18th Century Debates

Dark Age or a Period of Continuity and Change?

Types of Questions

1. 2003- Recent writing (revisionists) on the 18th century have

considerably altered our understanding of the period. Elaborate.
2. 2005- In what ways have recent historical writings challenged the
view that the 18th century was a “Dark age”?
3. 2010-Can the 18th century can be characterized as a “ Dark
Age”? Discuss with reference to some of the recent writings.

INTRODUCTION:

The political, economic and social transitions witnessed in 18th century

India have been subject to great historical debate. Most historians view
this century as marked by two important transitions – (i) in the first
half of the 18th century the decline of the Mughal empire and the rise
of regional political orders and (ii) in the second half of the 18th
century post the battle of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) a transition
in the society, economy and polity of India occurred, as the English
East India Company began to assume political control in north India.

The debate regarding the first half of the 18th century

revolved around the reasons for decline of the Mughal Empire and the
nature socio-economic change that followed. Two broad views can be
outlined – (i) Dark Age view-the first and earliest view held that
political collapse of the Mughal Empire in the early 18th century,
initiated a process of economic and social decline across India, and thus
the 18th century was a “ Dark Age ” . (ii)The second view held by
Revisionists historians, viewed the period on its own terms, looked at
political turmoil in terms of regional assertiveness, due to economic

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prosperity noted by them in the 18th century. Thus they studied the rise
of regional polities and regional economic prosperity to challenge the
“Dark Age” view and the causal links it draws between political and
economic decline. The debate regarding the second half of the 18th
century revolved around whether colonial rule had roots in pre-colonial
economy and society as Revisionists argue or if it marked a politico-
economic break with pre- colonial India as historians who propose the
‘Dark Age view’ argue.

DEBATE I- VIEW I- DARK AGE VIEW

The earliest views on reasons for Mughal Decline and the “ Dark
age ” character of the 18th century were presented by historians,
Jadunath Sarkar, William Irvine, Ishwari Prasad and Sri Ram Sharma.
They held individual character of rulers and their administrative and
religious policies as responsible for Mughal decline. Thus, Jadunath
Sarkar held Aurangzeb ’ s religious policy and Deccan Campaigns
responsible for imperial decline. He said that peasant rebellions of the
17th century were a “ Hindu reaction ’ ’ to Aurangzeb ’ s Muslim
orthodoxy, destroyed the Mughal polity and caused the subsequent
decline of Mughal economy, institutions and society. Prasad and
Sharma held that the 18th century was an economically crisis-prone
period.

From the 1950s, Marxist historians explained Mughal decline

in materialist terms. Some arguments revolved around the institutions of
jagir(a territory assigned to a noble by the Mughal emperor for a
limited period of time, from which he could extract revenue as his
salary in lieu for his service as a noble)and mansab(the administrative
rank a noble held, which corresponded to his jagir). Thus Satish

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Chandra argued that structural flaws in the functioning of the Mughal
institutions of jagir and mansab led to a fiscal crisis in the late 17th
century. The efficiency of these institutions depended on availability,
collection and distribution of revenue, when this began to falter from
Aurangzeb ’ s time it led to and heralded imperial decline. M. Athar
Ali holds that a shortage of jagirs caused by political expansion of the
empire into less fertile tracts of the Deccan and also an increase in the
number of nobles, without a proportionate increase in their jagirs led to
administrative and economic decline. John. F. Richards critiqued Ali’s
view with his study of Mughal administration in the Deccan he
concluded that there was no shortage of usable jagirs in the region, and
this couldn’t have led to an imperial crisis. Satish Chandra revised his
argument and put an economic spin on it. He like Ali held that jagirs
became few and infertile. Yet he linked this to an economic argument
that, few and infertile jagirs led to an increasing discrepancy in
estimated revenue (jama) and actual revenue (hasil) which led to a
decreased ability of state officials to collect revenue regularly, thus
fuelling a fiscal crisis.

Amongst the economic decline arguments Irfan Habib ’ s

view is one of the strongest within the “ Dark Century ”
conceptualization. Habib says that Mughal Empire was highly
centralization, from Akbar ’ s time onwards. This centralization was
seen in the universal land tax, systematic revenue assessment and
collection, with a share going to zamidars (local claimants) that
operated, as well as highly uniform revenue assignment tenures and
revenue collections from far away territories of the empire. Thus Habib
says the administration was a dominant factor in the economy.

