TRIBALS, BATTLES

AND DARINGS
TRIBALS, BATTLES
AND DARINGS
The Genesis of the Modern Destroyer

ALEXANDER CLARKE

Foreword by Andrew Lambert FKC

 This book is dedicated to the three guiding lights of my childhood, my
grandfather who taught me to think, my father who taught me to question
and my mum who taught me to speak out about what I believe to be right.

Copyright © Alexander Clarke 2021

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by

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 CONTENTS

Foreword 6
Preface 7
1 The Royal Navy of the 1930s 8
2 Forged by War 1939–40 30
3 A Different and Not So Different
Kind of War 1941–2 47
4 Cometh the War, Cometh the ‘Battle’ 65
5 The Shield and the Cannon 1943–5 95
6 To the East and the War is Over 117
7 The Lessons and Legacy of the
‘Back Pocket Cruisers’ 138
Notes 158
Bibliography 164
Index 174
 FOREW0RD
This is a book about options and choices in defence policy-making, about
individuals who made a difference, how decisions are tested in war, and
how far it is possible to anticipate future trends. These issues retain their
relevance today, long after these large mid-century destroyers have passed
into history. As I write this foreword a new HMS Defender has just con-
ducted a hugely significant Freedom of Navigation Operation off the coast
of the Crimea, an operation that was made credible by the impressive ca-
pabilities of the ship. Such diplomatic missions provide an alternative high-
light of this book, emphasising how destroyers were brought into the full
spectrum of peacetime maritime operations at a time when the overall size
of the fleet was restricted by international agreements, as well as budgetary
pressures. In a world dominated by images, their presence was enhanced
by aesthetic design, the architectural languages of power and speed em-
phasising national strength.
Alex Clarke demonstrates that the ‘Tribal’ class were always intended
to be something more than simply larger destroyers, taking up specific roles
in fleet and aircraft carrier operations, as well as fulfilling detached missions
as cruiser substitutes. They had achieved an esprit de corps befitting these
enhanced roles before the outbreak of war in 1939, in part through their
constant presence in the combat zone, their capabilities, and the outstand-
ing personnel who manned and commanded them. The cost was high,
three-quarters of the Royal Navy ‘Tribals’ were sunk in action, the others
survived serious damage and continued in front-line service across six
years. Their success had already prompted thinking about a follow-on class
that would become the ‘Battles’, a design that evolved as the experience of
war emphasised new threats from the air, threats that demanded new
weapons and sensors, and ultimately evolved into the Daring class, the last
gun-armed destroyers, which left a powerful legacy of names and battle
honours for the new Type 45s.

Andrew Lambert FKC

Laughton Professor of Naval History, King’s College London.

6
 PREFACE
This book describes the conception and evolution, through inter-war ten-
sions, global war and the later post-war years of Cold War hostility, of the
Royal Navy’s large fleet destroyers, their ‘back pocket cruisers’. The
‘Tribal’, ‘Battle’ and Daring classes provided the Royal Navy with a sig-
nificant portion of both their naval fighting and naval diplomatic capability
sets for one of the most critical periods in its, and the nation’s, history. They
did this not only by design and construction, but also by culture, not just
by image, but also by service. They were very much ships of their era, but
they also provided the roots for the capabilities and capacities which are
looked for in current and future destroyer construction.

7
 CHAPTER 1

THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

The desperate hunt for Bismarck was over, and the At- pany this tricky operation coincided with an hour-long
lantic had swallowed the physical remnants of the lull in the bombing.4 The ordeal was not yet over, how-
anger, fear and vengeance which the episode had cre- ever. Demonstrating the toughness of design and con-
ated. The ‘Tribal’ destroyers Tartar and Mashona were struction that was a ‘Tribal’ trait, Mashona remained
making their way home at the most economical speed, doggedly afloat. In fact, after Tartar had missed her with
trying to eke out their precious remaining fuel. It was a torpedo, it was left to two more destroyers (Sherwood,
at this precarious time the ships were discovered, south- a ‘Clemson/Town’ class Lend-Lease destroyer, and
west of Ireland, by a roaming Focke-Wulf 200 Condor.1 HMCS St Claire, a ‘Wickes/Town’ class Lend-Lease
Soon after this sighting, Heinkel He 111 bombers ap- destroyer) which had joined them, to sink Mashona
peared and started attacking; waves of aircraft tried and with gunfire.5
failed to hit the already exhausted ships, but sometimes Such an end was not unusual for this class. Mashona
it can take just one lucky, or in this case unlucky, bomb. was the fourth of thirteen ‘Tribal’ destroyers that would
be lost in the Second World War. This was out of the
Perhaps the Middle Bomb in one stick [of bombs] twenty-three of the class completed in time to serve in
had a bent fin. It seemed to wobble a bit as it fell. the conflict.6 Notably, the twelve Royal Navy ‘Tribals’
That one did not miss. It struck Mashona’s port side sunk were all lost in the war’s most desperate days, be-
abreast the fore funnel, penetrated No. 1 boiler room tween 1940 and 1942.7 They were hard-fighting ships
and exploded there, blowing a huge hole in the side. and, in a strange way, the losses were due to them being
No. 2 boiler room bulkhead held and shoring up such good ships. As a well-balanced, capable design,
began, but nothing could be done with the forward manned by personnel who considered themselves an
bulkhead – it looked like a lace curtain.2
Afridi, first of the class, looking resplendent in a Mediterranean Fleet
This was not the end of the attacks. Despite valiant ef- white inter-war paint scheme. White was chosen because it was felt
forts to keep the ship fighting and, most importantly, to have an impressive and positive impact (from the British Govern-
afloat, after 45 minutes their captain, Commander ment’s perspective) on viewers of the ship, especially if kept pristine;
Selby, was forced to concede defeat.3 They abandoned it was also considered beneficial for the crew as in hot climates it re-
ship and transferred to Tartar; luckily for the ship’s com- flected the heat. (Drachinifel Collection)
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

Somali on 24 August 1937, the day of her launch, showing how height of the war, but completed too late to be of much
much work is left to be done. (Drachinifel Collection) use in it, they would provide the Navy with much
needed ‘muscle’ in the financially stringent post-war
era. This class was most definitely a transitional class.
elite coterie (in the traditions of the Royal Navy, destroyer It was the Daring class, the post-war successors, that
crews considered themselves far more select than those would really take on and exemplify the lessons of the
of the battleships), they were regularly chosen for dif- ‘Tribal’ class in their construction. All this was far in
ficult operations; and even more so when there was a the future at the time ‘Tribals’ were first mooted as a
shortage of ships. The ‘Tribals’ were risked again and concept, let alone designed or ordered.
again.8 Eventually, their luck had to run out. This, By the mid-1930s the Admiralty, and other depart-
though, was their wartime fate; the ‘Tribals’, and the ments of the British Government such as the Foreign
role they were intended for, were conceived in peace- and Cabinet Offices, were having to confront the fact
time.9 Different factors hold sway in war and peace and that they had fewer warships to meet the same, arguably
peace tends to bring with it far closer scrutiny of value greater, level of commitment than before the First
for money than wartime fighting capability. World War. After the war the Navy had evaluated its
As they proved themselves in service and their luck operational needs, assessing a requirement for seventy
started to run out, their image gave birth to the first of cruisers in order to fulfil its peacetime duties.10 How-
their successors, the ‘Battle’ class. Conceived at the ever, due to international treaties, financial constraints
and the requirements of maintenance, it never really
Aisne, one of the 1943 Batch of ‘Battle’ class destroyers. This 1947 had more than fifty-five available during the period.11
picture illustrates the lines that exemplified the ‘Battle’ class’s shape A shortage made much more difficult by the fact that
and purpose. (Maritime Quest) by 1936 only twenty-three of these could be called

9
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

‘modern’.12 As part of the solution to this problem the 2. Vessels which cause the total tonnage in any cat-
Navy designed and built the ‘Tribal’ class destroyers, a egory to exceed the figures given in the foregoing
class specifically intended as general-purpose ships able table shall be disposed of gradually during the
to undertake both cruiser and destroyer duties. Al- period ending on the 31st December, 1936.
though not as good as purpose-built vessels for special- 3. The maximum number of cruisers of sub-
ist roles, they were designed to be ‘good enough’ and category (a) shall be as follows: for the United
as such provide much of the required capability where States, eighteen; for the British Commonwealth of
and when needed.13 The coming of the Second World Nations, fifteen; for Japan, twelve.
War would prove the worth of this concept and, as has 4. In the destroyer category not more than sixteen
been said already, the class were to become heavily re- per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be em-
lied upon. The beginning, however, was less certain. ployed in vessels over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric
tons) standard displacement. Destroyers com-
The London Naval Treaty of 1930 – pleted or under construction on the 1st April,
Origin of the ‘Super-Destroyer’ 1930, in excess of this percentage may be re-
When the ‘Tribals’ were conceived in the mid-1930s, tained, but no other destroyers exceeding 1,500
naval construction was limited by a series of naval ar- tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement
mament treaties, agreements that were negotiated be- shall be constructed or acquired until a reduction
tween the major powers to prevent another naval arms to such sixteen per cent. has been effected.
race such as that which had preceded and, arguably, 5. Not more than twenty-five per cent of the allowed
contributed to the First World War. Starting with the total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted
Washington Treaty of 1922, and followed by the 1930 with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft.
and 1936 London Naval Treaties, limits were set for 6. It is understood that the submarines referred to in
both the total tonnage of each category of ship and the paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 will be counted as
size of each vessel within that tonnage. Under the Wash- part of the total submarine tonnage of the High
ington Treaty the Navy had accepted theoretical parity Contracting Party concerned.
with the United States Navy (USN), although it was 7. The tonnage off any vessels retained under Article
only qualitative parity in terms of cruisers and de- 13 or disposed of in accordance with Annex II to
stroyers. With Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the First Lon- Part II of the present Treaty shall not be included
don Treaty this was extended to quantitative limitations in the tonnage subject to limitation.
as well, the USN being allowed to put more tonnage to-
wards heavy cruisers, while the Royal Navy allotted The reason the Navy wanted more light cruisers, and
more to light cruisers, a compromise which might seem had been willing to sacrifice heavy cruisers for them,
strange, but for which the Navy had good reasons.14 was to try to build enough ships to secure the stability
of the British Empire in peacetime, let alone in the face
Article 16 of the 1930 London Naval Treaty of war. Cruisers were cornerstones of imperial pres-
1. The completed tonnage in the cruiser, destroyer ence, both in terms of policing and security, fulfilling
and submarine categories which is not to be ex- the duties of everything from local crisis response force
ceeded on the 31st December, 1936, is given in to heavyweight diplomatic intervention. They could, in
the following table. the passage of a week, let alone a month, conduct

Categories United States British Commonwealth Japan

of Nations
Cruisers
(a) With guns of more than 180,000 tons 146,800 tons 108,400 tons
6.1in (155mm) calibre (182,880 metric tons) (149,149 metric tons) (110,134 metric tons)

(b) With guns of 6.1in 143,500 tons 192,200 tons 100,450 tons
(155mm) calibre or less (145,796 metric tons) (195,275 metric tons) (102,057 metric tons)

Destroyers 150,000 tons 150,000 tons 105,500 tons

(152,400 metric tons) (152,400 metric tons) (107,188 metric tons)

Submarines 52,700 tons 52,700 tons 52,700 tons

(53,543 metric tons) (53,543 metric tons) (53,543 metric tons)

10
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

counter piracy operations, find a lost merchant ship, total allowed destroyer tonnage for vessels of up to
exchange words with the cruiser of another imperial 1,850 tons. Theoretically, these larger ships were to act
power and host an event for indigenous and colonial as the flag vessel, the ‘Leader’, for each destroyer flotilla;
leaders. All this had to be catered for within any design at least that is what had been stated at the conferences
as well as fighting requirements. which produced the treaties. Destroyers had proved an
Working with a £10,000 per ton, or less, budget per essential offensive weapon in the First World War, and
ship was no easy task, particularly as the American and at the Battle of Jutland and in countless other engage-
Japanese navies did not have these pressures and could, ments in which they had been involved; evidence of
unlike the Admiralty, afford to focus their ships solely their potential impact had grown. The definition ‘de-
on fighting a Pacific war. The Navy might fight in the stroyer leader’ presented a potential opportunity, but
Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, or the Mediterra- the problem was that by using this destroyer tonnage
nean Sea, anywhere or everywhere else, and they had for a cruiser role, if done badly, it could decisively
to serve and protect a global empire; and all this with weaken one of the fleet’s most capable offensive
ships that could displace no more than those of their weapons.
potential opponents, and were to be limited in number. The conundrum was how to strike a balance be-
Politically, perhaps even strategically, it can be argued tween the roles. Cruisers were the general-purpose
the naval treaties made good sense. If they had not it is ships, capable of carrying out all missions, and pri-
doubtful that Britain would have hosted two of the marily relying upon guns for fighting. In contrast de-
three conferences that mediated them. Practically stroyers, the offensive tools, were built around their
though, for the Navy, they were a constant source of array of torpedoes. This did not mean that their guns
frustration. This frustration had a name, the ‘cruiser were not important. They were also expected to ‘act de-
gap’, and was the difference between the seventy ships fensively’ against their counterparts, so carried quick-
that the Navy defined as necessary for peacetime firing guns for that role, but these guns were very much
missions and the fifty-five they could actually call upon. the secondary system of the traditional destroyer. So
However, the 1930 treaty, specifically Article 16.4, also much so that the guns fitted were often single mounts,
provided an opportunity, with the newly defined cat- and in some designs even without shields to protect the
egory of ‘Destroyer Leader’.15 crews who served them.
Whilst other destroyers were limited to 1,500 tons, The ‘Tribal’ class design was to be a balance, a com-
each signatory was permitted to use 16 per cent of their promise, between these two roles. Their guns would be,
by necessity, the core of their armament and their fight-
Dainty as built. Like the ‘Battle’ and ‘Tribal’ class, if viewed from ing capability, unlike any other destroyer then in British
ahead at a distance she could well be confused for a cruiser, with service. More than this, however, their design would
the imposing height and shaping of the superstructure. (Drachinifel have to be that of a cruiser in shrunken form, meaning
Collection) they would cost more than an ordinary destroyer, but
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

less than a cruiser (especially in terms of ‘tonnage’), if mander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Sir William
they were to maintain enough of the destroyer capabil- Wordsworth Fisher, than the C-in-C Home Admiral Sir
ities to enable them to operate alongside their more William Boyle, 12th Earl of Corke and Orrery, or the
conventional counterparts. And it was understood from C-in-C China Station, Admiral Sir Fredric Dreyer.19
the beginning that the crews of these ships would need The Mediterranean Staff may have had their case par-
to live up to this hybrid nature. As a result the ‘Tribal’ tially undermined by the fact they complained a lot
class were, right from the start, treated as an elite group. about the potential sea-keeping of the vessels, yet the
This was a conscious attempt to retain their offensive Home Fleet and the China Station which were, and
nature in the face of their less traditionally offensive de- would be, the operational commands with rougher seas
stroyer form, through the encouragement and gener- did not.20
ation of ‘spirit’. This aim was helped by the fact that Admiral Fisher and his staff were most definitely not
their design, despite not being traditional destroyer, was supportive of the concept of a general-purpose de-
very striking. They had a presence which resonates even stroyer. They were more concerned with size in their
in photographs today, but which mattered even more analysis of what was needed for the cruiser role in gen-
at the time. Nothing illustrates this better than the im- eral, and a Rear Admiral, Destroyers, flagship in par-
pression of the then Sub-Lieutenant Ludovic Kennedy ticular.21 The response did not stop there, it went much
on seeing Tartar for the first time, during the Second further, for it provided a wide-ranging overview of his
World War. opinions on both Admiralty and Government policy.
This was further supplemented by attached supporting
When T–– returned to harbour I packed my few be- documents from his Vice Admiral and the Rear Ad-
longings, said good-bye to my hosts and to Able Sea- miral, Destroyers, of the Mediterranean Fleet. The
man Kelly, whom I happened to pass on the latter post was held, at the time, by Andrew Cunning-
quarterdeck, and climbed down the gangway to the ham, or ABC as he was known, who would command
boat. I saw my ship for the first time alongside an the Mediterranean Fleet for many of its successes dur-
oiler. She was a fine-looking vessel, with sloping ing the war. Their view could best be summarised as
bows and gracious lines. Her main armament of 4.7- destroyers were to be destroyers, cruisers were to be
inch guns stood out boldly against the evening sky; cruisers, and that the Navy needed to match design and
the White Ensign fluttered at her mainmast. I construction with others of the types and not deviate.22
thanked God then that I had not been appointed to The major criticism was that the proposed ship would
a drifter or a trawler as many of my messmates at not be as good for either air defence or as a pure air de-
King Alfred and Portsmouth had been. Here was a fence ship, as good at destroyer work as a regular de-
ship built to attack. Here were power and majesty stroyer, or as good in a cruiser role as a conventional
and beauty; sleek, sharp lines and wicked-looking cruiser; they would not be as good as three specialist
guns; bows which could cut through the water like vessels.
scissors through paper; a streamlined bridge from This was an interesting response considering that the
which to command, and to control the power of study had arisen because the Navy was already bucking
forty-four thousand horse. Amidships were the tubes the trend established in other navies by the treaties.
housing the ‘tin fish,’ those sinister weapons which Their preference for light cruisers over heavy cruisers,
speed through the water at forty knots and approach their negotiations and the reworking of the treaties to
their target unseen, and often unheard.16 allow the shifting of tonnage from one category to the
other, are all testimony to how far the Navy was pre-
Conception, Design and Construction pared to go. The response from the Admiralty to Fisher
The actual design study which led to the development is therefore unsurprising. They latched on to his words,
of the ‘Tribals’ was initiated in 1933 by the then Third using them to define more clearly what they were look-
Sea Lord and Controller, Admiral Sir Charles M ing for. Furthermore, their discussion of roles shows
Forbes, looking for a new light cruiser.17 However, it that the priority of the Admiralty was very different to
did not get far and it was under his successor, Vice Ad- that of Fisher’s almost First World War style analysis.23
miral Sir Reginald G H Henderson, that the study bore Curiously, Henderson did not write a long riposte to
fruit, first with the ‘Tribal’ class ‘super-destroyers’ (re- the points of Fisher as the assistant Chief of the Naval
ferred to as ‘V’ class Leader in the study) and then the Staff and others had done.
Dido class cruisers.18 Possibly this was because Hender- Henderson did not even discuss the proposed 4,500-
son took less notice of the responses of the Com- ton design option which would have required precious

12
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

cruiser tonnage. Instead he gives, in his words, ‘some rier design) but on destroyer design they were in ac-
notes on certain material questions arising out of these cord. Henderson supplied the vision and political ma-
papers,’ and writes one word, ‘Noted’, plus his signa- noeuvres, while Goodall provided the detail and
ture, which he ascribes to all his points, and in other engineering ingenuity, and both were equally com-
papers that is his only response when no more is mitted to the personal responsibility and investment
needed.24 The reason for the ‘noted’ this time, was more in their designs. Goodall was a critical voice when
to highlight to other, subsequent, readers of the file that Henderson was fighting the Whitehall battles, often
he, Henderson, had seen and read this – but it does not providing the key data and technical know-how to off-
have a bearing on his opinion. His more detailed re- set some of the more particular comments on man-
sponses are exemplified by that discussing anti-aircraft ning, layout and displacement. In the late 1930s their
fire control: ‘A form of H.A. control suitable for small partnership dominated naval ship design and would
vessels is to be tested in a sloop of the 1934 pro- define the debates on it for next two decades. They
gramme, but its use when there is considerable motion were, in large part, responsible for the decisions which
on the ship will be very limited until some form of sta- shaped the Navy not just at the beginning of the war
bilisation is in sight’.25 but, because of their part in creating its foundations,
In effect, he was pointing out where the Mediterra- for the whole of its duration and even afterwards into
nean Fleet officers had put forward excellent ideas, but the post-war years.
also showing how disconnected they were from current The Navy was not necessarily aiming to build up to
technological developments, and subtly emphasising the limit of the treaties for individual ships. Instead, it
that their less suitable ideas were not practicable. Hen- was aiming to build up to the limit of the total tonnage.
derson could afford to employ a minimalist response This was because the Navy was more focussed on the
because he had won. As the whole of the ADM 1/8828 role, rather than the competition, especially when it
file illustrates, Henderson had won because he and his came to wartime reconnaissance and peacetime pres-
staff in the Controller’s office had amassed a huge ence. In fact, it is arguable the decision had more to do
amount of detail and information. In 1934 he was esti- with peace and its preservation, through deterrence
mating the cost of the ‘V’ class Leader at £480,000, an rather than war. Fisher and the Mediterranean Staff
estimate that was within 7 per cent of the final revised would appear to have ascribed to the philosophy of the
and modified design.26 Italian fleet of the time: that what mattered were
More than this, however, Henderson won because numbers and strength on paper, not what was actually
whilst Fisher had read, and even quoted from state- built. The Admiralty favoured a peace through presence
ments and publications of the Lords of the Admiralty, approach, believing it was necessary to build the best
he had not understood that their interpretation of their ships they could, in order to project ‘real’ capability.
meaning, and their strategic perspective, might be dif- This meant fewer ships could be built on the allow-
ferent from his own. This lack of comprehension of the ances, as ‘real’ capability required ‘real’ tonnage. Put
direction of the Navy might also explain why Fisher, another way, in peacetime the Admiralty wanted to be
when stepping down in 1936, unusually after perform- spread across the world, so they could prevent or shape
ing so well in the premier role of C-in-C Mediterra- a potential conflict by presence; in wartime they wanted
nean, did not go on to the Admiralty. As a result, to find and destroy the enemy as quickly as possible.
Admiral Ernle Chatfield, who had become First Sea Both goals required quality every bit as much as quan-
Lord in 1933 at the age of 60, stayed in post. He was tity. It is no surprise, therefore, that in 1936 the Tactical
succeeded in 1938 by Admiral Sir Roger Blackhouse, School, an advanced training unit based at Greenwich
former C-in-C Home Fleet, and in 1939 by Admiral Naval Academy which was used almost as in-house
Sir Dudley Pound, following his three years as the C- think tank, summed up the intended combat roles of
in-C Mediterranean. Fisher was instead given com- the ‘Tribal’ class as:
mand of Portsmouth and died aged 62 in 1937 after a
year in post. used to supplement cruisers in reconnaissance and
Through all this Henderson was supported by Sir screening duties, including screening aircraft-
Stanley Vernon Goodall, the Director of Naval Con- carriers, and as support for the destroyers in opening
struction and the Navy’s most senior architect. Goo- the way for torpedo attack: they may also be used for
dall’s responses were often far more verbose than shadowing at night and to supplement the anti-
Henderson’s and they certainly did not always see eye aircraft fire of battleships, one ‘Tribal’ forming astern
to eye (they had very strong written disputes on car- of each battleship when air attack is anticipated.27

13
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

They would be not only a light cruiser substitute, they it transpired the ‘Tribal’ class was also cost efficient, a
would also be the spiritual successors of the First World crucial factor in ship procurement due to the Treasury’s
War Harwich Force, which had made its name in the peacetime pre-eminence.34
bitter fights between the light forces that had contested The cost efficiency is highlighted by the fact that, de-
the North Sea.28 The institutional memory of this force, spite changes in design introduced by war and the dif-
and the near-mythological status it had achieved, com- fering batches, the twenty-seven ‘Tribal’ class vessels
bined with very detailed post-war analysis, was influen- were procured for an average unit price of £513,412
tial at every step of the design process that aimed to (based on a cumulative class cost of £13,862,133).35
fulfil the uniquely British need for which the ‘Tribals’ Whilst costly in comparison with other contemporary
were designed.. destroyer classes of the time (the 1939 ‘K’ class de-
Traditionally, British ship design developed in re- stroyer averaged around £500,000), they were in fact
sponse to ship design of other countries, and this was exceptional value for money given that they were in ef-
the case with ‘super destroyers’, designed for the tradi- fect acting as substitutes for light cruisers. The contem-
tional destroyer roles. In contrast, ‘Tribals’ were seen as porary Dido class light cruisers cost £1,480,000 each.36
‘force multipliers’ to enable the Navy not only to secure It becomes an even clearer bargain when considering
Britain’s global trade, but also to provide the primary the cost of Sikh, the twelfth ‘Tribal’ class destroyer to
defence of the British Empire. There were constant dif- be built, and the cheapest at £510,046. She was pro-
ficulties finding enough ships to cover all areas and, cured as part of the 1936 programme, and ordered
when comparing numbers to stated requirements, re- from Alexander Stephen and Sons on the Clyde in
sulted in shortages in nearly every classification, for Glasgow.37 Built within fifteen months and commis-
example the fifty-five rather than seventy cruisers being sioned within twenty-five, she was astonishing value for
just one of many such examples. money considering her career would include facing
Not only a shortage of cruisers worried the Navy, down an Italian battleship, the Littorio, as well as taking
but the viability of their destroyers in fleet actions was a leading role in the sinking of two Italian cruisers in
also a concern. Designed to attack enemy surface ships 1941 at the Battle of Cape Bon, all many times her size
by mass attack with torpedoes, they would be of little and cost.
use if a lack of gun support from accompanying Displacement was in line with the treaty maximum
cruisers resulted in their elimination before they could (1,850 tons), but eventually varied between 1,959 tons
launch those torpedoes, or if they were split up to pro- (standard) and 2,519 tons (deep).38 As such they ex-
vide air defence pickets on ‘no fly days’ and so were un- ceeded by a margin the treaty regulations which had
able to mass for an attack.31 The reconnaissance helped create them, although by the time of their launch
role/picket duty of the ‘Tribals’ allowed the flotilla de- those treaties were hardly worth the paper they were
stroyers to be kept together. Furthermore, with their written on. They were a good size for a destroyer hull,
gun armament they would provide the necessary cover with a length of 377ft, a beam of 36ft 6in, and a draft
for any attack those destroyers mounted. They were in of 11ft 3in. The hull was powered by three Admiralty
effect the ‘meat’ of the Destroyer Leader role, without 3-drum boilers driving, via turbines, two geared shafts.
in theory their broader command duties, although as This arrangement developed 44,000 HP and enabled
will be seen they also took on those tasks.32 the class to reach 36 knots whilst also having a range of
First put forward as part of the 1935 proposals, there 5,700 nautical miles at 15 knots.39 This turn of speed
were two batches of ‘Tribal’ class which, whilst sharing beat the top speed of Arethusa and Dido class light
a basic design and layout, differed in armament and cruisers by at least four knots.40 Their top speed was in
crew.33 Although there was still some opposition, Vice line for destroyers, while their endurance, the defining
Admiral Henderson navigated the class through all the quality of cruisers, was satisfactory.41 The ‘Tribal’ en-
necessary procedures in good time and the first flotilla durance was slightly better than other destroyer classes
was ordered in 1936. The sixteen originals were the and proportionally comparable to the Arethusa (6,500
Navy’s own two flotillas, which was the maximum nautical miles at 16 knots) and the Dido (5,500 nautical
under treaty allowances, though the treaty system was miles at 16 knots).42 Nonetheless, the ‘Tribal’ class was
unravelling as they were being built. These were not the still felt to be underpowered by some officers and cer-
only members of the class. Eleven modified ‘Tribal’ tainly suffered from strain because of the constant high
vessels were ordered in 1940, eight for the Royal Ca- speed operations that wartime imposed on them.43
nadian Navy (RCN) and three for the Royal Australian In line with the requirement to provide gun support
Navy (RAN). As well as having the desired capability, to the flotilla destroyers the original design as built in-

14
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

cluded eight twin QF (Quick Firing) 4.7in Mk XII guns engaging S-boats and Italian MAS torpedo boats. As
in four CP twin Mk XIX mountings; the volume of fire destroyers, and especially smaller craft, were still often
provided by eight 4.7in guns was considered preferable conned from open bridges, even a well-aimed 4in gun
when engaging other light forces to fewer slower firing, could cause significant damage to the fighting ability of
heavier weapons. To supplement these weapons for an enemy ship. This easy transition was in contrast to
anti-aircraft defence they were initially fitted with a other pre-war destroyer classes, which often lost their
single quadruple QF 2pdr on a Mk VII* (P) mounting second torpedo mount to provide room for the in-
and two quadruple QF 0.5in on ‘M’ Mk III mountings; creased AA armament, which meant a 50 per cent re-
but an almost uniform wartime modification was the duction in what was their primary weapon system.
replacement of the ‘X’ mount 4.7in guns by a double However, it was not only weapons that were different
4in AA weapon to increase AA capability.44 The stan- for the ‘Tribal’ class.
dard armament was completed with a single quadruple In line with their multi-role design, the class was
21in torpedo mount and twenty depth charges split fitted with ASDIC (early sonar) to take part in anti-
between a single rack and two throwers.45 The modified submarine (AS) operation as well as operating as di-
designs of the RAN and RCN ‘Tribals’ were slightly rectors for surface and AA operations. The ‘Tribal’ class
less regular. They were of early wartime construction were the first destroyers to be fitted with the ‘Fuze
and fitting was often dependent upon the availability of Keeping Clock Mk II’ analogue fire-control computer
equipment. to enable its AA capabilities.48 This system was the
The ‘Tribal’ design proved both an advantage and a product of a long gestation, with much debate about its
limitation. Its space meant that when it was realised that form and capabilities.49 In simple terms the ‘clock’ was
there had been a navy-wide miscalculation of the nature a modified, arguably more accurate, variant of the sim-
of the air threat it was fixable. The Mk XII mount, the plified version of the High Angle Control System which
class’s primary weapon system, had been designed to had been fitted to the ‘C’ and ‘D’ class destroyers.50
elevate to a maximum of 40°. This was fine for com- The system was designed to improve the quality of
bating low-level bombers, not high enough to deal with the gunnery in both air and surface roles.51 The system
dive bomber attacks. consisted of a director control tower (DCT), contain-
Providentially, for their supporters, the ‘Tribal’ class ing the control officer, his team and the director sight,
proved more adaptable than most, so after Afridi and that would feed data to a transmitting station containing
Gurkha were lost during the Norway Campaign, the the ‘clock’ and range finder.52 The purpose of the ‘clock’
high angle 4.7in twin Mk XIX mounting in ‘X’ position was to calculate the deflection due to movements of
was replaced with the high angle 4in gun mounting for ship, enemy and wind, then to apply other factors such
the rest of the class with no appreciable loss of capabil- as the rate of change, before transmitting all the
ity.46 It is interesting that this change had to be made, required data to the guns to provide them with the best
because no less an advocate than the C-in-C Home possible chance of hitting the target.53 This provided
Fleet in 1934, Admiral Sir William Boyle, made his only the ‘Tribal’ class with arguably the best targeting sol-
major comment on the theoretical design. ution of any destroyer at the time, not only in the Navy,
but possibly in the world.
Whilst there is the necessity that the ‘V’ Leaders
under consideration should have a powerful long Vice Admiral Henderson
range anti-aircraft armament which is clearly recog-
nised, I strongly urge that every consideration should Henderson was a born leader of men, owing nothing
be given to improving the short-range armament as to tradition or rank for his ascendancy over them; it
well. This is particularly necessary to assist in repel- was a matter of personality with him. He was never
ling aircraft torpedo and dive-bombing attacks.47 bound by routine or convention if he saw advantage
to the Service in departure from them; he had an
It had not been fitted before, because the Navy felt it original mind, great ability and quickness of grasp,
was deploying enough AA armament with the pom- but was impatient of any suggestion of formalism or
pom and the heavy machine guns. Interestingly, it was red tape, so that his methods were often unorthodox;
also noted at the time that the change was potentially but they always justified themselves.54
beneficial for more than just an anti-aircraft role. Whilst
it represented a reduced ability against bigger ships, the So went the obituary issued by the Institution of Naval
rapid fire nature of the 4in gave it an advantage when Architects, and it must be wondered if the Vice Presi-

15
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

mirals, Sir Reginald Friend Hannam Henderson and

Sir William Hannam Henderson. Thus there were three
admirals in two generations, all of whom would have an
impact on the Navy. With both a father and uncles in
the service it is only really surprising that Henderson’s
older brother, Henry May Henderson, had not pre-
ceded him when he joined Britannia as a naval cadet in
1895.
Seven years later, in 1902 Henderson was appointed
sub-lieutenant and posted to the Myrmidon class de-
stroyer Syren. In 1911, at the age of 30, he married the
28-year-old Islay Campbell, with whom he had two
sons. In an age when officers often found the require-
ments of service at odds with family life, this sets him
apart. In 1913 he took part in the naval mission to
Greece, following which he was made a commander
and second-in-command of the battleship Erin (ordered
by, but never delivered to, Turkey), and in which he
served aboard at the Battle of Jutland. Following Jut-
land, Henderson was posted to the Admiralty, and took
part in the Battle of the Atlantic, during which he car-
ried out a critical analysis to make the case for the adop-
tion of convoys, which would be so crucial in winning
that contest.
After the war he was posted as chief of staff to the
Commander of the China Station, Admiral Alexander
Duff, where he remained until taking up a post at the
Greenwich Naval Academy in 1923. This was in many
ways another excellent post for an officer on the rise.
In 1926 he received his first real brush with naval avi-
ation, commanding the carrier HMS Furious before, in
1928, acceding to that most political of postings, Aide-
de-Camp to King George V. In 1931 he was promoted
Admiral R G H Henderson as pictured in his Obituary from the 1939 Rear Admiral, becoming the first Rear Admiral Aircraft
Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects (p.348). He was Carriers, and lauded by both the Navy and the Royal
in many ways the architect of not just the Fighting Air Force for his work.55 By 1934 he had had experi-
Destroyer/Cruiser Destroyer or ‘back pocket cruiser’ concept, but ence in destroyers, battleships, cruisers (the main com-
also the wider Royal Navy which would fight the Second World
ponent of the China Station) and naval aviation. He
War, having served as Third Sea Lord & Controller from 1933–9, the
also had Admiralty as well as political experience, and
crucial seven years when the ‘war fleet’ was conceived and com-
menced. (Author’s collection)
he had encountered Britain’s many friends and foes
around the world. Whilst this was not a particularly un-
usual career for an officer of the period, it had prepared
dent of the time, the serving DNC and Henderson’s him exceptionally well for the post in which he was to
colleague and friend, Stanley Goodall, had a hand in be installed.
the writing of it. It was written at the end of his career As Third Sea Lord, Henderson actively thought
of course; it had been very different in the beginning. about how best to sell politically what he needed. This
Then he had the makings of being all about tradition, meant ships would often be promoted as different
routine and convention. Reginald Guy Hannam Hen- things to different audiences, or rather would have dif-
derson was born the son of Commander John Hannam ferent capabilities emphasised, of which the aircraft re-
Henderson and his wife Betsy Ann May in Falmouth, pair ship Unicorn is perhaps the most obvious example.
Cornwall. Henderson’s family connections with the For reasons already discussed, in the 1920s and 1930s
Navy did not stop there, He was a nephew to two ad- the Navy put a lot of effort into planning how to sup-

16
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

port operations a long way from home bases. Oper- tion or secondary carrier in operations. In fact, she
ating, especially on the other side of the world, far from would serve in both the carrier role and support role
the home manufacturing base, meant a lengthy, and during the war, achieving honours in both. Henderson,
therefore dangerous, chain of supply. Anything which however, did not limit his creativity to naval aviation.
reduced the pressure on, or the danger to, the chain The ‘Tribal’ class was, as has already been discussed,
would be beneficial, and Unicorn did both. another prime example of his marketing. There were
She could carry a large quantity of stores, and she other classes too, but just getting ships built was not his
could operate aircraft herself.Yet despite being the fore- only contribution.
runner and template for the light fleet carriers with Henderson was a fact-based thinker, who had real
which the Navy fought the war, she was marketed as practical experience, and he had achieved high office
an ‘FAA support ship’. Everyone outside the Navy was in the Admiralty without abandoning his opinions.
largely sold on her being neither another aircraft carrier Ships built during his tenure all show a focus on rate of
nor an offensive ship, but a support ship. Within the fire over range and an understanding of what was use-
Navy she was certainly sold to some key groups as an ful and what was theoretical. For example, there is no
aircraft carrier, as a ship which either in extremis or point having the extra reach if it cannot be used, and it
through necessity could fulfil the roles of trade protec- becomes a hindrance if it slows down rate of fire at the
ranges for which it will be used. This showed an intu-
Mohawk from bow-on as she makes her way down the slipway itive understanding of something which we are still
during launch on 15 October 1937. This photograph highlights the grappling with today and which has only been growing
hull and especially the bow shaping which had been carefully cali- in magnitude since even before the First World War:
brated to enable both high operational speed and a stable platform what to do when weapon range exceeds information
for the firing of the guns. (Maritime Quest) range, ie target confirmation. What is the point of hav-
ing something which can shoot 50 miles if information
is only available about the first 10 miles? This was es-
pecially a factor in the days before radar, and also in re-
lation to the Navy’s preferred hours of daylight
operation.
Henderson, along with Admiral Chatfield and Ad-
miral Cunningham, had been part of a group of officers
who focused the Navy on night fighting. On realising
that the odds were such that, wherever or whenever war
started, the Fleet would be outnumbered locally, a way
had to be found either to win battles or at least to not
to lose them so badly that the war would also be lost.
The Navy turned to the experience of Jutland, but it
was not the ‘good parts’ which interested them. Instead,
they focussed on the bad: the fact that the Germans had
escaped at night. To the British officers this did not
seem a particularly intelligent move, and it was felt the
German’s had squandered an opportunity because the
Navy was just as bad as the Germans at fighting at
night; and the British had more reason to be careful
when firing as there were more of their own ships to be
accidentally hit. Any Royal Navy admiral in the same
position would have attacked. This was the philosophy
which started guiding British ship design, especially
during Henderson’s tenure: that ships, aircraft, and the
naval service as whole, would be the best at fighting in
the dark.
This was accomplished, and in the Second World
War the Royal Navy would dominate the night. In fact,
even the US Navy would not achieve equivalent parity

17
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

(ie, that all components were equally capable of fighting builders were chosen. It was not unusual for destroyer
at night as during the day) until after the war. This was classes, or even large vessel type classes, to be built at
a unique selling point, along with the armoured car- multiple yards, but the ‘Tribals’ were a class which had
riers, the versatile cruisers and aggressively handled de- to obey the letter of the treaty to which Britain was try-
stroyers. It was a whole force approach, the ing to hold others, whilst enticing more to join; any
components of which were good and able to act inde- deviation would be problematic.
pendently if necessary; but in combination were really Another complication was the selection of names.
formidable, exactly as Henderson had intended. As a The class name was chosen both with an eye to history,
result he was promoted to Vice Admiral and retained in to the politics of empire and the potential for future
post. Unfortunately, he never commanded the force conflict. The story of Ashanti and her name will be dis-
which he created because in May 1939 he died while cussed later in this chapter, and most of the class will
still in post. Many at the time attributed his death to be covered as the individual ships come to prominence
overwork, to the sixteen or more hours a day he spent in events. But the naming stories of Afridi, Mashona,
to prepare the nation, and the Navy he loved, for the Matabele and Tartar can be examined here.
coming war. Afridi was to be leader of the 1st ‘Tribal’ Flotilla,
His loss was a shame for several reasons. An officer which eventually became 4th Destroyer Flotilla. Her
of his calibre would have no doubt become a theatre name did have one precedent. That vessel, built in
commander, as did his successor Admiral Sir Bruce 1907, had been built by Armstrong-Whitworth, a pre-
Fraser. Henderson could possibly have even taken over vious incarnation of the builders of the 1938 Afridi. Her
the Mediterranean from Cunningham or succeeded name was that of a tribe of Pashtun, in Northern British
Noble in the China Station, and who knows how dif- India and territory which is still in India, but also split
ferent actions at sea might have concluded with an of- with Pakistan, Afghanistan and potentially China. The
ficer of equal drive, but arguably greater technological Afridi were known as fierce warriors, who dominated
savvy and understanding, at the helm? More impor- key strategic areas such as the Khyber Pass. Historically
tantly he was a leader, a proven ship officer, a fleet of- they had fought both for and against the British, es-
ficer and a Whitehall Warrior; it would be not beyond pecially during the Anglo-Afghan wars, gained a rep-
the realms of possibility to envisage a timeline where he utation that earned them the descriptor ‘martial race’.
became First Sea Lord. When the impact of his time as Some even served with the Khyber Rifles.
Third Sea Lord is considered, a more senior post might The Afridi were and are a long way away from the
have enabled him to have had an even more profound sea, but if it is remembered that one of the possible
influence on the Navy. scenarios at the start of the war was a Soviet descent
through central Asia on India, good links start to take
Construction on a greater significance. Considered in terms of a
Built at seven different yards around Britain, the broader strategy, this was a ‘fine warrior race’, and any
‘Tribals’ represented a true national project, involving war that ensued, especially a Far Eastern conflict, would
Vickers-Armstrong, Denny, Fairfield, Thornycroft, depend upon the Indian Army’s ability to grow and sus-
Scott’s, Alexander Stephen and Swan Hunter, names tain its increased size for the duration of the conflict.
which have today mostly slipped from national con- The Afridi and the wider Pashtun community would
sciousness, but which then rang out as bells of national be key recruiting grounds, essential to achieving the aim
pride. This policy had many benefits. It kept multiple not only of numbers in service, but also stability whilst
yards experienced in building the very best of destroyer troops were needed elsewhere. Finally, any positive feel-
designs, and by spreading work it helped keep multiple ings generated, either amongst British people for em-
yards in business. Furthermore, in a period just waking pire or amongst the subjects for British rule, would help
up to the repercussions of universal suffrage, it in- in lessening the risk of complications caused by disunity
creased the number of MPs whose constituencies of purpose.
would have significant numbers of workers involved, It was not just India though, which was the focus of
and the Admiralty, which had long faced the necessity these efforts to make friends and influence people. The
of a pragmatic approach to politics, needed voices to next two vessels, Mashona and Matabele were both
fight its case in the House of Commons; the Admiralty named after Zimbabwean tribes. Neither name had
had to garner support in whatever ways it could. How- ever been used before, nor indeed since. Mashona was
ever, to build in so many yards presented not insignifi- named after the populous Shona tribe, whilst Matabele
cant challenges, which perhaps explains why top is an Anglicisation of the less populous, Zulu related,

18
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

The ‘Tribal’ Class

Name Constructor Laying Commission Normal History of Name when bestowed Initial
Down Displacement Flotilla
(tons)

Afridi Vickers-Armstrong 9 June 3 May 2,244 Only one predecessor a member 1st TF/ 4th DF
(Capt. D) (Newcastle) 1936 1938 of the 1907 class of ‘Tribal’ destroyers

Cossack Vickers- 9 June 7 June 2,030 A traditional small ship name, five 1st TF/ 4th DF
Armstrong 1936 1938 predecessors had born it with pride, including
a member of the previous ‘Tribal’ class

Gurkha Fairfield Shipbuilding & 6 July 21 October 1,999 A name with precedent, two previous ships, 1st TF/ 4th DF
Engineering Company 1936 1938 a torpedo boat in the Royal Indian Marine
(Govan, Glasgow) and a member of the previous ‘Tribal’ class

Maori Fairfield 6 July 2 January 2,006 Again only one predecessor a member
1936 1939 of the 1907 class of ‘Tribal’ destroyers 1st TF/ 4th DF

Mohawk John I. Thornycroft 16 July 7 September 2,017 A very traditional small ship name, 1st TF/ 4th DF
& Company 1936 1938 thirteen predecessors had born it,
(Southampton) including a member of the previous ‘Tribal’
class and a 16-gun ‘Snow’ type

Eskimo* Vickers-Armstrong 5 August 30 December 1,987 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
1936 1938

Mashona Vickers-Armstrong 5 August 28 March 1,990 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
1936 1939

Zulu Alexander Stephen 10 August 7 September 2,050 One predecessor, unsurprisingly a member 1st TF/ 4th DF
and Sons (Glasgow) 1936 1939 of the 1907 class of ‘Tribal’destroyers

Somali Swan Hunter & Wigham 26 August 12 December 2,014 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
(Capt. D) Richardson (Wallsend, 1936 1938
Tyne & Wear)

Tartar* Swan Hunter 26 August 10 March 2,025 A traditional small ship name, seven 2nd TF/ 6th DF
1936 1939 predecessors had born it, including a
member of the previous ‘Tribal’ class

Sikh Stephen’s 24 September 12 October 2,015 Just two predecessors, a torpedo boat in 1st TF/ 4th DF
1936 1938 the Royal Indian Marine and an ‘S’ class
destroyer which had only been sold in 1927

Matabele Scotts Shipbuilding and 1 October 25 January 1,964 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
Engineering Company 1936 1939
(Greenock)

Punjabi Scott’s 1 October 29 March 1,990 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
1936 1939

Ashanti* William Denny & 23 November 21 December 2,020 A new name in 1936 2nd TF/ 6th DF
Brothers (Dumbarton) 1936 1938

Bedouin Denny 1 January 15 March 2,035 A new name in 1937 2nd TF/ 6th DF
1937 1939

*= survived WWII Capt D = Flotilla Leader

Shipyards and launch dates compiled by author from various records including those held at the UK National Archives and the work of Martin Brice (1957)

19
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Builders profile of Cossack, as fitted, 1935. (© National Maritime was one of the two that definitely was not. Illogical as
Museum, Greenwich, London) this name might seem for a class of destroyers, designed
in some ways to bind the Empire together, there was
sense it. She was the eighth vessel to bear the name. The
Ndebele. Zimbabwe (then the colony of Southern first had been a 28-gun Sixth Rate frigate, built in 1756
Rhodesia) was important in this period for its agricul- which served during the Seven Years War. She sub-
ture and mining; especially the cash crop tobacco and sequently carried the fourth Harrison time-keeper on
the metal chrome. Furthermore, whilst there was no a trial to Barbados. Tartar (1756) served in both the
vast African army ready to be called upon as necessary, American and French Revolutionary Wars, capturing
the country did represent a potentially fertile recruiting eleven ships during her service, which ended in 1797
ground, especially if indigenous African regiments when she was wrecked off Saint-Domingue.56 The sec-
needed to be found to take the place of regiments called ond was a 32-gun Fifth Rate, which also earned renown,
away to fight in a European war. Furthermore, both and it is only today that the Royal Navy finds itself in
tribes were respected for their military prowess and the longest period since 1756 that there has been no
heritage, the Mashona, for having run quite sizeable Tartar in commission; and that is only since 1984 when
kingdoms, the Matabele for being connected with the the 1960-built frigate Tartar was sold to Indonesia.
Zulus and having taken down one of the Mashona What attracted the Navy to Tartar as a name in
kingdoms. The establishment of the self-governing Brit- 1756? At the time the only plausible answer was the
ish Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia in 1923, in- image the name inspired. Tartars were known to be
corporating the lands of the Mashona and Matabele, fierce warriors, fleet of movement, who had fought
brought these new names to the fore and demonstrate alongside Genghis Khan and the Mongol hordes, and
the changing perspectives on the Empire. gone on to establish their own vast semi-nomadic em-
Whilst the others vessels were predominantly named pires. Despite so many forebears, there was one ‘Tribal’
after important tribes within the British Empire, Tartar destroyer with more, which was Mohawk with eleven.

20
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

Despite this distinguished pedigree the name was per- sighting and aiming of what was their ‘primary’ weapon
haps a somewhat odd choice and might have better system in the first tests.58
been bestowed on one of the Canadian ‘Tribals’. The reality was that most of the errors were small.
What proved the most complicated factor in the Despite this, the Director of Naval Ordnance was called
build was something no one had really anticipated – an in, full studies carried out, and it was clear that the
advanced targeting aid coupled with relative conven- problem was the result of the design being a scaled up
tional guns and mounts. They knew it was complicated single-barrel system that had been designed for de-
but thought they had already ironed out the potential stroyers without the fire-control equipment that the
issues with extensive testing prior to inclusion in the de- ‘Tribals’ were given. For most of the ships the solution
sign. Furthermore, within the gunnery system as a was found by the fitting of needle roller bearings on the
whole, the mounts and the barrels which were fairly deflection picot. Some vessels also required a redesign
conventional, and the innovative fire-control system of the mountings to accommodate the evolved 4.7in
(which was really more of an advanced targeting aid weapon system (as each manufacturer, whilst building
but still very useful), it was always presumed that if any to the same specifications, had constructed them a little
problems were found it would be with the latter. After differently); in a couple of cases the work had to go
all, the guns and mounts were practically off-the-shelf further, with the rebuilding of the firing gear and push
purchases. However, during trials the most consistent rods in order to make things work as they should.59
problems came from the mounts, not the new targeting Crucially, there was nothing that could not be solved.
aid. The actual gun sights, which were part of the All the problems had been seen in slightly different con-
mounts, were shown during testing to be frequently off texts in other classes. The DNO and Director of Naval
target when being fired together, and even on individual Construction, the shipyards and the naval officers
mounts not only were they not aligned with the barrel, tasked with the testing were all well versed in the
but the layer’s telescope would diverge from the weapon systems. Despite therefore some significant re-
trainer’s telescope.57 The entire class had issues with the building of the primary weapon systems for some

21
Mohawk in profile after the tugs have moved into help the newly- quotation comes from perhaps the only really good
christened ship to a fitting-out berth where she would acquire her book about the ‘Tribal’ class, written by Martin Brice.
guns, masts and other equipment. (Maritime Quest) So what makes a class of relatively small warships in-
spire so much emotion?
vessels, the class were barely held up and most of the The ‘Tribals’ only just came into service before the
ships kept to their original delivery schedules. Second World War began, the 1935 batch mostly com-
How had this happened? Though the double mount missioning in 1938, and the 1936 batch commissioning
had been developed earlier in the 1930s, it was really before the end of March 1939. However, even as they
the ‘Tribals’ and the more conventional ‘J’ class de- were commissioning and finding their feet, they were
stroyers, built shortly afterwards, that were the first already making a name for themselves in various pre-
classes in which it was deployed.60 In reality these were war operations.
teething troubles, The problems were caused mainly by These were mostly in the Mediterranean Fleet’s area
the design of the primary bearing under the mount, of operations, and as a consequence of the Spanish
which had to be light enough to be used aboard a de- Civil War; and a Mussolini-led Italy also required atten-
stroyer, but strong enough to take the force of the tion from the Navy.62 It was therefore unsurprising,
double recoil, especially when the gun was angled away considering the Mediterranean Fleet’s shortage of
from the centreline or the horizontal, which in both cruisers, that the first ‘Tribal’ flotilla was deployed
cases added substantial stress. It was largely therefore there. It was originally named, appropriately, the 1st
fixed as described above by adding in the rigidity and ‘Tribal’ Destroyer Flotilla, but by May 1939 this forma-
support which had been lost in the drive to save weight. tion had become the 4th Destroyer Flotilla.63 Afridi, the
Flotilla Leader, having passed her acceptance trials on
Entering Service 29 April 1938, was commissioned on 3 May and ar-
‘…commanding a Tribal was like owning a Rolls- rived in Malta on 3 June to take up her duties, exactly
Royce. No other ship would be quite the same.’61 This five weeks after commissioning.64

22
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

On 4 July 1938 she left Malta on her first patrol of was immediately thrust to the fore of Mediterranean
the Spanish Mediterranean Coast. Her ‘B’ mount was fleet duties, with Rear Admiral Tovey (Rear Admiral
painted with broad red, white and blue bands that Destroyers, Mediterranean 1938) embarking on her for
would identify her as British, and therefore neutral.65 the trip to the Ionian Sea where destroyer exercises
During this trip Afridi visited Palma, Barcelona, Mar- were scheduled for August 1938; she returned to Malta
seilles, Gandia and Alperello (modern-day El Perelló), on the 25th. Doubtless he took the opportunity to fam-
carrying out a solo cruise of what was an extensive, and iliarise himself with his newest ship.66 This was also an
at times, problematic area due to the ongoing Spanish opportunity for the Navy to show off to the Italians, in
Civil War. The patrols had been established to deter ‘pi- their backyard, the quality and capability of the Navy’s
rates’ from attacking British and French shipping in destroyer force. Such high-profile exercises were, as
Spanish waters, pirates strongly suspected to be Italian today, often used as a form of deterrent, and it was
submarines, but even though the Regia Marina would thought beneficial to include the newest ships along
join with Royal Navy and French Navy in the patrols, with capital units – battleships and carriers – to give the
and the attacks ceased, the patrols did not. exercise greater impact. This might also garner more
After this singular solitary patrol Afridi returned to press attention, which was useful in the domestic politi-
Malta for a short visit in the second week in August and cal funding battles.
Staying at Malta until 14 September, Afridi then met
Another perspective of a ‘Tribal’ being launched at Thornycroft’s up with her newly commissioned sister ship Cossack
yard. The photo is captioned Mohawk but it could be her sister and the eleven-year-old County class heavy cruiser De-
Nubian. vonshire off Delos on 18 September, with the intention

23
of embarking on a Black Sea cruise.67 The selection of Sikh in 1938, the year she was commissioned, but also the year she
the two ‘Tribals’ probably had the added foreign policy made her contribution to the ‘Tribal’ class’s royal connection, being
dimension of sending the message to Russia of Britain’s sent to Boulogne to collect King Carol and Crown Prince Michael of
resolve in the Middle East. They arrived in Istanbul on Romania and then taking them to Dover. (Drachinifel Collection)
19 September, but remained for only two days before
being recalled to Alexandra due to the Czechoslovakian on the Turks not to mirror the Ottoman Empire should
Crisis and the Navy’s preparations for war.68 This crisis any conflict occur. After the experience of Gallipoli the
passed and the two ‘Tribals’ returned to Malta where British were certainly hoping to avoid such a conflict
Afridi was dry-docked.69 Despite having been in com- again, and proactive engagement, diplomacy and, to
mission for just seven months, Afridi had sailed the use a modern phrase, ‘smart power’ deployment – vis-
length and breadth of the Mediterranean, entered the ible hard power in the form of potent warships, coupled
Black Sea, taken part in major fleet exercises and with soft power in the person of a senior admiral host-
visited dozens of ports. She had, by any measure, ac- ing, listening and talking – were seen as crucial tools.
complished a great deal in a very short period of There were lighter times, touches of soft power, when
time.70 for example Cossack acted as an ambulance in August
Cossack, the second of the class and arguably (due 1938. She had been sent to collect the British consul
to her later wartime exploits under Phillip Vian) the from Barcelona, but he slipped while boarding her
most famous ‘Tribal’ class destroyer, had accompanied whaler, so he was rushed to hospital in Marseilles at 30
her for some of the time.71 Then, when serving as divi- knots.73 Such halcyon days, however, were not to last.
sion leader with three even newer members of the It was not just the Mediterranean ‘Tribal’ Flotilla
Tribal flotilla, Maori, Zulu and Nubian, she escorted which had been active. The Home Fleet’s Flotilla (orig-
Admiral Cunningham travelling aboard Warspite for his inally called the 2nd ‘Tribal’ Destroyer Flotilla, but be-
goodwill visit to Istanbul in early August 1939, Cos- coming the 6th Destroyer Flotilla) was also working up
sack’s second visit to the city.72 This was a key part of under the leadership of Somali as the flotilla leader.74
the ‘Tribal’ class’s utility; their size, their armament,
their sweeping design, all served to make them impres- Ashanti’s Durbar
sive, and alongside the refitted and updated Warspite, ‘Captains of warships, my dear Woodie, are not only
this was a daunting force. Its intention was to impress naval officers. What we do or don’t do is being con-

24
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

stantly interpreted one way or another by friends and this, but after a 30-year exile the King of the Ashanti
enemies... or neutrals.’ Despite being a line from the was allowed to return in 1926. With his return and the
film The Battle of the River Plate, these lines which were administrative changes that came along with it, by 1935
put into the mouth of Commodore Harwood by the most of the regional power had been returned to that
script writers could not be a more accurate representa- city; although not to the king, or Asanthene as is the
tion of a captain’s position. Whether in peace or war, more correct title. He was allowed considerable in-
they need to constantly anticipate not just the first order fluence as it was felt participation would reduce likeli-
effects, but also the second and third, of any action they hood of repetition of past rebellious endeavours. It was
take. With this in mind, Ashanti is a prime example of therefore considered good politics, good for ‘hearts and
‘Tribal’ class pre-war activity; of how, despite being a minds’ to use the modern phrase, for the eighty naval
destroyer, she became involved with peacetime personnel to make the journey inland to Kumasi.
cruiser missions. Ashanti’s story begins not so much As part of this effort at the Durbar, it was not the
with her commissioning, as with her visit to the tribe governor who took centre stage; it was the Asanthene,
she was named after.75 She was the only ‘Tribal’ to Chief Prempeh II, who greeted the sailors and pres-
accomplish this. ented the gifts; and, of course, as has been said, this
Ashanti was named for the Ashanti (also called the was the man who had returned from exile just 13
Asante) tribe which even today makes up the largest years previously.79 He too was playing the political
population proportion of modern Ghana, and which in game, after all if he couldn’t beat the British then the
the late 1930s, as the British colony The Gold Coast, best option for his people was to try to get the best
was hugely important. The Gold Coast was not just a deal he could out of them as their friend. The gifts, a
colony, but a vital one. As its name suggests, there were silver bell and a golden shield, illustrate the wealth of
not only large deposits of gold, but also wood and other the colony.80 The shield was made by local smiths, and
vital war materials. So going to the effort of honouring featured crossed weapons which symbolised protection
and winning over such a tribe was worthwhile. A visit as well as the emblem and motto of the Ashanti. Prem-
which served to remind them of the power of Britain, peh was most emphatic that, whatever happened to or
and which also bound them to the Empire, represented befell the destroyer, these items had to stay with her
the very essence of imperial power play, and Ashanti’s throughout her career both at war and peace. Not only
2,020 tons of steel embodied, despite treaty limitations did these gifts highlight the mineral wealth of the re-
and Britain’s law-abiding image, demonstrable and gion, but their martial nature, along with Prempeh’s ut-
overwhelming power.76 With this in mind, it puts an terances, were taken as positive signs of overall support
interesting slant on what actually happened during for Britain. It was a very public commitment, which
the visit. built significant bridges in the minds of the British.
Ashanti arrived in Takoradi (Ghana’s deep water sea- As befitted the occasion, there was a parade followed
port) on 27 February 1939, the site of the first harbour by a party, full of pomp and protocol, but this event was
which the British had built on the Gold Coast and not the end of the ceremonies. When the party returned
begun during the tenure of Frederick Gordon Guggis- to Ashanti, she was opened to visitors in Takoradi for
berg (Gold Coast Governor 1921–7), and completed about a week. On the first day Ashanti Obayifo’s (High
after he had left in 1928.77 The harbour was of major Priests of the tribe) arrived, presenting further emblems
economic and political significance, and a visit by a of good fortune, before reciting prayers of valour and
warship named after the local tribe, a little over a dec- survival.81 Thousands came to look and visit, and she
ade after its completion, was a big event. was taken to the heart of the Ashanti people, a success
After docking, a party of officers and men travelled that augured well for her career, as well as suggesting
to Kumasi, where the then Governor of the Gold Coast, that the Navy’s naming policy for the class had not per-
Sir Arnold Hodson, held a Durbar (a sort of Imperial haps been without some merit.
era civil-military party) in the Prince of Wales Park.78 After this happy period, Ashanti returned to 6th DF,
That it was held in Kumasi was important. The Gold the Home Fleet ‘Tribal’ Destroyer Flotilla, and once
Coast was originally made up of three regions, with the again was immediately thrust into the fore of diplomatic
coast being the original colony, followed by the Ashanti efforts. This time it was closer to home, Cherbourg, for
region and above that the Northern Territories. The a goodwill visit with the French fleet. Again, offered a
gold was mostly found in the Ashanti region. Kumasi premium moment for diplomacy she rose to the occa-
was previously the capital, when it was known as the sion. This time she was part of a whole division of
Ashanti Confederacy. British colonial power changed ‘Tribals’, comprising Somali, Matabele and Eskimo. In

25
Ashanti’s Durbar

Above: Priests and warriors of Above: Ashanti in

the Assante gathered by the Freetown, where
Asanthene to take part in the senior tribal repre-
ceremony. (TNA-ADM 1.10160, sentatives and im-
Author’s collection) portant local figures
gather to view and
bless the ship.

