The Imperatives of Progressive Islam

With the proliferation of transnational Muslim networks over the last two
decades, the religious authority of traditionally educated Muslim scholars,
the ‘ulama, has come under increasing scrutiny and disruption. These net-
works have provided a public space for multiple perspectives on Islam to be
voiced, allowing ‘progressive’ Islamic worldviews to flourish alongside more
(neo)traditional outlooks.
This book brings together the scholarship of leading progressive Muslim
scholars, incorporating issues pertaining to politics, jurisprudence, ethics,
theology, epistemology, gender, and hermeneutics in the Islamic tradition. It
provides a comprehensive discussion of the normative imperatives behind a
progressive Muslim thought, as well as outlining its various values and aims.
Presenting this emerging and distinctive school of Islamic thought in an
engaging and scholarly manner, this is essential reading for any academic
interested in contemporary religious thought and the development of modern
Islam.

Adis Duderija is a lecturer in Study of Islam and Society, Griffith University,

Australia. His research focuses on Islamic, interfaith, and gender issues.
The Imperatives of
Progressive Islam

Adis Duderija
First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Adis Duderija
The right of Adis Duderija to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
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retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Duderija, Adis, 1977– author.
Title: The imperatives of progressive Islam / Adis Duderija.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2017. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016045403 | ISBN 9781138218017
(hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781315438849 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Islam—21st century. | Islamic modernism.
Classification: LCC BP161.3 .D835 2017 | DDC 297—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016045403
ISBN: 978-1-138-21801-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-43884-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
To progressive Muslims worldwide and all those who identify
with or are supportive of the imperatives of progressive Islam
as outlined in this book
Contents

Note on transliteration ix
Foreword xi

Introduction: broader contextualisation of progressive Islam 1

1 The poiesis imperative 10

2 The epistemological imperative 31

3 The religious pluralism imperative 56

4 The Islamic liberation theology imperative 75

5 The human rights imperative 99

6 The ethical imperative in Islamic jurisprudence/law 122

7 The gender-justice imperative 148

8 The imperative of non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 169

Conclusion: the future of progressive Islam 192

Select Bibliography 194

Index 205
Note on transliteration

Given the non-specialist nature of the book and its intended readership, the
Arabic and other foreign language terminology has only been placed in italics
but not transliterated. The exception to this are common Arabic words such
as Qur’an, hadith and sunna which have been not been placed in italics.
Foreword

Modern Muslims face a Herculean task. Those who seek to embed their
religious tradition, especially their ethical and ritual practices within a frame-
work of their lived experience, face numerous challenges. The very idea of
crafting a new interpretative framework commensurable with their lived
experience while simultaneously sustaining continuity with the past is an
unenviable task and some would say borders on the arrogant.
The pre-partition Indian poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal described
the task facing the modern Muslim as ‘immense’ but insisted that one

has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking

with the past . . . The only course open to us is to approach modern
knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate
the teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we
may be led to differ from those who have gone before us.1

They say the light of any poet is contradiction and so Iqbal in another
breath pushes back against modernization, especially western modernity. He
also wrote:

I fear this cry for modernism2

Is only a ruse to make the East imitate the Franks [the West].3

Iqbal sought a modernity that was anchored in a unique sense of Muslim

selfhood, not one born out of the imperatives of imitation, especially not
aping western modernity. Preceding the verses where he voiced skepticism of
modernity, he explains his preference clearly:

