Original Article

Democracy in South Asia: Studies in Indian Politics

11(1) 39–48, 2023
An Expanding ‘Imagination’ © 2023 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23210230231166193
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Sandeep Shastri1,2

Abstract
Democracy has become an accepted lexicon among ruling elites and the general public through the
twentieth century. However, there are also doubts about its strength in the current century. Looking
at survey data, this article attempts a first-cut analysis of citizens’ commitment to democracy. Taking
an elected government as the primary principle of democracy, do citizens make concessions to non-
elected decision-making processes? This article focuses on the five countries of South Asia to answer
this question and arrives at the conclusion that there is often a large gap between a broader acceptance
of democratic government as a principle and the more nuanced acceptance of democratic government
as a necessary element of democracy.

Keywords
Democracy, support for democracy, satisfaction with government, South Asia

The five countries of South Asia—Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—account for close to
one-fourth of the world’s population (2022 United Nations Revised Population Estimates).3 Since 2003,4 all
of them have had formal democratic processes in operation. While India and Sri Lanka have had, more or
less, uninterrupted democratic processes since their independence, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan have
seen phases of non-democratic governments also. This article seeks to explore the spread of the ‘idea’ of
democracy in this region as also the expansion of the ‘imagination’ of democracy in the five countries.
To undertake this analysis, the article uses empirical data gathered from the first two rounds of the
State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) study and the third round conducted in Bangladesh, India and
Sri Lanka.5 These data allow an exploration of democracy from the lens of the citizen. A common

1
NITTE Education Trust, Deralakatte, Mangaluru, Karnataka, India
2
Lokniti Network, Delhi, India
3
While Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives and Iran are often included in descriptions of the South Asia region, this study limits its
analysis to five countries for reasons specified later in the article.
4
2003 saw a return to democracy in Pakistan and in 2008, a democratically elected government was the first to complete a full
five-year term followed by an election which again ushered in a democratically elected government.
5
Lokniti-CSDS conducted the first round of the comparative assessment of the State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) in
2004–2005 and published the report in 2008 (SDSA; de Souza et al., 2008). The second round of the study was undertaken in 2013

Corresponding author:
Sandeep Shastri, NITTE Education Trust, NMIT Campus, Yelahanka, Bangalore, Karnataka, 560064 India; Lokniti
Network, Delhi 110054 India.
E-mail: [email protected]
40 Studies in Indian Politics 11(1)

questionnaire was administered to a representative sample of the population in these countries. The data
that emerged from the said surveys form the basis of the narration on the ‘idea’ and ‘imagination’ of
democracy in these countries. This bottom-up approach allows a citizen-centric perspective on the
emerging contours of democratic practise in this region. With one of every four people in the world
found in this region, the popular perceptions of democracy have wider implications for the journey of
democracy in this third decade of the twenty-first century.
An important caveat needs to be added at the start of this discussion. While it is important to assert
the distinctiveness of the journey of democracy in each of the five countries being assessed, they share a
‘common past, began their journey after independence around the same time, took different routes for
establishing democratic processes in their respective countries … and chose diverse strategies to resolve
the multiple crises that they faced’ (SDSA II; Shastri et al., 2017, p. 8). While highlighting the unique
nature of the pathways to democracy in each of the countries, the analysis would also seek to underscore
the elements of commonality that can be seen in the empirical data from the region.
It would be important to underscore the fact that the spread of the ‘idea’ of democracy and its growing
popularity has been a key trend across the globe, especially in the latter half of the twentieth century and
the early decades of the twenty-first century. It has often become the ‘currency’ for political legitimacy used
by leaders to assert their presence. The ‘fact of democracy’ has become a preferred expression of the
political architecture of countries, both by the common citizens and the different political actors, including
political parties and their leaders. With the widespread acceptance of the notion of democracy, the need to
excavate the deeper commitment to what actually constitutes the idea of democracy gains importance. Is
that merely to a commitment to the ‘fact’ of democracy and the presence of elected government or does it
run deeper in opposing non-democratic regimes and non-democratic forms of governance?
To capture the ‘idea’ of democracy among the people in the region and link the same to their deeper
‘imagination’ of democracy, this article employs the ‘funnel of democracy’ as developed by the SDSA
studies. This funnel provides for different levels of filters. At the first level, those who support rule by
elected representatives are identified as the ‘nominal democrats’. At a second level, those who supported
non-democratic regimes in special circumstances were excluded but those who still supported democracy
continue to include other less-than-democratic forms of government occasionally and so these are called
‘mixed democrats’. At the third level, those who had no objection to the rule by the army were also
eliminated leaving supporters of strongman leadership and elite-driven leadership, so these are called
‘weak democrats’. At a fourth level, those who endorsed the rule of a ‘strong leader’ who did not have to
bother about elections were also excluded. This then gives us a smaller section of citizens who continue
to support democracy. We call them strong democrats. At the final level, those who favoured ‘rule by
experts’, ‘elite democrats’. were also omitted. Those who remained after all these rounds of elimination
were termed as the ‘uncompromising democrats’6 and were seen as those who unequivocally endorsed
democracy without any limitations or reservations (although this article does not intend to go into the
issue of what these uncompromising democrats actually mean by ‘democracy’). The article thus focuses
on those who do not support any form of government that does not include elected rulers with popular
mandate.

