ctbuh.

org/papers

Title: Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade?

Author: Daniel J. O’Connor, Vice President, Schirmer Engineering Corporation

Subjects: Façade Design

Fire & Safety

Keywords: Building Code

Façade
Fire Safety

Publication Date: 2008

Original Publication: CTBUH Journal, 2008 Issue II

Paper Type: 1. Book chapter/Part chapter

2. Journal paper
3. Conference proceeding
4. Unpublished conference paper
5. Magazine article
6. Unpublished

© Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat / Daniel J. O’Connor

Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade?
Introduction building and building’s occupants. In this
paper, the mechanisms of fire spread at the
Visually, it is often the goal of skyscraper
façade and the recognized fire safety
architecture to define a personality or
considerations will be reviewed. The code
individual character through the design of any
provisions and current test standards
skyscraper’s façade. This face or skin, wrapped
applicable to perimeter fire barrier systems
to the structural frame beneath, is often key to
(installed between the façade and slab edge)
an architect’s desire to evoke our emotions,
will be reviewed including discussion of why
instilling a sense of grandeur as if each new
developing standards may jeopardize
skyscraper were an artist’s sculpture. Indeed, a
Author architects’ creative designs in the future. More
Daniel J. O’Connor P.E., FSFPE
trip to any library to browse the many books
importantly, as architects develop new and
on high-rise architecture or skyscrapers
Schirmer Engineering Corporation
leading edge creative curtain wall designs, it
provides us with page after page of
707 Lake Cook Road becomes more critical to consider the risk
photographs of hundreds of towering
Deerfield, IL 60015 factors that can impact the building’s overall
structures, each with a face and personality as
e: dan_oconnor@schirmereng.com level of fire safety. This paper will outline the
unique as the architects and engineers that
Mr. Daniel J. O’Connor P.E. is Vice-President of list of risk factors that may influence issues of
Engineering for Schirmer Engineering and received imagined and designed each tower.
curtain wall fire safety design and discuss what
his B.S. degree in Fire Protection Engineering from the
In recent decades the desire for taller building systems and features can factor into
Illinois Institute of Technology in 1979 and his M.S.
Degree in Fire Protection Engineering from the structures and, particularly, those that are an analysis to validate a given curtain wall’s
University of Maryland in 1992. In 2004 Mr. O’Connor competing for recognition to be among the design details.
was elected to the grade of Fellow in the Society of
tallest, if not the world’s tallest, is reason to
Fire Protection Engineers. Mr. O’Connor is a member
of five NFPA Technical Committees that include NFPA review the fire safety issues related to façade or
72, Fire Alarm Code, and the Chair of the NFPA 101 curtain wall design. Additionally, due to the Mechanisms of Fire Spread
Technical Committee on Healthcare Occupancies. He
creativity of architects, new and unique façade Our understanding of the mechanisms of
has been involved in numerous tall building projects
during his career including the Harold Washington designs are continually appearing. In 2005 at floor-to-floor fire spread at the curtain wall
Library Center in Chicago, fire and egress modeling the 7th World Congress of the Council on Tall have been established by the work of fire
for the Prudential Center in Boston, fire modeling
Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH) many researchers and fire engineers dating back to
analysis for Phoenix City Hall in Phoenix and the new
Trump Tower in Chicago. He currently serves as the unique designs were showcased with twisted the 1960’s-70’s, curtain wall fire testing work
principal fire protection and life safety engineer on facades, categorized as tordos or twisters done in the1990’s, and the continuing testing
three recent major tall building projects in Chicago –
(Vollers 2005). These unique designs veer from efforts of product manufacturers and testing
McCormick Place West Expansion, Block 37, and the
610 meter(2000 feet) tall Chicago Spire. the more traditional continuous vertical façade laboratories. From a fire dynamics perspective,
surfaces of the past, often using curved we know that flames emitting from an exterior
surfaces and rotated floor plates that window can extend higher than 5 m (16.5 ft)
The code provisions and current test complicate the facade connections and above the top of the window. Yokoi reported
standards applicable to perimeter fire barrier hidden details of fire barrier assemblies. such results in 1960. One test of Yokoi’s was a
systems may jeopardize architects’ creative Double curtain wall systems, where two glazed test room with plywood walls/ceilings and a
designs in the near future. As architects walls are separated by distances of less than a fire load of 40 kg/m2 (8 lb/ft2), which is
develop new and leading edge creative meter, are being implemented. These twisted characteristic of residential occupancies and at
curtain wall designs, it is important to façade designs, double skin designs and other the lower end of the fire load scale. The hot
develop an understanding of how various new facade creations this author has gases from the fire room window measured
components of the facade and the facade encountered pose new challenges from a fire 400-600°C (750°-1,112°F) at 1,750 mm (5.75 ft)
orientation can influence fire performance. engineering perspective. The risk of fire spread above the top edge of the fire room window.
In context of the whole building, this paper through articulated elements of the façade or The glass broke out under this exposure.
outlines a list of risk factors that may vertically around the facade via the
Analysis of 400 fire compartment experiments
influence issues of curtain wall fire safety mechanism of flame leap, poses new concerns
(Thomas and Heselden 1972) helped to more
design and discusses the building features for the newest class of super high-rise
fully explain the physical phenomena of
and occupancy characteristics that can structures. The concerns revolve around the
ventilation controlled fires. Ventilation-
factor into an analysis to validate a given issues of fire department response capabilities,
controlled fires represent the scenario where a
curtain wall concept. reliability of sprinkler systems and associated
fire burning in a building breaks the window
water supplies, and the characteristics of the