He who creates in this world of Becoming

Time revolves around him in all ages.
Don’t spoil your khudi through imitation of others.
Protect it, for it is of incomparable worth.4
xii Foreword
Here Iqbal favors the idea of authentic selfhood (khudi), a sentiment which
many Muslim activists and reformers from the nineteenth century to the
present continue to agonize over. But what does authentic selfhood mean
today? Authenticity might have been an apt response during colonial times,
but does it still demand our allegiance in an age of cosmopolitanism and
globalization?
Often the interpretative agenda of rethinking and reinterpreting Islam to
which Iqbal added his voice elicits multiple responses. They range from sup-
port to outright rejection and a myriad of positions in between. Agonism, a
sense of a strenuous struggle and one of perpetual combat, is the overwhelm-
ing emotional and mental condition. And yet, the reinterpretation of tradi-
tion is imperative in order for tradition to deliver on its moral promise.
Adis Duderija, in this collection of essays, works hard to provide the
contours of stimulating debates among scholars who are broadly working
in a spirit of what is called progressive Islam. In this collection, several key
figures and their work is reviewed in helpful fashion, including my work
in trying to conceptualize and rework tradition with attention to tradition
and history. As the author of this foreword, I have the advantage over my
colleagues in that I received a bonus opportunity to state some of my views!
It is a token of Duderija’s trust and friendship to allow me to offer some
comments.
One of the most challenging aspects of Muslim life in the modern world
is the attempt to configure the ethical practices from the moral values of
Islam. In a world where the past becomes increasingly illegible due to the
rupture of tradition, combined with growing technological prowess that
radically alters the lifeworld as we know it, to grasp this ethical nettle
becomes ever more daunting. Yet, few would quarrel about the need to reach
the ethical; but there is substantial disagreement on how to conceptualize the
ethical.
Alija Ali Izetbegovic, the late president of Bosnia, was deeply concerned
with the question of religion and morality. In his book-length meditative
essay, Islam Between East and West, Izetbegovic spent a considerable amount
of time to understand the nature of one’s moral life. For him, morality, like
art and religion, at the philosophical and theological are on the same “genea-
logical branch” that “springs from the act of creation”.5 Izetbegovic opposed
the idea that morality was based on progress and harmony with nature.6 The
essence of piety and morality, in Izetbegovic’s view, was like that of art; in
short, it was “inscrutable”.7 This perspective of inscrutability is not entirely
absent from a traditional or orthodox Islamic perspective claiming that we
do not entirely understand the divine wisdom behind moral imperatives. It
surely also has a Kantian resonance.
For Izetbegovic, morality lays stress on the good and on freedom.8 Yet, for
the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abdullah Daraz, the moral imperative
derived from the Qurʾān was to be reflective and contemplative.9 Daraz
identified four moral imperatives, namely duty, responsibility, deserts, and
 Foreword xiii
intentionality or motive. Why one should abide by these moral imperatives,
according to Izebegovitch, is inscrutable and beyond an understanding of
human interest.
Now, if morals are the habits of the heart in order to measure right and
wrong, then it would make sense if they were inscrutable. Authors of Islamic
morals talked about the formation of the interiority of the human person.
Instead of talking about individual moral traits, they thought more broadly
in terms of an ensemble of dispositions, temperaments, and intrinsic impulses
that constituted one’s moral character. The legendary Ghazali, for instance,
described khuluq (morals) as the firm “disposition that enables actions to
occur spontaneously without the need to reflect and deliberation”.10 When
such acts are praiseworthy and conform to the demands of reason and rev-
elation (sharʿ), then they are designated as ‘merit-worthy morals’ and, when
they fail the test of rectitude, they are deemed to be ‘wicked morals’. Fur-
thermore, most Muslim authors discuss morals as the formation of the self
and the purification of the interior (batin). A well-formed inner life, it is
believed, will correspond to an equally compelling exterior performance of
the body and limbs, meaning conduct. In the past, various philosophers,
moralists, mystics, and poets deployed technologies to finesse that moral
architecture of the self. Some of the behaviors that tutored the inner life were
to adopt habits of self-restraint, especially to moderate between knowledge,
passion, desire, and justice.
Moral and spiritual designs of the self correspond to the cosmologies and
worldview of every epoch. So what is the moral architecture that constitutes
the modern Muslim self from a spiritual and moral perspective? These nar-
ratives are always already there in the lived experiences of contemporary
Muslims, but they might not conform to the requirements imposed by Mus-
lim orthodoxy. In fact, one can say with confidence that anachronism is the
major hallmark of the advocacy of orthodoxy for the modern Muslim self.
Both the orthodox language and the scope of how to shape the inner life
require redressing. Muslims who view themselves to be at the interstices of
the orthodox and the modern, perhaps critical traditionalists such as myself,
or progressives such as Duderija and others, have the task to continue to
contribute and finesse that narrative of self through their various writings,
practices, and advocacy.
In fact, progressive Muslims have made it their goal to address the moral
and ethical gap that exists between Islam as an inherited tradition and what-
ever its appropriate manifestation ought to be in the present. As such, it is a
constructivist agenda. As an endeavor, it is bound to be a work-in-progress,
an ongoing debate in knowledge and not a finished product. Not to view it
as a discursive project would be the undoing of this desirable endeavor. And
to be vigilant of the various political pitfalls and co-optations is equally
important in the project of progressive Islam. Hence, self-critique and self-
reflexivity as to what one does and why one does certain tasks are all equally
laudable aspirations.
xiv Foreword
As a discursive tradition, ethics, as opposed to morals, as the practices by
which we reach the moral values we seek, cannot be beyond reason and
rationality. Ethics then falls in the realm of the political; namely, power,
interests, and the varieties of reasons and rationalities that drive the multi-
plicity of ethical projects. In short, they are constituted within knowledge
debates as to what are the best paths and means to reach certain moral
goals; hence we say ethics is a discursive practice. Apart from ritual prac-
tices (ʿibadat) that are largely inscrutable and linked to preexisting practices
and devotional myths since the dawn of time, the founding template for
Islam’s ethical practices are very much based on the customary practices of
seventh-century Arabia. For centuries Muslim jurists have done extraordi-
nary work to adapt and accommodate many of the ethical practices known
as fiqh, often translated as “law” but most of it consists of ethical rules.
However, fiqh as an ethical practice or a legal rule is also contextual. Unfor-
tunately, over the centuries, fiqh has erroneously become identical to the
moral rules.
But as a discursive practice, fiqh as ethics acquires new rationalities in
different times and phases of human experience. Some inherited fiqh prac-
tices addressing non-ritual practices, known as muʿamalat (social transac-
tions), we have to concede had largely become anachronistic in the present
age, especially those rules pertaining to gender, sexuality, human relations in
a cosmopolitan world, and post-religious empires, among other reasons. For
this reason, new fiqh rules corresponding to freshly articulated moral imper-
atives ought to be devised. For even moral imperatives need to periodically
be revisited to give it the appropriate tone and articulation so that it speaks
to the human self in every age. The moral imperatives are those very subtle
elements that lead to the beautification of the interior. The description of that
interior gets narrated and re-narrated by the myriads of moral traditions
both within Islam and the experiences of humankind outside of Islam.
For many lay Muslims, activists, and scholars, the discourses of the ‘pur-
poses of the Shariʿa’ (maqaṣid al-Shariʿa) has come as a major relief to
replace the canonical fiqh rules controlled by Muslim orthodoxy, especially
the ulama. Yet, we need to concede that these ‘purposes of the Shariʿa’ rep-
resent the ’interests’ of a religio-political community of Muslims who wish
to preserve religion, life, intellect, property, and family. How this community
or transnational polity is even defined is hard to gauge, but it exists in loose
terms. These interests nevertheless are not moral imperatives.
One also has to bear in mind that the ‘purposes of the Shariʿa’ discourse
is a transitional conversation and serves as a form of band-aid hopefully
leading to something more aspirational in terms of Muslim ethics. For now
purposes of the Shariʿa discourses are helpful up to a point. A set of activities
from a robust conversation, theorization, and reflection on Muslim ethics
are all still awaited aspects of the emergent progressive Islam discourse.
Whether one calls it progressive Islam, critical Islam, or critical traditional-
ism, they are far from being established intellectual discourses and in all
 Foreword xv
honesty they are at their mere infancy. Painstaking work awaits those who
wish to establish pathways to future thinking.
What is doubtless is that the critique of outdated orthodox paradigms of
interpretation requires viable alternatives. Beginning with a critique ought
to lead to alternative paradigms. Often progressive Islam is merely a form of
selective reading of scripture and a scripturalist approach to topics such as
gender, environment, or, for that matter, politics. Adis Duderija has done
some excellent work in trying to rethink the hermeneutics of the prophetic
tradition. But scholarly labor in order to foster a robust and sophisticated
progressive discursive tradition is what is most needed. Questions such as
the meaning of God in a post-Darwinian world, the meaning of scripture,
namely, both the Qurʾan and hadith, and their role in norm-making in con-
versation with historical change, philosophy, the humanities, and the social
sciences as we know it point to the large task awaiting.
Muslim progressives require an understanding of the place of the inherited
tradition in history and how it played a variety of roles. How does the mean-
ing of past events change depending on one’s place in a historical continuum?
Why were theological doctrines such as the Satanic Verses, as the late Shahab
Ahmed pointed out, once acceptable but later dogma decreed this belief to
be heresy? Once the doctrine to say that the Qurʾan was ‘created’ in time
was a perfectly acceptable teaching for some Muslims to hold, but later
adherence to such a view carried a death penalty in the official Qadiri creed
in the eleventh century.
Acquiring a deep sense of how the Islamic tradition, its faith claims, and
its practices navigated the shoals of time is a pre-requisite for its reinterpreta-
tion. Furthermore one has to transmit this historical literacy within lived
communities in order to foster pluralism and diversity. This could have the
plausible outcome for contemporary audiences to be in a position to recog-
nize the cachet of new interpretations of Islam. They will have to come to
grips with the fact that aspects of their practice might not resemble that of
their predecessors in the past and that it was acceptable to do so. It is impor-
tant for people to have a compelling explanation why in some aspects they
no longer believe or perform as their forebears did.
Countering the power of orthodoxy is possibly the biggest challenge for
progressive Islamic thought. Orthodoxy is formidable given its historical
reach and its power to intimidate even its adversaries. It will require the
effort of generations to weaken or dislodge the power of this orthodoxy or
alter the terms of the debate of its epistemological formation and power
constellations. But this can only be done if progressive thinkers engage the
canons of Islamic orthodoxy and make available not only the multiple his-
tories of Islam but also construct alternative interpretations. This, I dare say,
is going to be an uphill battle.
Some insiders would insist that one leave the inherited tradition and its
practices unmolested. Especially, in an age of secularity and moral relativism,
they argue, tradition and orthodoxy offer the secure harbor of certainty. And
xvi Foreword
some muscular defenders of Muslim orthodoxy and advocates of orthodox
practices would come close to insisting that contemporary Muslims must
refashion their present social and political contexts in order to render it
hospitable for their version of an unreformed tradition to be practiced. The
last mentioned is often a feature of ultra orthodoxy; these are life worlds at
which some secular observers uncritically bow in awe and admiration, as
well as mistake it for unblemished truth. Apart from pietist groups, extreme
militant and authoritarian groups too espouse such ideal worldviews in an
absolutist fashion. Pietist groups patronizingly view those who do not meet
their ethical standards or forms of practice as fallen, while militants anath-
ematize their rivals and often do worse. The common line of resistance to
arguments challenging tradition-bound morals and ethics is to claim that
interference with a divine and prophetically inspired tradition is nothing less
than heresy.
More politically minded critiques directed at advocates of an activist
engagement with tradition (‘tradition activism’ like ‘judicial activism’),
although I prefer critical traditionalism, is to dismiss the work of progres-
sives as nothing less than attempts to secularize and modernize Islamic sen-
sibilities in order to ultimately reduce Islam to the demands of the present.
Synoptic as this summation might be, it does capture the fault lines of the
debate.
Anthropologist Saba Mahmood, in an essay lacking nuance, attempted
to discredit efforts at rethinking religious thought as nothing but attempts
to frame Islam within a despised modality of liberalism or worse within a
hermeneutics of American empire.11 Yet, opponents of rethinking religious
thought in Islam offer no alternative approaches in order for faith commu-
nities to exit out of the narrow and anachronistic practices that do not reso-
nate with the lived experiences of Muslims today. Critics of interpretative
reform, such as Mahmood, often unwittingly reinforce practices and teach-
ings that are demeaning to human dignity by their shrill political indict-
ments of activists and scholars who strive to find Islamic teachings that are
consistent with Islam’s ethical interpretations and in the light of their faith
commitments.12 Critics of Islamic reform as use it as a pretext to prosecute
anti-liberal political struggles in which Islam and Muslims are the ciphers
for such meta-debates. These occur at a distance from the daily struggles of
ordinary Muslims who have to suffer large and small humiliations in their
day-to-day religious practices against establishment political and religious
authorities. These Muslims do not need saving by liberal or anti-liberal
discourses; they are saving themselves in their life-and-death struggles of
oppressive regimes from Iran’s ayatollahs to the establishment clerics of
al-Azhar and the Salafi ideologues of Saudi Arabia whose scripts have gone
viral. Apart from the suffering of Muslim women, which should not be
politicized or demeaned under the weight of patriarchal interpretations of
Muslim morality, there are numerous other issues that need attention. These
 Foreword xvii
include the anachronistic interpretations of a range of Muslim orthodox
advocates who validate slavery and other demeaning theological practices
meant for another time in history. Or take for instance the practices centred
on free speech and human rights, the religiously sanctioned penalties for
alleged acts of blasphemy to other draconian laws justified under Shariʿa
governance that dehumanizes. For progressive Muslims living in a global-
izing world by the lights of their faith, these are real dilemmas for which
there are no easy answers, except that the struggle for human dignity con-
tinues. Sandwiched between powerful globalizing discourses of liberalism
and secularism themselves not unfree from their own violence on the one
hand, and runaway brutalities in the name of varieties of Muslim orthodox-
ies on the other, Muslim progressives are caught in this intersecting vortex.
Yet this vortex is precisely the place to be in and to engage in the real
struggle for ideas, politics, and practice. Antonio Gramsci, the Italian
thinker, fully understood that the intellect allowed for a certain kind of pes-
simism to set in when one ponders the enormity of any task that lies ahead.
But Gramsci also grasped that the reach of the human will could overcome
this pessimism. Hence his much-repeated statement: “Pessimism of the
spirit; optimism of the will”. But Gramsci also had no time for those who
were indifferent. Therefore he said: “I hate the indifferent. I believe that
living means taking sides. Those who really live cannot help being a citizen
and a partisan. Indifference and apathy are parasitism, perversion, not life.
That is why I hate the indifferent”.
Adis Duderija’s essays on progressive Islam in this collection defy indiffer-
ence. Many individuals and collectivities of people working towards an ethi-
cal interpretation of Islam display the optimism of the will, the confidence
that a better way of doing things is possible within Islam.
Ebrahim Moosa