and the report was published in 2017 (SDSA II; Shastri, 2017). The third round of the study has been completed in Bangladesh,
India and Sri Lanka in 2019–2022 and is due to be held in Nepal and Pakistan. The South Asia Study is part of the Asian Barometer
Survey which is one of the components of the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS). GBS is a collaborative research project consisting
of five regional barometers and is the first comprehensive effort to measure, at a mass level, the current social, political and
economic climate around the world. It provides a scientific and multidisciplinary view of public opinion on a range of policy-
relevant issues. Currently, the GBS network covers 70% of the world’s population. For details, see www.globalbarometer.net
6
The category of uncompromising democrats was not developed by the SDSA report but created by the author.
Shastri 41

This article undertakes an analysis of how the funnel narrows down in each of the five countries in
particular and the region in general. It assesses the stages at which the numbers drop and links the same
to specific political contexts of each of the countries. It also helps capture, in significant ways, the true
and realistic ‘imagination’ of democracy in each of the countries. At the top of the democracy funnel
would be those who endorse the ‘idea’ of democracy. As one passes through each filter and arrives finally
at the uncompromising democrats, the true imagination of democracy and the extent of its acceptance in
the society become evident.

The Broader Context

As mentioned above, there are clear ‘areas of distinctiveness’ as well as ‘zones of similarity’ in the journey
of democracy and the trajectories of democratic engagement in the five democracies of South Asia being
assessed. The socio-economic environment in which democracy operates in each of these countries
unmistakably shapes the public perception of democracy. This is clearly evident, especially in the cut
and thrust of politics in South Asia in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.
Bangladesh has witnessed the ebb and flow of democratic and electoral politics with the ruling Awami
League winning a third successive term in office in 2019. Its economic turnaround in the early years of
the twenty-first century (Riaz & Rahman, 2016) coupled with challenges of poor governance and weak
political accountability mechanisms (Basu et al., 2019) have been important landmarks in its democracy
travails. Recent years have seen recourse to international loans from multi-lateral agencies by the
government. This, accompanied by the shrinking foreign exchange reserves, trade deficit caused by the
decline in demand for ready-made garments, high rate of inflation and fall in the value of the currency
are often attributed to the rising tide of corruption in the administration and poor standards of governance.
This has clearly impacted on the citizen assessment of democracy and democratic practices.
The last decade has witnessed a few major trends in the working of democracy in India. The 2014
elections saw the emergence of a ruling party (BJP) with a clear majority. This was happening at the
national level after a quarter of a century (after 1989). A linked development is the clear distinction that
the Indian voter is making between national and state elections. One notices the dominance of the three
C’s: dynamics of administrative coordination, compulsions of political competition and realities of inter-
governmental cooperation since 2014 (Shastri & Singh, in press). The third round of the SDSA survey
conducted in 2019, indicated a much higher level of public confidence in political institutions (Sardesai
& Shastri, in press). At the same time, there is a parallel narrative that non-elected institutions (judiciary,
media, election commission) are fast losing their independence and the same was linked to the emerging
political context (Ahmad, 2020; Ganguly, 2020; Mehta, 2019; Palshikar, 2019). The above issues are
clearly reflected in the funnel of democracy that flows from the latest round of the SDSA survey in India.
Nepal has seen some momentous developments in the last decade. With the final adoption of a new
Constitution in 2015, one saw a focus on federalism and political decentralization. Two elections have
been held under the new constitution. Ever since it began its experiment with democracy, Nepal has
witnessed an incessant power struggle between political parties (Gellner, 2007; Thapa & Sharma, 2009).
This has remained unchanged even after the adoption of the new constitution. The fact of coalition
politics has resulted in the pre-election competitors becoming post-election allies. Accountability
mechanisms have been a matter of concern. It is also important to record that none of the elected
