plaintiffs” anything) Defendant Dana chose those words, like she chose,

“sprayed water “AT” Plaintiffs windows” (so it wasn’t said they were busted out with Hammer) , and

how “Only” was used so to add a sense of extreme urgency and distilled fear to a reader; if she was

alone, and in fear, she would not spray plaintiff in the head and break his things while in the same

yard as him … She must not be afraid. See Id par 2.

7.2 CONSPIRACY
4. U.S.C. § 1985(3) “provides a cause of action if two or more persons conspire to deprive an individual

of his constitutional rights.” Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir.

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 337 (2021).

To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a

conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laSquatws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation
of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

5. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,

102–03 (1971)); see also Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Section

“1985(3) requires at least one of the wrongdoers in the alleged conspiracy to be a state actor.”

Pasadena Republican Club, 985 F.3d at 1171.

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6. “The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection … means that there must be some racial,

or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.”

Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.

2002); Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Animus toward union members does not meet the “otherwise class-based” factor of Griffin. See

United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983). The Supreme Court has

declined to address whether gender is an “otherwise class-based” category under § 1985(3). See Bray

v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993).

7. The Ninth Circuit has extended § 1985(3) “beyond race only when the class in question can show that

there has been a governmental determination that its members require and warrant special federal

assistance in protecting their civil rights.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). 197 2022 “More specifically, [the Ninth Circuit] require[s] ‘either that the courts

have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting

scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.’”

Id. (quoting Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Holgate v.

Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005); Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th

Cir. 1994); Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720 (9th Cir. 1981).

8. “A claim under this section must allege facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired

together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v.

L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d

1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991). For further discussion of proving conspiracy claims, see supra I.A.2.b.(6).

7.3 REFUSING OR NEGLECTING TO PREVENT

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7.3.1 MUNICIPALITY’S FAILURE TO TRAIN

In Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978)
(Owen II), this court determined that appellant George D. Owen could
bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) against the City of
Independence as well as its officials in their official capacities because he
had demonstrated that the conduct of city officials deprived him of his
constitutional rights in furtherance of official policy.

FAILURE TO TRAIN MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES ADEQUATELY

9. the plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by demonstrating that the alleged constitutional

violation was caused by a failure to train municipal employees adequately. See City of Canton, Ohio

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–91 (1989); Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir.

2016); Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014); Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d

962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484– 85 (9th Cir. 2007);

Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d

676, 686 (9th Cir. 2004); Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc);

Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see especially Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409–10 (1997) (discussing limited scope of such a claim). “A

municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a

failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted). See also Benavidez

v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021).

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10. To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference

(1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if

the municipality properly trained their employees. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153–54. Such a showing

depends on three elements: (1) the training program must be inadequate “‘in relation to the tasks the

particular officers must perform’”; (2) the city officials must have been deliberately indifferent “‘to

the rights of persons with whom the [local officials] come into contact’”; and (3) the inadequacy of

the training “must be shown to have ‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation at issue.” Merritt

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); see also

Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (stating,

“To satisfy the statute, a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a

relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’ [] Only
then ‘can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or
custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.’”) (Quoting City of Canton, 489
U.S. at 388)); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir.
2007); Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770. “Under this standard, a municipal
defendant can be held liable because of a failure to properly train its
employees only if the failure reflects a “conscious” choice by the
government.” Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc). The indifference of city officials may be shown where,
“in light of the duties assigned to specific … employees [,] the need for
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the
city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; see Long, 442 F.3d at 1186–87;
Johnson, 388 F.3d at 686; Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir.
2004); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682 (9th Cir. 2001);
Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477–78 (9th Cir. 1992); Merritt, 875
F.2d at 770; see also Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 137 F.3d 1372, 1372 (9th
Cir. 1998) (order) (amending originally filed opinion to include statement
that turning blind eye to constitutional violation can demonstrate
deliberate indifference). The Supreme Court has explained that
“[d]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of
his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 794. Whether the

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plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating such deliberate indifference is

generally a question for the jury. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 682 (citation
omitted); Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1478. “Satisfying this standard requires
proof that the municipality had actual or constructive notice that a
particular omission in their training program will cause municipal
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d
at 794 (internal quotation marks, alterations and citations omitted). In
order “to demonstrate that the municipality was on notice of a
constitutionally significant gap in its training, it is ordinarily necessary
for a plaintiff to demonstrate a pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The
deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability under § 1983 is an
objective inquiry. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (overruling Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d
1175 (9th Cir. 2002)).

