IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL COURT DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF ELECTRONICALLY FILED

PENNSYLVANIA
NO.: CR 711-2021
v.
HON. VALARIE COSTANZO
EMILY BINAKONSKY

Defendant. TYPE OF PLEADING:

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN
REPLY TO COMMONWEALTH’S
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS

COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR

DEFENDANT:

Steffan T. Keeton, Esq.

THE KEETON FIRM LLC
100 S COMMONS, STE. 102
Pittsburgh, PA 15212

PA I.D. #314635
1-888-412-5291
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 1
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 4
I. THE COMMONWEALTH INTENTIONALLY FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN ........................................ 4
II. THE AFFIDAVIT IS DEVOID OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THE COMMONWEALTH’S ATTEMPT TO
VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT ACTUALLY HURTS ITS CASE ............................................................ 5
A. Murphy .................................................................................................................................. 6
B. Murphy’s Use by Commonwealth........................................................................................... 8
C. Comparing the facts sub judice to Murphy .......................................................................... 10
III. THE VALUE OF THE TWO LETTERS ............................................................................................. 11
A. James Watson Does Not Exist.............................................................................................. 11
B. The Name “Amelia Breitenbach” Provides No Added Reliability Nor Credibility Because
Law Enforcement Never Interviewed “Amelia Breitenbach,” Examined “Amelia Breitenbach’s”
Criminal Background, or Withheld This Information. ................................................................ 13
1. Amelia Breitenbach’s Lengthy Criminal History Containing Numerous Crimes of Dishonesty with
Felony Gradings ..................................................................................................................................... 13
2. Any Presumption of Reliability or Credibility Is Not Present with a Source Named “Amelia
Breitenbach” Due to Numerous Crimes of Dishonesty with Felony Gradings. ....................................... 15
3. No Credibility or Reliability Should Be Associated with “Amelia Breitenbach’s” provided
information............................................................................................................................................. 19
C. The Total Value of the Two Letters ...................................................................................... 20
D. Although the Two Letters Provide No Credible Information, They Should be Additionally
Stricken Because They Include at a Minimum, Reckless Misstatements and Omissions ............ 22
IV. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY AND STANDING TO
CHALLENGE, BUT THOSE FACTS ARE MOOT BECAUSE THE COMMONWEALTH WILLFULLY FAILED TO
MEET ITS BURDEN ............................................................................................................................. 24
V. THE COMMONWEALTH’S ATTEMPT TO SHROUD THESE NUMEROUS DEFECTS VIOLATES THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THESE DECEPTIVE TACTICS SHOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE
COURT. .............................................................................................................................................. 28
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 30

i
 INTRODUCTION

A “common sense,” “practical,” and “nontechnical”1 review of the warrant and

the April 11th hearing leads to one result: complete suppression of the evidence

seized. The warrant is wholly defective. That is clear.2 Instead of admitting this

fact, the Commonwealth made a bizarre presentation at the April 11th suppression

hearing. Presenting no evidence in defense of the warrant, the Commonwealth

didn’t just “sit on its hands.”3 Rather, the evidence never entered the building. The

Commonwealth did not bring a single person named in the warrant or the affidavit

of probable cause. This tactical maneuver was a failed attempt to make a collateral

attack on the defendants without exposing the affiant or any other person with

knowledge in the warrant to cross-examination. The sole purpose was to deprive the

Defendants of their opportunity to exercise their “right to test the veracity of the

information contained in the search warrant.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 407 A.2d

1345, 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). By failing to present a single witness, the

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden. On this point alone, the Court should

1 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

2 The Commonwealth by failing to respond and thus conceding the arguments
raised in the opening briefs: (1) the particularity of the items to be searched or
seized and (2) the overbreadth of the place to be search resulting in an unlawful,
general warrant. These defects alone – even if probable cause was found in the
affidavit – are fatal to the warrant. Groh v. Ramirez. 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (“In this
respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as
‘warrantless’ within the meaning of our case law”).
3 Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 62 A.3d 1028, 1033 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), aff'd 106

A.3d 695 (Pa. 2014) (describing the Commonwealth’s failure to call a single witness
while affiant was present in the courtroom as “simply sit[ting] on its hands”).

1
grant suppression. The Superior Court would affirm the ruling, and the Supreme

Court would agree.

While the Court could grant suppression solely on the Commonwealth’s

failure to meet its burden, the warrant is fatally defective in numerous ways as

outlined in the opening brief. Moreover, it is understandable that the

Commonwealth failed to present a single witness with first-hand knowledge of

anything alleged in the affidavit of probable cause. This was both tactical and

factual: there was no witness and the Commonwealth knew it.

Once again, the Commonwealth is striving to bypass the Defendants’

constitutional rights to challenge the veracity of the affidavit of probable cause by

attempting to introduce evidence 28 days after the hearing ended. Not only is this

procedurally improper but also the evidence it attempts to introduce destroys the

Commonwealth’s defense of the defective warrant. It not only casts doubt on the

entire pre-search investigation and the warrant but also it explains the motivation

underlying the bizarre presentation at the April 11th hearing. In an attempt to

conceal these deficiencies, the Commonwealth denied the Defendants’ their right to

confrontation.

In a brief filed by the Commonwealth - not through testimony - the

Commonwealth finally reveals that there is no James Watson. In other words, the

most outlandish, horrific lies were sent by an unknown, unreliable person. Further,

no attempt prior to the search was made to confirm any of the information

contained therein nor if “James Watson” was real. Instead, the Pennsylvania State

2
Police relied on unnamed sources on Facebook, a fake name, a felonious name, and

rumors.

This was clearly a response to the opening brief which inquires about James

Watson’s reliability, criminal record, or existence.4 While the Commonwealth

answers the questions concerning James Watson, it avoids any discussion about

Amelia Breitenbach. Once again, the Commonwealth plays “hide the ball” because

it fails to answer identical questions concerning Amelia Breitenbach.5 This is a

tactical attempt to hide the facts before the Court. The Commonwealth does not

address this question because there is a person named Amelia Breitenbach who

lives in Allegheny Count,6 and this person named Amelia Breitenbach has a lengthy

criminal history with numerous convictions of crimes of dishonesty at felony grades.