Prime Ministers has been able to complete a full term in office. The fact that the 2022 parliamentary
election saw the defeat of nearly half the incumbent parliamentarians (including senior minsters) is a
reflection of citizen disaffection with their elected representatives. A major challenge that the democratic
42 Studies in Indian Politics 11(1)

process faces is the ironing out the hiccups in a transition from a unitary to a federal state (Ghimire, 2019,
2022; Lamsal, 2020).
The last decade marked an important transition in democratic politics in Pakistan. The 2018
parliamentary election was historic as it marked the successful completion of a full term of an elected
Parliament followed by a relatively peaceful election and a democratic transfer of power. As the term of
Parliament comes to an end in October 2023, there has been a change of government in April 2022, with
Imran Khan being replaced by Shehbaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. The change of government in 2022,
raised important issues both in terms of politics of the past and important departures in the present. There
have been references to an active tradition of politics in Pakistan, although not necessarily leading to a
deeper process of democratization (Zaidi, 2005, p. 5174). The role of the military continues to be critical,
like the politics of the past, when political processes were ‘controlled, rules, manipulated and determined
by the military, its institutions and their interests’ (Zaidi, 2005, p. 5174). In recent years, the role and
intervention of the judiciary in ensuring that political parties—especially those in power—adhere to the
constitutional mandate has strengthened the commitment to democratic norms and practices. The reversal
of the decision to prematurely dissolve the national assembly as well as protect the political rights of
leading politicians facing action from the State are indicators of the same (Afzal, 2023). Thus, the
practise of democracy has seen important developments in the last decade.
Sri Lanka has witnessed dramatic and unexpected turnarounds in its journey of democracy in the last
decade. The defeat of President Mahinda Rajapaksha in 2015 was seen as the ‘end of the dynasty building
project’ (Devotta, 2016, p. 152). Towards the end of 2019, a member of the Rajapaksha family (Gottabaya)
won the Presidential elections. The next few years saw the spread of the COVID pandemic and its mishandling,
spiralling corruption, collapse of tourism and a serious economic crisis in the country. A people’s movement
led to the ouster of President Gotabaya Rajapaksha in July 2022. The next Presidential election is due in 2024.
There have been calls for an early election as the present political dispensation is not seen to represent the
democratic will and public opinion. There is a strong popular movement for fresh elections, political reforms
and the creation of a new constitution approved by a referendum. The latest round of the SDSA survey was
conducted in Sri Lanka during the height of the crisis and the response of those interviewed as part of the
survey (a representative sample) reflects the frustration with the political class.
The above narration of the major political developments in the five nations of South Asia in the last
decade provides the context for the analysis of the ‘funnel of democracy’ in each of the countries and the
range of democrats, from the ‘nominal’ democrats to the ‘uncompromising’ ones. As a backdrop, a look
at the key projections made in the first two SDSA reports may be useful.
In its first survey conducted in 2003 (published in 2008), the SDSA study led to ‘a two-way question:
it is exciting enough to ask what democracy has done to South Asia; it is even more rewarding to engage
with what South Asia has done to democracy’ (SDSA; de Souza et al., 2008, p. 3). The ‘democracy
funnel’ is indicative of both what democracy has done to South Asia and what South Asia has done to
democracy. The Report went on to add that the ‘cultures, practices and institutions of democracy have
transformed the people of South Asia from subjects to citizens, bearers of rights and dignity, but this
gives rise to citizens’ expectations that most of our regimes fail to meet’. Yet again, this is clearly reflected
in the ‘democracy funnel’. where one notices a gradual decline in numbers of ‘committed democrats’ as
one eliminates those who are willing to accept critical deviations from democratic norms for a wide
range of reasons. Across the South Asia region, more than 9 in every 10 respondents unequivocally
supported democracy. Similar numbers held that democracy was most suitable for their country. The
study additionally found that there was a direct relationship between being satisfied with the working of
democracy and the intensity of support for a democratic government. The ‘democracy funnel’ possibly
mirrors this response.
Shastri 43