7.4 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

(See Below over a dozen unanswered discovery requests)
11. The Police withheld Plaintiffs exculpatory evidence, the jail refused law library, and deleted his files,

and the DA wouldn’t look into much required information.

12. . These Witnesses HAVE INFACT Willfully, Intentionally, knowingly conspired to VIOLATE

Plaintiffs Constitutional rights in Article III Section when they gave Discovery to the District

Attorney that framed an arrest of the defendant that true and complete description facts would have

not.

13. By intentionally ignoring all statements and testimony plaintiff alleged in investigating.

d. No where is it mentioned on either Officer Gunnerson, or Officer Blyth’s discovery

from March 6th, 2022, that the Windows were all busted out of the basement.

e. No where is it mentioned on either Officer Gunnerson, or Officer Blyth’s discovery

from March 6th, 2022, that the that there was a hammer in the hands of the Massiel

Galla, Plaintiff claimed that broke the windows.

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f. No where is it mentioned on either Officer Gunnerson, or Officer Blyths discovery from

March 6th, 2022, that there was a hose spraying in those pictures, that Plaintiff claimed

that Massiel Galla was spraying his property with through the broken windows.

g. No where is it mentioned on either Officer Gunnerson, or Officer Blyths discovery from

March 6th, 2022, That Plaintiffs Property was damaged by means of spraying with water

and covered in flower.

h. Covid has killed a substantial amount of people prior to my arrest on March 6 th, 2022.

And Plaintiff was forced to deal with a 500% injury rate by vulnerable where he would

not have been without the faulty actions.

14. Plaintiff Caught Covid inside Clackamas County Jail

15. Upon discovery intentionally withholding pictures that if included in Plaintiffs testimony would have

painted a picture to those that attempted to further prosecuted plaintiff by describing the “defense of

personal property” and “defense of premises”. Being bias in selecting evidence to mislead further

prosecution.

16. When they allow their officers under the color of law to delete Plaintiffs Files, ignore grievances

regarding health and contact denials for 5 weeks, when they deny Plaintiff Law Library 9 days in a

row. And it is unacceptable.

17. Opposing the Plaintiff without evidence at all besides the Hostile witness who stated on the record the

facts Defendant Rebecca Portlock had were full of “half-truths” (See Exhibit 13 Page 77 at 49)

18. For the plaintiff to prevail on his claims in this case the deliberate or reckless suppression of evidence

must stop, the plaintiff simply should not be forced to prove a claim for all independent harms already

endured while having new constitutional violations encumber his path.

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19. In Devenpeck v. Alford, the Supreme Court reiterated the Fourth Amendment standards applicable in

a § 1983 claim for false arrest:

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

REQUESTED DISCOVER IGNORED

I HEREBY STATE THAT THE FOLLOWING DISCOVERIES HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPLIED:
(BESIDES THE 5 marked DOCUMENTS)

PREVIOUSLY IGNORED REQUESTS

Warrantless Arrest, Writ of Habeas Corpus, March
th
29 , 2022
Accusatory Instrument, Demurrer / MTD, March 31st, 2022
Motion, Show Cause (PO’s & DA), April 1st, 2022.
Notice, Demand for Speedy Trial, April 1st, 2022
Notice, Oregon’s Attorney General, April 5 2022nd
Discovery Request, Response to Photos Withheld, April 8th, 2022.
Request for Compel, “Notes to receiver” / Letter, April 8th, 2022.
Discovery Request, Show Cause, April 12th, 2022.
Discovery Request, Request for Discovery
Discovery Request, Motion to Compel Discovery, June 15th, 2022.
Discovery Request, Material Witnesses to SC, June 27th,
2022
Discovery Request June 30th,
2022
Discovery Request, Subpoena DHS records, June 30th,
2022
Motion to produce Officer Records, June 30th, 2022.
Disciplinary Action, Motion for Discovery Sanctions, July 1st, 2022
Case Record, 20PB05750 January 9th, 2023
Case Record, 21CV02575 January 9th, 2023
Case Record, 22CR10908 January 9th, 2023
Discovery Request, Records Department CCPD January
9th, 2023
Discovery Request, Request for cam footage January
28th, 2023

Tried to receive this footage for a long time, and I finally see where it was blocked
on the file. And changed their “policy” to not give out video footage after West
Linn PD was sued multiple times with notices in November 2022.