30 | Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II

 Figure 1. Exterior curtain wall and floor fire exposure mechanisms. Figure 2. Impact of horizontal and vertical projections on
(Schirmer Engineering, 2007) window plume. (Oleszkiewicz Nov.1990, Fire Technology, p. 366)

glazing, permitting hot gases to flow out the knowledge of fire dynamics allows us to Exterior building detailing, articulations
top portion of the opening. A portion of the understand how the building interior areas incorporated as elements of the facade and
hot gases are unable to burn inside the room and curtain wall can be attacked by fire in structural floor plate changes can all impact
due to limited air (ventilation controlled) but, three principal ways. Figure 1 illustrates the the flame projection and associated corrective
upon movement to the exterior, encounter potential temperature and heat flux and radiation heat exposure to the façade.
sufficient air entrainment, allowing the hot fuel characteristics of a fully developed, Work done at the National Research Council of
gases to burn outside the building. The result unsprinklered compartment fire. Canada (Oleszkiewicz 1990-91), showed the
is a flame projecting out and upward from the The three principal mechanisms at work in extent to which a horizontal projection located
window. From a visual perspective, flame Figure 1 are as follows: above flames issuing from a window can be
extension is estimated at the point that flame effective at reducing the flame exposure. This
temperature drops below 540 °C (1,000 °F), • Inside – Flames and fire gases in the work also showed that vertical exterior
which corresponds to the flame no longer building attack the interior surfaces and elements could have a negative impact by
appearing luminous. details of the curtain wall and associated increasing the vertical projection of flames
perimeter fire barrier materials. along a façade. Figure 2 illustrates the change
Taking the data of various researchers, Ove
Arup & Partners was commissioned to develop • Outside – Flames and hot gases projecting in fire flame position and extension due to a
a number of correlations to estimate flame from fire-broken glazing or other openings horizontal projection above a window and
projections and flame temperatures under directly impinge on the curtain wall exterior vertical panels located at each side of a
natural or forced draft conditions (Law and face (convection). window. 
O’Brien 1975). We know from this work that • Outside – Flames projecting from fire-
the fire flame projection and temperature broken glazing or other openings radiate
profile will be a factor of window area and heat to and through glazed surfaces or
height, room geometry, fuel contents and through other openings to building
burning rate, and wind velocity. In review, our contents and furnishings.

CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade | 31

 “Technology allows us to go as high as we want. For example, in the Background on Current Code
Practices
past, elevators were a challenge – but not any more.”
Today’s codes such as the 2007 International
Hamid Kia, Director of Middle East Operations at RMJM Hillier, discusses how architects and Building Code and the National Fire Protection
engineers are attempting to break new records by raising taller and taller buildings into the sky. Association’s 2006 Building Construction and
From “Reaching for the Clouds” by Angela Giuffrida, The Nation, June 16 Safety Code (NFPA 5000) recognize that with a
properly designed and operational sprinkler
system, the threat of fire spread along the
In terms of hazard reduction or increase, Figure window showed a significant decrease in heat exterior of the curtain wall is effectively
3 illustrates how the deflection of the flame by flux with horizontal flame deflectors in place. mitigated. This is a critical assumption that
a horizontal projection reduces the heat For example, at the 1 m height above the deserves further consideration in the context
transferred to the wall above the burning window opening, heat flux ranged from of super high-rise buildings and is discussed in
compartment. Conversely, the vertical approximately 50 kw/m2 to 100 kw/m2. detail later.
projections increase the heat transfer to the However, as indicated in Figure 4 at the 1 m From a fire containment perspective, there are
wall. The increase in heat flux with vertical height, total heat flux was reduced by currently two basic ways to provide a code
projections installed is due to the restriction of approximately 55 %, 60 % and 85 % complying curtain wall design in fully
lateral air entrainment, which forces a respectively for projections of 0.3, 0.6 and sprinklered buildings. The most basic approach
lengthening of the gas plume as it seeks to 1.0 m. These reductions show the is for the curtain wall to be supported directly
entrain more air for combustion. Oleszkiewicz effectiveness of a horizontal projection. By on the structural floor slab edge, which
conducted propane fueled experiments in a comparison, Oleszkiewicz noted that a vertical precludes any gap or joint condition, given
three-story high facility using a window of spandrel wall was not found to be a practical that the floor slab is continuous to or extends
2.6 m width and 1.37 m high (8.5 ft x 4.5 ft) means of protection against flames issuing past the building envelope. This type of
and fires on the order of 6 MW. Horizontal from an opening. Achieving a 50 % decrease installation would permit floor-to-floor glazed
projections of 0.3, 0.6 and 1.0 m (approximately in heat flux exposure via a vertical spandrel curtain wall assemblies in fully sprinklered
1, 2, and 3.3 ft) were compared to the case of panel in this same test would require a 2.5 m buildings as shown in Figure 5. This approach
flames issued out the window along a vertical (8.2 ft) high spandrel. It is noted that the same is sometimes observed in high-rise building
wall with no projections. Heat flux (connective performance in heat flux reduction was design, but it is not the most common
+ radiative) measurements taken at 1 m, 2 m, achieved with the 0.3 m (1 ft) horizontal approach for the installation and support of
3 m (3.3, 6.6, 10.8 ft) above the top of the projection at 1 m (3.3 ft) above the opening. curtain walls. The second approach is

Figure 3. Decrease and increase of heat transfer for horizontal and vertical projections on Figure 4. Heat transfer comparison of exposures for 0.3, 0.6 and 1.0 m horizontal flame reflectors.
window plume. (Oleszkiewicz Nov.1990, Fire Technology, p. 367) The data is normalized to readings taken at 1m above the opening with no horizontal deflector.
(Oleszkiewicz Nov.1991, Fire Technology, p. 339)

32 | Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II

 The methodology for compliance with either fire barrier system. A T-rating is expressed in
the criteria of item 1 above or item 2 is hours for perimeter fire barrier systems that do
essentially the same, the former being the not show a temperature rise of 181˚C (325 ˚F)
original performance intent statement which for any individual thermocouple, or a
evolved into the more recent and formally temperature rise of 139 ˚C (250 ˚F) for
defined ASTM Standard. Although a defined averaged thermocouple points (required for
ASTM Standard does exist, there is confusion in wide voids). T-ratings are typically on the order
the building industry among design architects of 0, ¼ and ½ hour.
and fire engineers resulting from differences in
the rating criteria imposed by various testing
laboratories. Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Insulation Rating:
certifies perimeter fire barrier systems under This rating provided under the UL certification
the product category “Perimeter Fire Barrier process is similar to the T-Rating per the ASTM
Figure 5. (left) Curtain wall supported on Slab edge. Containment Systems”. The systems certified E2307 procedure; however, UL additionally
(Schirmer Engineering, 2007) by UL use the same two-story large scale fire evaluates the temperature rise on the
test apparatus as are described in the ASTM unexposed interior surface of the curtain wall
Figure 6. (right) Curtain wall hung off Slab edge. E2307 Standard. However, the systems certified assembly above the fill materials. This is
(Schirmer Engineering, 2007)
by UL are measured in four aspects – an intended to determine if fire can spread to a
F-Rating, a T-Rating, an Integrity Rating and an floor above through the curtain wall
applicable when the curtain wall assembly is Insulation Rating. The ASTM E2307 Standard construction and not just the fill material of the
positioned just outside the edge of a fire rated requires the reporting of an F-Rating and a perimeter fire barrier system. Insulation ratings
floor system, such that a void space results T-Rating. This is in contrast to the F-rating are typically on the order of 0, ¼ and ½ hour.
between the floor system and the curtain wall which is the only requirement stipulated by
assembly as shown in Figure 6. the 2006 IBC and NFPA 5000 (per code change
Integrity Rating:
The noted codes require that the void space at proposal.) It is important to understand these
This rating provided under the UL certification
the slab edge in Figure 6 be sealed with an ratings and the purpose behind each rating.
process is similar to the F-Rating per the ASTM
approved material or system to prevent the E2307 procedure; however, UL additionally
interior spread of fire (IBC 713.4, NFPA 5000 evaluates if there is any flame passage or
F-Rating:
8.9.3). This requires some form of a joint system surface flaming on the interior surface of the
An F-rating evaluates the most fundamental
or what today are called “perimeter fire barrier curtain wall assembly above the fill materials.
function of a perimeter fire barrier system. The
systems.” The basic performance criterion for In addition, the glazing above the fire exposed
F-rating is given if the vertical passage of flame
these perimeter fire barrier systems is either floor is monitored to determine when the
and hot gases sufficient to ignite a cotton pad
one of the following: glazing breaks. The intent of monitoring the
is prevented by the perimeter fire barrier
system. This is testing the ability of the glazing integrity is to identify how long in
perimeter fire barrier system to maintain fire hours the curtain wall glazing will survive,
1. Such material or systems shall be securely
resistance in the void space between the resisting the fire leapfrog that has been
installed and capable of preventing the
interior surface of the curtain wall assembly observed to occur in multi-story buildings.
passage of flame and hot gases sufficient to
ignite cotton waste, where subject to ASTM and the floor slab edge. The F-rating is The F-Rating and Integrity Rating are
E119 time-temp fire conditions for a time expressed in hours (e.g. 2 hours) for sometimes interrelated in that a perimeter fire
period equal to the fire resistance of the comparison to the fire resistance rating of an barrier system will not be capable of achieving
floor assembly, or associated floor assembly. an F-Rating if the curtain wall does not
maintain integrity and allows the perimeter fire
2. Such material or systems are to be tested
barrier system to become dislocated or
in accordance with ASTM E2307, “Standard T-Rating: displaced during the fire test. This is generally
Test Method for Determining Fire Resistance A T-rating evaluates the extent of temperature the case for fully glazed curtain wall systems
of Perimeter Fire Barrier Systems Using increase on the non-fire side of the perimeter that incorporate glazed insulated spandrel
Intermediate-Scale Multi-Story Test fire barrier system. The temperature panels. The failure mode for such assemblies
Apparatus”. measurements are taken at a point 25.4 mm occurs if the spandrel glazing and framing
(1 in.) or less above the fill materials perimeter members are not sufficiently insulated. 

CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade | 33

Under these conditions, the perimeter fire Loss History glass set in steel frames supported on a
barrier system fill materials will fall out of place The threat of floor-to-floor fire spread at the concrete spandrel (14.2 in. high) that was
when the glazing panel and associated exterior façade of any building is real and integral with the concrete floor slab. Every
insulation fail to maintain a compression fit confirmed via actual unsprinklered high-rise other section of windows was operable. From
with the fill materials of the perimeter fire building fires. A number of incidents have the 4th and 5th floors, the fire spread up the
barrier system. This has often resulted in been identified in the literature (Shriver 2006, open stairs to involve the 6th and 7th floors.
confusion and frustration for architects Belles 1986, Peterson 1973, Lathrop 1977, As heat broke window glass, flames broke out
desiring to use full height, floor-to-floor glazed Demers 1982). The extent of fire spread in ten the north side on all four floors, forming a
openings. well known incidents has been reviewed in flame front that exposed three or four floors
order to report some key observations of past above the department store. The heat from
incidents which are graphically represented in exposing flames ignited combustible ceiling
Given that the 2006 IBC and NFPA 5000 codes tiles and wood partitions on each floor. The
Figure 7.
only require the void at the intersection of the estimated time for full involvement of the
curtain wall and the floor assembly be façade after flame had emerged from the
protected with fire barrier fill materials, there is department store floors was 15 minutes.
often confusion. There are no formally Approximately 300 people fled to the roof top
published tested perimeter fire barrier systems heliport and were eventually rescued by
that allow for floor-to-floor height vision helicopters. Fire department response involved
glazing. This is mostly an artifact of the nature 28 pumpers, numerous tank trucks, and four
of compression-fit type fire barrier methods aerial ladders.
and their integration with fully glazed curtain
walls. If a tested perimeter fire barrier system
could be shown to stay in-place in the void First Interstate Bank Building, Los Angeles,
after the glazing failed, then code compliance CA, USA, 62-story office building (Klem
would be achieved. Howver, the extent of the 1988):
failed glazing may raise concerns for flames In 1988 this fire started on an office floor, and
readily entering adjacent spaces above. This by the time the fire department arrived, a
lack of such capable perimeter fire barrier significant portion of the floor was involved in
Figure 7. Fire involved floors of ten past high-rise fire
systems poses a challenge to curtain wall incidents. flame. Fire extended to four floors before
designers/architects who wish to create being contained after 3-1/2 hours. The
façades using expansive vision glass panels. building was being retrofitted with sprinklers,
The issue of performance expectations of non- The following four summaries provide some but the system was not operational at the time
fire rated curtain walls and the associated context of the fire severity that is possible in of the fire. A 3-inch void between the floor slab
perimeter fire barrier assembly has been a exterior facade fire spread events. The and the exterior aluminum and glass curtain
significant item of discussion in the United summaries are based on information extracted wall was filled with thermal insulating material
States. As a result of recent code changes, it is from the noted references: extending approximately 18 in. above and
reported (Koffel 2005) that the code intent is to below the floor slab. Gypsum board enclosed
recognize that if the curtain wall assembly Andraus Building, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 31 the safing material above the floor slab. The
does not have the same fire resistive capability stories, (Willey 1972): insulation below the floor deck was open to a
of the floor slab, then the system protecting This building was a department store ceiling return air plenum. About 40 persons
the void space need not perform after curtain occupying the basement and seven stories were in the building. The fire department
wall integrity is lost. above grade. The 8th to 31st floors were office rescued two others from the 37th floor and
use. In 1972 this fire occurred on the 4th floor one from the 50th. The fire department with
of the department store. The fire developed on 64 fire companies and 383 fire fighters made a
the four floors of the department store and stand on the not-yet-involved 16th floor and
then spread externally up the side of the was able to stop further spread.
building, involving another 24 floors. The fire
gutted most areas of the building. A total of 16
fatalities resulted. The building façade had
extensive floor-to-ceiling areas of ¼-inch plate