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 Looking at the 18th century, Habib argues for economic
decline. He says from the late 17th century as Francois Bernier observed
there was a process of economic decay in India, due to unrestricted
authority of the jagirdars who were assigned lands for unpredictably
short tenures by the emperor. Accepting this view Habib argued there
was an increased pressure for revenue by jagirdars, which led to a flight
of peasants from land, peasant uprisings against the State and a
breakdown in collaboration between jagirdars and zamidars, as the
zamidars became leaders of peasant uprising. This led to an agrarian
crisis and subsequent weakening of the political edifice. The zamidars
emerged powerful now and shaped local state formation. With regards
to localization of power and administration Habib argues that
administrative checks collapsed in the early 18th century, as seen by a
passage from Khafi Khan (1731) which talks of sale of tax farms
becoming a general practice.

Regarding trade and urbanization, he says during the

Mughal period there was a growth of urbanization and trade, with a
large transfer of rural surplus to the towns and its conversion into craft
commodities and services to meet the demands of an essentially town
based ruling elite. There was also large availability of capital and a
developed system of banking and credit. Habib argues that decline of
any of these factors as the empire declined would have led to
commercial and urban decline. He also cites Ashin Das Gupta’s study
of the fall of the Guajarati port of Surat (significant for inland and
overseas trade) which mirrored the decline of the empire and was
caused by disruptions in the hinterland due to this imperial decline. Das
Gupta shows number of ships calling at Surat declined from 87 in 1693
to 19 by 1741. A similar situation was witnessed in Bengal shipping too,

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by him. Regarding inland trade Habib concedes there is limited
material Francis Buchanan’s study from the 17th /18th century shows
that interest rates seemed stable in Eastern India early 18th century
onwards. Habib says this suggests a stagnation of capital supply but one
can’t confirm this.

Habib also discussed economic conditions present under

local polities in India which he divided into two categories- (i) States
created out of Mughal officials turning into local rulers-Jaipur, Bangash,
Nizamates of Deccan, Awadh, Bengal- and (ii) States created by
opponents to Mughal power- Marathas, Jats, Rohillas and Sikhs. For the
Bengal Niazmate, Habib says there is no comprehensive economic
study- based on James Grant ’ s study one can conclude that land
revenue did not rise in correspondence with rise in prices caused by a
silver influx, there was only a moderate inflow of revenue which
managed to sustain considerable urbanization. In Awadh he says
Muzaffar Alam’s study of 18th century revenue figures, is limited even
if it shows expansion of agriculture in Awadh, as these statistics are
unadjusted to prices. Regarding the Marathas, he says the establishment
of hereditary fiefs and offices (unlike in Mughal times) led to constant
fiscal crisis and urban growth was limited to Pune. Regarding the
Rohillas he says they seem to have reclaimed land and promoted
agriculture. Yet Habib emphasises that the above studies, are limited in
scope and cause doubts about any significant economic growth in the
18th century.

Athar Ali locates Mughal decline in a cultural context. He

argues that the decline was caused by the cultural failure of the ruling
elite to respond to the superior technology and science that Europe
developed between 1500-1700. He says those regional polities in India,

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such as Mysore and the Marathas which attempted to bridge this
gap,failed. Haidar Ali and Mahadji Sindhia tried to organize their
armies on modern lines with French help. Later Tipu Sultan also tried
to develop commerce and production. Yet Ali says within the
intellectual sphere they failed as they didn ’ t establish schools or
institutions to absorb western learning. Thus these regimes continued
with the Mughal ideological apparatus.

Looking at the economic context of the 18th century, Ali

argued that the new regional polities preserved essential features of
Mughal land revenue system yet combined possession of revenue rights
with private zamidari rights. Thus the fundamental nature of the State
was still remained that of a rent extracting one. This necessitated the
association of rulers with merchants, to collect land revenue. Other
continuities from Mughal times, we seen in maintenance of courts on a
local scale, large armies, large proportion of agrarian surplus flowing
into towns. Yet he notes a decline in urban centres such as Delhi and
Agra, and the rise of new ones like Faizabad and Lucknow. Over all
Ali concludes that there was resilience in the economy, but there was
no real growth or new elements as revisionists like C.A. Bayly suggest.