Moreover, this person had multiple probation violations while serving those

sentences and completed probation a mere three years before her hearsay

statements. These statements – without investigation by the Pennsylvania State

Police – were included in the affidavit of probable cause. Any statement from a

4 “There is no information that any member of law enforcement

spoke with a person named Watson, ran a criminal background check on a person
named Watson, checked property records for someone named Watson, nor any other
step to establish his reliability or veracity. In fact, there’s no indication in the
affidavit that “James Watson” is even a real person.”
5 “There is no information that any member of law enforcement spoke with

a person named “Amelia Breitenbach,” ran a criminal background check on a person

named “Amelia Breitenbach,” checked property records for a person named “Amelia
Breitenbach,” nor any other step to establish this person’s reliability or veracity. In
fact, there’s no indication in the affidavit that “Amelia Breitenbach” is even a real
person.”
6 Contemporaneous with the filing of this reply brief, Defendant filed a Motion for

Judicial Notice.

3
person with this name should have required further investigation, and at a

minimum, required a single conversation between law enforcement and the

referenced individual. This information was not hidden on JNET nor CPCMS – it

was publicly available on UJS and could be discovered with a simple search.

Instead, the Pennsylvania State Police searched Facebook. In the Commonwealth’s

attempt to cover up its 4th Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 violations, it

continued its Constitutional attacks by attempting to evade the confrontation

clause.

ANALYSIS

I. The Commonwealth Intentionally Failed to Meet Its Burden

By failing to present a single witness, the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden. “When the defendant specifically complains of defects in the warrant or its

execution, he thereby alerts the Commonwealth of a particularized burden of proof

on those objections. To satisfy that burden the Commonwealth must introduce

witnesses subject to the defendant's cross-examination.” Commonwealth v.

Iacavazzi, 443 A.2d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). Here, the Commonwealth failed

to do so.

At this point, the Court could grant suppression. The Superior Court would

affirm the ruling, and so would the Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v.

Enimpah, 62 A.3d 1028, 1033 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), aff'd 106 A.3d 695 (Pa. 2014)

(“[a]s the Commonwealth essentially refused to contest [defendant’s] motion, Judge

[ ] was well within [ ] discretion to grant the motion and suppress the evidence”).

4
“The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish the validity of the search warrant

and the burden is not carried by merely introducing the search warrant and

affidavit with no supporting testimony because then the only way for the defendant

to challenge the veracity of the information is to call witnesses himself and this

effectively shifts onto him the burden of disproving the veracity of the information,

an almost impossible burden.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 407 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1979).

Rather than shifting an improper and “almost impossible burden” upon

Defendants, the Court should suppress all evidence because the Commonwealth

intentionally failed to meet its burden at the April 11th hearing.7

II. The Affidavit is Devoid of Probable Cause, and the Commonwealth’s

Attempt to Violate the Sixth Amendment Actually Hurts Its Case

The affidavit is devoid of probable cause,8 and the Commonwealth continues

its gamesmanship in its attempt to violate the 6th Amendment. Even then, the

information provided actually harms their case and proves that the police failed to

7 As described later in section “IV. The Commonwealth’s Attempt to Shroud these

Numerous Defects Violates the Confrontation Clause and These Deceptive Tactics
Should Not Be Supported by the Court,” the Commonwealth’s failure was not from
neglect rather it was done with intent to deprive the Defendants of their rights.
8 The Commonwealth failed to respond nor rebut the strong arguments presented in

Defendant’s opening brief concerning the particularity and overbreadth defects.

Thus, the Commonwealth has waived them, and the warrant is fatally defective. In
other words, even if the Court were to find sufficient probable cause, it would not
change the outcome. Intentionally failing to meet its burden combined with these
fatal defects could not be cured by a finding of probable cause nor would it lead to
any result other than suppression.

5
investigate anything or they did and withheld it from the magistrate. Given that

this fact – that James Watson is not real - was only revealed to the Defendants,

their counsel, and numerous tribunals (including this Court), 1,357 days after the

search casts doubt on the police’s motivations in obtaining the search warrant.

Unfortunately, these areas could not be explored at the April 11th

suppression hearing because the Commonwealth intentionally failed to present any

cross-examinable witness with pre-search knowledge. Either way, whether by

laziness or deception, the affidavit is devoid of probable cause which leads to the

same result: complete suppression. In support of its numerous arguments

concerning probable cause, the Commonwealth relies on a single case,

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 916 A.2d 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).

A. Murphy

On June 20, 2005 at 11:18PM, the named informant (the victim) called the

police from her job and told them that she received threats from Mr. Murphy, that

he was on his way from New York City, and he was driving at a high rate of speed

towards her place of employment. Id. at 680–81. Law enforcement arrived and

learned that Mr. Murphy was angry about the victim’s “interference” with his

relationship with his girlfriend. Id. While on the scene, the victim indicated to

police that Mr. Murphy was trafficking drugs and illegal proceeds through the home

he shared with his girlfriend. Id. The victim also indicated that defendant was a

drug dealer that would secure drugs in New York City and bring them to

Pennsylvania multiple times a week. Id. The victim informed the officer that she

6
was a recovering addict and was contemplating buying drugs from Mr. Murphy. Id.

at 683. Mr. Murphy called the victim once again,9 and told her to wait there because

one of his associates would be there in fifteen minutes. Id. at 683-84.

Approximately 15 minutes later, Mr. Murphy’s associate arrived and told the officer

that he was a friend of Mr. Murphy. Id. Subsequently, Mr. Murphy arrived, acted

erratically and violently pounded on the door of the victim’s place of employment.

Id. He was arrested for harassment and terroristic threats, and his car was

searched. Id. The search revealed marijuana. Id.

From this incident, police secured a search warrant for his home which was

executed on June 21, 2005. Mr. Murphy argued that the affidavit was facially

invalid because it failed to indicate when his conversation with the victim occurred.

