UNIT 2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INDIA’S

FOREIGN POLICY
Structure

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Political Realist and ‘Complex Neo-realist’Approaches to India’s Foreign Policy
2.3 Perspective of Interdependence and Complex Interdependence
2.4 New World Order
2.5 Non-alignment and the Nehruvian Consensus
2.6 Summary
2.7 Exercises

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Literature on Indian foreign policy offers a range of approaches to the study of the subject. They
range from traditional approaches based on the theories of realism and neo-realism,
interdependence and complex interdependence to approaches that are rooted in the domestic
cultural and socio-political ethos centred on the historical experiences and of Indian freedom
movement as well as the ideals and aspirations of the leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru of India’s freedom struggle.

At the outset two points need to be stressed. In the first place, while each one of the approaches
helps us in an understanding, India’s foreign policy can, and need, better be studied from an
eclectic perspective. No single approach would suffice for an understanding of the complexities
of the making and conduct of India’s foreign policy. Besides, in the available literature there
obtains a quality, which is native to the country. Nor for that matter, policy-makers and practitioners
have and would ever fit their practices into rigid theoretical framework.

A perusal of the varieties of approaches nevertheless offers useful insights to the principles and
ideals, mechanisms and instruments, and the actors and forces that have come to frame the
objectives and devise appropriate instruments for the formulation and implementation of the
country’s foreign policy.

It also needs to be borne in mind that India’s foreign policy is not a simple amalgam of responses
to the exigencies of international relations. For whatever reasons—size of area, population,
economy, leadership, etc.—India has consistently sought to influence the course of international
relations in an independent and energetic manner, conscious of its responsibilities and
commensurate to its status and capacities in the international system.

2.2 POLITICAL REALIST AND ‘COMPLEX NEO-REALIST’

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 APPROACHES TO INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
There is some evidence in the argument that, barring perhaps the United States, realism has had
its over-riding influence on what could be described as the ‘foreign policy establishment’ or the
‘strategic community’ of India. Echelons of at least six identifiable groups viz., the military,
diplomatic corps, bureaucracy including the foreign service, political class, policy experts from
the academia and the media, and the community of scientists and technologists of the so called
foreign policy establishment, it can be said, help shape India’s thinking on foreign policy matters.

The ‘strategic community’ is intertwined closely and shares state power more than others; for
example, the business community—although the influence of the business is on the rise in the
wake of the economic liberalisation and is evident in the formation of various government-business
consultative mechanisms. Also, sectors in the middle echelons of the afore-mentioned six
identifiable groups while do not influences they, at best, legitimise policy at the popular level. This
should not be surprising. For, foreign policy and diplomacy invariably remain the handiwork of
the elite.

India’s ‘strategic community’ operates, more or less, within the parameters of political realism or
simply realism. The ‘strategic community’ perceives itself as being pragmatic, responsible and
experienced, and is oriented to practical problem-solving. The ‘strategic community’ does not
function in an ad hoc fashion nor are its responses ad hoc or “knee-jerk” responses. To the
contrary, the ‘strategic community’ is conscious of the fundamental goals and means at its disposal
for the realisation of foreign policy objectives.

Political realism entails the view of power as the basis of inter-state relations, which are seen
normally in conflictual modes, with each state seeking to pursue egoistically its own interests.
Neo-realism recognises the primacy of politics but concedes that international order based on
the convergence of interests among actors, and not conflict alone, is the basis of international
relations. With the above in view, at least, three goals can be identified with paramount importance
attached to the goal of external national security and internal national unity. The two other goals
are leadership at least within the region and at a larger Third World level; and a place in the
comity of nation-states appropriate to India’s size, stature and capabilities.

Two assumptions underlie the approach: one, security of Indian state is paramount and is, best
subsumed, as ‘national interest’. All other elements and goals are subordinate to this basic
national interest. It is the leitmotif or the guiding factor of all political and strategic thinking and
planning. It is to be noted that the term security is defined essentially in political-military terms.
The assumption is that a physically and militarily secure nation-state is a Sine qua non of the
well-being and unity of the society.

Underlying the supremacy of national security goal is also the belief and the experience of colonialism
and foreign domination. Historically, as and when India had a weak or a fissiparous state structure,
the country had been prone to foreign domination and rule. The second assumption, and which
is related to the first, is that international system is essentially an inter-state system. Non-state and
trans-state actors are present but there is no denying the centrality of states in the international
system. Legal and ethical norms of international system are and must be followed by all states;
but, in the end, it is the great powers that shape the world because they have the power.

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It is a contentious point but power is unambiguously defined as state power. India, it is argued,
is potentially a world power. Therefore, it should try to fulfill this potential and its foreign policy
should reflect this aspiration and promote its achievement. India’s nuclear and missile development
programmes, its space research and its scientific and technological achievements, large and highly
professional defence forces under civilian control, a highly competent bureaucracy, and a large
pool of highly skilled professionals, and no less a visionary political leadership and Indian
democracy—with its national consensus on the above meaning of national interest—are all seen
as vital elements in the realisation of national security and a great power status.

Skillful diplomacy which was the hallmark of foreign policy under the leadership of Jawaharlal
Nehru, military prowess that India began systematically building under Indira Gandhi, and political
astuteness to engage all significant powers in political and strategic dialogues that characterises
Indian foreign policy since the 1990s are vital capabilities of a great power that India has so
consistently demonstrated.

It is in such a vein that political pronouncements and analyses often describe India as a great
power or potentially a great power. Description of India as a “great” power, an “emergent”
power and, at times, as “super” power—some time still with an interrogation mark—have become
more frequent in the aftermath of the nuclearisation and the significant achievements made in the
field of missile technology since 1998.

Is some kind of a pax-Indica possible? Since independence and well up to the 1960s, India’s
‘strategic community’ saw the country as destined to be a future great power of Asia rivalled only
by two other Asian powers namely, Russia and China. By the 1980s, Indian realists had a more
ambitious view, but argued realistically for India’s regional pre-eminence to be acknowledged by
the rest of the world. In other words, the view was to project the country as the leader, if not the
hegemon, of South Asia. With the collapse of Soviet Union and the ensuing uncertainties of the
post-Cold War era, the idea to view the country as a great power, and that it be so recognised by
the international community, has gained firmer grounds.

To the idea of regional pre-eminence is appended the desire of a strong and responsible global
player. In ‘complex neo-realism’, periods of transition in international relations—such as the
one witnessed in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Union—offer significant opportunities for
upward mobility to certain intermediate powers. Indian foreign policy in the 1990s including
India’s successes in the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery system
is seen as a time-tested approach to enter the concert of great powers on the basis of its military
strength.

There are certain themes that recur in the Indian realist view of foreign policy. Foremost, and it
is seen more or less regularly, is to view China as an actual or a potential strategic rival or
competitor of India. The India-China conflict of 1962 and the border dispute have strengthened
the view that the two big and strong neighbours are destined to be rivals, at least periodically.
Pakistan’s hostility including the dispute over Jammu & Kashmir, tilt towards Soviet Union during
Cold War including the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with that country, and the entire gamut of
Indo-US relations have always had and continue to have a Chinese dimension. Emergence of
China as a great military and economic power would have major repercussions for the security
of Asia and the Pacific including the Indian Ocean region. The resulting dis-balancing and re-

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balancing of regional equations would surely impinge on Indian sovereignty and security. A large
sized India, second in terms of population, its large GNP and skilled manpower, and with its
more than a million strong defence forces has to stand up and possibly emerge stronger in the
wake of destabilising effects of China. The view that China is India’s ‘enemy number one’ which
the Indian political leadership enunciated just prior to the nuclear experiments of 1998 are a
piece of such a realist thinking.

The afore-mentioned proposition is precisely the kind of historical notion of inter-state relations
and geo-political thinking realists, in general, entertain. (It is also true that many Indian realists do
not preclude the possibility of a strong India and a strong China turning into strategic allies or
friends at some future date.) It is to counter pointedly the Chinese strategic challenge and put
India in the “big power” league that much of the justifications for nuclearnisation have been
proffered. Often thus, it has been argued that India’s decision to go nuclear has been independent
of its relationship with Pakistan.

In such a perception, China-Pakistan relations are viewed as an anti-India strategic alliance.

‘Our rival’s greater insecurity is our security’ is the dictum of competitive security approach,
which is sometimes promoted by the realists. Relations with Pakistan consume a good deal of
the time and energy of Indian foreign policy planners and analysts. A stable, secure and preferably
a democratic Pakistan is in India’s greater national interest than a Pakistan which is jingoistic,
authoritarian and on a collusion course with India. There are several problem areas, which are
identified in Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s membership in the Western alliance system had
brought Cold War to the doorsteps of India; India had to resort to highly skillful diplomacy to
ward off the threat of ‘consummation’ of such an alliance relationship. Since then the Western
powers particularly the US have viewed Pakistan in terms of their own global strategic interests.
First, it was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism and its search for ‘warm waters’
in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean region that made Pakistan a frontline state in the Cold War
calculus of the US. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1978 made Pakistan once again a frontline
state—this time as a conduit of arms and money to the mujaheedens—in the grand battle between
the East and the West. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in US on 11 September 2001,
Pakistan has once again become a frontline state—this time in the US war against international
terrorism. Besides, the West in general is looking at Pakistan as a gateway to the grand opening
that awaits the exploitation of natural gas and other minerals in Central Asian region. Interestingly,
Indian foreign and security policy planners have rarely, perhaps for understandable reasons,
taken into account the thesis of a decline in the US power, which many neo-realists had peddled
during the Cold War.

Yet, another matter of concern has been Sino-Pakistan axis. Pakistan has been the ‘most reliable
friend’ of China ever since the latter was in near isolation in international affairs. China’s clandestine
support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development programmes is an evidence of anti-India
axis of their relationship. It is the play of extraneous powers and forces which are intent on
creating a sort of military ‘parity’ between Pakistan and India which has remained a matter of
great concern to Indian foreign policy planners and leaders. For, India which is several times the
size of Pakistan in terms of territory, population, GNP, and military preparedness, the externally
induced idea of ‘parity’ is seen as a bid to stymie India’s own great power claim. The convergence
of international and regional strategic forces and actors and the dispute over Jammu & Kashmir

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bedevil India-Pakistan relations. Realists point out that Pakistan’s intransigence and pursuit of
adversarial relationship are also impinging on national unity. Pakistan is the direct source of many
of India’s domestic problems including trans-border terrorism and support for militant groups in
Jammu & Kashmir and North-East of India.

2.3 PERSPECTIVE OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND

‘COMPLEX’ INTERDEPENDENCE
Another view, and which has gained currency, is that there are deep connections between the
domestic factors and foreign policy priorities and conduct of India. A narrow and simplistic view
of political-military security is not only static but outmoded also. Writings mostly from the decade
of 1990s suggest that Indian foreign policy is undergoing political instability and ideological
uncertainty as to the basic goals and means appropriate for the entire gamut of its external relations.

A point repeatedly underlined is that international system is much more than inter-state system;
and it involves various kinds of non-state and trans-state actors and relations. These include for
instance the trans-national corporations, the entire complex of NGOs-INGOs and international
financial agencies. In short, it is undeniable that those who influence or have stakes in policy-
making include societal forces and non-governmental actors, which are both domestic and
international.

Besides, it is argued that military-political security is only one of the dimensions of security of a
country; and, moreover, such a definition is not only narrow but also takes a static view of state
security. Issues related to environmental degradation, trans-border migrations and the networks
of international terrorism, crime and illicit finances besides growing poverty in the South and
income gap between the North and the South all are matters of security and sovereignty—
environmental, economic and social. Even the great powers, notwithstanding their ability to
influence the course of international relations, can be unilateral and are facing a world that is
increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar. To face new types of challenges are required new
forms of inter-state cooperation and trans-state activity.

Inter-dependence is more true of the international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War and
with the rapidly integrating economies. Realists’ understanding of security does not take into
account problems such as the growing social and economic gap between the developed countries
of the North and the developing countries in the South, and within each developing country the
growing gap between the elite and the vast multitude of the poor; or population explosion in the
developing world and the problem of the migration within and across national borders or, even
for that matter, the global environmental degradation. Admittedly, these problems render a realist
view of security as of declining importance and somewhat outdated.

Inter-dependence underscores the aspect of economic globalisation. In effective terms, it means

the rise of new transnational economic agents, mechanisms and institutions. These are trans-
national corporations, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank along with the G-7 countries. Patterns and volume of capital, technology control
regimes, economic and increasingly political and social conditions attached to loans and assistance
or access to the markets of developed countries, and concerted pressures built by industrialised

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countries importantly US through the WTO on developing economies to open their agricultural,
industrial, services, and financial sectors to global financial and economic actors all mean that the
notion of economic sovereignty has become outmoded. A number of militarily strong states have
experienced economic regression, even collapse in the 1990s. A major challenge for Indian
foreign policy is how to intervene in these emerging international economic institutional patterns.
In other words, India’s foreign policy in the present and in the future will have a large economic
content. Put differently, what should India’s place in the global economy be? The question has
become as important, if not, more important than the goal of a great power status. Geo-
economics has taken precedence over geo-politics. National security is today closely related to
the prosperity and standard of life of its citizens.

In view of the above, it is argued that India better rid itself of the realist framework, and thereby
of great power status. In the first place, in our increasingly inter-dependent world, even great
powers are not able to influence decisively the course of international relations. This is true even
of the US—the sole super power—which perhaps had exercised a greater influence during
rather than after the Cold War. Other great powers including Britain, France and potentially
Germany and Japan have even less influence today. In the complex inter-dependent world, there
is diffusion of power and influence within the international system favouring the emergence of
multipolarity and a concert of powers that would include India also. More so, India needs to
seize and exploit judiciously the opportunities that economic globalisation is offering. It needs to
enter into coalitions of the like-minded countries to advance its economic goals.

Indian realists have paid a good deal of attention to China as potentially a great power, even as
a future super power. It is suggested that India can advantageously build economic bridges with
China while resolving the border dispute in a pragmatic “give-and-take” fashion. In contemporary
times, geographical contiguity need not produce a naturally adversarial relationship; on the contrary
it can be the beginning of trans-border trade, investment, and integrated production system. The
profile of the two-way trade between China and India is presented as proof of the logic of geo-
economics.

The realist goal of regional pre-eminence, critics argue, has presented insurmountable problems.
In its place, Indian foreign policy should focus foremost on economic cooperation in South Asia.
Normally, two aspects of a South Asia-centric foreign policy are stressed upon. In the short and
medium term, it is stressed that relations with Pakistan be managed in a tension-defusing manner
so as to gradually transform that relationship. India may as well launch a peace offensive towards
Pakistan through a series of confidence-building measures, reciprocal arrangements for verification
of nuclear and related issues, greater civil society interaction, etc. The second element in this
view is to realise the goal of South Asian economic cooperation. In the absence of a robust
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), not only the economic diplomacy
to interact with other regional economic forums such as the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC) or South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) etc. will bear limited dividend,
India’s own search for regional pre-eminence gets pushed that far into the future. Regional
economic cooperation is seen as a stepping-stone for an eventual political community in South
Asia, which, in the long term, is also necessary to keep extra-regional powers away and out of
the region. It is through a complex South Asia-centric policy that some satisfactory and enduring
solutions could be found to the disturbing inter-state relations—be it separatism in Kashmir,
trans-border terrorism, influx of Bangladesh refugees, or the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka.

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Inter-dependence calls for a different kind of pragmatism that focuses on issues of trade and
economic cooperation. Indications of change are already evident. For instance, the role of
economic ministries in the making of foreign economic policies has increased, while the Ministry
of External Affairs especially India’s diplomatic missions abroad are playing more the role of a
‘facilitator’. Among the domestic constituencies impacting the foreign policy, the role of corporate
sector is on the ascendance. Governments may make policies but it is the corporate world,
which is realising those policies. It is a moot point whether India’s corporate sector has become
an influential member of the ‘strategic community’.

It is to be noted that some of the above analyses are also part of the realist perception, which
admit of the metamorphic changes in the international system. Admittedly, Indian strategy is one
of ‘muddling through’ without either racing towards total globalisation or relinquishing the
conventional political-military dimension of national interest and security.

2.4 NEW WORLD ORDER

Interdependence between rich and poor, and powerful and the weak are bound to create
asymmetrical relationship, which enhances the dependence of the poor and weak over the rich
and the powerful. Globalisation means among others that the locus of decision-making is shifting
beyond the control of national sovereignty. Diminished autonomy in international relations means
loss of decision-making powers not only in economic but also in political sphere. Whether it is
policies of investment, import of technology or even foreign aid, conditionalities, which are not
only of economic but also of political and social nature, are being attached. Conditionalities are
intrusive and strain the democratic process of contestation and consensus, rendering governments
not only powerless but also unpopular and illegitimate. Equally deleterious are the consequences
for societal cohesion and stability. Internally arrived consensus and ideological preferences are
being given a go-bye as internationally prescribed uniform and standardised formulae are being
adopted in economic, political and social areas by countries one after another. Self-perception
and self-confidence of people are on the wane and paving way for bitterness and discontentment
leading to outbursts of chauvanism, fundamentalism etc. Diminished status in international system
and the pressures coming from the US and other great powers and the IMF/ World Bank
are impinging on the domestic economic and democratic processes of India too.

Globalisation is singularly the most important dimension of the new hegemonic world order that
the advanced capitalist countries led by the US are imposing on the countries of the South
including India. One significant consequence witnessed is the rolling back of the Nehruvian
framework of the Indian foreign policy. Not only has the international public space for India
shrunk gravely, but also the autonomy of action and the ethical dimension of its Non-aligned
foreign policy. More dangerously, the US-led New World Order has put the concept of nation-
state in the countries of the South in serious crisis. Several states have dissolved; others have
been intervened in the name of general well-being and protection of the populations. The New
World Order threatens the assiduously built national consensus on an independent foreign policy,
national security, national unity and a democratic order.

Critics portend the dangers of the New World Order for India; and warn against national goals
and aspirations becoming hostage to US unilateralism and conditionalities of international institutions.

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2.5 NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE NEHRUVIAN
CONSENSUS
For a long time, particularly during the Nehruvian years, Non-alignment had served as the most
significant approach to the study of Indian foreign policy. India never had a more coherent view
of the world and of its place therein than during the heydays of Non-alignment during the 1950s
and the 1960s. There was a coherence, rather a consonance, of the goals and instruments of
Indian foreign policy until nearly the 1970s when the so-called Nehruvian consensus broke down,
ironically for the high moral ground that Indian foreign policy had occupied on international issues
and precisely for the failure of Non-aligned stance to ensure India’s security (in the wake of the
Chinese aggression of 1962) and its great power ambition. It is however undeniable that a Third
World solidarity that had infused non-aligned policy continues to enthuse India’s foreign policy in
some very significant manner even today.

