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Republic of Turkey Identity Card (TCKK): Banking Use Case in Authentication &
Customer Onboarding

Conference Paper · April 2020

DOI: 10.1145/3397125.3397126

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 Republic of Turkey Identity Card (TCKK):
Banking Use Case in Authentication & Customer
Onboarding
Mehmet Kıvılcım Keleş1,2, , Şenay Demirel 1,3
1, Vakıfbank VLAB R&D Center, Turkey
2, Maltepe
University, Turkey
3, Bahçeşehir University, Turkey

[email protected]; [email protected]

ABSTRACT After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, first official

The Republic of Turkey Identity Cards (TCKK) were issued on identity cards are issued in 1926 in the form of a small notebook
March 2016 to enable the electronic identity and electronic services and called “Birth Certificate”. In 1976, the identity cards are
for the citizens. TCKK includes personal and biometric information decomposed by gender and distributed to men in blue and to women
which allows authentication process to be enhanced with visual and in pink. On 14 March 2016, the Republic of Turkey Identity Cards
electronic security elements of the highest standards. (TCKK) were issued by the General Directorate of Population
Citizenship Affairs (NVİGM) in single color and chip format (see
In this paper, we present a remote customer onboarding scenario Figure 1).
and the usage of The Republic of Turkey Identity Card (TCKK)
authentication with face recognition. We also explore the case for
Near Field Communication (NFC) capable mobile devices which
enable to take the colorful face image to improve the face
recognition rate. The authentication steps are described in detail to
further employ this usage. TCKK allows authentication process to
be enhanced with visual and electronic security elements of the
highest standards that can be applicable for many other digital
banking scenarios or new applications in the financial sector.

CCS Concepts Figure 1. Historical Info of T.C Identity Cards.