The was the sole basis of the appeal. The court rejected the “staleness” argument

because the other elements of probable cause from multiple sources of information

were so strong. In its view, to eliminate probable cause with a large amount of

supporting evidence solely because of a missing date for one source would be a

hypertechnical analysis.

9 It is difficult to follow whether this call was made in the presence of the officer or
later relayed to him. Given the 15 minute time window, and the subsequent
statement concerning Michael Dwyer, it could be interpreted that the call was made
in the officer’s presence.

7
 B. Murphy’s Use by Commonwealth

The Commonwealth cites Murphy for almost every aspect of its probable

cause discussion. However, this “versatile” case fails to offer the full value to the

Court upon analysis.

In Paragraph 13 of its brief, the Commonwealth cites to Murphy in support of

its argument that “[t]he number of tips recorded within the warrant, including

Facebook posts add further reliability.” That language fails to appear in that

pincite. In fact, there’s no support for any of those assertions in Murphy, nor do

many of those words – including “tips,” “Facebook,” or “number” – appear anywhere

in the opinion.10 Instead, the law completely refutes this argument. See

Commonwealth v. Sharp, 683 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting

information in an affidavit that “is devoid of any facts regarding the reliability of

the unnamed sources of the reputation information, including the basis of the

information, or any reason to credit it”); United States v. Coleman, 540 F. Supp. 3d

596, 603 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (where an affidavit fails to articulate the informant’s

basis of knowledge, “the informant's factual basis could have come from rumors on

social media or twenty levels of hearsay”) United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26,

31 (2d Cir.1976) (mere rumor is “patently insufficient to provide a sufficient basis

for probable cause”).

10The phrase “reasonable and prudent [person]” is the only phrase that appears
anywhere in Murphy, and it merely states the standard – not its connection to a
reasonable and prudent person’s interpretation of unnamed, unverified Facebook
comments in the context of an affidavit of probable cause.

8
 In Paragraphs 7 and 9 of its brief, the Commonwealth cites Murphy for the

argument that the names “James Watson” and “Amelia Breitenbach” appear in the

affidavit of probable cause, and they are therefore “named informants” which can be

viewed as additionally reliable or credible. Unlike the citation in Paragraph 13, this

language appears in Murphy. A named informant can add additional reliability, but

it cannot be the sole factor for reliability. In other words, the mere fact that hearsay

statements from a named “person” appear in a warrant – without any other

information concerning veracity, reliability, timing, or basis of knowledge – fails to

establish reliability. It is a piece of the analysis, but it cannot form the sole basis.

Reviewing the facts and affidavit of Murphy places this statement in its proper

context. The court did not rule simply because the informant was named. She was

named, but also the informant’s reliability was shown by:

1. Identifying where Mr. Murphy was heading and that he was driving from
New York City where he trafficked drugs and proceeds through his home.
2. Informing officers that Mr. Murphy was active in drug sales.
3. Informing officers that she was an addict.
4. Informing officers that she had thought about purchasing drugs from Mr.
Murphy.
5. Informing officers that Mr. Murphy called her and said one of his
associates would be there soon.
6. The officer’s observation of this associate who informed police that he was
“a friend” of Mr. Murphy.
7. The officer’s observation that Mr. Murphy arrived, acted erratically, and
violently pounded on the business’ doors.
8. Mr. Murphy had drugs in his vehicle.

The informant’s reliability was shown primarily by repeated confirmation of

her statements made to law enforcement as well as the officer’s first-hand

knowledge and observations on the scene. The appeal in Murphy concerned an

9
attack on probable cause because the affiant failed to include information regarding

the timing of a conversation. The court rejected the staleness issue because there

were so many other sources of quality information in the affidavit. Here, the

Commonwealth wants the Court to find reliability solely based on the fact that two

names were included in the affidavit and discount the numerous reliability,

veracity, timing, and source of knowledge problems discussed at length in

Defendant’s opening brief. To follow the Commonwealth’s argument would be to

adopt the technical standard it loathes.

C. Comparing the facts sub judice to Murphy

Comparing the case at bar to Murphy shows that probable cause fails to exist

in the present affidavit. Here, unlike Murphy, officers never interviewed the

“named informants” nor observed behavior supporting reliability (they say

something and it happens). Instead, the affiant and the magistrate accepted rumors

from H.O. Cunningham, two unidentified Facebook posts, and two letters bearing

names. Further, the only corroboration of any of this information was that Raymond

Seddon had the same publicly listed address that was referenced in the letters. In

comparison, the police in Murphy talked with the informant, met with the named

informant (proving she was a real person), and the information she provided was

confirmed by the arrival of Mr. Murphy’s associate, Mr. Murphy’s arrival at her

place of employment, and the presence of drugs in Mr. Murphy’s vehicle after he

was arrested for acting in an aggressive way as she had previously described.

10
 No legitimate investigation occurred here, and that was how the

Pennsylvania State Police relied upon uncorroborated statements of a fake person.

With even a rudimentary investigation, perhaps a few clicks on a keyboard, this fact

would easily have been confirmed with minimal effort. Instead of investigating, the

police searched Facebook.

III. The Value of the Two Letters

As outlined in Defendant’s opening brief, the two letters suffer from

numerous flaws. The Commonwealth, in its opposition, introduces the argument

that the two letters contain “names” and thus provide a sufficient basis for

reliability. Upon analysis and application to the facts at bar, this argument quickly

erodes.

The fact that an informant may be “named” is not dispositive of reliability.

Rather, it adds “additional reliability to the information given to the issuing

authority.” Murphy, 916 A.2d 679, 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In other words, the

mere fact that an informant is named does not manifest reliability. If that were the

case, a letter that simply signs “John Doe” – or in this case “James Watson” – would

grant law enforcement carte blanche authority to violate Article 1 Section 8 and the

Fourth Amendment. Here, PSP failed to discover – or ignored – that “James

Watson” was not a real person.

A. James Watson Does Not Exist

In its brief, the Commonwealth reveals that “James Watson” is not a real

person. This is the first time this critical information has ever been revealed. For

11
1,357 days, the Commonwealth has projected to the Defendants, their counsel, the

public, and numerous tribunals, that “James Watson” is a real person.