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[Only the 4 Underlined Files, replied, and the Attorney General was not supposed to]
ALL SAID MOTIONS AND REQUESTS SENT TO THE FOLLOWING:

ATI'N: Clackamas County Clerk of the Court

807 Main Street
Oregon City, 0R 97045

CC: Clackamas County Circuit/Trial Court Administrator

807 Main Street (Room 104)
Oregon City, 0R 97045

CC: Clackamas County District Attorney

807 Main Street, (Room 7)
Oregon City, OR 97045
PHONE (503)655-8431

ATTN: Assistant Attorney Generals

Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE, Rm. 100
Salem, OR 97310-6313

TWO PACKETS SENT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE IN SALEM OREGON

WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS INCARCERATED ON OR ABOUT APRIL 5TH, AND JUNE 30TH.
ATTN: Assistant Attorney Generals
Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE, Rm. 100
Salem, OR 97310-6313

While plaintiff was incarcerated, he had limited access to the law library, copy facilities, and ability to
communicate as required to prevail in a claim. Without said time, this false arrest plaintiff was prevented from
his claim rights and the ability to research freely. Plaintiff’s files were deleted two separate times. Moreover,
deleted by Clackamas County jail staff, at 5:10 pm on June 20th while all inmates were locked up for dinner,
and count.6.

WEST LINN POLICE DEPARTMENT

When Plaintiff tried receiving records and cam footage, he received a denial stating the following:

❖ Pursuant to ORS 192.415, “any person denied the right to receive a copy of any public record of a public

body, other than a state agency, may petition the District Attorney’s Office of the county in which the public

6
Plaintiff is rather educated on computers, and programming, even though the computers were locked
with many restrictions, Plaintiff by key code, opened CMD prompt, pulled the files by directory name,
and discovered that sixty-two of Plaintiffs Files were selected and deleted by an officer under the color of
law.

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body is located. The District Attorney’s Office will review the public record to determine if it may be

withheld from public inspection.”

❖ West Linn Police Department currently is denying Plaintiff the access to requested reports due to “Child

Abuse”, there was no child involved in any such issues, and there was no abuse.

7.5 DENIAL OF NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE CARE AND

TREATMENT
20. 1. There were insufficient elements to charge the Plaintiff [Defendant at the time], he had done no

harm to the girlfriend it was obvious he was the rational one in the situation. The WLD were privy to

all this information, and not only had access to it, but had actual knowledge of the facts. (Stated in

both WLD reports) In Order to manipulate the facts into an “almost crime” they Officers took all

statements from the victim, who just caused $10,000 of damage to her own house in a rant,

specifically ignored anything the Plaintiff had to say when they already admitted to knowing about

the two previous days.

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21. The outcome of the case[report] in their eyes, was pre-determined. WLD actions are not only

unethical and illegal, but it is also a good indication (or even) [proof] that the Defendants’ actions

were Gender bias (at least on Dana’s Behalf) and partial and it was not an accident; the Defendants

acted with unfair practices, and by doing so, violated Plaintiffs Equal Rights, and opportunity to a fair

prosecution. Moreover, Defendants Dana Gunnarsson, and Catlin Blyth’s Simple twisting of words,

resaying them to the Plaintiff while he was being arrested made it known. Changing when he

explained why “he was reaching for the hose”. Plaintiff had said “he let his girlfriend go when she

was fighting back” [and was upset], and he heard someone yell “let her go” yet in a pre-planned word

spin, Gunnarsson said it back to Plaintiff but added the words “Only ”, [so you] “Only let her go

because someone was there yelling]”, insinuating that if no one was there yelling Plaintiff would

cause a serious issue to the alleged victim/girlfriend.

