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Chronic Depression Interpersonal Sources Therapeutic
Solutions 1st Edition Jeremy W. Pettit Digital Instant
Download
Author(s): Jeremy W. Pettit, Thomas E. Joiner
ISBN(s): 9781591473060, 1591473063
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 12.09 MB
Year: 2005
Language: english
Chronic
Depression
INTERPERSONAL SOURCES,
THERAPEUTIC SOLUTIONS
Jeremy W.Pettit
Thomas E. Joiner
A M E R I C A N P S Y C H O L O G I C A L A S S O C I A T I O N
W A S H I N G T O N , DC
Copyright © 2006 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved. Except
as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication
may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, including, but not limited
to, the process of scanning and digitization, or stored in a database or retrieval system,
without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Published by
American Psychological Association
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Washington, DC 20002
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The opinions and statements published are the responsibility of the authors, and such
opinions and statements do not necessarily represent the policies of the American
Psychological Association.
Pettit, Jeremy W.
Chronic depression: interpersonal sources, therapeutic solutions / Jeremy W. Pettit and
Thomas E. Joiner.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-59147-306-3
1. Depression, Mental. 2. Interpersonal psychotherapy. I. Title.
RC537.P438 2006
616.85'27—dc22 2005008956
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter 7. Self-Handicapping 85
vii
Chapter 13. Therapeutics 151
References 171
Index 203
viii CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PREFACE
Chronic
Depression
DEPRESSION CHRONICITY:
1
PERSPECTIVES ON FORMS
AND REASONS
3
much of which has focused on depressed women, and much of which has not
examined potential ethnic and cultural differences. The research emphasis
on ethnic majority women is due in part to the higher rates of depression
among women (discussed in chap. 2) and in part to practical issues of obtain-
ing research participants, but it also reflects the need for more investigation
of depression in men and members of ethnic minority groups. Evidence thus
far suggests that the processes outlined in this book may work similarly among
women and men from different ethnic backgrounds, although we emphasize
the importance of further study in these areas.
In addition to the book's foundation on research, there are also specu-
lations included herein; we believe they are reasonable ones, and we label
them as speculations in the book, but ultimately, the judgment as to whether
they are reasonable and useful is left to subsequent psychological and clinical
science.
We begin with a discussion of the chronic nature of depression, includ-
ing the forms depression chronicity can take and current explanations for
why depression is often a chronic problem. We present this discussion first
because depression chronicity represents the heart of this book. In chapter 2,
we examine depression in broader terms to address questions like what is
depression, what is its typical course, and how prevalent is it?
4 CHRONIC DEPRESS/ON
The story with dysthymia is equally astounding. What dysthymia lacks
in acute pain (it is a low-grade depression) it makes up for in sheer length of
episodes. The average length of dysthymic episodes is around a decade, and it
is relatively common for people in their 40s and older to report decades-long
dysthymias (e.g., a woman in her 50s who had experienced persistent, low-
grade depressive symptoms since her teens; a 40-year episode!).
Therefore, episode length or duration is an important form of depres-
sion chronicity. As noted earlier, once depression finally does go away, it
tends to return. The two other important forms of depression chronicity have
to do with depression's return.
Recurrence is defined as the reestablishment of clinical depression fol-
lowing a diagnosis-free period. Someone who recovers fully from a past de-
pression, but then experiences a future depression, can be said to have expe-
rienced a recurrence. Recurrence, too, is of considerable importance, in that
it can affect substantial portions of people's lives (Lee & Murray, 1988).
There are times when people get somewhat better from a past depres-
sion, but some depressive symptoms remain nonetheless. Someone who par-
tially recovers from a past depression but then experiences a subsequent de-
pression is said to have experienced a relapse. Relapse is the resumption of
symptoms in the vulnerable timeframe just following remission of a depres-
sive episode. Here, as with recurrence and with episode duration, depression
relapse is an important concept in that it conveys the very chronic nature of
depression.
There is an important distinction among these three forms of depres-
sion chronicity. In a scenario in which someone is experiencing a long-last-
ing episode, depressive symptoms are an obvious part of the clinical picture.
So, too, with relapse: The person has partially recovered, but depressive symp-
toms remain. In both of these cases, depressive symptoms are part of the
picture. Depression recurrence, however, is different. By definition, recur-
rence includes a period of time when symptoms were not present (i.e., the
person has fully recovered).
Why is this an important distinction? Several theorists have argued
that depressive symptoms have a way of sustaining themselves. In this view,
it is as if depression "feeds off itself," "maintains its own momentum," and
"self-amplifies." A key argument of this book is that these self-sustaining
processes in depression may be interpersonal in nature. But for something to
sustain itself, it has to be there in the first place. Most of the interpersonal
explanations provided here thus apply to episode duration and to relapse (when
some depressive symptoms are present), but they may not apply equally well to
recurrence (when depressive symptoms have been absent for a period of time).
For each of the interpersonal factors described in the following chapters, appli-
cation to episode duration versus relapse versus recurrence is noted.
Although not specifically a form of depression chronicity, one other
fact about depression deserves mention. As pernicious and chronic as it can
DEPRESSION CHRONICITY 5
be, it can also spontaneously disappear (i.e., spontaneous remission). A power-
ful view of depression chronicity will have at least something to say about
spontaneous remission; this too is addressed in later chapters on the interper-
sonal factors.
6 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
Do scenarios like the one just described actually occur? Despite the
intuitive appeal of the scarring model, there are questions about whether
scar and erosive explanations stand up to empirical scrutiny. This view has
been applied primarily to the domains of personality, cognitive style, and
neurobiology, with varying degrees of empirical attention and support.
The possibility that depression changes personality has received the
most empirical attention, and findings are mostly unsupportive of the ero-
sive perspective. In a compelling test of the prediction that a depressive epi-
sode would change personality, Shea, Leon, Mueller, and Solomon (1996)
conducted a 6-year study of a group of people who, at the outset of the study,
were nondepressed and had no past history of depression. At the study's con-
clusion, those who experienced their first-episode of depression during the
6-year study were compared with those who remained well. No support for the
erosive perspective was obtained: The amount of personality change—for
the better or for the worse—was not different between the groups. The Shea
et al. study replicates earlier findings by Rohde, Lewinsohn, and Seeley (1990)
and Zeiss and Lewinsohn (1988). It is interesting to note that few studies on
this question have been conducted among children and adolescents, perhaps
because of the complexities of conceptualization and measurement of per-
sonality among youth. As exceptions to this, Ge and Conger (1999) found
that psychological distress and emotional problems in early adolescence pre-
dicted personality levels of positive and negative emotionality in late adoles-
cence, and Rohde et al. found that self-rated social skills remained lower
after recovery from a depressive episode. Drawing from those studies, one can
make an interesting speculation that depression may erode personality resources
in youth but not adults, because personality may be more malleable in youth
than in adults. In adults at least, depression apparently does not erode person-
ality strengths; depression does not appear to leave a personality scar.
It may, however, erode cognitive and attributional resources, such as
the ability to maintain optimism or to explain the causes of life events in
optimistic ways. This appears to be particularly the case among children but
may not apply to adults (e.g., Hamilton & Abramson, 1983), perhaps be-
cause children's cognitive style is more malleable than that of adults (Turner
& Cole, 1994). In the most comprehensive studies on this issue, Nolen-
Hoeksema, Girgus, and Seligman (1986, 1992) found that the attributional
styles of depressed children deteriorated and did not later ameliorate, even
on remission of symptoms. These results are consistent with the model of
Segal, Williams, Teasdale, and Gemar (1996), who theorized that negative
cognitive patterns, once used and practiced, become more and more easily
activated. With regard to cognitive style, then, depression may be erosive.
We elaborate on this point in our chapter on the interplay of propagatory
and erosive processes (chap. 10).
Beck (1996) hypothesized that a key depression-related phenomenon,
suicidality, may operate similarly. Briefly, Beck theorized that previous sui-
DEPRESSION CHROMCITY 7
cidal experience sensitizes suicide-related thoughts and behaviors such that
they later become more accessible and active. The more accessible and ac-
tive the schemas and modes become the more easily they are triggered (even
in the absence of negative events), and the more severe are the subsequent
suicidal episodes. In recent research, we and our colleagues have found that
as past suicide attempts accumulate, subsequent episodes of suicidality take
on distinct qualities, including stress-independence and a particularly unpre-
dictable course (Joiner & Rudd, 2000; Rudd, Joiner, & Rajab, 1996).