Even with this revelation, the Commonwealth uses vague language to cover

its tracks. It does not describe which of the past 1,357 days that this information

was discovered. Instead, it states that “sometime after the search warrant was

issued” the Pennsylvania State Police learned that James Watson was not a real

person. If the Commonwealth had provided a single witness with pre-search

knowledge of the contents in the affidavit of probable cause at the April 11th

hearing, this information would have been discovered with minimal cross-

examination. Instead, the Commonwealth attempts to bypass the Constitutions by

withholding key evidence until 28 days after the hearing. It strains credulity to

suggest that this information was suddenly discovered after the April 11th hearing.

But, even if this information was determined 1,357 days after the search, a sloppy

investigation does not support the reliability of the contents within the affidavit of

probable cause.

While “James Watson” is “named,” the law does not support any value or

reliability to the “named” status. No attempt to meet with “James Watson” was

made. No attempt to talk with “James Watson” was made. No attempt to check

public records for “James Watson” was conducted. Simply, “[m]ore police work was

needed.” United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1365 (6th Cir. 1993). If the mere

inclusion of a name in an affidavit of probable cause becomes the basis for reliability

and justifies a search of private property, then the Constitutions provide no

12
protection. “Upholding this warrant would ratify police use of an unknown,

unproven informant—with little or no corroboration—to justify searching someone's

home.” United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996). This is

additionally concerning in the current “technological age” where people can claim a

host of pseudonyms and use them for nefarious purposes.

B. The Name “Amelia Breitenbach” Provides No Added Reliability

Nor Credibility Because Law Enforcement Never Interviewed
“Amelia Breitenbach,” Examined “Amelia Breitenbach’s” Criminal
Background, or Withheld This Information.

In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts that “Amelia Breitenbach’s” name

should lend additional credibility to a finding of probable cause. The name in

isolation does not provide any credibility, and at best and without any investigation,

it severely impairs any notion of credibility for any of the statements made by a

person named “Amelia Breitenbach.”

1. Amelia Breitenbach’s Lengthy Criminal History Containing Numerous

Crimes of Dishonesty with Felony Gradings

Contemporaneously with this brief, the Defendant filed a motion for judicial

notice. That motion respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of the

following information:

1. A person named Amelia L. Freno has a lengthy criminal history with

numerous charges for crimes of dishonesty including three at felony

gradings.

2. This same person named Amelia L. Freno lives in Allegheny County.

13
 3. This same person named Amelia L. Freno has lived in southern portions

of Allegheny County including Bethel Park.

4. This same person named Amelia L. Freno has “Amelia Breitenbach” and

“Amelia L. Breitenbach” as listed aliases in the UJS Portal.

5. This same person that uses “Amelia Breitenbach” as an alias has been

convicted of the following crimes of dishonesty:

a. Forgery (18 § 4101 §§ A3), a Misdemeanor of the first degree;

b. Acquisition or obtaining of possession of a controlled substance by

misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge (35 §

780-113 §§ A12), an ungraded Felony;

c. Falsified or Fraudulent Insurance Claims (18 § 4117 §§ A2), a

Felony of the third degree;

d. Theft by Deception – False Impression (18 § 3922 §§ A1), a Felony

of the third degree; and

e. Bad Checks (18 § 4105 §§ A1), a summary offense.11

6. While serving her probation sentence for crimes of dishonesty at felony

levels, this same person that uses “Amelia Breitenbach” as an alias was

convicted of a Mt. Lebanon, PA local ordinance listed as Container W/O

Marijuana (LO § 3 §§ 702.1), a summary offense.

7. While serving her probation sentence for crimes of dishonesty at felony

levels, this same person that uses “Amelia Breitenbach” as an alias,

11 This offense occurred while serving a probationary sentence for crimes (a) – (d).

14
 violated her probation on at least two occasions with one hearing before

the Honorable Donald E. Machen of the Allegheny County Court of

Common Pleas on May 13, 2014 and one hearing before the Honorable

Philip A. Ignelzi of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on June

26, 2015.

2. Any Presumption of Reliability or Credibility Is Not Present with a Source

Named “Amelia Breitenbach” Due to Numerous Crimes of Dishonesty with
Felony Gradings.

The Commonwealth claims that a person “named” in an affidavit should be

given a presumption of reliability and credibility. While that could be true

potentially with a name that has a track record for honesty, or at worst, nothing

bad in that name’s history, that is not the scenario with “Amelia Breitenbach.”

The name “Amelia Breitenbach” has no presumptive credibility due to the

numerous crimes of dishonesty associated with that name.

Crimes of dishonesty are so harmful to witness credibility that both the

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence treat them

differently than all other types of crimes. See Pa.R.E. 609(a) (“[f]or the purpose of

attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been

convicted of a crime…must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false

statement”); Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (“the evidence must be admitted if the court can

readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving - or

the witness's admitting - a dishonest act or false statement”). The Congressional

15
Report describes crimes of dishonesty as “peculiarly probative of credibility.”12 In

other words, crimes of dishonesty provide incredible insight into a witness or

source’s credibility and reliability, and “[t]he rule is intended to inform fact-finders

that the witness has a propensity to lie….” United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d

886, 893 (6th Cir. 2012).

Courts throughout the country consistently agree. See, e.g., Gordon v. United

States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“A ‘rule of thumb’ thus should be that

convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of

violent or assaultive crimes generally do not”); United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d

803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Human experience does not justify an inference that a

person will perjure himself from proof that he was guilty of petty shoplifting…[a]n

absence of respect for the property of others is an undesirable character trait, but it

is not an indicium of a propensity toward testimonial dishonesty”); Gov't of Virgin

Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1976) (defining crimes of dishonesty as

those that reveal “the accused's propensity to testify truthfully”). In federal court,

crimes of dishonesty, like forgery and fraud, are so damaging to the presumption of

credibility that they are held to be more damaging to presumptions of credibility

than robbery13 and murder.14

12 H.R.Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News 7098, 7103.
13 Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 334 (3d Cir. 2004) (robbery is not a crime of

dishonesty under the rules of evidence).