Right: Processing past the Gov-

ernor of the Gold Coast, Sir Ar-
nold Hodson at the Prince of
Wales Park, Kumasi.

Below: The front cover of the Durbar’s offi-

cial programme.

Ashanti alongside at Freetown, showing the efforts the crew have gone to get her ready
for her special visitors.

26
 The gifts themselves, the bell and the
shield, which were presented to the ship
and which would protect her throughout
the course of the Second World War.

Above: The naval party

from Ashanti marching
through the Prince of
Wales Park.

Right: Ashanti in profile

from the roof of the
one of harbour build-
ings in Freetown.

Below: The Governor,

Sir Arnold Hodson.

Above: The‘Asanthene’ Chief

Prempeh II, making his
speech on the platform set
up for the presentation.

A detachment of the Gold

Coast Regiment at the
Prince of Wales Park.(TNA-
ADM 1.10160, Author’s
Own Picture)

27
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

The Thetis Incident

May 1939, war was looming and the visit was impor- Before the years of peace came to an end, the ‘Tribals’
tant. It was presumed that allied destroyers would have of the recently named 6th DF of the Home Fleet found
to operate closely together, making it crucial they were themselves involved in one of the saddest losses which
not only allies but friends.82 With this in mind, every- the Royal Navy had ever sustained, and which resulted
thing that could be done was done to build such a rela- in the greatest peacetime loss of life for the service.
tionship. Parties and dances of all kinds, excursions and Whilst still on trials in Liverpool Bay off the Welsh
sports events, along with as many ‘professional’ meet- coast, the submarine Thetis, due to a combination of
ings as possible were crammed in, and the ships even design faults, the quality of build and human error, sank
found time for some harbour exercises.83 bow first to the bottom of the Irish Sea. The event
Ashanti really did fight her way through the war, the caused a chain reaction which saw the 4th DF dashing
6th DF being heavily involved with the Home Fleet’s to the rescue at full speed, before being called upon to
myriad duties, providing protection for fleet move- act as taxis, salvage ships, and flagships for admirals. It
ments and convoys, anti-submarine sweeps and com- saw them put to good use not only their critical asset,
mando raids. An incident near Trondheim during the the space built into their design, but also, when the Brit-
Norway campaign set the tone for much of the war. On ish weather during the course of the incident prevented
26 April 1940, her sisters Sikh and Mohawk patrolled other ships holding station, their manoeuvrability and
the mouth of Trondheimsfjorden, while Ashanti and powerful engines which enabled them to stay on
Nubian went up the fiord, and on to Kraakvaagsfjord station.
looking for German destroyers. The Luftwaffe were Thetis had failed to surface by her appointed time of
none too happy having the Navy quite so close to their 1600hrs (she had been diving at 1400hrs so this was
newly acquired airfield, but the hundred bombs they supposed to provide plenty of time for the checks to be
dropped did not stop the destroyers escaping, although carried out) in the approximate position 53° 33’N; 04°
one near miss blew Ashanti’s main turbo-generator off 00’W,87 and at 1745hrs on Thursday 1 June 1939 Rear
its bedplate. Despite losing electricity she got away, and Admiral (Submarines) (or ‘S’) Bertram Watson (who
after a moderately eventful trip home, and then some would go on to become a Vice Admiral and Flag Officer
repairs, she was back in service. Iceland during the war) decided to take emergency ac-
This set the tone for much of her service. She was tion. Ships were dispatched to begin the search, includ-
to take part in many high risk operations, including ing two special formations, the 1st Minesweeping
Claymore, Anklet, Pedestal and Torch to name just four. Flotilla (MF) from Brixham, and the 6th DF from
She avoided being sunk, though she sustained enough Portland. In addition, Brazen, a 1930-built ‘B’ class de-
damage to require considerable time undergoing re- stroyer, which had been crossing the Irish Sea at the
pairs on occasion, for instance after running into time, was also diverted.
another destroyer, Fame (which had run aground due Winchelsea, a First World War vintage ‘W’ class de-
to a navigational error) off Whitburn Rifle Range. This stroyer raced from Portsmouth with the Rear Admiral’s
collision required her to remain with Swan Hunter & Chief Staff Officer aboard in charge of operations. Wat-
Wigham Richardson at Wallsend (the firm that had son himself was sick.88 The warships were in addition
built her sisters, Somali and Tartar) from November to specialist vessels such as the deep diving tender Ted-
1940 to August 1941. worth, and a little later, after Thetis had been discovered
Ashanti was one of just four ‘Tribals’ to survive the by Brazen, ships came from Liverpool to support the
war, remaining in commission, but not really in service, submarine in the precarious position she had been
until 1949.84 Perhaps the tokens and prayers of the found. This included Vigilant, a type of salvage ship
Ashanti helped her survive when others did not.85 Ar- sometimes referred to as a camel, which attempted to
guably, her war service was not quite as significant as pass a wire around the Thetis’s stern whilst it was still
the service she had rendered the empire before the war visible. However, with the forward compartments
in 1939. From that visit to the Gold Coast flowed tan- flooded she proved immovable and as the tide not only
gible diplomatic and practical benefits for the Royal began to rise but drew her under, the wire parted and
Navy and for Britain at a very dangerous time.86 For the she disappeared underwater.
duration of the war Britain could rely upon its west Af- The 6th DF arrived at 1030hrs on 2 June when Cap-
rican colony for treasure, for materials and for men, men tain Randolph Nicholson of Somali assumed com-
who would fight in the Far East with distinction. Ashanti mand, until the arrival of Watson, well after Thetis had
had played a big part in making all that a reality. dipped below the waves, who was brought from
Liverpool by another ‘Tribal’, Bedouin.89 Watson set up

28
 THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE 1930s

his staff aboard Somali, quickly deciding it was the most for 48 hours.93 However, it was not until 0300hrs on
suitable ship for the mission. During an early meeting, the following morning, and after another meeting
chaired by Nicholson, as Watson felt he was still getting aboard Somali, which this time included the recently-
up to speed, it was decided that every effort was to be arrived Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, Admiral Sir
made to release those still trapped (three crew and one Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, that the rescue mission was
Cammell Laird employee had escaped before being called off.94 Ninety-nine people died on board, includ-
overcome by the carbon monoxide poisoning) in the ing twenty-six employees of Cammell Laird, and one
submarine by cutting a hole in the stern and, if necess- diver died later during the salvage operation. She was
ary, into the after tank and through its bulkhead.90 This salvaged in good enough order and she was then com-
was a risky operation, as the report states. missioned as Thunderbolt and went on to have a suc-
cessful career until sunk in the Mediterranean in 1943.
It was realised that in such a decision, grave risk of The ‘Tribals’ and the large destroyer concept im-
total flooding was being accepted, but judged by pressed many observers, notably the new Controller,
conditions of survivors at the time of their escape Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser (brought out aboard
nine hours earlier, it was obvious that desperate Ashanti from Liverpool), and Rear Admiral (Submar-
measures were essential to meet a desperate situ- ines) Bertram Watson. What particularly attracted at-
ation.91 tention was their speed of 30 knots, a speed that was
not just achieved for a short sprint, but which was
Unfortunately, as the hours ticked by the operation maintained for most of the journey. In a number of
turned from recovery to salvage. At 0630hrs on 3 June cases their engine rooms had been under the command
two divers went down to tap near the control room but of the most senior rating, rather than officers, because
there was no response. Nevertheless, they carried on so many of their crew had been ashore when the ships
with their plan to try to connect an air supply. By were ordered to sea, though Ashanti had been left be-
1300hrs, despite the wires between the camel and the hind to bring out stragglers.95 The ‘Tribal’ Taxi Service,
submarine having slipped and no fresh wires connected which was set up between the stricken submarine and
because of the strong tide, they were still working on the Liverpool, and which facilitated an almost constant
the air supply.92 But at 1700hrs orders arrived from the flow of people and equipment, had clearly demon-
Admiralty to cease life-saving operations, as there was strated their capabilities.
now no hope of survival, the crew having been trapped

29
 CHAPTER 2

FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

The ‘Tribal’ class were conceived and designed, in part, mediate predecessor Admiral Fisher’s professed reser-
for the Fleet cruiser role, which was confirmed and out- vations, both Admiral Sir Dudley Pound and then Ad-
lined in their initial operations document: ‘Tribal Class miral Andrew Cunningham embraced them
and I Class Destroyers – Disposition of on Completion enthusiastically. Selecting the 4th DF for critical oper-
with Regard to Organisation of the Fleet and Destroyer ations, and exercising them extensively, they were the
Flotillas’. The phraseology was from the proposals of vessels of choice for these officers when faced with
the Tactical School but went further than those had complicated and critical assignments.
dared, stating: ‘…(a) By Day – Reconnaissance and This favour perhaps could have been considered
counter action against enemy flotillas. (b) By Night – natural for a destroyer officer such as Cunningham
Shadowing and/or Screening. (c) In General – as a who was a ready advocate for such ships, though he
counter to the large Leader type of other countries. had, as Rear Admiral (Destroyers) under Fisher,
...Their duties are thus more in the nature of those of written in opposition to them. Why the change of heart?
cruisers than of destroyers.’96 Perhaps it was due to their obvious qualities, or the fact
This clearly indicates their intended duties were to the battleship officer, Pound, who held the role of
include those of a ‘cruiser’ but the vessels were non- C-in-C Mediterranean in between Fisher and Cunning-
etheless destroyers, and when war came the ‘Tribal’ ham, had been impressed by them. It may, of course,
class were expected to perform both duties often, as in simply have been necessity that led to their being such
peacetime, carrying out both roles simultaneously.97 coveted tools of naval power. Whatever the case, by the
Their deployment to the Home Fleet and Mediterra- time war came they were already critical assets, used in
nean Fleet meant it eased the strain on the available the roles of their concept and deployment, to free up
cruisers that were to be spread thinly in these areas, es- cruisers and regular destroyers for other duties, by pro-
pecially the Mediterranean where, despite their im- viding the functional proximity of both.
Such duties were hard, and required more from their
crews than destroyers or cruisers due to the need to
Afridi in her role as the leader of the then 1st ‘Tribal’ Flotilla (later maintain the standards of spit and polish to achieve the
to become 4th Destroyer Flotilla). In this role she would set the poise of the latter, whilst also throwing themselves into
standards for all that would come after her. This picture highlights training and every situation with absolute commitment
how her weaponry has been laid to provide coverage against to embody the aggression of the former. They did this
attacks on all quarters.(Drachinifel Collection) with such aplomb, that even if they had not already felt

30
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

Afridi from the stern profiling her pre-war weapons and mast fit. ‘Town’ class, the fast, large, light cruisers which were
(Maritime Quest) the pride and, arguably, the elite of the Navy’s cruiser
force. This squadron, which was combined with the
themselves elite crews, the rest of the Fleet’s reaction to Tribals of 6th DF and five ‘F’ class destroyers of 8th
them soon would have told them. As a result, when war DF under the command of the Home Fleet’s Rear Ad-
came it was an opportunity for them to build upon a miral Destroyers was, by itself, a potent striking force.
reputation, rather than providing the opportunity to Yet, the Navy did not settle for this alone. Anchored in
prove their capabilities. Scapa, alongside this powerful force, were the fleet car-
riers Ark Royal and Furious, the seaplane carrier Pega-
With the Home Fleet sus, the battlecruisers Hood, Repulse and Renown, and
The 6th DF began the war off Iceland with a force of the battleships Nelson and Rodney, forming an over-
British and French battlecruisers. Two hours after war whelming force, particularly for any potential Kriegs-
was declared Captain Nicholson captured the first Ger- marine task group.
man merchant ship of the conflict, the 2,377-ton Han- This, however, proved unnecessary. The feared Ger-
nah Böge. When Somali first sighted a strange vessel on man mass break-out into the North Atlantic and any
the horizon, she seemed to be flying South American fleet action for which this force was amassed never ma-
flags; as they got closer they could see men painting out terialised, and it was instead broken up to cover con-
her name. Somali ordered the merchant vessel to stop voys, patrol the Faroes/Norway gap and start the
and prepare to be boarded, which she was with one of- waging of an even greater global maritime conflict than
ficer accompanied by eight sailors. They took her with had been experienced in the First World War. Convoy
a prize crew to Kirkwall, in the Orkneys, arriving there duty proved wearing on what were fleet/scout vessels,
on 5 September. It was an auspicious start to the war. with hulls unsuited to the constant hum of convoy duty.
It was not long before the rest of the 6th DF were However, they threw themselves into the role. The con-
back in Scapa Flow, deployed with many of the Home voy that brought the damaged submarine Spearfish
Fleet’s heavy ships, but most importantly with the 18th back home safely to Rosyth in September 1939 was no-
Cruiser Squadron (CS), the squadron made up of the table for Somali along with her sisters, Mashona and

31
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Eskimo, getting their first taste of enemy bombing, as in similar circumstance she had proved crucial during
well as the royal gratitude of King George VI when he the Spanish Civil War, fulfilling many duties and earn-
visited the Home Fleet Destroyers in October.98 ing herself the honour of being the most attacked Brit-
Convoys were the day-to-day life of the 6th DF. For ish ship involved in that conflict.100 She was anchored
example, on 12 December 1939 it was the 6th DF that in Scapa Flow when she was torpedoed and sunk in the
was stationed at the front of other destroyers and capital early hours of 14 October 1939 by U-47, which had
ships to secure SS Aquitania, SS Empress of Britain, SS threaded through the defences the Admiralty had
Empress of Australia, SS Duchess of Richmond and SS thought impregnable. This attack caused uproar, not
Monarch of Bermuda, otherwise known as Convoy just the loss of life (835 died either that night or of their
HX1, and which was carrying a third of the 1st Cana- injuries, including Rear Admiral Henry Blagrove, the
dian Infantry Division.99 This was a critical mission newly appointed commander of 2nd BS), but the shock
both in terms of numbers of personnel it carried, and that the northern fleet fortress, the bulwark for the
the fact that it was in many ways more a product of do- Northern Patrol, had been violated. Immediately after
mestic Canadian politics than a response to a British the attack, Somali, Mashona, Ashanti and Eskimo swung
Government request; it was, in that sense, a significant into action. Their Asdic picked up an echo in the
development in terms of politics and the Empire. middle of the Flow itself. Shortly afterwards it was lost,
It was the case with the ‘Tribals’ and the subsequent then recovered and subsequently depth charged, and
general-purpose destroyers, that they were often where the contact was still being investigated (plans were in
it was ‘important’ to be, not always where it was ‘criti- place for a diver to go down) on 17 October when an
cal’. The critical incidents required the cruisers, the de- air attack came in. This time the Germans were target-
stroyers, the full fleet of ships needed, or at least those ing Iron Duke, the former flagship of the Grand Fleet,
which could be spared. Important incidents had to but now a gunnery training ship. Whilst the ‘Tribals’ ac-
make do with whatever ships might be available; which counted for two of the attacking aircraft, two near
meant that it was often the assignment that best fitted misses had damaged the older ship and she ended up
the ships which could multi-role. Coastal convoys were being beached with Eskimo providing emergency power
important, in fact arguably critical. The transatlantic till her own systems could be repaired. The war was al-
convoys, the anti-surface raider groups were critical at ready proving eventful not only for 6th DF, but also for
the beginning of the war. ‘Tribals’ were often called their sister ships of 4th DF.
upon for all of them, sometimes in the same mission.
That is why, even though coastal convoys were impor- On Mediterranean Service
tant, the Northern Barrier was critical and thus would At the same time, Afridi and Cossack, together with the
have first call on the 6th DF if needed. It is because of rest of the 4th DF, were deployed in the Red Sea.101 4th
this that they were so often stationed at Scapa Flow and DF was under the command of Captain George Cres-
why they were present during the infamous sinking of well, aboard Afridi.102 Although at times command of
Royal Oak. the flotilla would be transferred to Cossack.103 Creswell
A Revenge-class class battleship, with eight 15in guns, was a 34-year-old veteran, who had been the first com-
Royal Oak was a powerful unit. Having undergone two mander of the original 1st ‘Tribal’ Flotilla, and stayed
extensive modernisation refits in 1922–4 and 1934–6, in command when it became the 4th DF. This posting
she was one of the better vessels of the class. The un- was arguably the zenith of what he had worked for in
modernised battleships would be a constant problem his career as a destroyer officer (although he would go
throughout the war. On paper they mattered, but in real- on to become Rear Admiral, before retiring and being
ity they were not the vessels the Navy wanted to find in recalled to service), having first achieved command of
a fleet battle, and not even in a duel with a significant a destroyer as a Lieutenant-in-Command of the ‘C’
surface raider; this was especially true for Admiral class destroyer Dove in May 1915.104 She was the first
Somerville in charge of the Eastern Fleet. Although of seven destroyers he would command, with Afridi
Royal Oak lacked the speed necessary for a fast battle being the last. In many ways it was Creswell, the dedi-
fleet, as a convoy protection vessel or for amphibious cated but unconventional officer (he had found time in
bombardments she would have been very useful. Be- the inter-war years to design a very useful anti-aircraft
sides which, a war is fought with what is available, not sight), who set the mould for subsequent commanders
necessarily with what might be wished for. of the ‘Tribal’ class and, as such, defined the image that
Royal Oak was available, worked up and serving as commanders of the ‘Battle’ and Daring classes would
the flagship of 2nd Battle Squadron (2nd BS). In fact, aspire to.105

32
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

Zulu and the battlecruiser Hood at Malta in 1938 during the powers, the longer range and greater sustainability of
Spanish Civil War deployments, a partnership which often was surface raiders made them the likelier threat in this the-
repeated during the remainder of Hood’s career. The visual impact atre. They included those surface raiders disguised as
of the ‘Tribal’ class’s design and lines were key to their peacetime merchant ships, but potentially also the heavy cruisers,
mission role, as well as underpinning their wartime function. the ‘pocket battleships’ of the Deutschland class, which
(Maritime Quest)
had slipped out before the declaration of war. It would
be the Graf Spee, one of that class, which would visit the
4th DF had been deployed to the Red Sea for com- Indian Ocean in November 1939, although she did not
merce protection, principally against submarines. In stray far enough north to receive ‘Tribal’ attention.
this largely forgotten campaign of the war, the flotilla
did outstandingly well. They were also deployed there Gurkha was the first of the class to be sunk in the war, partly due
in case any German raiders should choose that rich to the limitations of the ‘Tribal’ class’s primary gun systems, the
hunting ground for their operations.106 In fact, those 4.7in mount. Despite being built as a general-purpose destroyer
ships were considered the more likely foe. Because lo- they simply did not have the range of elevation necessary for the
gistics and infrastructure were limited for the Axis air battles they found themselves fighting.(Drachinifel Collection)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Bedouin in 1937, quite soon after her commissioning. This photo Returning to the 4th DF at this time, when war
shows her in her mid-grey scheme which was favoured by the began neither Italy nor Japan entered the fray and, con-
destroyers of the Home Fleet to which the 2nd ‘Tribal’ Flotilla/6th sequently, the expected attacks failed to materialise in
Destroyer Flotilla belonged. (Drachinifel Collection) the Red Sea or the Mediterranean, but in the North Sea
and Atlantic the threats were clearer and the 4th DF
was needed at home.109 Between 10 and 12 October the
However, it was the Italian submarines operating from ships of the flotilla departed from Gibraltar, leaving the
their African colonies that were the publically discussed Mediterranean in ones and twos,11 in part to move the
threat and which had justified the deployment, princi- force more quickly, in part to disguise the move from
pally to try and deter others from entering the fray. observers; but more importantly the staggered depar-
The 4th DF was also well positioned to act as a for- tures were intended to avoid creating a large target for
ward force in case either a surge to the Far East was the voyage north.
needed or a reserve for the eastern Mediterranean The 4th DF gathered again at Scapa Flow, the home
required. In simple terms, if Japan or Italy suddenly de- of their sister flotilla the 6th DF, where they refitted for
cided to join the war, the flotilla was well positioned to northern waters.111 The journey itself had not been
move rapidly to any theatre in which it might be without its incidents, including one which would lead
needed. The ships could provide this critical capability to the highest award granted to a ‘Tribal’ class officer
whilst also still fulfilling another very important mission during the war.112 On 16 October, Cossack’s division,
which was that of multi-role and force multiplier. To comprising Maori, Zulu and Mohawk (replacing Sikh,
put it another way, the 4th DF was, in effect, covering which had engine trouble), entered the Firth of Forth
for the Navy’s lack of cruisers and destroyers by acting swept channels.113 Before this they had been escorting
as both in their principal assumed cruiser role of trade a convoy, but after an Asdic contact the merchant ships
protection, and simultaneously in a destroyer role of had been diverted to Methil on the north coast of the
anti-submarine warfare. Firth of Forth for safety and the division was proceed-
Together with escorting/scouting for the Fleet, these ing unencumbered. At 1100hrs the first air attack by
were roles for which they were used extensively before the Luftwaffe on Britain began, aimed at shipping in
and during the Norway Campaign.107 Creswell was the Firth of Forth and at Edinburgh.114
awarded a Distinguished Service Order for the flotilla’s The ‘Tribals’ were caught at the worse possible mo-
anti-submarine work during the first three months of ment, inside the cleared channels where the narrow
the war.108 And those anti-submarine duties, along with passages between the defensive minefields offered no
the salvage of the Thetis, the various convoy skirmishes, opportunity to manoeuvre, a situation made worse by
their activity around the sinking of Royal Oak, awards delay in identification which was caused mainly by the
for services in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, it knowledge that RAF aircraft were operating in the
is easy to understand why the ‘Tribals’ were acquiring area.115 The enemy aircraft were not identified as
a reputation as submarine hunters; and this made them thought hostile until they were almost upon them. The
even more in demand for operations, a circumstance Ju 88 released two bombs which straddled Mohawk on
that came with consequences. the diagonal, one detonating to starboard of the bridge,

34
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

the other to port of the torpedo launcher. The aircraft Cossack during her time on the neutrality patrol for the Spanish
was also firing its guns as it passed and the bullets, com- Civil War. The red, white and blue stripes stand out clearly on ‘B’
bined with splinters from the bombs, decimated the ex- mount was intendeded to protect her from miss-identification.
posed crew members.116 The mooring party and the (Drachinifel Collection)
bridge crew suffered the most, with fifteen killed in-
stantly and thirty injured, most experienced officers better condition than his captain. At the Forth Bridge,
and petty officers.117 Mohawk met the ‘Town’ class cruisers of the 2nd CS,
Among those injured was Mohawk’s commanding Edinburgh and Southampton, which had also been
officer, Commander Richard Jolly, who was shot attacked.
through the stomach. Yet with so many other injured The customary salute was sounded and as Com-
there was no relief available and his ship had a busy and mander Jolly turned in his chair to salute the flagship,
difficult passage to navigate. Whilst the remaining of- he collapsed. He survived for another five hours whilst
ficers organised engine room personnel into first-aid tugs took his ship under the bridge and into the dock-
parties, with the wounded taken to emergency quarters yard, from where he was rushed to hospital at South
and the dead wrapped up in their sea coats, he stayed Queensferry, where he died.119 Creswell recommended
on the bridge, denying himself medical attention in
order to get his vessel and ship’s company.118 For thirty- Cossack as newly completed, sporting a similar Mediterranean Fleet
five miles and eighty minutes, as his strength slowly white paint scheme as Afridi did in the photo on page 31. Here she
ebbed and his voice was reduced to a hoarse whisper, is, shown at speed, surging through the water with awning
he conned his ship with the aid of his navigating officer, suspended from the director level protecting the bridge crew from
who himself had a chest wound and was not in a much the sun. (Maritime Quest)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Cossack returns home to Rosyth (Scotland) from the Altmark

Incident 17 December 1939, laden with 200 rescued sailors and as
many stories from the crew who, along with their ship, became
national, even international, stars. (Maritime Quest)

at Rosyth, primarily to escort East Coast convoys.123

This allowed them to also serve as a forward-based re-
action force, rather like the battlecruiser force had been
when it was based there during the First World War. In
theory they were co-located with cruisers but in prac-
tice they were the permanent force as the cruisers were
always needed elsewhere urgently.124 As the forward-
based force their key role was scouting for the Fleet
(often manning what was termed the A-K line, the
scouting line which was postulated to operate far in
front of the main force), a role for which they were used
extensively up to, and particularly during, the Norwe-
gian campaign.125

Admiral of the Fleet Philip Vian,

the Intuitive Officer
Publically, professionally and even posthumously,
Philip Vian could never be accused of being timid or
diffident. Internally he might have felt fear, or a second
of doubt, but he would never let it show nor ever want
Jolly for a medal. No one thought it would be the anyone to know about it. To understand this one has
Empire Gallantry Medal which was announced a week only to read Oliver Warner’s introduction to Vian’s au-
later, particularly as it was the first time it had been tobiography Action this Day in which he wrote: ‘When
awarded to someone who had died.120 Later on, after
the institution of the George Cross as the second high-
est medal in the British order of precedence after the
Victoria Cross, it was declared that all those who had
received the Empire Gallantry Medal posthumously
during the war would have it replaced by a George
Cross.121 After the bombing raid, Cossack, Maori and
Zulu were judged capable of the voyage, so were
quickly despatched to Scapa Flow; which although not
considered safe from submarines at that point, was con-
sidered reasonably safe from air attack.
They were not to remain in Scapa Flow; despite the
4th DF often operating alongside as part of the Home
Fleet, after a short period Afridi’s band were moved on
between March and April.122 Instead of calling Scapa
Flow home, the ships were mainly based further south

Captain Philip Vian aboard Cossack. The photo illustrates the

exposed position that was required to command a destroyer. Vian
had the virtue of being ‘ranked among the handful of officers of
the armed forces who were trained, equipped, and of appropriate
seniority and experience’ to influence the outcome of the war.
Authority and energy would be the hallmarks of his time with the
‘Tribals’, and during his subsequent career. (Maritime Quest)

36
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

Zulu in 1939, making her contribution to the Spanish Civil War may have been tough, but he expected nothing more of
neutrality patrol. while it was certainly not a successful the men under his command than he expected from
international effort, due to a combination of half-heartedness and himself.
flagrant violation, it demonstrated to many within the British His luck began early in his career. Whilst at Osborne
Government the need to rapidly rearm due to the changing global
Naval College, he made friends with Prince Edward
dynamic. (Maritime Quest)
(the then Prince of Wales’s heir) which afforded him an
opportunity to meet Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord,
war broke out in 1939, Captain Vian, as he then was, and earn a favour from him by taking a photograph.
ranked among the handful of officers of the armed Only Vian had brought a camera, and Fisher promised
forces who were trained, equipped, and of appropriate that if he were to send the picture with a note, he would
seniority and experience to make it obvious that, if the try to help. This Vian did, and it secured him a transfer
struggle were to be protracted, it would be upon them during 1915 from an old cruiser, Argonaut¸ patrolling
that tactical success would depend.’126 off the African coast in search of a surface raider, to the
If any naval officer of the era could be written about latest and fastest destroyer in Grand Fleet, the Yarrow-
in such a way it was Vian. He was a perfectionist who built ‘M’ class Morning Star.127 It was from this vessel
expected perfectionism in others; a taskmaster who that he witnessed the Battle of Jutland and it was this
should by any normal standards have provoked another vessel which launched his destroyer career. After serv-
Bounty mutiny. Unlike Captain Bligh, however, Vian
was also inspirational, successful and lucky. He made Zulu with flag signals hoisted. Flags were still a key part of naval
every unit he commanded feel they were the elite. When communication. With their experience from the First World War in
put in command of a ‘Tribal’ destroyer flotilla he not mind, the Navy were always worried about unnecessary radio
only found his niche; the Navy created a perfect fit. He transmissions. (Drachinifel Collection)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Then, with the advent of the Spanish Civil War, instead

of demobilising, the flotilla was kept in the Mediterra-
nean, which included Vian himself. Instead of attending
Staff College he was granted a flag captaincy and com-
mand of the cruiser Arethusa, and consistently given op-
portunities to hone his skills and impress his superiors,
in a way that other officers might not have come by; they
might, on the other hand, not have been as confident in
promoting themselves and pushing their cases. 133
A regular ally of the ‘Tribal’ class in their wartime operations were When his time on Arethusa came to an end, and
the Free Polish destroyers. ORP Piorun, pictured here, was often aided by the threat of imminent war, Vian continued to
present, and her name is often found alongside ‘Tribal’ names in dodge Staff College. At the beginning of the conflict he
operational lists. (Roger Litwiller Collection) returned to command another reserve flotilla, but it was
not long before Vian was given command of the 4th DF
of ‘Tribal’ class destroyers in January 1940. From then
ing as First Lieutenant in two other destroyers, he went on his career would be woven closely with the
on his gunnery course, again finding luck and connec- ‘Tribals’.134 All that had gone before had built the man
tions, being on the same course as George, Marquess he had become at the time of this command; the Vian
of Milford-Haven, brother of Earl Mountbatten.128 Fol- who stepped on to the bridge of the Afridi and assumed
lowing this course he served as a gunnery officer on the command of his new flotilla; the man who could pro-
flagship of the Royal Australian Navy, HMAS Austra- ject, even if he did not always feel it, absolute con-
lia, under the squadron gunnery officer, Harold Bur- fidence in his judgement and his role; a leader who,
roughs, who was later famous for running convoys to because of this confidence, could, and just as impor-
Malta. When, in his own words, economy and Admiralty tantly would, take risks, risks which, on balance, paid
interfered in his career, Australia was paid off, but in- off more than their cost. While he never aspired to it,
stead of taking the post as ADC to the Governor-Gen- Vian would achieve personal fame through his time
eral, Vian was called home to the Cadet Training with the 4th DF, not aboard his flagship Afridi, but in
Battleship, Thunderer.129 Cossack, in an operation which not only highlights the
Vian’s career continued on its charmed trajectory. ‘Tribal’ class’s duality of role, but also became the cor-
Despite much hard work on his part, he nevertheless nerstone of the case made for their successor classes.
managed to fit in a three-month honeymoon, a busy The February 1940 Altmark incident, for which Vian
Admiralty posting and still manage to lead a destroyer was awarded the DSO, also closed the Graf Spee saga,
division of the Mediterranean 3rd Flotilla in 1932, and heralded the beginning of the Norway phase of the
something even he admitted was unusual for a specialist ‘Tribals’ service.
officer such as he had become.130 Even more remark-
ably, whilst in command of his destroyer Active within Altmark Incident
the division of the 3rd Flotilla, he damaged her badly In the 1930s, after the failure of the Hague convention
enough whilst docking with the depot ship to require a to reach any agreement on territorial waters, most
dockyard trip; yet despite this he was appointed to the countries still observed a three-mile limit as the extent
rank of captain in 1934, at the comparatively young age of ‘national waters’. This distance was defined in the
of 40, after just twenty-two years in the Navy.131 eighteenth century by a Dutch judge, Cornelius van
At this point in their careers, Royal Navy officers Bynkershoek, because it was at that time the maximum
would commonly become held up on their career path. range of a cannon. Whatever the questionable logic
They would face time ashore which would delay them behind it, this was the distance that still mattered in
acquiring either the sea time, the command experience February 1940. Furthermore, considering that the
or the opportunity to distinguish themselves afloat pertinent events of the Altmark incident largely took
needed for promotion. However, Mussolini and the place inside Jossingfiord, it could be argued that they
Abyssinian crisis of October 1935 intervened, compel- actually took place in Norway, let alone within its
ling the Navy to practise a mass mobilisation. Admiral territorial waters. That though did not matter to the
William Wordsworth Fisher, C-in-C Mediterranean, Navy or Churchill, who was first Lord of the Admiralty
asked for Vian to command the additional destroyer flo- at the time; this was a battle at the start of a long war in
tilla commissioned from reserve to support him.132 which merchant seaman would be the lifeblood of the

38
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

Battle of the Atlantic, and here were a number of The first three articles of Treaty XIII of the 1907 Hague
experienced sailors who could be rescued and who Convention are as explicit as diplomatic language ever
could prove critical; and successful intervention would gets. A total of thirty-three articles provided the basis
halt the German government claiming any more for the security of merchant shipping, then and now. In
victories from the cruise of the Graf Spee, and play well 1940 it was the mantra which not only the Royal Navy,
for domestic political consumption, for which the Battle but everyone was supposed to follow. The taking of
of the River Plate had already proved critical to morale. Altmark would violate Article 1, although that was only
Most importantly, it would be a statement of intent and proved by the operation – an operation which would
confidence from the most powerful navy in the world violate Article 2; although the Navy would be very good
at the time, that it would do whatever was necessary to about not violating Article 3, as tempting as the capture
win the war that was to come. However, this did not of a merchant ship might have been.
mean that the 1908 Hague convention was either It was from Cossack that Captain Vian’s commanded
irrelevant or unimportant. operations during February 1940, a command which
would propel Cossack and the ‘Tribals’ into the public
Article 1. eye. On 14 February 1940 she put to sea with her
Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign sisters Maori, Sikh, Nubian, two 1936/37 completed ‘I’
rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in neutral class destroyers Intrepid and Ivanhoe (both of which
territory or neutral waters, from any act which were fitted as minelayers), and Arethusa, a 1934 com-
would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, con- pleted light cruiser of the class bearing her name.135
stitute a violation of neutrality. This force was officially at sea to intercept German iron
ore ships in the Skagerrak; it was a capable and well-
Article 2. armed force for such a mission.136 Its strength had been
Any act of hostility, including capture and the exer- further supplemented by having its influenza-affected
cise of the right of search, committed by belligerent crewmen replaced with crew from Arethusa’s sister Aur-
war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral ora.These were then organised into boarding parties.137
Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is The force was thus substantial enough and well-provi-
strictly forbidden. sioned enough to take on normally lightly crewed, and
lightly or unarmed merchant ships.
Article 3. Whatever the true mission (and despite the number
When a ship has been captured in the territorial of educated guesses, we are unlikely ever to know), it
waters of a neutral Power, this Power must employ, was on 15 February the force learnt that the Kriegsma-
if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, the means rine supply vessel Altmark, with an estimated 300 Brit-
at its disposal to release the prize with its officers ish merchant seamen prisoners captured by Graf Spee
and crew, and to intern the prize crew. during its raiding, was near Trondheim.138 Altmark was
If the prize is not in the jurisdiction of the neutral
Power, the captor Government, on the demand of Another Spanish Neutrality Patrol photo, this time of Gurkha at
that Power, must liberate the prize with its officers Malta. (Drachinifel Collection)

39
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Eskimo as built,
prior to the Second
World War.
(Maritime Quest)

HMS Eskimo after the Battle of Narvik where she lost her bow to a
German torpedo. Everything forward of ‘B’ mount was destroyed.
‘A’ mount was dangling down on the bent deck plating which had
be cut off, and ‘B’ mount removed, just prior to this photo being
taken, as part of the process to make her safe to take back across
the North Sea. (Maritime Quest)

within Norwegian waters, posing as a merchant ship.

This was illegal under international law because she was
carrying prisoners so was technically a combatant.
What the Navy was about to do would also be a viol-
ation of the law.139
With these issues in mind, after much fruitless dis-
cussion with the Norwegian navy and at the urging of
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, on
16 February Cossack alone entered into Jossingfjord to have been enough on its own to secure a place for
‘verify’ Altmark’s merchant status.140 As she ap- Cossack in the public consciousness but her war was
proached, Altmark turned on her searchlights to try to really only just beginning;145 and her involvement, with
dazzle the bridge crew, whilst at the same time ma- others of her class, in Norway would be the next chapter.
noeuvred in an attempt to crush Cossack. It was here
that the manoeuvrability of the destroyer-sized cruiser, Norway
combined with the Navy’s well established ship hand- Gurkha was named to fight and, as a ‘Tribal’ class de-
ling skills, saved the day.141 The result was not what Alt- stroyer, she was built to do so; and in the concentrated
mark had intended as, while it did bring the ships German air attack off Norway on 9 April, under sus-
together, Cossack escaped serious damage and the op- tained bombing, she fought to the death.146 The sixth
portunity arose, in the tradition of Drake and Nelson, of her class to commission, she was the first to be
for some of the boarding party to leap across the gap sunk.147 1940 had started well for Gurkha. Together
between the ships.142 The first members of the boarding with Nubian she had been repeatedly engaged in hunt-
party were soon joined by others, including Cossack’s ing U-boats, without loss, but without any confirmed
First Lieutenant who ‘forcibly dispossessed’ the Alt- sinkings. However, she was eventually found success
mark’s captain of his ship.143 It was an action in which when partnered with Le Fantasque, the lead ship of the
four Germans were killed, five wounded and 299 French Le Fantasque destroyer class, sinking U-53 on
prisoners rescued. Cossack left the fjord, leaving the Alt- 21 February.148 Less than seven weeks later, whilst es-
mark aground with her crew.144 corting the Home Fleet in tempestuous weather, she
This story of heroism and success (features of ‘Tribal’ would meet her fate. At 1400hrs on 9 April the force
destroyer actions throughout their service), at a time came under attack by German Junker Ju 88 and
when there was little to buoy the public mood, would He 111 bombers. The weather made adequate AA

40
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

defence difficult, so Ghurkha made the courageous cost him his ship, and very nearly the lives of his
move to alter course in order to bring her guns to bear crew. 153
on the attacking aircraft. However, the new course took
her away from the rest of the screen.149 Easily singled From an officer whose writing and service suggest can-
out, she came under concentrated attack and was hit by dour, this was an unusually equivocal summing up. Per-
a single bomb.150 haps the reason is that until the Second World War no
The bomb struck home aft, ripping a 40ft wide hole one really knew, despite the many exercises and the
in the starboard side, causing the aft magazine to flood quantity of ink expounded upon it, what an air attack
and fire to break out. This led to a 45° list to starboard would be like. Just as with every previous war officers
and the stern became awash. At 1900hrs she sank, fir- were quickly learning that the theory, the exercises and
ing into the sky almost to the very end; and it was for- the training they had all completed,were only based on
tunate she did so because Aurora, the Arethusa class the best possible assumptions at the time. In war, as op-
light cruiser, alerted by the firing of high explosive posed to in naval exercises, the wrong decision could
shells, arrived to rescue her crew, of which 190 sur- lead to much graver consequences. It is worth noting
vived.152 that, in the immediate aftermath, Rear Admiral De-
At the beginning of the war such a response to an air stroyers, Ronald Hamilton Curzon Hallifax, who had
attack was not unusual. There had been a continuing overall authority over destroyers in the Home Fleet at
debate, which to some extent still exists today, about the time, wrote:
how individual ships, and groups of ships, should best
respond to air attacks. The idea behind the aggressive 8. Captain (D) IV in paragraph 1 of minute II has
response was that by moving into the most advantage- generously accepted the responsibility for allowing
ous position for their guns to bear on targets, for GURKHA to become detached, but his minute was
example with a surface combatant fight, they would written on the 22nd April by which time all or most
have the greatest chance of shooting down enemy air- of us had realised that to remain concentrated was
craft. Such manoeuvring was clearly predicated on the the best defence against air attack, whereas on the
belief that the most effective method for stopping an 9th April, when the attack took place this was not
enemy air attack was to destroy the aircraft, but it in- generally realised. Destroyers escorting Norwegian
evitably splits up a task force, and ships can find them- convoys when under air attack had often been out of
selves beyond the range from which they can provide supporting distance from each other and no harm
mutual support. The alternative was for ships to stay had come to them. I knew this and had issued no in-
together, presenting a joint wall of ‘fire’ which sought structions on the matter. I do not, therefore, consider
to drive enemy aircraft away as much as destroy them; that Captain (D) IV, is any more to blame than I am,
this was the more defensive approach and became stan- except for the omission to notice that the GURKHA
dard thinking, but the experience of Gurkha and other had detached herself completely as opposed to tak-
ships lost filtered into the debate. ing independent avoiding action.154
Gurkha’s loss was the subject of discussion, and re-
sponsibility for her loss sought. In his autobiography, In his own report, Commander Buzzard cited the maxi-
the then Admiral Philip Vian who had commanded mum angle of elevation of the 4.7in guns as the reason
wrote: for his manoeuvre. 4in guns with a far higher angle of
elevation would replace ‘X’ mount later in the war.
One destroyer of the Flotilla, Gurkha, was com- However, he also claimed he was targeting a four-en-
manded by a noted gunnery officer, Commander Sir gined bomber type aircraft, something which is dis-
Anthony Buzzard. After years of training, presented puted as the only German aircraft of that type, the
at last with live targets, he was excessively annoyed Fw 200 Condor, did not arrive in Norway for another
by his inability to hit them, and turned his ship away week.155 Buzzard’s decision made at the time was,
from the wind and sea, to better the conditions for thanks to this and other experiences, not something that
the control and fire of the guns. would be repeated. Vian recalled in his memoirs that,
This involved leaving the cruiser screen, and I ‘Returning from this meeting … I observed to Captain
should have recalled him at once; but in those very Mountbatten … how I viewed the Admiral’s opinions
early days of air attack on ships, the tactics to be pur- about bombing with foreboding; it amounted, if hit, to
sued by surface forces were still being worked out, losing one’s reputation in addition to one’s ship and,
and there was no set policy. Buzzard’s manoeuvre possibly, life.”156

41
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

This was after the previously mentioned RA(D), Eskimo photographed taken from the carrier Furious during
Hallifax, following his experience of the air attacks Operation Pedestal, sporting her new bow and engaging the
which resulted in the loss of Gurkha, insisted that enemy as furiously as she could, acting as ‘goalkeeper’ or ‘preferred
whether a ship was hit by a bomb or not depended last line of defence’ for aircraft carriers. (Maritime Quest)
upon the actions of the captain.157 This did not sit well
with either Mountbatten or Vian, both of whom seemed When discussing Norway and destroyers, however,
to grasp early on that it was an educated guess which there is one place which almost always demands most
way to dodge when the bombs dropped, and no one’s attention – Narvik. There were three battles. In one the
honour should hang on the whim of fate such a guess. Norwegians were overwhelmed; another ended in a
draw with the Navy losing good ships; and one ended
Eskimo with her final pennant number clearly visible. Partly as a
way to confuse enemies and partly as a way of reshaping the fleet,
in annihilation of the enemy with the Kriegsmarine
Eskimo changed designator letter for her pennant twice in her beaching destroyers so that their crews might escape.
career. She entered serves as L75, then became F75 and finally The ‘Tribals’ were involved in the third, but as the Navy
served out the remainder of her career as G75. (Drachinifel only count the last two, it has become the Second Battle
Collection) of Narvik.158
 FORGED BY WAR 1939–40

From War at Sea: A Naval Atlas 1939-1945, by

Marcus Faulkner, Seaforth Publishing, 2012

The Second Battle of Narvik mishes which followed. It was a significant force, de-
It was almost exactly a month after the Altmark inci- signed to finish off any remaining German naval forces
dent, when Cossack was back under the command of in the Narvik area, and capable of dealing with any de-
Commander Sherbrooke (who would go on to be be- fences that the Germans had managed to erect after the
come a rear admiral and earn a Victoria Cross whilst in First Battle.
command of the destroyer Onslow), that she would The effect of the aerial reconnaissance was felt al-
achieve her next battle honour at the Second Battle of most immediately. One German destroyer, Erich
Narvik.159 This battle would demonstrate the value of Koellner, had been so badly damaged during the First
having an armament of a larger number of faster-firing Battle of Narvik that she was judged fit for an ambush
guns, rather than fewer heavier guns. The First Battle only. However, she never made it to her ambush point
of Narvik, on 10 April 1940, had been a wild affair. of Taastadt. Instead, upon sighting the British force
German ships had been badly damaged during the making their way in, she and her escort (Hermann
battle, but they had retained control of the water, while Kunne) split up, with Koellner retreating to Djupvik
the British lost the majority of what had been a fairly Bay, from where she still hoped to launch an ambush
effective flotilla. The Second Battle, on 13 April 1940, at an opportune moment. It was not to be. They were
would correct the result. This battle had three signifi- spotted by the Swordfish crew, and when the starboard
cant differences to the first: there was a battleship in column of destroyers – the three ‘Tribals’ Bedouin, Pun-
support, Warspite; her Swordfish airplane was able to jabi and Eskimo – rounded the entrance to Djupvik,
scout ahead; and the Navy sent in its ‘fighting de- British guns and torpedoes had already been sighted.
stroyers’, the ‘Tribal’ class.161 This resulted in a very quick, almost one-sided ex-
The force deployed under Admiral Whitworth con- change. A torpedo and the destroyers’ shells were fired
tained, in addition to Warspite, nine destroyers: four in the initial salvo. These were quickly followed by shells
‘Tribals’, Cossack, Bedouin, Eskimo, and Punjabi; the from Warspite as she too rounded the southern point.
1935 constructed ‘H’ class Hero, whose sisters had Unsurprisingly, under such a weight of firepower,
fought in the First Battle of Narvik; the 1936 ‘I’ class Koellner rolled over and sank.163
Icarus; the 1939 ‘K’ class Kimberley; and the two 1934 Hermann Künne had used this time to raise the alarm
‘F’ class vessels, Forester and Foxhound.162 These last five and had formed up with Hans Lüdemann, Wolfgang
ships were very much Treaty destroyers, built to the Zenker and Bernd von Arnim to make a run at the Brit-
letter of the agreements, and designed for torpedo at- ish force together.164 This resulted in a melee, similar to
tack. Although good ships, they were at a disadvantage the First Battle of Narvik, but this time the Germans
compared to ‘Tribal’ vessels in the fast-flowing skir- were forced back up the fjord by the Navy’s ‘solid front

43
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

line’ of destroyers constantly ‘altering courses and place at Gibraltar.176 Following this her high level of ac-
speeds as necessary to avoid the enemy fall of shot, tivity continued unabated.
while maintaining a steady and continuous pressure’.165 Eskimo was involved in the Thetis disaster, and al-
It is here that the qualities of the ‘Tribals’ firepower most fought a battle with Faulknor, Foxhound and Fire-
came to the fore. However, it was not only their strength drake during a night passage to Scapa Flow in
of firepower, but also their strength of design which was September 1939 when both groups were at high alert
tested. Punjabi attracted particularly heavy fire, suffer- and failed to recognise each other. With her draw to-
ing much damage and casualties, but after retiring for wards action, it is unsurprising she was in the Fourth
an hour to repair herself, she re-joined the force fully Estuary when the first air raid took place on 17 Oc-
combat capable, highlighting once again the resilience tober.177 Her activities did not stop there, and after a
enshrined in the ‘Tribal’ class design.166 The Hermann winter of patrols, convoys and maintenance she was re-
Künne split from the other three and made for Her- fitted just in time for the Norway campaign.
jangsfjord, but was pursued and torpedoed by Eskimo, All the three Narvik battles were dirty, fast and hard;
forcing her captain to beach her.167 they were close-range destroyer fights, and the difficulty
At this point the British destroyers divided into two for the Germans was that these were the fights for
groups, one heading into Narvik harbour, led by Cos- which the ‘Tribal’ class had been built. They were the
sack, and the remainder, led by Eskimo, following the fighting cover, the suppressing fire that would allow
German destroyers as they made for Rombaksfjord.168 their more conventional destroyer sisters to get close
Cossack discovered Narvik harbour still held a German enough to launch a massed torpedo attack which, ac-
destroyer, the Diether von Roeder.169 This vessel had cording to contemporary theory, would decide a battle.
been largely immobilised in the First Battle, but still put For the ships of this class, with their all-round fields of
up such fierce fire that Whitworth, looking on from fire, the swirling mixture of smoke, metal and fire was
Warspite thought it was a shore battery.170 Despite this their metier. Eskimo was to the fore, and exposed as she
heavy fire and grounding on a wreck while manoeuvr- was lost her whole bow forward of ‘B’ mount; nonethe-
ing and firing, Cossack silenced her opponent.171 She less she kept on fighting.178
had sustained damage, including one shell that pen- Eskimo had been the last to join the force as it was
etrated her transmitting station172 which housed the being amassed, and almost immediately upon arrival
clock for her fire-control system, whilst another shell took up station in the starboard line (relative to War-
severed the main steam pipe, and yet another damaged spite), with her sisters Punjabi and Bedouin. Cossack was
a boiler room.173 Despite this, she kept firing on local in the port line, with Kimberley and Foxhound).179 Dur-
control, with the gunnery crews demonstrating their ing transit these lines remained stationed close to War-
training by doing all the fire-control work manually. spite, but once Ototfiord was reached they were thrown
Targets included a troublesome German mortar on the forward for optimum offensive impact. First blood
shore, but the job mainly comprised of methodically went to Eskimo and her sisters in the starboard line, due
working through any other German craft in the har- in large part to Warspite’s Swordfish aircraft, which had
bour.174 The damage suffered by Cossack and Punjabi spotted the Erich Koellner loitering with intent just in-
paled in comparison to that which Eskimo survived, side the entrance to Ballengenfiord, leading to
however. Djupvik.180 This turned a potential ambush into a one-
sided rout. The guns of the three ‘Tribals’ enveloped
Eskimo, twice bowless but unbowed the Erich Koellner in such fire that she had no chance
Some people are described as being ‘born under a lucky to avoid the torpedo fired by Bedouin which disabled
star’, and if viewed in that way Eskimo must have been her, let alone mount a proper defence.
launched under an unusually lucky star. She had a long The fight continued all the way up Ototfiord, where
war. She had joined 6th DF, the Home Fleet ‘Tribal’ de- German vessels joined the fray, only to be forced back
stroyer flotilla, just in time for the 1939 combined fleet under weight of fire. This was something more conven-
exercises at Gibraltar where, by highlighting the strength tionally designed British destroyers could not have
of the Fleet,175 the Navy tried to buy time for diplomacy. achieved, but for which the design of the ‘Tribals’ made
After Easter leave, she was, with her sisters Ashanti and them more than capable. Eskimo and the Hermann
Matabele, on a goodwill visit to Cherbourg. Once again Künne veered off from the main fight, the German
naval diplomacy was at work, but on this occasion it was vessel probably seeking to work around the British de-
more about soft power and building of relationships, stroyers and either make a run for the Warspite or the
than about the open display of naval strength which took open sea, or engage in a one-on-one duel.181 Steaming