Similar to the cognitive models of Segal et al. (1996) and Beck (1996),
Post (1994) has theorized that the experience of acute stress or of a depres-
sive episode may leave behind "memory" traces at the level of gene expres-
sion that heighten subsequent vulnerability. The model thus proposes a neu-
robiological sensitization process in which the underlying biological
mechanisms responsible for depression-free functioning are permanently
eroded, thus sensitizing the individual to stress. As the individual becomes
more sensitized, less stress is required to trigger a depressive reaction.
The erosive perspective, with regard to cognitive style and neurobiol-
ogy (but probably not to personality), holds promise with regard to explain-
ing depression chronicity and guiding clinical interventions (e.g., rehabili-
tating eroded domains of functioning). The perspective is limited, however,
by a small empirical base. An additional difficulty is that there are features of
depressive chronicity that the perspective does not adequately explain. For
example, why is it that interpersonal factors, arguably above all others (e.g.,
Hooley & Teasdale, 1989), comprise very strong predictors of depression
chronicity? Once erosion has occurred, the resulting sensitivities should be
similarly impinged on by an array of stressors, interpersonal and
noninterpersonal alike.
Yet, interpersonal factors are among the strongest predictors of depres-
sion chronicity. Hooley and Teasdale (1989) reported that perceived criti-
cism was a powerful predictor of relapse. People with more interpersonal prob-
lems experience longer duration of depressive episodes (Hale, Jansen, Bouhuys,
Jenner, 6k van den Hoffdakker, 1997). Lara, Leader, and Klein (1997) found
that social support was predictive of recovery from depressive episodes, even
controlling for common clinical variables, such as episode severity and the
presence of "double depression." Impaired relationships predict long-lasting
episodes of several disorders, including depression (Miller, Ingham, Kreitman,
6k Surtees, 1987). Interpersonal problems have also been implicated in chro-
nicity of a depression-related disorder, bulimia nervosa (e.g., Steiger, Leung,
& Thibaudeau, 1993), discussed in detail in chapter 11.
The erosion-scarring perspective does not fully explain why interper-
sonal factors, as opposed to other forms of life stress, appear to be closely
related to depression chronicity. Moreover, there are features of depression's
aftermath that are not best described as mere diminutions of resources but,
rather, appear to be active, motivated processes that propagate life problems
8 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
and depression (depression feeding off itself). These latter processes, described
in chapters 3 through 8, are, in the main, actively performed by the depres-
sion-prone person, whereas erosion happens to the person—a passive pro-
cess. Depression not only may erode existing resources but also may "build
up" processes that maintain depression vulnerability. These latter processes—
the building of depression-maintaining patterns—as well as the suggestion
that they are interpersonal in nature, compose the heart of this book.
As a prelude to following chapters, reflect back on the man whose opti-
mism was eroded by a depressive episode. This was a passive process in that it
happened as a result of depression. As we briefly have alluded to, and expand
on in chapter 3, his pessimism then drove others away from him, creating the
risk factor of decreased social support. How did this happen? It was an active
interpersonal process of communicating his hopeless outlook to others. As
others grew weary of hearing his negative views on life and himself, they
distanced themselves from him. In this sense, the interpersonal expression of
his pessimism built up problems in his social network, which likely length-
ened his current depressive episode and increased his risk for future episodes.
Stable Vulnerabilities
DEPRESSION CHRONICfTY 9
tors (e.g., excessive dependency), and those emphasizing personality-based
vulnerability factors (e.g., high neuroticism, low extroversion). As with ge-
netic—neurobiological explanations, psychological approaches have made some
progress but cannot claim to provide a complete account of depression's causes.
As with erosion—scarring, the stable vulnerability perspective does not
easily explain depression's chronicity, including its apparent tendency to pro-
long itself. If people are persistently vulnerable, why do they have depres-
sion-free periods? One answer to this question is that stable vulnerabilities
only eventuate in depression when activated, for example, by the occurrence
of negative life events. Consider a person who has been shy "since birth." As
we discuss in chapter 6, shyness represents a stable vulnerability for depres-
sion. However, this person is not always depressed; rather, shyness only ap-
pears to promote depression when the person also feels lonely (Joiner, 1997),
perhaps after the termination of a romantic relationship. In this case, the
stable vulnerability (shyness) must be activated by some stressor (romantic
breakup) to produce depression. Although the notion that stable vulner-
abilities like shyness only lead to depression in the context of some stressor is
a reasonable view, it does not account for the finding that some shy (or oth-
erwise vulnerable) people experience depression independent of negative life
events.
Partly in response to this quandary, a main purpose of this book is to
explore interpersonal mechanisms whereby depression prolongs itself, even
in the absence of external causes like negative life events. Other theorists,
too, have focused on the self-propagating nature of depression (although not
from an interpersonal perspective). For example, Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, and
Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) have shown that the tendency to ruminate about
negative things in response to a negative mood prolongs the mood and may
serve as an entryway to full-blown episodes of depression (which themselves
may be prolonged because of rumination). These researchers have shown, for
example, that people who experience negative moods and who ruminate
during negative moods recall more painful autobiographical memories. These,
in turn, may only exacerbate negative mood, encourage further rumination,
and prolong dysphoria and possibly depression.
Somewhat similarly, Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) have maintained
that potentially depressed people become caught in a cycle of excessive self
focus, which leads to an increase in negative affect, self-blame, self-criticism,
and the like. As a result, self-image may become more negative, and this new,
negative self-image is sustained by the "depressive self-focusing style." Both of
these models of depression chronicity are examined further in chapter 9.
SUMMARY
There are three forms of depression chronicity: episode duration, re-
lapse (i.e., when one becomes depressed again after incomplete symptom
10 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
remission), and recurrence (i.e., when one becomes depressed again after
complete symptom remission). There are several current explanations of de-
pression chronicity, including scarring-erosion and stable vulnerabilities. Al-
though the perspective offered in this book is different from current explana-
tions, there is potential compatibility among the various perspectives, and
chapter 10 is devoted to exploring this topic.
Chapter 2, presented next, describes depression in depth, addressing
the nature, course, and prevalence of the disorder. We view this as an essen-
tial background that is necessary to understand prior to an exploration of
interpersonal processes in depression. In chapters 3 through 8, six processes
are described, each of which may represent a contributory factor as to why
depression may, in a sense, sustain itself. It is noted that the six processes
differ from one another with regard to the empirical attention paid to each;
nonetheless, each at least holds promise in explaining the pernicious phe-
nomenon of depression chronicity. The first, stress generation (defined as con-
tributing to the occurrence of one's own negative life events, especially nega-
tive interpersonal events), is viewed as a broad, higher order concept that is
inclusive of several of the other five processes, and thus is described first, in
chapter 3.
DEPRESSION CHRONICITY 11
2
DEPRESSION AS A PERSISTENT
AND RECURRENT SCOURGE
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed.; 3rd
ed., rev.; 4th ed.; DSM-III; DSM-III-R; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric
Association, 1980, 1987, 1994) defined major depression as a condition that
(a) is relatively persistent (e.g., symptoms occur more days than not for at
least 2 weeks), (b) is associated with significant distress and impairment, and
13
(c) includes a majority of the following symptoms: loss of capacity for plea-
sure (anhedonia), sadness, low energy, suicidal thoughts or behaviors, sleep
disturbance, appetite disturbance, psychomotor disturbance (slowing or agi-
tation), concentration difficulty, and feelings of guilt or worthlessness. As
we point out in the chapters that follow, major depression is a chronic condi-
tion, but less so than dysthymia, that can be viewed as a low-grade, more
chronic version of major depression. The DSM definition for dysthymia is
that depressed mood has persisted (most of the day, more days than not) for
at least 2 years, accompanied by at least two of the following: low energy,
sleep disturbance, appetite disturbance, concentration difficulty, low self-
esteem, and feelings of hopelessness.
Major depression can be superimposed on dysthymia. For example, con-
sider a patient who has had depressed mood more days than not for about 4
years, accompanied by energy and concentration problems (i.e., has dys-
thymia). This patient's symptoms become precipitously much more severe
and expand to include sleep and appetite disturbance, suicidal thoughts, and
psychomotor retardation. A major depression has developed in addition to
the dysthymia, a phenomenon termed double depression. Double depression is
not a formal term in the DSM—IV but is worth noting because patients who
experience double depression may respond to treatment more slowly than
patients with major depression or dysthymia alone.