Notes
1 Iqbal, Muhammad. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, edited by
M. Saeed Sheikh, 4th ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1999), 78.
2 Muhammad Iqbal, Āsān Kulliyāt-I Iqbāl (Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing,
2000), 798.
3 Muhammad Sir Iqbal, The Rod of Moses: Versified English Translation of Iqbal’s
Zarb-I Kalīm, translated by Syed Akbar Ali Shah (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Paki-
stan, 1983), 335.
4 Ibid.
5 ʿAlija ʿAli Izetbegovic, Islam between East and West (Indianapolis, IN: American
Trust Publications, 1984), 64.
6 Ibid., 98–99.
7 Ibid., 68.
8 Ibid., 69.
9 Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Darāz, Ḥawla Risālat Dustūr Al-Akhlāq Fī Al-Qur'ān,
edited by Aḥmad Muṣṭafá Faḍlīyah and al-Sayyid Muḥammad Badawī, al-Ṭabʿah,
1st ed. (al-Qāhirah: Dar al-Qalam, 2005).
xviii Foreword
10 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā ʿUlūm Al-Dīn, 5 vols.
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al- ʿIlmīya, 1421/2001).
11 Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic
Reformation”, Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006), 323–347.
12 Rochelle Terman, “Islamophobia, Feminism and the Politics of Critique.” Theory,
Culture & Society 33, no. 2 (2015), 77–102.

References
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rut: Dār al-Kutub al- ʿIlmīya, 1421/2001.
Darāz, Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh. Ḥawla Risālat Dustūr Al-Akhlāq Fī Al-Qur’ān,
edited by Aḥmad Muṣṭafá Faḍlīyah and al-Sayyid Muḥammad Badawī. al-Ṭabʿah
(1st ed.). al-Qāhirah: Dar al-Qalam, 2005.
Iqbal, Muhammad. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, edited by M.
Saeed Sheikh (4th ed.). Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1999.
———. Āsān Kulliyāt-I Iqbāl. Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing, 2000.
Iqbal, Muhammad Sir. The Rod of Moses: Versified English Translation of Iqbal’s
Z̤ Arb-I Kalīm, translated by Syed Akbar Ali Shah. Lahore: Iqbal Academy Paki-
stan, 1983. doi:http://library.duke.edu/catalog/search/recordid/DUKE000646993.
Izetbegovic, ʿAlija ʿAli. Islam between East and West [in English]. Indianapolis, IN:
American Trust Publications, 1984.
Mahmood, Saba. “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic
Reformation”. Public Culture, 18.2 (April 1, 2006): 323–347.
Introduction
Broader contextualisation
of progressive Islam

Beyond myopic relativism, particularism and exceptionalism, it is possible,

and indeed imperative, to make universal moral contributions that consti-
tute advancement in beauty and ethics.
(El Fadl, 2014, 476)