14 Eng v. Scully, 146 F.R.D. 74,(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (multiple murder convictions were

not crimes of “dishonesty”).

16
 Pennsylvanian courts maintain similar views concerning the importance of

credibility and the negative presumption that exists when a person has been

convicted of crimes of dishonesty. This presumption is so strong that a defense

counsel’s failure to include the impact these crimes cause to a witness’ credibility as

a special jury instruction has been used as the sole basis in granting a new trial for

a defendant. Commonwealth v. Cole, 227 A.3d 336, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).15

“[C]rimes involving dishonesty or false statement are commonly referred to as

crimen falsi crimes…” Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1264 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2022). Crimen falsi crimes involve an “element of falsehood, and include[]

everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect the administration of justice

by the introduction of falsehood and fraud.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 5 A.2d 804,

805 (Pa. 1939) (internal citations omitted). Historically, the definition has also

included “forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by

bribery or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness, barratry, [and] the

fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's

right.” Id.

15In Cole, defense counsel failed to request a special jury instruction concerning a
witness’ prior convictions of crimen falsi crimes and the doubt that such crimes cast
on the witness’ credibility. This omission was held to be ineffective assistance of
counsel based solely on this defect, and this defect could only be remedied through a
new trial. Id. (“had the jury been instructed that [witness’] crimes of dishonesty
were yet further reason to view [witness’] testimony with suspicion, there is a
reasonable likelihood that it would have tipped the proverbial balance in favor of
discrediting [witness]….”). Id.

17
 The criminal record for the name “Amelia Breitenbach” contains five crimen

falsi crimes:

1. Forgery: Commonwealth v. Vales, 2022 WL 1514143, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct.

May 13, 2022) (“theft by deception, bad checks, forgery…” are crimen falsi

crimes); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“Forgery, of course, involves dishonesty and false statement”).

2. Acquiring Controlled Substance through Fraud: See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Jones, 5 A.2d 804, 805 (Pa. 1939).

3. Insurance Fraud: In Re Bolus, 251 A.3d 848, 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021).

4. Theft By Deception: United States v. Ollie, 996 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (W.D.

Pa. 2014) (“forgery and theft by deception is the kind of crime that is

highly probative of truthfulness”).

5. Bad Checks:16 Dinges v. Winstead, 2009 WL 1099190, at *6 (W.D. Pa.

Apr. 23, 2009) (“writing bad checks [and] theft by deception” are crimen

falsi crimes); Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 890 F.2d 652, 656

n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (convictions for forgery and passing bad checks

“involved dishonesty activity”).

16Commonwealth v. Young, 638 A.2d 244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (crimes of
dishonesty graded at summary level may be used for credibility determination).

18
 These numerous convictions are “peculiarly probative”17 and show “that the

witness has a propensity to lie….” United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 893

(6th Cir. 2012).

3. No Credibility or Reliability Should Be Associated with “Amelia

Breitenbach’s” provided information.

While a named witness could potentially have a presumption of

credibility, that name “Amelia Breitenbach” is not such a name. Presumptive

credibility of the name “Amelia Breitenbach” listed in an affidavit of probable cause

without any interview, investigation into information connected with that name, or

confirmation that the named person “Amelia Breitenbach” is not the same Amelia

Freno a/k/a Amelia Breitenbach that is a multiple convicted felon for crimes of

dishonesty.

The Commonwealth attempts to bolster the information provided by “Amelia

Breitenbach” in Paragraphs 11 and 12 by stating that the police confirmed a single

item from her statement. She identifies Raymond Seddon as the owner. However,

that is the only item that is corroborated by the police. Ownership of property is

publicly available information which does not bolster reliability. Commonwealth v.

Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1052 (Pa. 2012); see also United States v. Mendonsa, 989

F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere confirmation of innocent static details is

insufficient to support an anonymous tip. The fact that a suspect lives at a

H.R.Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. &
17

Ad.News 7098, 7103.

19
particular location or drives a particular car does not provide any indication of

criminal activity.”); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996)

(holding insufficient probable cause was presented in an affidavit where “the only

corroboration [affiant] provided was that the informant's directions to [defendant’s]

home were correct. Almost anyone can give directions to a particular house without

knowing anything of substance about what goes on inside that house….”).18 Here,

“Amelia Breitenbach’s” only corroboration is a public fact: Raymond Seddon’s

publicly listed address.

“Amelia Breitenbach’s” letter provides no support for probable cause. Instead,

given the long criminal history of crimen falsi crimes associated with this name, and

the fact that law enforcement failed to confirm to check anything other than

Raymond Seddon’s address severely harms any notion of support for a finding of

probable cause.

C. The Total Value of the Two Letters

These two letters provide no support for probable cause. On their face, they

are mere tips from unproven and anonymous informants which fail to establish

probable cause.19 Upon scrutiny and with the inclusion of materially omitted

information as well as the correction of materially misrepresented information, each

letter creates a strong negative inference to the validity of the affidavit’s entire

18 In Wilhelm, the affidavit of probable cause was so deficient that the Fourth
Circuit held that even the good faith exception could not save the warrant.
19 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983). “The letter provides virtually nothing

from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information
reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the
writer's predictions regarding the [defendants’] criminal activities.” Id.

20
contents. Combined, they form a significant burden to the Commonwealth that

should offset any inclination of finding probable cause. The “catalyst” letter from

“James Watson” proved to be false, as were many of the allegations therein, and the

“support” letter from an “Amelia Breitenbach” was from a “named” person that

lacks credibility in the eyes of the law. At a minimum, law enforcement should have

interviewed in person, discussed on the phone, or simply run a background check on

any of these two names. “More police work was needed.” United States v. Leake, 998

F.2d 1359, 1365 (6th Cir. 1993). Had they done these simple acts, it is

incomprehensible that a reasonable law enforcement officer would run to a

magistrate based on these two sources nor would a reasonable magistrate sign a

warrant based off names connected to a fake person and a person with a long felony

record for crimes of dishonesty within the recent time period. “Upholding this

warrant would ratify police use of an unknown, unproven informant—with little or

no corroboration—to justify searching someone's home.” United States v. Wilhelm,

80 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996).