This book presents an interpersonal view of major depression, dysthymia,
and related chronic mood problems. The DSMs present useful definitions of
these phenomena. It is important to note, however, that the DSM defini-
tions are works in progress and are defined by committed consensus. Al-
though things like major depression and dysthymia seem to exist in nature,
precise, scientifically supported definitions have been difficult to come by.
Can it seriously be questioned that major depression, as defined in cur-
rent class ificatory systems such as the DSM—IV (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 1994), represents a true and valid construct? From diverse perspec-
tives ranging from the genetic (Kendler et al., 1996) to the interpersonal
(Coyne, 1976a), the construct enjoys considerable support. To take just one
example, Kendler et al. (1996) have shown that "typical depression," similar
in composition to major depression, can be discerned as a syndromal class,
distinct from nondepression as well as from "atypical depression" (character-
ized by increased eating and sleep), among a large sample of women from a
population-based twin registry. These and other results, when added to the
actuarial, historical, grantmaking, industrial, and conventional momentum
enjoyed by the concept of major depression, combine to make it a formidable
concept indeed.
Yet, despite all this, there are disquieting strands of evidence and
thought. For example, is depression a category, an all-or-none, "either-you-
have-it-or-you-don't" phenomenon, similar to heart attack, or, a clearer ex-
ample, biological gender? Or is depression a continuum distributed along a
H CHRONIC DEPRESS/ON
graded dimension, similar to temperature or mass, where a thing can have
very little of it, or a little more of it, and so on up to having very much of it?
On the categorical view, there is a gap in nature between those who
have depression and those who do not. Those who have it are categorically
different from those who do not. By contrast, on the continuum view, we are
all in the same boat, just at different places along the boat. That is, depres-
sion applies to all of us, just in varying degrees.
Those who assert that depression is categorical (and they are legion)—
and, for that matter, those who assert that it is a dimensional continuum—
all display a lack of awareness that this is, at bottom, a taxometric question.
The whole point of taxometrics, developed by Waller and Meehl (1998), is
to discern categories (i.e., taxa) from dimensional continua and to establish
the true indicators and base rates of established taxa. The technique capital-
izes on the brilliant insight that any reasonably valid indicators of a potential
taxon behave in a certain way—they intercorrelate in samples in which taxon
members and nonmembers are mixed, and they do not correlate in pure
samples of taxon members or in pure samples of taxon nonmembers.
What, then, is the verdict of the taxometric jury? If ever a jury were still
out, it is this jury. A handful of early studies that used taxometric methods to
examine depression had important methodological limitations and did not
assess major depressive disorder (MDD) per se (e.g., Franklin, Strong, &
Greene, 2002; Grove, Andreasen, Young, & Endicott, 1987; Haslam & Beck,
1994; Whisman & Pinto, 1997). As such, they had little conclusive to say
about the taxonicity of clinical depression. Two additional taxometric stud-
ies on depression stand out in terms of their quality but have reached differ-
ent conclusions (Beach & Amir, 2003; Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000,). Ruscio and
Ruscio found some evidence of depression taxonicity using self-reported de-
pressive symptoms but concluded that the majority of their findings sup-
ported a dimensional view (see also Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, &. Waldman,
2005, for similar results among depressed youth). Beach and Amir (2003)
examined MDD and reached different conclusions. Crucially, they distin-
guished between symptoms of mere distress and hallmark symptoms of MDD
(e.g., depressed mood, anhedonia) and found evidence for taxonicity of hall-
mark symptoms but not of general distress symptoms (see also Ambrosini,
Bennett, Cleland, & Haslam, 2002, for a similar finding in adolescents). This
raises the possibility that depression is taxonic but that most studies to date
have not used rigorous enough indicators to detect depression taxa. Research-
ers who are interested in whether depression represents a continuum or a
discrete category would do well to learn and apply taxometrics; in this as in
all areas, mere assertion is not good enough and may even retard progress. It
is disquieting that this basic question is currently unresolved (and has hardly
even been broached regarding dysthymia).
As another disquieting example, it is well-known that depression is a
very heterogeneous thing—well over 200 different possible combinations of
16 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
can be agitated, thus, fidgety, and have concentration problems. But another
good possibility is attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)—
children with ADHD also can be moody, fidgety, and inattentive. How does
one discern between these possibilities? The following question may do the
trick: "Is he always like this, or do these problems come and go?"
Mothers of ADHD boys will often reply "he's been like this since he
was a baby," whereas mothers of depressed boys may reply "the problems are
really bad at times but disappear at other times." (Children can both be de-
pressed and have ADHD, a complicated diagnostic picture.) The reply of the
mother of the ADHD boy conveys a constant and persistent course, with
little variation in symptom picture; the reply of the mother of the depressed
boy conveys an episodic, recurrent course, in which symptoms come and go
in episodic and recurrent fashion. Knowing symptoms' course can aid in dif-
ferential diagnosis, even in situations in which the current symptom picture
is consistent with more than one diagnosis.
Major depression's course is episodic and recurrent. The disorder comes
and goes; at times it is in full swing, with numerous and severe symptoms; at
other times, it is mild or moderate, with symptoms present but less notice-
able; and at still other times, it is absent, with symptoms in full remission.
Dysthymia, by contrast, has a less episodic, more chronic course. The symp-
toms of dysthymia tend to remain at relatively constant levels, with little
variation over time.
The implications of depression's course for an interpersonal explana-
tion of depression chronicity are discussed in chapter 1. There, we present a
main argument of this book, that depressive symptoms have a way of sustain-
ing themselves. Depression appears to "feed off itself," a process that we ar-
gue may be interpersonal in nature.
18 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
gets, the more prone one is to forget having experienced a prior depression!
Or perhaps depressed people die earlier and thus are not around to report on
past depressions when older cohorts are assessed. (In fact, there is some evi-
dence that mortality rates are elevated among depressed people, even ac-
counting for higher suicide rates among depressed people.) Or perhaps health
care professionals are doing an increasingly better job of detecting depres-
sion; if so, what has changed is the behavior of health professionals, not the
rates of depression. Or perhaps it is increasingly acceptable to report depres-
sion. If so, what has changed is the perceived stigma of depression, rather
than the actual rates of depression.
All of these alternative explanations should be considered, but for an
array of reasons, they are not completely convincing. For one thing, if in-
creased prevalence were merely due to forgetting, why would 30-year-olds
differ so much from 18-year-olds? Also, we could only wish that depression
were stigma-free or that health care professionals detect it carefully! Although
there has been progress on both these fronts, there has not been so much
progress as to account for the large cohort difference in depression preva-
lence rates. Finally, researchers who conduct this work make efforts to con-
trol for various confounds like these, and even when they use stringent con-
trols, the effect emerges nonetheless.
The increase in prevalence rates thus may be a real phenomenon. Why
might depression be on the increase? Many possible explanations exist, in-
cluding (among other things) changes in environmental toxins, increased
drug abuse, increased divorce rate, changes in parenting practices, and changes
in communication methods (i.e., more electronic, less face-to-face), but none
yet has good scientific backing.
Regardless of why (and assuming the trend is real), the upshot of all this
is a looming (if not current) epidemic of depression. In the middle of the 21st
century, when those in their teens at the turn of the century are in their 70s,
their lifetime prevalence of depression may be astonishingly high. And, as
we discuss, depression is rarely a once-in-a-lifetime event—someone with a
lifetime history of depression is far more likely than others to experience
current depression. A cohort with a very high lifetime rate of depression is
thus quite likely to have a high rate of current depression. Accordingly, as
younger and more vulnerable cohorts age, depression looms as an even more
urgent international health problem than it already is.
We have just seen that age may represent an important factor regarding
depression prevalence. There is little question that gender is as well. The
incidence of clinical depression and depressive symptoms is two to three times
higher among women than men. In their review of large epidemiologic and
family studies, Klerman and Weissman (1989) noted that women show a
higher lifetime prevalence of major depression across all birth cohorts. A
recent report on epidemiologic surveys conducted in a number of industrial-
ized countries, including the United States, showed higher rates of depres-
sion in women across all sites (Weissman et al., 1993). The effect seems
resilient: It tends to persist when demographic variables such as race, income
level, education, and occupation are controlled (McGrath, Keita, Strickland,
& Russo, 1990; Radloff, 1977). It is interesting to note that the gender differ-
ence emerges at adolescence because there is no gender difference in depres-
sion for preadolescent children (e.g., Hankin et al., 1998).