In its second round undertaken in 2013 (report published in 2017), the SDSA report made the point
that the ‘idea’ of democracy ‘has a place of pride in South Asia’ but the ‘imagination of institutionalizing
democracy remains weak’ (SDSA II; Shastri, 2017, pp. 9–10). This often led to a growing hiatus between
the aspiration for democracy and its achievements, the rhetoric of the promise of democracy and the
reality of its performance. Citizens who were more satisfied with the working of their government were
more likely to be satisfied with the working of democracy. The report went on to conclude that the
‘gaping mismatches witnessed by democracy in South Asia produce not frustration and abandonment of
democracy, but additional expectations and burdens’ (SDSA II; Shastri, 2017, p. 98). The hope of a
future democratic dividend led to a commitment to continue to investment in democracy. This helps
build the context for the ‘funnel of democracy’ in the region.
Has the situation altered in any significant way over the last decade? Major developments in this
period have been highlighted at the start of this section. A third round of the study has been completed
between 2019 and 2022 in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. The third round is still to be done in Nepal
and Pakistan. The data from the three countries point to some critical trends.

The Idea Versus Its Imagination

The ‘democracy funnel’ provides for a filtering of the intensity of commitment to democracy among
citizens. While the broad end of the funnel (first level) has ‘nominal’ democrats and the narrowest stage
has the ‘uncompromising’ democrats, along the road are ‘mixed’. ‘weak’. ‘strong’ and ‘uncompromis-
ing’ democrats (see Table 1).
A broad trend one notices across the surveys is the marginal fall in the percentage of ‘nominal’
democrats. In Nepal and Pakistan (where one does not have the data from the third round of the survey),
the first two rounds of the survey indicate marginal or no change in the percentage of nominal democrats.
In Sri Lanka, there is a 12 percentage point fall in the number of nominal democrats. In Bangladesh, as
compared to the first round of the survey, there is a 10 percentage point decline and in India there is a
9 percentage point decline. In both Bangladesh and India, there is a gradual decline in the percentage of
nominal democrats across the three rounds of the survey.
The sharpest fall in the percentage of nominal democrats is seen in Sri Lanka. As the third round of
the survey was held in the midst of the economic and political crisis in the country, the decline could well
be mirroring popular response to political developments in the country. The public outcry against the
incumbent President and the strong movement for his ouster is reflected in the decline in the percentage
of even the ‘nominal’ democrats. The growing public movement for far-reaching reforms and reviewing
the constitution and ensuring the public endorsement of the same through a referendum is reflective of a
‘restive’ citizenry who prioritize change to improve the functioning of the democratic process and
institutions.
Bangladesh too has seen a sharp fall in the percentage of nominal democrats in 2021, as compared to
2013. Here too, the weakening of the opposition political forces, the limited democratic choices that
people have, the challenges of good governance, the violation of human rights, coupled with the latest
economic crisis may have all caused the increasing cynicism.
In India, the real decline in the percentage of ‘nominal’ democrats was in 2013. As the SDSA II report
mentions, this could well have been due to the political developments around the time the survey was
undertaken, including a strong wave of protest against the government. This percentage has further
declined, albeit marginally, in 2019. Here too, this may be on account of the shrill polarization that the
democratic process has witnessed in recent years (Shastri, 2021; Shastri & Ramaswamy, 2016).
Table 1. Funnel of Democracy in South Asia.