44
at speed while firing with everything they had, the en- Bedouin in Hvalfjörður Iceland, most likely preparing for a convoy
gagement ended suddenly with Eskimo emerging vic- run which was the bread and butter duty of not just the ‘Tribal’
torious and the Hermann Künne sunk by a torpedo in class, but all destroyers in the early stages of the war. (Drachinifel
Herjangsfiord. Her men had certainly acquitted them- Collection)
selves with honour.182
It was after this action that the fight reached the har- continued firing until the ammunition ran out.185 The
bour of Narvik. It was there that the British destroyers, crew went to work lightening the upper works and shor-
divided into two groups. One led by Cossack forced its ing up the bulkheads so that she could get home.
way into Narvik while the other, led by Eskimo, con- The battle was over. Any German ships not sunk by
tinued to chase the retreating Germans.183 The battle this point had been beached by their crews, and the
was now in its final phase. Surging up Rombaksfiord British destroyers were busy making sure they were
after the remaining German destroyers, Eskimo, Be- properly wrecked and that no other useful shipping
douin, Hero, Icarus and Forester reached the point, two could be salvaged from the fiords. Eskimo meanwhile
thirds of the way up, where it suddenly narrows; the managed to reverse out of the fiord and was escorted
British destroyers knew it would be a perfect trap. back to the UK by her sister Bedouin, together with the
Eskimo went first; Forrester and Hero followed close two destroyers, Hostile and Ivanhoe.186 Thus ended Nar-
behind. Eskimo was fulfilling the role for which her class vik, one of the most notable destroyer actions of the
had been built, providing cover to allow the conven- early part of the war.
tional torpedo destroyers to get closer to the enemy. The battle demonstrated again how tough and ver-
This she succeeded in doing, shepherding her small satile the ‘Tribal’ destroyers were. Even discounting
force through the narrows and towards the denouement Operational Irregular, Eskimo dodged potential de-
of the battle. The British destroyers pushed the Ger- struction on a regular basis, and though she suffered
mans on under a remorseless hail of fire, the Germans more than enough severe damage, she never completely
responding as best they could; one of their number, succumbed like so many of her colleagues.187 Not only
Georg Thiele, had become a blazing wreck, but in a last did she lose her bow at Narvik, but she lost it for a sec-
act of defiance, as she rolled over and sank, launched ond time later in the war in a collision with Javelin, took
her torpedoes.184 As Eskimo, along with her charges, part in Lofoten raid and the Bismarck chase, and re-
avoided other torpedoes launched by the Hans Lüde- ceived major bomb damage in 1943.188 Eskimo played
mann, and tried herself to fire her last torpedo, one of a significant part in many actions including, together
the Thiele’s struck her forward. with Ashanti and Tartar, Operation Torch, Operation
The torpedo struck like Thor’s hammer Mjölnir, tak- Husky and Operation Neptune.189 Her use in such an
ing off with one blow Eskimo’s bow section up to the array of missions is proof of the ‘Tribal’ class design’s
‘B’ mount, and obliterating both ‘A’ mount along with versatility. She epitomised the fighting spirit associated
seventeen crew. The strength of the design is revealed with the ‘Tribals’, so clearly demonstrated by Cossack
in the subsequent events. Eskimo did not stop. She com- when called upon to engage the Altmark, or by Sikh at
pleted her turn, fired her torpedo and the ‘B’ mounting Sirte in 1942. This was a spirit of resilience, persistence

45
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

and leadership, over and above what duty expected; it during the transit home following the successful with-
was a spirit which was the hallmark of the class’s service, drawal, Afridi’s luck ran out .194 As the convoy of trans-
and which was a constant theme of Eskimo’s career. ports and escorts reached the main fleet, a large force
of Stukas attacked. Afridi was bracketed by two attack-
Namsos: The Central Norwegian Campaign ing dive bombers. Already turning to starboard, Cap-
With the disposal of the enemy destroyers the Navy had tain Vian decided to continue the turn, but despite this
secured the control of the sea which had eluded them attempted evasion Afridi was hit, the first bomb land-
after the First Battle of Narvik. This was exploited ing in the foremost boiler room causing massive dam-
throughout the remainder of the Norway campaign, age and starting a fire; the second taking out much of
and the ‘Tribal’ flotillas were significant participants. the hull portside just forward of the bridge.195 This
Afridi, as flotilla leader, was at the head of the amphibi- proved too much damage even for a ‘Tribal’ destroyer
ous operations conducted around Namsos as part of to take although, judging from Eskimo’s experience,
the Central Norway campaign, and playing a vital role she might well have coped with either one or the other,
supporting the land forces. During the preliminary re- but not both. Captain Vian and most of the ship’s com-
connaissance, for instance, it was the 4th DF which in- pany were rescued before she rolled over and sank.
vestigated the possible landing sites and were key to the From this point on Cossack became the 4th DF’s main
selection of Namsos.190 leader, a role that raised her to even greater promi-
For the insertion of the troops, Somali was left be- nence in their next major operation. Afridi and the 4th
hind to help establish a base at Namsos, after which the DF had succeeded in their mission; the troops had
‘Tribals’ escorted the converted liner/troop ships to been withdrawn and not a single transport lost. As at
Namsos, and ferried the troops to Lillesjona.191 For op- Dunkirk, so at Namsos, the Navy had covered the
erational command, both Afridi and Somali were used Army’s back.
as general headquarters by Major General Carton De Even before the Norwegian campaign was over, the
Wiart.192 For both assignments, the increased size of the use of the ‘Tribals’ in the destroyer flotilla formations
‘Tribal’ design and the space it provided in comparison was reduced. Subsequently this accelerated, due in part
to other destroyers was crucial. At the same time their to their losses and in part to the shrinking of flotillas for
size in comparison to larger cruisers meant they could strategic reasons, but mostly it was due to the oper-
operate with greater nimbleness further up the narrow ational need for these capable vessels elsewhere; their
fiords. Later, after the withdrawal, in an operation that fighting power and the morale they could lend to other
had foreshadowed the evacuation from Dunkirk a few destroyers had been recognised. It now became more
weeks later, the Navy earned high praise from Carton common for the class to operate in pairs. For example,
De Wiart. ‘In the course of that last endless day I got a by 17 May 1940, Mohawk and Nubian had been trans-
message from the Navy to say that they would evacuate ferred from the 4th DF to the 14th DF and returned to
the whole of my force that night. I thought it was im- the Mediterranean.196 However, there were still occa-
possible, but learned a few hours later that the Navy do sions when four or more ‘Tribals’ would be grouped to-
not know the word.’193 gether in future battles, some of which will be discussed
Such involvement could not be without cost. On 3 in later chapters.
May 1940, exactly two years after her commission,

46
 CHAPTER 3

A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT

KIND OF WAR 1941–2

By 1941 the war was well into its second year, a year in the present as modern escorts are increasingly de-
which was marked by the entry of America, Japan and signed to allow for the deployment of land forces, either
the Soviet Union, thereby turning it into a global con- for maritime or littoral missions. The Royal Navy were
flict. But at the start of the year, however, this was not to lose ten ‘Tribals’ during this period, and Somali, tor-
foreseen and the Admiralty were really expecting more pedoed by U-703 in September 1942, had the dubious
of the same: Axis superiority on land in Europe offset honour to be the last ‘Tribal’ to be lost during the war.
by Britain, its Dominions and the Empire and their
strength and resiliency at sea. A hard year was antici- The Battle of Matapan
pated, but it was not expected by many to be a decisive Matapan is perhaps a less well-known battle than it
one; it was going to take time for Britain to gather the should be, particularly in Britain. It was the largest fleet
resources to launch a counter attack, although after the action the Royal Navy fought during the Second World
successful 1940 North African Campaign the con- War, and was unusual for turning out almost exactly as
fidence for it was there. theorised by the one of the participants pre-war. The
This confidence for offensive action would fortify traditional maxim is that no plan survives first contact
not only the land forces but also those at sea, and it co- with the enemy, but on this occasion, from the 27 to 29
incided with the unleashing of a new and potent force, March 1941, the first, second, third and fourth contacts
a force which would often collaborate with the ‘Tribals’
in this phase of war: the commando units. During Mohawk was the command of Commander Richard Jolly when war
1941–2 the commandos and the ‘Tribals’ increasingly began, but after his fatal wounding on 16 October 1939,
operated together. This not only influenced warship de- command was take up by Commander John Eaton who would
sign and development during the war, but still applies command her till she was lost in 1941. (Drachinifel Collection)
Mashona, like most of her sisters. has relatively few photos of her plan was not without its difficulties, especially if it was
taken of her as her service life was so relatively short. Here she is in to be implemented at night. The biggest impediment to
1940. (Drachinifel Collection) success was communication. How would ships keep
their communications discreet in order not to reveal
almost went to the plan which the Navy had carried out their position, yet exchange enough information for an
in many pre-war exercises. Admiral to co-ordinate a tricky series of manoeuvres to
The Navy had planned for a chasing battle, one in achieve the desired consequence? What was this plan?
which a fleet seeks either to disengage or at the least It was a plan which involved ranges and rates of in-
avoid a confrontation, whilst the other fleet ‘chases’ it. terception. The longest range and the highest rate of in-
Rather like the development of the strike carrier Ark terception belonged to the carrier-borne aircraft, which
Royal, intended to carry as many strike aircraft as poss- would be used to slow down the enemy fleet’s progress
ible and to be able attack the enemy both at sea and in by launching attacks on their ships. Torpedo bombers
harbour and which emerged from the research done for were ideally suited to this role. A torpedo would either
the Harbour Attack Committee, a sub-committee of the hit and damage a ship, or the manoeuvring of ships try-
Parliamentary Committee for Imperial Defence, this ing to avoid torpedo attack would break up the cohe-
battle plan was a product of experience in the First sion and formation of the fleet. With multiple aircraft
World War, of post-Jutland frustration. However, the striking from as many points on the compass as could
be achieved, this type of battle becomes a defending ad-
Matabele started the war with the newest propellers. After the
miral’s nightmare. The enemy fleet would be located
Thetis incident she had been dry-docked and had them replaced. either by scouting cruisers or aircraft, and if not already
She would be perfectly placed to go to the help of HMS Spearfish, there at the point when the enemy fleet is smarting
another submarine in trouble, in September 1939, which had a from air attack, cruisers would move in to maintain
happier resolution than the Thetis incident. (Drachinifel Collection) contact if weather made air shadowing impossible; they

48
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

would also provide a better guide point for subsequent was no Trafalgar, but also no Jutland; if any battle was
air attacks rather than bearings estimates based on its forerunner, in terms of impact and damage at least,
sightings. It was in this role that the involvement of the then it would be the First Battle of Heligoland Bight.
‘Tribals’ came into being, making up for the lack of For the ‘Tribal’ class the battle was important because
cruiser numbers and filling gaps in the scouting line. two of their number, Mohawk and Nubian, of the 14th
However, this was neither the end of their involve- DF, were selected by Admiral Cunningham for a critical
ment, nor the end of the plan. It would be the battle- role in an act of subterfuge. It was not a role for which
ships and any other available cruisers closing in, as they had been particularly planned or conceived, but it
attacks by aircraft continued, possibly supplemented by was a role which was critical if Cunningham was to not
‘Tribal’ torpedo attacks, that would further impede only overcome the major problem, locating the enemy,
enemy progress. The ideal culmination of such a battle but to actually succeed in carrying the battle plan out.
would be the launching of devastating fire from massed It was, because of the difficulty of finding the enemy
heavy artillery, combined with air attack and a massed and their co-operating by being in the right place for a
destroyer attack, spearheaded by the ‘Tribals’.197 This battle, unlikely that the plan would come to fruition.
was a well thought-through battle plan and it was Cunningham and the Mediterranean Fleet therefore
adaptable to circumstances. went to a lot of trouble to increase its likelihood, to en-
More importantly, however, especially in the light of courage the Regia Marina to come out to sea and to
the events of the battle, this was something which had encourage it as far towards the eastern Mediterranean
been practised live as well as war gamed, sometimes as they could. This included staging their own ‘maski-
even through extensive exercises which combined both rovka’, which although a term drawn from Russian op-
mediums, and most often in the Mediterranean. For erational theory denoting a combined political, strategic
such a decisively offensive plan, the circumstances of and tactical military deception, describes well the level
its implementation were defensive, in that they were of operational subterfuge which Cunningham con-
about maintaining dominance in the Mediterranean, ceived and enacted. However, even with all that work,
not achieving control. So, despite the propaganda, it intelligence suggested that battle was still not thought a
likely outcome. The Navy were relying on signals traffic
Bedouin in Iceland after Narvik, preparing to escort Southern Prince analysis – the increase in frequency and length of trans-
across the Atlantic with equipment for the battleship Rodney’s refit. missions, along with some intercepts – which suggested
(Maritime Quest) the Italians were heading to sea from Naples to attack

49
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Maori had not had quite the same experience and blessing as her the 14th DF with the ‘J’ class vessels Janus and Jervis.
sister Ashanti, but she did receive two ‘tiki’ (Maori Totem Poles) At sea already was Force B under the command of Vice
from New Zealand and instructions for how to perform a Hakka. Admiral Light Forces, Henry Daniel Pridham-Wippell,
(Drachinifel Collection) which comprised of four light cruisers, Ajax, Gloucester,
Orion and the Australian Sydney, as well as three de-
the Greek convoy running between Greece and Egypt. stroyers. Cunningham could also call upon the escorts
The movement of the Italian cruisers in the Ionian of two convoys, three more light cruisers, including the
Sea, confirmed by a sighting from a Sunderland flying Dido class Bonaventure and five destroyers. Whilst the
boat, finally provided Cunningham and his officers abandoning convoys would be unusual, as later events
with the opportunity to enact their plan. On 27 March involving ‘Tribal’ class vessels during the hunting of the
Cunningham went ashore in Alexandria with an empty Bismarck will illustrate, it was not unknown if the situ-
suitcase, in order to look as if he was going to stay the ation required it.
night in order to play golf at the same club as the Japa- Thanks to the air reconnaissance the Navy quickly
nese Ambassador. The ships issued dinner invitations found the Italian forces, but Cunningham’s flagship,
and put up awnings to provide outside entertaining Warspite, had trouble getting up speed, while Vice Ad-
space. In simple terms, the Navy looked as if it had little miral Pridham-Wippell, who had sailed from Piraeus,
intention of going to sea. The ‘Tribals’ played a part in was engaging the Italian cruisers away to the northwest.
this; if any ships were likely to be deployed to reinforce Warspite’s sister ship, Valiant, along with Mohawk and
the convoys it would be them, but they were in harbour Nubian were therefore ordered to surge ahead of the
and just as stately adorned as if they had been cruisers. main fleet to support them.
With all this in place, and with the Italian Air Force Hardly had the order been sent than it was cancelled
being less than attentive the plan worked and, other than because the Italians had broken off the engagement and
picking up the cruiser squadron, the Regia Marina did were attempting to withdraw. During the afternoon,
not realise the extent of the Navy’s deployment. The after the carrier Formidable had launched her first strike
RAF maximised air reconnaissance over the southern Io- at the Italian force, the Regia Marina continued to with-
nian and Aegean seas, which complemented that being draw, albeit at a slower pace. Cunningham grew wor-
carried out by the fleet. When Cunningham arrived back ried about the security of his communications. Using
onboard Warspite in the early evening the flags were radio would in all probability have alerted the Italians
hoisted and the Battle Squadron made for sea. to the presence of Force A, and thereby reveal the scale
This fleet was a formidable force, with Cunning- of the operation. Cunningham therefore deployed the
ham’s direct command, Force A alone containing, ‘Tribal’ sisters forward to provide a visual signal link
alongside Warspite, two of her Queen Elizabeth class using flags and signal lamps between Warspite and Prid-
sisters, Barham and Valiant, along with the Illustrious ham-Wippell.
class aircraft carrier Formidable, nine destroyers, includ- This was critical. Cunningham was attempting to
ing the two ‘Tribals’ Mohawk and Nubian, grouped into manoeuvre in preparation for a decisive battle, which,

50
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

if successful, could deliver permanent superiority in ible, signal lamps far too visible. The ‘Tribals’ were now
the Mediterranean, consolidating the strategic security recalled to 14th DF stationed to the starboard of War-
which the airstrike on the Italian fleet at Taranto had spite and her sisters to provide cover for a strike in the
provided all too briefly. A successful battle could, in event of a major action.198 It was also hoped that they
theory, have destroyed not only the Regia Marina flag- could ‘illuminate’ the enemy by fire, one of the most in-
ship, Vittorio Veneto, but also a large number of their teresting and pragmatic ideas of British night fighting
vital heavy cruisers and destroyers, and even more cru- doctrine.
cially it would have deprived them of an operationally This idea of using 4.7in shells, exploding against
significant proportion of their trained personnel. This larger enemy warship armour, to highlight them to both
was the engagement and the outcome that Cunning- the ‘Tribals’ and any other British destroyer’s torpedo
ham was seeking. The strikes from Formidable con- crews would, however, go untested at Matapan. As the
tinued, the second managing to damage the Vittorio attack never took form, the destroyers were instead em-
Veneto, the third crippling the cruiser Pola. This further ployed later during the rounding-up operation, deliver-
slowed down the Italian force, forcing them to leave an ing a coup de grâce with torpedoes where necessary, and
entire division of their force behind in order to try to it was Nubian which finally sank the cruiser Pola. Cun-
recover the stricken cruiser. ningham’s Battle Squadron had come across Pola, with
Cunningham used Pridham-Wippell’s force to keep her two sisters Fiume and Zara, catching them com-
up the pressure all afternoon, while at the same time pletely unawares and destroying them in short order at
maintaining his distance with his force, and as a result close range. It was not what Cunningham had hoped
the Italians did not realise just how close and powerful for, but with three heavy cruisers and a brace of de-
the British force was. In addition, by being careful with stroyers incapacitated, plus further damage inflicted
his distance, Cunningham knew he could not only react on the wider fleet, Cunningham was not going to com-
quickly if Pridham-Wippell’s cruisers were pressed or plain. Significant as it was, and successful as the plan
other circumstances demanded intervention, but could was in forcing the engagement, Matapan was not as
also choose his direction of engagement for maximum decisive as it could have been. The failure to follow up
effect. Mohawk and Nubian made this possible, and with the main force and the concentration on the
could be used in this role because they had the fire- cruisers, due in part to a communication misunder-
power needed to survive on their own as well as speed standing, meant that this battle as said achieved domi-
and seakeeping capability. The two ‘Tribals’ continued nance, but not control. As such it represented only the
providing the visual link until dusk, after which such beginning of the ‘Tribal’ story against the Italian
communication became impractical: flags being invis- forces; soon they would prove themselves just as they
had in Norway against their German foes, but not
without losses.
Mashona was the first Royal Navy vessel to carry the name and was
named after the Shona tribe of Rhodesia. She was commissioned
Loss for the ‘Tribals’ came quickly on the heels of
straight into service, almost straight into the war, being victory when Mohawk was sunk by to a torpedo
commissioned on 1 March 1939. She escorted King George VI and launched by an Italian destroyer, herself severely dam-
Queen Elizabeth aboard the Empress of Australia in May, before aged. This was the same ‘Tribal’ commanded by Com-
taking part in the Thetis disaster. (Drachinifel Collection) mander Jolly when he received his mortal wound, and

51
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Punjabi at anchor in 1939. (Drachinifel Collection) were about 2,400 yards ahead they launched what
might be considered a textbook attack. Lampo was
taken out by Janus and Jervis in a hailstorm of 4.7in
in a way her end befitted that. The evening of 15 April and 2pdr fire. In return, the Italian vessel fired three sal-
began, as so many evenings had for 14th DF (compris- vos from her four guns and launched her torpedoes.
ing the two ‘Tribals’, Mohawk and Nubian along with Baleno had the misfortune to run into Nubian which
two ‘J’ class destroyers Janus and Jervis), leaving Malta wrecked her bridge and caused so much damage that
in response to air reconnaissance reports of a Tripoli- she was forced out of the fight before capsizing and
bound convoy off Cape Bon. This convoy comprised sinking later that day. The 14th DF then started work-
of the Italian Sabaudia carrying munitions and the four ing through the merchantmen with an efficiency
German freighters Adana, Aegina, Arta and Iserlohn echoing Narvik and Operation Claymore (to be dis-
loaded with men and vehicles, escorted by three de- cussed next).
stroyers, one larger ‘Navigatori’ class vessel, Luca Tarigo, It was at this point that Luca Tarigo engaged in the
and two smaller members of the ill-fated Folgore class, fight. The British destroyers had managed to drive be-
Baleno and Lampo. tween Lucia Tarigo and her charges, and it was as they
Luca Tarigo was an interesting design. Ships of her reduced speed to attack those charges that she entered
class had been given a centreline midships mounting, a the fight. She was hit by fire from all the 14th DF, with
‘Q’ position in British parlance. As such it kept the the two ‘J’ class vessels firing torpedoes at her. Seeing
centre of mass as close to the dimensional centre of the her successfully crippled, the British carried on finish-
ship’s hull as possible. This weapon enabled her to en- ing off the merchant vessels, but it was now, as she lay
gage from the beam with all six guns, but meant that damaged and stationary in the water, that Luca Tarigo
she had no preponderance of fire either forward or aft. launched her torpedoes. At 0230hrs, twenty minutes
It also kept top weight down because no superfiring after the engagement had begun, and just after avoiding
positions were required. She was also armed with two the ramming bow of the leading merchant vessel, Mo-
triple 21in torpedo launchers (which had replaced the hawk was hit close to ‘Y’ mount on the starboard side.
pre-war fitted 21in, 18in and 21in torpedo launchers). This was similar to the damage that Eskimo suffered
Luca Tarigo was command ship of the convoy, and the at Narvik. As with Eskimo, the guns continued firing
arrangement of her weapons made this the logical posi- and within five minutes her chief engineer reported to
tion because it permitted maximum freedom of ma- her captain, Commander Eaton, that Mohawk was
noeuvre to enable all her guns and torpedoes to bear ready to move again. However, that was not to be. A
rapidly on any attack. second torpedo hit the bulkhead between No 2 and No
The 14th DF located the convoy using radar at 3 boiler rooms, causing instantaneous damage. In ad-
0210hrs on 16 April and spotted the convoy against the dition to burst boilers, the upper deck split, causing the
moonlight at a distance of about six miles. When they torpedo tubes to crash down and crush most of the

52
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

Mohawk was one of the ‘Tribal’ class vessels that served as March 1941, prior to Matapan, it should probably have
linchpins for Admiral Cunningham’s plan, which depended upon been examined first for chronological reasons, but its
radio silence so that the Italians not realise the extent of the British impact is better understood in the context of Matapan,
‘maskirovka’ before the Battle of Matapan. (Drachinifel Collection) Claymore, like so many military operations conducted
in the twentieth century, was about oil, not in this case
watch below. It was the end. With no time to launch crude oil, but fish oil. Fish oil was a key requirement
boats, most of the crew had to swim for it, although for many of the munitions and lubricants upon which
some managed to get into one of the six Carley floats the Nazi war machine depended. Lofoten was a critical
which made it clear. All three other ships in the flotilla point in the chain of production for those supplies. An
helped out with recovery of her crew and, including the Allied attack was, however, a long-range gamble. The
losses of the other ships, only forty-three British sailors force would have no air cover; no land aircraft would
were lost. Then Janus launched a torpedo at Mohawk be within range and no aircraft carriers were available.
which was exhibiting the ‘Tribal’ class’s trademark stub- Furthermore, it would be supported by no ships larger
born buoyancy. Was it worth losing forty-three lives and than a destroyer. The force was going to have to be en-
a very useful destroyer in such a way? tirely self-reliant and operate in the face of significant
For three enemy destroyers alone, the loss of one potential enemy retaliation.
might be justified, but for the additional destruction of Four ‘Tribals’ were to provide 80 per cent of the total
five valuable merchant ships along with 350 troops, 300 fighting force. Carrying by this time a quick firing (QF)
vehicles and 3,500 tons of stores and ammunition from 4in anti-aircraft gun in place of an ‘X’ mounting, they
the Afrika Korps, the price was undoubtedly war- were judged capable of putting up a good defence
ranted, and such missions were the entire reason for against anything, and of being a serious threat offen-
maintaining Malta. As with many of the ‘Tribal’ class sively.200 Along with the converted Dutch passenger
losses, they were risked because it was justified, and it ferries acting as infantry landing ships, Queen Emma
was not only in the Mediterranean that they were being and Princess Beatrix (officially designated Landing Ship
risked during this period; in Norway, in March, the Infantry (Medium), LSI(M), they were to be supple-
‘Tribals’ of the 6th DF took on the role of escorting the mented by Legion, an ‘L’ class destroyer which had 4in
landing forces of Operation Claymore into the Arctic guns fitted in all mountings, making her, in theory at
Circle. least, an anti-aircraft destroyer.201 The 4in gun was an
interesting weapon. While it was primarily intended for
Operation Claymore AA use, just as the 4.7in gun with which the ‘Tribals’
The events of March 1941 around the Lofoten raid were armed was primarily orientated for anti-ship use,
were, in terms of strategic importance if not in terms it was still an effective general-purpose weapon, es-
of fighting, not dissimilar to those around the more pecially when used against lighter faster craft such as
familiar battle off Cape Matapan.199 Taking place on 4 E-boats – just as the 4.7in was a reasonably potent anti-

53
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Matabele seen in 1939, highlighting the pre-war Home Fleet tack on a key Norwegian industry. If improperly
destroyer look, the peacetime presence shading, and the handled it had the potential to cause not only reprisals,
commonality of the weapons. (Maritime Quest) economic or worse, on Norwegian civilians by Nazi
authorities, but also deaths at British hands, with the at-
aircraft weapon, as long as the aircraft were not attack- tendant political consequences.203 For this reason the
ing from too close to vertical. This combination of rules of engagement were tight. In fact, compared with
weapons and ships, supported by a considerable some of those used in later operations, they could al-
amount of unconventional thinking, was to prove im- most be described as modern with their focus on avoid-
portant to operational success. ing civilian casualties and damage to civilian
Operation Claymore had the potential to cause
trouble, particularly beyond that area where the force Matabele was the only ship to ever carry this name to serve with
was dependent on Allied assistance and co-operation. the Royal Navy, and she adopted the Zulu motto hamba kahle
The force would refuel from the tanker RFA War Pin- meaning ‘go in peace’. She has accounted for all the name’s battle
dari, at Skalafjorour, in the British-occupied Danish honours, in Norway 1940 and the Arctic 1941–2. (Drachinifel
Faeroe Islands.202 More significantly, it would be an at- Collection)
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

infrastructure. Partly, the restrictions were due to the the LSI(M)’s Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM(1)),
novelty of the operation, for it was the first such oper- which enabled them to be launched in the same wave
ation to be conducted. And it was to be conducted as their LCAs (Landing Craft Assault), the standard
against a relatively densely populated area for such a infantry carrier employed by the Navy throughout the
target. It was incredibly important to not upset the Nor- war. This mattered because LCM(1)s could accom-
wegian Government in exile, nor give ammunition to modate quadruple the tonnage of a LCA, enabling
the Nazi propaganda machine. commandos to take essential equipment with them. It
Operation Claymore was to be the first major com- was these little ships, far more than their transports,
mando raid of the Second World War and would set the which needed the escort, and previous experience in
pattern for many operations to come. It was a departure Norway had already demonstrated their vulnerability.
from the previous small amphibious operations, Val- It was while acting as a ranging shield that Somali¸ the
entine and Fork, respectively the British occupation of ‘Tribal’ not assigned for close escort, took part in the
the Faroe Islands and the invasion of Iceland, earlier in only naval fire-fight of the operation when she en-
the war. It would make use of specialist shipping and countered Krebs, an armed trawler, which yielded a set
specialist troops, alongside the very special generalists, of rotors for an Enigma machine and some code books
the ‘Tribal’ class. Not only was all this assorted equip- which were of great use to Bletchley Park. However, the
ment to be used, but to complicate matters the landings German vessel only managed three shots before being
would not be concentrated; in another parallel with permanently silenced after she ran aground on fire and
modern operational concepts they were to be distinctly out of control. The five surviving crew were picked up
dispersed. Some troops were going to Stamsund on the by Somali. It was a very one-sided exchange.207
island of Vestvagoy, some to the islands of Hennings- Bedouin intercepted the unarmed coastal ferry Mira,
vaer, while others were dispatched to Svolvaer on Aust- which had the misfortune of being in the wrong place
vagoya and still more to Brettesnes on Stormolla.204 at the wrong time. Unexpectedly, however, this vessel
This was by definition a widely distributed operation, continued on her course despite being ordered to stop
something which in the pre-helicopter-assisted era of because an officer in charge of the German equivalent
amphibious warfare was a much bigger risk than it of an Entertainments National Service Association
would be today; there was no quick way to concentrate Group had put a gun to the captain’s head and wanted
ground forces should unexpected resistance be met, to go down fighting.208 Bedouin, in case the ferry passed
and if such circumstances did arise, the ground forces’ word to other German occupation forces, had to sink
dependence on the support of warships was absolute her and then rescue the survivors, including the gun-
Fortunately, this was not put to the test, but the possi- wielding officer and the captain. At the same time, Tar-
bility does make the division of warships very logical. It tar continued the tradition of efficiency established
was Legion that escorted the commandos to Stamsund, during Narvik, focussing on the valuable merchant ships
the attack taking place furthest from the mainland and with her 4.7in main guns and diligently sinking them.
therefore least likely to suffer any surprises.205 In Mostly these were of the coastal variety, but they also
contrast, the commandos for Hennigsvaer, Svolvaer and included vessels such as the 9,780-ton Hamburg (a re-
Brettesnes were escorted by Eskimo, Tartar and Bedouin frigerated fish factory ship in great demand due the
respectively, with Somali going from port to port to pro- Battle of the Atlantic) and which the naval demolition
vide support, while at the same time acting as both naval party had fancied as their prize/transport home to the
and military command post, having embarked the com- UK, but they had forgotten to tell anyone else of their
mander Brigadier Haydon and Rear Admiral Louis plan.209 Rather unusually for her, Eskimo had little to do,
Keppel Hamilton.206 When considering the Namsos ex- and the expected level of opposition did not materialise.
perience where air attacks and fast German counter-at- This was particularly true of the air threat, feared
tack had been critical factors in operations, this is throughout the planning, but which only materialised
understandable. Although it must have put a strain on at the end when a lone reconnaissance aircraft ap-
the commanding officer at the time, Captain Clifford peared. However, it never reached within range of the
Carlson, it did not adversely affect his subsequent ca- task force’s guns, and nor could it manage to send any
reer, which included command, as Captain, of the report as Bedouin jammed its signal.210 No further air-
battleship Nelson, and promotion to Vice Admiral and craft appeared and the force made it home successfully
the running of Singapore for the Navy. to Scapa at 1300hrs on 6 March. The force had sunk
The commandos were able to achieve multiple land- ten ships for a total of 19,350 tons of shipping and de-
ings because of the unique davit launching system of stroyed eighteen factories including eight critical to

55
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Maori leaving Malta in 1941 . (Drachinifel Collection) highlights their cruiser style duties: scouting, fixing and
keeping in contact with the enemy.211 On 23 May 1941
emollient production. Furthermore, 800,000 gallons of Cossack, again under the command of Captain Vian,
oil in seven tank farms were burned. The force had along with her 4th DF sisters Maori, Sikh and Zulu, a
rounded this all off by taking 213 German and 12 Quis- Polish destroyer Piorun, and the AA cruiser Cairo, were
lings prisoner, as well as 300 Norwegian volunteers. For escorting a troop convoy south-bound from the Clyde
Combined Operations Command it was testimony to and were roughly 300 miles west of Ireland.212 It was
a job well done. then that an alert came through: Bismarck and the
With most of the action taking place primarily on the cruiser Prinz Eugen had been sighted in Denmark
land, why did the destroyers matter? Simply put, it was Strait. The next day they received the shocking news
the weapons of the destroyers, their torpedoes, 4.7in that the pride of the Royal Navy, the battlecruiser Hood,
and 4in guns, that had provided confidence to the force following an engagement with Bismarck, had been
as well as the necessary firepower. The ships and their sunk.213 Vian’s first reaction was to order Cairo to a sta-
crews had proved themselves in a mission which tradi- tion thirty miles in the direction of the enemy to provide
tionally would have been conceived as a cruiser-based early warning, and this is how the convoy proceeded
operation, but was judged achievable because of the ca- until 0330hrs on the 26th.214
pabilities of the ‘Tribals’ which made up the force. It At this point Vian received orders to abandon the
was these capabilities which contributed to the oper- convoy, with all five destroyers under his command,
ation’s success and Lofoten was not the last time these and to join Admiral Tovey and his flagship King George
strengths would be called upon; long-range, indepen- V. Tovey had had to order many of his own destroyers
dent operations would be a feature of the ‘Tribal’ class to return to port because they were running out of
experience throughout their war service. fuel.215 At 0800hrs Vian received the sighting report
from a Catalina search aircraft giving the actual posi-
Sink the Bismarck tion of Bismarck. Based on this information he decided
If the Norway campaign can be said to have enabled to head straight for Bismarck as he believed his was the
the ‘Tribals’ to demonstrate their fighting prowess, es- best placed force to intercept her. However, he was un-
pecially their ability to give and take punishment while able to tell Tovey of his decision due to prior orders for
providing cover to more conventional destroyers, the the maintenance of radio silence.216 Fortunately for
story of the operation to find and sink the Bismarck both the Navy, and potentially Vian’s career, this proved

56
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

to be a propitious move. When the 4th DF reached Bis- In total, sixteen torpedoes were launched over the
marck, they arrived ‘to join the fray at the moment they course of six attacks. Three hits were registered, with
were most needed’.217 The ‘Town’ class cruiser Sheffield, flames on Bismarck’s forecastle visible to all the ships
which had established contact during the day and was after two of the strikes, although these were quickly ex-
still shadowing, had suffered damage to her radar and tinguished.222 As dawn broke on the 27th, King George
contact would have surely been lost during the night V and Rodney drew near to finish off the German
had Vian’s force not arrived in time to prevent a poten- battleship, escorted by the those ‘Tribals’ of the 6th DF
tial German rescue mission of the by now stricken which still had fuel, Somali, Tartar and Mashona.223 The
Bismarck.218 subsequent battle was fierce until Bismarck was finally
Contact would now not be lost thanks to the for- defeated and sunk. The duties of the ‘Tribals’ of the 4th
tuitous arrival and timing of the ‘back pocket cruisers’, DF were not over for all the ships of the 6th DF had by
Vian’s destroyers, which carried out the cruiser role and now all been sent home. This meant Cossack, Sikh and
kept in touch with Bismarck throughout the night.219 Zulu of the 4th DF had the crucial duty of escorting
However, Vian being the leader he was, they were never the battleships King George V and Rodney back to
just going to shadow. It was almost inevitable that the Scarpa Flow.224 Had these ships had been lost to the
‘Tribals’ would attempt to combine the cruiser role of gathering U-boats then the Battle of the Atlantic, in
shadowing with the destroyer role of slowing the terms of managing the surface raider threat, could have
enemy, although, of course, Ark Royal’s Swordfish tor- become very problematic and other theatres would
pedo bombers had arguably already accomplished this have suffered as a consequence.225 Maori remained, to-
mission with a hit to Bismarck’s rudder.220 gether with the cruiser Dorsetshire, picking up survivors
A destroyer slows down an enemy ship in the same from Bismarck before hurrying to join with the rest of
way as it seeks to sink it, with torpedoes, and if by aim- the 4th DF.226 This was not the last time the ‘Tribals’
ing to do the former it accomplishes the latter, that is a would be involved in hunting ‘large prey’.
bonus. After the Piorun spotted Bismarck at 2238hrs, It was at this moment that a cat, of much myth and
the flotilla took up shadowing positions, and Vian gave some history, mingled its story in with that of the
the order ‘to attack independently as opportunity ‘Tribals’. The story goes that one of Bismarck’s feline
offered’.221 crew survived her sinking and was rescued by the crew
of Cossack and christened Oscar, or Oskar. He did not,
however, prove such a good luck charm, though he
Mohawk in a photo which seems to be have been taken just on the himself survived the sinking of both Cossack and, later,
cusp of war, as she was to become G59 in the autumn of 1940. the carrier Ark Royal. Re-christened Unsinkable Sam,
Taken after March 1939 she is dressed for leaving port, consistent he eventually found himself assigned to Gibraltar naval
with peacetime practice. (Drachinifel Collection) base for the rest of his service career.
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Somali at speed. (Drachinifel Collection) survivors were abandoned, volunteers from Punjabi
completed several trips by ‘borrowed’ truck in order to
rescue as many of those left behind as they could.
Operation Aerial and Convoys from Malta For a ‘Tribal’ class destroyer, convoy duty did not al-
to Murmansk ways assume what is traditionally meant by the ex-
Convoys, whether abandoned to chase Bismarck, pro- pression: close escort work. While ‘Tribals’ did
tected around coastal waters, or escorted while crossing sometimes perform this duty, they were more often as-
the Atlantic or Arctic, were a big part of the fighting de- signed to scouting, being positioned far enough ahead,
stroyer story. Even Gurkha, the first ‘Tribal’ to have or travelling the route unaccompanied to trigger traps
been sunk, had already taken part in escorting at least and either sweep the waters clear of any threat that they
six convoys before she was lost in April 1940. The rest could out match, such as destroyers or submarines, and
of the class were to be equally heavily involved; for report any threat they could not tackle. This role was
example, Nubian accompanied at least twenty-three crucial to the safety of convoys even after the introduc-
convoys, Ashanti twenty-one, Eskimo twenty and Tartar tion of Airborne Early Warning systems in the form of
twenty-five. The class average was roughly fourteen radar-carrying Swordfish in 1941. Frequently beyond
convoys each. These figures do little to describe the ex- help from other escorts, ‘Tribals’, with their excellent
perience of any convoy, nor the experience of the least mix of capabilities, were well suited to this role.
well known of the class, Punjabi, veteran of at least For Punjabi and her crew, life on the Arctic convoys
eleven convoys, the story of which illustrates the convoy began as it would go on, with a lot of action and plenty
experience well. of heavy weather. Punjabi was one of four vessels
Punjabi’s early convoy experience included the which made up Rear Admiral Vian’s Force K. The
evacuation of St Nazaire, Operation Aerial. Between 17 other vessels were her sister Tartar and the cruisers
and 20 June 1940 she saw constant action, first coming Aurora and the flagship Nigeria. This force was set up
under incessant air attack as she and other destroyers on 27 July 1941 for two main roles, though at times it
ferried troops from St Nazaire to Quiberon Bay, the was divided. The first role was to cover Operation
closest spot the transports could reach, and sub- Gauntlet between 25 August and 3 September, a raid
sequently, after escorting the transports home to Ply- on northern Norway (to be precise, Spitsbergen in the
mouth, returning alone to rescue the Polish troops left Svalbard Archipelago) to destroy coalmines and ship-
behind to cover the escape. It was also discovered that ping infrastructure, thereby denying coal to Germany.
there were survivors from one of the transports, the The second was to assess the passage to Russia and try
requisitioned liner Lancastria which had been sunk with to compensate for the Navy’s reluctance to base a sur-
a loss of perhaps as many as 5,000 troops. With Ger- face strike force in Russia despite the diplomatic and
man troops closing in on the nearby hospital where the political pressure being brought to bear for such an ac-

58
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

tion. Gauntlet was successful: the reassurance of the man battleship, despite achieving some near misses, was
Russians less so. That would be an ongoing saga, and already running south back to Trondheim, and the
all the time the Russians could not guarantee the Navy never caught up with her.
defences of their ports (especially against air attacks) 1942 continued to be an eventful period for Punjabi.
it was judged best to deploy submarines rather than After being part of the covering force for PQ13 (along
risk surface ships. with sisters Ashanti, Bedouin, Eskimo and Tartar), Con-
From an operational perspective it is interesting to voy QP10 would see Punjabi as close escort. Punjabi
note that, despite the 24-hour daylight, allowing for al- had not originally been assigned this role, but after the
most constant surveillance by German reconnaissance air attacks on PQ13, she was sent to reinforce the con-
aircraft, most were stationed far away in the south with voy forming up in Kola inlet. They sailed on 10 April
the German Norwegian occupation forces. Con- in snowy, foggy weather, with bad visibility, and the
sequently, there were no attacks on the forces involved captain, Commander The Hon J M G Waldegrave, kept
in Gauntlet; but the threat of such attacks was the jus- a careful watch over the icy waters. Despite the weather,
tification for not basing a surface force in Russia, some- the first air attacks, from the Junkers Ju 88s, arrived the
thing which Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary had following day. Although a pair were shot down, with the
promised their Ambassador to Britain, although with- twin 4in AA mount earning an honourable mention, SS
out first checking with the Admiralty. Empire Cowper was sunk with the loss of nine crew. The
Gauntlet was swiftly followed by Operation following day U-435 sank two merchant ships, the Rus-
Strength, in which the oldest carrier in the Fleet, Argus, sian freighter Kiev and the American cargo vessel El
was supported by the ‘County’ class cruiser Shropshire Occidente. Attacks by Ju 88s continued, with Punjabi
and three ‘Tribals’, Punjabi, together with her sisters continually finding herself in harm’s way by being posi-
Matabele and Somali. The operation involved the tioned up threat. Nevertheless, they successfully fought
twenty-two Hurricanes of No 151 Wing RAF, aboard the attacks until weather, first in the form of fog and
Argus. Together with fifteen more aboard the merchant then gale force winds accompanied them all the way to
ships of another convoy, Operation Dervish, and per- Iceland where they arrived on the 22 March. On that
sonnel carried aboard the ‘Tribals’, it was hoped Oper- occasion fog saved the convoy, but two months later,
ation Strength would provide critical protection for the whilst part of the distant cover for PQ15, more fog,
subsequent convoys as they reached the air support technical failures and navigational mistakes led to a col-
range off the Russian coast. This was part of the Oper- lision with the 35,000-ton battleship King George V.
ation Benedict deployment, whereby Hurricanes would Punjabi was sunk and only 169 of her crew were res-
be deployed to Vaenga (modern-day Severomorsk) cued, all from the forward half.
from where they would operate whilst simultaneously
training up Russian crews to take over. The goal was Return to the Mediterranean
achieved and unloading at Archangel was completed by While escorting convoys was a key role, it was in the
12 September 1941. The British air crews were with- cruiser role of surface sweep (the ‘offensive’ counter-
drawn in November, and the Russians maintained units part to those sweeps carried out to secure convoy
to cover the ports and convoy approaches for the rest routes) that the ‘Tribal’ class contributed to the success
of the war. Following these operations the more routine of the Battle of Cape Bon in December 1941. Two of
convoy duties began, although not necessarily so in the their number, Sikh and Maori, along with a Dutch ship,
case of Punjabi. Isaac Sweers, and another destroyer, the ‘L’ class Legion,
Punjabi would often be attached to the covering sank two Italian light cruisers which in design were
force rather than the convoy, acting as part of the fight- similar to that preferred by the Mediterranean Fleet’s
ing strength that was in place to deal with any major command during the pre-build ‘Tribal’ discussions as
surface threat that might emerge from the Norwegian examined in Chapter 1.227 Cape Bon was a battle which
fiords. One such occasion was during the emergence of clearly showed both the capabilities of the Navy’s de-
the Tirpitz during the PQ12 and QP8 ‘transition win- stroyer force as a whole and the ‘Tribal’ class in par-
dow’. This is when both convoys had been timed to be ticular, as the following accounts demonstrate.228
at sea so that the covering forces could be at maximum
potential strength to deal with such a threat, but it is Malta – Cape Bon –Tennyson Randle Ford229
also when the convoys are actually passing each other.
Punjabi was ordered out to sea with a mixed cruiser/de- Commanding Officer, HMS ‘Sikh’ and the Senior
stroyer force to try to locate the Tirpitz, but the Ger- Officer of Group I, including HM Ships ‘Legion’

59
Matabele in 1942 with an altogether more complicated paint 3. I immediately reduced the speed of the force
scheme than her previous photo. This depicts one of the versions of under my command in order to avoid showing a big
a ‘disruptive paint scheme’ adopted as the war went on to make it phosphorescent bow wave and led inshore so as to
harder, especially for submarines, to spot ships. This photo is also get between the enemy and the land, which, I judged,
taken after the ‘X’ mount was changed to twin 4in guns to provide
would give me a chance of getting in unobserved.
improved air defence. (Maritime Quest)
4. The manoeuvre was successful beyond my
wildest expectations and after passing the customary
warning signals to the ships astern, I engaged the
and ‘Maori’ and HNMS ‘Isaac Sweers’. The Allied leading cruiser with torpedoes and the second with
force was steaming south in line ahead at high speed guns at a range of about one thousand yards. Two of
in a narrow channel off Cape Bon between the coast my torpedoes hit the leading ship which immediately
and an Italian minefield when two Italian cruisers burst into flames forward and after, and the second
were sighted ahead steaming on the same course. ship fired one salvo from her main armament (which
Commander Stokes was about to overtake and at- salvo burst on the foreshore of Cape Bon) before she
tack the cruisers, when the latter turned 16 points; was silenced by three well-directed salvoes from
he therefore reduced speed to avoid showing a big ‘Sikh’ and a torpedo amidships from ‘Legion’, and
bow wave, kept on the landward side and success- she disappeared in a cloud of smoke and I did not
fully avoided being sighted by the enemy. ‘Sikh’ ob- see her again. I afterwards engaged a torpedo boat,
tained two hits with torpedoes on the leading cruiser, thought to be of the ‘Spica’ class, with my short
which burst into flames, and attacked the second range weapons only as she passed so close and at
cruiser so successfully with gunfire that she only such a high rate of change of bearing that the main
fired one ineffective salvo and was destroyed by armament could not be brought to bear.
‘Legion’ and ‘Maori’. A small destroyer which ap-
peared on ‘Sikh’s’ starboard side was engaged with Maori – Cape Bon – Commander Rafe Edward
pom-pom and 0.5inch guns and was damaged; a Courage RN231
second destroyer, or E-boat, was probably destroyed 3. After your torpedoes had damaged the leading
by the Allied force cruiser, ‘Maori’ opened fire with gunfire and a large
number of hits were observed on the bridge of the
Sikh – Cape Bon – Commander Graham Henry enemy. When she was abeam, ‘Maori’ fired two tor-
Stokes RN230 pedoes, one of which was seen to hit; the other was

60
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

unobserved. This cruiser the passed astern in flames engine room while she lay at anchor in Grand
and was undoubtedly sinking. Harbour.233 In contrast to Sikh and Zulu, lost in a brutal
4. The second ship was lost sight of, but a sheet battle when taking part in the commando raid on To-
of flame was seen away to port and it was presumed bruk in September 1942, it was an ignominious end.234
that she was sinking. In March 1942 the Second Battle of Sirte took place,
5. One torpedo-boat was seen and passed, very a battle which confirmed what the chase of the Bis-
close, down ‘Maori’s’ starboard side. Fire from 4.7in marck had demonstrated: it is not, as the old adage goes,
guns was opened but was not very successful owing the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of fight in
to the very short range. Close range weapons unfor- the dog that matters. The ‘Tribals’, and their successors,
tunately jammed. I did not pursue this torpedo-boat were built with a lot of fight in them.
as you made the signal to ‘Dis-engage’.
The Second Battle of Sirte
Rate of fire was critical to this action, just as it had been The Second Battle of Sirte is a battle which arouses di-
in the fjords of Norway. The manoeuvrability and sheer verse opinion in relation to both its context and the
firepower of the ‘Tribals’ provided the necessary cover, consequences. But as the historian Peter C Smith
just as it was thought they would, for a torpedo attack makes clear in his work on Laforey class destroyers,
to be pressed home forcefully, aided of course by the everyone agrees that it was hugely significant.235 On one
element of surprise gained by attacking from the shore side was the British convoy, MW10, making an urgent
side which also made it difficult for the Italians to see run for Malta under the command of Rear Admiral
them. It was a combination of sudden, concentrated Philip Vian. The urgency was serious because Malta
4.7in fire, momentarily dazzling the bridge and gun was running out of everything, and the importance of
crews, with the coup de main delivered by torpedoes that the convoy led to the formation of a sizeable escort
disabled the two cruisers Di Giussano and Da Barbiano. force made up of four light cruisers, a dedicated AA
None of this would have been possible though, without cruiser and eighteen destroyers, which included both
the advantages of radar, deployed on an aircraft which Sikh and Zulu.236 Large it may have been, however, but
had found the Italians, as well as on board the ships. its potency was compromised due to the damage sus-
Once again, this attack showed the potency of an ag- tained by major fleet units, such as Valiant and Queen
gressively handled destroyer force, which the ‘Tribals’, Elizabeth, and the need to find ships for not just both
thanks to the confidence of their captains and the esprit halves of the Mediterranean, but also the Atlantic, the
de corps of their crews, epitomised.232 After taking part Indian Ocean and the Pacific. As a consequence the
in this and other actions, Maori’s demise came when convoy had no battleships and no carriers and was
she was destroyed by a bomb which penetrated her therefore entirely dependent upon destroyers, cruisers
and land-based air cover when that was available.237 In
Sikh was in many ways a queen of the Mediterranean in her time, contrast, the Italian force which confronted the convoy
operating from Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria, taking in actions – located thanks in large part to the Axis Mediterranean
with Force H, various striking forces and the Mediterranean Fleet air dominance in March 1942 – was numerically
proper. (Drachinifel Collection) smaller but far more powerful, comprising the battle-

61
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Pujabi would have her career cut short by HMS King George V battleship’s armour would have been beyond reach of
splitting her in two whilst they were operating as part of covering even the 4.7in main guns), but which established them
force for PQ 13/ QP 10 Arctic convoys in 1942. (Drachinifel as an ‘aggressive’ threat in the mind to the battleship.
Collection) They combined this with a smoke cover which was so
dense that it made it difficult for the other destroyers
ship Littorio, two heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers.238 to fire, let alone for the Littorio make contact with her
On paper, therefore, the Italian battleship’s 15in guns quarry.241 In this battle Sikh epitomised those qualities
out-matched and out-ranged anything on the British around which the ‘Tribals’ had been conceived,
side, making victory all but certain. whether fulfilling either cruiser or destroyer roles. They
During the height of the battle, while the British light were designed to fight and, just as importantly, lead the
cruisers were engaged by the Italian heavy cruisers and fight.242 This action is important because, just as the 4th
some of the destroyers, Littorio tried to work her way DF did against Bismarck, and Sikh had done at Cape
around the escort force and reach the convoy. Although Bon, she used both her rate of fire and her torpedoes,
this was to an extent successful, unfortunately for Lit- and her destroyer design capabilities of manoeuvrabil-
torio, it left her in way of the operationally grouped 5th ity, high speed and relatively small target profile, to fulfil
Division, comprising Sikh, the Laforey- class Lively, and the cruiser role of holding an enemy battleship at bay
two ‘H’ class vessels, Hero and Havock.239 These de- in order to protect the convoy.
stroyers hurled themselves at the battleship and its es- Operation Harpoon began like many other Mediter-
corts. Havock was damaged and out of action quite ranean convoys, with another convoy starting from the
quickly, but the remaining three destroyers, through other end of the route; in this case Harpoon started
sheer aggression, a willingness to expose themselves to from Gibraltar, while Vigorous set out from Alexandria.
danger, and by maintaining a constant barrage of fire Harpoon though, would result in what came to be
from any weapons that would bear, straddling the Lit- called the Battle of Mid-June, the nondescript but ap-
torio consistently, managed to hold off the battleship for propriate name for a battle which took place on 15 June
forty minutes until reinforcements arrived and took up 1942.243 The ‘Tribal’ class Bedouin was one of five fleet
the challenge.240 destroyers assigned to convoy protection, the other four
Sikh was the leader of this division, and it was Sikh being a War Emergency Programme ‘P’ class Partridge,
that spotted Littorio first, engaging at 16,000 yards, a the ‘I’ class Itheurial, and the 1939 ‘M’ class vessels
range at which firing was pointless from a combat dam- Marne and Matchless. Bedouin’s captain, Commander
age perspective (although it would not have mattered Scurfield, had been charged by the convoy commander
how close they had been, as anything covered by the at 0630hrs to lead the destroyers to face the Italian

62
 A DIFFERENT AND NOT SO DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 1941–2

cruisers and destroyers if, but as likely when, they slow the convoy down the decision was made to turn
sighted by the convoy.244 It was a sunny day, and the for Gibraltar.250 This proved fatal. At 1320hrs they once
Italian force of two cruisers and five destroyers were again found the Italian squadron.251 At this point Par-
unhindered by the need to protect merchant ships, an tridge slipped her tow, hoping to draw the Italians away
unusual boon in Mediterranean actions. In the war in from her consort, but it was an unsuccessful ploy.
the Mediterranean ships were almost always operating Though Bedouin managed to get underway with one
in range of land-based enemy aircraft, but for both sides engine, her fate was sealed.252 Not only did the Italians
it was necessary to run convoys. And it was arguably call on two ‘Condottieri’ class cruisers, the Raimondo
more necessary for the Regia Marina than the Royal Montecuccoli (of the sub-class of the same name) and
Navy as the latter’s convoys were mainly for supply of Eugenio di Savoia (of the later Duca d’Aosta sub-class)
Malta, while the former supplied the entire North Af- along with five destroyers, but they also deployed tor-
rica campaign. Under those circumstances, when two pedo bombers, one of which, a Savoia-Marchetti
convoys engaged in a battle each side judged it a suc- SM.79 Sparviero of 132nd Gruppo launched the tor-
cess if their convoy got through. However, when only pedo which sank Bedouin; in a last act of defiance, Be-
side had a convoy to escort, then the measure for suc- douin shot this aircraft down.253 A recurring theme in
cess for the other side altered. the story of the ‘Tribal’ class is the threat of air power,
This scenario was why the division of the escort be- and six of the twelve vessels lost by the Royal Navy
tween a ‘Close Escort’, comprising the anti-aircraft were lost to air attacks. Conversely, they consistently ac-
cruiser Cairo, the minelaying cruiser Abdiel, a flotilla of quitted themselves well for their size in air defence
‘Hunt’ class escort destroyers along with various mine- roles, particularly after upgrading to the twin 4in mount
sweepers and launches, and the ‘Mobile Escort’, which in X position and fitting extra light weapons. They were
comprised of the fleet destroyers was necessary. It frequently used for the transport or transfer of VIPs,
would allow for speedy reaction in the event of the force such as Winston Churchill and King George, both
being discovered as it proceeded alone without cover. around the British coast and in the Mediterranean as
Commander Scurfield later wrote to his wife: ‘This was will be discussed later. It is also why, as with Operation
what I had been training for, for twenty-two years, and Claymore, when an operation came up in the Mediter-
I led my five destroyers up towards the enemy. I was in ranean which was long range and with minimal sup-
a fortunate position in many ways, and I knew what we port, the ‘Tribal’ class were often the first choice.
had to do. The cost was not to be counted. The ship was Operation Agreement was a commando raid
as ready for the test as we had been able to make her. I planned to cause massive damage to the ability of the
could do no more about it.’245 Axis powers to fight in North Africa and took place in
These are words which reflect not only the fighting September 1942.254 It came about at the request of the
ethos of Royal Navy destroyers during the war, but also Army, and it was the then C-in-C Mediterranean, Vice
illustrate the conduct of the ship and her crew on 15 Admiral Harwood, of Battle of the River Plate fame,
June 1942. Bedouin and Partridge opened fire with their who planned it and oversaw its execution. The plan in-
guns at maximum elevation and range, drawing enemy volved disguising two destroyers, Sikh and Zulu, as Ita-
fire to them, enabling their sister ships to get closer.246 lian destroyers, by modification of the funnels and their
The fleet destroyers fought so well, that even though silhouettes, and, under the cover of night, sneak in close
they were forced to withdraw through their smoke- to Tobruk in support of a raid which it was hoped
screen because of the sheer weight of enemy fire, the would severely damage the facilities of the port.255 The
enemy chose not to follow them.247 These destroyers ‘Tribals’ had been chosen partly because their gun ar-
bought time for their convoy to escape, although it was mament would enable them to provide stronger sup-
not without cost; by drawing the enemy fire to them- port for the ground troops than other available
selves Bedouin and Partridge suffered greatly.248 As the destroyers. The remaining force comprised Coventry, a
convoy reformed they were left behind, valiantly at- ‘C’ class AA cruiser, the four ‘Hunt’ class escort de-
tempting to repair and get underway again. stroyers of the 5th DF, as well as sixteen Motor Torpedo
Of the two, Partridge had suffered less damage and Boats (MTBs) and three Motor Launches (MLs). The
managed to get underway quite soon, and took Bedouin MTBs, MLs and ‘Tribals’ would carry out the oper-
in tow. She had received twelve 6in hits, an indication ation to land and recover the troops. The remaining
of the tough nature of the ‘Tribal’ design.249 Despite re- ships were to act as an escort and supporting force, re-
gaining the convoy, damage to Bedouin was thought too maining out of the way to the east during the actual op-
great for Malta’s repair capabilities, and rather than eration.