Although the gender differential in depression is consistent and well
documented, little is known about the processes that underlie these differ-
ences. The artifact hypothesis suggests that gender differences in depression
result from women's greater reporting of stress and symptoms (Weissman &
Klerman, 1977), and the masked depression hypothesis posits that depression
in men remains undetected, or is masked by their higher rates of alcohol and
substance use (e.g., Egeland & Hostetter, 1983). Biological hypotheses sug-
gest that greater vulnerability among women is due to genetically transmit-
ted factors and that women are at greater risk because of mood changes asso-
ciated with their reproductive cycles (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Weissman &
Klerman, 1977, 1985). Psychosocial explanations include the social status
hypothesis, which suggests that the disproportionate rate of exposure to stres-
sors resulting from women's lower social status is responsible for their higher
rates of depression (Weissman & Klerman, 1977, 1985). Social role hypoth-
eses focus on aspects of the traditional female role, such as concern with
relationships and dependence, which may increase women's vulnerability
(see also Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Weissman 6k Klerman, 1977, for review).
Evidence for each of these hypotheses has been largely inconclusive (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987; Weissman & Klerman, 1977, 1985). Although researchers
continue their search for clues that might explain the gender difference in
depression, this consistent finding goes largely unexplained.
A promising explanation was provided by Nolen-Hoeksema and Girgus
(1994). These authors focused on the intriguing fact that the gender differ-
ence in depression does not exist in young children but emerges in adoles-
cence and persists throughout adulthood. They suggested that the combina-
tion of preexisting risk factors for depression and the social and biological
challenges faced by adolescents lead to gender differences in depression.
According to this view, girls have more childhood risk factors for depression
20 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
and are confronted with more biological and social challenges in early ado-
lescence than boys. Nolen-Hoeksema and Girgus cite lower instrumentality,
lower aggression and dominance in interpersonal interactions, and greater
ruminative coping in girls than boys as specific risk factors for depression.
In addition to being depressotypic, ruminative coping is also anxiotypic
(i.e., involves worry and fear). Because ruminative coping is more common
among girls, a comorbid depressive and anxious presentation may also be
more common among girls, consistent with our findings. Anxiety may be a
preexisting risk factor for the development of depressive symptoms in adoles-
cent girls. For example, Reinherz et al. (1993) found that early onset (by age
9) of anxious symptoms in girls was significantly related to the development
of depression in adolescence. Anxiety was not found to be a significant child-
hood risk factor for male adolescent depression.
In addition, the contribution of parental psychopathology to gender
differences in adolescent depression requires further exploration. Children
of parents with affective disorders are more than twice as likely to develop
major depression than children whose parents have no disorder (Beardslee,
Keller, Lavori, Staley, & Sacks, 1993). Furthermore, daughters of parents
with recurrent major depression have three times the risk of major depres-
sion compared with sons of recurrently depressed parents (Warner, Mufson,
& Weissman, 1995). Radke-Yarrow, Nottelman, Belmont, and Welsh (1993)
provided interesting observations about the affective interactions between
depressed mothers and their children as they relate to gender. Depressed
mothers exhibited more negative affect (e.g., irritability, anxiety, fear) to-
ward their daughters than mothers without depression. However, this find-
ing did not apply to depressed mothers and their sons. In addition, depressed
mother's episodes of negative affect corresponded to episodes of negative
affect in their daughters.
Ethnicity
22 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
not explain the effect either, because other ethnic groups who confront
acculturative stress do not have elevated depression rates. A possible resolu-
tion to this quandary is the following hypothesis: On average, Mexican people
(wherever born) possess a depression risk that (a) many other ethnic groups
do not possess to the same degree and (b) is activated by the experience of
acculturative stress.
What is the nature of this hypothesized depression risk? There is pre-
liminary evidence that a negative cognitive style (e.g., pessimism) is cultur-
ally favored among Mexican people (Domino, Fragoso, & Moreno, 1991; cf.
Fehrenbach's, 1995, statement that "The people of the United States like to
believe that political will and good intentions can solve most human dilem-
mas. They often find it hard to understand Mexicans, who know better").
This style may represent a depression risk factor, but only among those who
are faced with serious stress (including acculturative stress). Joiner, Perez,
Wagner, Berenson, and Marquina (2001) obtained evidence in favor of this
view among Mexican American adolescents; namely, that higher rates of
pessimism accounted in part for the higher rates of depression among these
adolescents. The role of negative cognitive style in depression in general is
returned to in chapter 9 on stable vulnerabilities.
Depression has been termed the common cold of mental disorders. With
regard to prevalence, this analogy may be apt: Depression is becoming more
and more common. But otherwise, the analogy may be unfortunate because
it belies the pernicious quality of a depressive episode.
Depression is among the most debilitating and costly of any health prob-
lem. In a recent large-scale study of medical outcomes, only heart disease was
associated with more bed days, physical symptoms, and social and role im-
pairment than depression. Depression was associated with worse outcomes
than all other conditions studied, including chronic lung disease, diabetes,
arthritis, gastrointestinal problems, back problems, and hypertension (Stewart
et al., 1989; Wells, 1991). Furthermore, depression is associated with the
ultimate health index: In a study of nursing home residents, depressed people
died at higher rates than nondepressed people (O'Connor & Vallerand, 1998),
and this was true even controlling for general health status. Numerous other
studies likewise support the association between depression and increased
early mortality rates (e.g., Cuijpers & Smit, 2002).
In a 2-year follow-up of over a thousand participants in the medical
outcomes study, Hays, Wells, Sherbourne, Rogers, and Spritzer (1995) re-
ported that depressed patients were similar to or worse off than all patients
with other medical problems, including congestive heart failure and myocar-
dial infarction. It is interesting to note that this result applied to many types
24 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
All of this would be bad enough, even if depression were an isolated
event in the lives of people who have experienced it. But depression is re-
markably persistent and recurrent (Wells, Burnam, Rogers, Hays, & Camp,
1992). The average length of major depressive episodes is approximately 8
months in adults (Shapiro & Keller, 1981), and 9 months in children (Kovacs,
Obrosky, Gatsonis, & Richards, 1997). And the mean length of dysthymic
episodes may be as much as 30 years in some adult samples (Shelton, Davidson,
Yonkers, & Koran, 1997); the corresponding figure for children is 4 years
(Kovacs et al., 1997). Emslie, Rush, Weinberg, and Guillon (1997) found
that 61% of depressed children experienced recurrence of depression within
2 years; similar 2-year relapse rates have been reported among adults (Bothwell
& Scott, 1997). Tsuang and Coryell (1993) found that 56% of people with
psychotic depression at intake remained ill 8 years later. In studies with fol-
low-ups of 10 years or more, Coryell and Winokur (1992) found that 70% of
people with one depressive episode subsequently experienced at least one
more. Lee and Murray (1988) reported that 18 years after an initial depres-
sive episode, approximately 20% of patients remained incapacitated by de-
pression. Depression is thus persistent within acute episodes, and recurrent
across substantial portions of people's lives.
SUMMARY
27
Haramen (1991) theorized that depressed people are particularly stress-
prone, in the sense that they actively generate negative life events. (It is
important to distinguish active from intentional here—we do not believe that
depressed people intentionally create problems for themselves, but that some
of their behaviors have the unintended consequence of making life more
stressful). If so, a self-sustaining process would be implicated in which for-
merly depressed people actively generate future life events that, in turn, sow
the seeds of future depression. This would explain, at least in part, why de-
pression persists and recurs.
In a series of empirical studies, Hammen, Davila, Brown, Ellicott, and
Gitlin, (1992) have documented the phenomenon of "stress generation."