Broader contextualization of progressive Islam

The religious authority of traditionally educated Muslim scholars (‘ulama),
the fashioners and perpetuators of the classical Islamic tradition, has been
seriously disrupted and contested by a number of actors, among the most
influential of whom are apologists, puritan-fundamentalists, intellectuals,
and scholar-activists. This process of contestation has gained increasing
momentum over the last two decades with the establishment and increased
activity of transnational Muslim networks. These networks have opened
doors to the emergence of a transnational Muslim public sphere that facili-
tates dialogical engagement and the creation of discursive communities and
new political spaces and identities that draw on the universal principle of
the Islamic umma (Sharify-Funk, 2008). This public sphere also “fulfils a
crucial political function insofar as it offers a discursive space in which
Muslims can articulate their normative claims (i.e. Islam) from a multiplic-
ity of positions” (Mandaville, 2001, 186). Some of these transnational
Muslim networks promote a more inclusive, pluralist, vibrant civil society
that rejects false essentialisms such as modernity versus tradition, Islam
versus human rights, Islam versus feminism, etc., and maximizes the
engagement and participation of the individual, and especially of Muslim
women (Mandaville, 2001).
Among the important actors involved in this emergent phenomenon are
what I term the proponents of progressive Muslim thought (Duderija, 2011),
who engage in both textual and ‘social hermeneutics’ (see below) that entails
a ’multiple critique’ (Cooke, 2000; Safi, 2003). This critique, as demon-
strated in this study, simultaneously challenges both (neo)traditional and
puritan Islamic hegemonic discourses on many issues (including the debates
on modernity, human rights, gender equality and justice, democracy, and the
2 Introduction
place and role of religion in society and politics) and their Western-centric
conceptualizations and interpretations, embedded as they are in the values
and worldview assumptions underpinning the Enlightenment.
As aptly noted by Mandaville (2003, 34), there are indeed important link-
ages between Muslim intellectualism and social activism today. For the pro-
ponents of progressive Muslim thought, there is an organic and symbiotic
link between the political and the hermeneutic. This has given rise to the
notion of what can be termed ‘social hermeneutics’, which can be described
as a highly participatory political endeavor enabling progressive Muslim
scholar-activists to seek socio-political change within a faith-based frame-
work. For these actors, being engaged in social hermeneutics implies that
religious knowledge can act as a basis for social transformation, revolution,
and collective political activism. Progressive Muslim social hermeneutics, as
it is, in part, concretely demonstrated in the several chapters of this study, is
also employed to argue for the emergence of religiously persuasive discourse
on issues such as gender justice/equality, human rights, freedom of religion
and democracy, the establishment of a vibrant public sphere, and increased
transparency and accountability of political structures and institutions, espe-
cially in Muslim-majority contexts.
It is noteworthy that many proponents of progressive Muslim thought are
women. It is they in particular who are dislodging the epistemic privilege
enjoyed by traditionally educated, exclusively male religious scholars and
clergy. In this context, they play a major role in the process of shifting the
locus of authority and normativity in Islamic discourses. With the focus on
gender equality, and particularly the reform of traditional jurisprudence
(fiqh) pertaining to Muslim family law being one of the pillars of both their
scholarship and their activism, progressive Muslim scholars subscribe to the
idea, stemming from feminist discourses, that the personal is political, thus
bringing issues of gender and the Muslim juristic tradition in general to the
forefront of Muslim politics.1
It is in this broader context of contestation and fragmentation of tradi-
tional Islamic religious authority that this book aims to provide a compre-
hensive discussion of the normative imperatives behind progressive Muslim
thought and its worldview.

On defining progressive Islam

The definition of progressive Muslim thought in this book is in accordance
with a previous study by Duderija (2011) which examined the interpreta-
tional assumptions behind progressive Muslim thought and their under-
standing of the concept of tradition (turath).
In the study, the main theoretical proponents of progressive Muslim
thought have been identified as a ‘community of interpretation’2 in the sense
employed by a contemporary literary critic Stanley Fish (b.1938; 1976;
1982) which share certain interpretational assumptions, be they
 Introduction 3
epistemological, hermeneutical, or methodological when conceptualizing
and interpreting the turath and its foundational texts (Duderija, 2011).
Another consideration in relation to the question of defining Muslim
groups which is adopted in this study following Kurzman (1998, 5) is that
various “socio-religious interpretations” of the Islamic tradition “overlap
and intertwine and should not be considered mutually exclusive or internally
homogenous but as heuristic devices which provide insight into the history
of Islamic discourse”. As such, progressive Muslim thought should not be
seen as an entirely internally homogenous group or as a rigid conceptual
category, but the concept of progressive Muslim thought should primarily
be seen as a heuristic tool that may be used to define and delineate a particu-
lar type or way of being a Muslim. Therefore, this study does not offer a
fixed and final definition of progressive Muslim thought. Instead, it examines
the normative imperatives which guide their thought and their overall
weltanschauung.
Further considerations regarding the definition of progressive Muslim
thought as adopted in this study will be discussed in chapter one in the con-
text of examining the views of one of the major theoreticians behind progres-
sive Muslim thought, Ebrahim Moosa.

The concept of a normative imperative as

a heuristic in understanding the progressive
Muslim worldview
In order to understand the nature of the progressive Muslim worldview, this
study adopts the concept of a normative ‘imperative’ as its heuristic. The
concept of normative imperative as employed in the book is linked to that
of the categorical imperative in teleological and deontological ethics that can
be traced back to the ideas of Immanuel Kant (d.1804). However, it does not
entirely correspond to it, as it is, of course, embedded in decisively Islamic
cosmology. In this study, the concept of the normative imperative for the
proponents of progressive Muslim thought refers to certain theological,
moral, and ethical principles3 that ought to guide principled actions of those
who believe in the Islamic message and which are considered to be in accor-
dance with the foundational Islamic textual sources. Importantly, however,
these normative imperatives are considered as applicable to all humanity
since they are premised on the belief in pre-theoretical and pre-conventional
concepts of truth and justice that do not presuppose faith. In the context of
Islam as a religious tradition, this translates itself in the idea of Islam being
an ethico-religious worldview whose anchoring value is the idea of ‘ethics of
responsibility’4 in which humans as stewards of God’s creation have the
responsibility to act justly and fight for justice even if it is against their own
self-interests.5 This idea is conveyed eloquently by one of the leading progres-
sive Muslim thinkers, Khaled Abou El Fadl (2014, 116–117), who states that
“[t]he religious conscience should be invoked in all situations that could
4 Introduction
create a greater sanctity and understanding of the sacred nature of human
life”. In other words, the normative imperative is an affirmative obligation
of the idea that “the religious conscience must be thoroughly engaged with
everything that elevates human beings from ugliness to goodness” (Sachedina,
2008, 89). Sachedina (2008), another leading progressive Muslim scholar,
uses the terminology of ‘ethical necessity’ which more or less corresponds to
what is termed a ’normative imperative’ in this study. For Sachedina, ethical
necessity is “an action that is rationally required (wujub ‘aqlı) because it is
based on moral norms that follow from human nature which not only serve
as the underlying framework for natural law but also Islamic natural law”
(Sachedina, 2008, p. 89) if approached from the standpoint of rational theo-
logical ethics to which progressive Muslim thought subscribes.6
In philosophical terms, the idea of the normative imperative employed in
this study is premised on the presupposition that, contrary to much of the
western contemporary liberal ethico-political theory, it is possible to make
a philosophically coherent argument that human beings have real moral
duties (MacDonald, 2012). As a result it is possible to deliberate and ulti-
mately form a judgment about the truth of different moral and ethical
claims on the basis of one’s commitment to ethics of responsibility and
humility, and hence legitimacy of diversity.7 However, this process of delib-
eration about truth and justice is dialogical in nature and considers diversity
of perspectives as integral to it.8 Hence, the above-described concept of the
normative imperative as employed in this study is not tantamount to the
belief in crude moral absolutism and accompanying fundamentalist and
totalitarian approaches to truth, the politics of truth, and its socio-political
ramifications. This is because progressive Muslim thought gives due consid-
eration to the idea that these moral and ethical ways of acting manifest take
different forms and shapes in different socio-cultural and historical con-
texts, and that they are in principle subject to evolution.9 This approach to
the ‘regimes of truth’10 will become more apparent in the discussions in
individual chapters.
Generally speaking, an insight into what constitutes normative impera-
tives of progressive Muslim thought can be gleaned from the delineating
features of the major themes, values, and ideal which inform its worldview
as presented below.