22. WLD went all in the light off what they could squeeze out of the alleged victim, they did not have

enough evidence, so they fabricated, and twisted the rest. Plaintiff alleges that this is true, because he

knows Massiel better than anyone alive, and she does not look up law. Doesn’t want to, doesn’t care,

doesn’t know how, and she quoted “needed another incident” and that’s identical to the language in

the statute for the charge the WLD pinned on plaintiff,*** “harassment” requires a “series of acts,”

which the law says means at least two incidents.*** and so dana not only did she try and frame

plaintiff when plaintiff showed the officers that his actions didn’t consist of the crime, ***” since the

court did not hear evidence of at least two incidents “***” she went out of her way to go back to

Massiel and manipulate her by laughing with her about my broken property on the ground, to

persuade Massiel to allow her [even though it states in the witness evaluation to not be scared, never

be hurt by me] she was upset and allowed her in the heat of the moment to include that second

incident, that never happened like it was stated, and Massiel can say it, but nothing would suit better

than the live cameras.

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23. Massiel and Plaintiff did not speak for months, but by the time she came and filled out multiple

Waiver of no contact form (See Exhibit) Plaintiff had read that statute for harassment so many times,

the elements clearly relate to a stalking repetitive action, and the Dana Gunnerson was trying to frame

Plaintiff, and that is completely unexpectable.

24. What makes the bias even more obvious7, is the fact that no logical well-grounded mind would step

over the broken glass, matching the allegations of the police officers peers, the Plaintiffs testimony,

who was someone who on the record of the officers peers as not the one in the wrong, and go

completely take the side of someone who had just tried to burn the house down while running

back inside, Punched all the windows out with a hammer and turned Plaintiffs property into a

paper machete sludge by dumping 30lbs of flour inside the windows that the Plaintiffs

property was in,

25. The only testimony Plaintiff had inside their discovery was faulty words spin, none of his own at all.

Plaintiff there for believes, and therefor alleges that is why the Defendants are still refusing to give up

that testimony of the Cruiser and Body Cams… Its known… One thing for certain it is not because

there was child abuse going on in the back of the cop car… None the less plaintiff is requesting the

following from WLD: (1.) Cruiser and (2 & 3)8 body cam footage from March 6th, 2022, footage that

Plaintiff is aware that they have, as well as police officer discovery from the 4th, 5th, and 6th, of March

2022. Where Plaintiff requests both incident reports on the 4th and 5th and then both officer

discoveries on the 6th of March and he requests any official policy from any municipality, city,

regarding any city, or special regulations that any Defendant may have to abide by.

7
Even without Plaintiff having a relationship with Massiel for a 6th year in 2023 who has firsthand
knowledge for this to be true.
8
Both officers Dana Gunnerson and Catlin Blyth

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26. There were also (2) separate motions to preserve the officers evidence attached hereto as exhibits, and

so not to confuse the matter, all exhibits will be referenced within the Memorandum.

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27. The Plaintiff has exhausted all possible routes to get his discovery specifically from West Linn Police

Department, and Plaintiff is requesting the court to order West Linn Police Department to release

information to regards to Tyler A. Lofall, there cannot be anything with-held, or the decisions of the

District Attorney cannot be fully evaluated.

28. Currently Plaintiff seeks the following from West Linn Police Department:

a. The Police officer reports,

b. Any report involving testimony declared by any alleged “Victim.”

c. The police report from the 4th, 5th, and 6th of March 2022,

d. Body and cruiser camera footage from March 6th, 2022,

e. The photos taken,

f. Any notes from the officers,

g. And anything else that seems like it would be exculpatory evidence,

h. Any advocate data learned throughout the investigation.

i. What actual evidence did Rebecca Portlock have when it was claimed that plaintiff had

covid on June 10th, 2022.

j. Defendant Rebecca Portlock claimed she had evidence and that the trial set for June

10th, 2022, had to be reset due to said illness.

k. Plaintiff was dressed and ready for trial, at the courthouse and did not have covid.

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l. Plaintiff alleges they were waiting for the return of the alleged “victim” to return from

out of the country who already told Defendant Rebecca that her facts were not correct.

m. This is important for the malicious prosecution claim.

FEDERAL LAW STATES

NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES OR

IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES; NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON

OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON

WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

THE VALIDITY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES, AUTHORIZED BY LAW, INCLUDING

DEBTS INCURRED FOR PAYMENT OF PENSIONS AND BOUNTIES FOR SERVICES IN SUPPRESSING

INSURRECTION OR REBELLION, SHALL NOT BE QUESTIONED. BUT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES

NOR ANY STATE SHALL ASSUME OR PAY ANY DEBT OR OBLIGATION INCURRED IN AID OF

INSURRECTION OR REBELLION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY CLAIM FOR THE LOSS OR

EMANCIPATION OF ANY SLAVE; BUT ALL SUCH DEBTS, OBLIGATIONS AND CLAIMS SHALL BE

HELD ILLEGAL AND VOID.