63
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Unfortunately, this land and amphibious operation at least, was not dissimilar to Claymore and should have
proved to be the North African version of Operation worked. The answer to the failure lies in the different
Market-Garden in that as much as the risk might have circumstances. The Italians were better prepared in To-
been worth it, it was a bridge, or more accurately a bruk than virtually anywhere else, and while all available
beach too far. As well as the amphibious assault there Allied forces had been assigned to it, there were simply
were to be air attacks, a land-based attack by the Long not enough to make it viable. This was a key reason why
Range Desert Group and another by the Special Air the Navy was losing so many ships: often because they
Service. Fate was not kind however. The commandos, simply did not have enough viable hulls in the water to
who were supposed to be landed from the ‘T’ class sub- complete all the necessary tasks that needed doing.
marine Taku, failed to get ashore because of sea con- Ships were moved from crisis to crisis and mission to
ditions, and so were unable to place the necessary mission; the ‘Tribal’ class destroyers plugged the gaps,
beacons to guide the naval forces. As a result, Zulu and a role for which they had been built in the first place.
Sikh escorted the seaborne troops into the wrong While the losses of 1942 mounted, it was the losses
beach.256 The mistake was compounded by the shore of 1940 and 1941 which had already persuaded the Ad-
garrison being much stronger than intelligence had sug- miralty that the ‘Tribal’ class needed a successor,
gested. The situation was then further exacerbated beyond those further ‘Tribals’ being assembled and en-
when Sikh was hit by shore artillery while trying to tering service into the Royal Australian and Royal Ca-
evacuate the troops, and Zulu was damaged trying, and nadian Navies. Furthermore, cruiser construction was
failing, to pull her sister out.257 Unfortunately for the not producing enough ships; there were only so many
Navy, the operation swiftly turned into more of a rerun shipyards which could build the larger vessels and they
of Dunkirk and Crete than the success of Namsos. were overwhelmed. The smaller cruisers, such as the
Sikh sank during the battle, losing many of her crew. Didos with, for example, the problems with their 5.25in
Zulu managed to withdraw, but only after being dam- guns, were not proving as good value for money as had
aged by Italian fighter-bombers and she now needed been expected during pre-war discussions. In 1942, the
assistance.258 She made it to within 100 miles from decision which had been contemplated in 1941 was fi-
Alexandria before sinking while under tow, taking nally acted upon. A new design was chosen and the
thirty-nine of her crew with her; and en route she had Navy committed valuable and limited resources to the
had to sink the badly-damaged Coventry.259 So an op- construction of a new class of destroyer. The question
eration, for which the two ’Tribals’ were the best option was whether it would be built in time to see service in
available, ended in their loss. The operation, in concept the war.

64
 CHAPTER 4

COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

If the ‘Tribal’ class can be said to have had a turbulent in terms of size for their successors the ‘J’ class. Unfor-
conception, then that of the ‘Battle’ class was even more tunately, the case for the armament of the ‘J’s was still
so. There were those who felt the big destroyer, the being made and his successor, Rear Admiral Fraser (of
‘fighting’ destroyer, the ‘back pocket cruiser’, was not Battle of North Cape and British Pacific Fleet fame)
worth it and that it would be better to build more was more conventional. Initially the ‘Battles’ were held
cruisers and more destroyers. Surely specialist ships up by the hope that light cruiser production could fill
were better than all-rounders? Furthermore, unlike the the gap between the smaller, more torpedo-focused de-
‘Tribal’ class, the ‘Battles’ would have no friend with stroyers and the need for firepower over and above their
real influence in the halls of Whitehall, the Palace of capabilities. However, it was not long before war ex-
Westminster or even the Admiralty to fight for them. perience and need forced the ‘fighting’ destroyers back
They were ordered though because, even with the Do- on to the agenda. When designs similar to those Hen-
minion builds, there would not be enough ‘Tribal’ class derson had suggested not long previously (as early as
destroyers to carry out all the missions that were 1936/7, but also continually until he died) for the ‘L’
required of them, especially as those missions led to class were proposed in September 1941, they were
heavy losses; and there certainly would not be enough granted Admiralty support and ordered with unpreced-
cruisers to carry out all their missions, and the smaller ented speed in October 1941. It was a combination of
destroyers just did not have the firepower. the urgency of war requirements, and the fact the de-
The case for new, heavy destroyers to succeed the sign had been on the drawing board for some time,
‘Tribals’ had been started by Admiral Sir Reginald which made this possible.
Henderson when Third Sea Lord and Controller of the The design reflected the different times it found
Navy. Almost as soon as the ‘Tribals’ had been ordered itself in. The designers of the ‘Tribal’ class had had the
in 1935, he had started the campaign that he would win luxury of peace to think about how they might be used
when not at war: the ‘Battle’ class were the built when
the nation found itself fighting a second major war less
Sluys was a fine example of a completed 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class.
than twenty-five years after the first. This forced deci-
As well as two twin Bofors STAAG mountings she also carried six
single Bofors Mk VIII including one mounted abaft ‘B’ turret which
sions to be made which would radically affect the de-
is clearly visible in this photo, as is one of the mounts on the signal sign of the class, the most obvious of these being in their
deck next to the superstructure. Sluys achieved a very respectable layout. When describing the 1942/3 batches of ‘Battle’
top speed of 30.29kts in trials and retained a reputation for being class destroyers, the focus is often on the decision made
a quick ship. (Drachinifel Collection) to give them only two forward turrets because the aft
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Solebay, another 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class, in profile. This photo abaft the funnel, with a 4.5in multi-purpose gun in the
highlights the two amidships deckhouse single Bofors mounts. 1943 batch. By the time the 1944 batch of ‘Battle’ class
After trials she almost immediately become the flotilla leader for destroyers developed into the 1950s Daring class, the
5th Destroyer Flotilla, which meant that during Operation vessels were equipped with three turrets including one
Deadlight, she took part in the sinking of German U-boats, in ‘Y’ position. Without the pressure of war, and with
including one which required eleven rounds of 4.5in ammunition.
the improved capabilities of the weapon systems, it was
(Drachinifel Collection)
not only a sound operational decision but also a logical
procurement one. And indeed, the design of the 1942
turret was not needed in combat.260 Often reference ‘Battle’ class, the first batch of these vessels, was the
was made to fighting in the Mediterranean and Nor- product of a sound operational concept and logical pro-
way. But as has been discussed earlier, the aft turrets curement strategy, at least on paper, for otherwise ap-
were well used in those battles, so did the Navy misread proval would never have been granted, even under the
the evidence? In reality it was a misreading of what was pressures of war.
said in the files, or rather the context of what was said.
These turrets were the most technologically and ma- HMS Savage, a Test Bed
terially taxing components of the ships, barring the en- Even in the midst of war the Navy could not avoid
gines. Reducing the requirement from the four of the some testing, and it was crucial that the guns for the
‘Tribal’ class, or the three of other classes, would ease ‘Battle’ class, as well as the ‘Z’ and ‘C’ classes of the War
production and allow more space and displacement for Emergency Flotillas, underwent appraisal. In order to
torpedoes and light AA weapons. It was not a case of do this, the Admiralty chose to modify an ‘S’ class de-
not needing something: it was a case of whether the lack stroyer of the 5th Emergency Flotilla, then under con-
thereof could be adequately compensated for so as to struction, and create a ship with the equipment of the
bring the class more quickly into service. fighting destroyer. Her hull was of the Emergency Flo-
It was not an easy decision to make. The reason for tilla destroyers’ standard, as established by the ‘Q’ class
the pronounced space between ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets and of the 3rd Emergency Flotilla, in turn an adaptation of
the ship’s main structure was the need for the maxi- the ‘J’ class’s longitudinally framed hull, which included
mum possible firing arcs, and the need to cover as a ‘Tribal’ class style bow, but the stern modified with a
much of the stern as possible. The idea was that if an flatter and broader transom. It had been found that this
80 per cent solution could be achieved then the ships not only gave more space aft on the upper deck – useful
could be procured quickly enough to enter service and for equipment such as depth charges – but also gave
have an impact on the outcome of the war which by noticeable, albeit not massive, advantages in speed and
then was proceeding at pace. However, if any proof was endurance. Like the rest of her class she had four prin-
needed about the unease with this decision, it is there cipal guns, but their arrangement differed significantly
with the replacement of the 4in starshell mounting from those of her sisters.

66
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

Matapan was a 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class. The absence of the single the Battle of North Cape, which is discussed in the next
Bofors abaft ‘B’ turret makes the distance between the main chapter. She took part in at least sixteen trips with Arctic
armament and the superstructure quite distinct. (Drachinifel convoys, not many compared to the twenty-five of Tartar
Collection) or the twenty-three of Nubian, but still a respectable
number. Although the Navy was short of ships, service
Whereas the rest of her class were armed with four on Arctic convoys was unforgiving, and it was not a sta-
single 4.7in weapons, Savage had four new type 4.5in, tion where inadequate examples of ship types were
disposed as a twin mount forward, like those which sent. There were all sorts of places, for example
would equip the ‘Battle’ class, and two single mounts Africa or South America, where a less capable warship
aft which would be the armament on the ‘Z’ (10th could be put to use. It is reasonable to conclude that,
Emergency Flotilla) and ‘C’ (11th–15th Emergency despite being experimental, Savage was chosen because
Flotillas) classes. Other than this she was outwardly, her unique design was felt to be highly capable. This au-
barring the missing the super firing weapon in ‘B’ posi- gured well for the classes which were subsequently built.
tion, a conventional vessel of her class. Below, however,
the requirements of the ‘tween-deck arrangement The ‘Battle’ Design
necessary to support the twin turret necessitated some The operational concept of the ‘Battle’ class was even
changes and rearrangement. In order to expedite com- more orientated to fighting with guns than even the
pletion of her as quickly as possible, the twin mount ‘Tribal’ class. The older class had been conceived in
fitted was modified from a spare from Illustrious, the peacetime at a time when thinking about space for
lead ship of the armoured-hangar aircraft carriers general-purpose duties and general-purpose fighting
which had been one of Admiral Henderson’s principal was not just allowed but, in the case of the ‘Tribals, but
projects. When commissioned, Savage displaced 1,734 encouraged. In contrast the ‘Battle’ class came into
tons in standard configuration, 2,465 tons when fully being at a very different and more difficult time. Losses
loaded, like all War Emergency Destroyers. As a feat of had mounted and the solution revolved around more
naval architecture, this was by no means the only sig- armament. This meant that, despite being bigger, they
nificant aspect of her design. became rather cramped in comparison. They also dem-
The Navy may have conceived Savage as a test bed, onstrated the trend towards specialist ship designs, even
but she was nonetheless built as a destroyer to fight in for commando raids. Prior to Operation Claymore
a major war. She never had an option other than to cruisers and destroyers had provided the necessary lift.
serve doubly, both as a test bed and a warship. After With the rise and ready availability of specialist ships
successfully going through her trials, her equipment such as Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) and other landing
thoroughly inspected and assessed in operation, she was craft, less provision needed to be made on destroyers
deployed to the Fleet. She would spend most of her ser- for a sudden increase in embarked personnel. Fur-
vice life on the Arctic convoys, as well as taking part in thermore, while the ‘Tribal’ class could be said to have

67
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Asine, another of the 1943 Batch ‘Battle class’. (Drachinifel The ‘Battle’ class was conceived with worldwide op-
Collection) erations in mind. The ships were to be as potent and as
useful in the White Sea as in the Yellow Sea, or, perhaps
been built as cruisers to destroyer lines, the ‘Battle’ class more likely, in the Barents Sea as they would be in the
would be cruisers forward of the bridge structure but Philippines Sea. As a result, range, survivability and po-
destroyers aft. The primary benefit of cutting the ‘Y’ tential punch were all key areas of the design, although
turret was the doubling of space for torpedo armament. this did not mean significant real-life lessons and ex-
In other matters though the concept was remarkably perience would only be fitted into the concept as they
similar to the brief as written for the ‘Tribal’ class. materialised; some had been predicted before the war
demonstrated them. It meant the operational concept
Lagos was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class and despite not being of the ‘Battles’ as compared to that of the ‘Tribals’
completed in time for war was rushed to the Far East in January evolved. Space was less of a priority than overwhelming
1946 to replace war-weary vessels. (Drachinifel Collection) firepower for air defence. This was why every weapon,

68
Hogue, a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class, had her career cut short in a largest option for the ‘L’ class in 1937, a similarity
collision with a larger ship during an exercise in 1959, the ‘Crown which would only grow with each iteration of the design
Colony’ class light cruiser Nigeria, which had been Admiral Philip from concept to build.261 In fact, the ‘Battle’ class was a
Vian’s flagship in Force K. By the time of the exercise the ship product of much of his work, even beyond the hull.
belonged to the Indian Navy and the ship had been renamed INS The superstructure and bridge layout were taken
Mysore. She would go on to take out two more ships in exercises
from the ‘J’ class, which itself had been an evolution of
via collision, in 1969 and 1972. (Drachinifel Collection)
that used on the ‘Tribal’ class. Once again this was a
design produced during Henderson’s tenure as Third
barring torpedoes and depth charges, was at least dual Sea Lord, and most importantly for continuity, Goodall
purpose. They represented a continuation of the was still in post, and by October 1941 Vice Admiral Sir
‘Tribal’ class and, barring the lack of space for peace Bruce Fraser, Henderson’s successor, was in a far
keeping duties, they were the destroyer which Admiral stronger position than Henderson had been when he
Henderson would have wished to build. had started. This mattered for two reasons. First, it was
With an overall length of 379ft (364ft on the water- Goodall whose studies in the earlier part of his career
line), a beam of 40ft 3in and a full load of 3,361 tons, and his interest in foreign destroyer designs had made
the ‘Battle’ design was interesting, especially when com- possible the most obvious structural changes in com-
pared to the ‘Tribal’s’ measurements. The original class parison to the ‘Tribal’ class, and which enabled so
had an overall length of 377ft (364ft 8in on the water- much more weaponry to be carried. Exhaust was
line), a beam of 36ft 6ins and a full load of 2,519 tons. trunked out through a single funnel. Furthermore, the
The main areas of growth therefore were the beam and engine arrangement to achieve this difference was ca-
the draught, which had also increased by 15in. These pable of producing 50,000shp, 6,000shp more than the
hull changes were to benefit stability for the purposes ‘Tribal’ class had achieved. Secondly, because there was
of air defence. The ‘Tribals’ had been orientated around still the constant view that ‘it’s better to concentrate on
surface warfare: ‘Battles’ were surface warfare strong, cruisers and to make smaller destroyers slightly more
but they also reflected both the growing threat of air powerful, rather than build bigger destroyers’, which
power and the fact that navies in general, but the Royal was held by many naval officers. However, useful the
Navy in particular, were in 1941 still developing and smaller destroyers were, the bigger ‘fighting’ destroyers
refining the operational tactics needed to counter air at- had proved themselves too. A new generation was
tacks. Admiral Henderson returns to the story here, be- required, but their value was not simply their size, but
cause the ship design that emerged was very similar to what their size enabled them to carry.
that which had been proposed by him in 1937 as the As with the ‘Tribals’ it was sensors which mattered,

69
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Alamein, a 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class, is pictured here in a way Electronics, however, is more than simply radar: it
which highlights the anti-air weapons fit: the two imposing twin also comprises communications such as the varieties of
40mm Bofors STAAG mounts, the Squid ASW mortar fitted further Radio Direction Finding (RDF). This was not an early
back, then a quintuple torpedo launcher, followed by another twin form of radar, but a system designed to detect enemy
40mm Bofors, the second quintuple torpedo launcher, then the transmissions. The most commonly known of these sys-
single 4.5in gun, before reaching the funnel, the single 40mm tems, the High Frequency Detection Finder (HF/DF)
abreast the bridge structure at the signal deck level and finally,
was more colloquially known as huff-duff. It was de-
forward, two twin 4.5in turrets. (Drachinifel Collection)
signed to detect the communication signals of submar-
ines and aircraft. Along with its counterpart, the less
sensors and the ability to process the information pro- well known Medium Frequency Detection Finder
vided. Carrying four different types of radar, the 275, (MF/DF), this proved crucial to class vessels during the
the 282, the 293 and the 291, the ‘Battles’ were fes- Battle of the Atlantic, especially in providing intelli-
tooned in comparison to the pre-war ships. The Type gence to support the communication traffic analysis
275 was a centimetric evolution of the – by 1941, when which underpinned many of the key strategic decisions
design selection took place – quite well developed Type of the battle. It is unsurprising therefore that in the de-
285 anti-aircraft gunnery radar, a system which had sign and specifications their fitting was given great em-
evolved into a more general-purpose gunnery radar by phasis. It was not only enemy communications that
1944. Therefore, although new in 1944, the year before were critical, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) had
the class entered service, it was also to a great extent grown in importance from its initial developments in
proven.262 The Type 282 had entered service in 1941. the 1930s to the absolutely essential war fighting tool it
It was a ranging system for Bofors and pom-poms, became for integrated naval and air operations.
fitted in the ‘Battle’ class to the critical Hazemeyer Whether used for single nation or multinational oper-
mounts, which will be discussed more fully when guns ations, it was the key enabler.
are examined further on. The Type 293 continued the The third sphere of electronics was the High Angle
theme of combining the new with the proven. Its elec- Control System (HACS). Originally developed for
tronics came from the proven Type 276/7 surface cruisers or bigger ships, it was adapted for the ‘Battles’
search system, while the 293 was a short-range air by the time the class was fitting out. It had built-in Type
search radar thanks to the new antenna design. The 275 radar and was modified further by being combined
Type 291, last but by no means least, was designed for with the Fuze Keeping Clock, as had been fitted aboard
destroyers and small ships, including submarines. This the ‘Tribal’ class. This system, by this time called the
system was crucial in enabling Royal Navy warships to Mk VI director, was critical though it was by no means
find opponents in all weathers. perfect. This was principally due to the assumptions

70
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

The starboard side of Alamein. With her boat deployed alongside ment they had not got far, principally because they had
and awnings up, she is transformed into a venue, a place to only gained control of the Fleet Air Arm in 1939, and
entertain and impress . (Drachinifel Collection) could not really develop capability without getting the
Air Ministry on side, which in turn meant they could
made during the early design phase about the kind of not develop the counter. It was not only sensors and
air attack fleets would have to face, and this in turn targeting systems which had to catch up, but also guns
meant that the engineers developing and the crews and, more specifically, their mounts did as well.
manning the systems were to an extent playing catch It was this need to counter air attack which really
up, but it was certainly better than nothing. The initial, drove the selection of arguably the primary weapon sys-
incorrect, assumption had been that future air attacks tem of the ‘Battle’ class. The double QF 4.5in Mk IIIs
would largely be confined to those which could be car- on Mk IV Between Deck, or in abbreviated form ‘BD’,
ried out by heavy bombers (ie level bombing from quite mounted forward, was certainly prominent. As BD they
high up) or torpedo bombers. Dive-bombing was dis- differed from guns normally fitted on destroyers at this
counted, chiefly due the bias of the Air Ministry, but time, which were normally Upper Deck (UD) systems
less so by the Royal Air Force which had inherited the that did not have anything below deck level; simply put
technique from the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal they were more battleship style weapons than de-
Naval Air Service when formed before the First World stroyers’. Moreover, these gun systems were placed so
War. This was not something in which the Air Ministry far forward of the superstructure that they made an al-
was really going to invest, nor indeed promote, since ready aggressive-looking design appear even more so;
they felt the heavy bomber was the more capable it seemed as if the guns were so eager to engage the
weapon system for fighting a war. It was also con- enemy they were stretching their own ship. If the layout
sidered by some to be the best guarantor of maintaining of the ‘Tribals’ made them look impressive in a
the Royal Air Force as a separate service, something statesman-like way, the ‘Battle’ class could be said to
viewed as essential to the security of the United King- have been made to look impressive in a thoroughly
dom in the face of increasing air power. threatening way. The reason that these guns were so far
This is not to say that dive-bombing came as a sur- forward was to give them as extensive a field of fire as
prise to the Navy when it experienced it on operations: possible, and it was also, at least in part, to make up for
in fact, barring the few Hawker Hart light bombers that the lack of firepower aft. The question is: what did these
remained in Royal Air Force service at the time, it was systems offer to justify the cost in displacement, in
the Navy’s Fleet Air Arm Blackburn Skua which rep- complexity of construction and operation, in materials
resented British capability for carrying out dive- and in design compromises?
bombing. Despite the Admiralty’s interest and commit- This system was selected over the 4.7in guns that

71
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

The ‘Battle’ Class 1942 Batch

Name Constructor Laying Commission Normal History of Name when Bestowed Initial
Down Displacement Flotilla
(tons)

Barfleur* Swan Hunter 28 October 14 September 2,958 A traditional capital ship name, four 19th DF
(Capt. D) (Tyne & Wear) 1942 1944 predecessors had born it with pride, most were
closer to the Centurion class battleship in
naval ship status

Camperdown Fairfield Shipbuilding 30 October 18 June 2,819 A traditional capital ship name, three 19th DF
& Engineering 1942 1945 predecessors had born it with pride, most
Company (Govan, like the ‘Admiral’ class battleship that was its
Glasgow) immediate predecessor were more obvious
high status ships

Armada Hawthorn Leslie 29 December 2 July 2,315 One predecessor, a 74-gun Third Rate ship 19th DF
(Capt. D) and Company 1942 1945 (standard) / of the line which saw action in the war of
(Tyneside) 3,361 (full) 1812, when she was just two years old and
which had served the RN till 1863

Trafalgar Swan Hunter 15 February 23 of July 3,094 A capital ship name which had previously 19th DF
(Capt. D) 1943 1945 equipped two First Rate ships of the line, and
was namesake for a class of battleships in
1887… subsequently has also been namesake for
a class of nuclear-Ppowered submarines launched
in 1981

Hogue Cammell Laird 6 January 24 July 3,211 The original vessel in the lineage was called 19th DF
(Birkenhead) 1943 1945 La Hogue and was a Third Rate ship of the line
eventually converted to have steam screw
propulsion, there was also a Cressy class
armoured cruiser, sunk in 1914… to date this
is the last ship to have carried this name

Finisterre Fairfield Shipbuilding 8 December 11 September 2,757 A new name in 1942, only ship to have Gunnery
& Engineering 1942 1945 borne this name so far Training
Company Ship

Solebay Hawthorn Leslie 3 February 25 September 2,905 Six(Seven) predecessors bore this name, 5th DF
(Capt. D) and Company 1943 1945 all Fifth and Sixth Rates during the age of sail,
originally was allocated to an Algerine class
minesweeper – but was reallocated whilst that
was still in build to this vessel.

Lagos Cammell Laird 8 April 2 November 3,060 A new name in 1942, only ship to have 19th DF
1943 1945 borne this name so far

St Kitts Swan Hunter 8 September 21 January 2,315 A new name in 1942, only ship to have 5th DF
1943 1946 (standard) / borne this name so far
3,361 (full)

Cadiz Fairfield Shipbuilding 10 May 12 April 2,806 Predecessor had been a fireship that was 5th DF
& Engineering Company 1943 1946 used at the Battle of Barfleur, however that
and this destroyer are the only uses so far

Gravelines Cammell Laird 10 August 14 June 2,315 A new name in 1942, only ship to have Reserve
1943 1946 (standard) / borne this name so far Fleet
3,361 (full)

St James Fairfield Shipbuilding 20 May 12 July 2,873 Predecessor had been a ship captured in 1625 5th DF
(Capt. D) & Engineering 1943 1946 and sold in 1628; so far this has been
Company the last ship to carry the name

72
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

Name Constructor Laying Commission Normal History of Name when Bestowed Initial
Down Displacement Flotilla
(tons)

Saintes Hawthorn Leslie 8 June 27 September 2,315 A new name in 1942, only ship to have 5th DF
(Capt. D) and Company 1943 1946 (standard) / borne this name so far
3,361 (full)

Sluys Cammell Laird 24 November 30 September 3,080 A new name in 1942, only ship to have borne 5th DF
1943 1946 this name so far

Vigo Fairfield Shipbuilding 11 September 9 December 2,757 Three (four) predecessors, a Fourth Rate and Reserve
& Engineering Company 1943 1946 two Third Rate ships of the line, a modified ‘V&W’ Fleet
destroyer of WWI was also to be namedthus –
but was cancelled whilst in build, as such this is
currently the last ship to have borne the name

Gabbard Swan Hunter 2 of February 10 December 3,105 A new name in 1942, only ship to have 5th DF
1944 1946 borne this name so far

*= served in WWII Capt.D = Fitted to act as Flotilla Leader ** = as recorded during full power trials unless otherwise stated
Shipyards and launch dates compiled by author from various records including those held at the UK National Archives and the work of Patrick Boniface (2007)

had been the basis of destroyer armament, and were the these systems were just as important. They were the
defining characteristic of the ‘Tribal’ class. What made reason why, when commissioned, the vessels of the
it special? What made a barely modified version of the class were considered some of the most powerful anti-
secondary armament of carriers and capital ships the aircraft ships in the Fleet. They were also some of the
desired system for the new fighting destroyers? Simply most complex and difficult systems to maintain, but
put, as the secondary armament on capital ships, they until something better was developed, they were judged
were designed to be both heavy anti-aircraft and anti- to offer the only solution. The gun was the twin 40mm
surface weapons, with a rapid rate of fire and rotation, Bofors Mk IV mounting, copied from a Dutch design
but also with an elevation of up to 80 degrees. First and originally conceived for a class of unbuilt German-
foremost, however, the system was available; it was in inspired battlecruisers proposed for the Far East and
service with existing lines of support and training, and
a world war was being fought. It was a compromise, but
not one that was going to keep Vice Admiral Fraser, or Armada was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ and here is pictured early in her
anyone within the Controller’s or Constructor’s office, career, when she could have mounted up to fourteen 40mm
awake at night. cannon, although she seems to have had just ten, including the four
Turning to the lighter weapons, in the ‘Battle’ class Hazemayer twin mounts clearly seen arraigned aft. (Maritime Quest)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Builders’ profile of Lagos, as fitted, 1946. (© National Maritime be produced every four months. This added time to the
Museum, Greenwich, London) production, but in comparison to the 4.5in guns, the
Hazemayer was far simpler.
Since they first evolved, torpedoes had been the
mainstay of destroyers, in fact they were the reason for
brought across from the Netherlands to Britain by an their evolution. First came the torpedo boats, small
escaping minelaying destroyer, HNLMS Willem Van vessels armed with the ‘giant killer’ or ‘magic bullet’
Der Zaan. It had been a revelation to British armaments that torpedoes were thought to be prior to the First
officers. Simply put, it gave a ship stopping power. The World War, and which would be the cheap counter to
increased damage caused by a Bofors 40mm round the mighty battleships which then ruled the waves. The
compared to a pom-pom/Vickers 40mm (especially in response to these vessels was slightly bigger ships, still
terms of range and velocity) coupled with the stability armed with torpedoes, but also with QF guns to de-
of the platform, thanks to its gyrostabilised three axis stroy the torpedo boats. These were the torpedo boat
system, all combined with its tachymetric targeting set destroyers, the appellation soon shortened to destroyer,
up, made for an excellent system.263 Fortunately, the on which torpedoes were such a significant fixture. The
Dutch were allies and friendly, so the Hazemayer was ‘Battle’ class had two quad torpedo launchers,
quickly in production, the aim being to produce five mounted on the centreline, slightly aft of midships.
units a month by mid-1942. The Dutch would require Each launcher was loaded with four Mk IX 21in tor-
at least two of those, so it would take 17 months to ac- pedoes, ship-killers which were carried by cruisers as
quire the fifty ordered. The ‘Battle’ class of 1942 orig- well as destroyers and which had been in service since
inally carried four, one pair in echelon occupying the the early 1930s. Displacing nearly 1.7 tons and
‘X’ position towards the stern, the other pair arranged measuring nearly 24ft in length, it is not hard to see
on the structure between the torpedo launchers. why they were considered such a potent weapon, es-
Enough systems for three ‘Battle’ class destroyers could pecially with a top speed of 41kts and a 365kg Torpex

74
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

warhead. These were the weapons – though slightly The ‘C’ Class Destroyer
newer, slightly bigger and marginally faster – that At the same time as the ‘Battle’ class was being designed
would sink the Argentinian cruiser Belgrano in 1982. so were other classes, the most important of which were
Furthermore, they had been in service since 1929 and the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th War Emergency De-
used to arm almost all the Royal Navy destroyers from stroyer Flotillas, the ‘C’ class destroyers, sometimes
the ‘A’ class onwards. termed ‘War Emergency Destroyers’. This class is
However, the torpedo was not the simplest weapon worth examination by way of comparison with the
system aboard. That honour went to, by this time very ‘Battle’ class. They were a traditional destroyer in form
traditional but still effective, ten-pattern depth charge and size, at least on paper and in terms of concept,
system which provided the anti-submarine capability compared with the heavier ‘Battle’ class’s ‘fighting’ de-
on this next generation general-purpose destroyer, and stroyer shape, and they well illustrate the differences of
had been chosen over the more complex Squid anti- conception for the two types. Technically, there were
submarine mortar, which was later fitted in the 1950s. four sub-classes within the single ‘C’ class, and they
It was a standard heritage four-thrower ten-depth were ordered in four batches of eight ships each be-
charge launch system. This made sense, because the tween February and September 1942. They were des-
‘Battles’, like the ‘Tribals’ before them, were not pri- tined to become escorts with torpedo and
marily anti-submarine vessels. They were general- anti-submarine cover. With 12th Flotilla, the ‘Ch’ sub-
purpose fighting vessels which would carry out such class, the design stabilised with a displacement of 1,900
work when needed. They were there to support and fill tons in standard load and 2,535 tons in full, respectively
in for specialist vessels, as were the ‘Tribals’. Anti-sub- 415 tons and 826 tons lighter than the ‘Battle’ class.
marine work was not their raison d’être, so a good, solid This meant less displacement was available for armour,
and reliable weapon system, rather than one might have weapons and machinery, less displacement for every-
offered more but been more complex to operate, was thing in comparison to the class which was very nearly
the sensible design decision. a third bigger. However, the ‘C’ class was larger than

75
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

This photograph of Armada displays well the rake of the bow and Destroyers of the ‘C’ class, thereby building ships which
the imposing nature of those 4.5in guns. It also highlights the could be the ‘big destroyers’ for work in the Arctic con-
relative position of the Mk VI director and fire-control system which voys, the Battle of the Atlantic, moving men and materiel
was the British answer to the American Mk 37. (Drachinifel from front to front as the waging of a global mechanised
Collection) war required, or alternatively filling the traditional de-
stroyer role in fleet operations by providing the heavy
previous War Emergency designs, reflecting the fact torpedo strike capability. In all these roles destroyers were
that more was needed from almost every ship. The in- needed and they were needed then and there.
crease in size of existing types left space for smaller The speed with which ‘C’ class ships were built and
types to emerge, for example the ‘River’ class frigates commissioned represented one of the principal differ-
of 1941, a new anti-submarine design which itself dis- ences between that class and the ‘Battles’. Caprice was
placed the ‘Hunt’ class escort destroyers of 1939. The laid down on 28 September 1942 and commissioned
growth in ship size offered new opportunities; but in twenty months later on 5 April 1944. Carysfort, the last
reality more was being demanded of the ships, which of the first batch, was commissioned on 20 February
was due more to exposure to wartime experience than 1945. The first of the second batch to be commis-
to the sort of speculative concepts which had driven the sioned, HMS Chaplet, was laid down on 29 April 1943,
initial development of the ‘Tribal’ class. and only missed the victory over Japan and the end of
The concept for the ‘C’ was for a conventional de- the war by nine days. In contrast, the ‘Battle’ class
stroyer. The Navy needed ships with heavy anti-sub- Barfleur, the only one to make it to the war in the Far
marine and torpedo weaponry, capable of engaging East, was laid down on 28 October 1942, a month after
other destroyers. It needed the bigger escorts, corvettes, Caprice, but was not commissioned until twenty-three
sloops, even the new frigates, but those ships could only months later on 14 September 1944, more than six
do so much and only so many could be built, or more months after Caprice. Lagos, a 1942 ‘Battle’, was laid
pressingly crewed with enough experienced personnel. down on 8 April 1943, three days after Chaplet, but was
While sloops and frigates could be built in the smallest commissioned more seven months after her on 2 No-
shipyards, they presented a problem for the larger vember 1945.
yards, which could not construct multiple frigates or Slow as the ‘Battle’ builds might seem, they still rep-
sloops in the same dock, nor build a single small vessel resented an improvement on peacetime building times.
in a dock which would have been a waste of their facil- Afridi, the first of the ‘Tribal’ class, was laid down on
ities. But they could be used for the War Emergency 10 March 1936 and commissioned on 3 May 1938,

76
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

twenty-six months later, and this difference of three Another early photograph of Armada. Photos of the Hazemayer in
months highlights the urgency applied to war builds, this configuration are quite rare as it was quickly phased out in
especially considering the relatively more complex favour of the only slightly better, but much heavier and more easily
build of Barfleur compared to Afridi. Unfortunately, as maintained STAAG system. (Drachinifel Collection)
Lagos’s thirty-two months demonstrate, not everything Armada in her later configuration, still with ten 40mm, but now
was always straightforward, even when a design was they are in STAAG mounts, placed in a little star around the
understood. When days and ship numbers matter, the structure and with two pairs securing the stern. It was in this form
less capable ship available today is as valuable as the that she would exercise presence on behalf of the British
more capable ship tomorrow. This was the balance the government throughout her service life. (Drachinifel Collection)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Jutland was a 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class with a predilection for night provements in the next one, a process of evolution. A
action befitting the name. At one point, after recently entering good example of this was the weapons fit. The main
service, she advanced on a suspected Soviet spy ship and then, guns were four 4.5in single mounts, which had already
lighting up the vessel, made the vessel withdraw. It was a classic been tested aboard Savage and which did not penetrate
and recurring role as the world transitioned from World War to
the deck. The four mounts were arranged as in the
Cold War. (Drachinifel Collection)
‘Tribals’, with mountings in ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ posi-
tions. This newish gun armament was coupled with
Admiralty was trying to strike. The Navy needed the eighty depth charges and two quadruple 21in torpedo
best destroyers it could come by, as quickly as possible, launchers, systems which could have come off a pre-
so it had to strike a balance between the best, the good war destroyer, but which still packed a punch. These
and the ‘it will do’. Destroyers tended to fall into the primary systems were supplemented by a twin
first or second categories: corvettes, frigates and sloops mounted 40mm Bofors Hazemeyer, like the ‘Battles’.
into the second or third. How did the ‘Cs’ save six-plus Other than that it was either four single QF 2-pounders
months on their construction in comparison to the or two single QF 2-pounders and two single 20mm
‘Battles’? Oerlikons, a simple but effective armament.
To begin with, the Admiralty used ‘last year’s’ tech- Without the ‘C’ class and other War Emergency Flo-
nology which, while not the best, was mostly good tillas coming through the yards, commissioning at a
enough. For example, they used the same Fuze steady and reliable rate, the Navy would never have felt
Keeping Clock targeting assist system that had been able to spend the time, money and effort on building
fitted to the ‘Tribals’, rather than the Fuze Keeping the ‘Battle’ class. Reaching for the next generation, the
Clock of the ‘Battles’ which was integrated with radar next evolution, the next level, is necessary in war, but
and a Mk VI director and as such was a generation or only if the country is sure that it has its immediate
more beyond what their predecessors had. Like the Fai- needs secured. It took until 1942 for the Navy to begin
rey Swordfish and every other torpedo bomber to the a ‘Tribal’ class successor programme because they
Sopwith Cuckoo in the Fleet Air Arm service, the War needed to be sure they had enough destroyers before
Emergency Destroyers were the product of a process they could start apportioning precious resources to
of the experience of each generation leading to im- more ‘fighting destroyers’. What is more, between the

78
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

1942 and 1943 batches, the ‘C’ class design was use the top weight for other weapons, mainly more
changed to reflect the lessons learned during the build- 40mm cannon. However, the change of gun meant that
ing of each batch. its platform, in comparison to the 1942 Batch, had to
be built up, and it was primarily as a result of this that
The 1943 Later ‘Battle’ Class the bridge on the 1943 Batch was raised 9in. This was
While operational concept, hull and structure were very significant when a warship was for the most part
broadly the same between the two batches, the 1943 commanded from an open bridge, and when the
class incorporated a number of significant changes. Al- human eye was still the most critical sensor available to
most imperceptible to the human eye, the 1943 Batch a crew, and the closest thing to a tactical command
had 9in height added to the bridge, were 3in broader computer processing system was represented by the
in the beam and, at 3,418 tons fully loaded, displaced brains of the captain and executive officers. An open
nearly 60 tons more than the 1942 Batch. So why make bridge with uninterrupted views was essential. It is only
such minimal changes when it was essential to get these when electronic sensors, and the displays of informa-
ships into service as soon as possible? These changes tion gathered by those sensors, take over the conduct
were necessary to support other changes. The broader of combat, that the need for an enclosed bridge, and
beam helped compensate for the higher bridge and it later a Command Information Centre buried inside the
crucially helped with the greater top weight of the ship, becomes not only necessary, but practicable.
weapons load. Torpedoes had been changed from two The ingenious Hazemeyer gun mounts were re-
quadruple, manually-trained systems to two quintuple placed by STAAG mountings (Stabilised Tachymetric
torpedo tube systems which were much heavier, but did Anti-Aircraft Gun). Still mounting the all-important
enable a 25 per cent increase in torpedo salvo. 40mm cannon, they utilised a more potent and much
The 4in signal or starshell gun, which had been in- more reliable platform. The new system was built
corporated amidships just aft of the funnel on the 1942 around the capabilities and requirements of the Type
Batch, was replaced with a 4.5in QF Mk IV 55°, which 262 radar, rather than the Type 282 used for the Ha-
was also fitted as the primary weapon systems on the zemeyer. The Type 262 was a more dependable system,
‘C’ class destroyers. In addition to providing more and when combined with STAAG offered the oppor-
coverage aft, this increased the ‘broadside’ 4.5in weight tunity to introduce a level of standardisation of system
of fire by 25 per cent and provided a weapons system across the fleet. The STAAG’s statistics were interest-
which could be trained manually in an emergency. The ing. The systems weighed twice as much as the Hazem-
in-service conversion of the 1942 Batch would remove eyer, 14 tons compared to 7 tons. This increase in top
their starshell guns as well and all but five ships were weight was justifiable not only because they gained 5
completed without them as it was more beneficial to degrees of variance between maximum elevation (92.5
degrees) and depression (-12.5 degrees) or had a 24-
Barfleur was not just a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class, she was the first volt electric pistol firing mechanism capable of firing
one to achieve operational status and the only one which saw under local or remote control, but mainly because of
combat with the British Pacific Fleet, although she was originally their reliability. A weapon which works, especially after
fitted out for the Arctic. (Drachinifel Collection) long voyages, is far more useful than a lighter system

79
HMS Barfleur was quite successful as a diplomatic asset and during The major problem with the 1942 ‘Battles’ was that
one five-day visit in Marseilles in 1955 she was toured by nearly the British fire-control systems which were then avail-
3,000 people – showing the draw of even what was just a able were not that effective against fast low-flying tar-
‘destroyer’.(Drachinifel Collection) gets. Much pre-war investment had been focused on
engaging slow bombers. Undermined by this miscalcu-
lation, the Admiralty was faced with a stark choice:
which does not. It was this reliability that sold STAAG either start research and development from scratch to
to the Admiralty. develop a new fire-control system, or import a system.
The changes though did not stop there and it is, ar- The first option would take time they did not have, so
guably, the next modification that was the most signifi- initially they went down the latter route. The American
cant. The 1943 Batch also replaced the depth charges Mk 37 DCT could be adapted and fitted with a Type
that their 1942 sisters carried with the Squid Mk 1 anti- 275 radar. More importantly, it was lighter than existing
submarine mortar, allowing both for a more capable British equivalents and was better able to deal with fast-
anti-submarine profile and the levelling up of the anti- moving high-angle attacks. It was, however, only avail-
submarine capabilities into the wider fleet. This was the able in limited numbers, and it was these numbers,
new version of the weapon system that had begun with minus those needed for certain carriers and the new
the Hedgehog. There had been some broadly unsuc- battleship HMS Vanguard, which decided how many
cessful experimental models prior to the Hedgehog but 1943 and later ‘Battle’ class ships could be ordered.
this was the first weapon that enabled ships to maintain Twenty-six of the American type were ordered, which
ASDIC/Sonar ‘lock’ on the target. It was a major break- was sufficient for just over three flotillas of 1942
through for convoy escorts. Prior to its introduction, ‘Battles’, but only eight were available for the 1943
experienced – or lucky – U-boat commanders managed ‘Battles’, and only these were completed by the end of
to use the break in contact provided by the conclusion the war.
of a depth-charge run, or concussion of the blasts, to What did this all mean for the mission capabilities of
execute a rapid random manoeuvre away from the Batch? Up to that point they were the most powerful
danger zone. This led to the Allied operational tactic of destroyers designed and built for the Royal Navy. They
one ship standing and ‘fixing’ the target and another had the best radars, sonar and command and control
one or two attacking, making escape less likely, although equipment available. Of equal importance was the over-
this tied up more escorts for each individual contact. all design which was large enough, not only to accom-
By eliminating this weakness, the Navy was able to free modate the equipment and position it correctly, but also
up escorts and make more contacts simultaneously. to allow it to be crewed and maintained at the necessary
This was only one step in the technological battle, but levels. These sensors were backed up by an impressive
it was an important one. The next decision equally im- array of weaponry. Despite the fact that it still com-
portant, and just as with the Dutch Hazemeyer system prised the Mk IV DP 4.5in turrets, rather than the
chosen for the 1942 Batch, demonstrated that the Navy hoped-for Mk Vs, which would be on the Daring class,
was not precious over national sourcing of equipment. it was nonetheless highly effective. Thanks to the range

80
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

and number of 40mm cannon, and the positioning of a ployed the machinery then being readied for the
4.5in amidships, the ships were capable of mounting a Weapon class, which was heavier than that used in the
terrific storm of hot flying metal against any air attack. ‘Battles’. In addition, it would have required two
In addition, a ten-torpedo salvo could be launched. funnels, arranged in the USN alternating series style
They also mounted the most advanced anti-submarine rather than the parallel style preferred by the Royal
weapon of the time. Navy. The former was felt to offer greater survivability
However, they were not without their faults. Being as, in theory, a single hit was unlikely to disable all the
packed with the latest electronics and weaponry left not turbines or all the boilers; on the other hand, it resulted
much room for anything else besides their battle roles in more hull and deck space being taken up by engine
and duties. The ‘Battles’ lost the space and comparative machinery. In the end it was not to be. These ships were
luxury with which the ‘Tribals’ had started their ca- required to be in service as soon as possible and the
reers, although they themselves became overcrowded changes would have almost amounted to designing a
under the pressures of war. Whereas the ‘Tribal’ class whole new class. Which is actually what the Admiralty
had been good-looking ships, designed for diplomacy, chose to do, when designing a successor to the ‘C’ class.
the ‘Battles’ looked powerful, but did not display the
same elegance. The ‘Weapon’ Class
The 1943 ‘Battles’ did not have either the main guns One of the most interesting aspects of the ‘Weapon’
or engines which the Third Sea Lord, the then Vice Ad- class is the story of their creation. They were part ex-
miral Sir Frederic Wake-Walker, would have liked: the periment, to show that ships, especially destroyers, did
Mk VI light turret on the upper deck, rather than the not need to be any bigger than they already were. The
Mk IV BDs then in use, and which did not penetrate argument came from largely the same group of officers
the deck. It was the new hope, but would not be ready who felt the ‘Tribal’ class were too big, and had argued
on time. This will be discussed later in relation to the in favour of the Dido class light cruiser over the ‘Town’
Daring class. Engines, or more powerful engines to be and ‘Crown Colony’ classes of cruiser. They also felt
exact, were another issue, and they might have em- the Illustrious class aircraft carriers were too large and
that the 14in gun was the perfect calibre for a battleship.
This was not illogical. They believed, rightly, that
Barfleur had an eventful career and much of it was spent in the
smaller ships were cheaper to build, run and sustain.
traditional Royal Navy theatre of the Mediterranean, including
during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Her career straddled not just major
They felt that if they made the Navy as cheap as poss-
political and international upheavals, but also the transition from ible, the politicians would interfere less when seeking
Destroyer Flotilla to Destroyer Squadron. After starting her career economies, and there would be sufficient ships to carry
with the 19th DF, she spent most of it with the 3rd DF which out defence duties effectively.
became the 3rd DS. (Drachinifel Collection) The only flaw in their arguments was that none of

81
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

them could agree what should be removed to make needed to be more magazine capacity, allocated deck
those ships smaller. Neither the ships nor their designs space and top weight provision. All this required a
had been growing in size because the DNC and Third larger hull to retain stability and a steady gun platform.
Sea Lords were obsessed with big ships. They were During the late 1930s, Radio Direction Finding
growing larger because to achieve greater speed, bigger (RDF), as in electronic warfare, and then RDF, which
and more powerful machinery – for example, engines, was early Radar, came with demands for space. They
boilers and gearboxes – were necessary. To achieve a needed generators, cabling, and tall masts. The latter
greater range necessitated creating the capacity to carry needed to be particularly carefully designed and posi-
more fuel. In order to carry more guns, and to deal with tioned to minimise the risk of capsize, the fear of which
the increase in demand for anti-aircraft weapons, there was not overblown. It was always a risk with the smaller

‘Battle’ Class 1943 Batch

Name Constructor Laying Commission Normal History of Name when bestowed Initial
Down Displacement Flotilla
(tons)

Dunkirk Alexander Stephen 19 July 27 November 2,816 Whilst the three predecessors had had a 4th DF
and Sons (Glasgow) 1944 1945 somewhat ignominious start, being a 2-gun
ketch captured from the French, the next two
had been a 48-gun and 60-gun Fourth Rates
respectively; as yet though she is the last to
have borne the name.

Barrosa John Brown & 28 December 14 February 2,910 A fifth rate sailing ship, a wooden screw Reserve
Company (Clydebank) 1943 1947 corvette and a Third-Class cruiser all precede Fleet
this destroyer as carriers of the name; although
none since.

Alamein Hawthorn Leslie 1 March 20 March 2,380 A new name in 1943, only ship to have Reserve
(Capt. D) and Company (Tyneside) 1944 1947 (standard) / borne this name so far Fleet
3,315 (full)

Aisne Vickers-Armstrong 26 August 20 March 2,850 A new name in 1943, only ship to have 4th DF
(Newcastle) 1943 1947 borne this name so far

Corunna Swan Hunter 12 April 6 June 2,787 A new name in 1943, only ship to Reserve
(Capt. D) (Tyne & Wear) 1944 1947 have borne this name so far Fleet

Agincourt Hawthorne Leslie 12 December 25 June 3,076 There were four(five) predecessors to carry 4th DF
(Capt. D) and Company 1943 1947 this name, two Third Rate ships of the line,
a Minotaur class ironclad frigate, and whilst
originally planned for an unbuilt Queen Elizabeth
class battleship – was instead used for the force
purchased-battleship Rio de Janeiro/Sultan Osman that
served in WWI. The name is due back in service
soon, having been bestowed on what is currently
planned as the seventh and last Astute
class submarine.