Both Athar Ali and Irfan Habib, argue that regional polities
specially the Marathas and Sikhs continued the exploitative tendencies
seen under the Mughals. Their analysis explained regional political
realignment within the framework of the Mughal “agrarian system”
and focused on revenue structures. Yet Athar Ali, who is a proponent
of decline like Habib, criticised Habib ’ s arguments also, saying that
they represent an old simplistic historical view, that the decline of the
Mughal Empire was a major socio-eco-political setback for India which
enabled the British conquest to take place.

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 VIEW II- The view that the 18th century was a “Dark Age”
has been criticized by many historians, specially the Revisionists who
present the second view on this debate. Revisionist works focused on
the socio-economic functioning of regional polities and pioneered in
depth studies on trade and mercantile activity. Historians Herman Goetz
and Bernard Cohn focused on the society in the 18th century. Goetz
analysed 18th century music and architecture and argued for the
resilience of Mughal society, reflected in evolving music and
architectural styles despite imperial decline. Cohn studies Banaras and
analysed efforts of Mughal zamidars and alimdars, who manipulated
imperial and regional power to carve out independent areas of power
for themselves. These works also critiqued Irfan Habib ’ s conception
of the Mughal state as a centralized state as it is hard to conceive a
centralized bureaucratic model of state when economic and social
markers outlive political decay as pointed out above.

Within factors for the decline of the Mughal empire and

state formation of regional polities, (which few revisionists focus on)
Muzaffar Alam’s study critiqued Irfan Habib’s view that zamidars
led uprisings 0f oppressed peasants which were responsible for state
formation. His study of Persian sources, to understand aspects of
agrarian uprisings in north India, focused on three regions-(i)
Moradabad-Bareilly,(ii) Awadh and (iii)Banaras region. He quotes the
Ain-i-Akbari to show that various castes and communities held zamidari
rights in these regions, e.g.- Rajputs (who were dominant), Jats,
Brahmans, Muslims, Afghans, Kayasthas and Kumris. Yet he says that
not all these groups rose against the Mughals. He points out that due to
caste, clan and territorial distinctions, zamidars were not unified in their
rebellion against the Mughals, but were infact at war with one another.

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He says clan often faught against one e.g. in Chakla Etwah, Akhbarat
report two out of four cases were inter clan rivalries, in which in fact
the Mughal state came to the aid of some zamidars, and played clans
off and overcome the danger they posed to the Mughal State. Alam also
mentions that there were intra clan clashes- eg: in Moradabad Madar
Singh a Rajput fought against Debi Chand a fellow Rajput. Finally
critiquing Habib, Alam points out that zamidars who led raids expressed
the anger of local ruling classes, who had their military contingents and
were rising in a context of local economic prosperity. He also says at
times, peasants resisted zamidars, since rural populations was a victim
of zamidar revolts.

Alam also argues for a context of local economic prosperity

which led to zamidar ascendency. In his study of Awadh-He says
villages and zamidars had great availability of money. Agrarian
prosperity can be seen due to brisk trade carried out by Banjaras
between Awadh and Bihar, as they carried goods worth 4,00,000 at
times. New towns came up, indicating expansion of trade networks. He
says Banaras in early 18th century witnessed the rise of 3new market
centres- Azamgarh, Bhadohi and Mirzapur and new ganjs or grains
markets aorse, pointing to rise in commercialized agriculture. Banaras
was the most prosperous city by the 1740s in the region, as it was the
main entrepot for long distance trade which led to a rise of local
industries. The Ain-i-Akbari showed an 85% percent rise in agricultural
revenue collected from Awadh in early 18th century, indicating agrarian
prosperity. Thus Alam contests the economic decline model.

However Alam’s study has been critiqued from within the

revisionist camp by John. F.Richards and V.Narayana Rao who like
Alam himself, point out his exclusive use of Persian sources which may

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hamper evidence of resistance against Mughal rule found in vernacular
sources. Athar Ali critiques him for comparing Ain-i-Akbari ’ s
jamadani figures with that of 18th century revenue figures, which show
a rise without adjusting them to the rise in prices in 18th century. Ali
says it’s incorrect to use this as evidence for agrarian prosperity.