• Security and privacy → Security services • Security and The Republic of Turkey Identity Card (TCKK) has been developed
privacy➝Authentication • Security and privacy➝Multi-factor capable of responding to the needs of our time in the digitalized
authentication world. It has been designed with the aim of providing or facilitating
the access of the citizens to many electronic services and it is
Keywords adorned with visual and electronic security elements of the highest
The Republic of Turkey Identity Card; TCKK; Electronic Identity standards.
Cards; Electronic Authentication System (EKDS) ; Authentication
; Biometric Authentication ; Banking; Digital Banking; Remote 1.1 Properties of the Republic of Turkey
Customer Onboarding ; Identity Management; Optical Character
Recognition (OCR); Face Recognition; Near Field Communication Identity Cards (TCKK)
(NFC) National Electronics and Cryptology Research Institute (UEKAE)
developed the TCKK unique to our country. It has a validity period
1. INTRODUCTION of 10 years and consists of polycarbonate material, including
Identity is any document which may be used to prove a person's contact and non-contact chip (chip); in accordance with
identity. If issued in a small, standard credit card size form, it is international standards (ICAO); the population, photographs and
usually called an identity card (IC, ID card, citizen card), or biometric data of the citizen are safely stored on the contact chip on
passport card [1]. the card, making it impossible for unauthorized persons to
reproduce the card or modify the information in the card [2].
On the front side, there are T.C. Identity Number, Name, Surname,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for Date of Birth, Gender, Nationality, Signature, Card Serial Number
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are and Validity Date (see Figure 2).
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, On the back side, there are Mother’s Name, Father’s Name, Giving
or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior Authority, PUK Access Number, Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)
specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Data, Barcode (T.C. Identification Number) (see Figure 2).
[email protected].
ICCTA 2020, April 14–16, 2020, Antalya, Turkey.
© 2020 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7749-2/20/04…$15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3397125.3397126
  ISO/IEC 7816 Information technology — Identification
cards -- Contact integrated circuit cards: This part of the
ISO / IEC 7816 standard specifies the dimensions and
locations for each of the contacts on an integrated circuit
board of the ID-1 card type. It also provides information
on the determination of which standards define the use of
contacts [8].
Figure 2. Both sides of the TCKK (example).  ISO 19794-5 Information technology — Biometric data
interchange formats — Part 5: Face image data
2. AUTHENTICATION WITH TCKK This part of ISO 19794-5 specifies a recording format for
With the widespread use of the TCKK, the authentication storing, recording and transmitting information from one
procedures will be carried out completely electronically and or more face images or a short face image stream,
securely. However, it is expected that most services, which could It also specifies the stage constraints, photographic
lead to a waste of time for citizens, will be transferred to electronic properties, digital image attributes of face images, and
media, thus saving labor and other costs, and preventing the card provides best practices for photographing faces [9].
from being used by someone else in a way that constitutes a security  ISO 19794-7 Information technology — Biometric data
breach [3]. interchange formats — Part 7: Signature/sign time series
data
Per each TCKK card, unique Personal Identification Number (PIN)
ISO / IEC 19794-7 specifies data exchange formats for
codes are given to the citizens. The user receives the PIN and
signature / signal behavior data captured in a
Personel Unblocking Key (PUK) codes in a sealed PIN envelope
multidimensional time sequence using devices such as
and there is a hologram that contains the 6-digit PIN number.
digitizing tablets or advanced pen systems. Data
Citizens are requested to change the PIN values and keep the PUK
exchange formats are generic because they can be applied
code.
and used in a wide range of applications with handwritten
TCKK also contains biometric information including fingerprint, signs or signatures. No application-specific requirements
finger vein and hand palm vein. This will allow the usage of PIN or features are addressed in ISO / IEC 19794-7 [10].
and/or biometric authentication according to the security level of  Electronic Identity Verification System (EKDS)
the applications [4]. Standards: Turkish Standards (TS) issued by the Turkish
Standards Institute (TSE) in order to integrate the
2.1 Standards institutions with the EKDS are 4 pieces as shown Table
There are different standards used to specify the information on the 2 below [11]. The institutions that implement EKDS are
TCKK: obliged to comply with these standards when developing
 ICAO 9303: International Civil Aviation Organization system components.
(ICAO) is established in 1944, reporting to the United
Nations and working with 191 member states for Table 2. New Turkish Standards for Electronic
developing standards in different industries [5]. ICAO Authentication System (EKDS) [11]
has issued a standard MRTD (Machine Readable Travel TS 13678 Electronic Identity Verification System for T.C
Document) namely ICAO 9303 for electronic passports Identity Cards
[5]. Part 1: Overview and T.C ID Card
Biometric passport photos are photos of the current TS 13679 Electronic Identity Verification System for T.C
ICAO design and machine-readable identities; high- Identity Cards
quality, face-to-face biometrics, size 50 mm X 60 mm, Part 2: Authentication Server
TS 13680 Electronic Identity Verification System for T.C
white background and without pattern [6]. Identity Cards
 DS CEN/TS 15480-1: 2012 identification card systems - Part 3: Authentication Policy Server
European citizen card - part 1: physical, electrical and TS 13681 Electronic Identity Verification System for T.C
transport protocol characteristics: This Technical Identity Cards
Specification specifies Electronic Citizen Card (ECC) Part 4: Authentication Methods
requirements. The requirements described in this TS 13582 Secure Card Access Devices for T.C ID Cards
Section 1: Overview
Technical Specification are used to: 1) define a plastic TS 13583 Secure Card Access Devices for T.C ID Cards
body card with associated physical and logical securities; Part 2: Interfaces and Features
2) specify the electrical interface and data transport TS 13584 Secure Card Access Devices for T.C ID Cards
protocols for the ECC; 3) support the basic set of Part 3: Security Features
identification and authentication elements visible at the TS 13585 Secure Card Access Devices for T.C ID Cards
card surface; 4) provide guidance for the specification of Part 4: Application Software Features
the ECC Durability. 2.2 Electronic Identity Verification System
 ISO/IEC 14443 Information technology — Identification
cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards:
for T.C Identity Cards (EKDS)
One of the most fundamental aims of the new generation ID cards
It is an international standard that defines the proximity
is to verify the identity of the person receiving service in various
cards used in Near Field Communication (NFC)
electronic applications accurately, quickly and reliably. It was
operations and the transmission protocols used to
specified by the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship
communicate with it. It consists of 4 parts. Chapter 4 of
Affairs (NVIGM).
the standard deals with operations that require near field
communication such as NFC, HCE [7].
Within the scope of this project, Electronic Identity Verification Method Security Mechanisms Card Reader
System (EKDS) has been developed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM and Type
it has been put into service as the infrastructure that will enable the Physical controls (such as MLI, photo,
use of TCKK in various electronic applications [12]. The most Y1 microscript) -
Authentication certificate validation Standard Card
important feature of EKDS is that it supports all the security
Y2 Reader
features of standard smart cards, and the electronic data of the card
Card reader and card verification Card Access
can be protected with cryptographic keys. EKDS guarantees that: Y3 Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
- The ID card is issued by General Directorate of Population and Card reader and card verification Card Access
Citizenship Affairs (NVIGM), Y4 Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
Verifying cardholder with photo
- The person holding the ID card is the person requesting the service Card reader and card verification Card Access
and is in that place, Y5 Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
- The time, place and purpose of the authentication process [12]. Cardholder verification with biometrics
Card reader and card verification Card Access
EKDS system consists of four main components: TCKK, Card Y6 Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
Access Device (KEC), Authentication Server (KDS) and Cardholder verification with biometrics
Authentication Policy Server [12]. Card Access Device (KEC) is as Verify cardholder with photo
a reliable tool located at the terminal that performs authentication Y7 Verify the authentication certificate Standard Card
and connects to the EKDS system. Verify cardholder with PIN Reader
Y8 Card reader and card verification Card Access
Standard Card Reader which is a data input device that reads data Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
from contact chip, is another option to perform authentication but Verify cardholder with PIN
it cannot connect to the EKDS. Standard Card Readers can only Y9 Card reader and card verification Card Access
read the contact chip on the card and validate PIN and certificate of Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
the TCKK. Verify cardholder with PIN
Verifying cardholder with photo
Using this two devices, the cardholder can be verified in 11 Y10 Card reader and card verification Card Access
different ways and multi-factor authentication can be performed to Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
meet different level of security requirements, as shown in table 3 Cardholder verification with biometrics
Verify cardholder with PIN
below [3].
Y11 Card reader and card verification Card Access
Table 3. Authentication Methods [13]. Verify the authentication certificate Device (KEC)
Verify cardholder with PIN
Cardholder verification with biometrics
Verify cardholder with photo