Jutland Alexander Stephen 27 November 30 July 3,045 Technically would have been the first 4th DF
(Capt. D) and Sons 1944 1947 Malplaquet, but when they cancelled
the original first Jutland… they transferred
the name across to this ship

Matapan John Brown & 11 March 5 September 2,862 A new name in 1943, only ship to have Reserve
Company 1944 1947 borne this name so far Fleet

*= served in WWII Capt.D = Fitted to act as Flotilla Leader ** = as recorded during full power trials unless otherwise stated
Shipyards and launch dates compiled by author from various records including those held at the UK National Archives and the work of Patrick Boniface (2007)

82
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

The 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class Barossa. She began her career As an ‘intermediate’ destroyer the ‘Weapon’ class was
delivering food and other provisions to the storm-ravaged Isle of a compromise in the sense that it was seeking to offer
Skye and Western Isles before spending much of 1948 filming The the general-purpose capability that the ‘Tribals’ had de-
King’s Navy. (Maritime Quest) fined and the ‘Battles’ then embodied, but with ‘less’
than either, and that is why the chosen design was just
ships designed to go faster because there was less hull smaller than the ‘Battles’. The ‘Weapons’ were not to be
in relation to mass to displace the ship’s weight. Over the largest destroyers in the Fleet. As they were desig-
and above these considerations, the new, more compli- nated ‘intermediate’ destroyers, the ‘Weapon’ class was
cated equipment required more crew, and larger crews technically the successor of the ‘C’ class flotillas, and
require yet more crew, in terms of the supporting two of them would take over yard units belonging to
specialties. Furthermore, these crew knew their value the 13th/‘Ce’ flotilla, Centaur and Celt. Unlike the War
and the Invergordon Mutiny was still fresh in any of- Emergency Destroyers, which had in many ways been
ficer’s memory. As well as more pay they needed better made with whatever was available, this class definitely
accommodation, a requirement for yet more space, were not. Under such muddled circumstances of con-
which all had to be balanced. Mistakes could be very ception, where what was wanted was something not a
costly. A class built to serve twenty years or more might ‘Battle’, but still a generation beyond a ‘C’, the quality
have to be replaced early, with all the financial and of the design of the ‘Weapon’ class might be considered
political costs that come with such a decision. Worse surprising, but for Stanley Goodall and the DNC ex-
still, mistakes could lead to death of crew, without a war cellence of design was very much the standard for
and the attention of an enemy. which he and his department strove.
The answer upon which officers and politicians fo- The success of the design might also have been un-
cused was specialist vessels. An anti-aircraft vessel can foreseen considering how much of it was in flux while
reduce its main armament to focus on AA systems, and the ships were being built. Much the design would be
need not carry depth charges and or torpedoes. This changed and adapted before the ships entered the water
strategy only works when it is possible to guarantee that and the class shrank dramatically to four units from the
the anti-aircraft vessel will be operating with anti- nineteen ordered. Originally, they had been specified
surface vessels and anti-submarine vessels, and that with six 4in guns mounted in three twin mounts, two
none of these ships become incapacitated. To ensure twin 40mm STAAG mounts, two single 40mm, a single
the availability of such a wide range of specialist capa- Squid and two quintuple torpedo systems. Two sex-
bility requires more ships and concomitant costs. Such tuple systems were considered, but were found to be
a specialist fleet was not something that was going to too heavy. This armament had an all-around capability.
be considered in the midst of a major war in which The 4in guns had been chosen because they would give
ships were being lost and when every convoy, every op- sufficient firepower without the need for an increase in
eration, every movement could be threatened by displacement and size. Torpedoes were especially im-
enemies who were capable of mounting all-arms at- portant for their anti-ship capabilities. Fitting all this
tacks, and frequently did so. into the design was never going to be an easy task, but

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

it was made especially difficult because it was important provided the vessels with 40,000shp (half of what the
that the ‘Weapon’ class be ‘intermediate’ destroyers, not engines in the inter-war refit of the battleship Warspite
‘large’ destroyers like a ‘Battle’, but also not small ships generated) which gave them a top speed of 34 knots.
like a ‘Hunt’; and nor was it really a continuation of the The alternating engine and boiler rooms, known as a
‘War Emergency Destroyers’; it could be considered the ‘unit’ arrangement, required two funnels. Trunking, to
first class built with an eye to the post-war world. One try to combine the stacks, seems not to have been seri-
element was strongly defined, the overall length, which ously considered as it would have wasted space and
should be no more than 365ft. Even this limit had its would have cooked the crew in warm climates. The ad-
critics inside the Admiralty. vantage of the arrangement meant that a single hit was
The reason for the criticism was that the ‘Battles’ unlikely to disable both engines, and even if it did, the
were only 379ft, not much longer than the ‘Tribals’ greater separation of the systems made the potential for
377ft and a lot less than the Darings 390ft; it was the battle damage repairs or routine maintenance work eas-
12ft longer than the ‘Weapon’ class which made the dif- ier. This was never to be tested in combat.
ference and meant they were the ‘big’/‘fleet’ destroyers, The ‘Weapon’ class eventually entered service in
but only just. Which meant detractors declared they peacetime, with two commissioned in 1947 and the re-
were really just a second class of large destroyer, a case maining two commissioned the following year. They
seemingly supported by their being beamier than the entered service not as general-purpose ‘intermediate’
‘Tribals’, at 38ft compared to 36ft 6in. However, the destroyers, but as prototype fast anti-submarine vessels.
‘Weapons’ needed the width in order to accommodate They had lost a 4in mount but gained a Squid, and they
the machinery which, for a displacement of 540 tons, retained their secondary armament and their torpedoes,
which in the pre-missile/post-war age, offered the best
mix for surface combat. Adhering to such a heavy tor-
Builders’ profile of Corunna, as fitted, 1947. (© National Maritime pedo armament may in hindsight seem outmoded, but
Museum, Greenwich, London) at the time the last British battleship, Vanguard, had only

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 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

just commissioned (1946) and was considered a critical The 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class Gravelines would serve a short career.
national asset, as were many older battleships still in Commissioned in 1946, she had a refit cancelled in 1958 and was
service. Although they were out-ranged by aircraft scrapped in 1961. (Drachinifel Collection)

85
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

launched from aircraft carriers, they were nonetheless ‘Battles’ were modified into the Darings that followed
still perceived as the best-value surface combatant avail- in the post-war years. In some cases hulls were length-
able. There had been plenty of opportunities for the ened, in others the slip numbers and the materials that
decision to have been questioned and changed if had been allocated were transferred. Two were com-
deemed sensible, but at each turn they had, at least pleted to the original plans for Australia. The Darings
under wartime conditions, triumphed in the face of were redesigned around the new Mk VI twin 4.5in
their detractors. upper deck (UD) turret (which did not penetrate the
The procurement of the ‘Weapon’ class spanned the deck), the quintuple torpedo system, and their ma-
periods in office of two Third Sea Lords, the years of chinery was organised in the new ‘unit’ arrangement as
fighting a world war and its attendant loss of personnel, in the ‘Weapon’ class, which meant a second funnel was
and the consequential and constant turnover of staff. necessary. Most importantly these were destroyers de-
When all this change was combined with the rapid pace signed with radar and electronic warfare systems as a
of technological development, it was not surprising that central core around which the ship would be built. As
decisions taken months or years previously were reversed such they could well be described as the first truly mod-
in order to produce a more useful and relevant vessel. ern destroyers: general-purpose and built around a
The history of the ‘Weapon’ class is littered with changes power-hungry, all-seeing electronic eye that became a
of heart. Despite the evolution of their design they re- conspicuous element the design. The most unsurpris-
tained their principal characteristics, but in a post-war ing, but also most visible, change was the appearance
world which was changing fast, the building and com- of a third turret aft. The firepower of three turrets pro-
missioning of just four was considered sufficient. vided the opportunity for a transformation of auxiliary
weaponry and, coupled with the anticipated arrival of
The Daring Class peace, there was a significant reduction in the number
We now turn our attention to the Daring class, the lar- and standardisation of the light guns. Compared to the
gest destroyers then built for the Navy. Some 1944 earlier ‘Battles’, the six, or sometimes four, 40mm Oer-
likons of 1944, mounted in two or three twin mounts,
was light. Once again the size argument reared its head.
Saintes was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class and would serve with
distinction. She did trials of the Mk VI 4.5in gun that would equip
These destroyers, at 390ft overall, with a beam of 43ft
the Daring class in 1947, but after the trials returned to the Mark III and a displacement of 3,600 tons or more in full load,
4.5in that the rest of ‘Battle’ class carried. She would have a long had now attained the scale of the First World War Are-
career as a vital member of the 3rd DF/DS, including acting as lead thusa class, and the 54,000shp and 34-plus knots put
escort for aircraft carriers and the Royal Yacht Britannia. (Drachinifel the Darings’ performance beyond it. They were nearly
Collection) four times the size of the Acasta class destroyers which
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

Hogue in 1945 in Malta as she made her way out to the 19th DF as remarkably small. Some proposed designs were bigger
part of the relief of the forces in the Far East after the Second and it is due to the skill of the DNC that such a com-
World War ended. She returned to the UK in 1947 and was pact vessel was successfully built. To achieve this, they
deactivated until 1957. She had only been reactivated for two built upon a legacy of previous designs and ideas. The
years, and was still a relatively new ship when she had to be hull was a much-modified form of the ‘Battle’ class
stricken off after a collision in 1959. (Maritime Quest)
vessels, which had been fitted with stabilisers. Its under-
water profile was adjusted to allow better support of
had been Arethusa’s contemporaries. In twenty-eight sonar. The hull shape above the water, its angles and
years, destroyers had grown from relatively simple rake, was inspired by the ‘Tribal’ class. The length and
ships, hardly bigger or more advanced than the torpedo beam, the proportions which along with their depth of
boats their forebears were built to counter, into major 30ft 9in/22ft 6in, marked them out as a destroyer, a
warships which could have outshone some recent large one, but certainly a destroyer.
examples of that traditional policeman and shield of This was coupled with power and manoeuvrability,
Empire, the cruiser. the former a product of the new engine form arranged
‘The bigger ship makes certainly a steadier platform in the ‘unit’ fashion, the latter aided by two huge
than the smaller one, and the pitching in the longer ship rudders. The engines were developed by the engineers
is of less amplitude and less angle than in the shorter of the Parsons & Marine Engineering Turbine Research
vessel…’264 These words, spoken in 1934 during a de- and Development Association (PAMATREDA). Pro-
bate on aircraft carriers at the Royal Institution of Naval pulsion was provided by two units, comprised of a
Architects by Sir Eustace T D’Eyncourt, a former double reduction geared steam turbine, driving one
DNC (1919-24), still hold true for destroyers. If a propeller each. The steam came from oil-fired water-
ship’s weapon system is primarily its torpedoes then tube boilers, one per unit, for Daring, Decoy, Delight and
stability is less of a worry because the torpedoes self- Diana, which came from Babcock & Wilcox. The ma-
stabilise. If guns, especially early generation radar- chinery for Dainty, Defender, Diamond and Duchess
controlled guns, are the primary weapon system then came from Foster Wheeler. The eight ships were already
stability becomes crucial. Taking into consideration all two batches of four, and were further divided because
the new systems, and the weight of weaponry required, only four, Daring, Delight, Defender and Dainty were
the size of the Darings, despite them being the biggest fitted with the then conventional 220-volt direct current
conventional destroyers yet built, could be considered power supply, while the other four, Decoy, Diamond,

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Diana and Duchess, were fitted with 440-volt, three suite of capabilities. The standard design is always
phase, alternating current. In reality, and from a power based around the three main guns with the anti-air,
and mechanical perspective, rather than a class of eight anti-surface and anti-land capabilities. Everything else
destroyers, the Navy had built four two-unit sub-classes is built around them. In the 1950s, the Mk VIs could
with all the attendant complexity and training issues. fire shells up to 14,000yds at an elevation of 80 degrees;
This was partly because the Darings became victims at an elevation of 45 degrees they could reach nearly
of their own success. As the largest class to be built 21,000yds, or 19km, which was in excess of the pre-
post-war, the number of ‘new builds’ gave the construc- war calculated maximum effective cruiser fighting
tors opportunities for trialling new ideas, ideas which range.265 These were excellent weapon systems, which
would be critical if the world changed again and the needed to be provided with the best possible platform
Fleet had to renew itself in a hurry. This is part of the to enable them to live up to their capabilities. Therefore,
point though with this class, because of the vessels or- the hull, in length, breadth and depth, was of destroyer
dered – on paper at least – in 1945, one, Delight, had proportions, as defined by the needs of the guns, but
effectively been ordered in 1943, the yard number hav- crucially, in terms of politics, was not a cruiser. The
ing been assigned to the 1943 ‘Battle’ class vessel Ypres. Daring class were built in peacetime for both war and
The first Darings were not launched until 1949, while peacetime duties, for example by using naval diplomacy
the last, Diana, was launched in 1952. Commissioning either as a deterrent or to shape potential conflicts.
took place over a two-year period from March 1952 to This is clearer when some designs aspects of the
March 1954. Almost a decade passed from the stroke vessels are considered, and they demonstrate how they
of a pen on an order sheet to the emergence of fully were built for the deterrence of war. An electric galley,
commissioned ships. It was a long time to be at the fluorescent lighting and a laundry are not cheap and
mercy of changing naval constructors and Sea Lords. for a ship which was still to make use of depot vessels,
How did these large destroyers come to be built in where normally destroyers would regularly restock and
the face of constant worry over their size and cost? To get a lot of their ‘hotel’ functions carried out; but they
begin with, as with the ‘Tribal’ class, these vessels were offered facilities for taking on the cruiser roles of diplo-
thought of as different from destroyers, not quite or- macy. This was augmented by the three ‘structures’ of
dered in Daring flotillas, but not far of it. Indeed, for the vessel. First was the ‘stepped’ forward structure,
much of their service lives they were not counted as containing the Mk VIs; the two STAAG 40mm weapon
being part of the Navy’s destroyer strength, but in a cat- systems; and the large open bridge of a new design (up
egory on their own. until the Darings all destroyer bridge structures had
Secondly, while many wanted to return to building been based on the design of the 1936 ‘H’ class), with
‘proper’ destroyers, in the sense of small, fast, torpedo the principle director and the base of the tripod radar
attack-orientated ships, no one could really agree what mast that rose high up above it all. The forward funnel,
was to be cut to make that possible. If the height of the fitted with a cowl, was enclosed within the lattice main-
mast was reduced in order to reduce the beam, the mast. Lines were solid, angled and stylised, demonstrat-
radar and gunnery officers would be upset. If the size ing great attention to detail, all of which sent an
of the engines was reduced, the Fleet Air Arm would important message that if this was a nation prepared to
be upset as the new ships would not be fast enough to invest in appearance, imagine what it would invest in
screen their aircraft carriers. Lots of different groups fighting. Next was the first torpedo launcher, followed
were keen for the smaller, cheaper, easier-to-build by the middle structure which contained the second
ships, but it would be at the expense of the capabilities funnel and the single non-STAAG twin 40mm. There
which mattered to them. followed another torpedo launcher and the aft struc-
Furthermore, a return to peace had halted the flood ture, containing the auxiliary director and third Mk VI.
of specialists ships, and this had registered with the Ad- Finally, between that and the stern nestled the Squid
miralty. What was needed was a well-armed all-rounder, anti-submarine mortar. At first glance the ship looked
proficient for anti-submarine work, but equipped with good, while further scrutiny revealed all the detail con-
anti-aircraft firepower and the capability to destroy sur- firming first impressions. These ships were built to be
face or land targets. For those making the case for the statements, just as the ‘Tribals’, together with the
smaller ships it must have been frustrating when reality ‘Town’ and ‘County’ class cruisers, had been. It is a fea-
and pragmatism got in the way of the pursuit of the ture of ships expected to perform naval diplomacy.
more specialist destroyer type. It is interesting that, even with a weapon system
The Daring class were always built to offer a wide covering the rear, Stanley Goodall apparently con-

88
 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

The Daring Class

Name Constructor Laying Commission Normal History of Name when Bestowed Initial
Down Displacement Flotilla
(tons)

Diamond John Brown & 15 March 21 February 2,950 With ten ships having preceded this 5th DF -
Company (Clydebank) 1949 1952 (Standard) / vessel bearing this name and one since Partnered
3,580 (full) succeeding it (that is currently in service), with HMS
this arguably one of the most storied names Swiftsure
in RN history.

Daring Swan Hunter 29 September 8 March With five (seven) ships having borne the name 2th DF
(Tyne & Wear) 1945 1952 prior to this ship, including the lead ship of
another destroyer class in 1893, and
it having been planned for a Laforey class
destroyer and a Danae class cruiser, before
given to the ‘D’ class destroyer that immediately
preceded her (and which was lost in WWII),
it’s rather fitting that this name has since gone
on to christen the name ship in a third class of
destroyers within the RN.

Duchess John I. Thornycroft 8 July 23 October Five previous bearers of the name in RN service, 5th DF-
& Company 1948 1952 including a paddle steamer in WWI and a carrier
(Southampton) 90-gun Second Rate ship of the line. guard

Defender Alexander Stephen 22 March 5 December Started life as Dogstar which would have been 2th DF –
and Sons (Glasgow) 1949 1952 the first use of that name, but was changed to but deployed
Defender, which had been borne by six ships to Far East
previously and a shore establishment. Like Daring to substitute
and Diamond it has since been used for a vessel for
which is currently in service with the RN. cruisers

Dainty J. Samuel White 17 December 26 February This was the most recent of ships to carry the 2th DF
(Cowes) 1945 1953 name, one it’s three predecessors had been
a 4-gun ‘Pink’ sailing vessel. Which probably
made more sense, than one of the largest
destroyers in service at the time of commissioning.

Decoy Yarrow Shipbuilders 23 September 28 April Would originally have been Dragon, a name which 2th DF
Ltd (Glasgow) 1946 1953 was brought back with the latest (Type 45) Daring
class destroyers. Decoy was chosen because it had
the greater connection with destroyers, having two of
its five predecessors being a destroyer and
torpedo boat destroyer respectively; Dragon
conversely was considered more of a cruiser name.

Delight Fairfield Shipbuilding & 5 June 9 October This was this vessel’s (or rather yard number’s) 5th DF
Engineering Company 1943 1953 third name, it started as a 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class
(Govan, Glasgow) called Ypres, but then became Disdain before
eventually becoming Delight. That was an exceedingly
storied name to choose, having been used by eleven
(twelve) vessels previously, mostly smaller sloops,a ‘D’
class brig and Sixth Rate sailing ships, but a destroyer
had carried the name more recently. So when the
ship which was to have been Delight, was cancelled,
Disdain was renamed to continue this tradition.

Diana Yarrow Shipbuilders Ltd 8 July 29 March Was originally ordered as Druid, but that name 2th DF
1948 1954 lost out to Diana and the eight predecessors who
had carried that name when the original Diana was
cancelled. Whilst most had been smaller vessels,
those predecessors had unsurprisingly included
a ‘D’ class 1930s-built destroyer and just as
interestingly an Eclipse class second-class cruiser.

Shipyards and launch dates compiled by author from various records including those held at the UK National Archives and the work of Neil McCart (2008)

89
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Builders’ profile of Dainty, as fitted, 1955. (© National Maritime Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, when he became
Museum, Greenwich, London) First Sea Lord. When they finally commissioned, the
visual impact of their design endowed them with status
and strength to spare. They had a tenacious presence,
sidered extending the hull and mounting the forward without the ‘straining to destroy’ aspect struck by the
Mk VI’s well forward of the bridge structure, as in the ‘Battle’ class design.
‘Battle’ class, in order to provide as much weapons Surprisingly, given the precedent, but not surpris-
coverage aft as possible. This was a further riposte to ingly considering the context of the time, the sensors
the explanation that, for the 1942 ‘Battles’, there was were far more an evolution of the ‘Battle’ class than a
no need to worry about the main armament’s field of revolution in electronic wizardry. Type 262s were back
fire not covering the stern because operational experi- in the STAAGs and also on the ‘auxiliary director’, the
ence demonstrated that destroyers always fought to- Close Range Blind Fire Director (CRBF) – another en-
wards an enemy. gineering committee-named system – which was also
Too many in the Admiralty, especially those from very effective. There was a Type 275 mounted on an
cruiser and battleship-orientated careers, were fixated HACS director unit, a Type 274 for navigation, a Type
on displacement, as if by returning it almost 1922 291 for air warning and a Type 293Q for target indica-
Washington Treaty standards, would engender again tion. All, barring the Type 274, or a version of them,
what they regarded as the key attribute of a destroyer. had been fitted to the ‘Battle’ class. Some of the systems
Indeed, so obsessed were some with this aspect that at together with their earlier versions had been used in
one point the naval constructors were prevailed upon combat by the ‘Tribal’ class. This was sensible, con-
to consider reducing the deck heights to save weight. sidering these were very good radars for the period and
Fortunately for their crews this idea was squashed. The the Navy had limited funds to spend on radar systems
design was nurtured by the naval constructors, shielded which might be shortly rendered useless by the advent
by successive Third Sea Lords, and the former Third of missiles. It also meant the risk was lowered in a high-

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 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

risk area; they had a proven track record, while at the at its genesis, then become its articulator and translator
same time their machinery and power supplies meant from concept to reality, was Stanley Goodall, alongside
there was the potential to upgrade them with relative his team of naval constructors, naval architects and
ease if needed. shipwrights – the details and drawing men – who were
Conceptually, the ships of the Daring class were the employed directly by the Admiralty to oversee naval
heirs of the ‘Tribal’ class. They had destroyer propor- construction. They were the craftsmen charged with
tions, and were almost built to a light cruiser’s bearing, turning Henderson’s ideas into a reality that could be
displacement and scale, with the ability to be a presence understood by the yards that would build them. Goo-
and carry out diplomatic as well as combat duties. They dall survived his friend Henderson by many years, a
were ships of their time, but their time was one of tran- fact which doubtless explains the greater amount of
sition, and even if they offered the useful characteristics available material on him than on Henderson.
needed to provide the Navy and the nation with an ap- There is also his own writing, particularly his con-
titude for diplomacy, when the Darings entered service tributions to the proceedings of the Royal Institution of
there was a worry they would quickly become outdated, Naval Architects. Goodall had a wealth of experience
for the dawning of the missile age was on the horizon. upon which to draw. He joined the constructors straight
after graduation from the Royal Naval College in 1907.
Stanley Vernon Goodall, Director of Naval He was appointed Director in 1936, having accrued
Construction twenty-nine years’ service, just as the ‘Tribal’ class were
The person behind this design, Stanley Goodall, Direc- being finalised, With the support of Henderson, he
tor of Naval Construction, was a consummate and pro- would serve in the role until 1944, a period spanning
fessional builder of ships of all sizes and duties. If the service of three Third Sea Lords. Goodall was, with-
Admiral Henderson had been the driving force of the out doubt, the institutional memory for he was the con-
concept of the fighting destroyer, the person who had stant which kept the department running during
provided both inspiration and political communication transition periods, when Third Sea Lords were finding

91
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

their feet. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Swift Lilli- I listened to Lord Cork’s remarks on the carrying of
crap, but continued to advise the next two Third Sea aircraft in men-of-war with considerable dismay. Ad-
Lords, was consulted extensively by the department miral Thursfield dismissed this question rather
and, as Vice President of the Royal Institution of Naval lightly by comparing the carrying of aircraft with the
Architects, gave freely of his time and lobbied hard for carrying of boats. But the two problems are not at all
projects about which he was passionate. comparable. Admiral Thursfield stated that space
Goodall was a details man, judicious in his use of and weight are required for the catapult from which
language, a good example of which is a post-war piece aircraft are flown off. Lord Cork spoke of the diffi-
in which he described the some of the difficulties build- culty of getting the aircraft back into the ship, but
ing the vital convoy escorts essential to the Battle of the neither mentioned the subject of gunblast. Aircraft
Atlantic. are large and fragile, and the greater part of the deck
area of a capital ship is swept by gunblast, hence to
One important matter in planning, a word that has provide such accommodation for the aircraft that
become rather unpopular of late, is the psychology after action they be available for use in the air is a
of the people called upon to carry out the plans. We problem that is extremely difficult…
have heard a great deal about prefabricated ships in But apart from this fact I feel that naval officers
the United States. There the shipyard labour was do not comprehend sufficiently clearly the effect on
new and had to be trained so that the methods displacement of those weapons which had not been
adopted were readily accepted. But in our case, the limited by treaty as the gun has been limited. I refer
prefabricated parts were assembled by men used to to the mine, the torpedo, and the bomb, protection
normal practice. They may vote progressive in elec- against which affects the size of the capital ship.
tions but they are conservative in their work. It was There have been great technical advances since 1921
very trying after all our efforts to see work absolutely – I should like to refer particularly to the advances
stopped because two unions could not agree which in marine engineering – which would have enabled
should put together the pre-fabricated parts to make some reduction to be made in the displacement limit
a fair ship. Eventually, that difficulty was overcome of capital ships, if at the same time a limit had been
but we lost some valuable time.266 placed on the size of the torpedo, the mine, and the
bomb. Until such a limit is imposed I fail to see any
One can imagine the intense frustration this must have hope for a reduction in the displacement of the cap-
caused, having poured so much time and energy into ital ship.267
pushing designs forward to get them into the war as
quickly as possible so they could serve the nation to These are two paragraphs taken from one-and-a-half
which he was devoted. Yet only a little of this is appar- A4 pages of tightly packed script, neither of which
ent. It is wryly observant, and it contains the sort of in- applies explicitly to destroyers; but in fact they are
formation useful for arming potential successors with highly relevant. Aircraft can be substituted with radar,
the necessary understanding to enable his role to be and other delicate equipment, which became key dur-
carried out in the future. ing the war. For capital ships a direct substitution of a
From a study of his work, many might consider Goo- destroyer works just as well. The world of the 1920s and
dall a battleship man, but he had, prior to becoming 1930s had changed the calculations for what a capital
DNC, spent much of the 1920s and 1930s as head of ship needed in terms of torpedo defence and secondary
the Destroyer Design Section, and he presented a paper armament. Those years also changed the facts of life for
on Ark Royal to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects destroyers, as did wartime experience, and constructors
in 1939. He had seniority and experience and, having sought to wrestle with the same challenges they faced
had regular contact with him prior to his selection, it is with the larger capital ships, but in destroyers with even
clear Henderson knew the abilities of the man. Not least less space to play with and often far more exacting de-
of these was Goodall’s ready use of his knowledge and mands. A destroyer had to retain its speed otherwise its
experience to argue the Admiralty’s case in places which raison’d’être was gone. And just as the tonnage had to
mattered. For example, in 1936, at a meeting of the be watched, so too did the cost. Capital ships, even car-
Royal Institution of Naval Architects, he responded to riers and cruisers, were national status symbols, steel
Rear Admiral Thursfield’s paper, Modern Trends inWar- ambassadors of presence and power. Destroyers were
ship Design, and the discussion it created, with a long not. They were the workhorses of the Fleet, wanted in
statement which included the following. bulk and at bulk prices, and designers were supposed

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 COMETH THE WAR, COMETH THE ‘BATTLE’

A fine view of Jutland taken by P Woodyard RN, with her crew structors and Controllers. What is most striking, for
manning the rails. It highlights the distribution of firepower: the those familiar with debates about ship design of the Na-
eight 40mm cannon, the five 4.5in guns, the ten torpedoes, and poleonic Wars, is the similarity between the two eras. If
the two Squid launchers. (Maritime Quest) building for the same displacement, more weapons can
only be carried if something else is cut. The Navy was
to fit in all the trimmings. As Head of Destroyers and building ships to fight a global war and they not only
then DNC for a combined total of more than three dec- needed weapons but also fuel, spare parts and all the
ades, Goodall was responsible for delivering that to the other things a ship needs when operating around the
Navy. globe far from its home base. And in wartime these fac-
What probably complicated the role more than any- tors are exacerbated.
thing was his position. While advising the Admiralty In wartime, while the pressures on the purse strings
Board he was not a member of the Board. Therefore, may be reduced because making the case for the pro-
the role was to an extent reliant upon the qualities of curement of weapon systems is much easier with a vis-
the Third Sea Lord, who as Controller was the voting ible threat, it does not make procurement easier. The
member responsible for construction. Therefore, Goo- questions still remain as to what exactly should be pro-
dall’s job was as much about managing upwards, as cured. Is it best to procure the latest, most high-tech
downwards, as much about personalities as detail. An products of research and the biggest and best design
active Third Sea Lord like Henderson would require that can be built, or is it better to stick with tried and
one style of communication from him – more action tested, off the shelf and easily procured gear? Neither
rather than bureaucracy – while a more conservative route, taken exclusively, is the right one. The first route
officer, such as Admiral Fraser who succeeded Hender- leaves a nation open to simply being outnumbered and
son, required a different style again, an often more pretty much steamrolled by larger forces at the time of
outspoken one. This was also true of Admiral Wake- the latter’s choosing. The second may lead to a nation’s
Walker, and the relationship evolved still further with forces taking the figurative ‘knife to a gunfight’. A bal-
Admiral Daniel and Admiral Denny by which time he ance must be sought and in such a complex design as
was no longer DNC, but an advisor. a warship, quality and reliability have to be encapsu-
lated in one system. The engines chosen, the layout se-
The Balancing Act and Summary lected, the shape of the hull, these are all major choices
A constant refrain in this era, seen in the reports and to be made, even before weapons or sensors can be
memoirs of officers, was that British ships were under- considered. They all combine to create a critical asset.
armed in comparison to their opponents. It was thought Admiral Henderson, to an extent, conceived and
this was due to undue conservatism on the part of con- championed the ‘fighting’ destroyer. It was Stanley

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Goodall who transformed the concept into a design, not Barfleur in 1945 in her fighting form. There were eight 40mm
just once, not just twice, but many times and with many Bofors in four twin Hazemayer mounts on the stern, with six 20mm
designs. That is why a chapter in a book about three cannon (twins mounted in the bridge wings, one abaft ‘B’ turret
classes of destroyer has discussed five. The ‘Battle’ class, and a sixth on the quarterdeck) arranged around her. In this form
both 1942 and 1943 Batches, like the ‘Tribal’ class be- she was one of the most powerful destroyers to serve with the
Royal Navy in the Second World War. (Maritime Quest)
fore them and the Daring class which sprang from the
1944 Batch, were not produced in isolation. To evaluate
them without the context of their construction, whether
historical, technological or political, would be to strip enough of those ships and they furnish the nation
them of a large part of those intangible qualities which which possesses them with high degree of both de-
made their designs work so well for the Royal Navy and stroyer and anti-destroyer fighting capability. This will
other navies which employed them. Warships are part be discussed further in the next chapter which picks up
of a whole, a navy, and are not just individual vessels. the events of operations where it left them in the pre-
Each ship gives that fleet particular capabilities. Build vious chapter, in November 1942 and Operation Torch.

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 CHAPTER 5

THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

In his The Navy at War, Stephen Roskill quotes the newer Duke of York, the last battlecruiser Renown and
words of Churchill, who proclaimed on 11 February the carriers Victorious, Formidable and Furious. Leading
1943, that ‘The defeat of the U-boat … is the prelude Force H from the Admiral’s bridge aboard the Duke of
to all effective aggressive operations.’268 It was a suc- York was Acting Vice Admiral Edward Syfret. Vice Ad-
cinct appraisal of the war’s direction at the beginning miral Borrough was in charge of the Allied Fleet aboard
of that year. But it was not, however, entirely accurate. the Landing Headquarters Ship Bulolo, with Admiral
It is true the U-boat menace had to be dealt with, but Cunningham, commanding from ashore, leading as
there were other priorities. 1943 was to be a year of a Naval Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. These
range of campaigns and events, all of which required command arrangements mattered little to the ‘Tribals’
timetabling, plans, and, regardless of cost, the war had as they forged through the water on their way to
to be taken to the enemy in other theatres. another amphibious operation.
In North Africa, in early 1943, Ashanti, Eskimo and Torch was very different in many ways from pre-
Tartar continued to represent the ‘Tribals’’ participation vious amphibious operations. It was not a commando
in Operation Torch. These three destroyers had joined raid, a trial run or an evacuation. It was planned as a
the Force H during October 1942, when it was re- fully supplied and supported assault against a com-
formed following Operation Ironclad (the invasion of mitted enemy. Only the most optimistic believed that
Madagascar) that had taken place earlier in 1942. They French soldiers would not defend French territory;
had come to the Mediterranean to take part in Oper- after Mers El Kebir and Madagascar it was unlikely that
ation Pedestal where they were part of Force X and they would be welcoming. But hopes that resistance
Force Z. Their initial duties as members of the re-
formed Force H were to screen the larger ships, includ- Ashanti featuring her 1943 paint scheme. The camouflage was
ing the sister battleships Nelson, Rodney, and the far intended to make visual tracking difficult. (Drachinifel Collection)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Corunna was a 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class which, like many of her forced to go full astern using maximum rudder to avoid
sisters, arrived much too late for war, but took the opportunity to collision with Ashanti, something which would have
fight for hearts and minds, a role that typified much of the naval taken place just where the Albacore’s depth charges ex-
diplomacy of the Cold War. On one occasion she became the post ploded and the U-boat had dived. In the midst of this
boat at Christmas between Sicily to Malta, making up a Royal Mail
mêlée, with the sea transformed into a swirling and
sign and dressing a crewman as Santa Claus to deliver the post.
foaming mass of water, the U-boat escaped, with a
(Drachinifel Collection)
story to tell.
Ashanti’s next job, on 9 November, was as part of
would be less than total were to some extent vindicated the screen for the carrier Argus which was providing
by an opportunistic deal made by General Eisenhower support to the troops ashore. However, as soon as
with the captured Admiral Darlan whereby the Vichy Mers-El-Kebir was secured and cleared, by 11 Novem-
Forces would not surrender, but rather retain rank and ber Ashanti’s job became one of gate guard, to prevent
privileges and transfer to the Free French.This was, German E-boats, or more likely Italian torpedo boats,
however, more of an issue for the land forces. For the from trying to gain entry to the harbour; but also the
warships, Operation Torch represented another critical occasional coraller of circling torpedoes, dropped or ac-
Mediterranean convoy battle along with the possible cidentally launched by damaged enemy aircraft and
added duty of delivering naval gunfire support. There ships, and on occasion taking on the role of tugboat
were other tasks such as Ashanti at one point during the when an ocean liner went rogue slipping her own and
night of 7/8 November, along with the Dido class severing Ashanti’s mooring cables.270 Ashanti’s charmed
cruiser Argonaut, being used to make false signals and existence, whereby she had managed thus far in the war
pretend to be lost merchant ships in an attempt to mis- to avoid major damage, continued, partly thanks to the
lead the Vichy French and other Axis forces in the area boom-defence erected around her berth to protect from
into attacking Force H rather than the convoy. torpedo attack, but also to luck. For example, the petrol
On 8 November 1942, guided by a Fairey Albacore, store next to her berth in Oran was hit during an air
Ashanti and Tartar sought to engage a surfaced U-boat raid on 14 November very soon after she had left for a
just to the east of Algiers. After being illuminated by patrol, causing an explosion which would have surely
Ashanti’s searchlight, the U-boat turned inside towards destroyed her. In January 1943 she managed to damage
the destroyer and dived, coming too close for ‘B’ mount a propeller when moving in alongside the battlecruiser
to bear, but giving Ashanti the opportunity to launch Renown in Gibraltar to have her feed-water tanks re-
depth charges.269 Unfortunately, Tartar was bearing paired. This of required more time in dock for repairs
down as hard as she could and suddenly found herself before her return to work in March 1943 escorting a

96
Barossa was another ‘Battle’ class which suffered collision damage, cables. This kept her out of the war for a week, but after
although hers was inflicted by her sister ship Corunna responding a herculean feat by the dockyard workers, naval person-
to orders too quickly and ramming her. Luckily, and thanks to some nel from Vindictive and her own crew, Eskimo was back
quick reactions of the watch, it was only the stern starboard to the normal duties of a critical fleet destroyer, princi-
quarter that was impacted, though it damaged nine frames and
pally with Force Q, a cruiser and destroyer task force
flooded of the spirit compartment, the latter problem quickly
tasked with operating in the Western Mediterranean.
solved by an emergency jackstay transfer of rum from another
sister, Agincourt. (Drachinifel Collection)
However, this was not for long for the world was about
to change.

convoy of LSIs heading for the Cape of Good Hope. Cadiz looks still incomplete in this photograph. A 1942 Batch
Eskimo also suffered damage when in harbour, on ‘Battle’ class, she was delayed and eventually completed without
this occasion alongside the battleship Nelson at Mers El many of her 40mm weapons because after the war was over the
Kebir, and though the feed-water boiler room had a Navy just needed ships in the water to replace so many damaged
fire, the major damage was done to her main electrical ships. (Drachinifel Collection)

97
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Tartar was the ‘Lucky’ ship during Operation Husky. She started her most a flight of the latter – the ships at the heart of this
career, pre-war, as one of the escorts of Empress of Australia, and operation had been chosen to match the nature of the
she was also the lead escort for Queen Elizabeth on her maiden occasion: the four largest destroyers available, Eskimo,
voyage. These duties were followed by a hard fighting war. her sister ship Nubian, together with the ‘J’ class Jervis
(Drachinifel Collection)
and the ‘L’ class Lookout, escorting the small Arethusa
class cruiser Aurora. This group could have been mis-
By 7 May 1943, the Axis armies in North Africa taken for a destroyer sweep, and an enemy pilot, es-
were no longer fighting, but withdrawing on all fronts pecially one engaged with fighter cover, could have
as rapidly as they could; it was naturally assumed that easily missed the presence of a small cruiser in a pack
there would now be an attempt to evacuate their troops, of large destroyers. The degree of care and attention on
as the British had done at Crete, Dunkirk and Namsos. this occasion was warranted by the presence of the
On 8 May Admiral Cunningham, intending to take full King aboard ship, who was going to Malta. Setting out
advantage of this, issued the order to the Fleet to ‘sink, from Tripoli, the little force arrived safely in Grand
burn and destroy. Let nothing pass.’ With these words Harbour, Valletta, at 0800hrs on 20 June. The King was
Operation Retribution commenced.271 After such an given fourteen hours to tour the island before being
impassioned inception, the anticipated evacuation whisked back to Tripoli. The ships were on maximum
proved an anticlimax. The German and Italian high alert the entire time, for although the Mediterranean
command were both unwilling as well as unable to re- was now safer, for this mission nothing was safe enough
cover their forces without serious risk of losses. As a re- in their minds. The orders to the destroyer captains
sult, Retribution was less a ferocious battle than a having been clear, that any and all measures necessary
rescue exercise, often of small craft, one of which was to protect the cruiser would be justified. After leaving
towing an RAF sergeant pilot in his dinghy. The high- the King at Tripoli and a short respite, they returned to
light for Eskimo was capturing a Panzer division’s Chief Malta and, almost immediately, into the jaws of the
of Staff. Despite its limited scope, the operation was not enemy. It was from Malta that the ships would proceed
without risk. The destroyer Laforey was hit by a shore with the next phase of the Mediterranean war.
battery and a ‘Hunt’ class escort destroyer, Bicester, was For Nubian, having been assigned to the reformed
bombed by an RAF Spitfire while carrying out mine- Force K in December 1942, and earning her laurels the
sweeping duties, despite her upper works being painted hard way, Malta was by this point practically her home
red and sporting a large Union flag. port. Fortunately, while operations were intensive, the
opposition was frequently less than equal to the task
Very Special Operations and below the fighting standard which might have been
On 19 June 1943 five warships sped across the Medi- expected. The force actually deployed consisted of
terranean, preceded by minesweepers and under the poorly-armed merchant ships, schooners, torpedo boats
densest possible fighter cover. While the minesweepers and a trawler with a single 66mm Stromboli gun. The
and the fighters were a little out of the ordinary – nor- trawler, combusted under a maelstrom of shells pro-
mally there would be a couple of the former and at a vided by a welter of 4.7in destroyer guns, the explosion

98
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

showering Nubian’s deck in oily soot and jagged shrap- wished they had inspected her to make sure she was
nel, possibly causing more risk of injury than her gun what she claimed to be.
had.272 As time went on, Operation Retribution offered Later that week they encountered another hospital
ever slimmer pickings and even these started to dry up ship, this time flying the Nazi merchant ensign. It was
within a couple of weeks. a converted yacht shadowing the British destroyers,
Elite crews expect to be in the action, although they Nubian, Paladin and Petard, as they carried out a patrol.
too enjoy a respite, and if too many days are spent at A boarding party was despatched and and after a thor-
sea to no avail it can weaken morale or, worse, crews ough search of the vessel, which revealed no signs of
might become overconfident. But in this case the fer- sick or wounded personnel, but plenty of arms and am-
ocious pace of operations (Operation Retribution had munition, the yacht was taken as a prize of war and her
after all come on the heels of Operation Torch, which crew put under armed guard. However, the crew still
itself had come on the heels of a slew of operations) did tried to cause trouble and it was found they were carry-
not let up the entirety of 1943, and that level of intensity ing iron in their pockets with the intention of upsetting
can have an impact of its own. It is possible that the the compass. The return journey to Malta took three
pace and constant activity of operations was telling on days, with a diet of black bread and tinned pears as sus-
the crews, because Nubian suffered her own accident tenance for the prize crew.274
in April. A 4in graze fuze shell, fired from ‘X’ mount, In June 1943 Nubian paired up with her sister Tartar
proved faulty and exploded alongside the 40mm pom- for island-storming operations to clear the Fleet’s path
pom, instantly killing two ratings and wounding another from North Africa to Sicily in preparation for Oper-
who later died in Bighi Hospital on Malta.273 It was a ation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. Beginning with Pan-
sad loss, but a sort of harbinger of what was to come. telleria, and in the company of other destroyers and
Two events now occurred involving hospital ships. cruisers, Rear Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor (a future
The first concerned an Italian hospital ship which Nu- First Sea Lord), commanded the forces from aboard
bian, along with the two ‘P’ class destroyers, Paladin and Tartar, providing another instance of ‘Tribals’ being
Petard, encountered on 4 May 1943. This encounter used to command operations, even if they were not
took place at an extended range, because the British de- openly (officially) chosen as flagships. The operation,
stroyers having destroyed a convoy consisting of a mer- which began on 11 June, went well. The island was se-
chant ship Campo Basso loaded with munitions and cured quickly with minimal resistance, and sub-
vehicles, and an escorting Spica class torpedo boat Per-
seo, off the coast of Kelibia, Tunisia, the night before Camperdown was a classic example of the 1942 Batch ‘Battle’
were eager to get back to Malta. They let this vessel go class. She was rammed by the ‘Flower’ class corvette Coreopsis
having signalled her as to where they expected surviv- during the filming of The Cruel Sea and had to be towed to the
ors to be from the previous night’s action; some officers 1953 Coronation Review. (Drachinifel Collection)

99
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Navy’s most high profile and risky operations such as

Operation Husky, she survived.278 Tartar’s involvement
with Husky and the invasion of Sicily is a good point
from which to examine her history, which demonstrates
so well the utility of the class, and the facilities that their
design offered.
From D+1 Tartar was primarily on amphibious
duty, joining with the ACID assault convoy (the assaults
for D-Day in Operation Husky were called ACID,
BATK, CENT, DIME and RESERVE) aiming for the
Augusta to Catania area of eastern Sicily. On the night
of D-Day she escorted the landing craft in, leading
them to the correct position despite the failure to pick
Finisterre was another of the 1942 Batch ‘Battles’ which had been up the sonic buoys placed by submarine.279 As the land-
rushed into service for the 19th DF, although she ended up being ing craft approached two powerful enemy searchlights
retained in home waters and would spend most of her career in the were switched on. They were immediately engaged by
1st DS. Here she is in Malta, a regular haunt of the ‘Battle’ class Tartar, using all her guns to extinguish them before they
units. (Maritime Quest) could be of use.281
On D+2, 10 July 1943, Tartar took a break from sup-
sequently most of the force was sent to Lampedusa porting the amphibious operations to join Force H in a
where again their efforts met with similar success. It sweep of the Sicilian Channel, the strait between Tuni-
was then decided that a single ‘Tribal’, Nubian, was suf- sia and Sicily, and the sweep was entirely without inci-
ficient to tackle Linosa, while the majority of the re- dent, barring a false ASDIC contact which resulted in
maining force moved on to Lampione.275 the dropping of a single depth charge.280 This is testi-
Commander Holland-Martin, captain of Nubian, re- mony to how successfully the Navy had sanitised the
ceived a signal on 12 June: ‘Deal with Linosa tomorrow. Mediterranean by that time. The Italian fleet was still a
Defences unknown.’276 Nubian approached the steep presence, but Mare Nostrum had become, as it had
and rocky island at 0530hrs on Sunday 13 June 1943. largely been since the Battle of Trafalgar, a decidedly
The landing party was taken ashore by whaler, as her Royal Navy body of water. After completing the sweep,
motorboat was still in Malta being repaired and Nubian Tartar returned to her previous station providing sup-
began her conquest of the island. In response to the porting fire and air cover for the amphibious operation
sounding of her siren to alert the garrison and the until late on D+2 when an air attack disabled her sister
people, there was a flourish of white flags waved from ship Eskimo. Tartar assisted her back to Malta.282
all sorts of vantage points. Nubian continued to steam These were not the most perhaps the most signifi-
slowly round the island, menacing it with her guns and cant aspects of Tartar’s involvement with Husky. Be-
picking up Italian soldiers from the garrison as they cause of its success, it was hugely important beyond its
rowed out to her in whatever craft they could find. immediate impact in the Mediterranean for it was a
Ashore the landing party had more difficulty. The proving a ground where lessons were learned, especially
commandant was not where he was supposed to have with regard to Operation Overlord the following year,
been, and when he was eventually located, he declared it and the fact that Tartar had on board Major J Michael
beneath his dignity, both as a commandant and a gentle- Lind made her contribution particularly important.283
man, to surrender. He was then informed that his 168- It was Major Lind’s report which emphasised the
man garrison was already aboard Nubian under guard need during training to accustom ‘by practice to the
and that his gesture was thus futile. 277 He signed the sur- motion of their craft’ the troops who would be used in
render at 0615hrs. Linosa had been conquered in less an assault, and which provided the necessary confirma-
than 45 minutes and the crew of Nubian celebrated with tion for what had already been suspected and which
breakfast. Unfortunately, not all amphibious operations would inform a lot of the training for D-Day.284 In ad-
were so easily executed, as Tartar’s story shows. dition, he recommended the need for those directing
the guns with the landing parties ashore and those fir-
Tartar, the ‘Lucky’ ship during Operation Husky ing them from ships to have met in order to be able to
Tartar was christened ‘Lucky’ Tartar by her flotilla better understand each other.285 He drew directly on his
mates because, despite taking part in many of the Royal experience of Tartar, having watched gun crews do

100
Cadiz looks a lot more finished here, although all the 40mm Bofors only involvement in Overlord, although the duties of
mounts and searchlights are under covers. (Drachinifel Collection) the 10th Flotilla will be discussed later. Furthermore, it
was also not her only experience of carrying a very
their best to understand what was needed by the troops special passenger.
when the two sides were not used to talking to each On her next amphibious operation, Operation Bay-
other. Unfortunately, this was a lesson which was for- town, which could be called a precursor of Operation
gotten soon after the end of the war, and had to be re- Avalanche, the main landings at Salerno, Tartar was
learnt in 1982 during the Falklands War, testimony to carrying Admiral Cunningham.288 Having read Lind’s
the importance of institutional memory.286 Finally, Lind report, he wanted to make his own assessment of the
enunciated clearly the difficulty of unloading merchant amphibious operations for which, as Commander-in-
ships and the potential consequences which would have Chief Mediterranean Fleet, he was largely respon-
occurred had the enemy had more assets, especially ar-
tillery or aircraft.287 These were crucial lessons which
Sikh at Malta before the Second World War when she was a
were to have an impact on D-Day. Most significantly,
pristine, white, the elegant presence ship with her crew lining the
perhaps, is that although Dieppe had previously shown rails and giving little indication, beyond ‘B’ mount’s painted stripes,
the need for the Mulberry harbours, the experience of of the frantic rescue of refugees from Cartagena displaced by the
Husky emphasised this as a priority which could not Spanish Civil War, or the global conflict she herself would soon be
take even a day; it needed to be ready to go the moment swept up in and which would eventually overwhelm her.
the beaches were secured. This was not to be Tartar’s (Drachinifel Collection)

101
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

made her a ‘relatively safe’ ship for a VIP. The report on

Avalanche by Cunningham, written very soon after it
was over, makes interesting reading, especially in light
of D-Day.
Particularly pertinent was why the Gulf of Salerno
was chosen over the Gulf of Geata further north, de-
spite the presence of Unicorn acting in the capacity of
a light fleet carrier, together with four escort carriers
being made available to support operations. They made
up Force V, under the command of the by then Rear
Admiral Vian, and were in addition to two existing fleet
carriers and battleships of Force H of the Mediterra-
Gabbard was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class built by Swan Hunter and nean Fleet. Despite this air cover the Gulf of Salerno
entered service in 1946, but due in part to the manning crisis did was favoured because single-seat fighters could reach
not achieve real operational activity till 1947. Her career would there from bases in Sicily.291 Furthermore, due to the
have high points and low points, and in 1949 she was called upon Italian Armistice, Force H spent most of its time either
to tow the damaged carrier Albion into port after the larger ship
covering the escape of the Italian fleet or providing air
had collided with a collier. (Maritime Quest)
defence for Force V, which took the lead in providing
essential combat air support.292
The problems experienced with the loading of stores
sible.289 Tartar was the ideal vessel. As a destroyer she during the operation was something which would again
could get closer inshore, allowing a better view, and her be experienced by naval forces in the Falklands War,
speed allowed a wide area to be covered. Most impor-
tantly, however, the space provided by the ‘Tribal’ class
design meant both the C-in-C and a small staff could Finisterre was one of the ships activated when the submarine
be accommodated.290 ‘Lucky’ Tartar may not have had Affray was lost in the English Channel. Eyewitnesses watched as
the blessings which her sister Ashanti experienced, but she went astern from her berth, turned on her axis and then shot
she had earned her own reputation for good fortune. out of Portsmouth Harbour with every knot she could muster.
This, combined with a ‘Tribal’s’ inbuilt toughness, (Drachinifel Collection)

102
St Kitts was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class and when she had been in she was assigned to the 15th Cruiser Squadron in Force
service just three years, she and Gabbard were sent to take part in K.295 Force K was to have served as the ‘supporting
Operation Rusty, an exercise intended to determine how well the force’ if there had been a fleet action, and would have
new ships stood up to arctic ice, especially their crucial electronic been recalled to Force H. If the assault forces needed
equipment. (Drachinifel Collection) fire support, they were to charge in and provide
bombardment. Basically, these ships were grouped
although in the case of Avalanche it actually put four together as the ‘forward reserve’. This was a role for
Landing Craft Tank out of action, causing problems which the ‘Tribals’ were eminently well suited, and
beyond just logistical issues.293 Loaded stores had to be which would comprise most of Tartar’s subsequent war
carefully balanced because of the stresses that could put experience.
on the hulls, something that was possibly better under- By 1943 Force K was well into its third incarnation.
stood by Merchant Navy crews than wartime naval per- Its first had been as an Africa based anti-surface raider
sonnel. In addition, the right stores had to be loaded at formation in 1939; the next two were spent as surface
the right time and in the right order to support the raiders. Their role was simple: to operate from Malta
operations ashore, something that required careful and cut off all supplies to North Africa by whatever
co-ordination. means possible. The second had unfortunately to come
Through all the details of the report there appear to an end following a nasty experience in a minefield
little asides which seem to have been added in later in on 19/20 December 1941, not far from Tripoli, when
the war by Admiral Cunningham. In a section on Gun- the Arethusa class cruiser Aurora was damaged, and the
nery and Bombardment, Point 33, has been added ‘The Leander class cruiser Neptune and the destroyer Kanda-
gunnery lessons learnt in this operation have been ap- har sunk. The third incarnation of this force came to a
plied in operations in 1944 and 1945’. By that point in conclusion after the successful completion of Operation
1945, Cunningham was First Sea Lord and many of Stone Age in November 1942. Nubian was a key part
the lessons drawn from his own earlier observations and of this convoy operation which brought important
the reports of others, had been applied.294 This shows supplies to Malta.
how useful was his experience on Tartar, and that his Arguably, one of Force K’s most critical successes
first-hand knowledge helped him face the weighty deci- took place the following year, on 3 May 1943. It has al-
sions he had to make later with more certainty. ready been mentioned briefly, but now is the time to
consider it in more detail. Nubian, along with the ‘P’
Force K class sisters Petard and Paladin, tracked down the Italian
After Tartar’s involvement with Baytown, she continued transport ship Campo Basso with her torpedo boat es-
to play a part in Operation Avalanche. With her sister cort, Perseo, heading for Tunisia. Engaging their quarry
ship Nubian and the other destroyers of the 19th Flotilla, at 2347hrs, they fired ten salvos at the merchant ship.296

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Mohawk was lost to torpedoes, fired from a sinking Italian command of Force H. The latter included at this point
destroyer, after taking part in the destruction of an entire Axis Nelson and King George V, used largely to provide sup-
convoy bound for North Africa, but even before the war had begun port for the Army and to deal with any remaining units
she had faced the threat of Italian torpedoes during the Spanish of the Italian navy which had either been taken over by
Civil war. (Maritime Quest)
the Germans or were still loyal to the Fascist regime of
Mussolini. By January 1944 it was no longer necessary.
Laden with a cargo of vehicles, bombs and landmines, Force H was disbanded and its ships proceeded to the
it is not surprising that the 60 4.7in shells and 120 4in Home and Eastern Fleets to continue the war on those
shells that hit the Campo reduced her to a fireball so fronts.
huge that the destroyers, which were three miles off, felt
the effect of the blast. It was so violent it was claimed Battle of North Cape
stacks of signals sheets were whisked off tables in the December 1943 witnessed an engagement of huge im-
Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) room, while the stokers port that saw the Canadian ‘Tribals’ Athabaskan, Huron
manning the boilers ‘complained that it felt as though and Haida representing the class, although Ashanti was
their ears were being drawn out’.297 Nor did the Perseo involved as well. Furthermore, Savage, the ‘S’ class test
escape. First Nubian engaged her, and then the other bed for the ‘Battle’ class, was also an important partici-
two destroyers joined the fray even after she was out of pant. But before considering the Battle of North Cape
control and belching smoke and steam; soon she ex- and its real impact, it is necessary look back almost a
ploded and sank. What is perhaps most illustrative of year, to December 1942 and the Battle of the Barents
the relentlessness of Force K’s activities and duties, is Sea, to understand its context and potential impact.
that during this engagement, Nubian’s engine room ar- This action involved Captain Robert St Vincent Sher-
tificers were repairing the evaporator distiller, complet- brooke, a ‘Tribal’ class alumnus, who had commanded
ing the job on their way back to Malta.298 both Cossack during the Battles of Narvik and Matabele
After Operations Husky, Avalanche, Baytown and prior to his command of Onslow and the 17th De-
Slapstick (the September 1943 landings at Taranto) in stroyer Flotilla, which provided the bulk of the escort
which Force K had consistently been called upon to of Convoy JW15B during the Battle of the Barents Sea.
provide a mobile, high-speed, hard-hitting reaction There was distant cover available from the ‘Town’ class
force, it was time for a change to suit changing circum- cruiser Sheffield, the ‘Crown Colony’ class cruiser, Ja-
stances. The Italian fleet had surrendered, along with maica, and two more destroyers under the command of
their government, on 9 September 1943. Most of the Rear Admiral Robert Burnett, though they were many
fleet went on to form the Italian Co-Belligerent Navy hours away.
(the Marina Cobelligerante Italiano of the Italian Roy- The scene was set when the Kriegsmarine heavy
alist forces) which was probably not to be wholly cruisers, including the Deutschland class Lützow
trusted, but it did mean the Allies could, with these Ita- (formerly the Deutschland, which under her previous
lian forces fighting on their side, restructure their own name had provided not only the class name, but also
Mediterranean forces. Force K was placed under the the less successful Northern Waters counterpart to the

104
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

cruise of the Graf Spee) and the Admiral Hipper of the booke pursued him and drove him outside gun range
class of that name, along with five destroyers, including of the convoy and towards our covering forces.
three vessels from what the Allies referred to as the These engagements lasted about two hours, but after
‘Narvik’ class; two Type 36A, Z29 and Z30, and one the first forty minutes HMS Onslow was hit, and
Type 36A (Mob) Z31, as well as the pre-war de- Captain Sherbrooke was seriously wounded in the
stroyers, one Type 1934A Friedrich Eckholdt (Z16) and face and temporarily lost the use of one eye. Never-
two Type 1934 Richard Beitzen (Z4) and Theodor Riedel theless he continued to direct the ships under his
(Z6), all hove into view between 0800hrs and 0820hrs command until further hits on his own ship com-
on Thursday 31 December. What would unfold was de- pelled him to disengage, but not until he was satisfied
scribed in the VC citation which appeared a little over that the next Senior Officer has assumed control. It
a week later in the Third Supplement to The London was only then that he agreed to leave the bridge for
Gazette on Friday 8 January 1943. medical attention, and until the convoy was out of
danger he insisted on receiving all reports of the
The KING has been graciously pleased to approve action.
the award of the VICTORIA CROSS, for valour in His courage, his fortitude and his cool and
the defence of a convoy, to: prompt decisions inspired all around him. By his
Captain Robert St. Vincent Sherbrooke, DSO, leadership and example the convoy was saved from
Royal Navy. damage and was brought safely to its destination
Captain Sherbrooke, in HMS Onslow, was the
Senior Officer in command of the destroyers escor- Captain Sherbrooke’s available destroyers included, in
ting an important convoy bound for North Russia. addition to his own ship Onslow, Achates and Onslow’s
On the morning of 31st of December, off the North sisters Orwell, Obedient and Obdurate; this number was
Cape, he made contact with a greatly superior further reduced as Achates was left with the convoy.
enemy force, which was attempting to destroy the This whole operation was about aggression. The
convoy. Captain Sherbrooke led his destroyers into Kriegsmarine force, which had been brought together
attack and closed the Enemy. Four times the Enemy under Vizeadmiral Oskar Kummetz, should have
tried to attack the convoy, but was forced each time routed them. However, there were two problems. At the
to withdraw behind a smoke screen to avoid the time Kummetz was one of the most unlucky command-
threat of torpedoes, and each time Captain Sher- ing officers in the Kriegsmarine; it had been his cruiser
Blücher which had been sunk during the invasion of
St Kitts was completed in 1946 and escorted Vanguard, Britain’s Norway. Most importantly no one had told Sherbrooke
last battleship, to South Africa on the Royal Tour which included that he was meant to lose. For an officer who had been
King George VI, Queen Elizabeth and the Princesses. (Drachinifel inculcated into the culture of the ‘Tribal’ class flotillas,
Collection) such a concept would have been as foreign to him as