Other revisionists such as Ashin Das Gupta, B.R. Grover

and Karen Leonard focus on regional shift of trade and banking
institutions, which earlier studies of Habib and Ali ignored. Das Gupta
argued that inland trade increased, even in a period of some decline,
and corporate mercantile institutions survived. He says though former
ports like Surat and Masulipatinam declined with low international trade,
new colonial ports-Madras Bombay and Calcutta arose. B.R.Grover
looked at rural commercial production, found new provincial markets
rose to absorb rural commercial production, thus compensating the loss
in foreign trade. Karen argues that merchant activity shifted from Delhi
to regional territories and led to local economic buoyancy.

Frank Perlin’ s study of the Maratha state argued that the

characteristic feature of Maratha state building was high
commercialization, which was not a function of state demand alone. He
also says that the new political orders arose due to an interrelationship
between two force-(i)centralizing state building and (ii)Local communal
forces. Thus he says the administrative forms adopted by the “ great
households ” which controlled these States was of amassing lands
under hereditary control through acquisition of prebendal rights and
former resumeable rights. This process was accompanied by the rise of
an accounting/record keeping class that served these households to
enhance their familistic administration. This also led to tension between
this centralizing tendency of the state and older rights of peasants.

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Peasants local assemblies (gota) to protect their interests. Yet
paradoxically, there was a linking of communal and prebendal
properties of the peasant and royal court respectively as the great
households controlled economic power in the state. Thus these
households benefitted from development of regional and international
trade. Perlin critiques the view that political decline led to economic
decline. He argues instead that political decentralization and localization
of power went hand in hand and this was seen in rise of new political
orders (Marathas, Nizam ’ s in Hyderabad) which went along with
socio-eco reconfigurations. This was seen in transfer of small lordly
courts and urban functions to small towns and villages in the
countryside. He also argues that manufacture and cash cropping for
distant markets at a local level was part of a “rurban” (rural-urban)
economy that he argues for.

Perlin has been critiqued by M.Athar Ali who argues that Perlin
discounts the influence of the Mughal Empire on Indian society and
that Perlin and just looking at grassroots polity and social groups like
Perlin and C.A.Bayly do, it is easy to see no decline in the economy.
He says these revisionists easily dismiss the significance of the imperial
economy.

One of the most important revisionist views was

provided by C.A.Bayly. Bayly argues against the Dark Age position. He
argues that certain regions like Awadh and Banaras witnessed
urbanization and agricultural expansion. Regional centres like Bengal
and Lucknow grew and so did the textile industry. He also argues that
indigenous capital didn’t shrink but was engaged in internal bulk and
luxury trade along new routes and in financing military and revenue
machineries. He also points out Mysore, southern Malabar, Hyderabad

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and Maratha territories also were nodes of agricultural stability and state
formation. Yet he doesn ’ t postulate a universal economic growth in
the 18th century. Some areas of decline existed. He also critiques the
views of Habib and Ali who ascribe decline only to political factors
and don’t explore ecological and economic forces. He also questions
Habib ’ s assumption that the Mughal state and economy was highly
centralized. He said that was not a condition for the economic growth
witnessed in the 17th century. Secondly he critiques the Habib ’ s
assumption that universal economic decline was due to rising zamidar
power at the expense of the State. Bayly says the interesting facet of
the 18th century was that the zamidars and intermediaries established a
closer control of the peasantry and artisans than under Mughal
hegemony, and the mechanisms of control differed in various kingdoms.
He also critiques the view that the British assumption of diwani rights
destroyed all socio-economic forces unleashed in the 18th century-i.e.
wiped out a possibility of British rule building upon a pre colonial past.

Finally Burton Stein another revisionist, focused on

formation of south Indian polity of Mysore, presented a different view
for the rise of this state. He attributed it to “military fiscalism” and
the subsequent thrust towards centralization, which resulted in the state
being freed from control of the local aristocracy and putting together an
extensive tax base and a state organised around war. He asserts that the
18th century had a dynamic economy was there was a relocation and
restoration of high economic production even in war torn economy. He
agrees with Bayly on the developments of new economic relations-
commercialization of rights, investment of capital in new areas,
coercion of labour by intermediaries.