Nehruvian consensus was built around the ideals and principles that had developed in the course
of India’s struggle for freedom. The influence of Mahatma Gandhi was profound on the entire
course of Indian national movement. What he had struggled for was not mere political freedom
but a cultural and moral regeneration of the Indian civilisation. Nehru had combined these Gandhian
moral and social imperatives while analysing the course of international relations between the two
World Wars. Nehru had found that the two dominant norms in international relations were the
politics of power and the threat of force. It were these norms that had caused the onset of First
World War, failure of League of Nations, rise of fascism, and the politics of alliance and counter-
alliance leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Nehru was very perceptive in foreseeing
the working of the same norms behind the unfolding rivalry between the US and the Soviet
Union.

It remains a matter of debate among scholars to view Nehru as an idealist who sought to base
Indian foreign policy on certain ideals; or somewhat even as a realist who accorded high importance
to diplomacy in order to circumvent the power politics of international system. By placing Indian
foreign policy on the precepts of non-alignment, Nehru had simultaneously pushed for normative
changes in the international system and thereby secure the perceived national interests of India.

How did he reconcile these goals? In the first place, non-alignment was based on securing the
independence and freedom of action especially of the newly independent countries of Asia and
Africa. In that respect, Nehruvian foreign policy was premised on the idea of sovereign nation-
states as the units of the international system. Secondly, Nehru sought to upgrade the aspect of
inter-state cooperation—in place of confrontation which was inherent in the power politics—in
the international system. One can see this pragmatic mix of idealism and hard-headed national
interest in at least three important concerns of Indian foreign policy under him. Non-alignment
was a response to the threats posed to the international system by the two super powers armed
with nuclear weapons who were engaged in encapsulating and subordinating the weaker regions
of the world. In this way, the super power rivalry that was beginning to expand beyond the
Western world so as to include in its fold the countries of the developing world constituted a
direct threat to the international system. In other words, Cold War marked a regression to the
evolution of a universal, democratic international society. Non-alignment was a principled and
pragmatic step to retain and widen the space for autonomy in the rapidly shrinking international

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public space caused by the bloc politics. Nehru was very perceptive a realist to have foreseen
the course of international relations and exhort India and the other struggling colonies against the
dangers of bipolarity as early as 1946.

Lack of concern for or importance attached to the national security is often the criticism levelled
against the Nehruvian framework of Indian foreign policy. However, the enthusiasts of the non-
aligned framework argue cogently that by insisting upon the autonomy of foreign policy decision-
making and by containing the expansionism of Cold War, Nehru was as well addressing the core
issue of national security. That non-alignment was more than idealism was apparent in the context
of India’s relations with Pakistan. A non-aligned stance did not close the windows of opportunity
towards the West including importantly US, discouraged the formation of Soviet-China axis
(who were until at least 1957 close friends) against India, and kept relations with Pakistan and
Indian position on Kashmir intact in the face of the fact of Pakistan’s membership in the Western
alliance system. The same primacy of diplomacy was evident in the way Nehru sought to tackle
Chinese challenge to Indian security; first through panchsheel and Hindi-Chini bhai bhaism
and later, building closer relations with Khruschev’s Soviet Union which was beginning to
acknowledge NAM as its ‘natural ally’. The military debacle against China notwithstanding, the
reliance on skillful diplomacy to keep India as a prominent power while at the same time resetting
the norms of international system away from power politics were the hallmark of Indian foreign
policy under Nehru.

The relevance of Nehruvian consensus remains under debate in the changed circumstance of
today. However, one may still argue that the reliance on skillful diplomacy rather than military
force was never more relevant than today as India seeks to engage a whole range of powers to
work out strategic understandings and economic cooperation. To the contrary is the view that
considers Nehruvian consensus as outmoded and largely abandoned. For one, the international
public space, which had allowed Nehru, and the Non-aligned Movement in general, autonomy
of action has shrunk. Besides, Non-aligned Movement itself has lost its internal coherence and
unity of purpose so as to be of any relevance.

Apart from putting the Non-aligned foreign policy of India in the larger cultural and historical
context of Indian freedom movement, analysts invariably pay glowing tributes to the personal
influence of Nehru on the thinking and conduct of India’s foreign policy. Nehru was a keen
observer of international affairs and had devoted considerable time to formulating, thinking and
position of the national movement on issues of international importance. He was his foreign
minister. He continued to formulate the Indian foreign policy practically himself throughout his
term as prime minister; and would consult only a very close group of ministers including Sardar
Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Radhakrishnan, and V. K. Krishna Menon and officials
such as Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, Sir B. N. Rao, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai and India’s first
foreign secretary K.P.S. Menon-Senior. During the early period of Nehru’s prime ministership,
the institutional and structured policy planning mechanisms were either lacking or were weak. J.
N. Dixit, India’s former foreign secretary has opined “Jawaharlal Nehru was the perceiver of
national concerns and interests, conceptualiser of policies and options to meet them, and the
initiator of policies and actions on all aspects of External Affairs. He had the unique
advantage of back-up by unqualified national consensus on priorities as well as policies in External
Affairs.” He was able to carry the cabinet, the parliament, the political parties and the public
opinion along with him on all-important aspects of Indian foreign policy.

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2.6 SUMMARY
India’s foreign policy combines various influences, factors, goals and mechanisms. It is for these
reasons that no single theoretical approach is appropriate for the study of India’s foreign policy.
The eclectic approach is perhaps the best to the study of India’s foreign policy. There is an
indigenous quality to the writings of Indian foreign policy; and these writings are also responding
to diverse forces and factors both — domestic and international. Statesmen and policy planners
and practitioners also do not fit their ideas and practices into theoretical frameworks.

A perusal of these varieties of approaches nevertheless reveals the principles and ideals,
mechanisms and instruments, and the actors and forces that have come to frame the objectives
and devise appropriate instruments of foreign policy. And this precisely is the purpose of studying
the theme of approaches to the Indian foreign policy.

2.7 EXERCISES
1) Describe briefly the ‘Realist’ view of Indian foreign policy.

2) What do you understand by the term ‘Nehruvian Consensus’?

3) Highlight the points of divergence in the Realist and Inter-dependence approaches to the
study of Indian foreign policy.

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11
UNIT 1 EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S WORLD-VIEW
Structure
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Sources of Traditional Values
1.3 Nature of Traditional Values and Themes in the Evolution of World-view
1.3.1 Preference for the Middle Way
1.3.2 Tolerance
1.3.3 Idealist and Realist Traditions
1.3.4 Absence of Imperialist Tradition and Ideals of Freedom Struggle
1.3.5 Approach to International Law
1.3.6 Expressing Positive Ideas through Negative Terms
1.4 British Rule in India
1.5 The Indian National Congress on India’s World-view
1.6 Summary
1.7 Exercises

1.1 INTRODUCTION
The prime objective of this unit is to explain how India’s history, cultural and philosophical tradition
and ideals of freedom struggle helped the evolution of its world-view in the post-Independence
era. For, after all world-view of any country being a form of social action and its makers being
part of the socio-cultural milieu in which they operate, the significance of those values and
traditions, especially those transmitted through successive generations, cannot be gainsaid. This
is especially true in the case of countries like India, which has been the seat of an ancient civilisation
and meeting-place of great cultures.

According to India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who tailored its world-view during
the initial phase, two aspects of India’s world-view, namely, the ‘positive aspect of peace’ and
the desire to promote ‘a larger degree of co-operation among nations,’ were based on India’s
past thinking on the formulation of foreign policy. It is therefore necessary to discuss those socially
accepted traditional values, which are expressed either in writings of thinkers or embodied in
ancient institutions and customs that inculcate peaceful attitudes and practices notwithstanding
imperfections or shortcomings in these ideals and objectives native to India.

1.2 SOURCES OF TRADITIONAL VALUES

The chief sources of India’s ancient values are the scriptural texts like the Vedas; the law books
by sages such as Manu, Yajnyavalkya, and Parashar; the Dharmasastras; text of Buddhists and
Jains; the great epics, the Ramayana and Mahabharata; the puranas, legends, and chronicles
of great national events; and theological treatises and manuals of worship. As a means of popular
education in social values, these epics are even more important than the scriptural texts and law
books, knowledge of which is generally confined to a very few.

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It is relevant to remember in this context that the above-mentioned traditional sources of values
covered various aspects of human life such as spiritual, social, economic, and political, as ancient
Indians did not divide human activities in watertight compartments. Secondly, though these
traditional values underwent certain changes due to the impact of the Islamic and Western culture,
the works of modern Indian thinkers like Vivekananda, Tagore, Tilak, Aurobindo, Gandhi, and
Nehru show that they were very much influenced by ancient Indian thought, which in turn influenced
their ideas about shaping the destiny of independent India.

1.3 NATURE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES AND THEMES

IN THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD-VIEW
Five aspects of India’s traditional values have a bearing on the evolution of its world-view, namely,
preference for a middle way, tolerance, idealist and realist traditions, absence of imperialist tradition,
and a habit of expressing positive ideas through negative terms.

1.3.1 Preference for the Middle Way

A preference for the middle way has been one of the cardinal features of Indian tradition and
culture as seen in the Sanskrit saying, ati sarvatra varjayet meaning “Let us eschew excess at
all times”. This saying underlines India’s philosophical abhorrence of absolute, of extremes, of
the tendency to see things strictly in terms of black and white. It runs like an unbroken thread
through Indian culture. The Indian preference for the middle path is reflected in their attempt to
synthesise the goals of dharma, (“duties—whether social, moral, spiritual, or ritual”), artha
(“capital accumulation”), Kama (“sensual pleasure”), and moksha (“liberation”). Though dharma
and moksha are given prime importance, artha and kama are not ignored. This is evident, for
instance, from works like Vatsyayana’s Kamsutra, from sculptures like those of Khajuraho,
and from sayings like sarve gunah kanchanamasraynti (“all virtues lie in gold”). The Bhagavad-
Gita therefore speaks of the divine sanction for all desires, which are not against the moral order
and moral law.

While there may be disagreement as to how far the Indians have been able to translate their
ideals into practice and to arrive at a position in the socio-economic and politico-religious ordering
of life that could secure the solace of both the worlds—the here and hereafter, one cannot
gainsay the significance of the underlying synergetic impulsions of Indian culture. Michael Brecher,
therefore, observes: “The central message of India’s philosophical traditions dating from the
Buddha has revolved round the rejection of absolutes, and extreme positions. On the contrary, it
has stressed philosophical relativity, intellectual Catholicism and co-existence of good and evil, in
short the golden middle path of compromises and tolerance of opposites.” Nehru echoes the
same sentiment, when he says: “India has absorbed and harmonised different religions; and even
the conflict between science and religion in the past; and maybe it is our destiny to help reconcile
the conflicting ideologies of today.”

In view of such a cultural-philosophical tradition, it was not surprising that India should prefer the
golden mean of the middle way between the two competing international ideologies during the
Cold War years—Western liberal democracy and Soviet egalitarianism. With the West, India
shared such values as dignity of individual and sanctity of civil liberties, democratic political

2
institutions, the rule of law, and modern technology. At the same time, it appreciated the Soviet
emphasis on distributive justice and its stand against colonialism and racialism, as also its Asia-
mindedness. India, therefore, refused to align with any power bloc and resolved to cooperate
with both of them in furtherance of its own ideals and interests. Nehru proclaimed this in a
language reminiscent of the great Ashoka thus: “We propose, as far as possible, to keep away
from politics of groups aligned against one another. The world, in spite of its rivalries and hatred
and inner conflicts, moves inevitably towards closer cooperation and the building up of a world
commonwealth.”

This was the message of friendship that India issued in 1946. This policy of friendship gave India
freedom of manoeuvre in a world, which was getting frozen in its divisions. Even the Great
Powers, their reservations notwithstanding, found India’s detached stance useful in the Korean,
Indochinese, Suez, and other crises. Thus, by becoming a bridge between the two power blocs
and by blunting the edges of the ideological conflict between them, India acquired a prominence
in the comity of nations far in excess of military strength and economic capabilities.

1.3.2 Tolerance
The aforesaid account of the ancient Indian philosophic attitude of avoiding extremes shows the
traditional faith in reason and abhorrence of dogma. As the old Indian saying goes, vade, vade
jayate tattvasiddhih: “Enlightenment is achieved through debate.” Ancient Indian tradition believes
in the paramountcy of reason. Prajna (“reason”) is an important concept that indicates how one
may pursue the three objectives of life—dharma, artha and kama. In the Mahabharata, for
instance, there is a clear attempt to relativise dharma by saying that it has to be judged on the
basis of experience and reason.

This undogmatic approach to duty and rational tradition that does not claim monopoly of truth
constitutes the core of Indian culture; from it flows tolerance. This tolerant approach rests on the
belief that the human mind, being limited in its range and power, cannot comprehend the nature of
reality in its totality. The Rigveda, therefore proclaims, ekam sadviprah bahudha vadanti
meaning, “The one truth is described variously by learned”. The Upanishads declare that just as
cows of varied colours yield the same white milk, all the different paths lead to the same goal.

Tolerance is not just an ideal mentioned in the scriptures: it is a social reality. That is why, when
the first Christians came to Kerala in 47 AD, they were not repulsed or hounded but welcomed;
and when the first Jews came to Kerala in 70 AD, they too were welcomed and allowed to
practise and propagate their faith. Similarly, when the Parsis fled their own country in the face of
the advent of Islam and came to India in the 7th Century AD, they were also to practise and
propagate their faith. The Ashokan edicts speak highly of tolerance of all the views then obtaining.
Though there were religious persecutions during the time of some Muslim rulers, tolerance was
conspicuous during the reign of the Emperor Akbar, who adopted a policy of universal harmony
(sulh-i-kul). The Muslim poet, Rahim, and the Hindu poet, Tulsidas, were close friends. The
eldest son of the Emperor Shah Jahan—Dara Shikoh—translated the Upanishads into Persian.
The recurring caste and communal violence in India shows that there is much less tolerance today
than there was in the past; we cannot deny that the tradition of tolerance is fundamental to the life
of the masses in India. This explains why secularism has been adopted and has survived in India
inspite of its aberrations.

3
In the sphere of foreign relations, tradition of tolerance made it impossible for India to join any
particular bloc and conduct its international relations from the black-and-white perspective of
that bloc. The tolerant and pluralistic outlook of the Indian mind made it to react instinctively
against the politics of the Cold War characterised by intolerance and against the claims of the two
blocs that they alone had the monopoly of truth and virtue. Instead, India chose to purse a policy
of peaceful co-existence and friendship towards all countries.

This is why, when in the 1950s, the then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and the then
US vice-president, Richard M. Nixon, used almost abusive language with reference to the non-
aligned countries, Nehru urged them neither to suppress discussion nor to give up tolerance in
discussing the external relations of the new countries. He said: “I submit for consideration that
Mr. Nixon and Mr. Dulles are saying something opposed to the democratic way of life…. The
very basis of democracy is tolerance for differing points of view.”

The tradition of tolerance in fact has been the basis of India’s emphasis on the peaceful settlement
of disputes through negotiations. The essence of India’s approach has been that, to achieve a
lasting result, an attempt should be made to see that neither of the parties engaged in a conflict
suffers significant loss. This is how Gandhi tried to resolve India’s domestic tension as well as to
secure freedom for India—a modern application of the principle of negotiation so forcefully
adumbrated in the Mahabharata. Nehru clarified the essence of this approach on several
occasions. For instance, in a speech broadcast from London on 12 January 1951, he said: “If we
desire peace we must develop the temper of peace, and try to win over those who may be
suspicious of us or who think that they are against us.”

The aforesaid approach to negotiation was illustrated in India’s Panchaseela agreement with
China in 1954, the premium it put on diplomatic negotiations for a settlement of the border
dispute with China even after the situation worsened in 1959, and, its acceptance of the Colombo
proposals formulated by certain friendly countries after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 as the
basis for a resolution of the India-China border dispute. Prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee’s
visit to Beijing in June 2003 and the sincere attempts made thereafter to move India-China
relations forward is in line with India’s traditional approach to negotiation. This approach to
conciliation is also reflected in India’s offer of a no-war pact to Pakistan in 1949 and its repeated
renewal of the offer in the subsequent years, its willingness to accept a division of Kashmir on the
basis of the ceasefire line in the interest of Indo-Pakistani peace. New Delhi’s current peace
initiative with Pakistan is the latest manifestation of this negotiating method.

1.3.3 Realist and Idealist Traditions

Two important approaches to inter-state relations have existed in India since the beginning. The
positivist approach is advocated, for example, in the Arthasastra of Kautilya, as well as of
Bharadvaja, in Manusmriti, in some portions dealing with the teaching of Panchatantra. While
these realist thinkers differ over the means to be employed, they generally believe that both
defence of a kingdom and aggressive war, if used to conquer the whole country, are just. They
hold that war should be undertaken only as the last resort, not because war is immoral, but
because it is expensive and troublesome and victory is not certain. Panchatantra, for instance,
says that royal policy has peace for its beginning and war for its end.

On the other hand, from the times immemorial, a school of philosophy has existed in India, which

4
maintains that penance, self-abnegation and non-injury are the means to get rid of sin and secure
salvation. The Upanishads give us the basis of the theory of non-violence. There is one undivided
and indivisible spirit, which may be called God or truth. The universe is expression of it, and all
beings form part of it. Since perfection consists in realising this truth, any kind of violence would
be a repudiation of the truth.

The Buddhists and the Jains are most fervent advocates of non-violence although non-violence is
expected to be practised rigorously only by monks. On the whole, they discourage Machiavellian
politics and deglamourise war. A Mahayana Sutra, the Suvarnaprabhasottama, condemns all
warfare as sinful. When Ashoka became a Buddhist and renounced war as an instrument of his
foreign policy, he uncovered a new dimension of inter-state relations. He maintained friendly and
diplomatic relations with his immediate neighbours and other countries of Europe and Asia and
pursued a peaceful, non-aggressive policy throughout his reign.

In the modern era, Mahatma Gandhi revolutionised the idea of non-violence by demonstrating
first in South Africa and later in India, that it could be employed as a weapon to achieve socio-
political ends. He wished to use this ideal of non-violence in international relations as well, as
according to him, this was the only way to ensure security in the atomic age. Needless to add, the
stress on disarmament in India’s world-view derives from this ideal of non-violence.

The application of non-violence to India’s world-view meant a deliberate acceptance of a method

or approach to foreign policy problems, which emphasised the temper of peace. This was clearly
reflected in India’s decision to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations after
independence although Britain had subjected India to injustice and cruelty. Echoing this spirit of
reconciliation, Nehru stated in the Rajya Sabha: “Our approach is not to stress the differences
but to stress the similarities.”

This idealist method had its limitations as India discovered to its cost during the action in Goa in
1961, the Chinese invasion in 1962, and the Pakistani aggressions of 1965, 1971 and 1999.
India attempted the peaceful method of negotiation in each case. From the failure to prevent war
it learnt that the reality of power should be taken into account along with the non-violent approach
to difficult international problems if the security of the country was to be ensured. In summing up
the application of the ideal of non-violence to India’s world-view, Nehru therefore publicly stated:
“He drew his inspiration from Gandhi.” He, however, followed the Master only as far as was
practicable.

The realist component in India’s world-view got strengthened after the Chinese aggression of
1962. As Nehru himself admitted: “In the past our preoccupation with the human problems of
poverty and illiteracy was such that we were content to assign a relatively low priority to defence
requirements in the conventional sense.” Not surprisingly, India’s world-view after the Chinese
aggression has been less doctrinaire and more realistic despite the continuance of its broad
ideological moorings.