Most of these studies have focused on depressed women to the exclusion of
depressed men, although limited evidence suggests that the processes may
work similarly in both genders (e.g., Hammen et al., 1992; Potthoff, Holahan,
& Joiner, 1995). In a 1-year study of women with depression, bipolar disor-
der, medical illness, or no disorder, Hammen (1991) showed that depressed
women experienced more interpersonal stress to which the women them-
selves contributed (e.g., disputes with teachers or bosses; conflicts with chil-
dren or partners), even compared with the women with bipolar disorder and
medical illness. The finding was specific to interpersonal events—depressed
women did not differ from others with regard to "fateful" events (i.e., those
that really are randomly foisted on people). This result highlights the impor-
tance of interpersonal events, as well as the idea that nonrandom, self-
produced negative events are characteristic of depressed people. Notably,
the depressed women in Hammen's (1991) study all experienced chronic
forms of depression. This finding has been replicated in samples of men and
women (Hammen et al., 1992), marital couples (Davila, Bradbury, Cohan,
& Tochluk, 1997), adolescent women (Daley, Hammen, Burge, & Davila,
1997; Davila, Hammen, Burge, & Paley, 1995), children (Adrian & Hammen,
1993), as well as by other research groups (Potthoff et al., 1995; Simons,
Angell, Monroe, & Thase, 1993). This line of research implicates the impor-
tant possibility that, although depression may occur in the wake of stress, so
may stress occur in depression's wake.
A series of studies of adolescent girls attending an obstetric-gynecology
clinic provides a potential example of a stress generation process (Wagner,
Berenson, Harding, Si Joiner, 1998). Wagner et al. had suspected that the
combination of a pessimistic attitude style and the experience of teenage
pregnancy might produce depression, consistent with cognitive theories of
depression (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). However, in the first
of these studies, they found that pessimistic, pregnant girls were less depressed
than optimistic, pregnant girls and nonpregnant girls.
This result was the opposite of the prediction, and Wagner et al. (1998)
speculated that depression-prone (e.g., pessimistic) girls may attempt to "solve"
problems such as loneliness, lack of identity, lack of status, and so on, by be-
28 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
coming pregnant. If so, they reasoned that this "solution" would backfire post-
partum, when illusions were shattered by the travail of teenage motherhood.
In the second study of the series, Wagner et al. (1998) replicated the
original surprising result—again, pessimistic, pregnant girls were less depressed
than other girls. However, as many parents know, that which applies during
pregnancy need not apply after delivery. In the third study of the series, they
found that postpartum, pessimistic teenage mothers were far more depressed
than optimistic teenage mothers.
Wagner et al. (1998) interpreted the pattern of findings as follows: The
depression-prone girls—along with their partners—generated the stressor of
teenage pregnancy and motherhood, and the generated stress eventually
caused the pessimistic girls, but not the optimistic girls, to experience de-
pression. As we discuss in chapter 9, self-sustaining processes (like stress gen-
eration) may interact with persistent vulnerabilities (like pessimism) to en-
courage depression chronicity (cf. Hankin & Abramson, 2001). A possible
example occurred in the study, in which a sample of girls generates a stressor
(i.e., pregnancy), but only a vulnerable subsample (i.e., pessimistic girls) re-
acts to the generated stress with depression.
Hammen (1999) made a very interesting point with regard to the stress
generation phenomenon in her studies: Women tended to generate stress
(e.g., initiate interpersonal conflicts) at times when they were not in a de-
pressive episode. This finding leads to an important speculation about recov-
ery from depression; namely, depression—because it is generally incapacitat-
ing—may shut down many processes, including stress generation processes.
While things are shut down, stress may recede, and recovery may be facili-
tated. Once depression lets up, however, stress generation may reactivate,
inducing stress and sowing the seeds for future depression. In this way, the
stress generation perspective may accomplish something that other models
do not, in that it provides at least a tenable explanation of why depression
lets up (cf. Jack, 1991). We caution, however, that some stress-generating
behaviors likely continue to occur during active depression, and speculate
that perhaps they simply slow down at times of greatest incapacitation.
The stress generation model appears to provide prima facie evidence of
an interpersonally sustaining process. Indeed, in the stress generation stud-
ies, it seems that recurrently depressed people are actively doing something
to produce stress. Moreover, it has been shown that generated stress, in turn,
exacerbates or reinstills depression (Davila et al., 1995; Potthoff et al., 1995;
Simons et al., 1993). But what are depression-prone people doing to produce
stress and thus perpetuate depression?
On the surface, this question is not difficult. According to the stress
generation literature, depression-prone people are initiating interpersonal
conflicts and disagreements, a form of interpersonal stress. But the deeper
question—why certain people initiate interpersonal problems—is not quite
as easily answered.
STRESS GENERATION 29
DYSFUNCTIONAL MATE SELECTION
Like not only finds like; it can't even escape from being found by its
like.. . .
—William Faulkner
30 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
resent long-standing problems. In this context, it is interesting to note that,
at odds with the Faulkner (1932) quote, "like is not finding like" here. Rather,
women and men with one form of psychopathology appear to gravitate to-
ward partners with a distinct form of psychopathology. Second, the men ap-
peared to have high rates of past psychopathology (before they met the
women). The end result is both people with elevated chances of experienc-
ing their own as well as each other's psychopathology—a stressful scenario
indeed. If both experience depression (which men with substance use disor-
ders often do), and both generate stress as a result of depression, stress and
depression will abound for this couple. Dysfunctional mate selection thus
may represent one way that a depressed person contributes to the phenom-
enon of stress generation.
Consider the case of Carla, a depressed woman in her mid-40s who had
experienced a string of relationships with neglectful, at times abusive, and
often heavy-drinking men. After completing the previously described exer-
cise of listing the most important people in her life, Carla noted that she had
given a lot—but received little—in her relationships. This served as a launch-
ing point for addressing several important issues in therapy, such as qualities
to look for (and to avoid) when forming new relationships, developing
assertiveness skills to even the balance of her giving and receiving in rela-
tionships, and examining the role of loneliness in her becoming involved
with men who might mistreat her.
STRESS GENERATION 31
are associated with impaired problem solving (Ebata & Moos, 1994; Holahan
& Moos, 1987). Thus, early depression and family dysfunction may prevent
the development of good problem solving; impaired problem solving, in turn,
may generate stress and perpetuate depression. As we see in chapter 13 on
clinical intervention, treatments focused on improving problem solving ap-
pear to work, even if the ultimate source of impaired problem solving re-
mains somewhat unclear.
For example, consider a depressed man who reacts negatively when his
wife (sincerely) suggests that his productivity in sales might increase if he
updated his wardrobe. He views her comment as a veiled criticism of his
appearance, and he responds by "shutting down" and withholding affection
from her but does not directly express his feelings. His wife picks up on his
aloofness and hostility, and responds in turn (i.e., she also shuts down). After
a day in this cold environment, the man explodes with an outburst of anger
toward his wife over a trivial, unrelated matter. He feels both angry with his
wife and disappointed about his own behavior and appearance. Although
the developmental roots of his poor interpersonal problem-solving skills are
uncertain, it is likely that strategic coaching in problem solving and asser-
tion would help him manage his negative feelings more appropriately and
avoid the ensuing generation of interpersonal conflict.
32 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
may be that depression induces a hopeless outlook, rather than inducing ac-
tual negative events; or second, depression may generate actual stress, and
hopelessness may be depression's "active ingredient" in the generation of
actual stress increases.
A main purpose of Joiner et al.'s (2005) studies was to evaluate these
two possibilities. Does depression merely induce a hopeless outlook that, in
turn, generates the perception but not the occurrence of stress? Might de-
pression generate actual stress—for example, interpersonal rejection—through
the generation of a hopeless outlook (which others may find aversive)? Joiner
et al. suggested that answers to these questions bear on the very existence of
a true stress generation effect, as well as on how the effect happens (i.e., its
mechanism).
Joiner et al. (2005) conducted three studies among undergraduate men
and women, all longitudinal using a relatively short time frame, and all ex-
amining self-reported depressive symptoms (not clinical diagnoses of depres-
sion). In each study, they tested the hypothesis that depressive symptoms
would be predictive of prospective increases in reported negative life events—
that depression would generate stress.
The first study represented a straightforward replication of the stress
generation effect. Students who reported depression at Time 1 were more
likely than other students to experience increases over time in self-reported
negative life events.
The second study, too, provided a replication of the stress generation
effect—here again, depressed students, as compared with their nondepressed
counterparts, experienced more increases in self-reported negative events.
But this second study also addressed the important possibility that a hopeless
outlook on the part of the depressed person may account for the stress gen-
eration effect. In fact, it was the case that depressed students tended to expe-
rience increases in hopelessness (in addition to increases in self-reported
negative events) over the course of the study. Furthermore, it appeared that
depressed students' perception of life stress occurred as a function of increased
hopelessness. As the students became more hopeless, they reported more
negative events in their lives.