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 The various views on the 18th century help us to
conclude, that even though the “Dark Age” view has been critiqued
extensively and doesn ’ t seem to hold in light of Revisionist studies
which pioneered work on regional polities, local economies and social
reconfigurations it is also important to note value earlier works which
explored the impact of Mughal decline on the 18th century and their
economic data, which some revisionists tend to negate.

The debate regarding the second half of the 18th century

mainly revolved around the question of whether colonial rule
constituted a critical break from the past or whether it marked
continuity with the economy and society of indigenous societies. To put
it simply-whether colonial economy, society and polity had indigenous
origins. This debate unfolded along some basic parameters which are
explored for continuity and change, these are- the agrarian economy,
trade and non-agrarian production, revenue settlements , agrarian
capitalism and governance. In this debate, most historians who argue for
a “ Dark Age ” previously hold that the Colonial State marked a
distinct break from the past, while Revisionists who see prosperity in
the early 18th century argue for continuities, with the Mughal past.

Regarding the agrarian economy amongst the views on

change or break with the past, one of the earliest views was by R.C.
Dutt and Dadabhai Naoroji who viewed the colonial economy and
polity as break from the past. Irfan Habib focused on Bengal arguing
for a break in the economy, he held that English Company’s trading
operations dislocated indigenous economies as the Company State was
located external to society and exploitative in nature. The company
acquired Diwani rights (revenue rights) of Bengal in 1765, which
reduced the flow of bullion into India, causing inflation and intensified

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the drain of wealth from Bengal post 1813. He says there was a clear
decline in the Indian economy and unfavourable balance of payments,
as India was forced to export much more than British exports of
treasure into India. Thus there was a rise in revenue demand from
Bengal from 2.2million pounds (1766) to 3.38 million pounds by (1779)
and estimated annual tribute to Britain was Rs.4 cores (1780-90) and
above this Bengal also funded the Company ’ s China trade by using
Bengal silver. These economic changes caused large deindustrialization
reflected in widespread artisanal and service sector unemployment and
put pressure on the peasantry. The pressure on the peasantry, who bore
the brunt of increased revenue extraction extended to Mysore and
Awadh which were soon annexed and began to pay annual tribute too.
Economic effects of tribute affected non-annexed regions too, as a
deflation was caused due to decline of silver replenishments. Trade and
towns decayed in Punjab and Delhi after 1770s. Thus Habib says that
there was no evidence for indigenous origins of the colonial economy,
as the Company rule changed the prevailing economic and revenue
arrangements in Bengal which impacted other regions too.

Regarding new revenue settlements and introduction of agrarian

capitalism by the EEIC, historians have made various arguments for
change. Ranajit Guha, held that the introduction of the Permanent
Settlement in Bengal, changed the earlier revenue structure and the ill
practice of revenue farming, as it introduced private property, created a
land market, a landed estates and new zamindars who invested capital
to purchase land and helped develop a system of rural credit. He also
points out that the settlement drew on various foreign intellectual
influences but was largely shaped by French Physiocratic notions. Eric
Stokes argues in a similar vein and says the Settlement was shaped by

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Whig notions of recognizing private property as a basic principle of
governance thus marking a break, as absolute private property and a
large land market didn’t really exist previously.

Historians B.B. Chaudhury and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya argue along

similar lines. For them the Permanent Settlement in 1793 began a
process of institutional innovation. In the agrarian sector, there was an
increase in rural credit, a land market developed as lands of defaulting
zamindars were sold off and the composition/functioning of agrarian
labour changed, as labour earlier composed of low caste and victims of
debt, but now it included impoverished sections of small peasantry and
people who suffered loss of land. Similarly Neeladari Bhattacharya
looks at social impact of British revenue settlements and says that they
changed the social fabric of India. According to him this agrarian
transition was shaped by active ‘social intervention’ by indigenous
classes since the nature of indigenous response defined the limits within
with the Colonial state could implement policies , thus Colonial revenue
settlements introduced changes shaped by an Indian response.