1.3.4 Absence of Imperialist Tradition

Another distinguishing feature of Indian tradition is the absence of imperialist tradition, including
what is called cultural imperialism. No prominent Indian thinker, not even a realist like Kautilya or

5
Manu or Bodhayana, advocated the extension of Indian empire beyond the geographical
boundaries of Bharat (India), which though varied from time to time, ultimately it came to mean
the country stretching from the Himalayas to southern sea and from the western sea to the eastern.
Kautilaya’s Arthasastra, or Samudragupta’s inscriptions, for instance, never envisage an Indian
emperor’s rule beyond the Indian sub-continent. The Mahabharata too lays down that an Indian
empire should not extend beyond the geographical limits of the country.

Likewise, the concept of chakravartin (“supreme ruler dispensing justice and maintaining peace”)
was envisaged only for the geographically and culturally defined parts of the country. Similarly,
though Buddhist literature speaks of a world state “ruled” by one person, such rule should be
established by love and not by force. Lord Buddha conceived of himself as chakravartin of this
sort. There is, therefore, no evidence of any aggressive war waged by the Hindus and the Buddhists.
The Hindus and Buddhists went to Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka as traders and missionaries, not
as invaders and conquerors. They did not go there to drain off their wealth. On the contrary, the
Indians who ruled in Southeast Asia underwent a process of indigenisation. They did not owe
any allegiance to, and were not controlled by, any power based in India. Kanishka’s aggressive
war against China and Chola’s conquest of and rule over Indonesia and Sri Lanka were repugnant
to the Hindu and Buddhist cultures. They were in fact aberrations, which should not be used to
negate the overall anti-imperialistic tradition of India. In fact the Cholas were engaged, not in
opposing an alien culture, but in striving for supremacy over dynasties, which belonged to their
own culture.

Ancient Indian history is, on the other hand, replete with examples of kings who voluntarily
relinquished conquered territories. Kalidasa’s Raghuvansam, for instance, mentions kings who
won righteous victories but gave up the territories conquered by them. A Gupta conqueror named
Baladitya defeated Mihiragula, a Huna, but in deference to his mother’s advice, he not only
reinstated Mihiragula but also gave him a royal princess in marriage. Kalhan, in his Rajatarangini,
speaks of many more such kings. Hindu kings apart, Ashoka denounced warfare everywhere in
accordance with the Buddhist ideology.

The desire of the best Muslim and Mughal rulers was also to establish a lasting all-India state and
to ignore the world outside India. Rulers like Akbar tried to achieve the unification of India
through tolerance, conciliation, and diplomacy. The attention of the Muslim rulers was confined
to India: India was their whole world. They fought among themselves and with whoever came as
invaders from beyond the Himalayas or from across the sea.

There has thus been no deliberate attempt at imperialism at any time in the history of India. This
anti-imperialist tradition and sentiments got a boost during the British rule, because of the suffering
caused to the people by British imperialism. The leaders of India’s freedom struggle therefore
viewed their movement as a part of the overall fight against imperialism and colonialism in the
world.

With this anti-imperialist tradition and culture, it was not surprising that when India achieved its
independence it vigorously pursued the cause of emancipation of colonial and dependent territories
and of promotion of racial equality through the policies of non-alignment and panchasheela. The
support India gave to the freedom struggles of dependent peoples is now a part of history. To
cite only a few examples: Nehru convened a conference in Delhi in 1949 to consider the question

6
of securing Indonesia’s freedom from the Dutch; India extended support in the United Nations to
the struggle for freedom in Algeria and Tunisia from the French and in Namibia from South
Africa. India’s action in returning to Pakistan in 1972 the territories it had wrested from it in the
Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and in enabling Bangladesh to emerge as an independent nation is in
line with the Indian tradition that prohibits an aggressive design by India and emphasises that it
should allow other cultures and states to work out their destinies in their own way. Nehru, therefore,
declared: “India’s world-view is grounded in ancient tradition and culture of this country.”

1.3.5 Approach to International Law

It was established in theory and practice in ancient India that it is the moral responsibility of a king
to safeguard the person of an envoy accredited to his court by other kings. One who kills an
envoy is supposed to overstep the limits of dharma and is condemned to hell. Kautilaya’s
Arthasastra endorses this view. The Ramayana shows that even Ravana, the ruler of Lanka,
has respected the idea of diplomatic immunity by agreeing to his brother’s advice not to kill
Hanuman, who had gone to Lanka as an ambassador of Shri Rama.

Modern international law too allows certain privileges and immunities to foreign emissaries.
However, some countries have violated this well-established law. Pakistan burnt down the US
embassy in 1980; Iran held American embassy personnel as hostages for a long period. On the
other hand, the Government of India has observed all diplomatic immunities.

More remarkable is India’s dealing with the refugees. India granted political asylum to the leaders
of the Nepali Congress when they came in the wake of the crackdown ordered by the king of
Nepal. It extended hospitality to the Dalai Lama of Tibet although it realised the price it might
have to pay both politically and militarily. It accepted the heavy burden of looking after a million
and more refugees who came over in 1971 from the former East Pakistan. While quite a number
of them have still not returned to their country, the inflow of refugees has also never really stopped.
India treated respectfully the prisoners of war who had been captured during the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971. They were later returned to Pakistan without any conditions. It accepted the
responsibility of affording protection to the Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka in the mid-1980s. This
modern Indian approach towards refugees in consonance with the dictum of the Mahabharata
that says an enemy seeking protection from fear, destitution, or defeat should be cared for as if he
were one’s own son. Similarly, the Hitopadesh declares that even if an enemy comes to our
house, we should receive him with hospitality. One should be like a tree, which does not hold
back its shade from a man even though he may have come to cut it down. It was this ideal that
inspired Prithvi Raj Chauhan to always forgive Muhammad of Ghor, despite his repeated invasions.
When, however, Chauhan was defeated, Muhammad of Ghor had him immediately killed!

1.3.6 Expressing Positive Ideas through Negative Terms

Indian history, tradition and culture have not only influenced the substance of independent India’s
world-view, but also to name the main instrument of Indian world-view, non-alignment. As K P
Misra explains: “Even a cursory look at the philosophical and civilisational tradition indicates that
the Indians have been fond of noun with negative. It is through negative terms that the Indians
have expressed positive and affirmative ideas of profound significance in their social evolution.”
Thus, for example, instead of saying “peace,” the Indians say “non-violence” (ahimsa). Instead
of saying “defeat”, they use the word “non-victory” (parajaya). Likewise, we are familiar with

7
the use of “non-one” (aneka) as against “many;” “non-idleness” (apramada) as against “exertion;”
and “non-grudge” (avaira) as against “tolerance.” We can cite many more words and expressions
of this kind, particularly from the literature of Buddhism and Jainism. These negative words have
a positive meaning of great significance. Nakamura, therefore, rightly points out: “To other nations,
showing the moral precepts in the negative form seemed somewhat powerless and unsatisfactory,
but to the Indians, who lay stress on the negative phase and pursue the non-determinant, the
negative form of expression has a more positive and powerful meaning.”
The formulation of the concept in a negative way reminds us of the fact that one of India’s most
far-reaching contributions to world civilisation is the concept of zero and its mathematical use in
positive value. Seen from a wider angle, the expression as well as content of non-alignment may
similarly suggest a deeper connection with the Indian cultural tradition. For, the word, non-
alignment is though negative in expression, it has very positive connotations that include pursuit of
an independent world-view, and efforts towards development, disarmament, decolonialisation
and democratisation of international relations.

1.4 BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

The British rule in India helped evolve India’s world-view in three ways. Firstly, it gave stimulus
to the national movement for freedom, which in turn led to India’s support for the freedom of
dependent peoples all over the world. Both merits and demerits of the British rule contributed to
the growth of national movement in India. As regards merits, facilitating of communication through
setting of communication network, introduction of the English language, laying of railways and
encouraging social reforms, and above all, bringing entire India under one administrative umbrella,
the British rule contributed to the rise of nationalism in India. On the other hand, their racial
arrogance, economic exploitation of Indians and excluding them from the power structure
contributed to the rise of national consciousness even among the wealthy class of people, who
earlier supported the British rule. This growing political consciousness was translated into mass
movement when beginning with the widespread protest against the Partition of Bengal (1905)
leaders like Aurobindo Ghosh, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and later on Mahatma Gandhi, began to
develop mass contact with their fingers on the pulse of the people. Freedom movement thus
became a national movement for freedom and ultimately found its fulfillment in 1947.

Under the circumstances, independent India’s support to the freedom movement of dependent
peoples all over the world was therefore not at all surprising. “We are particularly interested,”
proclaimed Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 September 1946, outlining India’s world-view, “in the
emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.”

Secondly, the humiliation and suffering experienced by Indians due to the British racialism made
the leaders of independent India to strongly oppose racialism. Jawaharlal Nehru in his statement
on India’s world-view on 7 September 1946, cited above, declared: “We repudiate utterly the
Nazi doctrine of racialism, wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practised.” He reiterated
this in the Constituent Assembly of India on 16 May 1949 thus: “One of the pillars of our foreign
policy is to fight against racial discrimination.”

Thirdly, India’s historic association with the British rule obliged independent India not to snap all
of its ties with Britain to avoid practical difficulties. Explaining the imperatives of India’s continued
association with the Commonwealth of Nations headed by Britain, Jawaharlal Nehru observed

8
in the Constituent Assembly: “The House knows that inevitably during the past century and more
all kinds of contacts have arisen between England and this country…. Any marked change in this
without something to follow created a hiatus, which may be harmful. Largely our educational
apparatus has been influenced. Largely our military apparatus has been influenced by these
considerations and we have grown up naturally as something rather like the British Army…. If
we break away completely, the result is that without making sufficient provision for carrying on in
a different way, we have a period of gap….If we don’t want to pay the price we should not pay
it and face the consequences.”

1.5 THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON INDIA’S

WORLD-VIEW
Our discussion on the evolution of India’s world-view would not be complete without a reference
to the ideas on nationalism and internationalism championed by the Congress during the struggle
for freedom. In fact, the leading members of the Congress, as early as 1921, intended the Congress
resolution on international developments to be a guide to independent India’s world-view. Mahatma
Gandhi, for instance, declared: “Indeed, while we are maturing our plans for Swaraj, we are
bound to consider and define our foreign policy. Surely, we are bound authoritatively to tell the
world what relations we wish to cultivate with it.”

The Jaipur Resolution of the Congress listed the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all
nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism as guiding principles of this
organisation. To this may be added one more—the duty of people of Indian origin settled abroad
to identify themselves with the people of the country in which they had settled and not exploit
them. Resolution after resolution passed by the Congress in its successive sessions clearly outlined
India’s world-view after independence on these lines.
The Haripur Congress resolution (1935), for instance, outlined India’s world-view thus: “The
people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other
countries, and for this purpose wish to remove all causes of conflict between them… A free India
will gladly associate itself with such an order and stand for disarmament and collective security.
But world cooperation is impossible of achievement as long as the roots of international conflict
remained and one nation dominates over another and imperialism hold away. In order, therefore,
to establish world peace on an enduring basis, imperialism and exploitation of one people by
another must end.”

1.6 SUMMARY
The above-account of the evolution of India’s world-view dating back to the ancient period
shows that though both idealist and realist approaches to inter-state relations existed in India, the
idealist approach advocated by Buddha and Gandhi dominated India’s world-view during the
Nehru era notwithstanding the recourse to violence in extreme cases such as India’s military
action for liberation of Goa. One may of course argue that Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was
as idealist as it appears to be. For, an alternative policy on aligning with any super power would
have brought the Cold War to India’s doorsteps and thereby jeopardised India’s pursuit of
autonomy and economic development. The policy of non-alignment, for instance, served India’s

9
national interest by enabling it to ensure Anglo-American assistance during the India-China war
of 1962 and Soviet neutrality. At the same time this enabled India to contribute towards world
peace and decolonisation. It is in this sense that the policy of non-alignment reflected both idealist
and realist traditions of India.

It cannot however be denied that a doctrinaire approach to non-alignment made Nehru to neglect
India’s defence preparedness leading to its debacle by the Chinese, which Nehru himself admitted
after that traumatic experience in India’s Parliament. India’s world-view turned to be more realistic
after 1962. Yet changes in India’s world- view continued to take place only within the overall
framework of continuity.

1.7 EXERCISES
1) What are the sources of India’s traditional values? How have these values guided India’s
world-view after its independence? Explain.
2) Evaluate the idealist and realist thinking in ancient India. How, and to what extent could
Nehru combine both the approaches in his world-view? Discuss.
3) “India’s policy of secularism and non-alignment are two aspects of the same coin, namely,
tradition of tolerance.” Comment.
4) Discuss the traditional sources of India’s world-view.

10
 Module – 1

Subject Name Political Science

Foreign Policy of India

Paper Name

1. India’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,

Module Objectives and Principles
Name/Title

1
Module Id

Pre-requisites

Objectives This module will analyze the origin, working, objectives

and principles of India’s foreign policy. Important
questions and suggested readings have also been attached
with this module.

Keywords India’s Foreign Policy, Historical Background,

Ideological Moorings, Objectives of India’s Foreign
Policy, Principles of India’s Foreign Policy, National
Security, World Order, UN System, Non-alignment,
Peaceful Coexistence.

Structure of Module / Syllabus of a module (Define Topic / Sub-topic of

module)
Role Name Affiliation

Professor Ashutosh Kumar Panjab

Principal Investigator University,
Chandigarh

Professor R.S.Yadav
Paper Coordinator Kurukshetra
University,
Kurukshetra

Content Writer/Author (CW) Professor R.S.Yadav Kurukshetra

University,
Kurukshetra

Professor Chintamani Mahapatra

Content Reviewer (CR) Jawaharlal
Nehru
University,
New Delhi

Professor Chintamani Mahapatra

Language Editor (LE) Jawaharlal
Nehru
University,
New Delhi
 Module – 1

India’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background, Objectives and Principles

Structure of the Module

1. Introduction
2. Objectives
3. Historical Perspective
3.1 Ideological Moorings
3.2 International Status
3.3 Role of Indian National Congress
3.4 Criticism of Colonialism
3.5 Unattached to British Policies
3.6 Support for Backward Nations
4. Objectives of India’s Foreign Policy

4.1 National Security

4.2 Economic Development
4.3 World Order
4.4 Opposition to colonialism, Imperialism and Racial discrimination
4.5 Support for Disarmament
4.6 Important Role in Asia
4.7 Afro-Asian regional cooperation
4.8 Faith in UN System
4.9 Protection of overseas Indians

5. Principles of India’s Foreign Policy

5.1 Non- alignment

5.2 Panchsheel
5.3 Dynamism and Adaptability
5.4 Peaceful Coexistence

6. Conclusion
7. Important Questions
8. Suggested Readings

1. Introduction

Foreign policy is the sum total of principles, interests and objectives which a state formulates in
conducting its relations with other states. Similarly, each state has its foreign policy through which it tries
to develop relations with other nations at international level. Through its foreign policy, states make
efforts to change the behaviour of other states or to control and regulate the activities of other states to
attain its nation interests. Hence, foreign policy represents both continuity and change in the relations
among states. Besides, it represents both positive and negative dimensions. It is positive when it makes
efforts to change the behaviour of other states, while it works negative when it do not try to change the
activities of other states. Therefore, foreign policy is a commitment by the state to put forward its
principles, interests and objectives by way of which one state tries its best to pursue its relations
with other states in the international system. In this context, states not only take decision
regarding their foreign policy but also establish relations with other states. However, foreign
policy behaviour of the state is dependent upon the evaluation of cost- benefit, as well as, risks
involved and the capabilities of that sate.

2. Objectives

Through this module an effort will be made to apprise the students about the origin and working
of India’s foreign policy. It is a well known fact that a country’s foreign policy does not evolve
all of a sudden rather it is a product of numerous factors and forces. India is no exception to this
phenomenon. Therefore, it becomes imperative to understand and evaluate the historical
perspective about the origin of its foreign policy. Besides, it is also essential to know about the
major objectives of the policy as to ascertain the trends and working of its foreign affairs. But
these objectives are not always manifested. As a result, to know the real intend of the working of
foreign policy, one has to understand the broader policy framework. For this knowledge of major
principles of governing foreign policy is to be deciphered. This may help to understand not only
the day to day affairs of the state with the outside world but a long-term foreign policy also.

3. Historical Perspective

Foreign Policy of any country, to great extent, is determined by the specific nature of external
and internal environment. Besides, the history, legacies, personality, ideologies, structural set up
etc also influence the foreign policy of a country. India`s foreign policy development is no
exception to this fact. Multiple factors have contributed towards the finalisation of different goals
and principles of its foreign policy. Hence, to study the impact of historical background on
India’s foreign policy becomes imperative as this has deep impact on the foreign policy making
over the years. In this context, Nehru was right when he observed that it should not be inferred
that India has started working as a state all of a sudden, rather its long past, contemporary history
and freedom movement have formed its ideals.

3.1 Ideological Moorings -- Indian foreign policy is considered to be the by-product of two
dominant ideological streams prevalent in its culture. These important traditions have been: (i)
tradition based on friendship, cooperation, peace and non-violence developed by the thinkers of
ancient India, i.e., Gautama Buddha and modern India, i.e., Mahatma Gandhi. They considered
that means and ends are equally important and should be pure to attain any objective. (ii)
Another tradition gave importance to realism and power influenced by the ideas of western
thinker Machiavelli and developed by Indian thinker Kautilya. It did not bother about the means,
rather ends justify the means has been its main motto. Out of these two traditions, however, India
adhered to the first one which primarily governed the foreign policy moorings of the country.
3.2 International Status -- As far as the international identity is concerned, India got a solid
result as it signed the covenant of League and Charter of United Nations as primary members. In
the English Empire, three self rule dominions were there with whom it used to have consultations
on matters of foreign affair on the bases of 1817 colonial conference. These dominions were ---
Canada, Australia and South Africa. But India had not been given this right. During the First
World War, India supported British like other dominions with a hope that it would get same
status of foreign affairs as was being given to other such states. As a result, India got permission
to join in colonial conference in 1917. Thus, for the first time India got membership of
international organization in 1917. In the same year the name of this conference had been
changed from colonial conference to Imperial Conference which was later changed into English
Commonwealth. Anyhow, this has opened the gates for the entry of colonial India to participate
in international conferences. Consequently, in 1945 at San Francisco as well, India joined the
UN as primary member. Thus, India has already acquired international identity even prior to its
independence.

3.3 Role of Indian National Congress -- Congress also contributed to a great deal for the
evolution of the process of foreign policy making in India. It starts playing an important role in
this direction since World War-I. The 1921 All India Congress Committee's session in New
Delhi is considered to be the landmark in the history of India's foreign relations. In 1925,
Congress authorized All India Congress Committee (AICC) to open a foreign department, with
Jawaharlal Nehru at its head. But this department could not achieve something substantial during
the period 1930-1934, as most of the leaders were busy in public movement or in jails. It could
get importance again only after Nehru got elected as President of Congress in Lucknow session
in1936. In May 1936, under the leadership of Ram Manohar Lohia, the office of foreign
department was established in All India National Conmgress`s Office. Within six months of its
existence, it contacted nearly 400 persons and institutions to formulate foreign policy. Besides,
Congress started regularly releasing press notes and bulletins on all-important international
issues. Probably as a result of huge network of Congress's foreign policy department, Jawaharlal
Nehru was able to give a detailed and comprehensive blue print of independent India's foreign
policy in his maiden radio broadcast on 7 September 1946 as Vice-President of interim
government.