BECAUSE MANY STATES CONTINUED TO PASS LAWS THAT RESTRICTED THE RIGHTS OF FORMER

SLAVES, ON JUNE 13, 1866, CONGRESS PASSED AND SENT TO THE STATES FOR RATIFICATION,

AMENDMENT XIV. RATIFIED ON JULY 9, 1868, THE AMENDMENT GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP TO

FORMER SLAVES AND SPECIFICALLY CHANGED THE RULE IN ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2 THAT

SLAVES BE COUNTED ONLY AS THREE-FIFTHS OF A PERSON FOR PURPOSES OF REPRESENTATION

IN CONGRESS. IT ALSO CONTAINED THREE NEW LIMITS ON STATE POWER: A STATE SHALL NOT

VIOLATE A CITIZEN’S PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES; SHALL NOT DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE,

LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND MUST GUARANTEE ALL PERSON’S

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

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THE SUPREME COURT, IN WHAT IS CALLED “THE DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION” HAS SINCE

INTERPRETED THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO APPLY MOST PROVISIONS IN THE BILL OF

RIGHTS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS WELL. THIS HAS MEANT THAT THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT HAS BEEN USED MORE FREQUENTLY IN MODERN COURT CASES

THAN ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF ITS ADOPTION, THE PRIVILEGES AND

IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS INTERPRETED VERY NARROWLY

BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. IN IN RE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES, THE COURT REJECTED THE

ARGUMENT THAT THE PROVISION GAVE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BROAD POWER TO

ENFORCE CIVIL RIGHTS, FINDING THAT TO DO SO WOULD INFRINGE ON A POWER THAT HAD AND

SHOULD BELONG TO THE STATES. THE COURT FOUND THAT THE ONLY PRIVILEGES PROTECTED

BY THE CLAUSE ARE THOSE “WHICH OWE THEIR EXISTENCE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ITS

NATIONAL CHARACTER, ITS CONSTITUTION, OR ITS LAWS,” ALL OF WHICH ARE ALREADY

PROTECTED FROM STATE INTERFERENCE BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN ARTICLE VI.

SUBSEQUENT CASES HAVE RECOGNIZED SEVERAL FEDERAL PRIVILEGES SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO

TRAVEL FROM STATE TO STATE, THE RIGHT TO PETITION CONGRESS FOR A REDRESS OF

GRIEVANCES, THE RIGHT TO VOTE FOR NATIONAL OFFICERS, AND SO FORTH, BUT OTHER

EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE MEANING OF THIS CLAUSE HAVE BEEN REJECTED.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE HAS BEEN

INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS TO PROVIDE THE SAME “PROTECTION AGAINST ARBITRARY

STATE LEGISLATION, AFFECTING LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY, AS IS OFFERED BY THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT.” THIS HAS MEANT THAT STATE LAWS THAT TAKE AWAY A PERSON’S PROPERTY

OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THEIR LIFE OR LIBERTY MUST AFFORD PERSONS A FAIR AND

IMPARTIAL WAY TO CHALLENGE THAT ACTION.

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FOR EXAMPLE, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE HAS ENSURED THAT PEOPLE ON WELFARE ARE ABLE

TO CHALLENGE THE LOSS OF THEIR BENEFITS AT AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND HAS

MEANT THAT PARENTS WHO ARE ACCUSED OF CHILD ABUSE, OR THE MENTALLY ILL WHO ARE

BEING COMMITTED WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTEST THE STATE’S ALLEGATIONS IN A

COURT HEARING. OFTEN THOUGHT OF AS A PROVISION THAT GUARANTEES FAIRNESS, THE DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES GOVERNMENT TO USE EVEN-HANDED PROCEDURES, SO THAT IT IS

LESS LIKELY TO ACT IN AN ARBITRARY WAY.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: THE SUPREME COURT HAS FOUND THAT THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS FROM ARBITRARY STATE LAWS

OR ACTIONS THAT INTERFERE WITH FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES. MORE THAN OFFERING A

PROCESS OF FAIRNESS, COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS

STATES FROM HARMING AN INDIVIDUAL’S ABILITY TO FULLY PARTICIPATE IN SOCIETY.