A brief overview of the major themes, values,

and ideals of progressive Islam
Progressive Muslim thought is an umbrella term covering a number of
approaches to the Islamic tradition and (late) capitalist modernity which, in
some cases, employ the words ‘progressive’ and/or ‘critical’ when self-labeling
themselves. It emerged in the shadows of the tragic events of 9/11. Although
the origins and the main theoreticians behind this contemporary Muslim
thought are to be traced mainly among Muslim academic and intellectuals
 Introduction 5
residing in the West, the proponents of progressive Muslim thought can be
found both in the Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts. Impor-
tantly, as noted above, progressive Muslim intellectuals and activists include
a significant number of those of the female gender.
Progressive Muslim thought is best characterized by its commitments and
fidelity to certain ideals, values, practices, and objectives that are expressed
and take form in a number of different themes. Some of the themes primarily
concern issues pertaining to their ‘critical’ positioning in relation to: i.) the
hegemonic economic, political, social, and cultural forces from the global
North; ii.) hegemonic patriarchal, exclusivist, and ethically ossified interpre-
tations of their own inherited Islamic tradition; and iii.) both the values
underpinning the Age of Enlightenment modernity as well as radical forms
of late (post)modern thought. As alluded to earlier, this means that the pro-
ponents of progressive Muslim thought are simultaneously engaged in a
‘multiple critique’ of discourses and practices (Duderija, 2011).
Commitment to social and gender justice (including indigenous Islamic
feminism) and a belief in the inherent dignity of every human being as a
carrier of God’s spirit is fundamental to the progressive Muslims’ weltan-
schauung. The centrality of spirituality and the nurturing of interpersonal
relationships based on contemporary feminist-friendly and Sufi-like ethico-
moral philosophy especially in its intellectual rather than purely aesthetic
form is another important characteristic of this progressive Muslim’s
world-view. A principled prophetic ethics of solidarity with all marginal-
ized and oppressed communities exemplified in what could be termed
Islamic liberation theology is another important characteristic underlying
progressive Muslim cosmology. Bringing about and strengthening the mul-
tifaceted, ethical, and dynamic aspects of the inherited Islamic tradition
and resisting its reductionism and exclusivist interpretation founded on
patriarchy, misogyny, and religious bigotry also characterizes the progres-
sive Muslim worldview. Another significant attribute of the thought is its
epistemological and methodological openness and fluidity. Progressive
Muslims do not subscribe to commonly employed dichotomies such as
tradition versus modernity or secularism versus religion, and/or simplistic
generalizations such as modernity equals Western or Judeo-Christian intel-
lectual/civilizational tradition. As such, progressive Muslims are engaged
in permanent dialogue with the critical and progressive agendas of other
cultures, drawing inspiration from not only faith-based liberatory move-
ments such as Christian liberation theology (see chapter four) but also
those that are premised outside of a faith-based framework, such as secular
humanism. Hence, progressive Muslims place a lot of emphasis on preser-
vation of a pluralist (including in terms of religious traditions) and multifo-
cal world in which relationships, including political and economic, between
different people, cultures, and civilizations are predicated on ethical, sym-
metrical, and mutually enriching power dynamics. Finally, progressive
Islamic hermeneutics is characterized by its emphasis on the role of context
6 Introduction
and history (i.e. nature of previous communities of interpretation) in inter-
preting the foundational Islamic texts without questioning their ontologi-
cally Divine nature.
It is on the basis of this worldview that the normative imperatives of pro-
gressive worldview are derived. As briefly alluded to above, how these nor-
mative imperatives concretely manifest themselves in various contexts will
be the subject matter of the individual chapters of the book.

The book’s structure

This study examines the main architects of progressive Muslim thought and
the normative ‘imperatives’ that guide and inform it. In that respect, the
proponents of progressive Muslim thought are heuristically considered as a
‘community of interpretation’ (in Stanley Fish’s sense) who uphold these
basic ‘imperatives’ but do not necessarily agree or share exactly the same
theoretical and methodological approaches.
The underlying theme that unifies and provides coherent structure to the
book is the idea of ‘imperative’. As argued above, progressive Muslim
thought is based on a specific worldview and embodies and is guided by
certain values and ideals. It is these values and ideals that progressive Muslim
thought views as ‘imperatives’ which must be attained and safeguarded in
order to bring about desirable transformations in the world.
Given the aim and the nature of the book, its approach is primarily if not
exclusively descriptive rather than comparative or analytical in nature. Apart
from the first chapter, the structure and the content of subsequent chapters
is such that it aims at breadth rather than depth, presenting the views of as
many progressive Muslim scholars on the subject matter as possible to ensure
diversity and representativeness. Each chapter also has an introductory sec-
tion whose purpose is to contextualize the main discussion and at times
provide historically important information directly relevant to each of the
chapter’s main themes.
Below is a chapter-by-chapter summary of the imperatives of progressive
Muslim though the book deals with.

Chapter one: the poiesis imperative

In the first chapter, I exclusively focus on the work of Ebrahim Moosa, a major
theoretician behind progressive Muslim thought. In it I characterize the main
contours and general themes which underpin Moosa’s scholarship, especially
in relation to how they have contributed to the emergence and development
of progressive Muslim thought. Being a major theoretician behind progressive
Muslim thought, Moosa’s scholarship provides us with an optimal introduc-
tion to the major aspects of progressive Muslim thought in general. This aims
to be achieved through a discussion of Moosa’s ideas on: epistemological/
methodological openness; the modernity-postmodernity divide; the nature of
 Introduction 7
history, time, and progress; the concept of tradition and its content; the nature
of Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics; critique of a variety of contemporary Muslim
thought currents; and, finally, Moosa’s scholarship on Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali
(d.1111 CE) as paragon of poiesis in classical Islam and his relevance for con-
temporary progressive Muslim thought (Moosa, 2005, 270).

Chapter two: the epistemological imperative

In the second chapter, I present the arguments of several progressive Muslim
thinkers, including Mohammad Shahrur, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and Abdol-
karim Soroush, in critiquing the static if not retrogressive nature of classical
Islamic epistemology. I also highlight theories and arguments these scholars
have promulgated in developing alternative forms of Islamic epistemology
in the modern age. These forms are characterized by epistemological open-
ness and by the ability to enter into a meaningful dialogue with contempo-
rary ‘epistemological cosmopolitanism’11 by means of subscribing to
epistemological theories which embrace the idea of epistemological syncre-
tism, dynamism, and progress.

Chapter three: the religious pluralism imperative

In the third chapter, I examine the main arguments employed by the propo-
nents of progressive Muslim thought for legitimizing the idea of divinely
willed religious pluralism in the context of the late modern episteme. This,
by definition, involves tackling the topic of the salvation of the religious
other. In this context, I examine the views of Abdolkarim Soroush and Tariq
Ramadan as being most representative of this approach. To contextualize
the discussion, I start the chapter by briefly defining what is meant by the
concepts of religious pluralism and ethic of pluralism as employed in this
study and how they played themselves out in Islamic history. I also trace the
broad approaches to the question of the salvation of the religious other in
the classical Muslim scholarship.

Chapter four: the Islamic liberation

theology imperative
The fourth chapter explains the main ideas and arguments of leading pro-
gressive Muslim liberation theologians including Farid Esack, Shabbir
Akhtar, Ali Ashgar Engineer, and Hasan Hanafi. Prior to explaining the
delineating features of the above-given progressive Muslim scholars’ libera-
tion theologies, the chapter begins by highlighting the similarities between
Christian and Islamic liberation theologies and in particular the influence
of the former on the latter. The reasons progressive Muslim scholars adduce
why Islamic liberation theology is an imperative for Muslims living in the
twenty-first century also forms the subject matter of this fourth chapter.
8 Introduction
Chapter five: the human rights imperative
In the fifth chapter, I examine the most significant theoretical contributions
progressive Muslim scholars have developed with respect to the issue of
conceptual compatibility between modern human rights discourses and that
stemming from an Islamic worldview. In this regard, I focus on the works of
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Muhammad Abed Al-Jabiri, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and
Ebrahim Moosa.