In the authentication methods listed above, the authentication

factors vary depending on the authentication process selected [14]:
a. Physical verification: The control of the visual identity
information made by the personnel of the service
institution by using the device visually or visually.
b. Secure messaging: This is a method that only Card
Access Device (KEC) devices can do, based on mutual
verification and subsequent communication between the
Secure Access Module (GEM) and TCKK contact chip.
c. Verification of the authentication certificate: The
verification of the identity certificate issued by the
competent authority by the KEC or Standard Card
Reader.
d. Verifying the cardholder with the PIN: The
verification of the PIN entered by the TCKK holder of
the KEC or Standard Card Reader.
e. Verification of the cardholder by biometry: The
verification of the biometric data inside the TCKK by the
KEC device by comparing the biometric data entered by
the cardholder.
f. Verifying the cardholder with the photograph: The
visual inspection of the digital photograph of the
cardholder by the KEC device by the official of the
service institution.
Depending on the use case that TCKK is used, one of the methods
that listed above can be used for authentication purpose and should
be integrated to the application/process.
3. BANKING USE CASE
End-to-end digitization is very crucial to reduce costs and to expand
profitability in many industrial sectors including banking and
finance. Moreover, the use of mobile channels in digital channels
are continuously expanding. In the last 3 years, the use of mobile
channels in the banking sector increased by 262%, while the use of
internet banking decreased by 38% [15] as shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Number of Active Customers in Internet and Mobile
Banking [15]
Number of Active Customers in Figure 3. TCKK back side MRZ data
Internet and Mobile Banking From this data, the key required for Basic Access Control (BAC)
Sep 2017 Sep 2018 June 2019 needs to be generated. The production steps of this switch are
#Active 26.535.690 36.328.418 43.584.050 described in ICAO 9303 standards [16]. With these values, the key
Customers in for BAC control is generated and the digital face picture in the ID
Mobile Banking is taken. In the next step, the user takes a snapshot of his or her face
#Active 12.782.808 12.702.089 11.584.141 with the camera on the mobile device. The BAC security
Customers in mechanism is used to prevent both the integrity and listening of
Internet Banking communication between the contactless chip and the reader.
After the basic access control (BAC) is performed, the name,
Visits to bank branches have dropped significantly and basic surname, TC identity number, birth place, issuing institution and
transactions are increasingly handled by digital services. This biometric information can be received from the contactless chip as
reduces opportunities for face to face engagement and makes online specified in the ISO 19794-5 standards.
& mobile channels the chief sales touchpoints [21]. Despite this
channel shift across all customer segments, banks has been 3.2 Authentication Steps
relatively slow to develop alternative strategies to leverage online With the widespread use of new ID cards, including the digital face
and mobile channels. picture in the contactless chip, remote customers can be identified
This, raised the question of whether new services can be provided by biometric verification.
through mobile channels to allow customers to provide information - The user is taken photo of MRZ data which is in the back
for themselves once, in a uniform and uncomplicated way at every side on the TCKK (step1)
contact point, and to apply for new products and services, on any - The data of MRZ is extracted by using OCR engine (step
device. 2)
With the authentication method described in this paper, it is - OCR data is verified by using check digit and bank web
possible to receive the personal information from TCKK and the service (step 3)
identity of the applicant is verified by biometric control. - If OCR data is verified, it goes to TCKK verification step
(step 3.1)
And as an example use case, remote customer onboarding is - TCKK Certificate is verified by using travel document
selected in this paper for further actions after the authentication root certificate service provider (step 4)
step. There might be many other scenarios applicable but it is - If Certificate is verified, it goes to take face image data
selected as an example use case for this paper. with NFC step (step 4.1)
- Customer biometric picture is received from TCKK (step
3.1 Authentication with TCKK 5)
In order to access the information and digital face picture on the - Then instant face picture is taken with the camera(selfie)
contactless chip of the card, contactless card reader or NFC-enabled (step 6)
mobile devices can be used.
TCKK new generation ID cards have a black and white image on
the front of the card. The contact and contactless chip on the ID The flowchart of this use case is shown in Figure 4 below.
cards has a color face image in accordance with ISO / IEC 14443
standards. A contact and non-contact chip is used for accessing
digital face picture and other information.
In order to access the information on the contact chip of the card
and digital face picture, software and card access device (KEC)
developed in accordance with TS13678, TS13679, TS13680,
TS13681, TS13582, TS13583, TS13584, TS13585 standards are
needed.
The MRZ field behind the ID is primarily obtained by using the
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) method for identification
serial number, date of birth and date of identification.
 - In determination of facial features, the digital face images
and instant photo is extracted to 128-d feature vectors
(step 10) It is colored according to gray scale in sizing
process. (RGB colors do not matter for this application,
in the method we apply, the darkness ratio of colors is
sufficient [18].)
- All of these tasks were accomplished with OpenCV,
enabling us to obtain OpenCV face recognition pipeline
(step 11). OpenCV is an open source image processing
library that is used to find the face in the images [19].
- In the case of not verifying the instant photo with digital
face image data from TCKK, another ID card would be
expected. (back to step 1).
- If instant photo is verified by the digital image from
TCKK, it goes to the further remote customer onboarding
steps (step 12) On the other hand, it is observed that the
source of verification varies according to the mobile
device and environmental conditions used.
After successfully completing the authentication phase, customers
are directed to the next steps in overall remote customer onboarding
service with the conclusion that:
- Customer’s TCKK is issued by General Directorate of Population
and Citizenship Affairs (NVIGM) and is valid,
- The person holding the TCKK is the person requesting the service,
Figure 4. Remote Customer Onboarding by Authentication
- Digital footprints of the authentication process (indicating the
with TCKK work flow
time, actions and results) is stored for further actions.
It is also possible to enhance the above steps to include the PIN
validation after validating the certificate of TCKK. However it is
realized that most of the customers are not effectively using their
PIN yet and it will be better to wait for widespread usage after year
2020. But the method is designed to include the PIN validation step
(after Step 4, before Step 5 from Figure 4) in the case of application
requirements. Customers will be asked to enter their PINs either
from the mobile phones, tablets or any digital devices.