But was there actually more stress in their lives (perhaps encouraged by
evolving hopelessness), or were the students merely perceiving more stress
(because they were becoming more hopeless)? The third study in the series
provided at least a partial answer to this question. In this study, instead of
assessing respondents' own perceptions of life stress, an instance of actual life
stress—roommate rejection—was directly assessed by including respondents'
roommates in the study. Joiner et al. (2005) reasoned that if depression was
leading to actual stress (here, roommate rejection), and that if increased room-
mate rejection occurred as a function of increased hopelessness, then hope-
lessness may be a main "carrier" of the generation of actual stress (not merely
perceived stress). In fact, results showed just this: Students who reported
STRESS GENERATION 33
depression experienced increased roommate rejection, and this appeared to
occur as a function of respondents' increased hopelessness.
How might hopelessness operate as an actual stress generator? Future
work may benefit from exploration of several related speculations (it is em'
phasized that these are speculations in need of future research).
First, depression chronicity itself may be involved in stress generation.
As depression persists, those who experience it may become more and more
hopeless, and their significant others may become more and more burdened
and disaffected. Consistent with this speculation, Sacco, Milana, and Dunn
(1988) provided participants with transcripts of depressed people whose epi'
sodes were long lasting, and transcripts of depressed people who experienced
short episodes. Compared with short-episode transcripts, long-duration
"depressives" elicited more anger and more interpersonal rejection. It is worth
remembering that Hammen's (1991) study on stress generation in depres-
sion focused on people with chronic forms of depression.
A second possibility is that hopelessness, because it has embittering
and stultifying effects, may lead to cognitive representations of depressed
people in the minds of significant others that are negative and change resis-
tant. Sacco (1999) argued that once these representations are developed,
they selectively guide attention and expectancies to confirm the representa-
tion. These social-cognitive processes may occur spontaneously and outside
of awareness (Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). Such processes may be
particularly attention grabbing with regard to negative as opposed to positive
behaviors. There is evidence that, as compared with positive behaviors, nega-
tive behaviors are more likely to draw attention (Pratto & John, 1991). Fur-
thermore, when negative behaviors are attributed to the person (as opposed
to the situation), they are more likely to be remembered (Ybarra & Stephan,
1996). Once crystallized, cognitive representations of negative behaviors are
more change resistant than representations of positive behaviors (Rothbart &
Park, 1986). Moreover, such representations gain momentum with use, in that
they come to disproportionately influence social cognition relative to actual
subsequent behaviors of the represented person (Sherman & Klein, 1994).
These processes are emphasized again in chapter 8 on blame maintenance.
Hopelessness, then, may generate stress by producing in others a person-
schema that negatively biases subsequent perceptions of the hopeless person
and is difficult to change. Others' negative views may, in turn, encourage
critical communications from others to the hopeless person, and these com-
munications have been shown to be strong predictors of depression chro-
nicity (Hooley & Teasdale, 1989). With regard to others' perceptions, the
hopeless and potentially depressed person may face a very difficult problem:
Continued hopelessness may only serve to maintain others' negative views
and thus generate stress in the form of criticism; positive changes, because
they do not match others' schemata, may be unnoticed or misattributed, leav-
ing others' negative representations unchanged.
34 CHRONIC DEPRESSION
To summarize the three studies, each replicated the stress generation
effect. The second study of the series showed that as hopelessness increases,
so does generated stress. The third study demonstrated that this process ap-
plied to the generation of actual stress (at least as reflected by roommate
rejection), instead of merely applying to the perception that stress is increas-
ing. It is important to note that the findings from this series of studies suggest
that similar processes are at work in both depressed women and men (in
contrast to earlier studies that focused exclusively on depressed women).
One other aspect of these three studies deserves mention, in that they
compared the specificity of the stress generation effect with depressive versus
anxious symptoms. It is conceivable that many mental disorders and numer-
ous types of emotional distress may be associated with generated stress. Is
there something special about depression in terms of generating stress?
Hammen (1991) reported that people with depression, as compared with
those with bipolar disorder and those with nonpsychiatric medical illness,
experienced higher rates of generated stress, in line with the specificity of
stress generation to depression. My studies extended this finding to anxious
symptoms—depression generated actual (not merely perceived) stress through
increased hopelessness, whereas anxious symptoms did not operate in this
fashion. Because anxious symptoms overlap considerably with depressive
symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1991), a finding that generated stress stemmed
from depressive but not anxious symptoms lends strong support for the speci-
ficity of stress generation to depression. An important reason that stress gen-
eration processes may be specific to depression is that depression is more
strongly associated with hopelessness than are most other mental disorders
and symptoms.
The potential role of hopelessness in the generation of stress suggests
an interpersonal elaboration to Abramson et al.'s (1989) hopelessness theory
of depression. According to the hopelessness theory, hopelessness produces
depression, and hopelessness, in turn, is produced by stress impinging on a
negative cognitive style (e.g., pessimism; cf. Wagner et al, 1998 study on
pregnant teenagers).
The addendum to hopelessness theory is depicted in Figure 3.1. The
highlighted aspects represent the suggested elaboration to the theory. Spe-
cifically, Figure 3.1 shows that hopelessness, once developed—perhaps as a
result of the operation of negative cognitive style activated by stress—
(a) leads directly to depressive symptoms; (b) leads indirectly to depressive
symptoms by generating interpersonal stress; and (c) in generating stress,
provides more "grist" for negative cognitive style's "mill," thus propagating
the sequence and perpetuating depressive symptoms.
The sequence depicted in Figure 3.1 is recurrent and self-sustaining
(i.e., feeds back on itself), and thus may shed light on why depression is
chronic. This process of stress generation is particularly relevant to two of
the three forms of depression chronicity discussed in chapter 1. First, current
STRESS GENERATION 35
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
of truth, because Malthus has certainly pled less for the cosmopolitan
than for the domestic and civic virtues. He wishes to lay the
foundations solidly and leave the building to others. Cosmopolitan
morality can rarely be the foundation. In the Empire, Christianity
may have raised the people, and Stoicism the philosophers, to the
wider morality without the training of the narrower, so that the
converts were made better members of their own small communities
by becoming members of the commonwealth of the saints and
citizens of the great world. But it seems to Malthus that, in the world
of to-day, the many conditions of a steady moral progress are best
secured if the domestic and civic virtues precede the cosmopolitan.
We must not legislate for a world of heroes, but for men as we know
them to be; and a comfortable domestic life (βίος τέλειος) must be
the common highway to goodness in a society of ordinary men. If
poverty were no evil, churlishness would be no vice. But extreme
poverty[942] is a real hindrance to goodness. In the apparent
exceptions, as in the voluntary poverty of St. Francis, the greatest evil
is absent, for there is no struggle for bare life. To abolish that
struggle, and help men to comfort, is in some degree to help men to
goodness; and it was the end for which Malthus laboured. The most
sure and solid way of reaching it lay, as he thought, in impressing
every man with a strong sense of his responsibility for his acts and of
his power over his own destiny. To reform a nation, we must reform
the members of it, who, if they are good at first in spite of their
institutions, will at last conform their institutions to the model of
their own goodness. To hold men the creatures of society, and make
society responsible for their character, was, he thought, to mistake
the order of nature. Society can feel its responsibility only in its
individual members; and no member of it can free his own soul by
the purity of a collective or representative conscience.
The doctrine of Malthus is, therefore, a strong appeal to personal
responsibility. He would make men strong in will, to subdue their
animal wants to their notion of personal good and personal
goodness, which, he believed, could never fail to develope into the
common good and goodness of all. Believers in the omnipotence of
outward circumstances and the powerlessness of the human will, to
alter them or the human character, may put Malthus beyond the pale
of sympathy. But all can enter into the mind of Malthus and
understand his work, who know the hardness of the struggle between
the flesh and the spirit, and yet believe in the power of ideas to
change the lives of men, and have faith not only in the rigour of
natural laws, but in man’s power to conquer nature by obeying her.
BOOK V.
BIOGRAPHY.
The few facts that are known of the life of Malthus bring us nearer
to him than we can come in his writings, and show us how well, on
the whole, his antecedents and surroundings fitted him for his work.
Our chief authorities are Bishop Otter’s biographical preface to the
second edition of our author’s Political Economy, which was
posthumously published in 1836, and Professor Empson’s notice of
the book in the Edinburgh Review for January 1837.[943] Otter was
the college companion and life-long friend of Malthus; Empson was
his colleague at Haileybury. The information they give us, though
meagre, is trustworthy; and happily it can be supplemented by hints
from other quarters.