Chapter six: the ethical imperative

in Islamic jurisprudence/law
In the sixth chapter, I focus on hermeneutical mechanisms progressive Mus-
lim scholars have devised in order to address these conflicts in search for
what I term here the ethical imperative in Islamic jurisprudence. With respect
to this, I highlight two important hermeneutical mechanisms progressive
Muslim scholars take recourse to in order to discover or recover the ethical
(and the rational) in Islamic ethics and jurisprudence. These include what I
term comprehensive contextualization and teleological (i.e. maqasid-driven)
Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics. In this regard, the scholarship of two progres-
sive Muslim scholars Hashim Kamali and Abullah Saeed are showcased.

Chapter seven: the gender-justice imperative

In this chapter, I discuss four themes. The chapter opens with a definition of
what is meant by the phrase ‘gender justice’ in the context of progressive
Muslim thought as employed in this study. Then, I briefly describe the argu-
ments behind classical gender ideologies in Islam and outline the progres-
sive Muslims’ alternative conceptualizations of the same. Next, I move on
to the debates among progressive Muslims scholars surrounding the viability
of (re)emergence of a religiously indigenous Islamic feminism as a way of
bringing about gender justice in Islam. Finally, I discuss two examples of
grassroots gender-justice social hermeneutics engaged by progressive Muslim
scholars; first I describe Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s involvement with Musawah,
the global movement for equality in Muslim family law, and Farid Esack’s
work with Positive Muslims, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that
provides counselling and support for Muslims infected with HIV/AIDS.

Chapter eight: the imperative of non-patriarchal

Islamic hermeneutics
In this final chapter, I discuss the works of a number of progressive Muslim
scholars, both female and male, who have developed important hermeneuti-
cal principles which both critique the patriarchal interpretations of the
Qur’an and hadith both in the past and in the present, and who have at the
 Introduction 9
same time developed sophisticated non-patriarchal Qurʾan-Sunna hermeneu-
tical models. Before I examine their arguments, I provide a definition of what
is here meant by non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics.

Conclusion: the future of progressive Islam

Here I summarize the main arguments of the book and offer brief reflections
on the future of progressive Islam.

Notes
1 See chapters seven and eight.
2 In relation to the normative textual sources of the Islamic worldview.
3 As documented in this book.
4 I borrow this phrase from Ebrahim Moosa that he expressed in one of our
conversations.
5 Qur’an 4:135: “Ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah,
even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be
(against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of
your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice,
verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do.” Yusuf Ali’s translation of the
Qur’an is used in this study.
6 See chapters two, three, five, six, and eight in particular.
7 In Islamic theology, human humility arises from the fact the Ultimate Reality
demands diversity (Qur’an 49:13; 30:21) and that human beings, although
endowed with God-given dignity and inalienable rights, are imperfect in both the
physical and ethico-moral sense (i.e. with proclivities for doing evil) (Qur’an
30:54; 4:28).
8 See chapter three.
9 See chapter two in particular.
10 I use this phrase by Foucault intentionally to highlight the idea that the normative
imperatives behind progressive Muslim thought have real and wide-ranging
political ramifications.
11 Phrase borrowed from El Fadl (2014).
1 The poiesis imperative

In my view, the need to promote a formative bond between ethos and poiesis
has never been so dire as it is in contemporary iterations of Muslim thought.
(Moosa, 2005, 270)

Introduction
In this chapter, I focus on the scholarship of Ebrahim Moosa, a major
theoretician behind progressive Muslim thought, and employ it as a theo-
retical lens through which to describe an important feature of progressive
Muslim thought here termed the ‘poiesis imperative’. In this regard, I
characterize the main contours and general themes which underpin Moo-
sa’s scholarship, especially in relation to how they have contributed to the
emergence and development of progressive Muslim thought. Because of
Moosa’s important contribution to theorizing many of the fundamental
aspects of progressive Muslim thought, this chapter will, it is hoped, serve
as an optimal introduction to most of the other major aspects of progres-
sive Muslim thought expounded on in the rest of the chapters. Moosa is
agonistic about the moniker ‘progressive’. While he does not reject the
appellation, he prefers to describe himself as a ‘critical traditionalist’ for
reasons discussed below.
In the introductory part of this book, I have described progressive Muslim
thought’s weltanschauung and its major themes, values, and objectives. This
chapter’s heuristic centres around the concept of ‘poiesis imperative’ which
features prominently in contemporary progressive Muslim thought in gen-
eral and in the thought of one of its main theoreticians, Ebrahim Moosa, in
particular. For Moosa this imperative is a call or, better still, a demand for
contemporary Muslims, and progressive Muslims in particular, to engage in
a critical, creative, and imaginative thought, poiesis, when engaging with the
Islamic tradition (turath). Moosa’s ‘poiesis imperative’ is, therefore, a pro-
cess which he differently describes as “the act of poetic creation”, “the cre-
ativity of an existential threshold position (dihliz) that enables one to engage
in creative and critical thinking”, “the craft of imagination and inventive
making and creating”, “discursive bricolage”, “the art of doing and
 Poiesis imperative 11
reflecting”, “the creative and imaginative remaking/production of tradition”,
etc. (Moosa, 2005, 32, 34, 39, 42, 265, 270). In short, poiesis for Moosa
means to claim a certain agency and, in this context, this agency ought to be
acknowledged and recognized in the construction and deployment of reli-
gious thought.
Being characteristic of progressive Muslim thought, the ‘poiesis impera-
tive’ or the imperative of agency, is the lynchpin that anchors our discussion
of the main themes discussed in the book in general and in relation to this
chapter in particular. For the purposes of this chapter, this aims to be achieved
through a discussion of the following themes pertaining to progressive
Muslim thought: epistemological/methodological openness; the modernity-
postmodernity divide; the nature of history, time, and progress; the concept
of tradition and its content; the nature of Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics; cri-
tique of a variety of contemporary Muslim thought currents; and, finally,
Moosa’s scholarship on Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d.1111 CE) as paragon of
poiesis in classical Islam and his relevance for contemporary progressive
Muslim thought.