Regarding the second view point which presents a case for continuities
with the pre colonial past, Ratnalekh Ray on the basis of local records
from Rajshahi says that there was no major change brought about by
British revenue settlements as changes were confined to the upper crust
of rural society yet at the village level both landholdings and
agricultural base remained unaltered. Even amongst the elite in rural
society, minor changes were affected as land didn ’ t usually change
hand but perpetual rights in revenue management changed. Property
ownership rights may have been conferred upon Zamidars, yet this was
only a formality as they already held rights over revenue collection and
land, thus arguing for continuities. N. Mukherji and R.E. Frykenberg

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emphasised continuity in the agrarian order in regions under Ryotwari
Settlement in South India. They say direct dealings with ryots may have
been interrupted initially, but soon old social balance was restored as
the Company, restored traditional privileges of mirsardars, kadims and
ulkudis, like under regional polities.

Regarding the introduction of agrarian capitalism and change, Irfan

Habib argues that in pre colonial India there was no evidence of
capitalist accumulation in agriculture. He says the payment of Kharaj or
land tax, led to growth of merchant capital but it remained confined to
the urban sectors and was not invested in the agricultural industry, as
the parasitic relationship between towns and rural areas prevented this.
Furthermore merchant capital dried up by the late 17th century due to
an agrarian crisis.

Revisionists C.A. Bayly and Laxmi Subramaniam challenge Habib ’ s

view and locate the rudimentary beginnings of agrarian capitalism in the
economies of the pre-colonial regional polities (Mysore, Marathas etc)
which emerged in the early 18th century. The revisionists have argued
that in the early 18th century the main problem with the Mughal state
was a gap between jama(estimated revenue) and hasil(collected
revenue).Regional polities rectified this problem by greater control of
peasantry, artisans and inferior trading groups, for this they indulged in
revenue farming, giving collection rights to local intermediaries
(merchants, zamindars, bankers), who amassed money through this. The
local economy was prospering in this period according to Revisionists,
as internal and luxury trade increased and grew along new routes. In
such a situation trading and merchant classes that emerged as a new
intermediary class, had a lot of capital accumulating and rulers who
needed money to finance their trade and wars borrowed money from

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this class, giving them prebendal rights, which these intermediaries
slowly converted into hereditary entitlements. Thus C.A. Bayly says
the ‘new gentry’ and portfolio capitalists that emerged, broke earlier
norms by extending the notion of private inheritable wealth and began
the process of capitalism. Subramaniam and Bayly suggest that agrarian
capitalism developed as a result of interaction between the new
indigenous capitalist relations and more powerful colonial capitalism.

Regarding trade and non agrarian production and the economy,

historians who argue for changes, such as Habib point out that the
economy was in a state of decline in the 18th century. Similarly
Bhattacharya points out as the Company established monopoly rights
over salt, opium and saltpetre and sidelined middlemen in the textile
industry also. It assumed Diwani rights of Bengal thus marking a
change in Bengals econmu as it ’ s revenue was used to purchase
export goods by the British. This change confined Indian capital to
internal trade, unorganized banking and petty commodity production.
Thus the British rule changed the nature of Indian trade and
subordinated it, thus marking a break with the past.

Revisionist historians who focus on regional studies and trade

argue contrary to this, they see links between the pre colonial and
colonial economy as historians such as C.A. Bayly, Burton Stein,
Marshall and Ashin Das Gupta argue that Company rule grafter it ’ s
self onto networks of indigenous economy and infrastructure. Ashin Das
Gupta says that when Colonial rule was established the intermediary
classes(bankers, traders, portofolio-capitalists) that emerged powerful in
the regional polities drifted towards the Company as traditional trade
centres declined and new trade centres emerged under company rule

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(Calcutta, Madras, Bombay). In these new centres these intermediaries
collaborated with the English, thus stressing continuity.