His father, Daniel Malthus, was born in 1730, and went to Queen’s
College, Oxford, in 1747,[944] the year when Adam Smith went home
from Balliol to Scotland. He left without a degree, not because of the
Articles, for he subscribed them at matriculation,[945] or from Dr.
Johnson’s reason of poverty, for he was a gentleman commoner, but
probably from a contempt for the distinction itself.[946] His mind was
active and open, and he seems to have formed literary friendships
that stood his son in good stead afterwards. He liked to stay up in
Oxford in vacation, working hard at his own studies in his own ways,
and seeing none but chosen friends. He wrote to his son in later
years, “I used to think Oxford none the less pleasant and certainly
not the less useful for being disburdened of some of its society; I
imagine you will say the same of Cambridge.”[947] On leaving the
university he married and went to live in Surrey at a quiet country
house on the way from Dorking to Guildford, still known by its old
name of the Rookery. Of his eldest son, who took his grandfather’s
name of Sydenham,[948] we know little except that in due time he
married, and had two sons, Sydenham and Charles, and a daughter
Mary. Mary died single in 1881 in her eighty-second year, Charles in
1821 in his fifteenth, their father in 1821 in his sixty-eighth.
Sydenham, our author’s nephew, who died in 1869, was proprietor of
Dalton Hill, Albury, where members of his family were, till recently,
still living; his son, Lieut.-Col. Sydenham Malthus, C.B., of the 94th
Regiment, served with distinction in the Zulu war a few years ago.
Daniel’s second son, Thomas Robert, familiarly known as Robert,
was born at the Rookery on 14th February, 1766, the year when
Rousseau came to England. His mother seems to have died before
her husband; she is not mentioned in our meagre biographies.[949]
His father, full of the teaching of the Émile, and by no means
prejudiced by his Oxford experience in favour of the ordinary
conventional training of the English youth, seems to have sent his
sons to no public school of any kind, and in all probability brought
them up at home under his own eye for the first eight or nine years of
their life. We may think of Robert, therefore, as passing his
childhood without privation, if without luxury, in the home of an
English country gentleman of moderate fortune, who was devoted to
books and botany, fireside and hillside philosophizing,[950] and the
improvement of his house and grounds,—a man full of life and
originality, gifted with vigorous health, and joining in his boys’ walks
and games.[951] In his quiet little valley it was easy for Daniel Malthus
to picture to himself a Millennial Hall of the future in store for every
one else, on the type of his own Rookery, with no worse interruption
than the rooks that cawed there nightly on the hill above him. From
his son’s description[952] and his own letters, we gather that he was
one of the best sort of the Enlightened followers of Nature. He knew
Rousseau personally, and became his executor;[953] but they were
liker in views than in character; Daniel Malthus had a deeper vein of
reverence and a stronger inclination to put theory into practice.[954]
The neighbours thought him an amiable and clever man who was an
ornament to his parish, but decidedly eccentric, for he made few
friends and was fondest of his own and his children’s company.[955]
He was versed beyond his compeers in French and German
literature, or he would hardly have been credited with having
translated Paul et Virginie, D’Ermenonville’s Essay on Landscape,
and the Sorrows of Werther. We have Robert’s authority for saying
that, although he wrote no translations, he wrote many pieces that
were very successful, but always anonymous.[956] With much of his
son’s talent, he had no power, like his son’s, of sustained intellectual
effort.
He saw the boy’s promise early, and gave him an education which
is condemned by Robert’s chief biographer as irregular and
desultory, but had a method in it. He believed that sons are always
what their fathers were at their age, with the same kind of faults and
virtues; and the men whose influence would have been best for
himself would, he thought, be the best teachers for Robert. At the
same time he believed with the “Émile” that a sort of laissez faire
was the best policy in the education of children; they should be left to
grow, and use their own eyes and hands and heads for themselves. At
the age of nine or ten, say in the year 1776, Robert was accordingly
delivered over to Mr. Richard Graves, Rector of Claverton, near Bath,
to be taught little but Latin and good behaviour, along with a few
other boys, most of them older than himself. Graves, who was
Daniel’s senior by some years, had been intimate with the poet
Shenstone at Pembroke College, Oxford, “a society which for half a
century” (on Johnson’s partial testimony) “was eminent for English
poetry and elegant literature.” From his novel, The Spiritual Quixote,
or the Summer’s Ramble of Mr. Geoffry Wildgoose,[957] we should
not fancy him the best guide for ingenuous youth. The book is a
coarse and offensive satire on Whitfield and Wesley;[958] and shows
Graves as a clergyman to be liker Laurence Sterne than Dr. Primrose.
“Don Roberto,” however, as the tutor nicknamed his pupil, was
fonder of fun and fighting than of his books, and at the ripe age of
ten is not likely to have been troubled about the universe or about
clerical consistency. From Graves he passed[959] into the hands of a
much better man, Gilbert Wakefield, a clergyman who had rebelled
against the Articles, turned dissenter, and become classical master of
an academy at Warrington, founded in 1779 “to provide a course of
liberal education for the sons of dissenters, and particularly for
dissenting ministers.”[960] About one-third of the boys at the
Warrington Academy were sons of members of the Church of
England, who were, like Daniel Malthus, liberal in their opinions,
and wished their sons to be likewise. Wakefield held decided views
on education; and they were in close accordance with Daniel and the
Émile. “The greatest service of tuition,” he said, “to any youth, is to
teach him the exercise of his own powers, to conduct him to the hill
of knowledge by that gradual process in which he sees and secures
his own way, and rejoices in a consciousness of his own faculties and
his own proficiency. Puppies and sciolists alone can be expected to
be formed by any other process.”[961] The tutor’s best service is to
point the pupil to the best authors and give him advice (not lectures)
when he wants it. There was self-denial as well as wisdom in
Wakefield’s view, for in one case at least the pupil showed his
proficiency by departing from the opinions of his tutor.
Wakefield, himself a Fellow of Jesus,[962] procured Malthus an
entrance to that college, and directed his studies till he matriculated
there as a pensioner (or ordinary commoner) on 17th December,
1784, beginning residence in 1785.[963] Robert esteemed him highly.
He described him twenty years afterwards[964] as a man “of the
strictest and most inflexible integrity,” who gave up not only
prospects of preferment, but even opportunities of usefulness, rather
than deny the truth and offend his conscience,—a man hot and
intemperate in public controversy,[965] but modest and genial in
society, never advancing his opinions till challenged, nor trying to
make converts to them, but urging others to an independent study of
the facts,—finally, a genius cramped by its own learning and good
memory, never taking time and pains to do itself justice in its
writings. Though a foe to the thirty-nine Articles, Wakefield was a
stout believer in Christianity, and attacked Paine’s Age of Reason in
a rough style that contrasts strongly with the sober remarks of
Malthus on Paine’s Rights of Man.
Up to 1785, therefore, his father and Wakefield had the largest
share in the education of Malthus; and their influence was shown in
the very fact that the opinions of Malthus were not fixed by them. His
opinions were to be of his own forming; and, having never learned
the schoolboy’s ambition of prize-taking,[966] he found time at college
not only for what would give him the best degree, but for every study
that interested him, especially history and poetry and modern
languages, as in his later years for Italian literature. Frend, author of
a political tract, Peace and Union, which brought him the honour of
prosecution,[967] was his college tutor, and spoke highly of him.[968] It
says much for his mathematical powers that in spite of his wide
general reading he took the ninth place among the wranglers of his
year, 1788. If he had been confining himself, as his father supposed,
to the beaten track, he might, like Paley, have reached the senior
wranglership.[969] After the Tripos he proposed to study at Cambridge
and at home on a plan of his own. His father, on the false analogy of
his own experience, had warned him against the abstract studying of
scientific and mathematical principles apart from their applications;
he must not “work curious stitches on a piece of rag”; he must
become a practical surveyor, mechanic, and navigator. The son had
answered that there would be ample time after the Tripos to make
the applications, and there was little enough time in three years to
study the principles. But thereafter, “if you will give me leave to
proceed in my own plans of reading for the next two years (I speak
with submission to your judgment), I promise you at the expiration
of that time to be a decent natural philosopher, and not only to know
a few principles, but to be able to apply these principles in a variety
of useful problems.”[970] In reality, so far from having his father’s
tendency to abstract speculation, he was (as he says himself) rather
“remarked in college for talking of what actually exists in nature or
may be put to real practical use.”[971]
Though the son had the best of this personal controversy, he would
have done well to have responded to his father’s letters in the spirit
in which they were written; in one instance at least, his father
complains that Robert “drove him back into himself.” But this was
rare. His father describes him as an admirable companion,
sympathetic and generous, and making everybody easy and amused
about him.[972] He was a favourite at home. When the family was
removing from the Rookery at Dorking to the Cottage[973] at Albury in
1787, he was told: “You must find your way to us over bricks and tiles
and meet with five in a bed and some of us under hedges, but
everybody says they will make room for Robert.” It was Robert’s own
warm heart that led him to give those years of leisure after the Tripos
to studies very different from those of his first plan. Social problems
were competing for his attention with scientific.