South Asia Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

2019–22* 2013 2005 2021 2013 2008 2019 2013 2008 na 2013 2008 na 2013 2008 2022 2013 2008
Nominal democrats 85 91 93 87 96 97 85 87 94 na 94 94 na 82 81 85 97 97
Mixed democrats 65 61 60 68 75 69 58 57 69 na 54 62 na 33 30 68 87 70
Weak democrats 45 45 44 48 50 36 38 40 59 na 42 48 na 17 17 52 78 56
Strong democrats 35 34 19 34 47 13 28 26 37 na 29 9 na 10 13 42 61 19
Uncompromising 29 27 5 30 44 4 26 19 8 na 26 3 na 9 5 32 43 5
democrats
Source: Lokniti-CSDS data file.
Notes: All figures are in percentages
*Based on data from Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka.
Nominal democrats: Include those who approve rule by elected representative.
Mixed democrats: Exclude those who prefer non-democratic governments sometimes.
Weak democrats: Exclude those who prefer rule by the army and who prefer non-democratic governments sometimes.
Strong democrats: Also exclude those who prefer rule by strong leader besides excluding the previous two groups.
Uncompromising democrats: Exclude those who prefer rule by experts besides excluding the previous three groups.
Shastri 45

Does the fall in the percentage of nominal democrats herald the arrival of the ‘critical citizen’ in South
Asia? Citizens in South Asia may well not be content with democracy being a mere reflection of an
elected government and would want a more active role in the process. In this context, the debate in some
parts of South Asia that democracies are being limited to ‘election-only’ democracies may also be
resonating in citizens’ responses.
The second filter seeks to remove from the number of ‘nominal democrats’ those who support non-
democratic regimes in special circumstances—giving us the category of the ‘mixed democrats’. Overall,
the percentage of ‘mixed democrats’ appears to have fallen. In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the ‘democracy
funnel’ appears to have returned to the 2008 numbers. The percentages of the ‘mixed democrats’ as they
stood after the filtering out supporters of those who accept non-democratic government sometimes in Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh seems to, in the third round, return to the figures of the first round! In India, the
numbers of the ‘mixed democrats’ after this filtering out is more or less the same as compared to 2013.
There is, of course, a need for a more nuanced analysis of the point. For instance, the endorsement of
non-democratic regimes in special circumstances witnesses no change in India. In Bangladesh, there was
a higher percentage of ‘mixed democrats’ in 2008 (18%) and this has declined in 2021 (9%). In
Sri Lanka, too, there was a much higher percentage of ‘mixed democrats’ (27%) in 2008 as compared to
2022 (17%). In Sri Lanka, the non-democratic actions of the elected leadership may well have heightened
the discontent with non-democratic techniques. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the continued practice of
democracy (with all its limitations) may have led to the lukewarm and reduced support for non-democratic
regimes in the minds of the citizens. It is also important to record that the percentage of ‘nominal’
democrats in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka declined in the third round of the survey as compared to the first
round. Pakistan and Nepal had the highest support for non-democratic regimes in special circumstances
in 2013. This was a direct corollary to the frustration with democratic processes in both the countries at
that point of time. These numbers are most likely to witness a change when the third round of the survey
is done. The popular movements in both countries are testimony to the people’s distancing themselves
from non-democratic regimes.
The next filter applied is eliminating those who support army rule—leaving out the ‘weak’ democrats—
because they may still support a strongman and/or an expert rule. Support for army rule has clearly been
on the decline in Bangladesh. Having witnessed a semblance of stability in democratic governance, with
its many challenges, the support for army rule is clearly on the decline. In Sri Lanka, there is a distinct
increase in support for army rule in the third round of the survey. This could well be a natural corollary
to the public unrest witnessed across the country on account of the economic crisis and political
upheavals. In India, 2 of every 10 respondents were fine with army rule. These numbers have increased
as compared to the earlier rounds of the survey. In the first round, just 1 in every 10 respondents favoured
army rule. It may be useful to mention that the army as an institution has consistently enjoyed a high
level of trust in India. This high level of trust is linked to public perception of the role of the armed
forces. Especially with a heightened focus on patriotism and nationalism, the armed forces are viewed in
the public eye with a high degree of respectability. This also needs to be seen in the context of the army
in India having always been under civilian control since independence and the country having had more
or less uninterrupted primacy to the institutions representing democratic forces. In the first two rounds
of the SDSA study, in both Pakistan and Nepal, the percentage of ‘weak democrats’. those who support
army rule, remains more or less unchanged. The strengthening of democratic forces in both these
countries is likely to see a diminishing of the support for army rule.
The fourth filter involved is eliminating those who favoured strong leaders who did not need to be
limited by legislatures and elected bodies. In both Sri Lanka and India, there is a steady decline in the
percentage of ‘strong democrats’. There is a marginal increase in the support for a strong leader who is
46 Studies in Indian Politics 11(1)