105
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

the idea of withdrawing. Furthermore, no one in- ship, the Scharnhorst, was sent out to intercept Arctic
structed him to scatter the convoy, as had been the case convoys.
with PQ17. Six big German destroyers and two over- This is what made the Battle of North Cape matter,
sized heavy cruisers should have overwhelmed the four not only from the British point of view, but also because
British destroyers, and previously, on occasions when of the high stakes involved on the German side. It was
those circumstances were feared, such orders would the last throw of the dice, an attempt to provide Scharn-
have been issued. horst, together with her sister ship Gneisenau, an oppor-
Sherbrooke, mostly using aggressive feinting, gun- tunity to repeat the successes of previous operations,
fire, the threat of torpedoes and the liberal use of including the 1939 North Atlantic cruise which sank
smoke, drove Kummetz and his ships off. In effect, the the Rawalpindi, Operation Berlin of 1941, and the
British destroyers held off the German force through Channel Dash in February 1942. This time, however,
intimidation rather than actual strength, just as Sikh had she was alone. Following the Battle of the Barents Sea,
against the Regia Marina’s Littorio earlier in the war. the work to repair the damage Gneisenau sustained dur-
However, the greatest impact of this action was not the ing the Channel Dash ceased. Furthermore, Scharn-
saving of the convoy, although that was important. Of horst had only five Narvik class destroyers
greater effect was the psychological impact on Hitler of accompanying her. However, prior to the battle they
the resignation of Admiral Raeder and replacement by were sent off by Konteradmiral Eric Bey to search for
Dönitz, and the threat to the continued existence of the the convoy but lost contact with the flagship. With no
Kriegsmarine’s large surface raiders. If Hitler had cruiser, she was on her own, a true surface raider, but
scrapped them at the beginning of 1943 the impact on without the benefit of being far from the enemy’s main
the rest of the war could have been enormous. It would fleet. As it turned out, the events of December 1943,
have freed a great many ships from the Home Fleet to shared a month and a geographical area with those of
reinforce the Mediterranean and Eastern Fleets, includ- December 1942.
ing almost every battleship and cruiser not needed for Onslow was once again the lead ship of the convoy’s
D-Day, every aircraft carrier bigger than an escort car- ocean escort, that of JW 55B, which was drawn princi-
rier, plus most of the smaller utilitarian vessels, together pally from 17th Destroyer Flotilla, by now under the
with most of the Navy’s cruisers. Dönitz successfully command of another ‘Tribal’ class alumnus, Captain
headed off this domestic political attack, and it was James Abernethy McCoy, a former commander of Be-
principally due to this that in December 1943 a battle- douin. The convoy also had a close escort, which in-
cluded two Canadian ‘Tribal’ class destroyers, Huron
The 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class Trafalgar carries out a series of high- and Haida, the latter now the last surviving ‘Tribal’ class
speed manoeuvres, typifying the handling qualities of the class. destroyer. preserved in Hamilton, Ontario. There was
(Maritime Quest) also a UK-bound convoy in the area, RA55A, with a
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

Trafalgar is a name which carries a lot of a weight, and the Royal without some cost to both sides. Norfolk had a turret
Navy does not bestow the name lightly. Prior to this ‘Battle’, it had and radar disabled by two hits from 11in shells. Scharn-
been carried only by two First Rates and a battleship, so the horst also lost her radar, which prevented her from
naming of this ship demonstrated the status of the class in the learning when engine problems with Norfolk and Shef-
minds of the Admiralty. (Drachinifel Collection) field left Belfast as her sole pursuer. Scharnhorst was not
going to escape. Fraser was deluged with radio traffic
similar-sized escort which included two more ‘Tribals’, updating him as to Scharnhorst’s position, and this
Ashanti and the Canadian Athabaskan. In addition, allowed him to refine his own attack from the south and
there was Force 1, a cruiser formation made up of the to call in further destroyers then escorting RA55A.
‘Town’ class cruiser Belfast (now another preserved Simultaneously, he ordered his attendant destroyers to
ship, based in London), as flagship for Vice Admiral surge ahead and attack with torpedoes. At 1617hrs
Robert Burnett, her older sister Sheffield, veteran of the Scharnhorst was detected by Duke of York’s Type 273
Barents Sea Battle and the ‘County’ class heavy cruiser radar; fifteen minutes later the Type 284 radar had her.
Norfolk. This was not all. Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, the Sixteen minutes later at 1648hrs, Belfast fired starshell
C-in-C Home Fleet, the man who had succeeded to illuminate the German battleship. Scharnhorst was
Admiral Henderson as Third Sea Lord, was at sea in his unprepared for what was coming. Duke of York opened
flagship the new King George V class battleship Duke of fire at a range of nearly 12,000yds which, in terms of a
York, armed with ten 14in guns, and with an escort com- 14in shell, is virtually point blank. The first hit disabled
prising Jamaica, a light cruiser and veteran of the Barents Scharnhorst’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets, a second destroyed the
Sea action, and the ‘S’ class destroyers Savage, Saumarez aircraft and their hangar. Bey turned north, hoping to
and Scorpion, together with the Royal Norwegian Navy’s outrun Duke of York but Belfast, with Norfolk, was wait-
Stord. Put in simple terms, Konteradmiral Bey was ing. Duke ofYork was joined by Jamaica, and at 1724hrs
advancing into a contested sea with one of the lower Bey sent the message, ‘Am surrounded by heavy units’.
capability battleships in service at the time, mounting An hour later, at 1820hrs, Duke ofYork disabled the val-
only 11in guns. He faced a newer, bigger, more heavily iant German ship’s No 1 boiler room.
armed and armoured battleship, a heavy cruiser, three This caused an immediate drop in speed and Fraser
light cruisers and four destroyers, with potential avail- was able to send in his destroyers. Now they could at-
ability of a maximum of twelve more destroyers, giving tack, pairing up, alternately approaching from each
odds of between nine to twenty-one versus one. side, while Scharnhorst tried to weave and drive them
Bey twice managed to find RA55A on Sunday 26 off in turn like a tired and wounded bison driving off
December but he was driven off both times by Bur- wolves. The first set of destroyers scored roughly four
nett’s cruisers and the convoy’s destroyers. This was not hits, further reducing the battleship’s speed. Belfast and

107
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Jamaica joined in with their torpedoes, before, finally, There are specks on the horizon
Opportune, Virago, Musketeer and Matchless arrived to As familiar as can be
unleash a further nineteen torpedoes at her. Despite her D10 with his flotilla
motto of Immer Voran – ever onward – the mighty Proceeding in from Sea.
Scharnhorst went ever downwards into the depths, tak-
ing most of her crew with her. The destroyers had Battle ensigns at all mastheads
struck again. After his victory, and the threat of the An impressive sight to see
large German surface vessels reduced, it is altogether The Tartar with the 10th DF
unsurprising that Fraser soon found himself in com- Come in triumphantly.
mand of the British Pacific Fleet, accompanied by
many of the ships he had led in the Home Fleet. The pendants now come visible
This battle was significant for the ‘Tribal’ class. In Four Three, Five One, Two Four,
the Barents Sea action their aggression and training Tartar, Ashanti, Huron,
which was brought to the fore. During the Battle of Astern there loom five more.
North Cape, their presence provided sufficient capa-
bility and reassurance to allow Fraser to denude the Blyskawica, Javelin, Haida,
convoy of almost everything else, and for not an incon- Piorun, Eskimo,
siderable amount of time, reasonably confident that Buntings on the signal bridge,
they were safe. More critically, he could commit what Stokers down below.
forces he had with 100 per cent certainty that if the
Germans had found a convoy with a reduced escort – Proceeding through the gate at last
a Kriegsmarine cruiser of which Fraser was unaware, They move more cautiously
or a well co-ordinated U-boat attack was launched – the The same old signal flying
general purpose destroyers would provide a safety net Act Independently.
in the face of any such eventuality. They were what gave
Fraser and all the Fleet/Force commanders the freedom We hope we’ll always see you
to take risks. In addition, the 4.5in weapons of Savage (Not calling pendant Three)
were absolutely savage, proving to be a good choice and The Fighting Tenth’s a lovely sight
worth the wait for the Battles. When coming in from sea 300

1944: The 10th Destroyer Flotilla and the Battle In the run up to D-Day the Fighting 10th were em-
of Ushant ployed extensively on channel sweeps, often called
D-Day or Operation Overlord, the invasion of Nor- ‘tunnels’, as they were ‘a straight run in the dark’. While
mandy, is famous for many reasons, not least for the they avoided following E-boats (Schnellboote) into
ferocity of the sea battles which took place around its shallow waters, they could use their radar and guns to
ragged coast. ‘Tribal’ class vessels were committed be- reach places into which they preferred not to run.
fore the start. Unsurprisingly, in view of their capabil- Though Ashanti and Athabaskan were both occa-
ities, they had been overwhelmingly selected for the sionally summoned away for others tasks they always
10th DF which was charged with clearing the seas from returned. On one such trip Ashanti was twice fired at
Plymouth to the West. The flotilla was made up of Tar- by U-739; both torpedoes missed and the blessings of
tar, Ashanti and Eskimo, two Canadian ‘Tribal’ class de- the Asante tribe held. On the ‘tunnels’ the destroyers
stroyers, Haida and Huron, the ‘J’ class Javelin and two were often joined by a cruiser; occasionally by Apollo,
Polish destroyers, the ‘N’ class Piorun and the Grom the Abdiel class minelayer with a top speed in excess of
class Błyskawica (built by Samuel White, Cowes, and 40 knots and a bad habit of leaving her escort behind
now preserved in Gydnia), and provided force security in the middle of night as she full steamed ahead. More
and ocean control. At various time the 10th also in- frequently, however, it was Black Prince, a Bellona sub-
cluded two Canadian ‘Tribals’, Athabaskan and Iro- class Dido class cruiser, with a top speed of 32.5 knots,
quois, together with the remaining ‘Tribal’, Nubian.299 which accompanied the destroyers. A typical ‘tunnel’
They quickly made a name for themselves, so much so operation was that of 25/26 April 1944. Black Prince,
that in 1944 a poem, or possibly song, The Fighting Ashanti, Haida, Athabaskan and Huron intercepted four
Tenth, was composed in their honour by Wrens based Elbing class fleet torpedo boats, which at 1,294 tons
at Longroom Signal Station. were virtually small destroyers and carried six torpe-

108
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

St James was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class with the distinction of This continued even after D-Day, as the great fear was
having unintentionally sunk another ship using her primary gun the Germans getting in amongst the lightly armed, slow
battery during calibration trials, when instead of hitting the target moving, numerous transports and landing craft – which
she hit the tug Bucanneer instead with a single 4.5in round. give them plenty of targets and make engaging them a
(Drachinifel Collection)
nightmare for the British.
The closest it came to happening was on 9 June,
when the 10th DF engaged the German 8th DF.302 The
does, together with four 4.1in, four 37mm and nine result was a hard fought action where the 10th DF car-
20mm guns. ried out their orders successfully, though it was largely
While Black Prince kept firing starshell until ‘B’ turret overshadowed by the scale of the other events which
jammed, the ‘Tribals’ pursued the German ships had started three days earlier and were ongoing. This
through rocks, smoke and shallow water in pitch dark- action, the Battle of Ushant, as some call it, or the ‘ac-
ness along the coast of France. They worked in pairs, tion off Île De Bas’ as it is referred to by the Royal Navy
one alternately firing starshell to supplement Black in their records, was significant.303
Prince’s efforts, the other concentrating on hitting the The ‘Tribals’ had not been selected just because they
Kriegsmarine vessels. One was sunk while the other carried more guns and had a well-established reputation
three were damaged. Unfortunately, Athabaskan would for doing whatever was necessary to win. Their size and
be lost three days later, when she and Haida were a dimensions made them the perfect candidates for the
covering a minelaying operation; with intermittent in- integration and upgrading of radar throughout the war.
telligence they investigated what turned out to be Ger- This meant that, on 9 June, all eight vessels incorpor-
man torpedo boats. T24 hit Athabaskan and many of ated good radar. While all carried Warning Combined
the crew, including the commanding officer Lieutenant Type 291 (as was being fitted to the ‘Battle’ class) it was
Commander John Stubbs who refused rescue by Haida seldom used because it could be monitored by the
while trying to swim back to rescue more crew, were enemy to reveal their positions. The Warning Surface
lost. The missions continued until 2/3 June when the units were for the most part better. The reason for this
flotilla was placed on the Hurd’s Deep patrol (a posi- qualification is that while Ashanti, Eskimo and Tartar
tion to the northwest of the Channel Islands and the were fitted with the latest Type 276, which could detect
deepest place in the Channel) and the Flotilla Com- smallish destroyers at a range of about 12 miles, the
mander given almost unprecedented powers. other two Canadian vessels, Haida and Huron, were
In October 1943, another Dido class cruiser Charyb- equipped with the Type 271Q, which was older and
dis and the ‘Hunt’ class destroyer Limborne were sunk had, theoretically, a far less useful display, only capable
by German destroyers during an earlier ‘tunnel’ oper- of detecting destroyers at nine miles. This latter fit was
ation.301 Taking this and the critical nature of the cross repeated on the Polish Błyskawica and Piorun, as well
Channel activity into account, the ‘Tribals’ and their as the British Javelin.
colleagues in 10th DF were employed as a blocking The Type 276 had the further advantage being a
force to prevent German surface vessels interfering. powered rotation unit. This enabled it not only to per-

109
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Solebay was something of a special guardian for the Royal Yacht The need and willingness to adapt is made clear in
Britannia, especially during the early 1960s when she was her the service history of 10th DF. Commander St John
escort for visits to the Mediterranean as well as West Africa where Tyrwhitt was the only son of Admiral of the Fleet Sir
they visited Ashanti’s favourite port, Takoradi, and where she was Reginald Tyrwhitt, who had commanded the Harwich
described as stealing the show whilst all lit up in Freetown at night.
force in the First World War. After the war St John
(Drachinifel Collection)
would follow in his father’s footsteps, rising to Admiral
and Second Sea Lord. He handed over to Commander
Basil Jones in March 1944, and the 10th DF soon de-
form constant horizon scanning, but to support a Plan veloped new tactics. Tyrwhitt, like his father, had al-
Position Indicator (PPI) display. This was critical for ready been experimenting not only with different
night operations because it enabled relative positions to options for night operations and during the hunting of
be shown in real time. This is why ships fitted with Type the Bismarck, Vian had famously and convincingly
276 had the better display. However, there are some re- made use of the box formation. Jones considered this,
ports, based on night actions in which the 10th DF but after careful analysis of the 25/26 April operation
were involved, that suggest it might not have been so discussed earlier, instead tried something new which
simple. In fact, it appears that 10th DF may have had would take advantage of the ‘Tribals’’ specific qualities:
PPI fitted to more than just those ships with the perfect their heavy forward gun arrangement, their radar and
radar set up for it. It is even possible that they had the quality of their crews.
somehow modified their radars themselves to work with
the displays. After all, the fitting of a small electric It was desirable that all destroyers should have their
motor to rotate a radar, which was already manually ro- forecastle guns bearing, their Radar unimpeded
tatable, would not have been a complicated task for a ahead, and ships capable of individual action comb
ship’s crew. Actions such as these were seldom di- enemy torpedoes. Only a reasonably broad and
vulged, and not just for reasons of national security, but shaken-out line of bearing formation [in this case,
because of the sensitivity about where the electric line abreast] could satisfy these conditions. It was
motor might have been sourced. It is unsurprising there realised cruising at night for lengthy periods in such
are conflicting reports. However, considering the fre- a formation was a strain as regards station keeping,
quency of night operations, their operational doctrine although the P.P.I. removed much of the strain [for
(which will be examined next) and the critical tasking those who had it]. Accordingly Line Ahead for com-
of the unit, it would have made sense for the unit to fort, and Line of Bearing for action, was the order of
‘adapt’ their kit where possible. the day.304

110
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

The traditional or standard formation had been line two Type 1936A Narvik class vessels Z24 and Z32,
ahead. It was safe and kept the force together during a along with a captured Dutch vessel, the Gerard Callen-
night battle. It had been used at the Battle of Cape Bon burgh (renamed ZH1) and a single torpedo boat, the
and it was why the two ships at the rear had such little Elbing class destroyer-sized vessel T24 (which had sunk
impact on the action. It was also more difficult to avoid Athabaskan in April) of the 8th Zerstörer-flotille that
torpedo attacks and, additionally, when turning away the Germans sent never reached their target.305
from an attack the destroyers often lost their prey. Line Thanks to intelligence both from Bletchley Park
abreast manoeuvring changed all that and it was the Enigma, and from the aptly named Headache, the
quality of the crews that made it possible. It also ex- C-in-C Plymouth, Admiral Leatham was able to coach
plains the use of the word ‘comb’, in that the ships in the 10th to an optimal position. The Headache system
formation abreast would act like the teeth of a comb, was fitted to destroyers which allowed them to tune into
forcing the water between them which, it was hoped, enemy radio communications. It was aptly named
would suck torpedoes and possibly mines into the con- Headache because it sometimes caused trouble and
fluence between the ships, rather than hitting them. misunderstandings. But on this occasion it worked well
It was a change in tactics which, had it had happened and, combined with other assets, helped Leatham to di-
earlier in the war, would certainly have been used to rect his forces. At 0114hrs on 9 June, Tartar’s Type 276
justify the weapons arrangement of the ‘Battle’ class. displayed contact, bearing 241° at a range of 10 miles.
That though is ancillary to the action currently under In contrast, though the Germans received some warn-
discussion. With this tactical change and the fitted ra- ing from their radars, it was only because of the moonlit
dars, in addition to the innate firepower included in night they knew the Allied destroyers were almost upon
Henderson’s original design and handling character- them. Immediately, the element of surprise having been
istics of ‘Tribal’ class vessels, the scene was set for an lost, the German vessels swung and launched their tor-
English Channel version of the Pacific campaign de- pedoes before trying to make good their escape. They
stroyer battle of Cape St George. took aim at the 19th Division. Each flotilla was grouped
The action took place of Ushant while the Allies were into two divisions, also given ascending numbers as a
still coming ashore. If the German destroyers had made rule. In the 10th DF there was the 19th Division, built
it to the lanes which the supply ships were crossing in around Jones in Tartar, and the 20th Division, as-
order to bring more soldiers and materiel to the fighting sembled around the less experienced Namiensniowski
effort ashore, the Allied operations would have been se- in Błyskawica and formed from the more recent addi-
verely disrupted (possibly even halted temporarily) tions to the flotilla. With ample warning from Head-
with all the consequent knock-on effects on the land ache, and advancing in line abreast, the ‘Tribals’ of the
operation. Instead, the three Kriegsmarine destroyers, 19th Division just kept advancing, avoiding the torpe-
does and, having lost no speed through diversionary
tactics, were soon upon the German vessels.
Solebay in 1945, just after being completed. It was broadly in this
form that she would start for the Far East, only to be recalled to the
This allowed Jones and the 10th DF to begin the ac-
5th DF to take on the role not just of Flotilla Leader, but also tion at a fast pace as the two forces engaged each other.
German Waters Guard Ship, visiting Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, Once the initial contact phase was over, Z32 turned
Kiel, Flensburg and Hamburg taking part in what was a post-war north to the waiting embrace of the 20th Division, while
northern European presence mission. (Maritime Quest) the 19th Division split, with Ashanti teaming with

111
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Sluys, soon after she was completed, making minimal speed and thought the others were part of their force. The Cana-
appearing almost serene. (Maritime Quest) dians became suspicious first and, using radar, opened
fire with star shell from their 4in ‘X’ mounts and blazed
4.7in gunfire from ‘A’ and ‘B’ mounts; for the second
Tartar against ZH1 and Z24.306 Z32 managed to get time that night a German destroyer took refuge inside
away from 20th Division, which had been in line astern a British minefield. However, this time the Allies main-
and had had less time to organise themselves for the tained a radar lock and were able to follow until, at
fight. The captain of Z32 deserves credit for the hand- 0444hrs, they opened fire again. Seeing the ‘Tribal’ sil-
ling of his ship, managing to surprise and score some houette in the flashes of their guns, Z32 believed them-
hits against Tartar before disappearing into the resulting selves to be engaging cruisers. By 0513hrs, with his ship
smoke. This did little to help the rest of the Zerstörer- enveloped in flames, and in a repeat of the Battle of
flotille, and just at this point ZH1, emerged from the Narvik, the captain ordered her to be run aground off
smoke (traditionally something with gave an attacking Île de Batz.307
destroyer an advantage) straight into a fusillade of fire Fortunately, for the 10th DF’s next critical operation,
from Ashanti and then Tartar. Thanks to radar and their which took place in the eastern Indian Ocean in the ap-
firepower – possibly involving two torpedoes from proaches to Singapore, they had charts with accurate
Ashanti – she was soon disabled, at which point both locations of minefields, and once again they were em-
‘Tribals’ closed in and finished the job with more gunfire. ployed clearing the path for an amphibious operation;
South of this action, Z24 and T24 were being given this one, however, never took place, and this time it was
undivided attention from the Canadian ‘Tribals’, Haida Nubian rather than Tartar forging the path.
and Huron, a move which forced the German vessels
to flee into a British minefield that had not been prop- Nubian, a virtually unmatched service
erly charted. That it proved only successful in halting
Calabria 1940, Norway 1940, Mediterranean 1940–
the Canadian pursuit was not well received when re-
3, Libya 1940, Matapan 1941, Sfax 1941, Greece
ported back to Admiral Ramsay. However, the night
1941, Crete 1941, Malta Convoys 1941, Sicily 1943,
was not yet over and Z32, having evaded the ‘Tribals’
Salerno 1943, Arctic 1944, Norway 1944, Burma
three times, was now to meet her end. Initially, when
1945–5
they encountered each other at 0230hrs, both sides

112
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

‘The dominion of the sea, as it is an ancient and un- around Norway. Shortly after Norway Nubian and her
doubted right of the crown of England, so it is the best sister Mohawk were transferred from the 4th DF to the
security of the land. The wooden walls are the best walls 14th DF, and by 17 May 1940 were back in warmer
of his kingdom.’ These are the words of Thomas Cov- waters.314 By March 1941 they had become the reliable
entry, Baron and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, in a fleet units which Admiral Cunningham felt comfortable
speech to judges on 17 June 1635 when justifying a ship using in critical roles such as at the Battle of Matapan,
money tax. Three hundred and ten years later he would previously discussed.
have replaced ‘wooden walls’ with ‘steel walls’ and Nu- Matapan is an interesting battle, mostly because it
bian would have been firmly in his eye, for her battle has the distinction of being one of the few battles ever
honours read like a list of the Royal Navy’s campaigns fought which conformed to one side’s pre-war doc-
in the war. Nubian was a ship which thanks to record trines, at least in outline. The RN did manage to use air
as much as design could easily lay claim to the title of attacks to slow down the enemy, and it did use cruisers
the Royal Navy’s ‘Swiss Army Knife Destroyer’, though to then track that enemy, while the battle fleet closed in;
the records of Ashanti, Eskimo and Tartar were not far and it did fight its main action at night. What is often
behind.308 Only Warspite would exceed her in battle forgotten about this battle is that it was a convoy pro-
honours, and she had been in another World War. Nu- tection battle. At this time the Royal Navy were heavily
bian has already been mentioned a number of times, involved in protecting convoys overflowing with British
but there is still much to tell; and she was, in many ways Army personnel, equipment and supplies to Greece, a
a quiet achiever, not acquiring the fame of some others too tempting a target for the Italian Navy to ignore.315
in her class. However, as so often with chases, the British forces
The understated report compiled by the Royal Navy started to spread out. Needing to concentrate his
of Nubian’s service after the war rather confirms this. cruisers on the enemy, Cunningham turned to Nubian
After taking part in the landings at Salerno and Sicily,309 and Mohawk to fill the gap, ‘to form a visual signal link
Nubian ‘had a busy time helping to stop supplies from between Pridham-Wippell’s cruisers and the Battle-
reaching Rommel, and sank at least two big merchant fleet’.316 This served two purposes: it kept the need for
ships and one destroyer’.310 While conducting what was ‘noisier’ radio communication to a minimum, and it
considered ‘probably the best work of her career’ dur- also provided a means of stopping the Italians slipping
ing a ten-day period in September 1943 she regularly unnoticed between the two groups of the British Force,
bombarded Pantelleria, Lampedusa, Catanai, Augusta with the intention of either escaping or surprising the
and Salerno, expending thousands of rounds in support main force.317
of Allied troops – nearly 2,000 rounds into Salerno Despite conforming to pre-war plans and exercises,
alone.311 Despite all the reports on her service, when the battle was not all the British hoped it would be.
writing in response to an enquiring cadet unit officer, Rather than the battleship Vittorio Veneto, damaged but
the head of the Royal Navy’s Historical section gave not crippled by an air strike from Formidable’s Sword-
only a minimal summing up of her service: fish, they had to make to do with three heavy cruisers,
Pola, already crippled by aircraft, Zara and Fiume
H.M.S. Nubian was a destroyer of the ‘Tribal’ Class, which Admiral Iachino had despatched back to recover
completed in 1938, which served with distinction Pola.318 During the night action the destroyer’s role was
throughout the Second World War. She was in the to find and fix the enemy with searchlights, to enable
Mediterranean until after the end of the war with battleships to engage while reducing the risk of a tor-
Italy in September, 1943, taking part in the Battle of pedo attack.319 It was a short sharp battle. The Navy
Matapan, the defence of Crete, the capture of Sicily, had prepared extensively for night fighting, practising
and other operations. Following a refit in the Tyne in regularly with the available technology such as flashless
the winter of the 1943-1944 she served in the Home charges for their guns to minimise exposure of their
Fleet for the rest of 1944, and in the Far East in position and avoid blinding gunners.320 Despite the
1945. She was placed on the disposal list in 1949. 312 focus on support of battleships and the subsequent
mêlée action that developed, the British destroyers, in-
This is not entirely accurate. While Nubian started the cluding the Tribals, were not as prominent as they
war in the Mediterranean, along with the rest of the 4th might have been in a larger action.
DF to which she belonged, they did not stay there.313 It was, however, Nubian which delivered the final
As previously told, the 4th DF was called back to Brit- blow in the battle, firing a torpedo into Pola and sinking
ain and almost immediately thrust into operations her at 0403hrs on 29 March, following the evacuation

113
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Lagos in the 1940s. She returned to the UK after her Far East place, the ground forces were quickly dislodged – requi-
deployment in 1947 and would be placed in reserve till 1957, ring further evacuation.323 It was a far more difficult
during which time she was regularly inspected and overhauled to task, which moved Cunningham to make his most fa-
keep her ready for operations at short notice. (Maritime Quest) mous pronouncement: ‘You can build a new ship in
three years, but you can’t rebuild a reputation in under
of her crew by British ships.321 Despite going roughly three hundred years.’324
to plan, and despite debate about a poorly-worded sig- On 26 May, as the destroyers of the 14th DF were
nal from Cunningham, the action could never have escorting Formidable and other main fleet units follow-
gone exactly as hoped. To have caught up with the main ing a successful strike against Scapanto airfield, which
Italian fleet would have left the British force close to the lies between Rhodes and Crete, the force was attacked
Italian coast, and exposed it to its air force and having by Ju 87s and Ju 88s. The Stukas went for Formidable,
to fight in daylight. Victory might have been theirs, but hitting her twice.325 The Ju 88s, which were trying out
not one with practically no losses. As it was the Navy the new technique of skip bombing, similar in principle
lost two Swordfish and crews. Cunningham, given the to the method employed by the Dambusters, focussed
opportunity, would probably have wished such an out- their attack on Nubian.326 They missed, but one bomb,
come for the next operation, one which was on the dropped by a Ju 87, hit ‘Y’ mounting and the resulting
same scale as Dunkirk in terms of risk and necessity, explosion caused the loss of her stern and started a
but even more fraught. number of fires, similar to the damage suffered by Es-
Crete was a direct result of Matapan. Without that kimo at Narvik, though at the other end of the ship.327
victory it would not have been possible to deploy troops As with Eskimo, Nubian was saved by excellent damage
and supplies to Greece at the same level, and when control and a miracle, for despite losing her rudder, her
German and Italian forces invaded, the British would props and her propeller shafts were unscathed, and she
not have been as exposed. The first evacuation was could manage 20 knots, steering by her main engines.
from the mainland to Crete, which was straightforward. She was escorted back to Alexandria by her flotilla mate,
However, on arrival on Crete the forces did not form a Jackal.328 Her survival was all the more remarkable con-
cohesive defence.322 Despite the set-up of a naval de- sidering that four cruisers and six destroyers were lost,
fence by Cunningham, which successfully prevented, in addition to damage to Formidable, two battleships,
with some help from the Luftwaffe and the Italian four more cruisers, another destroyer and a submarine.
navy’s reluctance to commit heavy units, enemy forces Nineteen vessels were put out of action, ten perma-
approaching, this was ultimately pointless, because the nently. It was a sacrifice which almost erased in one op-
enemy finally came by air. With no organisation in eration the advantages won by Taranto and Matapan.329

114
 THE SHIELD AND THE CANNON 1943–5

Cyprus – 26 May – extract from Commander Ra- total of 2,985 hours, used 16,726 tons of fuel oil and
venhill’s report: had averaged 18.5 knots. With such wear on the ships
The Action and a change in vision for the post-war era, it was in-
At approximately 1320 on May 26th, when Nubian evitable that their careers would come to an end.335
was in position ‘B’ of screening diagram No.6A With lessons from the war and the reassurance of the
screening the Battle Fleet, an attack was made on our numbers it had achieved during those years, the Navy
forces by a large formation of enemy aircraft consist- was focused on achieving capability through common-
ing of J.U.87s and J.U.88s. As the attack developed ality, for example the 4.5in and 40mm guns would be-
Nubian opened fire over the Fleet with umbrella bar- come standard, and maintaining a force of ‘specialists’
rage. It soon became apparent, however, that the as best it could. Cruisers, destroyers and frigates all had
leading enemy units were attacking the screen and a purposeful role: a worn out comparatively small class
two definite attacks were made on Nubian, one by a which straddled those duties was a complication. Es-
J.U.87 and one by a J.U.88. Speed was increased to pecially with the ‘Battle’ class still coming into service
26 Knots (maximum available) and the ship ma- and the Daring class on the ‘stocks’. So the Royal Navy
noeuvred to avoid the bombs which missed. put to one side the experience of capacity and capabil-
The Fleet was then attacked and the umbrella bar- ity that the inter-war general-purpose designs had pro-
rage was recommenced. Shortly after fire was vided it with.
opened it was observed that Formidable had been hit. The decision might have been different had surface
A number of enemy aircraft then passed down Nu- raiders continued to be a threat, but in the immediate
bian’s port side at a fairly low elevation and fire was post-war years of the 1940s such a threat did not exist.
transferred to them. At this moment one of the sig- It was only in 1949, the year in which ‘Tribal’ class
nalmen pointed out a J.U.87 which was approaching vessels were scrapped, that submarines ceased to be the
the ship at a low level from astern, I put the wheel only major sea threat and surface battles once again
hard to starboard and directed the guns on this tar- seemed possible; the date marked the commencement
get. The machine was, however, fairly close and be- of the building of the Soviet Navy’s Sverdlov class
fore effective fire could be developed it had reached cruisers.336 This might partly explain the survival of the
its position and dropped a bomb. This bomb hit Australian and Canadian ‘Tribals’, a decision that was
No.4 mounting and exploded heavily.330 vindicated by their excellent service in Korea.337 What-
ever the case, it is certain that Nubian, despite wanting
After such damage it is not surprising Nubian was out to be useful to the very end, did not get either the pres-
of action for some time. While in Bombay for repairs ervation or even the honourable end she deserved. By
the Navy took the opportunity to upgrade her, fitting 1948 she was being used as a target ship in Loch
radar, finally changing ‘X’ mount to a twin 4in high- Striven prior to being sent for scrap at Briton Ferry in
angle AA system, along with some 20mm Oerlikons June 1949.338
and moving the depth-charge throwers, to mention a
few.331 By October 1942, after 16 months, Nubian Construction Goes On
returned to the Mediterranean where she served there All the operational reports, and all the ongoing feed-
until 1944. 332 She became a permanent fixture of back from officers and petty officers, were constantly
operations, as elaborated earlier in the chapter, captur- fed back into the design and construction of the Navy’s
ing the entire island of Linosa, together with its garri- new destroyers, feedback which required the offices of
son, single-handedly in June 1943.333 At the end of the the Third Sea Lord and the Naval Constructors to walk
war in the Mediterranean, Nubian returned to northern a tightrope while delivering ships which were both
European waters, Arctic convoys and Norway. Her war, needed and then up to date on entering service. This
however, did not end in those waters. She earned was especially true of the ‘Battle’ class which were con-
further honour off the coast of Burma, for instance ceived at the moment of the greatest losses for the
clearing the route to Singapore for the planned Oper- Navy’s destroyer force, but were built as the war
ation Mailfist.334 changed, and entered service when the Mediterranean
The post-war service lives for the surviving ‘Tribal’ was nowhere near the high-risk theatre it had been.
ships were cut short by the extent of their wartime ser- From their conception radar had been a big part of
vice. According to her captain, Commander Holland- their design, but as it became increasingly not just an
Martin, by September 1943, Nubian, for example, had extra sensor, but also a critical part of the ship’s navi-
travelled 53,556 nautical miles, been underway for a gation system, and also employed in flotilla co-ordina-

115
St James (R65, ex-D65) is seen alongside Vanguard. ‘Battles’ were age space of anti-freeze and lubricants for protection
often used for such escort duties because of their powerful anti-air of such fragile things as radar; more obviously, she was
armament, along with their strong all-round capability. They could painted for the Arctic. As the war wound down in the
adapt to any role a destroyer might be called upon to fill within a West it continued to build in the East, towards the am-
task group, from distant picket to close quarters guardian.
phibious operations still to come, notably the envisaged
(Drachinifel Collection)
retaking of Singapore (Operation Mailfist), and the in-
vasion of Japan (Operation Downfall). The Navy
tion, changes were necessary. This was most visible in needed its best ships, forged by the experience of war,
the growth and structure of masts. There were other as- stationed in the East.
pects of their design that had to be developed. The developments in naval warfare between 1939
Barfleur, the first of the ‘Battle’ class to enter service, and 1945 had been enormous, and it is fair to say that
was well prepared for Arctic conditions and was to be some things had been foreseen correctly, some things
one of the critical destroyers escorting essential convoys had been prepared for well, but there is nothing like the
to supply the Soviet Union when the war in Europe no experience of war to push forward technology, doc-
longer required her services. This meant she had all trine, design and the philosophy of war; none emerged
sorts of modifications, including a huge amount of stor- in 1945 quite the same.

116
 CHAPTER 6

TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

When examining the deployment of ‘Tribal’ and ‘Battle’ means for Britain – and by extension the British Empire
class destroyers, it is worth looking at why it took so – to make a meaningful contribution to the war against
long to send them to the Pacific. Why was there not Japan. The recapture of as much lost territory as poss-
more haste placed upon the construction and deploy- ible was also imperative. This was the mission of the
ment of the 1942 ‘Battle’ class? In answer to the first, East Indies Fleet and, by extension, the ‘Tribal’ class
while the Royal Navy destroyers took their time getting destroyers which joined its strength in May 1945. For
to the theatre, the RAN ‘Tribal’ destroyers were already an understanding of how important they were as assets
out in the Pacific proving themselves. This, coupled in this force, it is necessary to consider what made up
with the ample numbers of cruisers and destroyers the force in May 1945. Its single most powerful unit
within first the Eastern Fleet and later the British Pacific was the venerable, refitted but still capable battleship,
Fleet’s order of battle, offers the main explanation. Queen Elizabeth, the name ship of the Queen Elizabeth
However, with the expansion of operations anticipated class. She was also the only unit of, and consequently
prior even to the defeat of Nazi Germany, it now was flagship of, 1st Battle Squadron. Often overshadowed
imperative to get these vital force multipliers into the- by her younger sister ship, Warspite, she was, with her
atre. eight 15in guns, a linchpin of many planned operations,
Unsurprisingly, considering their recent duties in the and also the most eminent ship of this force.
Mediterranean and Normandy, it was not the Pacific
Fleet they joined, but the East Indies Fleet, the force This photograph of the 1943 Batch ‘Battle’ class Agincourt in the
tasked with retaking, or assisting in the retaking, of Sin- English Channel in 1951 highlights the American Mk 37 Fire
gapore. By 1945 the East Indies Fleet was not as im- Control her batch were fitted with, but also the range of small craft
portant, from the perspective of the Alliance, as the and floats carried aboard these ships both for regular operations
British Pacific Fleet, which was viewed as the critical and crew survival. (Maritime Quest)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Agincourt after conversion to a radar picket. The photograph ‘County’ class heavy cruisers, Cumberland, London, Suf-
shows both the size and scale of the radar structure (and which has folk and Sussex (which left the East Indies in July 1945);
continued to the modern Type 45 Daring class destroyers with their and two 6in-armed light cruisers, the ‘Crown Colony’
‘conehead’ radars). It also highlights the structural changes that the class Nigeria and the Free Dutch Tromp (which left in
transition necessitated: the loss of torpedoes, and much of the
August). While there were a number of reasons given,
40mm armament. The number of personnel was also considerably
the main reason that neither Queen Elizabeth nor any of
reduced. (Drachinifel Collection)
the larger cruisers were flagship was because they could
thus be easily transferred should the British Pacific
The strike power of the East Indies Fleet was pro- Fleet find itself in a crisis.
vided by escort carriers. These do not have the same The East Indies Fleet was one which was dependent
lustre as a fleet carrier, or even a light fleet carrier. How- upon escort carriers for its reach and smaller ships, es-
ever, the nine vessels of the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squad- pecially destroyers, for its planned fighting strength. By
ron, Activity, Ameer, Attacker, Emperor, Empress, Hunter, May 1945, in addition to the three ‘Tribal’ class vessels
Khedive, Shah and Stalker, were operationally potent. Eskimo, Nubian and Tartar, there were twelve other de-
Their squadron flagship was usually one of the two stroyers present: Penn, Paladin, Scout, Rocket, Saumarez,
Dido class AA cruisers on station, Royalist and her sister the French Le Triomphant, HMAS Vendetta, which left
Phoebe, which were sometimes needed for more than in August, Venus, Verulam, Vigilant, two of which had
their 5.25in guns in this fleet, often being used as Task left by August, and Virago and Volage. In addition, there
Force flagships. In addition, there was also the virtually were approximately fifteen frigates, six corvettes and
unmodified Cradoc, a First World War ‘C’ class cruiser, seven sloops. This was the ‘fighting’ strength of the Fleet
the smallest cruiser on station, and which served as the which could, in theory, be called upon to do what was
East Indies Flagship.339 Chosen instead of the Dido class necessary, but in practice it was a force with very limited
vessels in large part because she did not need to move scouting and surface action capabilities, capabilities es-
around much, it avoided tying up a valuable asset. The sential for clearing out the Japanese forces remaining
bulk of the naval gunfire support for any amphibious between it and its target destination. The duties of the
operation would come from the four 8in armed ‘Tribals’ were to act as the ‘reliable’ independent ships

118
 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

Asine, also after conversion to a radar picket. The scale of the Nicobar Islands and Sabang (an island off the coast of
equipment is clearly demonstrated by comparison to other ships Indonesia), an area directly on the line from the main
and the dockyard crane. (Drachinifel Collection) Indian Ocean base of Trincomalee to Singapore.341 The
purpose of this mission was to find and destroy the
on station, scouting, clearing the path, and commando enemy in order to prevent the resupply of island garri-
operations – though without the commandos – as typ- sons or the operation of forces in an area through which
ified by Operation Irregular. an amphibious assault force heading for Singapore
would have to navigate. Force 65, as it was known for
Operation Irregular 1945 the operation, was made up of the three ‘Tribal’ class
While serving in the Far East, the trio of the remaining vessels along with the ‘P’ class destroyers, Paladin and
‘Tribal’ sisters, Tartar, Nubian and Eskimo, or 10th DF Penn. The five destroyers left Trincomalee at 1800hrs
as they had remained, became involved in Operation on 5 June 1945, a little over a month after VE Day.
Irregular, a little over a year after their action off Île de
Batz during the D-Day operations.340 Irregular was an Corunna during her working-up period in 1948, when she was
aggressive patrol in the area between the Andaman Sea based at Chatham before her deployment with the Colossus class
and the Strait of Malacca, specifically between the light fleet carrier Vengeance to South Africa. (Drachinifel Collection)
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

On 7 June Paladin was sent on a special patrol while not, however, stop the interception. At 0552hrs, and at
the other four destroyers remained together. On 9 June, a range of 6,500 yards, the ‘Tribals’ opened fire on what
following two days of aggressive patrolling, they met up proved to be an enemy Landing Ship, Tank (LST),
with Force 64, the resupply group, made up of the armed with a 3in gun and several 20mm cannon, and a
tanker RFA Olwen and the ‘River’ class frigate Test.342 sub-chaser of the PC 40-44 class armed with a 6pdr
Penn was not refuelled until early on 10 June, at which and a single 20mm cannon.346 Initially, the Japanese
point she was despatched on her solo mission. On the vessels attempted to flee, but then decided to fight.
11th Force 65, or specifically the ‘Tribals’, split from After initially staying together, at about 0603hrs the
Force 65, which remained near that area because Pala- enemy ships tried to separate, so that Nubian concen-
din was expected to call in shortly. Acting on intelli- trated on the sub-chaser leaving Tartar and Eskimo to
gence received from Trident, a submarine operating in focus on the LST. As more enemy aircraft appeared on
the area, the remainder of Force 65, Tartar, Nubian and the radar the decision was made to use torpedoes as
Eskimo, proceeded line abreast at a speed of 25 knots well. Tartar fired first but the torpedoes ran underneath
and spread over a front of seven miles, towards position the shallow drafted LST. More semi-armour piercing
06° 45’ North, 93° 50’ East, just south of the Great (SAP) rounds were fired, which stopped the LST, and
Nicobar Island, near the entrance to the Strait of Ma- caused a list of 30-degrees. By 0619hrs, less than an
lacca.343 Just as with the Île de Batz action, information hour after first contact, Eskimo was able to finish off the
and operational doctrine enabled the destroyers, still LST with torpedoes, while Nubian despatched the sub-
under the command of Commander Basil Jones, to seek chaser No 57 with heavy gunfire.347
out the enemy. However, the fight was not over. A group of four
The 10th DF was certainly successful. At 0526hrs ‘Lilys’, two ‘Dinahs’ and an ‘Oscar’ – or to give them
on 12 June 1945, near the island of Rondo just north their Japanese names, four Kawasaki Ki-48 twin-engined
of Sabang, two small radar echoes were detected at a light bombers, two Mitsubishi Ki-46 twin-engined re-
range of 26,000yds, nearly fifteen miles. Six minutes connaissance /light bombers, and the Japanese Army’s
later there was visual confirmation. Their targets had A6M Zero lookalike, the single-engined Nakajima Ki-
been found.344 At this point, the reason for sending 43 – kept up an intermittent but persistent series of at-
‘Tribals’, especially wartime upgraded ‘Tribals’, be- tacks, necessitating several burst of anti-aircraft fire to
came apparent. Before they were able to intercept the keep them at bay. The fight was further complicated
enemy ships, the destroyers were engaged by, re- when four Liberator aircraft ‘joined company’ with the
portedly, a ‘Tess’ (a Japanese domestically-produced destroyers, but for the first 30 minutes did not show up
version of the Douglas DC-2 airliner), and the gunfire on Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). By 0845hrs the
alerted the enemy ships to their presence.345 This did destroyers had managed to lose the harassing aircraft
and had a successful mission mostly behind them.348
Aisne, 30 August 1954 in St Helen’s Roads, just off the Isle of Paladin was still on her detached duties, as was Penn.
Wight at the entrance to the Solent and Portsmouth. She was The ‘Tribals’ refuelled from Olwen on 13 June, a move
travelling along the coast from Chatham to Portsmouth to join up made urgent by the discovery of water in two of Tartar’s
with other ships in preparation for the transit to Norway to take tanks, and reached Trincomalee on 14 June. On their
part in Exercise Morning Mist. (Drachinifel Collection) return, it was found that the three ‘Tribals’ had between

120
Daring demonstrates the big difference with the ‘Battle’ class, and Indies Fleet, it was the latest and best radar they could
the reason the class could do away with so many of the 40mm have. In fact, it was virtually the same system as that in-
cannon was the capabilities of the Mk VI 4.5in turrets. Their rate of stalled in the ‘Battle’ class on their entry into service.
fire, their range and ceiling provided these vessels with a significant This account has so far omitted much mention of
area of effect against aircraft, whilst also providing a boost in
the activities of Paladin and Penn. They had joined up,
relative anti-ship and anti-land capabilities. (Drachinifel Collection)
and it was partially to distract from what they were
doing that the ‘Tribals’ had pushed so far and hard to
try to draw the hornets’ nest of aircraft on to them. The
them expended 748 rounds of SAP, 336 rounds of ‘P’ class destroyers had been despatched to provide
4.7in High Explosive (HE), 45 rounds of High Explos- cover for Trident, which was aiming to recover a clan-
ive Variable Time (HEVT) and 189 rounds of 4in HE, destine party from the Batu Islands. They arrived by 9
a very high rate of, albeit approximate, fifty-five rounds June but were unable to make contact with the party,
fired per gun. This is of further interest in view of the although the destroyers managed to account for a Ja-
fact that Eskimo’s Type 285 radar developed a fault (a panese landing craft on 12 June. On 18 June, Trident
broken lead in an input plug caused by the firing salvos
of her main battery), which meant she was firing by Gravelines in 1952. Her crew are lining the rails fore and aft, and
Fuze Keeping Clock aid alone. It was particularly exas- this photograph was probably taken during the period when she
perating that this had gone wrong because, unlike the was shuttling back and forth between the UK and the
Type 293 and Type 291 sets with which the ‘Tribals’ Mediterranean as the Navy tried to manage its duties in the
had been fitted before proceeding to join the East emerging Cold War. (Drachinifel Collection)

121
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Relatives line the dockside while crew line the rails as the 1943 supply lines would have severely impeded their ability
Batch ‘Battle’ class Dunkirk arrives home to Devonport from a to defend it.
deployment to the Mediterranean on 21 April 1959, for what were
the extensive exercises and diplomatic events that comprised The End of the War
NATO’s tenth anniversary celebrations at Malta. (Maritime Quest) Irregular typifies the operations in which the ‘Tribals’
and the 10th DF took part in the East Indies and in the
herself destroyed a second landing craft with gunfire, wider, hard fought war at sea. In September 1944
which was found upon inspection to contain radio Ashanti went in for a major refit at Palmer’s Yarrow
equipment belonging to the clandestine party. The files Yard, at a cost of quarter of a million pounds, yet when
contain little more information about the party or their she came out she still suffered from mechanical prob-
fate, and in fact this was made as a separate report from lems. The years of unremitting sea time and hard fight-
that which was submitted about the more planned as- ing had caught up with the ‘Tribals’. In Ashanti’s case
pects of Operation Irregular. The destroyers had the failure of the refit led to her being put into reserve,
wanted to pick up Japanese survivors, but the presence followed by damage control tests in Loch Striven in
of enemy aircraft and the Japanese reluctance to be res- 1948, and finally her breaking up at Troon in 1949.
cued prevented it. This was hardly a fitting end for a ship after such a dis-
Operation Irregular was another illustration of how tinguished career during which she had brought her
the ‘Tribals’ could be deployed and used. It was a crews safely home from every mission, but it was not
mission without much fanfare and it was not the only untypical.
mission accomplished in the Far East by the class. Had In Eskimo’s case the war had taken an even heavier
the war continued for longer, the operation to recapture toll. There are not many ships which are on to their
Singapore would have been launched, and under those third bow before they have been completed six years in
circumstances the softening up and weakening of the commission. First, the wishes of her officers and crew
Japanese island defenders by the erosion of their re- to continue fighting rather than have a refit in Durban

122
 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

(because they had had one in Bombay on arrival in the of Penang in western Malaysia. She might not have lost
Indian Ocean) had been overruled. Instead of being a bow, but in 1941, while protecting Formidable off
present at Victory over Japan Day, Eskimo was in Diego Crete, she had lost her stern. Although she had lost her
Suarez, Madagascar, en route for a refit in South Af- rudder and most of the compartments aft of ‘X’ mount,
rica, the purpose of which was largely to keep the South her shafts had remained undamaged, enabling her to
African workforce employed. In November, on com- do 20 knots and steer by main engines, ensuring her
pletion of the refit, Eskimo made her way home, visiting survival. After Penang, Nubian and Tartar helped with
a number of ports including Takoradi, where, before the the evacuation of prisoners of war from Singapore, be-
war, Ashanti had been blessed by the Asante on the way fore returning home in 1945, crossing the Mediterra-
out, and where Eskimo was likewise welcomed and fêted nean with a sister ship as she had often done before,
by the Asante. She reached home on the Friday before but this time with no aircraft dogging their passage. It
Christmas 1945 and might well have been left on a was a smooth voyage which allowed the crew to relax.
midstream buoy in order to save the higher weekend For a while Nubian served as a Reserve Fleet accom-
wages of the dockyard workers if the Press had not modation ship at Whale Island in Portsmouth, until July
wanted photos of the unloading of Christmas 1948, when she was, like her sisters, sent to Loch
puddings, amongst other things, which she had brought Striven to serve as a target vessel. Less than a year later
with her from the people of Cape Town. Early in 1946 she was scrapped at Briton Ferry. Tartar also went to
her torpedo tubes and screws were removed, and she Loch Striven and was scrapped in February 1948. But
ended her days as a depot, accommodation and head- she would have the most appropriate retirement party
quarters ship for minesweepers and other vessels which before this.
were clearing the Thames and Medway of war detritus. The party, however, was not for Tartar, but for
Later she was used as target in the Gare Loch, before Aunty May, the American widow Mrs Hanrahan who,
being sent to Troon in 1949 for scrapping. during the war, had adopted the ‘Tribals’ as her ‘god-
For Nubian the war never quite ended. As one of the sons’. After years of support, on 6 May 1946, she was
most decorated ships it is no surprise that after what finally able to visit one of the class. In 1939 she decided
she had been through she was present for the surrender that while her country, the United States, might remain
neutral, she would not, and being a forthright woman
Matapan spent little of her career as a destroyer, but she was
of action as well as words, she was not to be persuaded
critical after her 1961–71 conversion (it was held up due to lack of otherwise. It is not certain why she picked Somali for
money) to an underwater trials ship, to test new sonars, especially the receipt of her care, but care she lavished on the ship.
a new bulbous bow unit. She would spend six years and notch up Thick winter clothing for the crew, together with choc-
several records doing this work before being paid off in 1977. olate, sweets, cigarettes and personal gifts were soon
(Drachinifel Collection) despatched. Upon learning that Somali was a flotilla
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

leader, she immediately despatched similar supplies to tween 1939 and 1946 she had had 3,500 ‘godsons’ and
all the ‘Tribals’. Her husband, Captain D C Hanrahan, had spent some £50,000, nearly two and a quarter mil-
had been a destroyer and Q-ship captain in the US lion in today’s money, a figure many believe to be an
Navy during the First World War, which gave her genu- underestimate, though she never confirmed the sum
ine insight into the needs of sailors. She was also a very herself. When presented with a silver model ‘Tribal’ she
wealthy woman with the means and opportunity to declared it ‘her most precious possession’. She died in
provide those extra comforts. 1953, unhonoured by the British Government but a
Parcels quickly became a regular, at least monthly, woman much loved by the Royal Navy’s destroyer men
part of the life of the ships, and were delivered wherever and their families for whom she had so diligently striven
the destroyers went, no matter how far away. She not during six years of war.
only sent presents to the ships, but food for the families In the years after the war ended the Australian
of the men at home; and she hosted parties for them at ‘Tribals’ made a name for themselves, operating with
her homes in London and New York throughout the re- American Task Force 74 and proving themselves of
mainder of her life. In 1946, she was welcomed aboard great value; the exploits of the Canadian ‘Tribals’, al-
Tartar for a thank you, and it was estimated that be- ready covered, were also significant. And their service
continued, chiefly because for these navies the ‘Tribals’
Corunna (D97) working with a Whirlwind from Eagle (R05). This were not only virtually brand new but were still entering
photograph was taken in 1953 and illustrates the difficulty and service as the war ended. HMAS Bataan was com-
complexity of working with early helicopters. It also highlights the pleted on 25 May 1945, HMCS Micmac on 18 Sep-
scale and size of the 40mm mounts arraigned aft. (Michael tember 1945, HMCS Nootka on 7 August 1946,
Rainsworth, Maritime Quest) HMCS Cayuga on 20 October 1947 and HMCS Atha-

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 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

Gravelines during the early 1950s when she still carried Hazemayer September 1950, continuing the ‘Tribals’’ association
40mm mounts. By 1951 she would lose these in favour of two twin with major amphibious operations.
40mm Bofors Mk 2 STAAG mounts. It is also just before she would
lose her depth charges for a Squid A/S Mortar. (Maritime Quest) The ‘Battles’ and the Royal Navy
The high point of the post-war years for the ‘Battle’
baskan on 20 January 1948. So in 1950, at the outbreak class was not the part played by the 1942 Batch Hogue
of the Korean War, the ‘Tribals’ found themselves at the standing in for the ‘Tribals’ for the filming Sink the Bis-
forefront. Haida spent much of the war deployed in- marck – although there was a nice symmetry there. Nor
shore where her task was to eliminate trains running was it Barfleur’s redoubtable efforts to join the British
along a coastal line. The engine of the first train they
engaged escaped their attack and thereafter Haida al- This profile view of Daring shows off her rounded lines and
ways aimed at the engine first. In contrast, Athabaskan sweeping foredeck, designed to give her the best possible
and Cayuga were present at the Incheon landings in performance at sea. (Maritime Quest)

125
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Daring class illustrated in profile as part of the ABCD guide to the hundred miles north of Shanghai whilst bound for
class (ADM 239.428). The emphasises the sub-division and Tsingtao (Qingdao). Finding herself being circled by
organisation the Navy was aiming for, especially between the all- pirates, she called for help. Armada rushed to the
important engine room/boiler room spaces and the use of liquid stricken merchant ship’s aid, and the pirates were suc-
stores to help give them greater protection/division from other cessfully driven off, but the destroyer was unable to free
parts of the ship. (UK National Archives)
Taiposhan, so stayed on watch for two days until a tug
arrived from Shanghai to complete the task. The faith-
Pacific Fleet in time to see combat with the 19th DF ful ‘Battle’ then escorted both merchant ship and tug
and take part with Task Force 38 in attacks on Tokyo to Shanghai and safety. It was a satisfying assignment
and Yokohama. It probably came with 19th DF’s con- for a ship designed for independent cruising.
tinuing post-war operations in the Far East, particularly This was not, however, a taste of things to come. For
when Armada stood up against pirates in large, sea- Britain, the First World War had been damaging
going Chinese junks. Armada had joined Barfleur, along enough, but the subsequent crippling Depression and
with Camperdown, Lagos, Hogue and Trafalgar roughly the Second World War were financially devastating.
six months earlier. Finisterre had been recalled to home Britain might have overcome the Depression and, won
waters which, with the end of the war, was considered the wars, but it was at a terrible cost in citizenry, ma-
more appropriate, and so the flotilla’s strength was teriel, infrastructure and, most importantly, financial
never complete. On 16 June the merchant ship SS Tai- cost. The Royal Navy now needed not only to find a
poshan, owned by the Tai On Steam Navigation Co Ltd way to save money, but also to preserve a force to fight
of Hong Kong, ran aground on a sandbank roughly a a war they feared was brewing with the Soviet-led com-

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 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

munist powers. It was neither

wanted nor sought, but Britain had
an Empire to protect, a Common-
wealth to which it owed a debt of
honour, interests to defend and the
constant requirement of its strategic
position to maintain freedom of
movement of goods and capital.
More importantly the Royal Navy
could consider a number of options.
In the numerically smaller forces