LIBERTY, THE COURT HELD IN MEYER V. NEBRASKA, “DENOTES NOT MERELY FREEDOM FROM

BODILY RESTRAINT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO CONTRACT, TO ENGAGE IN

ANY OF THE COMMON OCCUPATIONS OF LIFE, TO ACQUIRE USEFUL KNOWLEDGE, TO MARRY,

ESTABLISH A HOME AND BRING UP CHILDREN, TO WORSHIP GOD ACCORDING TO THE DICTATES

OF HIS OWN CONSCIENCE, AND GENERALLY TO ENJOY THOSE PRIVILEGES LONG RECOGNIZED

AT COMMON LAW AS ESSENTIAL TO THE ORDERLY PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS BY FREE MEN.”

7.6 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

29. Eligible persons are entitled to adequate representation in court, at state expense, under provisions of

the Oregon and federal constitutions and Oregon statutes. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States

Supreme Court held that, “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due

process of law….” Constitutionally, due process has been held to include the right to appointed

counsel in criminal proceedings – from arrest, through trial, at sentencing, and on appeal.

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30. In Gideon, the court wrote, “…reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary

system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be

assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to be an obvious truth.” Public

defense representation is not limited to criminal cases.

31. Other statutory and constitutional provisions include the right to appointed counsel in court

proceedings involving life, liberty, and property, including habeas corpus; post-conviction relief;

contempt; juvenile dependency, delinquency, and termination of parental rights; civil commitments

for the mentally ill or developmentally disabled; and parole and probation violation proceedings. The

U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the right to appointed counsel includes related costs such as

expert witnesses and investigation expense.

7.7 ORDER THE DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER THE SECOND

AMMENDED COMPLAINT IF IT SO MAY BE USED, THEREFORE
PLAINTIFF MAY PREVAIL.

THE CRUISER DASH CAME FROM MARCH 6TH, 2022, HAS BEEN REQUESTED SEVERAL
TIMES, AND FINALLY PLAINTIFF RECEIVED A NOTICE STATING THAT DHS HAS A HOLD
ON IT. PLAINTIFF WAS UNAWARE THERE WAS ANY CHILDREN IN THE COP CAR WITH HIM,
IN FACT THERE WAS NO CHILDREN INVOLVED AT ALL.
NONE-THE-LESS THIS TAPE IS EVIDENCE THAT CATLIN BLYTH KNEW THAT HE DIDN’T
HAVE THE PROPER ELEMENTS TO ARREST PLAINTIFF, HE SWORE, PROMISED, AND
ASSURED HE WOULD NOT LEAVE MR. LOFALL’S PROPERTY OUTSIDE, AND SET IT UP IN
MR. LOFALL’S TRUCK, HIT LOCK ON THE DOORS AND LOCK PLAINTIFFS BELONGINGS IN
A SAFE PLACE INCLUDING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM DATA THAT WAS ALL IN TUBS WITH HIS
TOOLS RIGHT ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD DUE TO THE OFFICERS COMING AS PLAINTIFF
WAS PACKING.
NONE OF THIS WAS DONE AND PLAINTIFFS PROPERTY WAS RUINED, HIS (TWO)
TRAILERS WERE STOLLEN, HIS CLAIMS RIGHTS WERE CATASTROPHICALLY DAMAGED,
AND HIS COMPUTER AND EVIDENCE WAS ALL FLOATING IN WATER.
MOREOVER, THE PICTURES THAT WERE USED TO PLAINTIFFS “PROBABLY CAUSE”
ACTUALLY WAS CRUX TO HIS CASE, AND WAS MISUSED THE ENTIRE TIME AND HE WAS
UNAWARE OF THEIR EXISTENCE, DESPITE THE FILINGS ABOVE WHERE PLAINTIFF
ASKED THE DA THIRTEEN SEPARATE TIMES FOR EVIDENCE AND A REASON HE WAS
DETAINED. FOR WEEKS, IF NOT THE ENTIRE TIME, PLAINTIFF HAD AN “*” NEXT TO HIS
CHARGE, USED AS A WILD CARD MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFEND.