Epistemological/methodological
openness/fluidity
One of the delineating features of progressive Muslim thought (in relation
to other contemporary Muslim schools of thought) is its openness to and/or
willingness to incorporate epistemological and methodological pluralism in
conceptualizing and interpreting the turath. This openness is best exemplified
by the willingness of the proponents of progressive Muslim thought, consis-
tent with the spirit of poiesis, to critically and creatively incorporate theoreti-
cal insights from the contemporary humanities- and social sciences-based
bodies of knowledge indigenous to the (late) modern episteme for the pur-
poses of engaging and (re)interpreting the Islamic tradition (Duderija, 2011,
130–136).
Importantly, Moosa believes that in doing so progressive Muslims are
reviving the best aspects of the turath. In other words, Moosa considers this
epistemological and methodological openness to be emblematic of the most
noteworthy aspects of what the turath had and still has to offer. In this con-
text, Moosa (2005) writes:

When studying the ancients, I am struck by the epistemic openness and

the liberty with which many thinkers and authors energetically engaged
with a wide variety of knowledge traditions. They did so without allow-
ing the provenance of knowledge to be a decisive veto factor. Hence, a
good portion of early Muslim intellectuals were open to the spirit of
knowledge, whether it came from Greek, Indian, Biblical, or other philo-
sophical traditions.
(25–26)
12 Poiesis imperative
Indeed, Moosa describes his acclaimed book on Ghazali and Poetics of
Imagination as a “dialogical conversation that takes place in the heteroge-
neous disciplines that draw inspiration from non-secular and non-Western
contexts as well as from knowledge traditions that are broadly conceived of
as Western humanities” (Moosa, 2005, 35). In the same spirit, Moosa char-
acterizes his own thinking (inspired by his long-time interlocutor Al-Ghazali
as discussed below) as ‘dialogical’ in the Bakhtinian sense, a knowledge that
knows no borders and is not constrained by any intellectual or cultural/civi-
lizational genealogies (Moosa, 2005, 51).1 Moosa’s epistemological and
methodological fluidity is also exemplified in his statement that “[p]rudence
requires that Muslims look at their own past while concurrently exploring
experiences and resources of knowledge in other cultures and traditions”
(Moosa, 2011, 113). Moreover, Moosa repeatedly emphasizes the need for
contemporary Muslims to engage in a perpetual quest of seeking ‘emergent
knowledges’ that would assist contemporary Muslims in finding creative
solutions and new possibilities to their problems (Moosa in Safi, 2007). In
another context, Moosa talks about a necessity to rethink or reconstruct
Islam in the spirit of openness in terms of “transcendence of ideas, religious
values and worldviews” (Moosa, 1999, 28).
However, Moosa’s argument for the need for epistemological and method-
ological fluidity and openness in contemporary Muslim thought is not framed
in terms of a Panglossian, unreflective, and unproblematic view of the (late)
modernity episteme that simply privileges the present over the past. On the
contrary, epistemological and methodological openness has a certain purpose
to serve. For Moosa, this purpose is ultimately “to advance an emancipatory
and humane discursive tradition, one to which the Muslim intellectual legacy
can make a meaningful contribution” (Moosa, 2005, 35). In this context,
Moosa has talked about the need to develop Islamic humanism (Moosa, 2011).
The discussion on Moosa’s approach to the nature of and attitude to
knowledge and the modern episteme brings us to the next point of charac-
terizing his thought, namely in relation to the debates on the modernity-
postmodernity divide in the study of religion that are representative of
progressive Muslim thought in general.

Modernist-postmodernist divide
in the study of religion
The discussions centring on the modernist-postmodernist divide in the study
of religion are still in full force (Hendel, 2014). Progressive Muslim thought
in many ways approximates a convergence between what Benhabib (1992)
terms weak postmodernism and enlightened modernist thought as discussed
by Hendel (2014).2 Hendel (2014), in actual fact, forms the view that Ben-
habib’s concept of weak version of postmodernism is indistinguishable from
what he terms ‘enlightened modernism’. Both accept the critique of reason
leveled by the proponents of ‘strong postmodernism’ such as Foucault and
 Poiesis imperative 13
Derrida who argue that reason is impure, embedded in culture and society,
vested in power and interest, embodied, historically variable, sensuous, fal-
lible, and practically engaged. Importantly, however, for the proponents of
the weak version of postmodernism, the epistemological consequences of this
view are not as ‘grave’ as argued by the strong postmodernists. In this con-
text, Hendel argues that despite being fallible, this corrigible reason is nev-
ertheless not only sufficient but indispensable for the formation of ethical
thought. The corrigible reason is also crucial in meeting the demands of
everyday rationality humans require in order to perform their everyday prac-
tices, something that the embrace of the strong postmodernists’ view of rea-
son is, in theory, incapable of doing (Hendel, 2014, 423–434).
Moosa’s thought also addresses this philosophical divide between modern-
ism and postmodernism in relation to the study of religion. Upon a careful
analysis of his writings, his views on reason and revelation can best be
described as being in accordance with weak postmodernism/enlightened
modernism described above. This is, for example, evident in the following
passage in which we find Moosa’s (2001/2002) critique of the principles
underpinning the Age of Enlightenment:

In the past, reason was seen as universal, held by all to articulate a set
of rational truths in order to distinguish reason from tradition and emo-
tion. . . . Now, reason is a contested terrain, no longer universally and
uniformly accepted as self-evident. We recognize that reason is socially
constructed and that it exists and is embodied in practices and dis-
courses. In the past one understood the self to be exclusively unique and
transcendent. In fact, the postmodern critique of the self suggests that
it too is a product of language and discourse. The correspondence
between language and reality once exerted a strong influence on our
thinking and imagination of the truth. In fact, it was a hallmark of early
notions of modernity. Today there is a healthy skepticism of what passes
for the truth.
(40)

Elsewhere, Moosa (2003b) states that:

Given that modernity, according to the German philosopher Jurgen

Habermas, is itself a work in progress, it is not surprising that we have
come to recognize many of the errors of Enlightenment thinking and
modernity as legions of scholars engaged in post-modernism have
pointed out. In some ways, post-modernism can be seen as a corrective
as well as a continuation of modernity.
(117)

On a general level, Moosa (1994, 63–64) also speaks favorably of this weak
version of the postmodern episteme. Indeed, Johnston (2007, 187) describes
14 Poiesis imperative
Moosa as “a progressive working within postmodernist epistemology”.
However, Moosa also questions the radical deconstructionist projects asso-
ciated with strong versions of postmodernism. For example, writing in the
context of how to critically interrogate and deconstruct the canonical
Islamic tradition, Moosa (2005, 265; 2011, 113) warns against the imita-
tion of certain types of postmodernism which have the tendency to decon-
struct for the sake of deconstruction as if deconstruction was an end in
itself. Elsewhere, Moosa (2005, 185) has critiqued strong postmodernism’s
view of reason.
Hence Moosa’s thought, in relation to the modernity-postmodernity
divide, is very much representative of progressive Muslim thought in general
(Duderija, 2011, 117–139).

Concept of history, time, and progress

Moosa’s work has been at the forefront of contemporary Muslim discussions
on the relationship between the past and its problematic relationship with
the present that neither simplistically or in a reductionist manner privileges
or imposes the former onto the latter, nor vice versa. Moosa, in this context,
argues that for contemporary Muslims to resist ‘homogenization’ of both
past and present, sensitive tools and theoretical applications are required. To
this effect Moosa has employed, among others, the idea that history occurs
through and not in time as argued by Reinhart Koselleck, and as represented
in Walter Benjamin’s critique of historicism and T.S. Elliot’s idea of the past’s
presence in the present (Moosa, 2003b, 124–125), all of which are consid-
ered as essential tools for understanding and writing about history as a kind
of open-ended, creative, and contested process. To demonstrate the kind of
theoretical relationship between past and present that contemporary Mus-
lims should adopt, Moosa remains true to his ‘poiesis imperative’ and defers
to the work of Boaventura De Sousa Santos. Moosa (2005) summarizes the
conceptual relationship between the past and the present in the thought of
De Sousa Santos as follows:

The past is, however, made present, not as a ready-made solution, as in

reactionary subjectivity, but rather as a creative problem susceptible of
opening up new possibilities.
(265)