34 | Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II

One Meridian Plaza, Philadelphia, PA, USA, • In several incidents occupants fled to the
30 stories (Klem 1991): roof of the building to be rescued by
In 1991 this fire started on the 22nd floor in a helicopters. In contrast, many of today’s
vacant office in a pile of linseed-soaked rags. It super high-rise buildings will not have an
burned for more than 19 hours, completely accessible roof to facilitate occupant rescue
consuming eight floors. There were three operations.
firefighter fatalities, and 24 were injured. The
exterior of the building was covered by granite • Fire spread was attributable to broken
curtain wall panels with glass windows windows and flame extension along the
attached to the perimeter floor girders and exterior facades. The number of floors
spandrels. Exterior vertical fire spread occurred involved was as few as two stories in a 32
as a result of exterior window breakage, and story building, but ranged up to as many as
this was the cited primary means of fire spread. 23 stories in three of the ten incidents
There were no sprinklers in the building up to reviewed.
the 30th floor, where ten sprinklers supplied by
fire department pumpers are reported to have • The value of sprinklers was observed in the
stopped fire spread. Only building staff were in One Meridian Plaza incident where ten
the building at the time of the fire. Fire attack sprinklers supplied by fire department
Figure 8. Hypothetical illustration of a complex constructed
was hampered by heavy smoke, complete pumpers are reported to have stopped fire
curtain wall assembly using an inclined glazing surface with
failure of the building’s electrical system, and spread. It is reported (Klem 1991) that the slight bottom extension of the glazing to create a shingle
inadequate water pressure. Firefighting was sprinklers activated as a result of heat effect.
abandoned after 11 hours due to risk of transmission via broken windows and
structural collapse. through the void space that existed a number of components are used to build,
between the floor slab and exterior granite support and anchor the curtain wall system to
Parque Central, East Tower, Caracas, façade, as well as heat conduction through the structure. Additional materials such as
Venezuela, 56-story office building: the floor slab. As combustibles ignited at mineral wool are needed to provide perimeter
In 2004 this fire started on the 34th floor and multiple locations, the sprinklers operated fire barrier protection. Although it can be
eventually extended all the way to the top of and extinguished the fires. straightforward to design and size the
the 56-story building. There were no components to readily fit together and form
functioning sprinkler systems. Pumps and an appropriate weather enclosure, it is difficult
standpipe systems apparently were not Curtain Wall Components – to know how the components and
working. Photographs show evidence of fire Performance Factors attachment methods will survive a high
spread along the exterior façade. The building Curtain walls are a relatively complex temperature flame exposure and the resulting
was unoccupied, but three employees and up combination of components that include induced thermal expansion, particularly, when
to about 25 firefighters were injured. aluminum frames, vision glass; spandrel panels unlike materials are needed to work together.
Firefighters backed by helicopters and troops of glass, metal or stone; metal back pans; Consider that aluminum loses roughly 50% of
battled the blaze for 12 hours before insulation; gaskets; sealants; and anchors or its strength at 200˚C and will melt in the range
abandoning the effort due to fear of structural connectors of steel or aluminum. Given a fully of 550-600˚C. The steel component is not
collapse. developed fire exposure in a room or space expected to melt, but will expand, inducing
(i.e. sprinkler system out of service or failure stress in other elements of the composite
Several observations are apparent upon review scenario) bordered by a building’s curtain wall assembly. In Figure 8, potential flame
of the ten reviewed incidents, which point to system, it can be expected that vision glass exposure to the curtain wall components is
fire risk assessment considerations. failure will occur within minutes. Once the likely exacerbated by the geometry of the
failure occurs and flames are extending to the inclined overlapping shingle design.
• Large fire department manpower and exterior, the various curtain wall components The nature of the curtain wall design will
apparatus response was observed in eight and any perimeter fire barrier system are then dictate the relative capability to resist floor-to-
of the ten incidents. In two cases, One subject to thermal forces and degradation that floor fire spread. Key factors that impact the
Merdian Plaza and Parque Central, the fire can result in fire spread to the floor above. curtain wall’s resistance to vertical fire spread
departments abandoned their efforts due to The possible complexity of a curtain wall is are as follows: 
fears of structural collapse. illustrated in Figure 8. In this hypothetical case,

CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade | 35

 • Full height or partial height (e.g. spandrel warp or distort allowing gaps to develop at the significant only if the glass does not break and
panel design) vision glass systems perimeter fire barrier system, and specific maintains its integrity as a solid barrier. A
• Nature of the glass used to construct measures may be needed to stiffen the metal recent study (Shields, Silcock, Flood 2005)
glazing system pans. indicates that double glazed systems exposed
• Nature of the curtain wall components (e.g. to heat fluxes as high as 25-170 kW/m2
framing, spandrel panels) Glass used in curtain wall assemblies may be provided much better integrity than single
• Height of spandrel panels one of several types – float glass which may be glazed systems. Tests using more fire resistant
• Vertical or horizontal projections on heat strengthened or tempered glass, and glass products (Manzello, et al 2007), known as
exterior that may deflect or enhance flame laminated or wired glass. Vision glass can be SAFTI Superlite II XL and Superlite I, showed
behavior single, double or triple glazed, and are typically that single pane glass would fall out of the
• Building geometry at curtain wall – twister, assembled into an insulating glass unit (IGU). frame at temperatures of 400-500 ˚C with
staggered, sloped, etc. Vision glass may also be tinted to provide a nearby heat fluxes measured at 50-70 kW/m2.
• Operable windows/openings – size, heat absorbing quality, or coated to provide a
vertical or horizontal orientation heat reflective capability. All of these features This brief summary of available data suggests
• Ability of perimeter fire barrier system to can impact the performance of glass under fire some limits of performance for glass breakage,
remain in void during fire exposure exposure, however, very little is currently fallout and reduction of heat flux to
known about the fire performance of the wide combustible materials, however, more testing
When full height vision glass systems are used, variety of IGUs that are possible. What we do to determine the performance of large IGUs is
flame extension and heat fluxes to the window know about glass performance is limited to needed to better understand these fire-related
areas above can be expected to be greater standard single glazed assemblies and, performance metrics. It may be that actual
than that expected for curtain walls using a recently, some information on double glazed IGUs may show fire performance benefits not
spandrel panel design. A spandrel panel units has been presented. yet understood, however, full installations with
design will limit the flame extension and Small scale tests (Kim, Lougheed 1990) have framing elements, sealants and gaskets may
reduce heat flux to the areas above by shown that plain float glass exposed to play a key role – positive or negative. Such full
providing an opaque surface to block the heat radiation at 10 kW/m2 and 40 kW/m2 in glass scale installations are not known to have been
transfer. To prevent the leapfrog effect using a broke at temperatures of 150-175 ˚C within tested to any degree that allows for reasonable
spandrel design requires a vertical spandrel eight minutes and one minute respectively. In conclusions about installed performance.
dimension of approximately four and five feet these same tests, heat strengthened and
in order to match the performance, tempered glass survived 43 kW/m2 for 20 Building geometry and exterior projections of
respectively, of one and two hour fire rated minutes without breaking while reaching the curtain wall or building structural elements
floors (Shriver 2006). The construction of the temperatures of 350 ˚C. Additional small scale can have a beneficial or negative effect on
spandrel can be an important factor to the tests (Mowrer 1998) showed that single glazed flame length extension and heat flux exposure
performance of the perimeter fire barrier windows failed in the range of 40 to 50 kW/m2, to curtain wall elements above the fire
system. Typical aluminum framed curtain walls noting that 33 kW/m2 appeared to be a level compartment. This can be particularly
using spandrel glass require that the glass be below which failure did not occur. important if operable windows or ventilation
appropriately insulated using mineral wool openings are used. Of course, any such
rather than fiberglass-based insulations that Of course, the ignition of materials on the opening can allow the unrestricted passage of
will melt. Additionally, the aluminum mullions unexposed side of a window is of key flames and hot gases from a fire on a floor
require insulation protection; otherwise the importance. It is important to know what below into the floor above. The position of the
aluminum frame will melt and no longer quantity of radiation will be transmitted window or ventilation opening relative to the
support the wall system. These measures will through a glass layer to combustible materials expected flame extension is important in
help keep the glass spandrel panel and any on the unexposed side, given that assessment of the leapfrog risk.
associated fire barrier system intact. Precast 10 – 40 kW/m2 can ignite materials in the
panels offer the advantage of high resistance range of lightweight fabric materials to Today many unique wall designs veer from the
to heat exposure and offer a solid rigid surface common cellulosics (Deal 1995). Again, the more traditional continuous vertical façade
for securely positioning or compression fitting results of small scale tests have shown that a surfaces of the past, often using curved
a perimeter fire barrier system into the void double glazed assembly will absorb surfaces and rotated floor plates that
between the precast panel and the floor slab approximately 90 % of the thermal flux and is complicate the façade connections and
edge. Metal curtain wall panels or metal back capable of reducing heat flux from 100 kW/m2 hidden details of fire barrier assemblies. Such
pans that, when subjected to the fire heat, may to 8 kW/m2 (unsprinklered conditions.) This is new designs can result in an orientation that