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PLAINTIFF IS ASKING THE NOTE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE LOOKING FOR EXCUSE
AFTER EXCUSE WHY NOT TO ANSWER TO THEIR ACTIONS, THEY HAVE THE BEST
LAWYERS IN THE STATE DEFENDING THEM AND THEY ARE TRYING TO “OUT
PROCEDURE” A PRO SE PLAINTIFF WHEN HE WAS DOING JUST FINE BEFORE THEIR
CLIENTS DESIDED IT NECESSARY TO MALICIOUSLY PROSECUTE HIM FOR LITERALLY NO
REASON. THE DEFENDNANTS NEED TO OWN UP, ANDSWER THE COMPLAINT, AND PAY
FOR THE DAMAGES THEY HAVE CAUSED.
PLAINTIFF DOESN’T KNOW HOW TO PROCEED BUT IF IT WASN’T FOR THE
DEFENDNANTS ACTIONS THERE WOULD BE NEED TO. PLAINTIFF IS INDIGENT TO THIS
EXTREME LEVEL BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND IF NOT CURED
IN US LAW, HE WILL PROCEED IN THE LAW OF NATURE.

7.7.1.1 CONVERSION / DUTY TO PLAINTIFF FOR PROPERTY / SETTLEMENT

OFFER

$109,500 Personal Property Lost

$180,000 Civil /assignment
Four months in jail

7.8 SETTLEMENT OFFER

A year and counting fighting it $1,200,000 to completely settle of give the rights if any to recoup on
appeal the lost assignment claim to the defendants. Offer is good for 30 days. From March 24th 2023.

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8 CONCLUSION

As shown throughout this filing, Defendant Dana Gunnarson, and Catlin Blyth’s, unwarranted

arrest caused a series of events to cause a significant amount of harm to the Plaintiff. The

Officers actions, were against policy, against state and federal law, and they caused hundreds

of thousands of dollars to Plaintiff, and they should not get away with it. The way that the Police

Department changed their policy soon as multiple lawsuits were deployed and Dana having a

part in at least two of them; leads the belief that there is a lack of training before putting their

Officers out on the streets.

When the falsified, stretched, bias evidence made it to the District Attorney’s office Rebecca

Portlock, she did not follow through the standard investigation that a typical DA would have

been assumed to do. Instead, Rebecca filed the charges without the proper evidence and didn’t

listen to anything the Plaintiff had to say. Plaintiff was denied over a dozen discovery requests

that although Rebecca kept attempting to get Plaintiff to take a deal, he had already served 25

times his original offer… and those actions make innocent people take guilty claims, and as

well as cost them $300,000 in losses due to abandoning property.

Plaintiffs’ ex-girlfriend attempted to waive the no contact order, and Rebecca opposed it,

evidence of reasons why came out after the facts, and that was it wasn’t that Massiel was in the

letters was against the Plaintiff, as much as she was lead to believe by the DA’s officer and her

“victim Advocate” that she would better chance of having her kids returned to her if she

prosecute Plaintiff…

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 124
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARCH 25th, 2023

Plaintiff spent a total of four months in jail, he caught covid, he was made be blind in there, he

filed a grievance after being ignored for days with Covid, that grievance was not answered for

5 weeks. The jail also had staff delete 62 of his files and withhold his law library but the crux

to the case is, the jail took and returned files, so there’s no other person it could be. There is a

the Jail through multiple staff argue with Plaintiff and ignore the fact that he was let out 10 days

his court date he was supposed to go home immediately afterwards, and there was at least a

handful of correction officers giving Plaintiff the runaround there like it was a joke to them…

and they kept him in the jail where he also missed a family event for the fourth of July.

Plaintiff at this time would ask the court again if he may be appointed counsel, for the facts are

there and it is very much needed for him to prevail on these claims and the direct actions of the

government agency has cost him everything he owns.

For these reasons described herein Plaintiff Prays for Relief, by means of (1) being granted the

appointment of counsel, (2) Compelling the Discovery if by the time of the hearing the

Discovery has not been received (3). Accept the evidence presented attached hereto, and give a

conclusion on the partial summary judgement determination on the case. (4) make a

determination on what it is that Plaintiff must present if this file doesn’t pause until finding a

pro bono lawyer.

Submitted to the best of my Ability and knowledge,

Given this 20th day of March 2023 for review.

/s/ TYLER A LOFALL__

Tyler A. Lofall Plaintiff Pro Se
(386)-262-3322 [email protected]

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- PAGE | 125