3.4 Criticism of Colonialism -- Congress always condemned the policy of colonialism and
imperialism. At its very first session in 1885, Congress had passed a resolution deprecating the
annexation of Upper Burma to the Indian Empire. In 1892, through another resolution, it
disassociated and made itself free from the imperialist policy of Britain. In 1920, by sending the
sympathy message to the people of Ireland for their struggle for freedom, Congress confirmed its
attitude of support towards freedom struggle against colonialism. During the World War-II, India
was critical of British imperialistic policies in general along with their particular response
towards it. Congress also criticized the UN Charter through its working Committee resolution in
July 1945. Two major objections of the Congress were: one, against the dominant role of the
great powers in the new organization to the extent that they are placed above and beyond the
law; and second, against the vague and unsatisfactory declaration in the Charter about non-self-
governing territories.
3.5 Unattached to British Policies -- Congress time and again declared itself unattached to the
British policies and proclaimed that the latter`s policies has nothing to do with the ideas of
Congress. In 1892, the Congress objected to the British policies to use India as a base for
political manoeuvring or military moves against surrounding areas such as Tibet, Burma,
Afghanistan and Persia. In 1921, for the first time in its All India Congress Committee meeting
in Delhi, it declared through a general resolution that "the present environment of India in no
way represents Indian opinion". Besides, it also declared that its neighbours not at all threaten
India.

3.6 Support for Backward Nations -- Congress exhibited great interest for the unity and rise of
backward and colonial states of Asia. In 1920, in Baku City of Kazakhstan in the erstwhile
USSR when a conference of Asian states was convened India was one of the 19 countries called
for such conference. In 1926 and 1927 such conferences were organized in Japan and China
respectively. India also participated in them. Main aim of such meetings was to end the European
colonialism in Asia. It resulted in the convening of Brussels conference on 10 February 1927.
Convening of Asian countries meetings in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949 were proofs of such
commitment.

Independent India's foreign policy, thus, has been marked by the impacts of legacies of British
rule, experiences of freedom movement, role of leaders during freedom struggle etc. These
factors, along with the changing national and international milieu, have given birth to major
objectives and principles of independent India's foreign policy.

4. Objectives of India’s Foreign Policy

Major objectives of every country's foreign policy are aimed at to fulfil the national interests of
that state. India is no exception to this phenomenon. A depth analysis reveals that generally a
consensus is found on the national interests in the country. But it may not always be necessary all
the time.

4.1 National Security

For any country, national security and territorial integrity used to be the prime concern and main
objective for it. Making a comparative assessment of the three primary objectives it has rightly
been observed that security is the first guarantee of a state's international personality; national
development is its categorical imperative; and an ordered pattern of international relations is a
minimum precondition for its independent existence and free development. In case of India, to a
great extent, security includes both traditional and non-traditional threat concerns. It also
includes independent decision making on international issues, opposition to military alliances,
friendly relations with neighbours and opposition to policies of colonialism and imperialism.
Besides, India has been a staunch critic of outside intervention and cold war. It is in favour of
judging foreign policy issues on the merit of the case. Consequently, its policy of non-alignment
represents its freedom, security and sovereignty.
4.2 Economic Development
For a developing country like India, rapid economic development naturally becomes significant
determinant of its foreign policy. In this context, first of all it has to develop its power potentials
which is dependent on three important variables- (I) population; (ii) natural resources: and (iii)
technology. Later on, the pattern of growth in India has to be determined in terms of its
constitutional limitations, role of state, and ideology of economic development. These domestic
factors need to be coordinated with outside world through foreign policy. Thus it is inevitable for
India to enhance its per capita income and gross domestic product to make it available for
spending more in the areas of its defence. Besides, through diplomacy it has to stop the
recurrence of wars and through United Nations it had to get the rules framed against the warfare.
Moreover, it has to strength economic cooperation with outside world through the activities of
foreign aid, capital investments, joint ventures, trade etc. Therefore, India since its inception has
been a supporter of getting the IMF and World Bank loans and aids from the developed world. It
has also approved the enhancement of bilateral technology transfer in vital areas of its economy.
Probably this might have been the reason for India's insistence for the establishment of New
International Economic Order (NIEO) since 1970s. It is also supporter of present organization
like World Trade Organization (WTO).

4.3 World Order

Foreign policy of a country works in a particular international milieu. Major task of any
country's foreign policy is to fulfil its national interests by making a favourable world order. That
is why; Jawaharlal Nehru visualized the working of foreign policy in a larger global order. India
has been supporter of policy of disarmament in the contest of threats from the nuclear
explosions. Similarly, it opposed cold war politics in the larger interest of the requirement of
peace for the developing countries. India was very much vocal on the issues, like freedom of
colonies; opposition to colonialism, imperialism and racialism; opposition to power blocks;
strengthening the United Nations; complete disarmament; world peace etc. Later on, economic
issues acquired prominence over political factors. Consequently, India became the main
supporter of the demand for NIEO. During the cold war and post- cold war eras, India, on the
one hand, has been making efforts for the establishment of NIEO, while, on the other hand,
striking hard for the creation of nuclear free world. Thus, during the last more than six decades,
India has been instrumental in creating an equalitarian and just world order to fulfil its national
interests.

4.4 Opposition to Colonialism, Imperialism and Racialism

Struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racialism has been the leading "ideological
currents" in Indian foreign policy. Based on India's own experiences with serviette, in the post
independence era India supported the cause of anti-imperialism in the context of other such
nations. India opposed all such policies of other such countries within the United Nations and
outside this forum. Besides, India has been ardent critic of the policy of apartheid in South
Africa. Beginning from Gandhi's movement and coming of Nelson Mandela to power, it has
been continuously criticizing the functioning of racial regimes in South Africa. Besides, India
has always felt concerned about the economic development of the nations in the African
continent. Rajiv Gandhi's efforts toward the setting up of an `Africa fund` is a clear example of
India's such foreign policy orientation.
4.5 Supporter of Disarmament
India has been striving hard for disarmament through United Nations and other such forums. It
had introduced numerous resolutions or amendments to resolutions introduced by other states in
the United Nations to achieve the aim of general and complete disarmament. It has taken active
part in the 18 nations committee on Disarmament (CD), which was created by the General
Assembly in 1961, and opened in Geneva on 14 May 1962, and has been functioning ever since.
In 1963, India not only initiated but also signed the `Moscow Test Ban Treaty` or Partial Test
Ban Treaty (PTBT). Later on, through the 26-nations ‘Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament’ and non-alignment movement India facilitated the process of the indoctrination of
non-proliferation treaty (NPT). However, due to its non-universal and discriminatory nature,
India did not sign its final shape and started the demand for the conclusion of a `comprehensive`
test ban treaty. Consequently, in December 1993, India and the United States of America jointly
sponsored the CTBT. While presenting this treaty, India put two conditions - it should be
universal and it should be aimed towards complete disarmament. But due to not fulfilment of
these twin objectives in the final shape of this treaty, India refused to sign the same. But still
India is ready to sign any such treaty based on above two objectives and non- discriminatory in
its nature.

4.6 Important Role in Asia

One central point of India's foreign policy has been to play an important role in Asia. Due to its
history, cultural legacy, area, geographical conditions etc. its ruling elite perceived an important
role for India in this region. Even during freedom movement, it raised the grievances of these
states along with its own concerns. A resolution passed by the first session of the congress in
1885 deprecated the annexation of Upper Burma by the British is proof of such interests of India.
Besides, it participated in the important conferences convened to discuss the problems of Asia.
For instance, it took part in 1920 Asian conference in Kazakhstan, along with 19 other nations.
Not only this, even before its independence, it convened a conference of Asian states in New
Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Later on, second such conference was called in New Delhi
in 1949 on Indonesian question. Thus, India always made efforts to play a significant role in
Asia.

4.7 Afro-Asian Regional Cooperation

Since its inception India is making serious efforts to bring out cooperation among the states of
Asia and Africa. During cold war era, this effort has mainly been limited to political dimension.
After covering of Asian conference in 1947 and 1949, India was also instrumental in bringing
about unity and cooperation among Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955.
Finally, non-aligned movement (NAM) was established from the majority of its membership
from Asian and African nations. In the post cold war era, economic dimensions acquired
prominence in the development of Afro-Asian cooperation. First, through the SAARC, an effort
is being made to develop free-trade area. Second, by developing cooperation between SAARC
and ASEAN, it wants to extend the area of cooperation in whole Asia. Finally by creating a 14
member (now reached to 20) Indian Ocean Rim - Association for Regional Cooperation (IOC-
ARC) on 6 March 1997, India is interested to create cooperation among the countries of Asia,
Africa and Indian Ocean littorals.
4.8 Faith in United Nations
One of the essential aims of India's foreign policy has been its quest for peace through the United
Nations. India's deep commitment towards this body can be seen from its joining of the United
Nations as primary member even prior to its freedom. India considers it as the only hope for
peaceful cooperation among nations. That is why; it never wavered in its support to this body,
even when it felt disappointed with the treatment meted out to it by the UN in respect of Kashmir
and other such issues. India took keen interest in all kinds of activities of the United Nations. By
giving prime importance to peace in its foreign policy, it has indirectly contributed to strengthen
the foundation of the United Nations. Despite its poverty it has always paid its contribution to the
United Nations in time. It has also contributed its forces for the UN peacekeeping activities.

4.9 Protection of Overseas Indian

Protection of the interests of the overseas Indians has been an important objective of India's
foreign policy. Basically, overseas Indian could be categorized into three groups: (i) Indian
citizens staying abroad for an indefinite period for whatever purpose (such as employment or
business, whether or their own, or on special governmental assignments or working in
international organizations). They have been clearly defined as non-resident Indians (NRIs) in
the FERA, 1973: (ii) people who were forced to immigrate to different parts of the British
Empire. Now the descendents of those migrants who are called people of Indian Origin(PIOs);
and, (iii) finally, people who are legally and technically branded as stateless persons of Indian
origin (SPIOs). India’s policy towards them has been two fold - (i) For those who have adopted
the nationality of the country in which they are living, India has no political concern with them,
though it would continue to have sentimental concern for them. For them Government of India
won't ask for special privileges, but where any unfair treatment is given to them, of course, it is
bound to react. (ii) In case of NRIs Government is willing to extend all kinds of cooperation.
Some of them have recently been provided double citizenship. These steps are being taken with
the expectation that they will greatly contribute towards the economic and technological
development of India.

5 Principles of India’s Foreign Policy

To fulfil the above objectives India's foreign policy is governed by certain principles. Principles
on the one hand, provide rational analysis of foreign policy, and on the other hand, they represent
continuity in foreign affairs. The principles governing India's foreign policy are as under: -

5.1 Non-alignment
Most important and central focus of India's foreign policy is its principle of non-alignment.
Basically, India's policy of non-alignment has been derived from two fold sources: material and
non-material. The two key material mainsprings are geopolitical and economic in character.
Among the non-material sources prominent are – historical legacies; and, philosophy/tradition of
the country. Non-alignment has numerous dimensions but usually it is considered to be a policy
related to cold war. In other words, it is considered to be a policy not to participate in the military
alliances systems raised out of cold war period. Besides, India regarded it as a principle having
independent outlook in global politics. It is a policy, which provides India an opportunity to act
independently on world problems without any pressures from the so-called superpowers. This
policy of independence of choice was first determined by national interest and then by merit of
the issue and the world situation.

Some Western observers often confuse this policy with the terms like- isolationism, non-
commitment etc. But these concepts are in no way similar to that of the non -alignment. For
instance, neutrality as policy of non-commitment had limited use during war times, whereas
policy of non-alignment is applied both in times of war and peace. Moreover, these days it is not
easy to remain neutral in world affairs. Thus, India cannot remain neutral where freedom, justice
and aggression are involved. Similarly, comparison of non-alignment with that of the concepts
of isolationism is also unwarranted. It is because; isolationism is not possible in the
contemporary world. Therefore, India’s policy of non-alignment is considered in a positive
manner as the policy related to development of goodwill and economic cooperation among
different states. It is because; on the basis of such cooperation the realization of the ideal of ‘one
world’ can be achieved. Non-alignment, therefore, is a multi-dimensional policy having both its
positive and negative aspects. It was not a policy of nonchalant, rather a dynamic policy which
changes according to the changes that take place in the international milieu.

5.2 Panchsheel
Ethical and peaceful dimensions of India's foreign policy are also reflected through its policy of
panchsheel which means five principles of peaceful co-existence. These principles were first
enunciated in the preamble of trade agreement signed between India and China on 29 April 1955.
Later on, these were reiterated in a joint statement issued during the visit of China's Premier
Chou en Lai to India on 28 June 1954. Five principles of panchsheel are: (i) mutual respect for
each others’ territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) non-aggression; (iii) non-interference in
each others’ domestic affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefits; and, (v) peaceful coexistence.
These principles are not only related to India’s policy towards China, but also a declared policy
towards other neighbours and rest of the world. Though a question mark has been put on the use
of this principle by the 1962 Sino-Indian war, yet India did not give up its faith in such policy.
Rather, with the improvement in India-China relations during the contemporary post-cold war
era, faith in these principles has again been reiterated.

5.3 Dynamism and Adaptability

India's foreign policy apart from being a dynamic policy has the capacity to adapt itself to
international changes. For instance, non-alignment did not mean that India always opposed the
receipt of military assistances. Rather it had accepted such aid and assistance whenever national
interests demanded so. For instance, it accepted America’s military assistance during 1962 crisis.
Conclusion of military - to - military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific in the post- cold war era in
1991 is another illustration of India's such flexible approach. Besides, to give military assistance
to Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka during the period of crises are additional proofs of such
changing stance. It was due to this dynamic nature; India's foreign policy has well adapted to the
changing international milieu. Moreover, from the cold warrior bloc politics of 1950s and 1960s
to that of quite opposite world found in the post- cold war era, India has been successfully
meeting out its divergent foreign policy challenges due to its flexible orientations. During these
decades, India has made itself capable enough to handle the crises like four major wars with
neighbours, non-proliferation and missile technology development obstacles, and economic
regionalism.

5.4 Peaceful Coexistence

Finally, the principal of peaceful coexistence also constitutes one of the principles of India's
foreign policy. Though it is constituent of India's principle of Panchsheel, yet in a more
comprehensive manner it represents the overall cultural ethos of ‘live and let others live’ of
India's tradition. In one more sense, it can be looked as an independent phenomenon to that of
Panchsheel, as the latter does not recognize the divisibility of world on the basis of ideology and
believe in the philosophy of friendship with all countries. Moreover, in terms of military
alliances, it does not prevent the states to form or join any group beyond such blocs. Despite
criticisms of cold warrior blocs of capitalism and communism, it did not prevent the states from
forging closer economic, social, cultural and scientific cooperation with the countries of these
blocs. Hence, it believes in the cooperation and friendship among all the countries of world for
the growth of peace and development around the globe.

6. Conclusion

Thus, India's foreign policy has been the by-product of specific historical backgrounds in which
contribution of INC, experiences of freedom movement and its leadership have been outstanding.
This historical backdrop to a great extent has influenced the growth of various principles of
India’s foreign policy. That is why in the post-independence era, three basic objectives i.e.,
national security; economic development and world order proved to be the core issues around
which India’s foreign policy revolved. Besides it has given birth to certain objectives which
provided the goals for its foreign policy. Broadly speaking, these objectives have been in
opposition to colonialism and racialism; efforts towards establishment of Afro- Asian unity;
develop faith in UN systems; friendship with all nations; protection of overseas Indians etc. To
implement these objectives, it adopted the twin main principles of non-alignment and panchsheel
as its basic framework. Besides, the principles of pragmatism, dynamism and adaptability and
peaceful coexistence have been adhered to. Through these principles, India has been pursuing its
interests and adapting itself to meet the challenges of changed global milieu.
UNIT 6 INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW
Structure
6.1 Introduction
6.2 India’s Foreign Policy under Nehru in the Formative Years
6.2.1 Tilt in Non-alignment
6.2.2 India-China Border War
6.3 Foreign Policy after Nehru
6.4 Indira Gandhi’s Tenure
6.4.1 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1971
6.4.2 Simla Agreement
6.4.3 Nuclear Test of 1974
6.4.4 Indira Gandhi’s Second Tenure
6.5 Rajiv Gandhi and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka
6.6 Narasimha Rao (1991-1996)
6.7 India- US Relations
6.8 Foreign Policy Developments and the NDA Government
6.8.1 Nuclear Weapons
6.8.2 Attempts to Improve Relations
6.9 Summary
6.10 Exercises

6.1 INTRODUCTION
We have so far studied policy decision-making at the institutional level in the government as well
as shaping of policy at the social and political level. With intense interaction between the government,
institutions and socio-political level actors ultimately the Indian foreign policy is made. The outcome
of the policy process, “foreign policy” is the concrete policy directed towards a foreign nation or
external policy issue.

What has been the outcome of policy process in the last fifty-six years after the independence? In
India, from an ordinary citizen to the Prime Minister and in abroad from foreign government
officials to informed public have been characterising the Indian foreign policy as Non-Aligned.
But even today, in the absence of an alternative policy framework, the Indian political class has
been describing Indian foreign policy within the framework of non-alignment. In this unit we will
know as to how non-alignment policy began, worked and progressed during the period since
independence. This unit will also analyse the ups and downs in India’s relations with major world
powers as well as neighbours.

6.2 INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NEHRU IN THE

FORMATIVE YEARS
Indians secured their control over nation’s foreign policy only after their independence from the

1
British colonial rule in 1947. A newly independent India was plunged into the world affairs when
the external environment was of the Cold War between the two super powers—the United
States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR)—both were on the winning side in the the Second
World War. Even before the independence in August 1947, an interim government under Nehru’s
leadership had been put in place in September 1946.

The first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru was in a dilemma. Though western educated,
he was personally attracted to the Marxist thought. But any alignment with the one or the other
bloc would have meant loss of newly won independence. Loss of India’s independence in the
decision-making even slightly was an unacceptable proposition to him. Thus, he opted to keep
India away from both the power blocs, and follow an independent foreign policy. This came to
be known as the policy of non-alignment.

He had formulated the basic policy outlines in a broadcast from New Delhi on 7 September,
1946 in which he laid out certain foreign policy goals. He was then only an interim prime minister,
as independence had not even been announced. These goals included: end of colonialism and
racism, independence from power blocs and close ties with China and Asian neighbours. In his
own words: “We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own
policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation…. We are particularly interested in the
emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory
and practice of equal opportunities for all races.”