unaccountable in Bangladesh. Given the strong leadership factor in party competition in Bangladesh, it
is possible that when the strong leadership question was asked, the respondent focused more on the
strong leader part of the question without paying attention to the second part (not having to be worried
about elected legislatures). Also, in the languages employed in South Asia, ‘strong’ need not necessarily
have a negative connotation, as is in the English language. Strong is often associated with decisive and
quick in decision-making.
In Nepal, the support for a strong leader was very high in 2008—with close to 4 of every 10 respondents
backing it. This was also the time that in Nepal, people were increasingly frustrated with the inability of
the political class to collaborate and work together on drafting a new constitution. The new Constituent
Assembly was elected in 2008 and could not arrive at a consensus till the end of its term. A new
Constituent Assembly was elected in 2013 which finally drafted a new Constitution. In the second round
of the SDSA survey (held in 2013), the support for a strong leader had declined sharply. Given the fact
that no elected Prime Minister in Nepal has completed their term, it would be interesting to see the
response to this question in the next round of the survey.
The final filter was on rule by experts. In Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, there is a visible and sharp
decline in support for rule by experts. In all three countries, the democratic elite has identified experts as
not necessarily representing ground reality. There have been public debates in which ‘experts’ are
projected as being ‘elitist’ and ‘arm-chair’ critics. The support for rule by experts has been lukewarm in
Pakistan and is likely to remain unchanged in light of recent developments. This is a long journey from
being a ‘nominal’ democrat: from nearly 9 out of every 10 who supported the idea of democracy but were
also willing to uphold some forms of non-democratic government at some point, very few citizens may
be willing to uphold democracy both as a precept and as a routine practice.
So, what does the picture of the uncompromising democrats look like? At an overall level, close to 3 of
every 10 respondents are ‘uncompromising’ democrats. In India, the percentage of ‘uncompromising’
democrats has increased to one-fourth of the respondents. Paradoxical as it may seem, precisely when
debates about the democratic nature or otherwise of the political process in India have emerged and sharply
divided political class and the public alike, we find that more and more citizens are willing to discard all
forms of less-than democratic rule and uphold the imagination that democracy means popular consent and
mandate alone. The proportion of uncompromising democrats is up from 2 of every 10 in the second round
and 1 of every 10 in the first round of the study. What accounts for the rise in the proportion of
‘uncompromising democrats’ in India? The high levels of satisfaction with the government (2014–2023)
could be an explanatory factor. It may also be relevant to note that among governments in South Asia in this
second decade of the twenty-first century, the one in India appeared to enjoy the highest degree of popularity.
In Sri Lanka, it has decreased from 4 out of every 10 in the last round to one-third of the respondents this
time around. This trend needs to be seen in the context of the economic crisis in the country leading to a
political upheaval. In Bangladesh, too, it has been reduced from over 4 out of every 10 in the second round
to 3 of every 10 this time around. Here too, the contemporary developments in politics may be a case in
point. In Nepal, one-fourth of the respondents were uncompromising democrats in the second round of the
study. In the same round, it was 1 of every 10 in Pakistan.

Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, one returns to the implications of the ‘democracy funnel’ and the lessons
for both the ‘idea’ and the ‘imagination’ of democracy in South Asia. The three rounds of the SDSA
Shastri 47

survey clearly indicate strong support for the ‘idea’ of democracy. When it comes to translating the idea
into a concrete imagination of democracy, the ‘democracy funnel’ provides one with a lens to explore
this imagination. It is clear that the ‘nominal democrat’ who believed that democracy was about rule by
elected representatives (but was willing to ignore aberrations) is now becoming more demanding. This
is reflected in the percentage of those who accept democracy as being rule by elected representatives
declining by a few percentage points across the three rounds of the survey. Does this reflect the visible
arrival of the discerning citizen? A citizen who does not accept a minimalist expectation from democracy
and wishes to hold the democratic forces more accountable could well be a trend. This does not imply a
reduced faith in democracy but a heightened expectation from the same. However, this hypothesis needs
to be checked both in South Asia through subsequent investigation and outside of South Asia.
Second, as one uses the democracy filter, one notices a decline in the numbers of those who would be
willing to accept non-democratic regimes in special circumstances. Support for army rule has declined.
It may be useful to make a distinction between respect for the army and support for army rule. Trust in
the army is not an endorsement of it being unaccountable to democratic forces. Rule by the experts
seems to enjoy limited support. This has a lot to do with the way in which the political elite has portrayed
the ‘expert’ as representing those distanced from ground reality.
At the end of the day, the ‘uncompromising’ democrat is the representative of an imagination of
democracy that would not concede any space for anything except elected governments. It is this
commitment for popular mandate that holds the key to the rise in the proportion of uncompromising
democrats. Across the last two decades as evidenced in the last three rounds of the SDSA study, the
‘uncompromising’ democrat has become increasingly visible. This greater visibility could well be the
by-product of an increased level of popular satisfaction with the incumbent governments. It could well
be the case that what India and some other countries in South Asia may be witnessing is the greater
acceptance of the regime (based on its popularity) which in turn produces citizen support to the idea of
a popularly elected government. This, as a natural corollary, may have resulted in greater support for the
idea of democracy, irrespective of the actual experience with the working of democracy. One could well
be witnessing a de-linking of the support for democracy from its actual working. A greater endorsement
of the imagination of democracy (in the form of elected government) as a cherished ideal could well be
the dominant theme in South Asia. How this imagination unfolds in the wake of controversies about the
democratic credentials of regimes is something that needs to be examined both empirically and
conceptually. Available data underscore the paradox that democratic theory has been facing in the
backdrop of the mismatch between continued popular avowal of democracy and indulgence in various
dubious practices that alert scholars to the possible slide-down of democracy.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the reviewers for their many suggestions and useful comments on an earlier draft. I
would like to thank the Communications Team at the Jagran Lakecity University for helping with the creatives. A special
thanks to the CSDS Data Unit. I, of course take full responsibility for the analysis made as part of the paper.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
48 Studies in Indian Politics 11(1)

Supplementary Material
The graphic ‘Funnel of Democracy in South Asia’ is provided separately as the online only material.

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