36 | Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II

 allows for either more direct flame exposure Risk Assessment Factors
(Figure 9) or diminishes the threat of direct Several factors to consider in a risk assessment
flame contact (Figure 10). It is important to of leapfrog fire spread at the building façade
note that regardless of the facade orientation include, but may not be limited to, the
that wind conditions are a significant factor following:
which may reduce or exacerbate the flame
and temperature exposure. • Automatic Sprinkler Systems’ reliability
• Fire Department/Brigade response
Double curtain wall systems, where two glazed capabilities
walls are separated by distances of less than a • Building height
meter are being implemented. These double- • Building occupancy considerations – e.g.,
skin systems intend to promote high- office, residential, hospitals, mercantile
performance energy efficiency through the • Building compartmentation features
use of natural ventilation and the greenhouse • Building evacuation strategies
effect, and may incorporate automated sun • Fire hazard – fuel loads, continuity of
shading devices and forced ventilation combustibles, compartment sizes
concepts. The risk of fire spread through such • Security threat assessment scenarios
double-skinned façades introduces new
concerns arising from the fact that any flame Sprinklered high-rise buildings have a very
that breaks through the inner façade is successful record of life safety and property
confined to within a long tall shaft-like space protection performance. For this reason, the
as indicated in Figure 11. The dynamics of the IBC and NFPA 5000 do not require fire
Figure 9. An inclined forward curtain wall condition can allow
for more direct flame impingement and higher exposure
flame and radiant heat exposure for this case is resistance rated spandrels or flame deflectors
temperatures on curtain wall components. expected to be more severe than a flame freely at the building façade in fully sprinklered
flowing to the open atmosphere. buildings. There are many sources in the
literature that review this successful record,
however, significant reliance on sprinkler
systems becomes exceedingly more critical for
super high-rises. As the height of buildings
increase, so does the complexity of sprinkler
systems with an integrated network of piping
zones, valves, pumps, power supplies, and
water supply tanks. Many components are
required to be operational and operated
properly for the sprinkler system’s success.
Sprinkler system maintenance can be a major
maintenance activity for today’s super high-
rise buildings and is key to successful
performance. A recent analysis (Hall 2006) of
data from the National Fire Incident Reporting
System (U.S. data) indicates that for all building
types, sprinklers failed to operate in 7 % of
structure fires. The identified reasons for these
failures were 65 % of the systems were shut off,
Figure 11. Double-skinned curtain wall condition showing
16 % were defeated by manual intervention,
vertical cavity which will confine and channel flame and heat 11 % were due to lack of maintenance, 5 % of
vertically. the systems were the wrong type, and 3 %
Figure 10. An inclined backward curtain wall condition can
were due to damaged system components.
diminish the ability of flames to contact the curtain wall These failure rates may or may not be 
components.

CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade | 37

applicable to new super high-rise buildings, Several basic building features and occupancy • Super tall buildings – buildings with large
but it is important to note that human error is considerations that may impact the occupant loads and long total evacuation
the primary factor. Consequently, it is assessment of leapfrog risk are: times (e.g. >1 hour). In an unsprinklered
important for buildings with complex sprinkler super high-rise fire scenario, fire spread by
system design to have features and • Assembly occupancies - have large and vertical means, whether exterior or interior,
redundancies that can overt issues of human potentially dense population of occupants. may unnecessarily subject large numbers
error and maximize sprinkler system reliability. Often these occupancies are found at the occupants to adverse conditions from a
very top levels of super high-rise buildings. single fire event.
Sprinkler system designs can be enhanced to
improve their reliability. Gravity feed systems • High-rise residential – sleeping occupants The relative fire hazard of various occupancies
that do not rely solely on electric pumps and in buildings generally of high degree of fire can present varying levels of concern in
emergency power supplies can assure that resistive construction and floor-to-floor assessment of leapfrog risk. Residential
natural pressures are available to supply compartmentation (except for the façade). occupancies are generally well
sprinklers. Also, piping schemes that use riser The defend-in-place concept has been used compartmented units. In the event of a
cross connections or feeds from alternate in apartment buildings of fire-resistive sprinkler failure and fire spread to a residential
floors can provide additional assurances that a construction, where it can be safer to remain unit on the floor above, it should be
single closed valve does not negate sprinkler in the apartment than to attempt recognized that the fire would not propagate
water flow. Electrical supervision of valves and evacuation. If the defend-in-place concept readily due to the fire-resistive enclosure walls
other sprinkler components has long been is to be viable for the wide variety of of apartment units. Note that this generally
recognized to be a most important feature to possible fire scenarios, then the leapfrog assumes vertical stacking of units. Conversely,
monitor sprinkler operational status. The value issue needs to be addressed. Human in retail or office occupancy, there is far less
of sprinklers was observed in the One Meridian behavior has been, on several occasions, subdivision to provide passive fire
Plaza incident where ten sprinklers supplied by cited as playing a major role in the fatalities containment, increasing the risk of fire spread.
fire department pumpers are reported to have and injuries in high-rise residential buildings Security threat assessment scenarios should
stopped fire spread after burning for 19 hours. (Macdonald 1985, Proulx 1996). Both consider the impact of any damage scenarios
If buildings’ sprinkler systems can be designed authors’ works have seriously questioned on the performance of the buildings fire
so that successive floors cannot be turned off the appropriateness of evacuation of high- protection features and, specifically, the
with a single valve, then a significant level of rise residential buildings, including hotels. sprinkler systems. The survivability of sprinkler
redundancy to protect against leapfrog can be Frequently, occupants who stayed in their system features and water supplies may be
maintained. apartments or hotel rooms were safe and critical to prevent a major fire spread event
uninjured, while those who evacuated that results from a security threat scenario.
Fire department response capabilities need to became casualties. In an unsprinklered
factor into the leapfrog analysis for super high- super high-rise fire scenario, maintaining
rise buildings. Prior incidents in unsprinklered safe floor areas (safe from leapfrog effect) for
buildings demonstrate the difficulty that large, residential occupancies could be a critical Conclusion
capable fire departments may have for need. Our understanding of fire and its mechanisms
buildings 60 stories or less in height. Consider of spread in buildings no longer eludes us,
that many of the new class of high-rise • Hospital facilities – these are facilities in however, the risks of fire spread related to
buildings will double or triple this height. An which occupants can be expected to super high-rise buildings and the facades that
important question in this regard is, “does the require assistance from staff and are define their character has not been well
local fire department have the response physically not capable of relocating down examined. Current code practices recognize
capabilities and response plan to handle an stairs or to the building exterior. This may be the successful record of fully sprinkler
unsprinklered fire in a super high-rise the most critical situation that deserves protected high-rise buildings and only require
building?” If the answer is “no,” then, again, consideration of the leapfrog risk. Horizontal that the void space between the curtain wall
great reliance is shifted to the automatic exits, where a floor is subdivided into two and the floor slab be resistive to fire spread
sprinkler system. fire areas, are often used in hospital facilities using a perimeter fire barrier system. These
and can be a mitigating factor in the risk curtain wall code allowances are key to
assessment for hospitals or other occupancy providing architects with the design freedom
groups. to design unique and creative facades.

38 | Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II

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KLEM, T. (1988). First Interstate Bank Building Fire, Los
Angeles, CA, May 4, 1988. NFPA Fire Investigation Report, Rem Koolhaas speaking to Nicolai
Quincy, MA. Ouroussoff in New York several years ago.
Whilst this viewpoint is widely shared by
close observers of the evolution of cities, not
even Koolhaas, it seems, was prepared for
the explosion in construction in China and
the Persian Gulf, where cities comparable in
size to New York have sprouted up almost
overnight. From “The New, New City” by
Nicolai Ouroussoff, New York Times, June 8

CTBUH Journal | 2008 Issue II Building Façade or Fire Safety Façade | 39