The two letters provide no support for probable cause. A fake name and a

felonious name do not bolster probable cause. Instead, they cast doubt on the entire

warrant as well as the Commonwealth’s conduct throughout the entire pre-search

and pre-trial process.

21
 D. Although the Two Letters Provide No Credible Information, They
Should be Additionally Stricken Because They Include at a
Minimum, Reckless Misstatements and Omissions

The two letters should be additionally stricken from the affidavit of probable

cause because they represent at a minimum a “reckless disregard for the truth.”

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). The Watson letter misrepresents that

James Watson is a real person. Sometime, in the 1,357 days after the search, the

Pennsylvania State Police determined that James Watson was not a real person.

The Pennsylvania State Police confirmed that a person named Raymond Seddon

lived at a publicly listed address and investigated via Facebook yet failed to confirm

the mere existence of the key informant that wrote the letter that incited the

request for the search warrant. This is at a minimum reckless.

Additionally, the warrant omits the lengthy criminal history for crimes of

dishonesty for the name “Amelia Breitenbach.”

“[O]missions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in

his ken that ‘any reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of

thing the judge would wish to know.’ Commonwealth v. Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 688

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 787–788 (3d Cir. N.J.

2000)). “[W]here an omission, rather than a misrepresentation, is the basis for a

challenge to an affidavit for an arrest warrant, a court should inquire whether the

affidavit would have provided probable cause if it had contained a disclosure of the

omitted information.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2004) (citing and adopting the standard outlined in United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d

22
737, 743 (3d Cir. Pa.1993)). While Taylor outlines omissions concerning affidavits

of probable cause in the arrest warrant context, the standard should equally apply

to affidavits of probable cause in the search warrant content. Both are sworn

affidavits made to a neutral magistrate and under the same standard.

The inclusion of the omitted information, and the fact that the affidavit fails

to contain any information that the affiant spoke or met with this “Amelia

Breitenbach” to determine whether she was the felon Amelia Breitenbach or a

credible concerned citizen would concern any reasonable, neutral magistrate. The

inclusion of the omitted information would offer further value in the context that

the affiant failed to confirm the identity of “James Watson.” Specifically, “Amelia

Breitenbach’s” forgery charge is “the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); see also Com. v.

Jones, 13 Pa. D. & C.4th 351, 355 (Com. Pl. Bucks 1992) (suppression granted

because the police failed to investigate one informant’s background that contained

crimen falsi crimes and omitted knowledge of another informant’s similar crimes

which “constituted a reckless disregard for the truth which tended to mislead the

issuing authority”).

23
IV. The Defendants Have Legitimate Expectations of Privacy and
Standing to Challenge, But Those Facts Are Moot Because the
Commonwealth Willfully Failed to Meet Its Burden

The Commonwealth’s brief and its presentation at the April 11th hearing

blends standards of privacy and standing in an attempt to cure its intentional

failure to meet its burden at the April 11th hearing.

The Commonwealth foundations its privacy interest argument by quoting

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. 1996). However, in an additional

attempt to bypass its failure, it deceptively omits the Supreme Court’s footnote that

should be included within the quotation marks. The footnote reads, “This does not

alter the Commonwealth's burden of proving at the suppression hearing that the

government's search did not violate the rights of the defendant.” Rather than admit

defeat, the Commonwealth once again withholds, deceives, and attempts to trick the

Court. By failing to present a single witness, the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden, and without misstatements of fact and law, it cannot prevail. At this point,

the Court could grant suppression. The Superior Court would affirm the ruling, and

so would the Supreme Court. See Section I of this brief.

Nevertheless, the cases cited by the Commonwealth are distinguishable from

the case sub judice and many of the Commonwealth’s arguments do not conform

with the law.

In Gordon, the police received a call that a man had snatched a purse in

downtown Philadelphia and received a description of the suspect. Upon arrival,

“[t]he officer proceeded to a rear alley where an elderly man told him that a man

24
fitting the description of the perpetrator had been living in an abandoned house

down the alley. 683 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. 1996). As the officer went further into the

alley, he noticed a house that stood out from the rest. He entered the house from an

open rear door that had partially separated from the door frame. Inside he

discovered the suspect and the purse. Id. at 69.

In Peterson, the defendant sold drugs from an abandoned storefront in

Philadelphia. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 616 (Pa. 1993). An

anonymous informant told police that drug sales were occurring at this abandoned

storefront. To investigate, an undercover officer went to the establishment and

purchased drugs. After securing the drugs, he went back to his vehicle and waited

for additional officers. When they arrived, the police conducted a warrantless search

of the abandoned storefront. The police justified the warrantless search through

exigency. Id. at 616-17.

The present case is distinguishable because, unlike Gordon and Peterson, the

property was not abandoned and the co-defendant daughters had a legitimate

presence on their mother’s property. In Gordon and Peterson, the suspect had no

connection to the owners of the properties. They both involved searches of

abandoned buildings. Additionally, these cases involved warrantless searches

rather than the scenario sub judice: the Commonwealth backtracking from a fatally

flawed warrant.

The Commonwealth’s argument simultaneously confuses criminal procedure

and real property law in its attack on privacy. In support of this argument, the

25
Commonwealth argues that expectation of privacy is only established where a

person can exclude another from the property. Further, the only way that a person

can exclude is through an ownership in the property. The Commonwealth conflates

property ownership with the sole basis for the expectations of privacy. Not so.

Expectation of privacy exists even in instances where there is no ownership of the

real property. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (houseguest has a

legitimate expectation of privacy in a host's home even if that guest has no property

interest in the home); United States v. Benson, 12 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1993) (non-

owner defendant “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother's home, and

standing to challenge its search.”); United States v. Dubose, 2006 WL 1030154, at *7

(D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2006), (“the circumstances of this case-involving a common social

practice and a close familial nexus to the property, as well as the subjective belief of

defendant that his personal property was secure when left on his mother's property-

support a finding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his

mother's backyard during the time that the vehicle was parked there”).