Thus, non-alignment with either of the military blocs was Nehru’s answer to the dilemma he and
the nation faced. Non-alignment was an intellectual coup on the part of Nehru. It was in a sense
learning from history. Soon after the independence the first American president George Washington
had asked his countrymen while laying down his office in 1796: “It is our true policy to steer clear
of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world….”. Instead, he advocated that the
new Republic should cultivate “just and amicable feelings toward all” nations.

Primarily by non-alignment Nehru meant not getting entangled with any military alliances. Soon
after the end of the Second World War, there were military alliances floated by the United States
and the Soviet Union. The US promoted North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the
Soviet Union had to counter it by Warsaw Pact. While these were the competing military alliances
at the global level, these two super powers also promoted regional alliances to attract the newly
independent nations in Asia and Africa.

Second, non-alignment did not mean neutrality in world politics. Neutrality has a meaning that is
truly relevant during the times of war. But non-alignment is a positive thought; it meant that India
retained the independence of decision making on an issue that affected her interests. There was
no a priori commitment to support one or the other nation involved in a crisis.

Thus, in India’s neighbourhood the US promoted South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the 1950s. Both these organisations were ostensibly
meant to fight against communism exported by the Soviet Union. But India’s neighbour, Pakistan
joined the treaty organisations primarily to get military aid from the US to fight against India. The
membership of Pakistan of these treaties brought the Cold War to the doors of India aggravating
tensions between India and Pakistan. The American weapons and support generated because of
their membership of military alliances also complicated the India-US relations.

2
This was brought out very clearly over the question of Kashmir issue raised in the United Nations
(UN) Security Council (SC). Nehru had great faith in the international organisations and their
sense of justice. It was Nehru who had taken to the UN the crisis created by Pakistan’s war
against Jammu and Kashmir in 1948. He never imagined that the Kashmir question would become
a matter seen through the prism of Cold War.

The UN ordered a cease-fire and asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces. The Indian PM had
then given an assurance to hold a plebiscite to decide as to whether Kashmiris desired to join
India or join Pakistan. This brings out the faith Nehru had in the fairness of the UN.

But in practice the issue got entangled in the global Cold War between the US and the Soviet
Union. Once the issue became part of Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union,
Pakistan with its military alliance with the US, began to raise the Kashmir issue in the UN SC
now and then. The SC instead of declaring Pakistan as an aggressor and seeking to vacate its
aggression, kept the issue as an instrument to pressurise India politically.

Nehru had maintained close ties with the British Commonwealth of Nations by enabling the
Indian Republic as a member. But Britain was not interested in finding a solution to the Kashmir
crisis. Another power that could have helped India in resolving the conflict over J & K was the
US. But during his first visit to that country in 1949, Nehru had disappointed Dean Acheson then
Secretary of State. Dean Acheson states in his memoirs: “When finally, I urged Pandit Nehru to
help me by a frank discussion of a practicable solution of the trouble over Kashmir, I got a
curious combination of a public speech and flashes of anger and deep dislike of his opponents….
I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship.”

Acheson’s successor in office, John Foster Dulles did not turn out to be friendly to India either.
By then Dulles had come under the influence of pactomania in promoting military pacts. He
desired that India join the military alliances promoted by the US. Nehru’s non-alignment policy
was obviously against it. Hence, Dulles said that non-alignment is immoral as it failed to take a
firm stand against godless communism.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Union came to India’s rescue. It saw an opportunity to
befriend non-aligned nations in the predicament faced by India in the UN SC. The US was
guided by the British policy of divide and rule; the US, in that early period, went along with
Britain on the issues relating to the latter’s erstwhile colonies. Thus, when Western powers like
the US and UK began to vote on the side of Pakistan on the question of Kashmir, the Soviet
Union exercised its veto power to save the Indian interests from Cold War politics.

6.2.1 Tilt in Non-alignment

The Soviet Union helped India to get over the efforts by the western powers to embarrass India.
Now you do not embarrass a friend who comes to your rescue. That is a norm in interpersonal
affairs; so is that in international affairs. The test of this principle came during the SC discussion
on the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956.

There was an uprising against the Soviet domination of Hungary where the people were in favour
of democracy. However, the Soviet Union militarily intervened in that country to see that a pro-
democracy government was removed and a pro-communist government was installed. The
question of the Soviet military intervention came before the UN. The General Assembly discussed

3
the Hungarian crisis. There was a five-power resolution calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw
its troops. India voted against the resolution. This approach of India was widely disapproved in
the country as well as abroad. Was India supporting the Soviet military intervention? Nehru took
pains to explain rather unconvincingly that the circumstances and compulsions under which India
voted against the resolution. His main ground was that the resolution demanded that “elections
should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations.” That could be later used
to demand similar elections in Kashmir. But the fact that India did oppose the military intervention
did not miss altogether the world opinion. Thomas A. Bailey in his A Diplomatic History of the
American People records that “even ‘neutralist’ states like India were moved to protest against
the brutality of the Soviets.”

6.2.2 India-China Border War

The strengths and weaknesses of the non-alignment were also brought out during the next major
crisis in Indian foreign policy in the background of the Chinese aggression of October 1962.
Peace and friendship with China was a cornerstone of the Indian foreign policy as formulated
and executed by Nehru with assistance from his friend and Defence Minister, Krishna Menon.
As a matter of fact both of them never envisaged a threat from the Communist China. They
mainly focussed on Pakistan’s threat to India’s security.

Nehru thought of resolving the territorial crisis by political negotiations rather than by the use of
force. He never realised that military strength enhanced the ability to negotiate political settlements
amongst nations. This had led him to approach the UN in response to Pakistan’s proxy war in
Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, when, as a matter of fact, the Indian army was able to throw
out invading Pakistani army from the Kashmir.

In 1954 he had conceded the Chinese claim over Tibet by accepting its suzerainty over it, when
India signed an agreement for trade with the “Tibetan region of China.” India gave up its rights
and privileges in Tibet without gaining any reciprocal concessions from China. The first step
toward this direction was taken by China by ousting India’s influence in Tibet completely. The
Chinese People’s Liberation Army began raids in Tibet, with China declaring Tibet as an integral
part of its territory. In continuation of the policy of Indo-Chinese friendship, India signed the
Sino-Tibetan Agreement on May 23, 1951, which sealed Tibet’s fate permanently. Chinese troops
from then on were stationed on the borders of India, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and
the adjacent areas, whereas India withdrew all her military, postal, commercial, telephonic and
telegraphic services and equipment from the northern borders stationed for over a century. To
pacify the Chinese, Nehru concluded the Panchsheel (Five Principles) Agreement with Chou
En-lai in 1954, based on the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence.

The Panchsheel agreement was a shoddy attempt to hide India’s inability to oppose China’s
expansionist designs, and to lure China into a promise to restrain its territorial ambitions. That
China had no intention of abiding by this agreement was evident from the build-up of military
detachments in the Aksai-Chin area, construction of roads within the Indian territory along the
Sinkiang border, and the shelling of Indian outposts intermittently. The Chinese maps were already
showing the entire North East Frontier Agency (a part of India) as Chinese territory.

4
Despite China’s military operations, Nehru informed the Parliament in 1957 that there was “not
the remotest chance of India coming in to any kind of military conflict with China or the Soviet
Union. India is so situated geographically that it would not be easy to attack her.” Within two
years, in 1959, Tibet was run over by the Chinese forces and Dalai Lama had to undertake an
extremely dangerous and extraordinarily hazardous journey to escape the Chinese assault.

Three years later, in October 1962, the Chinese crushed the Indian forces, occupied strategic
outposts, and destroyed India’s border defences. The US Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith
in Ambassador’s Journal described India’s helplessness in resisting Chinese attack:

Their (India) air arm is not highly effective. The cities of the Ganges Plain are accessible
from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that Indians could retaliate to China
and there is nothing in Tibet. And there is no technical chance that we could accord
them immediately the protection that Nehru asked.

Nehru could have exercised flexibility in non-alignment in defence of India’s national interest.
Could he not have taken the help of the US, which was, anti-China then and which came to
India’s help anyway briefly after October 1962 Sino-Indian war? India took the diplomatic and
political help of the Soviet Union over Pakistan’s war in J & K even if it was extended without
India soliciting it. If India had solicited the US help in 1954 during the Tibetan crisis, the US help
in meeting the Chinese challenge in October 1962 could have been substantially bigger and more
effective. It would have given a correct image to non-alignment to prove that it allowed a country
to seek assistance from any country when its national security is threatened rather than making
India always tilt towards one Super Power—the Soviet Union. These are of course big if and but
of history. But this showed limitations of the Indian foreign policy in the formative years of the
Indian Republic.

Nehru’s reliance on the “doctrine of defence by friendship” vis-a-vis China was a failure. Indians
were all surprised at the failure of Nehru’s foreign policy. Nehru himself became a disillusioned
man. His Defence Minister, Krishna Menon was forced to resign from the Congress Party. J.
Bandopadhyaya in the Making of India’s Foreign Policy concludes: “It was Nehru’s apparently
idealistic interpretation of India-China relations that was probably responsible for the absence
of… strategic planning.”

6.3 FOREIGN POLICY AFTER NEHRU

In the 1960s one major question that was widely discussed was ‘After Nehru, Who?’ Nehru
died in 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him. His tenure was short as he died in Tashkent in
January 1966 after signing the Tashkent Agreement with Ayub Khan, military dictator of Pakistan.

In India’s foreign policy, Shastri has to be remembered for a major change he brought about in
the shifting of emphasis from international events more to the immediate neighbourhood of India.
It was Nehru’s personality that made him to think in terms of India playing a major role in
international affairs. Nehru perceived a larger role for India in international affairs, rather much
bigger than then resources permitted. He played a major role in Bandung (Indonesia) Conference
in 1955. He was responsible for introducing newly liberated communist China’s premier Chou
en lai. He was in the forefront of getting communist China seated as the legitimate member of the

5
UN in place of Nationalist China, which had fled to Taiwan after the communists captured power
in Mainland China in October 1949. It was Nehru who again played a role as a go between
China and the US during the Korean War.

In contrast Shastri focussed on India’s immediate neighbourhood aimed at improving relations

within South Asia. However, his perceived weakness led to conflicts and war in 1965 with
Pakistan. First it was in the Rann of Kutch where a dispute was created to claim Indian territory.
The dispute was referred to arbitration by mutual consent.

The Rann of Kutch is a marshy land between West Pakistan and Gujarat. It was Pakistan’s case
that Rann of Kutch was a lake and according to the international law, the boundary should run in
the middle of the lake. On the other hand, India claimed that it is a marshy land and the boundaries
between Sindh and India were well demarcated. But Pakistan was intruding into the area since
1956. In 1965 hostilities broke out between the two countries in the area. At the intervention of
then British PM Harold Wilson, an agreement was reached to refer the dispute to arbitration if
both the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Eventually, as the two countries could not
agree on a solution, arbitrators awarded 900 square Km to Pakistan—one tenth of their original
claim.

The perception of a weak India continued; in the meanwhile China had exploded a nuclear bomb
in October 1964 without India reacting to it immediately. Instead the non-aligned conference that
met in Cairo in 1964 sent a delegation to Beijing to urge upon China to desist from going nuclear.
The Chinese authorities even refused to receive the delegation.

Another major crisis faced by Shastri was the India-Pakistan War of 1965. The modus operandi
of this war was also similar to the first war in 1947-48. Perceived weakness of India, coupled
with the hope of Kashmiris rising in revolt against India, made Ayub Khan bold to launch the
War. In this war while Pakistan was able to capture some territory in J & K, Indians opened a
second front of its choosing by moving towards Lahore.

The US was then busy with its war in Vietnam. Hence the Johnson administration did not act
beyond imposing an arms embargo against both the countries as they were allegedly fighting with
American weapons. However, the Soviet Union was keen to use its good offices in resolving the
crisis. It had come closer to India by taking a neutral stand over the Sino-Indian border war of
1962. But the Russian leaders were keen that they be perceived as neutral in the Indo-Pak war.
The Russian leaders also desired to befriend Pakistan or at least wean it away from the US.

Then Soviet premier Kosygin invited Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan to Tashkent to find a
solution to the war and both the leaders accepted the offer. After a great deal of bargaining and
arms twisting by the Soviet premier, Kosygin, the warring leaders signed the Tashkent agreement.
Under the agreement India had to give away the territories captured by the army, which was
opposed by the opposition parties.

6.4 MRS. INDIRA GANDHI’S TENURE

Mrs. Indira Gandhi succeeded Lal Bahadur Shastri as the PM. After Pandit Nehru, Indira Gandhi
had the longest tenure, as the nation’s PM. Indira Gandhi, after the 1970 elections, was able to
consolidate her power in the country. By any standard of reckoning, the major foreign policy

6
event in her term was the Bangladesh war fought with Pakistan in 1971.

To understand this major event in Indian history it is necessary to summarise the background of
the crisis. In the only democratic election held in Pakistan in December 1970, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won a majority (88 out of 144) in West Pakistan while Awami
League won an absolute majority in East Pakistan by winning 167 seats. In accordance with the
democratic theory, then military dictator in Pakistan Yahya Khan should have invited the leader
of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to form the government. But the manipulative Bhutto
was unwilling to have a Bengali as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Yahya Khan was also unwilling to transfer power to a Bangladeshi. Instead of transferring power,
Yahya Khan imposed martial law, appointed Lt. General Tikka Khan as Governor and sent army
to quell the movement in East Pakistan in March 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, popular leader
of the Awami Party was arrested and imprisoned in West Pakistan. The enraged population of
East Pakistan then came out on the streets to denounce military dictatorship.

The military indulged in one of the worst human rights violations in the world history. The intellectuals
and supporters of the party were massacred; women were raped and there was a systematic
genocide of Hindus in East Pakistan. It was a sheer war of hatred. According to the New York
Times the Pakistani army painted “big yellow Hs on the Hindu shops” to be attacked and
destroyed. As a result over 12 million Bangladeshis, Muslims and Hindus, came to West Bengal,
mainly to Calcutta, as refugees. Feeding such large number was an economic strain on India but
added to that was the law and order problem for the government in West Bengal.

Indira Gandhi, adept in political gamble, went on a tour of Western countries to inform the
leaders of the human tragedy in East Pakistan. The US was then secretly engaged in opening up
relations with China in which Pakistan had played a crucial role as a go between. At the same
time she had also asked the army to prepare for military intervention. The army wanted the
intervention to take place in the winter, as the passes in the Himalayas would be snowbound and
Pakistan’s ally China could not militarily intervene in the crisis.

Pakistan, to pre-empt India and force her to divert troops to west, attacked on 3 December
1971. India intervened in the East in a massive way. The resulting war ended in the liberation of
East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent country. The Indian forces were at
their best when they accepted the surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops in the war.

The friends of Pakistan, especially the US, were upset over the Indian victory in the war as it
considered the Indian victory as that of the Soviet Union. Nixon, according to his memoirs, was
keen to save West Pakistan from destruction by India. Thus, to save West Pakistan, he asked
nuclear powered warship Enterprise to move to Bay of Bengal. In a well-coordinated move,
Soviet Union sent its nuclear powered ship to follow the US warship. The Soviet Union was the
main supporter of India in the War often using its veto power in the UN Security Council to nullify
the US resolutions condemning India and asking her to withdraw armed forces from East Pakistan.

6.4.1 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1971

A pro-Soviet tilt had already set in during the Nehru period in the practice of non-alignment. The
1970s were such that globally non-alignment movement had become a force sympathetic to the

7
Soviet Union. Cuba, as a member of the non-aligned movement, even introduced the idea that
the Soviet Union is a ‘natural ally’ of the non- aligned nations. This he did at the 1979 NAM
Summit held at Havana. The tilt became evident in the Indo-Soviet relations during the period.

Before the Bangladesh war of 1971, India signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the
Soviet Union. Under the treaty, the two countries agreed on “immediate mutual consultations” in
the event of either country facing a military threat and adopt appropriate effective measures.

The treaty expressed the Soviet Union’s acceptance of India’s policy of non-alignment. However,
the treaty was criticised by the US as an end of India’s non-alignment. But the treaty was India’s
answer to then changing global scene. Since 1962 Pakistan and China had befriended each other
against India on the theory that enemy’s enemy is a friend. The US was already close to Pakistan
with the military alliances binding their relations. Richard Nixon, the US President, was actively
working to establish relations with China aimed at balancing the perceived power of the Soviet
Union.

6.4.2 Simla Agreement, 1972

The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was brought to an end by signing the Simla Agreement between
Gandhi and Bhutto. Under the agreement both the countries “resolved to settle their differences
by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.” They also agreed to respect each other’s
national unity and territorial integrity and not to assist or encourage any acts, which could affect
the maintenance of peace in the region. Apart from these expressions of idealistic thought in
concrete terms, Pakistan regained all its territories lost in West Pakistan in the War and also
secured freedom for Prisoners of War taken in Bangladesh. POWs were actually released in
1973 after India obtained consent of Bangladesh. India gained assurances of good behaviour,
which Pakistan was incapable of in practice.

The opposition party, particularly then Jan Sangh-predecessor of the present Bharatiya Janata
Party, was very critical of the terms of the Simla agreement. Atal Behari Vajpayee who became
the External Affairs Minister in the subsequent Janata Party government under Morarji Desai
hinted in April 1978 that the agreement became possible only after “secret and midnight”
understanding between Gandhi and Bhutto.

6.4.3 Nuclear Test of 1974

Mrs. Gandhi will also be remembered by the nation for her determination to take nation on the
path of a major power. Nehru had an idealistic approach to power. But Mrs. Gandhi was realistic
to a great extent. Nehru said in 1954 in the Lok Sabha: “If you peep in the future and if nothing
goes wrong—wars and like—the obvious fourth country in the world (after US, Soviet Union
and China) is India.” But Gandhi translated his idealism in action. One such act was her conducting
nuclear test in May 1974 in Pokharan.

Ever since China conducted its nuclear tests in October 1964, there was domestic pressure on
the Indian government to conduct nuclear tests. However, Lal Bahadur Shastri was silent on the
demand. But his External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh had said in the Lok Sabha in May 1966
that India had the capability to acquire nuclear capability in a reasonably short time. Apparently,
Shastri as the PM in late 1964 had authorised Atomic Energy Commission to work on the bomb

8
design.

The test conducted by Indira Gandhi was to demonstrate the Indian nuclear capability though it
was claimed to be a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Her logic ran like this. During the
Bangladesh war in 1971 the US had used its nuclear powered enterprise to blackmail India to
desist from attacking West Pakistan. Earlier, when Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National
Security Adviser was in India, he had informed the Indian policy makers that India should not
bank on the US if China intervenes in the likely conflict between India and Pakistan. This was
contrary to the prevailing Nixon Doctrine which had promised the US protection if any non-
nuclear nation was threatened by a nuclear weapons state, in this case China. Thus Gandhi
desired to make India self reliant in her security.

6.4.4 Indira Gandhi’s Second Tenure

Mrs. Gandhi was briefly out of power when the first ever non-Congress government came to
power in 1977 under Morarji Desai as the PM. Charan Singh succeeded him for a six-month
term in 1979. Mrs. Gandhi replaced him again in January 1980. These two non-Congress
governments under the Janata Party had nothing much to contribute to the evolution of the nation’s
foreign policy. Though they had promised to correct the tilt towards Soviet Union in the Indian
non-alignment and make it a genuine non-alignment, nothing significant happened.