In 1797 he took his Master’s degree. In the same year he got a
fellowship at his college; wrote but, on his father’s advice, did not
print the Crisis;[974] and took a curacy near Albury. If the Crisis did
nothing more, it showed how the attention of the man was fixing
itself on the subjects that engrossed him during life, and how his
character was changing from gay to grave. It is difficult for a reader
of the later Essay or the Political Economy to conceive that the
writer could ever have been very merry in heart or light in touch; and
there is a still wider distance between the pugnacious Don Roberto,
never long without a black eye, and the grave gentle host of Miss
Martineau at the East India College. The change in style between his
early writings and his later was due to a real change in character,
produced by the concentration of his thoughts on the problem of
poverty. The success of the first Essay on Population[975] fixed for
him the work of his life. He was to set one neglected truth clearly
before the world; and he devoted himself wholly to it, pushing his
inquiries not only by study of authorities and facts at home,[976] but
by his own[977] and his friends’[978] travels, and by conversation and
correspondence with all that were likely to give him anything in
conference.[979] He sacrificed to it, fortunately or unfortunately, his
youthful buoyancy and freshness of style, though in speculation his
opinions passed from pessimism to a moderate optimism, and he
was never too old in spirit to unlearn a fault.
In his mature writings the composition is less faulty than the
diction, which is certainly too Johnsonian. The composition is a little
bald and often diffuse; but the meaning of each sentence is always
clear, and in economical writing that is the first of virtues. In a work
of imagination we may desire to have the greatest number of the
greatest ideas put into each sentence; but a scientific treatise is more
often concerned with a single truth in its full development; and the
perpetual recurrence of the same phrases in different connections is
unavoidable, in proportion to the thoroughness of the discussion.
Great variety of language would either imply in the writer or cause in
the reader some confusion of thought. It is not surprising, then, to
find Malthus saying substantially the same thing in nearly the same
words, whether he is presenting his views on Population directly in a
book on the subject, or placing them in their economical context in a
book on Political Economy, or touching them incidentally in a Corn
Law pamphlet or Quarterly article, or answering questions about
them before a Commons Committee. His abundant metaphors in the
first essay[980] had simply led to misunderstanding; and he
deliberately renounced fine writing for high thinking, present
popularity for permanent usefulness.[981]
The first essay was the turning-point in his literary life. Except the
pamphlets on Haileybury College, all his later writings are
economical. His personal history, being uneventful, was, like a time
of dull annals, presumably happy. The fine portrait of him by Linnell,
[982]
taken in his old age, gives a pleasing impression, not only of
mildness and firmness, but of serene contentment, without any trace
of physical suffering or physical defect, though it is certain he had the
latter.[983] In person he was tall and “elegantly formed.”[984] 1799 is
the year of his first Continental journey.[985] In January 1800 his
father died, at the age of seventy. In the same year appeared the tract
on The High Price of Provisions. In 1802 Malthus was again on the
Continent.[986] In June 1803 he published the second (or quarto)
essay, which seems, from a passage in Edward Clarke’s Travels, to
have been long expected by his friends. “I am sorry,” writes Clarke to
him from Constantinople on 16th March, 1802, “to find you confess
your breach of duty in not having written a book. But you have been
engaged in the press, because I heard at the Palace that you had
published a new edition of your Population, and, moreover, I was
there assured so long ago as last year that you had written a work on
the Scarcity of Corn. How does this accord with your declaration?
Perhaps it is a pamphlet, and therefore strictly not ‘a book.’”[987]
It is not impossible that Clarke had heard this rumour from Lord
Elgin, and Lord Elgin from Pitt himself, for Pitt had visited
Cambridge on the eve of the dissolution following the Peace of
Amiens. On the 16th (December 1801) he was present at the
Commemoration dinner in Trinity College Hall.[988] The visit is
described by Otter:[989] “It happened that Mr. Pitt was at this time
upon a sort of canvassing visit at the university.... At a supper at
Jesus Lodge in the company of some young travellers, particularly
Mr. Malthus, &c., he was induced to unbend in a very easy
conversation respecting Sir Sidney Smith, the massacre at Jaffa, the
Pacha of Acre, Clarke, Carlisle,[990] &c.” Though the talk was largely
on poetry and foreign politics, it may easily have embraced
economics; and the personal meeting may have helped to gain
Malthus his appointment as Professor of History and Political
Economy at Haileybury College. With or without Pitt, the
appointment was made in 1805; and in view of it Malthus was able to
carry out, on 13th March 1804, his marriage with Harriet Eckersall
(daughter of John Eckersall of Claverton House, St. Catherine’s, near
Bath), to whom he had probably been for some years engaged.[991] In
1806 he published the third edition of the essay (in two volumes), in
1807 the fourth edition, and also the letter to Samuel Whitbread on
his Bill for amending the Poor Laws. If it is true that he visited Owen
at New Lanark, it must have been in the course of the next seven
years.[992] There is nothing signed from his pen in that time but a
letter to Lord Grenville in defence of the East India College;[993] but
in 1814 and 1815 he wrote the Observations on the Corn Laws, the
Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of restricting Importation, and
The Nature and Progress of Rent. In 1807 he had been with Horner
in Wales, impressing Horner, as they went together from Raglan to
Abergavenny, with his idea that the people should “live dear”;[994]
and in 1817 he visited Kerry and Westmeath. In the same year, 1817,
he published the fifth edition of his essay. 1818 would be memorable
to him as the year when Mackintosh joined him at Haileybury as
Professor of General Polity and Law in succession to Mr. Christian.
In 1819 Malthus appears as Fellow of the Royal Society, though the
honour did not tempt him back into physical science.[995] In 1820
appeared the first edition of the Political Economy. In 1821, Thomas
Tooke, the author of High and Low Prices, founded the Political
Economy Club, James Mill drafting the rules. Malthus, Grote, and
Ricardo were among its members; and the survivors are said to
remember well the “crushing criticisms” by James Mill of Malthus’
speeches.[996]
1823 is the year of the tract on the Measure of Value and the
Quarterly article on Tooke; 1824 of the paper on Population in the
Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, and the article on the
New Political Economy in the Quarterly Review.[997] In 1825 he lost a
daughter, and went for his own and his wife’s health to the
Continent. In that year he contributed his first paper to the Royal
Society of Literature, of which he had been made an Associate two
years before; and that year saw Empson take the place of Mackintosh
at Haileybury. In 1826 was published the sixth edition of the essay,
the last published in his lifetime. In 1827 we find him before the
Emigration Committee, and we have from his pen the Definitions in
Political Economy, and the second paper contributed to the Royal
Society of Literature. In 1829 letters passed between him and W.
Nassau Senior, which were appended by the latter to his Lectures on
Population. In 1830 he wrote the Summary View, which involved no
new effort. Indeed his whole time seems to have been spent in
revising his Political Economy in the light of his public and private
discussions with Ricardo, though he did not live to print the new
edition himself. Shortly before his death he said to some one who
rebuked him for his delay: “My views are before the public. If I am to
alter anything, I can do little more than alter the language, and I
don’t know if I should alter it for the better” (Empson, l. c. p. 472).
He was one of the first Fellows of the Statistical Society, founded in
March 1834, and its first Annual Report contains a high eulogy on
him and his work; but he did not live to take much share in its
proceedings. He died suddenly of heart disease on Monday, 29th
December, 1834, on a visit to Mr. Eckersall at St. Catherine’s, where
he was spending Christmas with his wife and family. He is buried in
the Abbey Church at Bath, in the north aisle of the nave. Of his three
children, two survived him, of whom one, a daughter, is still living.
[998]
of
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
OF TRUTH,
AND FRIENDS.
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