It argues that none of the Defendants – including co-owner20 Charlotte

Binakonsky – could have prevented co-owner Raymond Seddon from the property.

This argument has no relevancy to the case sub judice for the purpose raised by the

Commonwealth.21 Additionally, the Commonwealth makes a bald assertion –

20
21It is merely a restatement of real property law: whether held as joint tenants,
tenants in common, or tenants by the entirety, co-owners generally cannot exclude
another co-owner from accessing to the property.

26
without citation – that “[n]one of the three Defendants could have…prevented

[Raymond Seddon] from allowing others to access the property….” While the

Commonwealth presents this as the law in every scenario, this is not always true.22

A person doesn’t waive privacy based on the mere fact that they may own or

reside within multiple properties. For example, in Rakas, the owner of that summer

cabin had a privacy interest regardless of that address being listed on their driver’s

license. Here, the two co-defendant daughters were present on their owner-mother’s

property at approximately noon on a weekday, and had complete access while their

mother was not present. Further, the property is private property that is not open

to the public for any purpose.

In Paragraph 20 of its brief, the Commonwealth makes a bald claim that all

of the Defendants lack a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the crimes that

were alleged to have occurred on the property. This is absurd.23 Under the

Commonwealth’s logic, if a suspect was allegedly running a drug trafficking

operation from one of their homes, no warrant would be needed because there would

be no expectation of privacy. In support, it once again, cites the Rakas footnote and

22 See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106, (2006) (when one co-tenant
consents to a search while another co-tenant declines, “a physically present co-
occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search
unreasonable and invalid as to him”).
23 United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We also reject the

government's argument that the illegal nature of Fields' activities made any
expectation of privacy regarding the premises unreasonable. Privacy expectations
do not hinge on the nature of defendant's activities—innocent or criminal In fact,
many Fourth Amendment issues arise precisely because the defendants were
engaged in illegal activity on the premises for which they claim privacy interests”).

27
Peterson case which are highly distinguishable. Without any evidence, the

Commonwealth testifies in its brief that the property’s “sole purpose” is in

furtherance of an illegal operation.

The Commonwealth’s standing argument additionally fails because

“contested evidence, tainted by the initial illegality, must be suppressed, even

absent a demonstrable expectation of privacy in the locations where the evidence

was found.” Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 280 (Pa. 2017).

V. The Commonwealth’s Attempt to Shroud these Numerous Defects

Violates the Confrontation Clause and These Deceptive Tactics
Should Not Be Supported by the Court.

“James Watson” is not real. Either the Commonwealth knew that prior to the

request for the search warrant and withheld it from the magistrate, or failed to

conduct even a minimal investigation into “his” background. Once this was learned

by the Pennsylvania State Police, they withheld it from the Defendants, their

counsel, and numerous tribunals. In revealing this critical information, the

Commonwealth does so in an evasive matter and fails to indicate on which of the

1,357 post-search days they discovered this information. Why did the Defendants

and their respective counsel first learn that “James Watson” was a fake name

signed by an unknown person until 929 days after charges were filed, 1,357 days

after the search warrant was approved and executed, and 28 days after the

suppression hearing?

28
 In Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 985 A.2d 975, 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), aff'd,

38 A.3d 816 (Pa. 2012), during cross-examination at the suppression hearing, a

witness revealed that he had provided false information that was used in the

affidavit of probable cause. Based on this revelation, the Superior Court rejected the

Commonwealth’s argument that “an informant's false averments in an affidavit of

probable cause does not warrant suppression of evidence obtained as a result of

those averments under the Pennsylvania Constitution,” and suppressed all seized

evidence. Id. at 978. The Commonwealth’s gamesmanship at the April 11th hearing

was conducted to avoid a similar scenario. Instead, 28 days after the hearing, the

Commonwealth revealed information confirming that James Watson is not a real

person

The name “Amelia Breitenbach” offers no credibility or reliability due to the

name “Amelia Breitenbach’s” lengthy history of crimen falsi crimes. Either the

Commonwealth knew that prior to the request for the search warrant and withheld

it from the magistrate, or failed to even search the name in UJS.

The Commonwealth’s bizarre tactics on April 11 were designed to conceal this

information from cross-examination as well as the Court. The Defendants’ Sixth

Amendment rights were not violated by neglect nor mistake, instead the

Commonwealth acted with deceit. In an attempt to conceal Constitutional

violations, it trampled across other Constitutional protections. As the court in Ryan

warned:

29
 If the procedure followed by the Commonwealth in this case were upheld
then policemen could recite in an affidavit as probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant any and all statements which they felt were
of help in obtaining the warrant, irrespective of the truth or veracity of
those statements, their legality or illegality, or constitutionality or
unconstitutionality, realizing that such statements would be insulated
from defendant's right of cross-examination since the Commonwealth
did not have to call witnesses who would be subject to cross-examination
to establish the facts necessary to support the issuance of the search
warrant.

Commonwealth v. Ryan, 407 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). Unfortunately,

that is exactly what the Commonwealth attempts in the case sub judice.

The Commonwealth knew this information would be revealed under a simple

cross examination, and didn’t want it to be exposed to the Defendants, their counsel,

and the Court. To avoid this scenario, they failed to present any person or thing

with knowledge of anything in the affidavit of probable cause. Instead, the

Commonwealth tried to sneak it in through a court filing that could not be cross

examined…almost a thousand days after charges were filed. This was deception by

design.

CONCLUSION

In the Defendant’s opening brief, the following challenges were raised:

1. The warrant fails to identify any of the items to be seized.

2. The Affidavit of Probable Cause is built from unverified rumors and

thus devoid of probable cause.

30
 3. The warrant is overbroad and authorizes an Unconstitutional

general search.