Bayly argued for continuities as well, he explores the “rise of

intermediary class ” of merchants and service communities in the
regional polities and how colonial state used them. He says that as the
new regional polities emerged since as large zamindars built up primary
land holdings, as the Mughals lost control. These new polities founded
by leading regional families, patronized merchants and service class
(Brahmans)e.g. Jagath Seths of Bengal, in their territories in return for
information, credit and legitimacy. Thus intermediaries groups rose in
society. Merchants had access to political power as they loaned capital
to the State, funded its wars and took on revenue farming functions in
regional polities. Thus there was a commercialization of State power
and the State emerged as a military fiscal State. In the 1760s Bayly
says an economic downturn was witnessed in these new polities due to
famine and war, in which period the Company used these intermediaries
to establish its power. This being continuity as even regional polities
used these intermediaries in their rise to political power. He says that as
the military fiscal states emerged (Indian regional polities and later
British), revenue pressure increased which enhanced the role of
moneylender and trader and scribal expertise. After 1780 when the
company took over he argues that the British used these intermediary
groups and their functions, by delegating business of local control to
them and also involving them in new cash crop trade. Thus British rule
drew upon extant groups to establish its colonial power.

While looking at the relationship between intermediary groups and non

elites (labour, artisans and workmen) Bayly argues that 18th century saw
the subordination and oppression of non elites, as intermediary groups

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extracted revenue from non-elites. In the Colonial State when the
Company began to collaborate with these intermediary groups, Rajat
Datta, P.J.Marshall and Bayly point out that these intermediary
groups(e.g. Bengali Traders) increased their control over the peasantry
and economy as a result of revenue squeeze imposed by the company.
Thus the rise of the intermediary classes who prospered in the 18th
century was closely connected to peasantisization and subordination of
labour, and the Company ’ s collaboration with intermediaries from
regional kingdoms shows continuity between the pre-colonial and
colonial period as well.

Burton Stein too emphasises similar continuities, and collaboration

between British and certain pre-colonial groups. Take for instance the
company’s military and political collaboration with surplus extracting
bureaucratic elite and traders.

Athar Ali critiques the views of Burton Stein and C.A.Bayly who
accept, that British rule continued the traditional institutions and
policies of former regional states, or even the view that English power
was dependent on compromise and collaboration with certain
indigenous groups. Ali delineates two types of collaboration-(i) Where
two powers collaborate on an equal footing (which is rare) and (ii)
Where one power is dominant and the other collaborates because this is
his only means of survival or profit. Ali says that the collaboration with
Indian merchants in the Permanent Settlement was of the second type.
This collaboration was only due to the company’s profit aim, as in the
case of merchants and bankers because they helped in revenue
collection. There was no collaboration with zamidars as Ali points out
and Subsidiary Alliance was one sided as Awadh was compelled to pay
50laikh annual tribute till 1801, and loose half its territory. Thus Ali

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concludes that colonialism marked a break from all previous political
regimes of India, in its nature and objective.

Revisionists also argue for continuities in the area of law,

administration, the military and society. Bernard Cohn and Burton
Stein regarding social structures have both argued for the resilience of
the clan-holding structures in North India, and segmentary systems of
south India respectively, well into the British period. Cohn also argued
that the new administrative and fiscal networks built in regional polities
were the base upon which English rule later structured itself, thus
arguing for continuity. Anand Yang ’ s study demonstrates the
persistence of local power holders during early colonial expansion,
while Frykenburg’s study of Guntur proposed that in outlying districts
of Madras between 1770 and 1830, British rule was supported by old
district officials, as such officials were in return patronized by the
British. C.A. Bayly also argues that company drew on an indigenous
network of support from the vibrant Indian information order- the
scribes and informers. Regarding military cultures, and the building of
the Company State as a “garrison” or military state Peers says, this
new State monopolized the pre colonial practice of military fiscalism
seen in regional polities, while Seema Alvi and Dirk Kollf ’ s study
focus on the Company State drawing upon indigenous military labour
market and the military state ’ s sustenance due to their relationship
with the native ‘ sepoys ’ respectively. With regards to the legal
sphere and the Company’s rise to political power, Singha argues that
the Company drew upon indigenous normative codes- of rule, rank,
status and gender even though it reshaped these to its own advantage.

In conclusion the recent revisionist arguments that comprise bulk of

new literature on the debates surrounding the 18th century, give us a

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nuanced understanding of the 18th century. It is important to note that
Revisionists writings may argue for continuities, but they also recognize
the changes that colonial rule brought in within political, social and
economic spheres, rather than a black and white understanding of the
century as one in decline with the pre colonial order being completely
uprooted and suddenly replaced by colonial rule as older writings seem
to suggest.

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