A major foreign policy challenge was unfolding while the nation was going through the election
process in December 1979 when the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan, a non-
aligned country on Soviet Union’s southern borders. Then Indian PM, Charan Singh called upon
the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops as early as possible and preserve the non-aligned character
of Afghanistan. But when the matter came before the UN for discussion on 12 January 1980,
Brajesh Mishra who was then India’s Permanent Representative said that India is opposed to the
presence of foreign troops or bases in any state. He also made an interesting statement that the
Soviet Union in the case of Afghanistan, had assured India that it would withdraw the troops
when the government in Kabul asked for it. He added: “We have no reason to doubt the assurances,
particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union, with whom we have close ties.” This
was totally going along with the Soviet Union amounting to alignment by a non-aligned country.
The statement was to trouble the Indian non-alignment policy even after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union.

This was more in tune with what Gandhi would have said than reflecting the approach of the
Janata Party government then in power. She, while campaigning, had said in an interview to
France’s Europe Radio Station that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was “a danger to
India.” Brajesh Mishra’s statement also did not reflect Charan Singh’s earlier position on the
issue.

This literally brought the US-Soviet Union Cold War to the Indian northwestern borders. The
US asked India to help it in getting the Russians out of Afghanistan. The US was interested in
performing a Vietnam in reverse in Afghanistan to the Russians. As America was forced to withdraw
dishonourably from Vietnam in 1974, the US wanted to force Russians to experience what that
dishonour means in a nation’s life. Russians had that experience in 1988.

9
Since India did not agree to cooperate with the US against the Soviets, Americans turned to
Pakistan for support. Pakistan readily agreed to be a conduit to transfer weapons to Afghan
guerrillas (Mujahidins) at a total military and economic aid package of $7.4 billion. This
transformed the region into a terrorist hub-terrorism strengthened by religious fanaticism in the
name of Jihad ever since then.

6.5 RAJIV GANDHI AND THE INDIAN PEACE KEEPING

FORCE IN SRI LANKA
As Indira Gandhi inherited Afghan crisis from previous government, her successor Rajiv Gandhi
inherited so to say an ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, which began in a big way in 1983. But Mrs.
Gandhi had handled the crisis as a disinterested mediator between Sri Lanka and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were demanding a separate Tamil state in the north-eastern
Sri Lanka.

But under Rajiv Gandhi the crisis took a turn for the worse. Earlier Rajiv Gandhi had asserted the
Indian interest in extending humanitarian aid to the beleaguered Tamils in Jaffna in the North as
the Sri Lankan government had imposed an economic blockade on the area. He had sent the
food grains by 20 boats but the Sri Lankans did not permit the supply to reach the needy. In June
1987, Indian air force dropped the supply for the people. This made it clear to the President
Jayawardane that he needed to understand the seriousness of the purpose exhibited by India.

However, as Sri Lanka was facing leftist, JVP threat on the South, Jayawardane requested help
from India in maintaining peace in the north. India and Sri Lanka signed an accord in July 1987.
Under the accord signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardane, the Indian troops were to be
sent to Sri Lanka to maintain peace in the North and East and also to accept arms laid down by
the LTTE. In return, for the militants accepting to return to peaceful life, the accord provided for
the merger of Tamil dominant areas in the North and East, holding of provincial elections, and
devolution of the powers.

But the distrust between the parties did not help in the smooth implementation of the agreement.
The Tamils perceived the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) as “Innocent People Killing
Force”. There was a demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka from both sides:
Tamils as well as the new president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa. Rajiv Gandhi’s successor, V. P.
Singh withdrew the IPKF; India not only lost face but also over 1000 Indian soldiers. There was
bad blood between all sides to dispute. As a result, LTTE plotted and a human bomb assassinated
Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991. Later the same forces were also responsible for assassinating
President Premadasa.

6.6 NARASIMHA RAO (1991-1996)

It goes to the credit of Narasimha Rao to survive as the Prime Minister of a minority government
and carry on with the foreign policy for a complete term of five years. He is the first Congress
Party PM outside the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty to do so. There were major foreign policy problems
faced by Rao government.

10
By any account one major problem was of economic readjustment from a mixed economy to a
global one. This was not done as a conscious policy decision to move economy by following
liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG). By the time Rao government assumed power,
India had an adverse balance of payments under which there was foreign exchange worth only
Rs 2000 to Rs. 2400 crores, enough to pay for imports of only 7 days.

6.7 INDIA–US RELATIONS

An economically weak government is always prone to foreign pressure. This situation was taken
maximum advantage by the only super power–the United States. The US did arms twisting in
pressurising Rao to economically open up the Indian market to the American penetration in areas
of computers, IT, and Telecommunications etc. India came under the American pressure to
rollback and cap its nuclear programme. India was compelled, under the US pressure, to abandon
the nuclear testing planned for 1995.

India has been stating that it wanted to retain its nuclear option, which became increasingly
difficult since the end of the Cold War. India joined the US in co-sponsoring the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT). India, under Rao, did try
in 1995 to conduct tests in Pokharan but could not succeed as it was detected by the US. And
Rao had to shelve the programme.

6.8 FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NDA

GOVERNMENT
Atal Behari Vajpayee became the PM in 1998 leading a coalition government consisting of 13
political parties. But the government could not last beyond ten months. In the elections held in
October 1999, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance was elected again to power. This is
the first ever coalition government to hold on to power for nearly four years.

6.8.1 Nuclear Weapons

During these ten months, its main foreign policy push came in the area of developing nuclear
weapons capability and trying to improve relations with Pakistan. The BJP has been a great
exponent of India going for nuclear weapons. Once it came to power, it planned for nuclear
weapons tests so that India can declare its status as a nuclear weapons state. On 11 May 1998
India surprised the world by conducting three nuclear tests. Two more tests were conducted on
13 May. Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India is a nuclear weapons state, and also declared
that it would not conduct any more tests as all the necessary data had been collected. India,
Vajpayee said, would maintain only minimum nuclear deterrent.

It turned out that India was trying to test nuclear weapons in 1982 during Gandhi’s tenure and
later in 1995 when Narasimha Rao was the PM. But each time the preparations were made to
conduct the tests, the US intelligence was able to detect the Indian plans. Hence, it goes to the
credit of the BJP to have planned the nuclear tests and conducting them undetected.

6.8.2 Attempts to Improve Relations

11
In 1999 the Indian PM set himself to improve the relations with Pakistan. The first step he took
was with a Bus trip to Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif, PM of Pakistan. During this trip PM
Vajpayee made a visit to Minar-e- Pakistan symbolising the Indian acceptance of the creation of
Pakistan based on Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s “two nations” theory.

As a matter of fact there was no such confirmation ever needed. Because after initial opposition
to the creation of Pakistan, the Hindu Mahasabha has become defunct and the Bharatiya Janata
Party, as the main ruling party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), never spoke in terms
of undoing the partition.

After the meeting in Lahore, the Pakistani PM said that it would be the year of decision on
Kashmir. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh had said that after fifty years of
independence “the time for map-making in the region is over” indicating that there is no question
of changing of geography in the region.

The month of May 1999 saw the Kargil war between the two nations. As the two PMs were
discussing the future of their bilateral relations, the Pakistani Army was preparing for the war. The
war is significant as it was the first military conflict between the two nations after they acquired
nuclear weapons in May 1998. This was an effort by the Pakistani armed forces to alter the
status quo on the Line of Control so that whenever negotiations take place, the Pakistanis could
use it as a bargaining chip with India.

However, Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf in a bloodless coup in October
1999, deposed PM Nawaz Sharif. This sent into limbo all efforts to normalise relations with
Pakistan. India reacted to the military takeover in its traditional way. India then boycotted the
meeting of the SAARC and also saw to it that Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth
of Nations. India made another attempt at peace when Vajpayee invited Pervez Musharraf for
talks at Agra in early 2001. The talks collapsed as General Musharraf was adamant on his terms
to discuss the so called core issue of Kashmir.

The armed forces of Pakistan have dominated all institutions of the government in that country.
The cross border terrorism that has been the bane of the India-Pakistan relations since 1989 has
been only aggravated by the military dictatorship. The Indo-Pak relations were further spoilt
when on 13 December 2001, Pakistani terrorists tried to attack the Indian Parliament and eliminate
our top leadership. Fortunately our alert security forces engaged the terrorists in a forced gun
battle just outside the Parliament House, and killed all the five Pakistanis. India withdrew its High
Commissioner from Islamabad and snapped air, rail and bus links with Pakistan. The Indian
government has perforce moved closer to the only surviving Super Power in the world—the US.
Hence the question of the relevance of the Indian Non-alignment is now and then raised. Meanwhile,
Pakistan had once again moved very close to the US by promising full cooperation in the American
fight against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

As we have seen, non-alignment was the child of a bipolar world in which two poles were
intensely contesting for supremacy at all levels—ideological, economic, and political. But with
the end of one pole, the relevance of rival military alliances and competition to enrol every nation
on one side or the other is over. However, another facet of non-alignment is the fact that a non-
aligned country retains its independence of decision making unlike a nation aligned with a bloc
normally toes the line of the leader nation. In this sense India still retains her independence of

12
decision-making.

In another sense, Indian non-alignment tilted towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But
now that Russia itself has moved closer to its former rival, there is nothing wrong in India moving
closer to the US. Earlier, during the Cold War, it used to be normal response of the policy
makers that it is not so much that India is leaning towards the Soviet Union but it is the other way
round. Similarly, if the US can be of help to promote the Indian national interest, there is nothing
wrong in India working in close cooperation with the US. However, India with other major
powers like the EU, and Russia is working towards bringing about a multipolar world. Meanwhile,
India adopted the “Look East” policy and swiftly moved to have closer relationship with the
ASEAN countries. India also moved closer to the European Union, Japan and Australia. By
2003, Sino-Indian relations had begun improving in a big way.

6.9 SUMMARY
The Indian foreign policy has undergone many radical changes in the last fifty-six years after
independence on account of many factors. One is the change in the international environment
with the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the US as the only super power. Second,
domestic changes have occurred replacing one party government by a coalition government in
the 21st Century. Third, personality of the PMs has also changed as a consequence.

Yet, Indian foreign policy is woven within the framework of non-alignment. Though there is,
looking at the origin of non-alignment in the bipolar world, reason to question the relevance of
non-alignment, its relevance lies in the fact that India claims to retain its right to judge every policy
independently and formulate its own policy response. But India works to usher in a multipolar
world wherein she can emerge as an independent player along with others.

6.10 EXERCISES
1) Discuss Nehru’s contribution to the foreign policy of India.

2) How did Pakistan try to exploit the perceived weakness of Lal Bahadur Shastri? What was
the outcome?

3) “Indira Gandhi laid the foundation to make India a major power.” Justify this statement with
concrete examples.

4) Examine Rajiv Gandhi’s achievements and failures in foreign affairs.

5) Discuss the main achievements of India’s foreign policy during the initial years of the 21st
Century.

13
UNIT 3 OBJECTIVES AND DETERMINANTS
Structure
3.1 Introduction
3.2 India’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Principles
3.3 Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy
3.3.1 Geography
3.3.2 History and Tradition
3.3.3 Economic Conditions
3.3.4 Nature of Leadership
3.3.5 Domestic Milieu
3.3.6 International Trends
3.4 Summary
3.5 Exercises

3.1 INTRODUCTION
A country’s foreign policy does not emerge from a vacuum; it is guided and shaped by that
country’s history and culture, the political system and various other factors. Some of them like
geography and the natural frontiers remain unchanged, while others like domestic and external
environment frequently and at times unrecognisably change. Elements of continuity and change
in a country’s foreign policy can be explained with reference to the important influence of these
factors and forces. The influence of these determining factors on foreign policies of countries
need not be uniform across the space and time span; it varies from country to country and from
situation to situation. The purpose of this Unit is to trace and appreciate the major determinants
of India’s foreign policy with reference to its objectives and principles.

3.2 INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND

PRINCIPLES
Any activity is likely to be productive when goals and objectives steer it; so is the case with
India’s foreign policy. Without knowing these objectives it may not be easy to appreciate and
evaluate the course of the policy. India’s leaders have specified right from the time of Independence
those objectives. Besides, many analysts and scholars have highlighted and evaluated these
goals in their writings and analyses.

Chiefly, India’s foreign policy aims to safeguard and further national interest in terms of protecting
the country’s political independence and promoting its external security. As a country that freed
itself from colonial rule, India naturally wants to follow such foreign policy that would not
compromise on its existence as a free country or give scope to other countries to dictate as to
how it should conduct itself. With the help of a successful foreign policy, India would like to
prevent or resist threats of military attacks from foreign quarters. India’s need for national security
is placed in the wider and wiser backdrop of the need to jointly work for security of the whole
world. In other words, it does not want other countries to be insecure while working for its own

1
security. India has always desired friendly relations with all countries, especially the major countries
as well as countries in its neighbourhood. In short, India’s foreign policy seeks to promote world
peace, work for avoidance of dangerous wars like the two World Wars during the first half of the
20th Century. India wants to promote harmony and cooperation between the countries that have
ideological, political and other differences.

As a country that suffered colonial rule and became free after long peaceful struggle, India’s
foreign policy is committed to strive for bringing an end to colonialism everywhere. Accordingly
it has supported freedom struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia. As an extension of this goal,
India has been interested to direct its foreign policy towards realisation of equal rights of all
peoples and nations without discrimination. Therefore, India opposed the abhorrent policy of
apartheid in South Africa; it sought to protect the right to equality under law to all people of
Indian origin wherever they are.

India’s foreign policy has another important goal, viz. to promote the economic development of
underprivileged nations and their peoples. For this purpose, its foreign policy seeks to develop
beneficial relationship with the industrially advanced countries with a view to securing necessary
assistance. India’s policy aims to cater to not just its own development needs but also those of
the newly independent poor countries in the Third World. A more equitable economic and social
world order that would help in eventually eliminating disease and deprivations has been a vital
goal of India’s foreign policy.

It is equally notable that a few laudable principles guide India to pursue the above foreign policy
goals. Let us take note of them here. India has tried to stand by the principle of avoiding use of
force in settling differences with other countries. Indeed it preferred the peaceful methods like
dialogue, negotiation and diplomacy for narrowing differences and easing tensions among countries.
India has always actively supported the development of international law to regulate various
problematic aspects of world affairs. India has firmly believed in strengthening the United Nations
and other global and regional organisations as useful tools for international harmony and
cooperation. India believes in working for reduction and final elimination of nuclear and other
types of weapons of mass destruction. India’s foreign policy principles as enshrined in Panchsheel
(1954) emphasise the imperatives of non-aggression, non-interference, and peaceful co-existence
among countries.

In short, through foreign policy India wants to be seen as peace-loving, mature, law- abiding and
trust worthy country while trying to benefit from friendly contacts with other countries in the
society of nations.

3.3 DETERMINANTS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

There are several factors that have influenced, and continue to influence, the shaping of India’s
foreign policy. Some of these factors are of permanent nature while others change with the time.
In this section, we will discuss major determinants of India’s foreign policy, viz. geography, history
and culture, domestic situation, external environment, etc.

3.3.1 Geography

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India’s geographical size and location have played vital role in shaping its foreign policy. India is
very big in size; it is the seventh largest in the world with nearly 3 million square kilometres of
territory. On its north, its boundaries are associated with the world famous Himalayan mountain
range. It has 15,000 kms long land boundaries with Pakistan in the West, Bhutan, China and
Nepal in the North, and Bangladesh and Myanmar in the East. Afghanistan and the former Soviet
Union are in the immediate vicinity of Jammu & Kashmir. Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
has noted often that one can change one’s friends, but not neighbours. Therefore, India has been
keen to have friendly and tension-free relations with all the neighbours.

India has 7,500 kms of coastline touched by the waters of the Indian Ocean on three sides of its
territory. Most of India’s foreign trade is routed through the Indian Ocean just as the Indian
harbours witness dense traffic of merchant ships proceeding from or towards Europe, West
Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asian regions; hence geopolitical and geo-strategic significance of
the ocean to India’s external relations. As you will recall, the Indian Ocean brought the colonial
rule of the French, British, Dutch and the Portuguese to India and East Asia during the 17-19th
centuries. Clearly India’s foreign policy has perceived the need to ensure that its northern frontiers
along with territorial waters in the Indian Ocean remain peaceful and free from foreign military
build up. India’s vast coastline necessitates not only a powerful navy, but also friendly relations
with other naval powers present in the Indian Ocean. These include Britain as well as the United
States, which have a powerful naval base at Diego Garcia.

The location of the country is also notable. Belonging to South Asia, India lies in the heart of the
biggest continent, Asia. Although India was victim of Chinese and Pakistani military attacks, it is
in its interest that the channels of communication are kept open. India therefore seeks that problems
with these neighbours are amicably settled. In keeping with the fact that India is the gateway of
both South-East Asia and the West Asia, India’s security and vital interests are closely knit with
the peace and stability in the larger region of Asia. As such, India keeps close relations with
regional powers such as Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam, etc. India has
followed the Look East Policy and is developing economic as well as strategic relations with the
ASEAN countries.

3.3.2 History and Tradition

India’s foreign policy provides a mirror to its historical heritage. India never mounted aggressive
campaigns outside the country for territorial expansion. Indeed it was targeted in a series of
invasions and alien rule, although notably the ruling dynasties made the country their home and
adapted themselves to local customs and traditions. The British colonial empire was consolidated
through deliberate policy of pitting the native kingdoms against one another in battles that bled
winners and losers alike. This experience as a victim of wars has turned India’s foreign policy
anti-war in nature. Moreover, the legacy of the non-violent freedom struggle launched under the
leadership of Gandhi and his lieutenants was bound to be evident in its foreign policy.

Not only this, the legacy of an ancient civilisation and culture also helped in foreign policy
formulation. The traditional values of Vasudheva Kutumbakam—One World—have come down
to the people of India from the ancient scriptures and the spiritual works of great men like Swami
Vivekananda. Particularly, the values that have helped in shaping India’s foreign policy are
tolerance, non-vio1ence and universal brotherhood. The furtherance of the tradition of non-

3
violence in India’s foreign policy, according to A. Appadorai, was “the deliberate acceptance of
a method of approach to foreign policy problems which emphasised reconciliation, and the temper
of peace, as opposed to a spirit of revenge and hatred.”

Most of the leaders of freedom movement were educated in Britain or were exposed to the
system of liberal education. They valued liberty, equality and democracy. These ideals are
embedded in the Indian foreign policy. While cooperating with liberal democratic countries,
India did not oppose the socialist countries either. The policy of non-alignment is not only an
outcome of keeping aloof from bloc politics, but is also in accordance with the goals and ideals
of freedom struggle cherished by our people.

The impact of the British rule in India and the influence of national movement and freedom
struggle are clearly evident in the shaping of India’s foreign policy. According to A. Appadorai,
the British rule in India had a two-fold impact on India’s foreign policy. Firstly, it gave a stimulus
to the national movement for freedom which in turn led to India’s support for the freedom of
dependent peoples; secondly, racial inequality that existed during the British rule made India
commit itself to root out the evils of racial discrimination.