The Commonwealth fails to respond and thus concedes to the first and third

challenges. Notably, these two challenges - in isolation - render the entire warrant

defective. Although, even if these defects were not present, the affidavit of probable

cause is still insufficient. The contents of the affidavit of probable cause:24

1. The “James Watson” Letter: This is the triggering item that started the

events which place the Defendants before the Court. In less than 24 hours

from first reading this false document, the Pennsylvania State Police and

H.O. Cunningham raided a 150-acre private property with at least a

dozen law enforcement officers. The letter contained horrible, horrific lies

of abuse that started the entire non-investigation, rush-to-the-magistrate

process which led to the illegal search and seizure by H.O. Cunningham

and the Pennsylvania State Police. It contained no reference to “Watson’s”

reliability, the timing of the information listed by “Watson”, nor the source

of “Watson’s” knowledge. Over 1,357 days passed before the

Commonwealth admitted that “James Watson” does not exist and

informed the Defendants of that important information. A simple search –

taking a few minutes of investigation - to confirm this fact was not done

1,371 days ago. Instead, the Pennsylvania State Police checked Facebook.

24A much more thorough analysis of the defects in each of these items is contained
in Defendant’s opening brief in the section entitled “II. The Affidavit Is Built from
Unverified Rumors and Thus Devoid of Probable Cause.”

31
 2. The “Amelia Breitenbach” Letter: At best for the Commonwealth, the

name “Amelia Breitenbach” lends no credibility to the affidavit. In reality,

the name “Amelia Breitenbach” should receive a negative presumption of

credibility for any information conveyed from this letter until the

Commonwealth met with and confirmed that the named “Amelia

Breitenbach” was not the felon Amelia Breitenbach with numerous

convictions of crimen falsi crimes. The affidavit does not include this

information. Additionally, it suffers from the same defects of the Watson

letter: no indication of timing, source of knowledge, reliability, or veracity.

3. Two Facebook Posts: This information doesn’t mention the names of the

purported posters, the timing of the posts, the past reliability of the

posters, the potential source of knowledge of the posters, and continues

vague references like “in the area of” and “possible puppy mill.”

4. H.O. Cunningham’s Hearsay Statements: This information fails to

support a finding of probable cause because it is mere rumor from

unnamed, unverified sources. In short, it is hearsay-upon-hearsay from

unnamed sources that have no indication of reliability.

5. NCIC search showing Raymond Seddon lives at 41 Hamilton Acres Lane:

a publicly available piece of information.

Rather than concede and admit that the warrants’ numerous defects run

afoul of the Defendants’ Constitutional rights, the Commonwealth misleads,

deceives, and ducks the Defendants’ rights and the Court’s honor. There were

32
numerous potential witnesses that could testify about the affidavit of probable

cause the preparation thereof, and the contents therein. Instead the Commonwealth

put a single, general witness that had no pre-search knowledge nor any knowledge

of the contents in the affidavit. This tactic backfired because the Commonwealth

failed to meet its burden. The Defendants never got the opportunity to exercise

their “right to test the veracity of the information contained in the search warrant.”

Commonwealth v. Ryan, 268 Pa. Super. 259, 264–65, 407 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1979).

Simply, “[t]o rule otherwise would permit police in every case to exaggerate or to

expand on the facts given to the issuing authority merely for the purpose of meeting

the probable cause requirement, thus precluding an objective determination of

whether probable cause for the warrant existed.” Id.

The Commonwealth knew that this information would be revealed, and that

it would severely impact the narrative that it has presented to the public and the

Court for over 1300 days. Instead, it ducked the Court’s authority, the Defendants’

rights, and the Constitutions. There was no opportunity to test the veracity. Only a

person can be cross-examined. Numerous questions are opined in the Defendant’s

brief concerning the two “letter writers.” Questions concerning their identities,

interviews, and criminal records are explored. One answer would have confirmed

that “James Watson” was a fake person that was never interviewed by the

Commonwealth. Another answer would tell whether the referenced “Amelia

Breitenbach” in the warrant is the same “Amelia Breitenbach” located in Allegheny

County that is a three-time convicted felon with numerous crimes of dishonesty

33
including acquiring controlled substances through misrepresentation, forgery,

fraud, and theft by deception. The Defendants were never able to explore whether

the Commonwealth knew – and withheld from the magistrate – this information.

This information is “the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.” Taylor, 850

A.2d at 688.

While the Commonwealth finally revealed that “James Watson” is not real in

its brief, it failed to answer any of the nearly identical questions concerning the

other named informant, Amelia Breitenbach. Once again, the Commonwealth

commits another deception upon the Court. Partial answers that withhold material

information are frauds by omission. At this point in this case, it is simply the

Commonwealth’s standard playbook: duck, evade, and avoid the Constitutional

protections provided to the Defendants….and try to cover up its mess.

The Commonwealth says its interpretation is practical, prudent, and

reasonable. “Common sense”25 shows that failing to suppress would be the opposite.

Following the Commonwealth’s logic would make the following scenario

Constitutionally sound:

A single person with numerous felonies for crimes of dishonesty sends a

letter to an animal control officer and posts information on Facebook.
After this letter fails to get attention, this person sends a letter using a
fake name to law enforcement to bolster the previous letter that failed
to get attention. In both letters, outlandish, over-the-top claims are used
to create urgency even though they have nearly no basis in fact. Law
enforcement checks a single fact which is a fact that is publicly known –
the address of the person named in the letter – and then raids a property
without checking anything other than rumor and Facebook.

25 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

34
The Constitutions are stronger than this. The Court should grant suppression. The

Superior Court would affirm the ruling, and so would the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court

grant the relief requested in the suppression motion.

Respectfully submitted:

Steffan T. Keeton, Esq.

Attorney at Law

35
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy
of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and
Trial Courts that require filing confidential information and documents differently
than non-confidential information and documents.

Submitted by: Steffan T. Keeton, Esq.

Signature:
Name: Steffan T. Keeton, Esquire
Attorney No. (if applicable): 314635
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL COURT DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA,
NO.: CR 711-2021
vs.

EMILY BINAKONSKY,

Defendant

ORDER

AND NOW, this ______ day of _______________________, 2022, upon

consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, it is hereby ORDERED

and DECREED that that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED and that all

evidence obtained from 41-43 Hamilton Acres Lane is hereby

SUPPRESSED.

BY THE COURT:

____________________________
Judge Valarie Costanzo