Daring’s 40mm STAAG AA mount, with

one fitted either side of the superstructure
position on O1 deck, the same level as ‘B’
turret. This was intended to provide
overlapping complementary fire position to
the 4.5in guns in the overall anti-air
protection of the ship. (Drachinifel
Collection)

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Daring class illustrated overview of Decks 02, 01, 1 and 2 as part of placed in reserve, some of which would hardly be used,
the ABCD guide to the class. The sick bay is at one end of the aft while some would not emerge from reserve for the best
superstructure, the Squid projectile stowage and crew’s bathroom part of a decade. All this was done to preserve their
at the other end, all built around the space for the Mk VI gun that value for the nation.
occupied ‘X’ position. (UK National Archives)
However, this did not mean that all twenty-four
members of the class were placed in reserve. The 5th
at the beginning of the twenty-first century the only op- DF, the Home Fleet ‘Battles’, remained at sea. Again,
tion in the face of the Treasury’s desire to limit running this was about cost. To deal with a surging proactive So-
costs is to invest in and run top-of-the-line warships to viet Union required cruisers or similar vessels, a like-
carry out a wide range of duties. In the late 1940s one for-like balance approach. Although it was cost effective
solution was put the best of their ships in long-term to deploy the available cruisers around the world to
refit/reserve so they would be available when needed. cover distant stations, it created other problems as there
Alternatively, they could keep War Emergency De- were far fewer cruisers than prior to the war, which
stroyers going and wear them out with peacetime made the coverage of all stations virtually impossible.
duties, or simply get rid of the vessels as some had sup- The ‘Battle’ class made sense for the busier home
posed would happen during the course of the war. By waters where the range was usually shorter and there
early 1947, the 19th DF had been mostly recalled and was far more infrastructure available nearby. The

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 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

‘Battles’ could provide the numbers,

and if the situation required more
‘muscle’ something else could
quickly be deployed. This was also
true of the Mediterranean Fleet,
though the ‘Battles’ often were the
‘muscle’.
It was not just money and inter-
national relations which were affect-
ing things. 1947 also brought with it
a manning crisis, a long-term con-

Daring’s Squid being loaded. The weight of

the rounds, combined with a desire to
make rapid reloading as practical as
possible, governed the layout of these
weapons.(Drachinifel Collection)

129
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Daring class illustrated overview of Decks 3, 4 and 5. This illustrates Under such circumstances it was probably a good thing
the space required for provisions, the relative thickness of the ‘cool’ that National Service numbers were reducing, because
rooms, the way the shell storage and diesel generators are without experienced personnel who could train them
distributed within the space of the hull to try to assist with damage to an acceptable standard, it would have been im-
control. (UK National Archives)
mensely taxing on an already stretched system. A com-
bination of all these factors meant the ‘Battle’ class
found itself severely disadvantaged just as it was getting
sequence of the war with its prolific short-term enlist- into its stride.
ments and commissions. By the end of the 1940s the By the late 1940s and early 1950s this was com-
Navy was dealing with a second wave of war-time ser- pounded by fear of the fast submarine and the cor-
vice personnel losses, the first wave having consisted of responding need to get as many fast anti-submarine
the duration-only personnel who departed in 1945/6. assets as possible into service. This might have been the
Even more critical was the loss of experienced officers death knell for the class for despite their all-around
and sailors who had extended their post-war service. strengths, their ASW capability was, even after refits to

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 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

the 1942 Batch and the addition of a single Squid mor- ence multipliers (or cruiser substitutes), and begin
tar, unimpressive. Fortunately, at the time the Navy had building a name for themselves the Daring class ap-
to worry about more than one threat, which is where peared. The ‘Battles’ never became wholly active, de-
the ‘Battles’ had the edge. They were the multi-purpose spite events at the time which suited them, their clear
asset with the most potential for development in other operational potential, and the Navy’s appreciation of
areas, namely air defence, and the ships were brought their strengths. With an ample supply of specialist
into service for the Mediterranean. So Saintes, Armada, vessels, both cruisers and allied ‘Tribals’ in Korea, these
Vigo and Gravelines – the latter replaced by Barfleur – general-purpose assets were not able to be used in a
were deployed to the Mediterranean, staying through way which would gain attention. For example, in late
the administrative transition that turned Flotillas into 1951, while part of 4th DF (the 1943 Batch unit),
Squadrons, and serving with Navy until 1958. In a Agincourt found herself in the Mediterranean.
sense, and despite this service, the class never fulfilled
its potential. The war was over, to be followed by reces- Later we were seconded to the Mediterranean Fleet
sion, and when they could finally be put to use as pres- and journeyed in the Persian Gulf with stops at Gi-

131
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Daring at speed, showing the pitch of the ship that the gun volved in more the conventional experiences compared
mounts would have to deal with. These ships were designed to be to their sister classes. A further example of this is the
as stable as practicable as platforms for their guns, but the reality story of Barossa – another 1943 Batch unit – during her
of high speed manoeuvring at sea as well as rough weather is that 1962/3 Indonesian patrol. ‘The Indonesian confronta-
both the fire-control mechanism and the guns themselves have to tion was well advanced by this time and along with other
be built to compensate for an unstable environment. (Drachinifel
naval units we were required to patrol the seas around
Collection)
the coast of Malaya in an attempt to prevent incursion
by hostile groups of Indonesian terrorists, regular sol-
braltar, Malta and Cyprus. While at Cyprus the crew diers and saboteurs. They would normally travel by
practised landing parties at Larnaca. We proceeded night and used small wooden boats, called kumpits, to
to Port Said where they refused to refuel us so Cap- carry arms, explosives and intelligence information.’350
tain Evans sent away a landing party, took over the No action took place, but both these examples illustrate
fuel station and pumped our own oil. I remember the kind of presence, when combined with a possible
there was a dockyard strike and I believe at about this mission, which Britain could project to the world.
time, the statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps – the
builder of the Suez Canal – was tipped over. We Daring Class Dawn
helped berth merchant ships which were waiting to ‘Though built as destroyers, these vessels were later of-
pass down the Suez Canal. We eventually reached ficially described as the “Daring class ships” thus be-
Port Suez and entered the Red sea but we were then coming neither fish, nor fowl, nor good red herring!
recalled, arriving back in Portsmouth in March They have now become destroyers again.’ So wrote
1952.349 Captain Manning RN (ret) in 1961.351 The arrival of
the Daring class represented the biggest possible threat
Although these were essential duties, they did not make to the ‘Battles’. The ships were everything that a post-
headlines, and certainly inspire no roles in movies. It war, uncompromising design could produce for a
was the fate of the ‘Battle’ class to be continually in- general-purpose fighting destroyer. They were big and,

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 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

for their size, impressively proportioned and, despite operated with the Navy’s first guided-missile ships,
theoretically being destroyers, they were high status the County-class destroyers. As their Official Logs,
ships. However, this did not mean everyone loved them. which are preserved at the National Archives,
Captain Manning’s quote is a good example of this. proudly proclaim, they were originally classified not
The bounty of war, and the freedom to build as many as destroyers, but as warships of the ‘Daring
specialists as necessary, was still a legacy which had to Class’.352
be dealt with. The reality was that the Navy could not
build enough of those sorts of specialist ships, so it In their own ways both these views are right. However,
needed ships which fill the cruiser roles of presence, the reality is that this was a concept introduced just
naval gunfire support and command, while also being prior to the Second World War, and originally was con-
able to carry out the destroyer/frigate duties of air de- ceived because of, and to, the artificial limits imposed
fence, anti-submarine warfare and surface attack. As by treaty. That twelve of the sixteen original ‘Tribal’
Neil McCart wrote in his recent work: class were lost would appear to justify the detractors,
though the circumstances of those losses would suggest
For the Royal Navy of the early 1950s, however, the that the other option of risking cruisers might well have
new class represent the ultimate in warship design, led to greater losses. The same could have happened to
comprising eight powerful destroyers which were ca- regular destroyers without the necessary firepower. As
pable of carrying out duties normally assigned to a result the ‘Battle’ class had been built but they had
light cruisers. Each of the Daring class ships was in problems fulfilling the peacetime cruiser role of pres-
commission for less than 20 years, but during that ence, rather than simple intimidation – the ‘Battles’ just
time they saw the final transition from the big-gun looked too aggressive. To establish a presence, a ship
era, to the age of the guided missile. During their has to balance its profile of power and visible strength
early years of service at least one ship of the class op- with poise and a statesman-like profile. It is the X-factor
erated with the Navy’s last big 15-inch gun battle- that can be designed for, but which cannot be measured
ship, HMS Vanguard, and in their closing years they until the class is in service. The Darings had the power
with their high bow, the steps of the forward turrets
Dainty, having lost her torpedoes for more accommodation space leading up to the open bridge, the director and finally
over the course of two major refits in six years. This was in many the radar-mounted lattice mast. They displayed power,
ways their final form in Royal Navy service. (Drachinifel Collection) but the angles of the structure and the lines of the hull

133
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

2.The Darings were included in the 1944/45 New

Construction Programme as Destroyers and were
laid down between 1946 and 1950.
3. The class totals eight ships; five have recently
joined the Fleet, one is being placed direct in Re-
serve because of naval manpower shortage, and
the remaining two will join the Fleet this Autumn.
4. These Ships carry six 4.5-inch guns with a high
rate of fire and good accuracy against both aircraft
and ships.
5. Their torpedo armament (ten torpedoes) gives
them a good offensive striking power.
6. In addition they carry an ahead-throwing anti-
submarine mortar (SQUID), and with their twin
rudders these ships, despite their size, have the
small turning circles essential for anti-submarine
operations.
7. Darings are in fact the smallest hull (3,500 tons)
Dainty pictured in final form as before, this time viewed from the in which it is possible to fit the complicated arma-
stern. It shows that while space had been taken for ments necessary for a ‘maid of all work’, and their
accommodation, plenty of deck space needed to be left for boats offensive power far exceeds that of the light
and other necessities of warship life. (Maritime Quest) cruisers of the past.
8. In a future war Daring Class ships will be
required:
gave them their poise and presence. In many ways the a) for use in screen of the British carrier striking
Darings were the quintessential post-war warship. They forces (Atlantic Station) and for inclusion in
represented the lessons learned and, despite being Dar- light surface action forces when needed;
ings, because they were grouped with destroyers it b) at the spearhead of light forces to seek out
meant that, unlike cruisers, carriers and battleships, enemy light forces (destroyers and below) in:
they were relatively free of scrutiny, that is, until the
Navy wanted to use them as intended, as officially out- Decoy in profile, showing off the lines of the Daring class. This
lined below in June 1953. picture was taken half way through the process of stripping away
torpedoes and represents the transition from the period when the
In your minute of June 2nd you asked for the history torpedo was the primary stand-off anti-ship weapon, to when the
of the Class. missile would take over that role. (Drachinifel Collection)

134
 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

i) the Scandinavian area

ii) Turkish Waters
For such a role their organisation as separate units
working as light cruisers is more appropriate than
the standard destroyer squadron organisation. To
employ them so at present helps to offset the short-
age of cruisers in commission, a shortage that cannot
be remedied while the manpower remains acute.353

The last paragraph is especially revealing. In wartime

they are to be used along the same lines as cruisers, and
in peace will be used as cruisers to prepare them for
this. During the 1930s, Treaties had been the driving
force behind the ‘Tribals’. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, it was manpower and the consequential costs Decoy was the only Royal Navy ship of the class to have missiles,
which were driving not only their use, but also their eventually being fitted with Seacats. If this had been extended to
form. If they had had the money there is no doubt the other ships of the class there is a definite chance some of them
Navy would have preferred more cruisers, but if there might have still been in service during the Falklands War, when
were not sufficient funds it aimed for the best ‘maid of their 40mm STAAG mounts and Mk VI fire-control systems would
have been very useful in San Carlos Water, and their Mk VI 4.5in
all work’ possible within all the limits.
main guns of real value for shore bombardment.(Maritime Quest)

Destroyers Filling in For Cruisers? The Far East

and Churchill’s Second Term
The ‘Battles’ had not taken part in Korea, although the
Commonwealth navy ‘Tribals’ certainly had. These two
destroyer classes were not the only ‘back pocket
Defender, one of the four direct current ships and one of four ships
cruisers’ which featured in the war or ‘peace’ which fol-
fitted with Foster Wheeler boilers, a combination she shared only
lowed after the ceasefire. On 16 June 1953, following
with her sister Dainty. This did have consequences for her
the Coronation Fleet Review, Defender, the fourth of the operation and upgrades as time went on, but these complexities
Daring class destroyers, left Spithead for the Far East, were all part of the politics of their construction. By patronising two
arriving in Hong Kong on 27 July in time for a truce to boiler manufacturers the ‘benefit’ had been spread and by using
be declared, but not knowing about the confrontation two forms of electric current the risk associated with a new system
she had left behind in Whitehall, nor what battles were had been balanced by retaining the established system. (Drachinifel
to come. The debate in Whitehall was between the Collection)

135
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Defender in 1953 in the Far East on her first deployment which Korea will provide valuable experience of this class
would in prove to be demanding and included taking part in the of ship in active service conditions.354
final stages of the Korean War, and being part of a deterrence
action in the Formosa Strait between Taiwan and China. (Maritime Churchill’s argument comes in paragraphs 4 and 5 of
Quest) his response dated 31 May 1953.

4. Please supply me with the legends and comple-

Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the ments I have asked for, and meanwhile do not sup-
Admiralty James Thomas (1st Viscount Cilcennin), and pose you can mislead the other side by pretending
the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Rhoderick that overblown destroyers are light cruisers or frig-
McGrigor, continuing to the natural conclusion of what ates. You have, I am sure, a good deal to play with in
had been begun by the latter’s predecessor, Admiral of complements so long as no hostile fleet is involved.
the Fleet Bruce Fraser. This was the solution to the on- 5. On the whole in present circumstances of world
going manning issues, and issues of presence, in which naval strengths which are overwhelmingly on our
frigates were not enough, but cruisers were just too side, I would feel inclined to favour a big ship under-
much. For the First Lord his argument can be summed manned to a little ship with full war complements.
up in paragraph 3 of his paper dated 28 May 1953. After all, the Chinese are not going to board any
ships we may have in their waters and firing with
3. Defender, one of the new Daring class, had been four guns out of six may do whatever is needful.355
allocated to the Mediterranean Fleet, but I have now
decided that she shall go to the Far East Station im- For a while the debate was heated but petered out as
mediately after the Naval Review, and shall relieve Churchill became distracted by other things. It also
the cruisers in turn. Ships of the Daring Class are al- served to illustrate both Churchill’s familiarity with the
ready being employed with the cruisers of the Home Navy and his distance. At this point the Navy had very
and Mediterranean Fleets, and, as I said when intro- few six-gun cruisers in service, most vessels being
ducing the Navy Estimates debate, they are to all in- ‘Town’, ‘Crown Colony’ or subsequent classes, often
tents and purposes light cruisers. To employ her in sailing with one triple gun turret crewed, whilst the

136
 TO THE EAST AND THE WAR IS OVER

Defender later in her life, with no torpedoes and no missiles fitted. The warring parties on the Korean peninsula might
In this form she epitomised gunboat diplomacy being, with some have stopped exchanging gunfire, but that did not
of her sisters, some of the last all-gun armament ships to serve in mean the Far East was either peaceful or could be de-
any major navy. (Drachinifel Collection) scribed as being at peace. There were still patrols to
carry out. In fact Defender would partner with the
‘Town’ class cruiser Birmingham and HMCS Iroquois,
other two or three turrets were mothballed to save on a Second World War-built ‘Tribal’ class destroyer of the
cost and relieve accommodation pressures. The final Canadian navy. Sometimes they also took the Colossus
note was from W Marshall of the Admiralty to John class light fleet carrier Ocean with them. On 1 October
Colville, Churchill’s Joint Principal Private Secretary 1953 Defender was visiting the USN joint base at Yoko-
dated 29 June. ‘Thank you for your letter of 28th instant suka, Japan, in preparation for a planned joint exercise
about the Daring Class. I confirm that Defender has al- which, in the event, never happened.357 Instead of a run
ready left for the Far East. The First Lord has no points ashore, her crew did not even make it to the liberty
on which he requires further clarification.’ 356 boat. Communist Chinese forces were thought to be
This typifies both the beginning of the story in massing in preparation for an invasion of Taiwan across
1934/5, when the ‘Tribals’ were conceived, as well as the Formosa Strait. Defender was despatched immedi-
the story post-war. General-purpose fighting destroyers ately, conducting a five-day patrol which finished in
were not so much a compromise with naval require- Hong Kong. Until the third week of January 1954 she
ments, as with political and foreign policy ones. The kept up a constant series of patrols of the Strait, a visible
need and quality of a presence in order to influence and potent British sentinel and a tangible sign of British
events was of great importance to the leaders of the na- interest in events. Once the government was sure no
tion. For the Navy the provision of the tools, on the threat would materialise, Defender was sent to Sasebo,
budget allocated by those leaders, was difficult. The to join one of Birmingham’s sisters, Newcastle, for a final
story did not end with this exchange, although, on 27 patrol of Korea’s west coast. Interestingly, it was Bir-
July 1953, when a truce in the Korean War was de- mingham and Newcastle that Defender, rather than
clared, Churchill might have thought he had been another cruiser, had originally been sent out to cover
proved right. for while they were in refit. 358

137
 CHAPTER 7

THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE

‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

Grand strategy is often confused with being a concept in the 1930s, possibly because of the very recent ex-
or idea which magically makes everything fit and work, periences of the First World War, possibly because, de-
and will serve as a solution to every problem; in reality spite the claims of ‘peace in our time’, many were
this can never be the case because the future cannot be conscious of the possibility of another war.
predicted. The value of a grand strategy is as an insur- The pre-war deployments of the ‘Tribals’ were about
ance policy against the future, by providing options to diplomacy. They were well suited to the role, and big
enable governments to deal with any eventualities as enough fulfil it. Warships require a great deal of equip-
they arise. It might be as simple as the construction of ment and weaponry to fight a war, and space to carry
a railway, or securing a stockpile of fuel and suitable out all their functions and activities. In peacetime, war-
raw materials; it can be as complex as ensuring the con- ships have ways and means of carrying out functions
tinuance of friendships between nations despite within a limited space. Reviews, receptions and parades
changes in governments. These facts were understood can be conducted on adjacent spaces such as jetties,
parks, sports grounds, lawns of government houses, to
name but a few. Tribal priests, local leaders and cocktail
Barossa after conversion to a radar picket ship. The sheer amount
of space required for all the extra personnel and supporting
parties always require more space than initially
equipment is clearly illustrated here, including the second funnel planned.359 It might be more food, drinks, or space for
introduced for the generators to power it all. There is also, clearly dancing, but they always require more and the ability
visible aft, in the space that used to be dominated by STAAG to accommodate it is important. The other side of di-
double 40mm, a Seacat missile launcher, which several of the class plomacy is the projection of power. In the modern
received. (Drachinifel Collection) world it may be a missile which carries the punch, but

138
 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

Delight in 1966 in her final ‘gunboat’ form. The absence of a anticipated. They must have been satisfied because the
missile system was a determining factor in the class’s later removal war had not long begun before the ‘Tribals’ were called
from service. (Maritime Quest) on to perform sundry duties.

the impression of power is as significant. The ‘Tribals’ At War

were ideally suited for this. They had eight guns which, During the war ‘Tribals’ were deployed everywhere. It
while not massive, were plenty big enough to impress. is no surprise that Nubian earned so many battle hon-
Their layout meant they had space, their appearance ours. Where there was a fight, the Navy sent ‘Tribal’
was striking and they carried a crew which was smartly class destroyers because they could rely upon them
dressed, well organised, well drilled, well led, but also, either to act independently or as part of a task group.
when necessary, able to think independently. In peace- They could also be counted on to fight aircraft, ships
time these attributes are impressive, to friend and foe or submarines. They could be upgraded as technology
alike. In time of war, they can save ships through fine developed and threats evolved. As their reputation grew
handling, for example with Cossack in the fjord along- they contributed an extra psychological boost within
side Altmark; through damage control on Eskimo or the forces to which they were assigned. This began in
Nubian, or quick thinking onboard Sikh. Pre-war, they Norway and Narvik cemented it; the rescue by Cossack
took part in a great many exercises, equipping them- of the Altmark prisoners taken by the Graf Spee cer-
selves well for these future eventualities. These exercises tainly began the myth. And it increased with every ac-
enabled the Navy to establish whether the ships would tion, be it racing across the Atlantic to intercept the
be capable of carrying out independent deployments; Bismarck, being the key link at Matapan, single-
whether the class, built as much to be small cruisers in handedly facing off against a battleship, sinking cruisers
terms of mission profile as they were destroyers, would at Cape Bon, fighting at Île de Batz or forging a path
actually be able to perform in the many ways that were during Operation Irregular.

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Diamond in 1952, highlighting in her original form the advantages ship gap, and the smaller frigate/sloop/corvette gap;
of her layout and the reasoning for parts of the class’s design, for their capabilities were as such that they would often
example the shaping of the superstructure’s angled corners which find themselves turned to fill many roles. Where the
were designed in such a way as to allow ‘B’ turret the maximum fighting was heaviest she would be found; she was al-
field of fire. She was only scrapped in November 1981 after being a
ways a significant asset, and whether this was because
dockside training ship for ten years and serving queen and country
through procuring to fill gaps the Navy managed to ac-
for nearly three decades.(Maritime Quest)
quire an excellent design which was so often called
upon, or whether it was because there were those gaps
Nubian is, thanks to her wartime service, the best and there were no other ships to call upon, it is difficult
example of a ‘Tribal’ class destroyer as a tool of grand to be sure. It was probably a bit of both.
strategy. ‘Tribals’ offered the capability to fill cruiser Like any class, the ‘Tribals’ were not perfect. As
shortages, the destroyer gap, the amphibious command ‘super-destroyers’ they were arguably not as good as
their Japanese or Italian equivalents. However, as they
were built under the ‘destroyer leader’/’super-destroyer’
allowance of the naval arms treaties, they were not built
exclusively for that role. The Navy built them for the
role for which they were needed, as light cruisers and

This photo of Diana alongside Eagle is testimony to the enduring

link of the large destroyers with the carriers. The large destroyers
served as some of the most potent defenders of the carriers, but
for the destroyers, when operating as pickets, it was the carriers’
aircraft which were the cavalry. They could be called upon should
something the destroyers could not themselves contend with come
into view. (Michael Rainsforth, Maritime Quest)

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Duchess with her canvas awnings spread. Awnings offered dian Navy, some ‘Tribals’, as mentioned earlier, had to
protection to crew working on torpedo and Squid launchers, or just be completed with 4in rather than 4.7in guns. Essential
an opportunity for the off-duty watches to enjoy life. (Drachinifel to the war effort was putting hulls in the water, and the
Collection) rest could be sorted out later. The key reason for this
was that in the early years of the war the ‘Tribals’ were
fighting destroyers, and as such they performed well. critical for making up for numbers of destroyers and
Their design was flexible and adaptable and, most im- cruisers, a force much greater in size than that pos-
portantly, strong. In the cases of Eskimo and Nubian the sessed today but still not great enough for all the
loss of large sections of their hulls was counterbalanced missions required of it. The continued utility of the
by the damage control efforts. However, such efforts ‘Tribals’ for the Royal Navy, even after greater numbers
would have been futile if the rest of the hull had not of destroyers and newer cruisers came into service, was
been strong and able to take the strain of the damage obvious because fighting what was in reality a four-
imparted upon it. ocean (plus Mediterranean) conflict meant the Navy
The flexibility and generalist nature of ‘Tribals’ was could never have enough ships. This was the conflict
so undoubtedly a positive. Today, the slogan is more that erupted at the end of the 1930s, a truly global con-
along the lines of ‘doing more with less’; but as the two flict. It is the worst-case scenario even today, a conflict
World Wars illustrated, no matter how great the tech- which can only be waged through alliances, not necess-
nological advantage, more was always better. For arily of equals, but of equally committed.
example, individually most variants of the American This is the reality of grand strategy, of which
Sherman were outclassed by almost every late-war Ger- ‘Tribals’, together with many other classes and their
man tank, yet more often than not they were deployed ships’ companies, the hundreds of thousands of soldiers
in larger numbers and as a consequence were either and thousands of aircraft, were all a part. While Britain
able to overwhelm, destroy or outmanoeuvre their foe. might not have equalled all the contributions of some
By contrast, today’s debates are almost always more fo- others by numbers, by the time the conflict was ending,
cused on tactics than strategy, and when considering the value of her contribution was great enough to en-
the design of warships, it is anti-submarine, air-defence, sure that a powerful voice was retained at the table. But
and naval gunfire support missions which are dis- the grand strategy, however, was not the whole reason
cussed; the ships are built for very specific roles. This for the ‘Tribals’’ greatness and their retention. As has
is fine when there are sufficient numbers to generate a been said many times, their design enabled them to be
balanced task group. The ‘Tribals’ were built at a time upgraded, which meant they could adapt as the tools,
when the Navy fielded more than fifteen times the force if not the nature, of the conflict evolved. Perhaps most
it does today, yet still they were procured as generalists, significantly, the ‘Tribals’ were good ships which had
with a focused capability yes, but still generalists. built up an enviable reputation that ensured a strong
During the war, when building for the Royal Cana- esprit de corps. Fleet commanders could rely upon

141
Corunna in her final form with radar, the Type 965’s AKE-2 aerial World War, in 1935 he achieved his first command of
proudly aloft. A Seacat launcher is at the ready aft. The ship the war-built ‘W’ class destroyer, Westminster, after
straddled the eras, with an early missile system aft and the slowly nineteen years’ service. By modern standards this
maturing radar in the middle that linked the two, as well as the would not have been considered an auspicious posting
guns of an earlier epoch. (Drachinifel Collection)
because Westminster was, at that time, a reserve ship.
Despite this, in 1936 was given command of the 1930-
them not only to be prepared for the seemingly imposs- built ‘B’ class destroyer Boreas, which he commanded
ible task, but to relish it. In any war the impossible and until 1939. This was an important command because
the unexpected have to be expected, and in a global war Boreas was a regular part of the British commitment to
this reality is just made bigger and infinitely more likely. the Spanish blockade which was part of the response
to the Spanish Civil War by the international commu-
Admiral John Eaton nity. This was no easy task, and required a commander
Philip Vian is the name most often cited as an example to exercise diplomacy with understanding while enfor-
of the ‘Tribal’ class officer, but there is another, John cing rules with power. There was a constant struggle
Eaton, who despite being less well known, is as deserv- between dealing with the combatants (the two sides
ing of the connection. During his service in the Second were in many ways easier to manage than their unoffi-
World War he commanded three ‘Tribals’. His first was cial sponsors the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy),
Mohawk, from October 1939 to April 1941, followed managing the crew and maintaining moral in what was,
by Somali from March 1942 to July 1942, and finally in many ways, a trail blazing operation.361 Peace
Eskimo from November 1942 to August 1943.360 Dur- keeping, even in a sort of blockade and convoy role, was
ing these twenty-two months in charge he fought at not something which had really been done before and
Matapan with Mohawk, took part in Artic Convoys certainly not something there was an extensive litera-
PQ15 and PQ17, as well as Operation Pedestal with So- ture or institutional memory to fall back on for advice.
mali and Eskimo. He commanded the destroyer screen It was the crews, officers and commanders on the spot
for Force H as part of Operation Torch, led them again who had had to make the decisions as best they could,
in Operation Retribution and was doing so a third time making it up as they went along. Eaton successfully
when his ship was damaged during Operation Husky. managed these conflicting demands and at the begin-
This was the middle of his long career in the Navy, a ning of the Second World War assumed command of
career which during its early phases offered opportun- Mohawk, the second, and last officer to hold that re-
ities to gain the experience that enabled him to achieve sponsibility.362
his commands, and which in its post-war phase would As mentioned earlier, Mohawk’s first commander,
both build upon and utilise the experience of command Commander Jolly, had died after bringing his ship back
he had acquired in the ‘Tribal’ destroyers. to shore despite suffering terrible woundsduring the
‘Tribals’ were not Eaton’s first commands. Following first German air raid on the United Kingdom during
his experiences as a young officer during the First the war. The German aircraft had managed to get in

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 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

close because reports of RAF aircraft in the area had her executive crew.364 This put extra pressure on her
constrained the destroyers to hold their fire. They were new commander, not only in finding and integrating
actually inside the Firth of Forth when the attack hap- new officers into the wider crew, but also in carrying
pened. As previously related, Jolly suffered devastating out extra duties normally performed by more junior of-
wounds but remained conscious and in command of ficers. This could well have been beneficial as it would
his ship for eighty minutes, and brought her safely back have allowed him far more opportunity for meeting the
to shore. He died in hospital in South Queensbury five crew and going all over his ship than a regular change
hours later. This was the character of the officer whose of command would have facilitated in wartime. Fur-
shoes Eaton had to fill. thermore, Eaton had a reputation for leading from the
From his own words in reports and newspapers ar- front, setting an example and encouraging others to live
ticles we know Eaton was no great orator, nor given to up to it. He was not only good at commanding a team,
speeches, and no diaries exist that anyone knows of. We but at building and maintaining one. These were skills
have little knowledge about his style of command, or which would prove useful when helping to set up
how he went about successfully assuming command NATO many years later. In 1939 it enabled him to
after Jolly’s death. However, what is certain is that in forge a new crew from the remains of the old.
the case of a crew which regarded themselves as an Unsurprisingly, Mohawk was not out of action for
elite, as any ‘Tribal’ destroyer crew did, a commander’s long. Having been repaired, she had barely left the yard
mere reliance upon the authority of the uniform would when on 14 December, together with the destroyer
not have maintained that esprit de corps which was just Kelly – also leaving the yard after repairs – she was des-
as important to the class’s success as their design.363 patched to secure two tankers in trouble off the Tyne.365
The ship’s subsequent service record is a testimony to Both tankers were found to have been mined, although
Eaton’s success as a commander, and there are some at first it was presumed they had been torpedoed. While
clues which offer an insight into how he achieved that Eaton was able to manoeuvre Mohawk alongside to res-
success. cue survivors, Kelly’s commander was not so blessed
Mohawk had been damaged, although not as severely and the destroyer was caught by a mine and put out of
as Eskimo at Narvik, and, crucially, had lost many of action. Mohawk successfully took her under tow for a
short time before a tug turned up and took over for the
The ‘Battle’ class Dunkirk in earlier times during a visit to Malta. passage back to the shipyard she had just left.366 Mo-
This represented almost the zenith of the torpedo-armed destroyer, hawk escorted them back in case of further attack. In a
only to be exceeded by their own slightly larger progeny, the way it was an omen of things to come for Kelly, and in
Daring class. (Drachinifel Collection) May 1940 during the Battle for Norway, when they

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

were again assigned together, Kelly was torpedoed by Fighting the German forces was often secondary to
the schnellboot S31, commanded by Oberleutnant zur fighting the forces of Mother Nature, which could
See Hermann Opdenhoff. Despite suffering heavy neither be eluded nor defeated, only endured. For
damage, she survived.367 Eaton this was more than just a challenge of his leader-
For Eaton, his time with Mohawk was one of con- ship skills. Somali was the flotilla leader, and he had to
stant action with nineteen months spent at sea in the combine the role of captain of his ship with command
North Atlantic, the North Sea, Norway and the Medi- of the flotilla, Captain (D) as it was known in the naval
terranean, which included some rather specialist parlance of the time. In comparison to other convoys,
missions. For example, in May 1940 he took Mohawk escorting PQ15 was relatively straightforward, although
to shell the Dutch coast to prevent the Germans land- this does not mean it was without incident, and one
ing transports on the beaches behind the Dutch which involved Eaton personally, as recalled by the Flo-
Army.368 Another example was the recovery of British tilla Signals Officer, John Buckeridge.
diplomats from The Hague, at the Hook of Holland,
while part of the force that covered the rescue and The Germans operated long range aircraft which cir-
evacuation of the Dutch royal family.369 These were two cled the convoy out of the range of our guns, homing
of Eaton’s earliest missions during his first command the torpedo bombers and U-boats on to the convoy.
of the ‘Tribal’ class destroyer. As described in Chapter They were seldom able to make a surprise attack as
3, this, unfortunately for Mohawk, came to an end in we kept watch on their frequencies and could esti-
spectacular fashion in the Mediterranean, but it was a mate within minutes when the attack was due, based
sign of the confidence in which he was held that in less on the build-up of their transmissions. This was a
than a year Captain Eaton was given a new com- godsend as it meant that action stations need not be
mand.370 sounded until just before the whistle went. An inter-
This new command was Somali, which he assumed esting moment occurred when I reported to Captain
in time to participate in the escort of Convoy PQ15.371 D in his sea cabin that the time had come, and found
For good reason, the Arctic convoys are legendary. that something was on fire. The ‘something’ was me
– I was wearing a heavy kapok suit and had leant
The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Vampire (D11), photographed against his radiator. As the attack came in D was
here in 1969. Vampire made such a name for herself over her wrapping his flaming signal officer in a blanket.372
career that like HMCS Haida, she has been preserved and is the
remaining living example of this class. (Lynn Monson, Maritime It was the events before this somewhat unusual and un-
Quest) intended version of shooting the messenger which had

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 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

Solebay bristling with guns. All her 40mm Bofors are out and at terranean. Eaton went from one battle to the next, from
45° and she looks not just purposeful, but menacing. (Drachinifel one responsibility to the next, and it is quite plausible
Collection) that Brice’s claim in his book The Tribals that Eaton was
relieved on 30 July 1942 due to a stress-related illness
made PQ15’s ‘straightforward’ passage possible, events is correct; he had certainly had enough for three life-
which illustrate how important the Battle of Narvik and times by this point.377 What is certainly known is that
the losses it had inflicted on the Kriegsmarine’s de- when Somali was sunk by torpedo less than two months
stroyer force had been. These events had occurred later, on 24 September 1942, while escorting PQ18, she
around QP11, a return convoy which had left Russia a was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Maud,
little before PQ15 left for Russia. This convoy had faced who had relieved a Commander Currey (who had
significant surface attacks, attacks which brought about taken over after Eaton) just three weeks previously.378
the loss of the ‘Town’ class cruiser Edinburgh, sister ship It was not that long till Eaton was once again back at
of Belfast, the final blow delivered by a British destroyer sea, in command of another flotilla and another ‘Tribal’
to prevent the enemy boarding her.373 The reason the destroyer, Eskimo, suggesting that if his removal had
Germans themselves had failed to deliver this blow was been due to illness, it was quickly and successfully
because they had mistaken minesweepers for de- treated.379 During his time with Eskimo, Eaton played
stroyers, categorising them, in order of threat, ‘Tribal’, an important role in Operation Husky – an operation
Jervis, ‘F’ or ‘H’ classes and one American.374 The Ger- covered in more detail in Tartar’s story.380 Operation
mans felt comfortable attacking a lone cruiser, but a flo- Torch, the invasion of North Africa, is well known,
tilla of destroyers, including ‘Tribals’, was justification while Operation Retribution gives a far clearer picture
for the withdrawal and the presence of such a group both of Eaton and the style of officer encouraged by the
forced a sort of short reset of German surface forces. Navy in its destroyers of the 1930s, a style which
But the reduction of German surface actions and sub- reached its zenith in the ‘Tribals’.
marine attacks, which justify the description of PQ15 Militarily, Operation Retribution was an anticlimax.
being termed ‘straightforward’, did not mean that it was The Axis naval forces never showed up.381 From the
safe. Air attacks, which sank three merchant ships, con- British perspective, normal rules of war indicated that
tinued and there were always submarines with which to the Axis forces would evacuate their remaining troops
contend. However, it was weather and ‘friendly fire’ from Tunisia, and when the Allied light forces pre-
which accounted for the loss suffered by the escorts.375 vented the merchant ships from getting through, the
Eskimo and Somali’s sister ship Punjabi collided with Italian battle fleet would sally forth to attempt to blast
the battleship King George V and sank.376 a passage. This is what Britain had done at Dunkirk, St
From that time, under Eaton’s command, Somali’s Nazaire and Saint-Malo, and for their forces deployed
operations became harder and included escorting the to Norway and Crete. To the British, not retrieving
legendary PQ17, and Operation Pedestal in the Medi- those soldiers would have been an anathema. Perhaps

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Trafalgar, due to time in reserve, missed Suez, and then returned Between Operation Retribution and Operation
again to reserve in 1947. After 1958 she had periods as an Husky, Eaton’s Flotilla was charged with the special
admiral’s flagship before rejoining the reserve in 1962. (Drachinifel mission, discussed in Chapter 5, of escorting the Are-
Collection) thusa class light cruiser Aurora and her special cargo.386
Aurora was carrying King George VI, who had decided
it was the difference between a dictatorship and a to visit Malta, which had recently been awarded the
democracy; total war, as was fought in the two world George Cross.387 Although Admiral Cunningham had
wars, required total commitment, but in a democracy, by this point, 19–21 June, declared the Mediterranean
where the support of the electorate matters, troops safe, it was but a relative safety. To ensure the King’s se-
could not be so easily sacrificed. Whatever the case, the curity, nothing but the best could be deployed, and
big battle never happened, but the operation did. ‘I re- Eaton and his flotilla were the best Cunningham had.388
gret that this patrol did not yield more substantial re- The mission went off without a hitch. Leaving Tripoli,
sults, but I feel it was of high nuisance value and the King spent a day touring the island, before return-
strongly discouraged enemy yachtsmen.’ These lines ing to Tripoli overnight. Following the King’s disembar-
from Eaton’s operation summary highlight the frustra- kation, the force returned to Malta to take part in
tion felt by some of the crews and officers involved.382 Operation Husky, the end of Eaton’s time in command
Even though the patrol captured several useful of ‘Tribals’. For the remainder of the war he was given
prisoners, including the Chief of Staff of a Panzer divi- staff appointments co-ordinating destroyers and oper-
sion, it was not the battle or the prize they yearned ational planning until, at the end, when the conflict was
for.383 For an officer like Eaton it was a disappointment. over, he was given command of the ‘Town’ class cruiser
In many ways it was, operationally, a rerun of the Span- Sheffield (of hunting the Bismarck, the Battle of Barents
ish Civil War – a good deal of rushing about, picking Sea and the Battle of North Cape fame).
up people from small boats, but not much of the sort
of action that had been anticipated.384 It was more a After the War
matter of maintaining the patrol and engaging with The end of the Second World War was a huge
small craft, rather than Admiral Cunningham’s vision watershed and turning point for the Royal Navy, but
for the operation to ‘Sink, burn and destroy. Let no- not all the changes that would follow were immediately
thing pass’.385 While it is certain there was a desire for discernible nor registered that quickly. The Navy was
more action during Operation Retribution, in the sub- still confronted by the problem that to had the problem
sequent operation in which Eskimo and her flotilla were that to build a properly capable cruiser, was to build
involved, Eaton must have wished for rather less. something to compare with the ‘Town’ class. The

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 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

trouble was that those ships, in terms of cost, perform- could be sent. It would be gleaming white, the crew
ance, manning and overall capability of weaponry, were would be well drilled, a dinner would be hosted and the
top of the line vessels. And this was in the context of six diplomats would talk with the important people. If
hard years of war and the effect on the fleet. As the matters were not resolved to the British Government’s
Navy started to demobilise from a war footing, and set satisfaction, a heavy cruiser would be sent and the rit-
about carrying out a thorough inspection of ships, as- uals repeated. If this did not succeed, a small force of
sets and projects, it was apparent that there was a mish- cruisers, which usually included the station flagship,
mash of vessels, some of which would be returned to would arrive. The Admiral or Commodore, depending
previous owners or given back under Lend-Lease; upon station, would host a bigger party, with even more
many pre-war ships, which had once been the bastions senior people invited. Governments usually understood
of naval power, were now either no more, virtually shat- the next thing to turn up would be a battleship or battle-
tered hulks or had had so many refits and patches that cruiser, to which they certainly did not have the capa-
a lot of work by the DNC and the shipyards would be bility to withstand, or if they did then they would be
required to get them back into shape. Thrown into this treading the high wire of potential war.
scenario were a few precious new builds, but they had The purpose was not to overawe with sheer power,
been ordered in times of war, when the pace was high, in fact the first approaches were carefully calculated not
resources were tight and space on a ship a luxurious to send something overwhelmingly powerful. The pref-
premium. Finally, there was the transition represented erence was for sloops and light cruisers. It is true they
by the end of the ‘big-gun’ era, or the beginning of the were powerful units for their size, but most nations pos-
end, and the Navy had to establish what a peacetime, sessed either enough cumulative force or even individ-
carrier-centric navy would look like. What it would ual units capable of defeating them. They were a
need? How it would conduct naval diplomacy? reminder of the Fleet across the horizon, and provided
This last part was especially important with the frac- an opportunity for diplomacy. The next levels above
turing world being further complicated by the newly were threats; they were the transition from something
emerging superpower dynamic over and above the which could almost be regarded as de-escalatory, to
existing global and regional power system which gov- something which was the equivalent of a heavy gauntlet
erned the world for the previous century or so. Before being dropped; they were the embodiment of might.
the Second World War naval diplomacy was simple, a However, after 1945 the Royal Navy had lost most of
case of showing the flag and building bridges of under- its battleships, its cruiser force was weak and it was dif-
standing to help solve crises, as well as to help promote
British interests, occasionally both at the same time. HMS Vigo was a 1942 Batch ‘Battle’ class, and spent most of her
When it went slightly wrong, on a domestic level in a time with either 3rd DS or as gunnery training ship attached to
minor nation in Africa, Asia or South America, depend- HMS Excellent, a role in which she replaced Finisterre. (Maritime
ing upon the status of the nation, a sloop or light cruiser Quest)

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

ficult mobilising enough of them to perform the normal The emergence of superpowers, the transition from
‘meet and greet’ of naval presence. And the new capital Empire to Commonwealth, the start of the Cold War
ships, the aircraft carriers, were not really as powerful and post-war reconstruction efforts were further issues
sitting in another nation’s harbour, under their guns to worry about. In addition, the end of the big-gun era
and unable to launch their aircraft. They were probably and the start of the missile age, the proliferation and di-
at their most intimidating when out at sea, just using versification of nuclear weapons, the introduction of a
their air groups for displays, but this kind of display new generaton of jet aircraft and the emergence of ‘fast
could be heavy-handed diplomatically, unless the situ- submarines’ added yet further pressure. It is a wonder
ation really demanded it. Submarines, the other success that any navy functioning within the limitations of a
of the war, were, for diplomatic tasks, quite unsuited. budget managed to build anything in this era, because
Submarines are ambush hunters, operating with stealth, of the constant discussion of around the new threats
and going into port negates this attribute, as would that would eradicate everything that had come before.
cruising up and down on the surface in sight of land. The reality was there was no panacea, excluding nu-
Post-war navies were faced with an issue, and the Royal clear oblivion which was an extreme method with
Navy with its tradition and institutional memory more which to contemplate winning a war, and it was quickly
so than most. How to project power? relegated to be used as a deterrent. This resulted in the
For a navy, if it is impossible to maintain the hier- clamouring for the specialist ships which were the ‘per-
archy, and building a new version solely for purposes fect’ antidote to this threat or the other.
of stronger diplomatic posturing is not a practicable The classic example of this is the impact of nuclear
solution, the answer might be to ask why not build an weapons, and also recently hypersonic weaponry,
intermediate layer? The ships would need to be larger which tend to lead to the belief that submarines are the
than the frigates and destroyers which, when not prac- solution. This view is based on the argument that the
tising for a possible war, were taking on the traditional threat to surface ships is now so great that all navies
role of sloops. They should be big enough, but not so most go completely underwater. But if a navy wants to
big that the existing cruisers could not be justifiably re- land more than small special forces units of ground
tained and employed, a real fear if they made the ships troops, or provide air support, or conduct naval diplo-
‘too capable’. And they needed to be capable of diplo- macy, in fact any of the peacetime duties that navies
macy and for going to war, so the Navy required a carry out, then submarines are unlikely to be the
‘light’ light cruiser. This is where the ‘Battle’ class lost answer.
out. They were too obviously ships of war, being too The answer the Royal Navy found to the threats
aggressive in looks and design. They were crammed posed in the 1930s, was effectively a general-purpose
with weaponry, leaving too little space for diplomatic destroyer, a design that was better than average, but not
entertaining, although this might have been forgiven in perfect, at dealing with all the extensive range of threats
times of Cold War and the threat of global nuclear con- for the time, through the weaponry carried or its ma-
flict when it was expected that such weapons would be noeuvrability. This approach was almost universally de-
used against fleet concentrations. Their lack of space cried as being ‘too conservative’, largely because it had
and issues with top weight made upgrades that much made concessions to the design of more specialist ships
more difficult. for other threats.
Furthermore, of the three classes of general-purpose Taking a conservative stance is not without some
destroyer which the Navy possessed in this period, the merit, and the fact is that the general-purpose de-
‘Battles’ were the ones whose visual impact came from stroyer, as the issues Henderson had with the Mediter-
their weapons, largely because of their placement. The ranean Fleet over the ‘Tribals’ and McGrigor had with
amount of weaponry crammed onto the ‘Battles’ gave Churchill over the Darings, showed that they were
them a slightly ‘messy’ outline, especially aft, accentuat- being radical in their conservatism. They were covering
ing that aggressive look. When coupled with the limited eventualities in building a ship which could carry out a
nature of potential diplomatic dining space, their un- range of roles moderately successfully either alone or
suitability becomes apparent. A navy, especially the working with a specialist, and could support that vessel
Royal Navy of the early Cold War global period, while also offering a modicum of protection from other
required a ship to be visually about being a ship, rather threats. This was a sensible solution. The ships of the
than just its weapons. This was where the Darings and three classes studied in this book were force multipliers.
their design proportions come in. Naval diplomacy was This is important. When the lessons of history, particu-
not the only concern for the Royal Navy at the time. larly recent history, are forgotten, decisions often

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 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

Diamond’s immediate forbear, commissioned in 1932 (H22). She has ever fought, its own government or rather its own
displaced less than 1,400 tons which was less half that of the 1952 government’s wishes to be re-elected. This has been
(D35) vessel, which displaced 2,830 tons. It was not only compounded by winning the battle for specialisation.
displacement that doubled, so had the complement and nearly For example, a frigate might have shorter-range air de-
every other metric. Most significantly, where H22 was built around
fence missiles to provide a measure of air defence, but
her torpedoes, D35 was built around getting the best out of all her
it needs the protection of a destroyer in a medium to
weapons to give her the general-purpose fighting profile needed
for her new role. (Drachinifel Collection)
high threat environment. While both these ships are to
be likely to be fitted with, an anti-ship or land attack
missile system, there is still the worry that remedying
become progressively less optimal, and the lessons of this traditional deficiency will mean a reduction in at-
the ‘back pocket cruisers’ should be applied to a mod- tack submarine numbers. The Navy as a whole is a
ern navy, most obviously to the navy which created strong force, but problems occur when specialist vessels
them in the first place, the Royal Navy. are built to counter a single threat. If that threat lessens,
then the need for such ships also lessens. But the pace
The Modern Royal Navy of ship building means that reacting to an uptick in
As the Royal Navy approaches its 475th year, based on threat might have to be measured in decades. What is
its creation by Henry VIII’s in 1546, it appears those at present available to the Navy it is unlikely to change
officers arguing for specialisation in order to reduce unless the context and criteria of funding change.
costs have won their battle but lost the war. The ships When the Type 45s were being built the world ap-
have grown in size. Type 45 Daring class (8,500 tons at peared relatively peaceful, wars were talked of as a
full load) area air defence destroyers and Type 23 ‘choice’ and so a reduction from twelve to six seemed a
‘Duke’ class (4,900 tons at full load) anti-submarine prudent financial decision. In addition, there were other
frigates are the size of Second World War cruisers. The things like the National Health Service, education and
Type 23’s successors, the Type 26 ‘City’ class (8,000 roads, all equally and immediately just as worthy of
tons at full load) anti-submarine frigates and the Type spending on as defence. Making the case for an air de-
31 (6,600 tons at full load) general-purpose frigates fence destroyer when there is nothing to defend against
even more so. However, they have lost the biggest fight. is difficult; the lack of an obvious enemy or threat, and
Despite all their willingly made sacrifices, they have membership of the world’s most powerful military al-
failed to preserve either numbers of ships or manpower liance provided the security. Perhaps that is the relative
in the face of the most relentless enemy the Royal Navy advantage which the Navy of the 1930s, 1940s and

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Diana was the last Daring to commission, and in October 1955 she strange is that these ships will be forward based, they
paid a reciprocal visit to the Soviet Union along with the Colossus will be the presence ships, those most often seen around
class light fleet carrier Triumph, the Abdiel class fast minelayer the world wherever the Navy visits. The Type 26 and
Apollo¸ and two ‘Ch’ class destroyers, Chieftain and Chevron. Type 45 will perform the majority of the duties of the
(Drachinifel Collection) task forces, and act as the reinforcements sent to sup-
plement these forward deployed ships when the situ-
1950s made the most of when compared to the modern ation demands. No doubt the favour will be returned
navy – evident enemies. However, they also made the should a task force have to go to war.
case for general-purpose destroyers. In the case of the Under such circumstances it can be argued that the
‘Tribals’ and the Darings they were ships which could Type 26 and Type 45 are inheritors of the sub-strand
with ease, as we have reiterated, carry out presence started with the ‘Battle’ class: a general-purpose orien-
duties and provide a decent level of land attack, as well tated design rather than necessarily a ‘general-purpose’
as air defence and anti-submarine capability. However, design, although also used as a fighting class. The Type
it cannot be denied that their capabilities made them 31s are the inheritors of the full tradition as displayed
bigger and more expensive units than their more in the ‘Tribal’ and Daring classes. They must be armed
specialist counterparts. This is worth bearing in mind commensurate with their role, but more importantly
when considering all the plans that have been made for must be outfitted as befits their diplomatic and engage-
a ‘frigate factory’, the idea that it is cheaper and more ment roles. In the modern world this means that when
efficient for the nation if a constant flow of orders is fitting out galleys, wardrooms and messes, for example,
kept up. Specialist vessels don’t suit this approach, as provision is made to support the large community
designs have to change to fit a particular need; a gen- required to run the ship. It means that effort and em-
eral-purpose design, would have been a practicable sol- phasis needs to go into the electronic systems, to allow
ution, not just the practical one. This all though matters the gathering of as much information as possible
for nought at the current time. wherever they travel. Information about their surround-
Currently, in terms of production, it is the Type 31 ings, especially in its raw form, is critical for officers on
class which is important. They will be general-purpose a vessel required to act independently, whether in peace
vessels, but already they are being spoken of as if such or in times of war. They are often called upon to make
a designation makes them second tier, makes them per- decisions which have ramifications far above their rank
haps more easily discarded or forgotten. Particularly and beyond their locality. And this brings about perhaps

150
 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

Above: Duchess, after the Royal Australian Navy lost one of their Below: Dunkirk had been commissioned in 1946 and spent two
Daring class destroyers, HMAS Voyager, in 1964. The Royal Navy years with the 4th DF in the Mediterranean. In 1949 she was paid
settled on the offer of the then HMS Duchess as she was already in off and would not be returned to service till 1958 when again she
the Far East and in need of refit. The Australian government would voyage to the Mediterranean where she remained, barring
accepted the offer and so began thirteen years of service, which Cod Wars and South American excursions, until 1963 when she
included many operations with her sisters of both navies as the retired from service. She was the last unconverted 1943 Batch
Indonesian Confrontation, the Vietnam War and other issues in the ‘Battle’ in service. (Drachinifel Collection)
Far East were addressed. (Drachinifel Collection)

151
Trafalgar pictured here with two other ‘Battle’ class vessels, need to carry themselves with the presence of cruisers
probably Dunkirk and Jutland, her sisters in the 7th DS whose of the 1920s and 1930s. Using that definition these
purpose was to try to shore up Britain’s position in the ships, especially those which are forward based, in
Mediterranean by conspicuous presence and action. (Drachinifel Bahrain or elsewhere, will be the ‘back pocket cruisers’
Collection)
of their generation.
The smaller the navy the more important are flexible
the most difficult requirement needed to help them ac- assets, for example, an aircraft carrier which can have
complish their role. its air group adapted at need. Amphibious ships are
The crew, like the ‘Tribal’ and Daring crews, have to similarly flexible, and can be quite different in their ca-
believe they are special, an ‘elite’, which we have dis- pabilities. For escorts, flexibility is not a virtue of their
cussed earlier. They will be representing a navy which core design. It is something which has to be built in, not
no longer has the squadrons of battleships and cruisers, only physically, but also culturally within the crew, and
the fleets of aircraft carriers which their forebears had if the modern Royal Navy succeeds in inculcating this
when they went to the front. This is a navy which dep- culture within the Type 31s, they will achieve a result
ends far more upon international cooperation. Such co- that not only continues a legacy, but which will provide
operation is built upon relations and impressions, and for flexible capability to underpin national security, in
there is seldom a chance for a second first impression. both presence and reach, for decades to come. Thus far
The Type 31s will, by virtue of their station and their the signs are good. The selection of the large Arrowhead
role, be the first impression, and the idea they might be 140 design, with its open architecture and space to de-
second tier or less is so potentially corrosive. They are velop within the existing builds which are planned cur-
going to be an essential constituent of the capabilities rently, let alone potential further builds, is a very good
of that fleet and for the nation. A navy is not about one sign. Signs though alone will not be enough; it will be
ship or even one class, it is the sum of all its parts. A time, commitment, support and the personnel of the
good navy is more than the sum of all its parts – made Navy and Britain’s political leaders which will decide
so by the crews that make it work, by the culture and what becomes of it.
tradition, which are its foundations, and by the nation Just as important as the escorts will be the core of
which it represents. They will be frigates, but they will the force around which they are built. While ‘River’