These idealistic notions notwithstanding, the realist legacy left behind by ancient scholars of
statecraft like Kautilya too have an important bearing on the country’s approach towards
safeguarding its vital interests by coercion if necessary. Leaders of India like Jawaharlal Nehru
and Indira Gandhi candidly acknowledged the limitations of idealism to guide state policy at
critical junctures. The action that India took in Goa (1961) and Bangladesh (1971) situations
symbolised pragmatism.

3.3.3 Economic Conditions

The possession of raw materials and natural resources and the compulsions of economic
development also determine the course of a country’s foreign policy. Low economic profile
could impinge on a country’s ability to play an influential and effective role in foreign affairs.

India is a storehouse of vast natural resources with great potential for achieving economic heights
in development. Its rivers are capable of generating power and providing enough water for
drinking and irrigation. Huge deposits of bauxite, coal, copper, manganese and other minerals
are India’s assets. Equally notable is the base of its skilled and educated work force. Despite
progress made in the fields of agriculture, literacy, science and technology, there is no denying
that India lags far behind in development. The bulk of its growing population finds it difficult to
cater to basic necessities like food, shelter and clothing. After Independence, it was clear to our
leaders that the country needs help from foreign governments in respect of transfer of funds,
import of equipment and finished goods, export of Indian commodities and goods, training of
technical personnel, etc. In an ideologically polarised world, India needed friendship and goodwill
from both the free market economies in the West as well as the Socialist world led by the former
Soviet Union. By adopting the policy of non-alignment, India hoped for assistance from both the
camps. As a parallel to that external policy, India has adopted a mixed economy approach that
combined public sector with heavy state investment in infrastructure areas while a strong private
sector flourished in an array of other areas.

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India’s economic linkages with the erstwhile colonial ruler, the United Kingdom guided Nehru to
forge friendly contacts with that country both bilaterally and within the Commonwealth grouping.
Vast portion of India’s trade involving export of raw materials like cotton, tea and import of
heavy machinery and technology has been with the United States and West European countries.
These countries have come forward with generous grants and loans for various projects, apart
from facilitating multilateral funding through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The former Soviet Union too emerged as a key partner in defence and other aspects of foreign
trade on favourable terms.

Also notably, heavy dependence on oil for industrial and economic needs has brought special
focus on relations with oil-rich Arab countries in West Asia, apart from working for stable supplies
and prices of oil in global market.

At a different level, the economic conditions of the country provide inputs to India’s foreign
policy to argue for easing of economic disparities between the developed and the less developed
countries and for greater economic relationships among the developing countries themselves.

3.3.4 Nature of Leadership

The personal qualities of leaders guiding the destiny of a nation at a given time tend to shape that
country’s foreign policy in a particular direction. Who can deny the role of, for instance, Woodrow
Wilson in shaping the foreign policy of the United States in the early decades of the 20th Century
or that of Mikhail Gorbachev in making the Soviet policy in the closing years of the same century?
Similarly, in the case of India too, the personality of the incumbent prime ministers has come to be
identified in certain measure with a particular flavour given to the country’s foreign policy. The
country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who steered India’s policy for more than one
and a half decades, was widely regarded as internationalist in outlook, with a preference for
enlightened, rather than narrow or self-centred, approach to problems. He was indeed regarded
as among the tallest of visionaries in his times. Understandably, therefore India’s foreign policy
during his tenure was more committed to the collective good of the comity of nations in relation
to concerns like world peace and disarmament. Panchsheel was a typical representation of the
Nehruvian outlook to approaching problems with other countries.

Quite contrasting is the case of the influence of his daughter, Indira Gandhi. By nature she came
out as a strong and decisive personality. Her proclivity to be pragmatic and sensitivity to the
imperatives of vital national interests left an imprint on reorienting the foreign policy along the lines
of realism, more than idealism. This is how India’s policy with reference to the liberation of
Bangladesh, non-accession to Non-Proliferation Treaty, and strengthening of ties with the former
Soviet Union may be viewed. Again, the reputed qualities as a moderate of Atal Behari Vajpayee
are said to have influenced the policy of engagement with Pakistan and the United States.

3.3.5 Domestic Milieu

No country’s foreign policy can be immune from the influence of the dynamics within. Indeed it
is an important determinant of foreign policy. The domestic milieu refers to, inter alia, the nature
of governing system, the political culture including the policies of political parties, public opinion,
etc. tradition, structure of government and enlightened leadership.

5
Independent India is a living example of ‘unity in diversity’. Having won freedom from British
after non-violent struggle, India chose a democratic system that could offer adequate representation
to diversities of all kinds—regional, religious, and cultural. The executive is accountable to
people’s representatives who are chosen in periodical exercise of franchise. India’s political
system was based (and is still based) on Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. However
much the executive would like to view foreign policy as its prerogative, parliamentary control
over the executive has opened channels for influencing the country’s foreign policy. In general,
fortunately, India’s foreign policy reflected the national consensus cutting across political differences
between the ruling side and the opposition. Non-alignment policy is a clear example here. This,
however, is not to say that the parliament and prime minister always looked eye to eye on all
foreign policy issues all the time. Even during the time of Nehru, who had exercised more discretion
than any other prime minister, parliament sought to assert itself in respect of his policy vis-à-vis
the boundary dispute with China and the Goa question in the late 1950s. Recently in 2003,
again, India’s approach to the Iraq problem was very much dictated by the sentiments articulated
in parliament in as much the government agreed to become party in “deploring” the American
military action against Iraq.

The political parties too at the time of elections take positions on foreign policy matters in their
respective manifestoes. There are varied views expressed by the BJP at one end and the
Communist Party (Marxist) at the other concerning globalisation, World Trade Organisation and
several other issues. Similarly, some of the regional parties like those in Tamil Nadu (DMK,
AIADMK, MDMK, etc.), and Jammu and Kashmir (the National Conference) for instance
have come to determine the country’s policy toward Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively.

Public opinion ventilated through media and other channels and the activities of interest/pressure
groups like the friendship societies or the business associations have gained importance as
determinants of India’s foreign policy. The role of ISCUS or of CII cannot be denied, for
example in the context of relations with the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. The
print and lately the visual media have been influential determinants of the policy. The two most
notable examples of the role played by the television and print media in making India respond the
way it did related to the hijacking of Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar in 1999 and the official
announcement of decision not to accede to the United States request for sending troops to post-
war Iraq.

3.3.6 International Trends

The broad currents of international politics at any given point of time have direct bearing on
foreign policies. The difficulty in conducting the foreign policy arises because states do not have
sure means of controlling the behaviour of other states. During the inter-war period (1919-39),
the quest for French security, followed by the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and
militarism in Japan had their impact on foreign policies. The US changed its policy towards the
Soviet Union and recognised it because, in 1933, Hitler’s emergence in Germany posed a threat
to the world order created after the War. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria (China) in 1931
provided a common threat to USA as well as USSR in the Far East. The two Powers gave up
their hostility.
The Cold War era (1945-90) has determined in a big way the foreign policy of most countries.

6
The fear of nuclearised United States brought the countries of Eastern Europe under the control
of the Soviet Union, with the result that all those countries adopted socialism and came under the
Russian wings. The entire policy of containment of communism adopted by the US was evident
in its setting up of NATO, SEATO and such other military alliances/arrangements. India’s efforts
in expounding the policy of non-alignment were directly a response to this emerging polarisation
in the international environment.
The Cold War was the defining characteristic of world politics for nearly 45 years. Arms race,
especially in the nuclear field, typically represented the height of suspicion and the impending
disaster. India’s policy to take up nuclear disarmament emanated from the imminent and perpetual
threat to human civilisation if those weapons were to be accidentally or deliberately used. Related
to nuclear field, India’s successful testing in 1998 of nuclear weapons was justified as a necessary
response to the fast changing international environment that sought to dismiss the demand for
nuclear disarmament and sanctify the inequitable hierarchy between the nuclear weapon powers
and non-nuclear weapon powers.
After the sudden end of the Cold War followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s
foreign policy underwent appreciable shifts on numerous counts—lack of enthusiasm towards
the non-aligned movement, eagerness to accommodate the American concerns, resumption of
full diplomatic ties with Israel, emphasis on economic aspects of relations with Europe, Southeast
Asia and even South Asia.
Again, in the post-cold war era, the increasing sensitivity in international quarters to the issues of
terrorism and human rights (along with the widely spread claims of self-determination) impelled
necessary adjustments in India’s foreign policy. During the 1990s, the critical observers of India’s
foreign policy have noted the government’s preoccupation with the question of Jammu and Kashmir
in its contacts with major countries and in global forums. The 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks on American targets in New York and Washington presented new opportunities to India
to push its anti-terrorist foreign policy with greater conviction.

3.4 SUMMARY
The multifarious objectives of India’s foreign policy achieve a blend of national and international
interests. India has sought to achieve its security and socio-economic advancement while at the
same time working for peace, freedom, progress and justice to all nations and peoples. Non-
alignment, adherence to peaceful procedures for settlement of differences, support to the initiatives
for disarmament, and active participation in international bodies constituted notable principles
that flow from the objectives of the country’s foreign policy.

As elaborated, among several determinants of foreign policy, the relevance of factors like India’s
geographical size, location, its historical experiences and traditions, the state of economy, the
nature of political institutions and structure, and the personality of the country’s leadership have
played significant role in shaping the country’s policy with countries in its neighbourhood and
outside. Moreover, the impact of the changing international environment—be it the cold war
politics, or the post-cold war trends—too is something not to be missed while understanding
shifts in our foreign policy. All in all, India seems to have done pretty well in formulating and
implementing a foreign policy behind which the nation stood united and which projected the
country as a peace loving, mature, democratic, and law abiding country in the realm of world

7
affairs.

3.5 EXERCISES
1) Explain briefly the objectives and principles of India’s foreign policy.

2) Explain India’s geography, history and tradition as determinants of its foreign policy.

3) State how the backwardness of India’s economy dictated foreign policy options.

4) Contrast the influences of various prime ministers on identifying the objectives and other
aspects of India’s foreign policy.

5) Comment briefly on domestic milieu as a factor in shaping India’s foreign policy.

6) Write short notes on media and foreign policy in India.

7) What has been the influence of changing international trends on India’s foreign policy?

8
9
 Module Detail

Subject Name Political Science

Foreign Policy of India

Paper Name

Module 2. Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy

Name/Title

Module Id 2

Pre-requisites

Objectives This module will analyze various determining factors of

India’s foreign policy. It will comprise the evaluation of
all the important factors like geography, economy, polity,
domestic environment, military capability, leadership,
international environment etc. Finally, important
questions and suggested readings are also included in the
module.

Keywords Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy, Geography,

Economic Development, Political Traditions, Domestic
Environment, Military Capability, National Character,
Personality, Regional Environment, International
Environment, International Organisations.

Structure of Module / Syllabus of a module (Define Topic / Sub-topic of

module)

Role Name Affiliation

Professor Ashutosh Kumar Panjab

Principal Investigator University,
Chandigarh
Professor R.S.Yadav
Paper Coordinator Kurukshetra
University,
Kurukshetra
 Content Writer/Author (CW) Dr. Suresh Dhanda S.A.Jain (PG)
College,
Ambala City
Professor R.S.Yadav
Content Reviewer (CR) Kurukshetra
University,
Kurukshetra
Professor R.S.Yadav
Language Editor (LE) Kurukshetra
University,
Kurukshetra

Module-2

Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy

Structure of the Module

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Introduction
2. Objectives
3. Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy
3.1. Internal Determinants
3.1.1. Geography
3.1.2. Economic Development
3.1.3. Political Traditions
3.1.4. Domestic environment
3.1.5. Military Capability
3.1.6. National Character
3.1.7. Personality
3.2. External Determinants
3.2.1. Regional Environment
3.2.2. International Environment
3.2.3. International Organisations
4. Conclusion
5. Important Questions
6. Suggested Readings
1. Introduction
Under foreign policy, nations take necessary steps to fulfil their short-term and long-term
interests. Foreign policy decisions are influenced by various important internal and
external factors or elements. Its design is an outcome of interactions among various
factors, some of which are called permanent while others called temporary. In fact, both
these kinds of factors play equally important role in determination/formulation of foreign
policy. But their comparative importance depends upon the situation. A factor may play an
important role in one situation while other may play the same in other situation. These
factors cannot be generalized on the basis of their importance. But it is certain that these
factors influence the process either collectively or individually. The formulation of a
meaningful foreign policy is possible only on the correct and logical evaluation of these
factors.

2. Objectives
This module will make the readers aware about the determining factors of India’s foreign
policy. Foreign policy of a nation is decided by various internal, external, human and non-
human factors. And India is no exception in this case. The present module will evaluate all
those determining factors of India’s foreign policy in detail. Only after the correct and
logical evaluation of these factors, a nation can formulate a meaningful and effective
foreign policy. This module will comprise the evaluation of all the important factors like
geography, economy, polity, domestic environment, military capability, leadership,
international environment etc. Finally, important questions and suggested readings will
also be included in the module.

3. Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy

The determinants of foreign policy of any nation can be divided mainly into two classes: -
(1) Internal Factors and (2) External Factors. And India is no exception for this
classification. India’s foreign policy is influenced by these two classes of determinants
which are as follows:-

3.1. Internal Factors

3.1.1. Geography
Geography has always been an important factor among the internal determinants of
foreign policy. Even according to some scholars this factor influences the main activities
of a nation. In contemporary context, it can be said that geography in itself is not helpful
or contrary factor but human beings may take its benefits through their activities.
Geography plays an important role in formulation of India’s foreign policy. Size,
topography, boundaries, population, climate, temperature, water resources, soil etc all are
included in geography. But in Indian context mainly three factors--- (1) geographical
position, (2) size, and (3) boundaries are prominent to show its influence.
India’s geographical position provides it an important place in international and regional
context but at the same time creates a sense of insecurity also. In the north, mountain
range like Himalaya and in the south, Indian Ocean makes India strategically insecure.
India’s geographical position has influenced it from ancient to the modern period. In
ancient period, India, on the one hand, has to face attacks through Khyber Pass in North
West, and simultaneously, on the other hand, it succeeded in expanding its culture and
religion in Tibet, China, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and South East Asia without fighting any
war. In the medieval period, due to the same reasons, it had to face invaders in North
West, and consequently, the whole sub-continent slipped into the grip of Islam. In the
modern times, due to insecure sea routes, India had to struggle against various European
imperialistic powers. And finally, India falls under the British Empire, and remained a
colony for around 200 years. Even after the World War-II, it got trapped in military
alliances due to cold war politics of America and Soviet Union. There has been a negative
impact on India’s security due to the Diego Garcia military base of America. In
contemporary circumstances after the end of the cold war, the political disturbance in
Pakistan & Afghanistan, and religious extremism in republics of Central Asia have
influenced the India’s foreign policy in a clear cut way.
The size of a country also plays an important role in determination of its foreign policy.
India has 3.27 million square kilometre area which puts India at 7th position in the world.
This is an important position. Its sub-continental form has always been very important in
context of its foreign policy, and still it enjoys the same importance. But it doesn’t mean
that small nations are meaningless in international politics. This kind of generalization is
neither possible nor should be done. But it is also true simultaneously that if the territory
of a large nation is not baron or is not covered by snow; it is directly beneficial to that
nation. In context of India, it can be said that Pakistan or China cannot control it in war. Its
larger size has helped it, at least, to become a great regional power, if not a world power.
Boundaries of nations also play an important role in geographical situations. India has a
geographical position through which it has a direct relation with its seven neighbours---
Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Bhutan, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh. With some other
countries like---Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Maldives etc---it has a close maritime
boundary. India is facing pressure on its foreign relations since beginning due to the
disputes arising out of the boundaries’ controversies. This problem erupted mainly in
India-Pakistan, India-China and India-Bangladesh contexts. So, here it becomes necessary
to analyse these problems:- (1) Since their birth, India and Pakistan have tense relations as
a result of accession and partition of Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought three wars
(1948, 1965, and 1971) and one warlike dangerous situation in 1999 at Kargil. (2) Also
India-China Border has always been a source of dispute, and finally, resulted in India-
China war in 1962. (3) Boundary and distribution of water resources have been the main
sources of disputes between India and Bangladesh.
Apart from above three borders, we cannot deny the possibility of border disputes in future
between India-Nepal, India-Bhutan, India-Burma, and Maritime border disputes between
India-Sri Lanka, India-Malaysia, and India-Indonesia etc. Hence, it is clear that
geographical situations determined by boundaries between the countries play important
role in the formulation and determination of foreign policy.

3.1.2. Economic Development

After security and sovereignty, economic development has a main contribution in the
foreign policy of a nation. And India is no exception in this regard. After independence,
where national security, sovereignty, unity and integrity of India have been important on
the one hand, economic development, on the other hand, has also been an important aspect
in international relations. Economic aspect is also taken into consideration while
formulating the foreign policy. Hence, economic development has always been an
important aspect of India’s foreign policy. According to J Bandopadhaya, its impact can
be evaluated through the study of three main key points. These are: (1) National Power
Capability, (2) Development Techniques, and (3) Diplomacy of Development. The
detailed study of these three factors throws light on the impact on foreign policy.
National Power Capability: There are three factors to know the national power capability
of a nation: (i) Population, (ii) Natural Resources, and (iii) technical Knowledge.
Population is the first main factor having an important impact on foreign policy of a
nation. In Indian context, larger size of population bears an important influence. Its larger
population has become a burden for it rather than be useful. Consequently, its foreign
policy has remained under crisis. This situation has made India dependent on great
foreign powers in the matters of foreign capital investment, technical knowledge, military
equipments etc.
Availability of Natural resources is the second main factor in increasing the national
power capability. But this factor alone cannot influence the foreign policy of a nation. It
needs capital, labour, organised techniques, social values etc along with natural resources.
The combination of both of these is available in India. So India has signed various
agreements time to time with different countries for optimum use of these natural
resources.
Technical knowledge is the third main factor responsible for increase in the national power
capability. Today all the countries of the world have to be dependent on each other to get
the technical knowledge for their development. India has been dependent on erstwhile
Soviet Union, Germany, England etc for coal, iron, heavy machinery etc to establish basic
infrastructure for its economy in the early decades. With the passage of time, pressure was
released in above mentioned areas when India got speed of development. Now this
dependence is visible only in the areas like military weapons production, super computer,
cryogenic engine, rocketry and satellite communication system etc.
Development Techniques: Different development techniques are adopted in different
ideologies and systems. In Indian context, development technique works under three main
limitations. These are: (1) Constitution, (2) Role of State, and (3) Ideology of Economic
Development.
As far as constitution is concerned, India has adopted democratic system along with
problems arising out of it. India wants to achieve development under this system in the
short term. So it wants to regulate the resources in such a way that there should not be any
danger to the fundamental rights of individual liberty. In this direction, neither the
necessity of too much foreign assistance and dependence is denied nor can a large portion
of internal resources by a nation either for today or tomorrow be spared for military
investment. Hence, the only nature has changed but demand for external assistance is still
continued in India after the independence. And this has pressurised India’s foreign policy
time to time.
Role of state is the second main limitation to the development techniques adopted by a nation
for economic development. India had to develop itself economically in a time when two
ideologies---capitalism and communism--- were fully propagated and expanded. Hence, India
was in search of such an ideology through which it can develop itself independently by
keeping the limitations of both the ideologies in view. So India has to determine its foreign
policy in context of both these ideologies where, on the one side, it can maintain coordination
between development and justice, development and equality, development and national
honour, and on other side, it can execute the mixed economy successfully.
Selection of ideology for economic development is the third main limitation in this regard. It
has influenced both, the established view of India in international context and its relations
with great powers. If India favoured the democratic set up after independence during the
whole period of cold war, it was only due to the fact that India wanted to get benefit of
cooperation from both the superpowers of that time. Adoption of policies of openness in
economy and liberalization after 1991 were the results of changed international environment.
Diplomacy of Development: Indian diplomacy is determined by keeping in view the short
term and long term objectives of development. In this context, Indian economy has been
influenced by: - (1) security, (2) foreign aid, and (3) foreign trade.
Security of nation is an important investment of India’s foreign policy. When we talk about
security we mean protection of regional as well as internal integrity, political and economic
system and sovereignty. A country like India cannot allocate more than 4 to 5 percent of its
GNP on its military system. Hence, its security from China, Pakistan and other great powers
is not possible through military means only; it has to use its diplomacy also.
Modern world is the world of interdependence. In this context, the situation of a developing
country like India is miserable. It is in dire need of foreign aid for its development. That’s
why it becomes the duty of India’s diplomacy to establish good relations with counties from
which it can get economic help. But before taking any foreign aid, India should keep in mind
its national sovereignty. It is necessary that sources of aid should be numerous because
complete dependence on a single country could be dangerous at any time. Non-aligned policy
of India during cold war, to raise loans from various sources, and to assure both the super
powers that India is not against any one of them etc are some of the things which provide the
clarification and justification of the above said fact.
In modern circumstances India should establish its relations with more and more trade
oriented countries. It is a proven fact that economic aid is not possible for a long time and
without hurdles. So, trade is the best means of political self-dependence of a country. Hence
first, India should conduct its foreign trade in different directions like with great powers;
China, Japan, neighbouring countries and South East. Second, the whole trade is not possible
through roads. So, sea routes, particularly the route of Suez Canal in west and Strait of
Malacca routes in East through Indian Ocean should be adopted. Third, where there is no
possibility of bilateral trade talks, it should be dependent on multilateral trade talks. India has
conducted its trade relations on these three factors since independence.