Figure 5. Instant Face Photo from Camera (left side) & Digital 4. CONCLUSION
Face Image from TCKK (right side) The use and development of electronic services requires reliable,
- So; the main data source for face recognition is biometric secure and easy-to-use electronic identification methods suitable
picture from the identity (step 5), and the instant face for different purposes. Secure electronic identification is
image data taken from the camera as the verification particularly required for the use of public electronic services that
source (step 6). contain sensitive personal data as well as for services that require
- Picture preparation (step 7): Before the instant photo payment [20].
image send to the server, it must be compressed. The customer onboarding scenario in which we use the existing
mobile phone has different resolution cameras therefore algorithm provided with OpenCV library. Achieving high
we used a method of image compression with color filter performance subject to challenging image conditions as well as
array. The used method allows for high compression liveness detection are major concerns that are left as]. Citizens
ratios that conventional compression is unable to achieve currently have the opportunity to identify themselves in electronic
and allow bandwidth reduction where images are services based on a user ID and password created by the users
transmitted over a communications link while themselves.
maintaining desired quality [17]. The digital face images
taken from our main data source, ID, are 24-bit color, 96 One objective of an efficient electronic identification method is to
dpi resolution and 240x320 pixel dimensions. make authentication in all, or at least nearly all, public and private
- When the input image is transferred to the server, faces sector services using one reliable method [20].
are detected first and transformed, and then faces are In accordance with the regulations of the Banking Regulation and
cropped from the image (step 8) Supervision Agency (BDDK), authentication is the basis of all
- Multiple face detect by using face detect algorithm (step transactions and security is the key for any actions. TCKK allows
9) authentication process to be enhanced with visual and electronic
- If there is more than one face in the instant photo (from security elements of the highest standards.
the camera by using the face detection algorithm), it is
expected to be taken another instant photo from camera The widespread use of new ID cards and the fact that they contain
(back to step 6) digital face pictures in the contactless chip (which is not in the old
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