152
 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and future Mine could be made for these vessels, to replace the already
Countermeasures Vessels (MCMVs) will be the sloop departed Ocean, the Landing Platform Helicopter
stand-ins, together with the Type 31s taking on the light (LPH) sold to Brazil, Britain would be truly capable.
cruiser/intermediary role and Type 45 Daring class de- Having three ski ramp-enhanced LHDs and two strike
stroyers along with Type 26s ‘City’ class frigates fulfil- carriers, Britain would have three amphibious oper-
ling the gauntlet function, the future of British naval ations (AMW) major/strike and air defence (S/AAD)
diplomacy would seem well placed. However, its suc- minor and two S/AAD major/AMW minor ships
cess and capacity to deliver will depend upon the around which to build task force.
numbers procured and the quality of the core, or capital This would mean that Britain would have five flight
ships, around which they are built. What first comes to decks which could operate the same mix of aircraft and
mind are the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, three major docks from which to draw to service its na-
Queen Elizabeth and Prince ofWales. Relatively large and tional and global reach. Under such circumstances, it
capable, they have been the subject of much debate for is hard to think that a major task force would ever be
not being of Catapult Assisted Take Off/Barrier Assisted assembled without both a strike/air defence designated
Recover (CATOBAR) design, being instead of the Ver- flight deck and an amphibious flight deck. As important
tical/Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) design as the flight decks are, the large docks are key for en-
with a ski ramp to assist with take-off. CATOBAR abling the deployment of heavier equipment, like main
allows for the use of a wider range of heavier, more ca- battle tanks; but also because, potentially, those same
pable aircraft, but the Navy will get only two of these docks would be able to support medium-sized Un-
ships. Two flight decks are not enough to guarantee manned Surface Vehicles (USVs), which themselves
constant availability for a medium or global power. To could be a critical part of the task forces’ operation and
guarantee that the strategic deterrent is permanently at conception.
sea requires four submarines. When taking into account Therefore, while it would always be conceded that
maintenance, deployment and accident, to guarantee CATOBAR and the aircraft that come with it produce
continual availability requires at least three vessels of the better technical solution, the case can be made that
any type, which is expensive. However, there is an ob-
vious solution in which VSTOL is not only a strategic
Vigo’s claim to fame is as the first winner of the Bulawayo Cup.
advantage for Britain to pursue, it is the critical enabler. This was awarded to the Royal Navy or Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship
This is the opportunity to replace, in time, the exist- which, in the opinion of the Committee, was felt to be the most
ing Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), Albion and efficient in fleet replenishment at sea on the Mediterranean station.
Bulwark, with two to three Landing Platform Heli- It was only awarded ten times, and only twice won by a warship,
copter/Docks (LHDs) that are also fitted with ski both times ‘Battle’ class vessels, Vigo and Aisne in 1955.
jumps for full VSTOL operational capability. If the case (Drachinifel Collection)

153
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Diamond in an obviously relaxed state, with guns turned inwards away from the history on which this book is concen-
and numbers of crew spread all around the ship. Days like this were trated, but it demonstrates how lessons and experience
what helped to build the bonds of a crew; they allowed sailors to in history can provide useful signposting for how we
get to know their fellows outside of their divisions. It was days like may approach the problems of today.
this which helped forge the friendships that the Navy’s destroyer
force relied on.(Drachinifel Collection)
Conclusion – the ‘Back Pocket Cruisers’
The stories that have been examined in this book offer
for Britain, VSTOL and the interoperability of all those a small window into the contribution the ‘Tribal’ class
decks would produce the most capable strategic and made to their country. The ‘Tribal’ class ships were de-
tactical solution. To produce the same level of security signed as general-purpose destroyers, and we have seen
capability would require four CATOBAR aircraft car- the way they went about doing it. They sacrificed a tor-
riers and four LHDs – eight ships, when for five Britain pedo set for an extra gun mount and included more de-
can achieve a flexible, but still potent, capability en- stroyer guns to achieve rapid fire instead of going
abling it to reassure allies and defend its interests ‘complete light cruiser’ with 6in guns, and all this was
against even the most dangerous of potential oppo- packed into a ‘destroyer leader’ hull, giving the class the
nents. speed and manoeuvrability that was necessary to maxi-
Britain, as she currently stands, would be classified mise their capabilities. In doing this the Admiralty had
as a medium global power. As a nation she is not in the chosen to build a general-purpose destroyer, rather
superpower realm, a status which is allocated really to than a light cruiser. As such they were the ‘back pocket’
one global and two regional alliances with nuclear ar- cruisers of the Royal Navy, not cruisers, but something
senals, but only one truly global power when it comes in the ‘back pockets’ of admirals which could fill the
to logistical capability and their conventional arsenal. void when needed – and they were used a lot. They
And Britain benefits from global reach thanks to the were well armed (for their period) in terms of air de-
hard work of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the RAF Trans- fence, even before the refits, though they were never
port Command and Royal Logistics Corps. Unfor- really AA destroyers. They had depth charges, but never
tunately, there is not enough depth to that capability, enough to be a true ‘AS’ ship. Thus was their general-
but it could well be deepened and developed by suffi- purpose design, their ability to fill a lot of gaps in the
ciently capable LHDs as outlined above. This is all far Navy’s surface forces (a result of the reduced numbers

154
 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

of those forces), the factor that gave them their worth. such as the forced consolidation of industry, all were to
The ‘Battle’ class were too much of war-influenced sap Britain of much of her self-belief, a belief which
design to follow this. They certainly shared the same would only begin to return after the Darings were re-
tenets. They crammed everything into a destroyer hull tired (which might be thought a waste as they would
– the guns, the torpedoes, the strength and the size. Yet actually have been useful if operational) and after the
the concept did not really work. If it had not been for successful deployment in the 1982 Falklands War. It is
the class which came after them, it could have been said very hard to evaluate the use of ships as presence ships
the general-purpose destroyer faded away. They looked when it is arguable that the nation does not seem to
both too aggressive and unbalanced with their main wish to be present at all. However, that was all after
firepower forward and the almost messy mass of 1953.
medium weapons aft. Despite the justifiable reasons, During 1930s, after the ‘Tribal’ class, the Admiralty
they would always look like a compromise forced out built the Laforey or ‘L’ class, a more traditional destroyer
of the experience of war, especially when single guns design to fill the role established by the ‘Tribals’. This
appeared amidships to provide cover. This was solved was done because the Admiralty preferred cruisers to
in the Daring class which was built for a nation which, try to fill the ‘cruiser gap’. As the war progressed, how-
although no longer the foremost of the imperial powers, ever, the ‘Tribal’ class’s value was proved while, more
was still a forward, outward-looking nation, a nation importantly, the cruiser construction never reached the
which believed in itself and its need and duty to in- levels required by the Admiralty. They returned to the
fluence events. Unfortunately, first the Suez Crisis, then principles of the design which had led to the ‘Tribal’
the long-term effects of recovery from the Second class, then the ‘Battles’ and later the Darings, which
World War, the dawn of the Cold War, combined with were arguably the next generation of general-purpose
decisions that were penny-wise and pound-foolish, destroyers, without the treaty limitations to contend
with. This Daring class drew from the lesson of the
Duchess in company with her sisters during what was probably the
‘Tribals’, with their emphasis on fighting capability pro-
1953 Coronation Review. 1953 was in many ways the Navy’s peak vided by guns rather than torpedoes, but adjusted for
of capability and flexibility. Ever since the flexibility of numbers has the context and nuance of their time. The ‘Tribal’ class
been sacrificed on the altar of increased capability. (Drachinifel emphasis on cruiser-style capabilities in a destroyer hull
Collection) also appeared with the ‘County’ class destroyers, when

155
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

One name has appeared several time in this work, but this is the the modern Navy. The legacy reaches right back to their
first picture of HMS Nubian, saved because in the end for all the pre-war service and actions, and it was also a product
discussion of the concept of the ‘fighting destroyer’/’back pocket of the classes that came after it, the ‘Battles’ and the
cruisers’ being about diplomacy, presence and winning the peace, Darings.
at their base point they are a concept of a warship and no ship in The Royal Navy won many successes in the Second
all these classes, not even her valiant sister the mighty HMS Eskimo
World War, and the capital ships and carriers gained the
are more of a warship, than Nubian, the stalwart warrior of the
glory, the cruisers being awarded much of what was
Second World War. (Drachinifel Collection)
left, but much of what they achieved was with the help
and sacrifice of remarkable smaller ships, foremost
amongst them being the ‘Tribal’ class destroyers. It was
the Royal Navy was again facing a cruiser shortage, or these ‘back pocket cruisers’, the first general-purpose
rather no cruisers. Instead, they built large, well-armed destroyers to serve with the Royal Navy, and the fore-
and spacious destroyers, albeit in a more circumspect bears of the vessels plying their duties on the world’s
manner, with less obvious space for diplomatic func- oceans today, that made such a difference. That differ-
tions than either the ‘Tribals’ or the Darings. However, ence is exemplified by the service of the sisters Cossack,
even with this reservation the ‘County’ class proved, as Eskimo, Sikh and Nubian. These were the ships which
had the ‘Tribals’ and ‘Battles’, to be easy to upgrade fought the war, day in and day out, and they could do
thanks to their space. The major advantage of the this because their design enabled them to adapt to every
‘Counties’ was that they were designed to fulfil com- circumstance, a lesson which should not be forgotten
mand roles for which the ‘Tribals’ had been used, and by contemporary governments or naval architects.
deftly stepped into the gaps left by the disappearing It was these ships and their capabilities that the Navy
cruiser force. Design, however, is just one aspect of the was most desperately seeking to emulate later in the
legacy of the ‘Tribals’, ‘Battles’ and Darings. war, a task the Admiralty set the DNC. Goodall re-
It was not only the design of the ‘Tribals’ that has sponded first with the ‘Battle’ class and then, post-war,
lived on as a legacy within the Navy, but also the dealing with the challenges of the changing world by
espritde corps, the fighting aggression and pride of the bringing into service updated version of the concept for
‘Tribal’ crews, which has been retained in the modern the 1950s, the Daring class. It was not easy to justify
Navy. Mixed with the traditions and personalities of the sometimes; general-purpose is never an easy case to
cruiser crews it has provided a twenty-first-century ver- make, as there is always another design which is better
sion of it – the ‘can do’ attitude which is the mantra of dealing with some specific threat. General-purpose is

156
 THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF THE ‘BACK POCKET CRUISERS’

about aggregate and whole-force capabilities. In a world lander’s U-454.389 The Harmatris was taken in tow by
which prized the sophistication of technology, which Speedwell, a Halcyon class minesweeper, and as the rest
prided itself achieving perfection and problem solving, of the convoy steamed ahead to gain the safety of har-
the nuance and context required for making the case bour, the two ‘Tribal’ class vessels were left to escort
for a general-purpose vessel, especially one not built on the tow.390 They were the vessels judged most capable
the traditional scale for it, to wit the full cruiser, it was of delivering the Harmatris and, most importantly, her
certainly not easy. Luckily, for the Royal Navy, they did cargo to their destination. They were the general-
make it, successfully. purpose destroyers which stood a chance of protecting
This book started with the story of Mashona, and it their charges against all threats, and indeed this was a
seems appropriate to finish it with another story, that mission in which they would succeed, though as it
of Matabele, a ship that has, by comparison, hardly been turned out not without loss. During the night Matabele
mentioned. She survived the early years of the war until was sunk by torpedo in another attack by U-454. There
January 1942 when, along with Somali, she joined the was no warning and all but two of her crew were lost in
escort of Arctic Convoy PQ8. The convoy had almost the icy waters of the Artctic.391 It was another grim loss,
reached safety, when the merchant ship SS Harmatris another ‘Tribal’ sacrifice. But it was not in vain for Har-
was torpedoed by a U-boat, Kapitanleutnant Hack- matris, with her cargo, made it to Murmansk.

157
 NOTES
Chapter 1 17 TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933; Friedman, 2010, p. 186
1 Kennedy, 1942, pp. 91–4 18 TNA - ADM 1/9384, 1933-1936
2 Brice, 1971, p. 166 19 TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934-1935
3 Ibid; Kennedy, 1942, pp. 91–4 20 Ibid.
4 Kennedy, 1942, pp. 91–4 21 TNA - ADM 1/9384, 1933-1936; TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934-
5 Brice, 1971, p. 166; Kennedy, 1942, pp. 91–4 1935; Friedman, 2010, p. 186
6 Twenty-seven of the class were built in total, HMCS Micmac, 22 TNA – ADM 1/8828, 1934-1935
HMCS Nootka, HMCS Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan (II) and 23 Ibid
HMAS Bataan were all completed after the war was over. 24 Ibid
7 Brice, 1971, p. 11; the ‘Tribal’ class were not the only class to 25 Ibid
suffer so, as Lt-Cdr Hugh Hodgkinson states in his work Before the 26 Ibid
Tide Turned; The Mediterranean Experiences of a British Destroyer Of- 27 TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936-1938
ficer in 1941 (1944, pp. 239-40), ‘The little Hotspur still fights. She 28 Temple Patterson, A. (1973), Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force;
is almost the last of the old Second Flotilla. Five went into Narvik. Friedman, 2010, p. 186; a good example of this ‘interchangeability’
The Hardy and Hunter were lost, and the VC won. The Hotspur with cruisers is discussion in TNA - ADM 116/3734 (1936-1938),
came out terribly damaged, but got home to be repaired. The rest where it was proposed that the 1st ‘Tribal’ class Destroyer Flotilla
of the flotilla were operating in the South Atlantic in those days, but would make up the balance of the 3rd CS.
once again they all joined up in the Med. In 1940 [sic]. For two 29 TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933; TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933; Hill-
years they took part in almost every action in that sea, and grad- Norton & Decker, 1982, p. 60.
ually their numbers lessened. It would be hard to count the hon- 30 TNA - ADM 116/3617, 1931-1933
ours they gained. The Hyperion and Hostile were the next two to go, 31 For an in-depth examination of First World War destroyer tactics
and the Herward went in our Heraklion evacuation. Then the Hasty and the operational difficulties they faced please read - Brooks,
was lost in a night operation, and finally the Havock, who was al- John. ‘British Destroyers at Jutland: Torpedo Tactics in Theory and
ways our particular friend, became a total loss. So remain the Hero Action’. British Journal for Military History, v. 3, n. 3, Jun. 2017.
and Hotspur to carry on the old name.’ Available at: http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/view/167.
8 A good example of this is Ashanti which between 22 May 1942 Date accessed: 03 Jun. 2017.
and 13 August, took part in two Arctic Convoys, PQ16 and PQ17, 32 TNA - ADM 1/9384, 1933-1936; TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933
and Operation Pedestal, the critical resupply of Malta (Brice, 1971, 33 Field, 2004, pp. 242–3: ‘Tribals’ were always key in the Mediter-
pp. 49–55; Smith, 2002, pp. 112, 148 & 152–5; Woodman, 2007, ranean, for example four would take part in Operation Pedestal, So-
pp. 146–61); in less than twelve weeks, this one destroyer took part mali, Eskimo, Tartar and Ashanti; (Smith, 2002, pp. 253–5).
in actions which spread from the Arctic circle to the Mediterra- 34 TNA - T 161/243 (25613). (1924-5). Navy Estimates 1925-26;
nean, and she was not unusual in this (Burt, 1985, pp. 41–2) Preliminary discussions as to total; TNA - T 161/243 (25613a).
9 TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933; TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936-1938 (1924-5). Papers relating to: Japan & USA Navies, Singapore
10 Morris, 1987, p. 174, & TNA - ADM 1/9427, 1937 Naval Base, Vote 10, Vote 9, Fleet Air Arm, Guns & Ammunition,
11 Ibid Vote A; TNA - T 161/243 (25613b). (1924-5). Papers relating to
12 Ibid USA Navy Estimates} in comparison with Navy Estimates
13 TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934-1935 1925/26; TNA - T 161/243 (25613c). (1924-5). Disarmament in
14 Signatories of the 1930 London Treaty for the Limitation and Re- connection with Navy Estimates 1925/26; TNA - T 161/243
duction of Naval Armament, 2003 (25613d). (1924-5). Papers relating to Cabinet Memoranda of
15 Signatories of the 1930 London Treaty for the Limitation and Re- Decisions in connection with Navy Estimates 1925/26; TNA - T
duction of Naval Armament, 2003 161/243 (25613e). (1924-5). Papers relating to Ministerial Corre-
16 Kennedy, 1942, p. 46. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that spondence in connection with Navy Estimates 1925/6; TNA - T
Plevy (Destroyer Actions, September 1939–June 1940, 2008, p. 11) 161/243 (25613f). (1924/25). Papers relating to New Construction
describes this meeting of Kennedy & Tartar no less elegantly, but & British Naval Strength in connection with Navy Estimates
slightly differently: ‘…a little way downstream I glimpsed her for 1925/26
the first time – as sleek and elegant and powerful-looking ship as I 35 Brice, 1971, pp. 252–5; TNA - ADM 1/15323. (1943). Tribal
have yet seen. From the bow there rose in successively higher tiers Class Destroyers: Cost of Building in the United Kingdom
A gun, B gun, the convex armoured wheelhouse and – the high 36 Batchelor & Chant, 2008, pp. 174–5; Friedman, 2010, p. 186.
point of the ship – the open bridge, some forty feet above the wa- TNA - ADM 1/9355. (1933, August 10). Cruiser Design: Request-
terline. At the back of the bridge was the foremast with its aerials, ing views of Commanders-in-Chief, Home and Mediterranean
aft of that the raked funnel, and in the waist of the ship the tor- Fleets; Stern, 2008, p. 94; TNA - ADM 1/9384. (1933-1936). Re-
pedo-tubes. Up again to the pom-pom and X gun and the down to quired for R.A.(D)’s Flagships: Proposed investigation of new de-
Y gun, the quarterdeck and the stack of depth charges. The whole sign for - Preliminary Staff Requirements; TNA - ADM 1/8828.
effect was one of symmetry and grace.’ (1934–35). New Construction Programme for Cruisers 1936;

158
 NOTES

Hansard HC Deb. vol. 345 cols. 433–4, 15 March 1939 67 Brice, 1971, p. 20
37 Brice, 1971, p. 254 68 Ibid
38 The largest destroyers ordered by the RN until the war-built ‘L’ 69 Ibid, p. 21
or Laforey class destroyers entered service; Plevy, 2008, p. 254; 70 TNA - ADM 116/3873, 1937-39; TNA - ADM 1/9942, 1939
TNA - ADM 187/1. (1939). Pink List, September 1939; Smith, 71 Brice, 1971, p. 105; Plevy, 2008, pp. 81–95; Carton De Wiart,
2010, pp. 13–48); Brice, 1971, p. 255: Jordan, 2011, p. 304 1950, p. 165; Dannreuther, 2006, p. 116; TNA - ADM 202/352,
39 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939 1941; TNA - ADM 1/9942, 1939
40 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939 72 Brice, 1971, p. 105
41 Hill-Norton & Decker, 1982, pp. 111–2 73 Ibid
42 Friedman, 2010, pp. 390 & 402 74 Ibid, p. 11; TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936–38
43 TNA - ADM 227/277, 1940 75 Ibid, p. 40
44 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939 76 Ibid, p. 252
45 Whitley, 2000, pp. 114-7 77 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939; TNA - CO 323/1694/8, 1939
46 TNA - ADM 1/12287, 1942; TNA - ADM 136/19, 1935–40 78 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939; TNA - CO 323/1694/8, 1939
47 TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934–35 79 Brice, 1971, p. 40; The National Commission on Culture, 2007;
48 TNA - ADM 1/9384, 1933–36; TNA - ADM 186/350, 1938. TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939; TNA - CO 323/1694/8, 1939
Handbook for the Admiralty Fire Control Clock, Mark 1; Brice, 80 Ibid
1971, p. 15 81 TNA - ADM 1/10160, 1939
49 TNA - ADM 1/8672/227 (1924), Light-Cruisers Emergency 82 Brice, 1971, p. 41
Construnction Programme; TNA - ADM 203/90 (1929), Strategi- 83 Ibid
cal Exercise MZ - Altantic and Mediterranean Fleets 1929; TNA - 84 Manning, 1979, p. 100
ADM 1/9355, 1933. TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934–35; TNA - ADM 85 Konstam, 2013, p. 38; Winton, 1986, p. 152; Brice, 1971, pp.
1/9384 (1933–36); TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936–38 40–65; Smith, 2002, pp. 152–5; TNA - ADM 1/15784, 1944
50 TNA - ADM 186/296. 1930. Handbook For High Angle Con- 86 TNA - CO 323/1694/8, 1939
trol System Marks I and I*. Book II - Plates 87 TNA - ADM 116/3818, 1939
51 TNA - ADM 186/278, 1927. Pamphlet on the Drill Procedure 88 Ibid
and Upkeep of the Admiralty Fire Control Table, Mark II (‘Kent’ 89 Ibid
Class and later Cruisers); TNA - ADM 186/296, 1930; TNA - 90 Ibid
ADM 186/350, 1938; TNA - ADM 1/12516, 1943; TNA - ADM 91 Ibid
220/1668, 1944; TNA - ADM 212/51, 1921–27. A.R.L. Domestic 92 Ibid
File: AA Predictor and AA Fire Control Equipment (A.R.L. Pre- 93 Ibid
dictors); TNA - ADM 186/345, 1925, January, April, July, October. 94 Brice, 1971, p. 42; TNA - ADM 116/3818, 1939
Vernon’s Quarterly Letter to the Fleet (No. 23, 24, 25, 26.); TNA - 95 Ibid
ADM 220/211, 1940-1946). General Fire Control Papers - R.D.F;
TNA - ADM 212/72, 1934. A.R.L. Domestic File (un-numbered); Chapter 2
E.T. Hanson (A.R.L. Predictor and other Fire Control Problems) 96 TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936–38: very similar to the four roles
52 TNA - ADM 186/350, 1938 outlined for a fleet cruiser ‘1. Reconnaissance in which the ultimate
53 Ibid aim is visual touch with the Enemy Battlefleet. For this to be effec-
54 Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, 1939, p. 349 tive, equal total cruiser strength with that of the enemy is required.
55 Royal Aero Club, The Development of the Fleet Air Arm, 1934, p. 2. The support of the Flotillas in the van. 3. Screening the Fleet
113 night and day. 4. Detached Operations.’ TNA - ADM 1/9355,
56 Barrett, 2015 (online publication) 1933
57 Tyne & Wear Archives - DS VA 6/36/17 (1936–39) 97 TNA - ADM 1/9355, 1933; TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934–35
58 Ibid 98 Brice, 1971, p. 228
59 Ibid 99 Ibid, p. 44
60 Ibid 100 TNA - ADM 116/3893, 1937–39
61 Brice, 1971, p. 19 101 Brice, 1971, p. 23; TNA - ADM 187/2, 1939
62 TNA - ADM 116/3871 (1939), highlights this delicate and 102 TNA - ADM 358/73, 1940; Creswell, 1967, p. 75; Carton De
complicated situation; however, Brice, 1971, p. 20, D’Este, 1990, Wiart, 1950, p. 165; Vian, 1960, pp. 23–73; Kennedy, 1974, p. 144
Greene & Massignani, 1998, and Smith, 2011, all agree and go into 103 Brice, 1971, p. 108; Vian, 1960, p. 50
wide detail of the affects this had on RN and to an extent wider 104 TNA - ADM 196/52/83, 1946
British Government thinking. Although it wasn’t just the RN, the 105 Ibid
wider British defence establishment worried about the Meditera- 106 Ibid
nean, as shown by the 1928 Air Ministry Report, Air Threat in the 107 TNA - ADM 187/1, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/2, 1939; TNA -
Mediterranean (TNA - AIR 2/1457). ADM 187/3, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/4, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/5,
63 Brice, 1971, p. 11; TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936–38 1940, Pink List, January 1940; TNA - ADM 187/6, 1940, Pink
64 TNA - ADM 136/19, 1935–40 List, February to March 1940; TNA - ADM 187/7, 1940; Vian,
65 Brice, 1971, p. 20. A fairly common patrol to be issued with at 1960, pp. 23–73; Kennedy, 1974, pp. 151–88
this time, although considering its requirements, and their capabil- 108 TNA - ADM 196/52/83, 1946
ities, the ‘Tribal’ class must have seemed a perfect fit (TNA - ADM 109 Brice, 1971, p. 23
116/3679, 1937–38; Lyon, 1970, pp. 36–7) 110 TNA - ADM 187/2, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/3, 1939; TNA -
66 TNA - ADM 116/3873, 1937–39 ADM 187/4, 1939

159
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

111 Brice, 1971, p. 24; Vian, 1960, p. 23 154 TNA - ADM 1/12287, 1942
112 TNA - ADM 358/3300, 1939; Brice, 1971, pp.179–80 155 Ibid
113 Ibid 156 Vian, 1960, p. 38
114 Brice, 1971, p. 24; Vian, 1960, p. 23 157 Ibid
115 Ibid 158 Haarr, 2013, pp. 3–33; Cope, 2015, pp. 137–92
116 Ibid 159 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940: See Chapter 5 for details of the
117 Ibid VC
118 Ibid 160 Cope, 2015, pp. 137–92; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; Hodg-
119 Ibid kinson, 1944, p. 239
120 Ibid 161 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; TNA - ADM 187/1, 1939
121 Ibid 162 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; Plevy, 2008, p. 134
122 TNA - ADM 187/2, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/3, 1939; TNA - 163 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
ADM 187/7, 1940; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; Vian, 1960, p. 164 Ibid; Plevy, 2008, p. 136
23) 165 Ibid
123 Brice, 1971, p. 24; Vian, 1960, p. 23 166 Ibid
124 Ibid 167 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; Plevy, 2008, p. 138
125 TNA - ADM 187/1, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/2, 1939; TNA - 168 Ibid
ADM 187/3, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/4, 1939; TNA - ADM 187/5, 169 Ibid
1940; TNA - ADM 187/6, 1940; TNA - ADM 187/7, 1940; Vian, 170 Ibid
1960, pp. 23–73; Kennedy, 1974, pp. 15188 171 Ibid
126 Vian, 1960, p. 7 172 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
127 Ibid, pp. 12–13 173 Ibid; Plevy, 2008, p. 139
128 Ibid, pp. 13–14 174 Ibid; Plevy, 2008, pp. 140–1
129 Vian, 1960, p. 14 175 Brice, 1971, p. 116
130 Ibid 176 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 3: HMS Ashanti, a
131 Ibid Soft Power Entrepreneur
132 Ibid 177 Brice, 1971, p. 116
133 Ibid 178 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
134 Ibid 179 Brice, 1971, p. 90; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
135 TNA - ADM 199/281, 1940 180 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
136 Ibid 181 Brice, 1971, p. 91; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
137 Ibid 182 Ibid
138 Haarr, 2013, pp. 352–89; TNA - FO 952/2, 1940, Report on 183 TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
the Altmark incident and local correspondence; TNA - ADM 184 Brice, 1971, p. 92; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940
223/27, 1940, Altmark Action Feb 1940; TNA - ADM 199/280, 185 Ibid
1940, War History: Interception and Boarding of German Auxilary 186 Ibid
Altmark, 16.2.1940; Vian, 1960, pp. 24–31; TNA - ADM 199/281, 187 TNA - ADM 1/15795, 1944; TNA - ADM 1/15791, 1944;
1940, German auxiliary Altmark: interception and boarding TNA - ADM 267/21, 1944
139 Ibid 188 Brice, 1971, p. 123; TNA - ADM 199/473, 1940; TNA - ADM
140 Haarr, 2013, pp. 366–73; Plevy, 2008, p. 90; TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA - ADM 267/21, 1944; TNA - ADM 1/15791,
223/27, 1940; TNA - FO 952/2, 1940; TNA - ADM 199/280, 1944; TNA - ADM 1/15795, 1944
1940; Vian, 1960, pp. 26–7; TNA - ADM 199/281, 1940 189 Brice, 1971, pp. 116–26
141 Lyon, 1970, p. 32; Vian, 1960, p. 27; TNA - ADM 199/281, 190 Plevy, 2008, pp. 149–70; Brice, 1971, pp. 24–7; Carton De
1940 Wiart, 1950, pp. 163-75; Vian, 1960, pp. 32–50
142 Haarr, 2013, pp. 374–6; Rodger, 2004, pp. LXII–LXV; 191 Ibid
Rodger, 1997, pp. XXI–XXVI 192 Ibid
143 TNA - ADM 223/27, 1940; TNA - ADM 199/281, 1940 193 Carton De Wiart, 1950, p. 174
144 Plevy, 2008, pp. 122–3; TNA - ADM 223/27, 1940; Vian, 194 Ibid; Vian, 1960 pp. 47–50
1960, p. 29; TNA - ADM 199/281, 1940 195 Vian, 1960, p. 48
145 Lyon, 1970, p. 32; TNA - ADM 223/27, 1940; Carton De 196 TNA - ADM 187/7, 1940; TNA - ADM 187/8, 1940; TNA -
Wiart, 1950, p. 165; Vian, 1960, p. 30; TNA - ADM 199/281, ADM 187/9, 1940; TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941
1940
146 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 1: Some Battles of Chapter 3
HMS Sikh 197 TNA - ADM 203/90, 1929; TNA - ADM 186/145, 1929; TNA
147 TNA - ADM 1/12287, 1942; Brice, 1971, pp. 128–9; TNA - - ADM 186/158, 1937
ADM 187/7, 1940 198 Simmons, 2011, p. 110 & 133; Cunningham, 1951, p. 329
148 Brice, 1971, p. 128; Vian, 1960, p. 37 199 TNA - CAB 121/447, 1941; TNA - DEFE 2/140, 1941; TNA -
149 Ibid PREM 3/328/7, 1941; TNA - ADM 1/20611, 1947; Brice, 1971,
150 Vian, 1960, p. 37 pp. 94–5
151 Friedman, 2010, pp. 156–62 200 Ibid
152 TNA - ADM 1/12287, 1942 201 Ibid
153 Vian, 1960, p. 37 202 Ibid

160
 NOTES

203 Ibid 238 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, pp. 147–56; Brice,
204 Ibid 1971, pp. 221-2
205 Ibid 239 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, p. 149; Brice, 1971,
206 Ibid pp. 221–2
207 Ibid 240 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, p. 149; Brice, 1971,
208 Ibid pp. 221–2; Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013, p. 110
209 Ibid 241 Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013, p. 110
210 Ibid 242 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, p. 149; Brice, 1971,
211 TNA - ADM 116/3734, 1936-1938 pp. 221–2
212 Vian, 1960, p. 56; Kennedy, 1974, inside book cover & pp. 243 TNA - ADM 199/1110, 1942; Britannia Naval Histories of
142–3 World War II, 2013, pp. 129–39
213 Vian, 1960, p. 56 244 TNA - ADM 199/1110, 1942; Britannia Naval Histories of
214 Ibid World War II, 2013, pp. 134–5; Brice, 1971, p. 97
215 Vian, 1960, p. 57; TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941, The Sinking of 245 Brice, 1971, p. 97
the Bismarck, 27 May, 1941 - Official Dispatches 246 TNA - ADM 199/1110, 1942; Britannia Naval Histories of
216 Vian, 1960, p. 57 World War II, 2013, pp. 134-5; Brice, 1971, p. 97
217 Kennedy, 1974, p. 177; TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941 247 TNA - ADM 199/1110, 1942; Britannia Naval Histories of
218 Ibid World War II, 2013, pp. 134–5; Brice, 1971, p. 97
219 TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941 248 Ibid
220 Kennedy, 1942, pp. 85–9; Dannreuther, 2006, p. 95 250 Ibid
221 TNA - ADM 367/137, 1941, Hood & Bismarck - Capital Ships 251 Ibid
vs Tirpitz; TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA - ADM 234/510, 252 Ibid
1941,The Sinking of the Bismarck, 27th May, 1941 - Plans 253 Ibid
222 TNA - ADM 367/137, 1941, Hood & Bismarck - Capital Ships 254 TNA - ADM 1/12325, 1942; Creswell, 1967, p. 105;TNA -
vs Tirpitz; TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA - ADM 234/510, ADM 1/12326, 1942; TNA - ADM 1/12771, 1942
1941,The Sinking of the Bismarck, 27th May, 1941 - Plans 255 TNA - ADM 1/12326, 1942; TNA - ADM 1/12771, 1942
223 TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941; Kennedy, Sub-Lieutenant; a per- 256 Ibid
sonal record of the war at sea, 1942, pp. 85–9 257 Ibid
224 TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941 258 Ibid
225 TNA - ADM 234/509, 1941; Kennedy, 1974, pp. 217–19 259 Ibid
226 Ibid
227 TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934–35; TNA - ADM 1/12325, 1942. Chapter 4
HNMS Isaac Sweers often accompanied the ‘Tribals’ on operations; 260 Boniface, 2007, p. 1
in fact it was she which played a crucial role (in spite of a subma- 261 TNA - ADM 1/9416, 1937
rine being in the vicinity, stayed stopped for over an hour) in pick- 262 Whitby, 1993, p. 5; Hodges, 1971, pp. 20–1
ing up the Laforey class destroyer HMS Ghurkha’s company, when 263 Lambert, 2019, pp. 176–7
the latter was torpedoed; whilst escorting a convoy from Alexan- 264 Johns, 1934, p. 11
dria, along with two other ships from the battle of Cape Bon team, 265 A calculation which had led to the focus on the 6in gun over
HMS Legion & the ‘Tribal’ Maori; TNA - ADM 1/12287, 1942 the 8in by the RN. The Mk IV mount combined with its two Mk V
228 TNA - ADM 1/12325, 1942 4.5in guns was a powerful weapon system. The RN needed it in
229 Ibid service and it would go on to become ubiquitous with the RN,
230 Ibid serving in the Falklands War thirty-plus years later, only having
231 Ibid begun to be replaced as the ‘go-to’ weapon in new builds in 1972
232 Some historians argue that it was the aggressiveness of the by the Mk 8 4.5in gun, which is the standard weapon of the RN to
RN’s destroyer force which was the decisive factor in forcing the the present day. This was despite it not living up to its promised po-
European Axis powers to adopt a defensive mind-set; Smith, 2010, tential at the time, as the automatic loader was complex and prone
p. 156; TNA - ADM 1/8828, 1934-1935 to issues which would lead to the gunnery crew manually carrying
233 TNA - ADM 178/280, 1942. Although even in death Maori out tasks, rather than letting the machinery cycle through as had
proved useful, as the diesel generator she had aboard ‘proved its been planned.
worth and enabled the supply of light and power in the fore part of 266 Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (1983),
the ship to be maintained after the loss of steam.’ As a consequence p. 113
of this experience diesel generators were more widely fitted, to pro- 267 Thursfield, 1936, pp. 12–13
vide support in such extreme circumstances.
234 Sikh does, like Tartar, have a book written about her, but unlike Chapter 5
Kennedy’s Sub-Lieutenant (1941), Davies’s Lower Deck (1946) does 268 Roskill, 1976, p. 262
not call her Sikh but Skye. 269 Brice, 1971, p. 57
235 Smith, 2010, p. 156 270 Ibid, p. 58
236 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, pp. 147–56; Brice, 271 Ibid, p. 118
1971, pp. 221–2; Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013, 272 Ibid, p. 207
pp. 104-15 273 Ibid, p. 208
237 TNA - ADM 199/681, 1942; Smith, 2010, pp. 147–56; Brice, 274 Ibid, p. 209
1971, pp. 221–2 275 Ibid, p. 210

161
TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

276 Ibid 116/3872, 1933-38; TNA - ADM 116/3873, 1937-39; TNA -

277 Ibid ADM 186/145, 1929; TNA - ADM 186/158, 1937; TNA - ADM
278 TNA - WO 204/7522, Experiences Operation Husky by Major J. 203/90, 1929
M. Lind, 1943 321 Simmons, 2011, p. 133
279 TNA - WO 204/7522, 1943 322 This is the only way that it can be explained how a 15,000-
280 Ibid strong force managed to defeat a 40,000-strong force.
281 Ibid 323 There were Italian landings on 26 May, but these were after the
282 Ibid; Brice, 1971, p. 120 British fleet was concentrating on evacuation. They were also not
283 TNA - WO 204/7522, 1943 even part of the original operational plan. Simmons, 2011, pp.
284 Ibid 155–60; Lambert, 2008, pp. 401–5; Brice, 1971, pp. 203–6
285 Ibid 324 Lambert, 2008, p. 404
286 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour, 1997, pp. 27–74 325 www.armouredcarriers.com, 2017
287 TNA - WO 204/7522, 1943 326 Brice, 1971, p. 205; TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941
288 Brice, 1971, p. 238 327 Ibid; Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 7 (I); HMS Es-
289 TNA - ADM 199/861, War History Case 7775 (Operation Av- kimo, often bowless but never bowed
alanche), 1945 328 Brice, 1971, p. 205; TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941
290 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 1: Some Battles of 329 Evans, 2010
HMS Sikh, 330 TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941
291 TNA - ADM 199/861, 1943 331 Brice, 1971, p. 206
292 TNA - ADM 199/861, 1945 332 Ibid
293 TNA - ADM 199/861, 1945; Clapp & Southby-Tailyour, 1997, 333 Ibid, p. 210
pp. 27–74 334 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 7 (II); HMS Eskimo –
294 TNA - WO 204/7522, 1943 legend forged in steel made real by the leaders forged within
295 TNA - ADM 199/861, 1945 335 Brice, 1971, p. 212
296 Brice, 1971, p. 208 336 Clarke, 2014, Sverdlov Class Cruisers, and the Royal Navy’s Re-
297 Ibid, p. 209 sponse
298 Ibid 337 Brice, 1971, pp. 140–8
299 Jones, 1979, pp. 74–5 338 Brice, 1971, p. 213
300 Brice, 1971, p. 60–1
301 Whitby, 1993, p. 5 Chapter 6
302 TNA - ADM 1/15784, 1944 339 Whitley, 1996, pp. 68-9
303 Ibid 340 TNA - ADM 1/30452, 1945; TNA - WO 203/4780, 1945
304 Whitby, 1993, pp. 10 & 20, quoting from Jones, ‘A Matter of 341 Ibid
Length and Breadth,’ in The Naval Review, XXXVIII, May 1950, p. 342 Ibid
139 343 Ibid
305 Brice, 1971, p. 69 344 Ibid
306 TNA - ADM 1/15784, 1944; Brice, 1971, p. 122 345 Ibid
307 Ibid; Whitby, 1993, pp. 14-19 346 Ibid
308 TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941 347 Ibid
309 During which time Nubian reached the milestone of steaming 348 Ibid
300,000 miles since her first commission (TNA - ADM 199/810, 349 Boniface, 2007, p. 122
1941), the distance from the earth to the moon and a little over a 350 Ibid, p. 150
quarter of the way back. 351 Manning, 1961, p. 116. Similar comments are repeated in the
310 TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941 later version of the work (1979) and in McCart, 2008, p. X
311 Ibid 352 McCart, 2008, p. X
312 Ibid 353 TNA - PREM 11/498, 1953
313 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 2: The Leadership of 354 Ibid
HMS Afridi 355 Ibid
314 TNA - ADM 187/7, 1940; TNA - ADM 187/8, 1940; TNA - 356 Ibid
ADM 187/9, 1940; TNA - ADM 199/810, 1941 357 Boniface, 2007, pp. 70–1
315 Lambert, 2008, pp. 399-401 358 TNA - PREM 11/498, 1953
316 Simmons, 2011, pp. 109–10; Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class De-
stroyers Part 1: Some Battles of HMS Sikh. Chapter 7
317 This can be considered both a practical and expedient use of 359 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 3: HMS Ashanti, a
suitable ships, but also a legacy of Jutland, where the German High Soft Power Entrepreneur
Seas Fleet had performed such a manoeuvre to escape. 360 Brice, 1971, pp. 126, 190 & 234
318 Lambert, 2008, pp. 399–401; Simmons, 2011, pp. 129–34; 361 In terms of previous experience there was perhaps the much
Clarke, 2016, What can be learned from the Fairey Swordfish? shorter Abyssinian crisis, and before that it was the counter-slavery
319 (Simmons, 2011, p. 129; TNA - ADM 186/72, 1925) patrols off the West Coast of Africa; so the RN really did not have a
320 So short and sharp that Cunningham compared it to murder lot of experience to draw on in terms of how to manage the force
and only one Italian vessel, the destroyer Alfieri was felt to have of- and act in the role when conducting what was in effect a de facto
fered resistance Simmons, 2011, pp. 130–1; TNA - ADM blockade against a nation that Britain was not at war with. As such

162
 NOTES

it was a steep learning curve that required a lot from ships and their 374 A Naval Staff History, 2007, p. 25
ratings, but perhaps even more so from the officers in command, 375 Brice, 1971, p. 233
who were burdened with trying to implement what was written as a 376 Ibid
very black and white policy in an extremely grey situation. 377 Ibid, p. 234
362 Brice, 1971, p. 190 378 Ibid
363 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 1: Some Battles of 379 November 1942; Brice, 1971, p. 126
HMS Sikh 380 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 4; HMS Tartar, the
364 Brice, 1971, p. 180 Survivor
365 Ibid 381 Roskill, 2011, pp. 301–46; Brice, 1971, pp. 118–19; Eisen-
366 Ibid hower, 2011, pp. 47–8; Tomblin, 2004, pp. 119–21
367 Ibid, p. 181 382 Brice, 1971, p. 119
368 Ibid 383 Ibid
369 Ibid 384 Clarke, 2017, Tribal Class Destroyers Part 7 (II); HMS Eskimo –
370 Ibid, pp. 190 & 234 legend forged in steel made real by the leaders forged within
371 Arctic convoys have a simple naming system. In the first series 385 Brice, 1971, p. 118
PQ were to Russia, QP away from Russia; in the second it was JW 386 Ibid, p. 119
and RA. However, that did not mean that PQ15 was therefore the 387 Ibid
15th convoy to Russia of the war; in fact it was the 16th, thanks to 388 Eisenhower, 2011, pp. 47–8; Roskill, 2011, pp. 301–46; Brice,
there being both a PQ7A & a PQ7B, the combining of PQ9 & 1971, p. 119
PQ10 and the running of Operation Dervish. 389 Wadsworth, 2009, pp. 71–9, Brice, 1971, pp. 168–70, Evans,
372 Kent, 2004, p. 136 2010, pp. 88–9, and Woodman, 2007), pp. 56–9
373 McCart, 2012, pp. 262–70; A Naval Staff History, 2007, pp. 390 Woodman, 2007, pp. 56–9
246; Friedman, 2010, pp. 178–85 ; TNA - ADM 1/9360, 1933; 391 Pearson, 2007, p. 22
TNA - ADM 1/9390, 1936

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 INDEX
All ships are British Royal Navy unless Barfleur 72, 76–7, 79, 80, 81, 94, 116, 126, RA55A 106–07
otherwise indicated. 131 Corunna 82, 84–5, 96, 119, 124, 142
Page numbers in italics indicate Barham 50 Cossack 19, 20–1, 23, 24, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38,
illustrations. Barrosa 82 39–40, 43–6, 56–7, 104, 139, 156
Bataan, HMAS 124 Coventry 63–4
Abbreviations: Baytown, Operation 101, 103, 104 Cradoc 118
Adm. = Admiral; Cdr = Commander; Cpt Bedouin 19, 28, 34, 43, 44, 45, 49, 55, 59, Creswell, Cpt George 32, 34, 35
= Captain; HMAS = His Majesty’s 62–3, 106 Crete, Battle of 64, 98, 113, 114–15, 145
Australian Ship; HMCS = His Majesty’s Belfast 107, 145 Cumberland 118
Canadian Ship; Fr = France; Ger = Benedict, Operation 59 Cunningham, Adm. Andrew 12, 17, 18, 24,
Germany; It = Italy; Neths = Netherlands; Berlin, Operation 106 30, 49–51, 95, 98, 101–02, 103, 113–14,
Nor = Norway; Pol = Poland; R/A = Rear Bernd von Arnim (Ger) 43 146
Admiral; RFA = Royal Fleet Auxiliary; V/A Bey, Konteradmiral Erich 106–07
= Vice Admiral Bicester 98 Da Barbiano (It) 61
Birmingham 137 Dainty 11, 87, 89, 90–1, 133, 134
Abdiel 63 Bismarck (Ger) 8, 45, 50, 56–7, 58, 61, 62, Daring 87, 89, 121, 125, 132
Achates 105 110, 139, 146 Decoy 87, 89, 134, 135
Active 38 Black Prince 108–09 Defender 87, 89, 135–7
Activity 118 Blackhouse, Adm. Sir Roger 13 Delight 87, 88, 89, 139
Adana (Ger) 52 Blücher (Ger) 105 Dervish, Operation 59
Admiral Hipper (Ger) 105 Błyskawica (Pol) 108, 109, 111 D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace 87
Aegina (Ger) 52 Borrough, Adm. 95 Di Giussano (It) 61
Aerial, Operation 58 Boyle, Adm. Sir William 12, 15 Diamond 87, 89, 140, 154
Afridi 8, 15, 18, 19, 22–4, 30, 31, 32, 36, 38, Brazen 28 Diana 87, 88, 89, 140, 150
46, 76–7 Bulolo 95 Diether von Roeder (Ger) 44
Agincourt 82, 117, 118, 131–2 Burnett, R/A Robert 104, 107 Dorsetshire 57
Agreement, Operation 63–4 Buzzard, Cdr Sir Anthony 41 Dove 32
Aisne 9, 82, 120, 153 Downfall, Operation 116
Ajax 50 Cadiz 72, 97, 101 Dreyer, Adm. Sir Frederic 12
Alamein 70, 71, 82 Cairo 56, 63 Duchess 87, 88, 89, 141, 151, 155
Altmark (Ger) 38–40, 45, 139 Camperdown 72, 99, 126 Duff, Adm. Alexander 16
Ameer 118 Cape Bon, Battle of 14, 52–3, 59–61, 62, Duke of York 95, 107
Anklet, Operation 28 111, 139 Dunbar-Nasmith, Adm. Sir Martin 29
Apollo 108 Caprice 76 Dunkirk 82, 122, 143, 151, 152
Arethusa 14, 38, 39 Carlson, Cpt Clifford 55
Argonaut 37, 96 Carysfort 76 Eaton, Adm. John 52, 142–6
Argus 59, 96 Cayuga, HMCS 124–5 Edinburgh 35, 145
Ark Royal 31, 48, 57, 92 Celt 83 Emperor 118
Armada 72, 73, 76, 77, 126, 131 Centaur 83 Empressi 118
Arta (Ger) 52 Chaplet 76 Erich Koellner (Ger) 43, 44
Ashanti 18, 19, 24–8, 29, 32, 44, 45, 58, 59, Charybdis 109 Eskimo 19, 25, 32, 40, 42, 43–6, 52, 55, 58,
95, 96–7, 102, 104, 107, 108, 109, 111–12, Chatfield, Adm. Ernle 13, 17 59, 95, 97, 98, 100, 108, 109, 113, 114,
113, 122, 123 Churchill, Winston 38, 40, 63, 95, 136–7, 118, 119–21, 122–3, 139, 141, 142, 143,
Athabaskan, HMCS (1941) 104, 107, 108– 148 145, 146, 156
09, 111 Claymore, Operation 28, 52, 53–6, 63, 64, Eugenio di Savoia (It) 64
Athabaskan, HMCS (1947) 124–5 67
Attacker 118 Convoys: Fame 28
Aurora 39, 41, 58, 98, 103, 146 HX1 32 Faulknor 44
Australia, HMAS 38 PQ12 59 Finisterre 72, 100, 102, 126
Avalanche, Operation 101–03, 104 PQ13 59 Firedrake 44
PQ15 59, 142, 144–5 Fisher, V/A Sir William Wordsworth 12–13,
Baleno (It) 52 PQ17 106, 142, 145 30, 38
Barents Sea, Battle of the 104–06, 107, 108, QP8 59 Fiume (It) 51, 113
146 QP10 59 Forbes, Adm. Sir Charles M 12

174
 INDEX

Forester 43, 45 Kandahar 103 Paladin 99, 103, 118, 119–21

Formidable 50–1, 95, 113, 114–15, 123 Kelly 143–4 Partridge 62, 63
Foxhound 43, 44 Kennedy, Sub-Lieutenant Ludovic 12 Pedestal, Operation 28, 95, 142, 145
Fraser, Adm. Sir Bruce 18, 29, 65, 69, 73, Khedive 118 Pegasus 31
90, 93, 107–08, 136 Kimberley 43, 44 Penn 118, 119–21
Friedrich Eckholdt (Ger) 105 King George V 56–7, 59, 104, 145 Perseo (It) 99, 103–04
Furious 16, 31, 95 Krebs (Ger) 55 Petard 99, 103
Kummetz, Vizeadmiral Oskar 105–06 Phoebe 118
Gabbard 73, 102 Piorun (Pol) 38, 56–7, 108, 109
Gauntlet, Operation 58–9 Laforey 98 Pola (It) 51, 113
Georg Thiele (Ger) 45 Lagos 68, 72, 74–5, 76, 77, 114, 126 Pound, Adm. Sir Dudley 13, 30
George VI, King 32, 146 Lampo (It) 52 Pridham-Wippell, V/A H D 50–1, 113
Gloucester 50 Le Fantasque (Fr) 40 Princess Beatrix 53
Gneisenau (Ger) 106 Le Triomphant (Fr) 118 Prinz Eugen (Ger) 56
Goodall, Sir Stanley Vernon 13, 16, 69, 83, Legion 53, 55, 59–60 Punjabi 19, 43–4, 52, 58–9, 113
88–90, 91–3, 94 Leatham, Adm. 111
Graf Spee (Ger) 33, 38, 39, 105, 139 Lind, Major J Michael 100–01 Queen Elizabeth 61, 117, 118
Gravelines 72, 85, 121, 125, 131 Littorio (It) 14, 62, 106 Queen Emma 53
Gurkha 15, 19, 33, 39, 40–2, 58 Lively 62
London 118 Raimondo Montecuccoli (It) 63
Haida, HMCS 104, 106, 108–09, 112, 125 Lookout 98 Ramsay, Adm. 122
Hallifax, R/A R H C 41, 42 Luca Tarigo (It) 52 Rawalpindi 106
Hamburg (Ger) 55 Lützow (Ger) 104 Renown 31, 95, 96
Hamilton, R/A Louis Keppel 55 Repulse 31
Hannah Böge (Ger) 31 Mailfist, Operation 115, 116 Retribution, Operation 98–9, 142, 145–6
Hans Lüdemann (Ger) 43, 45 Maori 19, 24, 34, 36, 39, 50, 56, 57, 59–61 Richard Beitzen (Ger) 105
Harpoon, Operation 62 Marne 62 Rocket 118
Harwood, V/A Henry 25, 63 Mashona 8, 18–20, 31, 32, 48, 51, 57, 157 Rodney 31, 57, 95
Havock 62 Matabele 18–20, 25, 44, 48, 54, 59, 60, 104, Royal Oak 32, 34
Henderson, V/A Sir Reginald 12–13, 14, 157 Royalist 118
15–18, 65, 69, 91–3, 107, 111, 148 Matapan 67, 82, 123
Hermann Kunne (Ger) 43–5 Matapan, Battle of 47–51, 53, 113–14, 139, Sabaudia (It) 52
Hero 43, 45, 62 142 Saintes 73, 86, 131
Hogue 69, 72, 87, 125, 126 Matchless 62, 108 Saumarez 107, 118
Holland-Martin, Cdr 100, 115 McCoy, Cpt James 106 Savage 66–7, 78, 104, 107–08
Hood 31, 33, 56 McGrigor, R/A Rhoderick 99, 136, 148 Scharnhorst (Ger) 106–08
Hostile 45 Micmac, HMCS 124 Scorpion 176
Hunter 118 Mira (Ger) 55 Scout 118
Huron, HMCS 104, 106, 108, 109, 112 Mohawk 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 28, 34–5, 46, Scurfield, Cdr 62–3
Husky, Operation 45, 99, 100–01, 104, 142, 47, 49, 50–3, 57, 104, 113, 142–4 Shah 118
145, 146 Morning Star 37 Sheffield 57, 104, 107, 146
Mountbatten, Lord 41, 42 Sherbrooke, Cpt Robert 43, 104–06
Icarus 43, 45 Sherwood 8
Intrepid 39 Narvik, Battles of 42–6, 52, 55, 104, 112, Shropshire 59
Iron Duke 32 114, 139, 143, 145 Sikh 14, 19, 24, 28, 34, 39, 45, 56–7, 59–
Ironclad, Operation 95 Nelson 31, 40, 55, 95, 97, 60, 61–2, 63–4, 101, 106, 139, 156
Iroquois, HMCS 108, 137 Neptune 103 Sirte, Second Battle of 45, 61–2
Irregular, Operation 45, 119–22, 139 Neptune, Operation 45 Slapstick, Operation 104
Isaac Sweers (Neths) 59–60 Newcastle 137 Sluys 65, 73, 112
Iserlohn (Ger) 52 Nicholson, Cpt Randolph 28–9 Solebay 66, 72, 110, 111, 145
Itheurial 62 Nootka, HMCS 124 Somali 9, 19, 24, 25, 28–9, 31, 32, 46, 47,
Ivanhoe 39, 45 Norfolk 107 55, 57, 58, 59, 123, 142, 144–5, 157
North Cape, Battle of 65, 67, 104–05, 146 Southampton 35
Jackal 114 Spearfish 31
Jamaica 104, 107–08 Obdurate 105 Speedwell 157
Janus 50, 52, 53–4 Obedient 105 St Claire, HMCS 8
Javelin 45, 108, 109 Ocean 137 St James 72, 109, 116
Jervis 50, 52, 98, 145 Olwen, RFA 120 St Kitts 72, 103, 105
Jolly, Cdr Richard 35–6, 51, 142–3 Onslow 43, 104–05 Stalker 118
Jones, Cdr Basil 110–11, 120 Orion 50 Stord (Nor) 107
Jutland 78, 82, 93, 152 Orwell 105 Strength, Operation 59
Overlord, Operation 100–01, 108 Suffolk 118

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TRIBALS, BATTLES AND DARINGS

Sussex 118 U-435 (Ger) 59 Waldegrave, Cdr J M G 59

Sydney, HMAS 50 U-454 (Ger) 157 War Pindari, RFA 54
Syfret, V/A Edward 95 U-703 (Ger) 47 Warspite 24, 43–4, 50, 51, 84, 113, 117
Syren 16 Unicorn 16–17, 102 Watson, R/A Bertram 28–9
Ushant, Battle of 108–12 Willem Van Der Zaan (Neths) 74
T24 (Ger) 109, 111, 112 Winchelsea 28
Tartar 8, 12, 18, 19, 20, 28, 45, 55, 57, 58, Valiant 50, 61 Wolfgang Zenker (Ger) 43
59, 67, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100–03, 108, 109, Vanguard 80, 84–6, 133
111–12, 113, 118, 119–20, 123–4, 145 Vendetta, HMAS 118 Z24 (Ger) 111–12
Test 120 Venus 118 Z29 (Ger) 105
Theodor Riedel (Ger) 105 Verulam 118 Z30 (Ger) 105
Thetis 28–9, 34, 44 Vian, Adm. Phillip 24, 36–40, 41–2, 46, 56– Z31 (Ger) 105
Thunderer 38 7, 58, 61, 102, 110, 142 Z32 (Ger) 111–12
Torch, Operation 28, 45, 94, 95–6, 99, 142, Vigilant 118 Zara (It) 51, 113
145 Vigo 73, 131, 147, 153 ZH1 (Ger) 111–12
Tovey, R/A 23, 56 Vigorous, Operation 62 Zulu 19, 24, 33, 34, 36, 37, 56–7, 61, 63–4
Trafalgar 72, 106, 107, 126, 146, 152 Virago 108, 118
Trident 120–2 Vittorio Veneto (It) 51, 113
Tyrwhitt, Cdr St John 110 Volage 118

U-53 (Ger) 40 Wake-Walker, V/A Sir Frederic 81, 93

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