Sample PHA Quality Checklist

Description Statement Comment Recommendations

1. ACCESS TO & 1. Is there evidence that the PSI was
USE OF PROCESS complete and available for the PHA
SAFETY team to use (or were
INFORMATION recommendations generated to
complete the PSI)?
2. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained up-to-date P&IDs?
3. Is there evidence that unit
procedures were available?
4. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained design temperatures and
pressures for major equipment (e.g.,
vessels heat exchangers, pumps)?
5. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained relief device design and
setpoint data?
6. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained ventilation system design
data?
7. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained electrical classification
drawings and information?
8. Is there evidence that the PSI
contained a list of materials of
construction, flange ratings, and
temperature and pressure limits for
piping (if this information was not on
the P&IDs)?

2. HAZARDS OF THE 1. Are all the covered chemicals

PROCESS documented in the PHA report?
(flammable, reactive, and toxic)
2. Are all pertinent hazards (fire,
explosions, BLEVES, toxicity,
chemical burns, asphyxiation, etc.)
associated with releases of all
covered chemicals (highly
hazardous chemicals, HHCs) in the
process addressed in the PHA?
3. Is all equipment containing HHCs, or
that could contain HHCs, addressed
in the PHA?
 4. Is contamination of the process
chemicals addressed in the PHA?
5. Is loss of utilities addressed in the
PHA?
6. Is the unit flare or relief header (and
KO drum if one is provided)
addressed in a separate PHA?
7. If the flare or relief header is not
covered in the PHA, will it be
addressed in a separate PHA?
8. Were the SDSs reviewed by the
PHA team?

3. PREVIOUS 1. Is there evidence that the PHA team

INCIDENTS WITH reviewed/discussed previous
POTENTIAL FOR incidents associated with the unit?
CATASTROPHIC Evidence may include:
CONSEQUENCES - A list or copy of incident reports
- A worksheet documenting incident
discussions.
2. Is there evidence that near-misses
were included in the discussion of
previous incidents?

4. APPLICABLE 1. Does the PHA report document the

ENGINEERING engineering and administrative
AND controls applicable to the process
ADMINISTRATIVE hazards identified?
CONTROLS
2. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed process
instrumentation, alarms, interlocks,
programmable logic controllers,
DCS, and SIS?
3. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed relief
valves & devices?
4. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed isolation
valves and emergency shutdown
systems?
5. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed released
detection and control systems such
as H2S, hydrocarbon, etc.,
monitors? (also see Siting)
 6. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed release
detection and control systems such
as dikes or other containment
structures around large liquid
inventories?
7. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed flares and
neutralizing systems?
8. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed PPE
(SCBA, protective clothing,
showers, respirators, etc.)? (also
see Siting)
9. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered or addressed fire
suppression and extinguishing
systems? (also see siting)
10. Is there evidence that the PHA
team considered or addressed
emergency response plans? (also
see siting)
11. Is there evidence that the PHA
team considered or addressed
redundancy of equipment (pumps,
instruments, uninterruptible power
supplies for critical components,
etc.)?
12. Is there evidence that the PHA
team considered or addressed
maintenance/testing program for
equipment, instrumentation/alarms
etc.?
13. Is there evidence that the PHA
team considered or addressed
control room construction and
applicable safeguards against
releases (detectors, pressurization
and alarms, intake elevation, blast
resistance, separation distance,
PPE, etc.)? (also see siting)

5. CONSEQUENCES 1. Is there evidence that the worst-

OF FAILURE OF case consequences were
ENGINEERING documented for postulated accident
AND scenarios?
ADMINISTRATIVE
2. Did the PHA team optimistically (and
CONTROLS
improperly) assume that
engineering controls (e.g., relief
 valves shutdown systems, alarms,
trips, interlocks) always work when
demanded to mitigate or stop an
accident scenario?
3. Did the PHA team rely on safe work
procedures or other administrative
controls (e.g., operating procedures,
lockout-tagout procedures, work
permits, management of change) to
eliminate or reduce the severity of
accident scenarios that could be
serious if administrative controls are
ignored or violated?
4. Are administrative and engineering
controls documented in the PHA
(safeguards or defenses in PHA
tables, list of generic safeguards,
etc.)?
5. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered electrical classification
for the unit?
6. SITING 1. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered siting issues by
performing a checklist analysis?
2. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered siting issues by
performing a walkthrough of the
process unit?
3. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered siting issues by
performing a plot plan review of
equipment and buildings in or near
the unit?
4. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered siting issues by
preparing documentation of
building, distances from
flammable/toxic threats, design
criteria, and potential (qualitative)
consequences to both on-site and
off-site personnel caused by
accidents in the unit?
5. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered siting issues by
preparing recommendations
pertaining to siting or location of
buildings (separation distances,
location of air intakes, ignition
sources, drainage, etc.)?
7. HUMAN FACTORS 1. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
performing a checklist analysis?
2. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
performing a walkthrough of the
process unit?
3. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
performing a procedures review
with a focus on reducing the
potential for human errors
(ambiguous steps, missing steps,
wrong steps, etc.)?
4. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
incorporating human errors as
causes of potential accident
scenarios identified and evaluated
by the team?
5. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
labeling or other ergonomic issues?
6. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
identifying operator staffing /
workload / schedule issues?
7. Is there evidence that the PHA team
considered human factors issues by
preparing recommendations
addressing ways to reduce human
errors?
8. Is there evidence that the PHA team
qualitatively evaluated the range of
effects for accident scenarios
postulated (e.g. impact area,
references to MSDSs, health /
safety effects possibly identified as
part of the hazards of the process)?

8. CONDUCT AND 1. For initial studies where the study

DOCUMENTATION team did not have actual operating
OF THE PHA experience with the process or a
similar process (e.g., projects for
de-bottlenecking or major
modifications), are those
sections/nodes for which the team
lacked this experience currently
 operating using the design limits
assumed in the initial PHA?
2. Is the PHA method applied
consistently throughout the prior
study? Evidence includes:
- A description of the PHA method
in the report.
- Proper documentation such as
“no new causes discovered” or
“no new issues (NNI)” when the
team could not identify unique
causes under a deviation.
3. Does the PHA report indicate that all
modes of operation were
considered by the team using
discussion guidewords? Is there
documentation to support that the
PHA addressed the unit hazards
during nonroutine modes of
operation (e.g., startup, shutdown,
emergency, maintenance, and
sampling)?
4. If a What-If methodology was used:
- Were that analysis sections small
enough to identify hazards?
- Was the checklist used to
formulate questions
- Are all appropriate questions
documented for each process
section?
5. If a HAZOP analysis was used:
- Are all nodes (or process sections)
documented?
- Are all applicable deviations in
each node documented even if
there were no consequences of
interest?
- Are loss of containment deviations
considered?
6. If an FMEA was used:
- Is the system boundary clearly
identified?
- Are concurrent failures identified?
- Are all components shown and
numbered?
7. Is there evidence that the PHA
considered human errors
(operations, maintenance, design,
 procurement, etc.)? As causes or
initiating events of accidents?
8. Is there evidence that the PHA
considered equipment failures
(Fatigue, vibration, defective
material, overpressure, weld failure,
corrosion, erosion, etc.) as causes
or initiating events of accidents even
though the equipment may have
safety or shutdown systems
specifically designed to prevent the
postulated failure?
9. Does the documentation for closure
of safety recommendations meet
the company requirements?
10. Did a review of all operability
recommendations from the prior
PHA confirm there were no safety
implications to the scenarios?