3.1.3. Political Traditions

The foreign policy of a nation is highly influenced by its political history and traditions. And
this is more suitable for a country like India because it has its own unique culture and a long
history of freedom movement whose influence is clearly visible in India. J.Bandopadhya also
analyses the influence of Indian political traditions in context of five elements. These are: -
ideal thought of politics and power; idealistic view of international politics; opposition to
apartheid and imperialism; capitalist western system; and opposition to communism. If we
see the near past of our culture and analyse the national movement, all the things will be
clearly visualized:- (1) Development of Indian culture and civilization has always been based
on the principle of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbhkam’ (the whole world is a family). (2) India has
been a strong critic of apartheid and imperialism even before the independence because India
has experienced these evils for a long time under British Empire. (3) Influence of Gandhian
philosophy on foreign policy is also clearly visible. The policy of ‘panchsheel’ is an apparent
example of maintaining the relations on this basis among the nations. (4) In the changing
scenario, some other ideologies also influenced the foreign policy of India. Chief among
them are--- Marxism, Democratic Socialism and Realism. Hence, political traditions not only
influenced the foreign policy of some early decades after independence but they have
demonstrated their behaviour also. The impact of not only ancient traditions but of current
political ideologies and circumstances is also clearly visible on determination of India’s
foreign policy.

3.1.4. Domestic Environment

There is a close relation between domestic environment and foreign policy of a country. The
impact of domestic environment on India’s foreign policy is clearly visualised through the
studies of:- (1) Elite Ruling Class, (2) Nation Building Process, (3) Party Structure, (4)
Pressure Groups, and (5) Public Opinion.
India got three-level elite ruling class when India got independence. These were--- congress,
bureaucracy and military. Congress was a blend of people from various classes having
influence of all kinds of ideologies. Hence, it was basically a group based on the process of
consensus which was totally influenced by the experiences of freedom movement. But
contrary to this, bureaucracy and military were appointed by British, and were highly
influenced by them in their working and ideology. As far as bureaucracy was concerned, it
was playing an important role in governance. Military personnel, as far as strategic ideology
was concerned, were dependent on their British experience. Hence, in present context,
foreign policy will acquire new directions through the coordination among political elites,
military and bureaucracy.
India is a country of diversities. That’s why existence of contradictory views is natural. So it
has to be determined through the conduct of foreign policy so that an integrated nation could
be created by removing all the main disparities. India has diversities with regard to
regionalism and casteism. If on one side, these diversities create challenges internally for
Indian political system, at the same time on the other side; these diversities give an indication
of a poor nation externally. If government is capable of tackling these challenges, it can adopt
a strong foreign policy. The clear example of this is witnessed through the prestige of India
regarding its foreign policy during the regimes of Nehru, Shastri and Indira on one side and
V.P. Singh, Chandershekhar, Dev Gowada, Inder Kumar Gujral and Atal Bihari Vajpayi on
the other side.
Though in a parliamentary system like India, the decisions on foreign policy are taken
formally by ruling party in parliament but opposition parties also influence these decisions in
a very strong manner. They do so because they play important role in parliament and have a
special influence on political system. Sometimes the ruling party in itself lacks general
consensus. In multi party system, it becomes necessary for a reasonable foreign policy to be
based on general consensus. The formation of coalition governments so many times in last
two decades (1977, 1980, 1998, 2004 and 2009) and the formation of minority governments
at centre (1989-90, 1990-91, 1991, and 1996) has been the main reason of this. In early years
(1941-67), the reason of following the foreign policy based on general consensus has been
the values of national movement and one party domination system of congress, but in later
years (1967-2010), polarisation of above mentioned politics has influenced the nature of
foreign policy.
There is lack of particular studies on the influence of pressure groups on India’s foreign
policy. Role of pressure groups in Indian political system is not like that of America and
other developed countries but it is in its early age. So, there are no possibilities of having
enough influence on foreign policy also. But the role of business pressure groups like
FICCI and CII has increased after 1991 due to the liberalisation, globalisation and
privatisation of the business. Some other NGOs, friendly associations and MNCs are also
active in the formulation process of India’s economic foreign policy.
Public opinion also exerts influence on foreign policy. But it has less impact. It may be
because of three reasons---backwardness of Indian public in various fields, very few
information about foreign policy and lack of means of communication with people. The
main weakness in this context is to evaluate the public opinion. This function is performed
in India by ‘Institution of Indian Public Opinion’ but in a very limited manner. There is a
need to make it logical and credible. Partially, this function is performed by newspaper
editorials, debates of parliament and public speeches but we can’t be completely confident
about the neutrality and objectivity of these mediums.

3.1.5. Military Capability

Military capability has an important place in the determination of the foreign policy of a
country. But two things must be taken into consideration in this context. First, military
capability is not an independent element in itself but it depends on economic position of a
nation. Second, military power as an authoritative element is important and necessary for
great powers but it is not so in case of a developing country like India. Its main reason is
that India cannot play a strong role on the basis of its military power in the world in
context of great powers. But it has to be dependent on diplomacy up to a large extent. But
it does not mean that military capability has no place in India’s foreign policy. In the
changing global milieu of today where peace establishing has become a difficult task, it
becomes necessary for India to keep sufficient military to secure its national boundaries.
India has very low military budget. Whereas big powers spend 6 to 15 percent of their
national income to increase military capability, India spends less than 2.5 percent. In
comparison to India, its neighbours Pakistan (7%) and China (7-9%) spends more on
defence.
3.1.6. National Character
Up to which extent national character influences the foreign policy is a matter of dispute.
Some scholars believe in the utility of national character. But some other scholars don’t
believe in this view. In fact, when we study the national character as an input for the
foreign policy, it should be based on the approaches of decision makers, ambassadors,
international observers or representatives along with criticisms and realism. In Indian
context, when we talk about this factor, we have to understand the basic aspects of Indian
culture. In our culture the emphasis is laid on God, goodness, badness, religion, social
harmony, unification etc. Hence, the ideas, approaches, criticisms etc coming out of main
currents of culture of any country are reflected through the ideas of policy makers,
ambassadors, representatives and through international issues and conferences.

3.1.7. Personality
Except in the case of some individual dictators, it is very difficult to establish the
individual contribution (national or international) of policy makers in policy determination
in democratic systems. It is true that in some democratic systems if Prime Minister is
politically very strong or having charismatic personality he/she plays an important role in
foreign policy. Beside this, if Prime Minister is politically weak and foreign minister is an
important leader in itself he/she can convert the foreign policy according to national
interest. Lastly, if both are weak leaders and if there is political instability also, the civil
servants will keep their dominance continue in foreign policy. If we see from the above
angle, India’s foreign policy has been influenced basically by the personality of Nehru and
up to some extent by Indira Gandhi. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Rajiv Gandhi, P.V.Narsimha
Rao, Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Bihari Vajpayi and Manmohan Singh have limited
influence on foreign policy while V.P. Singh, Chandershekhar and Devgoda have
negligible. The individual influence of Nehru has been due to his role in the congress.
After Nehru, Indira’s personality exerted a special influence on India’s foreign policy.
Though, five foreign ministers have took the responsibilities of foreign policy during the
first tenure (1966-77) of Indira Gandhi but all those could not influence the decisions of
Indira Gandhi. Lal Bahadur Shastri was not aware about the practice of foreign policy like
Nehru and Indira because his background and environment was quiet different from both
of them. But his contribution regarding foreign policy during his limited tenure of one and
half years has been appreciable. This role of Shastri was not individual based but he was in
favour of such institutional development of foreign policy even after his limited
experience that foreign policy should be formulated under more logical and clear structure
or system so that it can be based on a long term vision. Two things were definitely new
about the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. He was the product of post independence generation
and he was not clearly associated with any particular ideology. He was more close to
western culture due to his education, life style and marriage. Definitely, his foreign policy
was based on ‘world context of Nehru and regional dominance of Indira.’ Governments of
V.P. Singh and Chandershekhar could not perform well due to their short terms. Both the
governments could not pay more attention towards this due to their domestic problems.
The world was witnessing the phase of unimaginable turbulence during the tenure of
Narsimha Rao. The internal economic situation also went very critical. Hence, the process
of economic reforms was initiated as a result of internal economic pressures and
disintegration of USSR. Consequently, some decisions regarding foreign policy were
taken like cooperation with America, look east policy, open market system, joining WTO,
etc. But in all these changes, circumstances played more role than individuals. Devgowda
also lacked the individual influence on foreign policy. There has been a clear influence of
Gujral’s personality on India’s foreign policy. Though his term was also very limited and
he has been a supporter of foreign policies of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. But he exerted his
individual influence in context of changed world. Where on one hand, he maintained a
continuity of India’s position on its nuclear policy, at the same time on the other hand; he
propounded the ‘Gujral Doctrine’ in context of neighbouring countries. Through this
doctrine, India is in favour of maintaining good relations with neighbours by giving them
one sided exemptions. Individual influence of Atal Bihari Vajpayi was also visible in
determination of foreign policy but some pressure of his party’s ideology is also visible at
the same time. Influence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on foreign policy can be
visualised in the context of his policies of liberalisation. And currently, the Prime Minister
Modi is steering the foreign policy of India through his ambitious project ‘Make in India’.
He seems to have a personal impact on the execution of India’s foreign policy.

3.2. External Factors

3.2.1. Regional Environment

The incidents in nearby regions necessarily have a direct influence on the foreign policy of
India. Mutual relations of South Asian countries, reduction of tension in this region, free
from weapons and military alliances, free from outside interventions will have positive
impact while non-cooperation, competition, struggle and cold war will have negative
impact on foreign policy. From this point of view, the role in determining the India’s
foreign policy can be evaluated under the following old and new cooperation and conflicts
of South Asia:-
a) Boundary disputes of India with Pakistan and China.
b) The second most important element, India got from its neighbours in legacy, is an
ethnicity problem. India and Sri Lanka are fighting with the problem of Tamil people since
their independence. The same problem is there due to the refugees of India and
Bangladesh. The Chakama refugees of Bangladesh have created a situation of serious
crises in Tripura.
c) One more important problem is associated with the attitude of small neighbours
towards India. Area, population, military capability, economic changes etc of India are the
symbols of fear for its small neighbours. Its neighbours, particularly small nations, see
these elements as a power of India to dominate the South Asia. Treaties and agreements by
India with these countries time to time have created a doubt in these countries towards the
policies of India for these countries. Beside this, two steps taken by India in near past----
sending of peace forces in Sri Lanka (1987) and military intervention in Maldives (1989)--
--have also proved more clearly India’s image of a country having regional dominance.
The production and use of missiles named ‘Prithavi,’ ‘Agni,’ ‘Akash,’ ‘Nag,’ and ‘Trishul’
under the ‘Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme’ started in 1983 have also
strengthen their perception about India as a power of military intervention.
Along with the above negative attitude about India, there have been some positive
functions also. All these nations have strengthened the position of SAARC together. On
one side, they have prepared a code of conduct for consensus on some matters mutually
for all the nations through various conferences and on the other side; they got important
achievements in the economic field. But it does not mean that regional environment is in
favour of India. There are still many important issues.

3.2.2. International Environment

International political environment is directly associated with the international role of a
nation. If this environment is according to the situations of a country it can play sounder
role on international fronts/platforms. If the environment is against, then such possibilities
become nil. In Indian context, the importance of this factor can be studied in two parts---
(1) Cold War Period (1947-1991) and (2) Post Cold War Period (1992 onwards).
Cold-War Period: As a result of cold war, the era of military alliances started. In this
context, the multilateral alliances by America like----CENTO, SEATO, NATO and
bilateral alliances like—America-Pak Military Alliance (1948) are worth mentioning. But
India wanted to follow the non-aligned policy. India was not interested in joining any
group, and wanted to examine every issue on the basis of its merits and demerits. But both
the superpowers took it in a wrong way in the environment of cold war, and assumed the
India’s foreign policy doubtful. That’s why India has to face a tough struggle and
opposition of great powers while justifying its policy of non-alignment.
Second important event was the militarisation of Indian Ocean. America militarised the
whole area by converting the Diego Garcia as a military base which caused the danger to
the sovereignty and security of newly emerged nations of Indian Ocean. As a result, UN
declared this region as ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’ in 1971 on the initiative of these newly
emerged nations but it could not be actualised till date because of the opposition of the
great powers. All these activities around India became a source of tension for it. Hence,
India will have to struggle tough to liberate this region strategically from the conflict of
superpowers because every event happened in this region was having a direct bearing on
India’s security and sovereignty.
One more important event was the India-Soviet Friendship of 1971. This treaty was signed
in August 1971 on the basis of compulsions of both the countries but basically Former
Soviet Union wanted this kind of alliance with India under Brezhnev’s thinking of
‘collective security in Asia’ which was rejected humbly by India. But it became necessary
keeping in view the entry of refugees from East Pakistan in 1971 and emerging disputes
between both parts of Pakistan. Beside this, the encirclement of India and erstwhile Soviet
Union resulting from the developing alignments of Washington, Islamabad, Beijing and
Tokyo has also been responsible for bringing India and Soviet Union closer. As a result of
this, India-America relations got deteriorated while Pak-America relations became good.
Though this kind of relations remained stable for some time (1975-79) when detente was
witnessed between superpowers. But then new cold war started as a result of Soviet-
Afghan intervention in 1979, and the earlier situation was restored. No special change was
witnessed in this situation due to the cold war and India’s foreign policy received a
setback while establishing the relations with western countries.
During the cold war, particularly after 1970, nuclear proliferation has also influenced the
India’s foreign policy in a big way. The execution of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1971 and India’s refusal to sign it is a main cause of pressure of nuclear powers
on India.
Post-Cold War Period: Though cold war ended as a result of events in Europe (1989-91)
and disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 but still a Justifiable world system, based on
equality and sovereignty for all nations, has not been established. Hence, the negative and
positive aspects of India’s foreign policy, with same nature or changed, still exists. One
chapter, particularly of friendship and treaties, which continued for a longer time (1954-
1991, finished with the disintegration of Soviet Union.
In the post cold war era, there is a situation of detente in the world in general and in the
bilateral relations in particular. In this tension free environment, where on one side, the
peace is established in Cambodia and Philistine, there is unification of Germany also on
the other side (this process is hindered in Korea due to some reasons) but India and
Pakistan have not changed their earlier stands in any way.
End of significance to political issues and preference to economic issues is an important
change in this new world system. Economically sound countries are becoming centres of
main activities. Hence, the direction of foreign policy is decided by international trade,
capital investment, liberalisation, globalisation, expansion of means of communications,
important role of multinational companies, economic reforms etc. India also has to make
basic changes in its foreign policy in this changed scenario.
After the cold war era, India’s foreign policy now has started taking special interest in the
long ignored sector. Hence, the foreign policy after 1991 can be termed as ‘stress towards
East.’ Under this, the main attraction of India’s foreign policy is South East Asia along
with Japan, Taiwan, Korea etc. This region under the new world system has become most
important for India due to the strategic, trade and political reasons.

3.2.3. International Organisations

Transformation of world through international organisations has a direct relation with
India’s foreign policy. If we see the political traditions of India, we will come to know that
these have been in favour of establishing a peaceful, non violent and equitable world
structure. Beside this, there is coordination between the values of India’s freedom
movement and the objectives of United Nations. India has been a continuous partner in the
activities of international organisations in the context of its national interests and has
always been in a leading role. Though India tried always to play a neutral and objective
role in UN but great powers opposed this and denied many times to discuss the important
issues raised by India by saying that India is a satellite state.
Above situation continued in post-cold war era also. Only the issues of debate have
changed. The Gulf war has posed the question mark on UN. Beside this, it is now open
that use of Part VII (coercive methods) of UN is increasing instead of Part VI (peaceful
means). It means Security Council has become more important than General Assembly.
Hence, the demand for democratisation of Security Council raised by India is justified and
sound. But it looks impossible to attract the attention of five permanent members having
veto power towards this issue.

4. Conclusion
Hence, it can be said that foreign policy of a nation is determined and decided by various
factors. These factors may be classified into the category of internal and external, human
and non-human, permanent and temporary etc. Foreign policy is the result of interactions
among these factors. We cannot give more importance to one element in comparison to
others. In fact, all the elements have equal importance. These factors cannot be
generalized on the basis of their importance. But it is certain that these factors influence
the process either collectively or individually. The formulation of a meaningful foreign
policy is possible only on the correct and logical evaluation of these factors. It is clear
from the above discussion that India has tried to utilise all these factors efficiently in its
favour but sometimes circumstances have played negative role. Being a victim of colonial
rule and having the limitations of a developing country, the track record of India in
utilising these elements in formulation and execution of its foreign policy has been
appreciable.