Another aspect of theorizing the normative nature of the past-present rela-

tionship refers to the idea of progress. The concept of progress in progressive
Muslim thought is not conceptualized in its Hegelian-Fukoyamian teleologi-
cal view of history/time in a sense of inevitability of change (Duderija, 2011,
117). In this context Moosa’s theorizing of the concept of progress as “for-
tuitous, rather than as inevitable”, in which ‘progress’ is framed in the realm
of the ‘possibility of change’ and potential advances in knowledge without
 Poiesis imperative 15
making the idea of progress contingent on the teleological view of philoso-
phy of history, is fundamental to progressive Muslims’ weltanschauung
(Moosa, 2007, 119, 123). Moosa refers to the works of J.Herder, T.S. Elliot,
and W. Benjamin as those who have recognized the fundamentalist, deter-
ministic, and totalitarian nature of the ‘inevitability of progress’ thesis with
which he disagrees and which he considers a major threat to humanity
(Moosa, 2007). Moosa also laments that many (Muslim) modernist thinkers
unfortunately have purchased into the ‘inevitability of progress’ thesis with-
out carefully thinking through its implications (Moosa, 2007, 119). In this
context Moosa (2007) avers:

A great responsibility rests on the shoulders of progressives to revive

tradition in all its vibrancy, intelligibility, and diversity. One might have
to avoid the error made by some Christian and Jewish thinkers and
schools of thought who uncritically bought into the inevitability thesis
of progress.
(119)

Theorizing on the nature of history and its relationship with the present (and
the future) is a constant theme in Moosa’s writings, and has been used for
a number of purposes.3 One important function of developing a proper
understanding of (Islamic) history as conceived by Moosa is its function to
act as a remedy to various types of fundamentalisms and authoritarianisms
that plague contemporary Muslim thought. In this context Moosa (2003b)
writes:

. . . what threatens the inscrutable authority of authoritarians is history.

Any serious and close study of the Muslim tradition will unmistakably
vaporize claims of uniformity and absolute obedience to authorities. To
their utter disbelief, protagonists of authoritarianism will discover that
Muslim societies in the past, as in the present, have always been diverse,
differentiated, dynamic, but also in a state of contestation as all organic
human social formations naturally are. The false utopias of ideal and
perfect Muslim societies in the past, widely touted by ideologues of
authoritarianism, will not survive the scrutiny of history.
(117)

Furthermore, Moosa forms the view that one hallmark of various types of
authoritarianisms and fundamentalisms in (contemporary) Muslim thought
is their excessive and unjustifiable veneration of the past that is couched in
abundantly apologetic and defensive terms while the present is viewed as
“despised and fallen” (Moosa, 2003b, 123). For Moosa, such a weltanschau-
ung is indicative of loss of confidence by contemporary Muslims in engaging
in poiesis that is sorely needed to find solutions to contemporary Muslim
needs and subjectivities (Moosa, 2003b, 122).
16 Poiesis imperative
Moosa sees the actual, productive role of history vis-à-vis the present in its
critical ability to historicize the traditions but without becoming “a prisoner
to historicism” (2003a, 30). Another positive role a proper understanding of
history (and its relationship with the present and the future) for contemporary
Muslims is to view history as a kind of social experiment laboratory from
which they can learn without “resurrecting the solutions from the past and
without making the present entirely contingent on it” (2003a, 31). The cen-
trality of gaining a proper insight into the workings of history, its nature, and
its function is also conceptualized as a tool in developing (a) healthy self-
narrative(s) regarding theorizing of continuity and change in the context of
belonging to a religious tradition. In this context, Moosa (2003a) states:

critical to any meaningful self-understanding is the need to provide a

narrative as to why things had changed and to get an accurate picture
of how ideas, practices, and beliefs were implemented in the past; more
importantly, it helps us understand how two identical ideas applied in
different epochs may actually have opposite outcomes.
(31)

Hence, Moosa’s views on the nature and function of history as an open,

creative process that emphasizes human agency is consistent with his intel-
lectual and scholarly commitment to the ‘poiesis imperative’. Questions sur-
rounding the role of history and the nature of the relationship between past
and the need for engendering meaningful narratives take us to examining the
very idea of tradition (turath) and its nature, and it is to this aspect of Moosa’s
thought that we turn next.

The concept of tradition (turath) and its content

Elsewhere it has been argued that in progressive Muslim thought the con-
cept of tradition is viewed as very complex and multi-faceted. Tradition is
seen as consisting of a number of competing interpretations, a contested
terrain in which numerous actors and agents with different motives, politi-
cal agendas, interpretational approaches, and objectives are present. Tradi-
tion, according to this view, is like a rich and dense tapestry consisting of
many interlacing or, at times, parallel running threads all of which, put
together, give the tapestry its unique design. The progressive Muslim thought,
furthermore, considers the concept of the Islamic tradition as a result of a
fluid exchange of ideas and acknowledges a wide spectrum of interpretations
that are inherent to it and acknowledges the element of power and politics
which shape it (Duderija, 2011, 131–132). Furthermore, the question of
authenticity (asala) of the Islamic tradition in progressive Muslim thought is
not conceptualized in terms of a literal clinging to the heritage

but through a creative, historical, critical comprehension of it, through

transcending it in a new process of creation; through letting the past
 Poiesis imperative 17
remain past so that it may not compete with the present and the future;
and through a new assimilation of it from the perspectives of the present
and the future.
(Boulatta, 1990, 16)

Hence, the concept of Islamic authenticity for progressive Muslims is very

much in harmony with the task of poiesis. The view of tradition as an open-
ended, creative process is fully endorsed and epitomized by the work of
Moosa, who argues that the Muslim intellectual tradition ought not be seen
as static or inert but as a process with its own rhythms of continuity and
discontinuity which has the capacity to recalibrate itself “to the imperatives
of ethical, moral, and spiritual integrity” (Moosa, 2005, 269).
Furthermore, the idea of the dynamic nature of the concept of tradition
that Moosa subscribes to is evident in his view that tradition is always “sub-
ject to vicissitudes of human history, something that is subject to interroga-
tion, correction, and advancement”. Likewise, Moosa also warns against
conceptualizing tradition as a “pre-fabricated design of being”. In order to
be faithful to tradition, continues Moosa, one needs simultaneously “to imi-
tate, to question, and to interpret”. Tradition, for Moosa, is something that
one neither passively inherits and internalizes nor is it “a detailed archeologi-
cal map that unlocks knowledge of the past”. For Moosa the boundaries of
belonging to a tradition are dependent upon a historical context in which
one finds her/himself. Tradition for Moosa is, therefore, tightly linked to
one’s subjectivity, something that determines one’s sense of belonging, a state
of being, and a state of mind (Moosa, 2007, 123–124). In Moosa’s words it
is “the self-intelligibility of the past in the present” and a “continuously
evolving and mutating intelligibility or state of being” (Moosa, 2007, 124).
Therefore, tradition includes but also goes beyond texts, history, practice, or
methodology of interpretation.
Moosa also describes tradition as a contested, constructed, discursive, and
embodied practice. Drawing upon the work of medieval scholar Ibn Jahiz
(d.868 CE), Edward Said (and his idea of contra-punctual readings in par-
ticular) (Moosa, 2007, 124), Talal Asad, and Michel Foucault, Moosa (2005,
54–55) highlights the contested and constructed nature of tradition and the
power dynamics that are inherent to it. Furthermore, in concert with the
insights from Pierre Bourdieu and Alasdair MacIntyre, Moosa considers that
one aspect of the concept of tradition can be best conceptualized in terms of
embodied practices learnt by the body because the Islamic tradition is practice-
oriented and, like the body, does not just memorize the past but “enacts the
past, bringing it back to life” (Moosa, 2005, 53–54).
In accordance with his ‘poiesis imperative’ credo, Moosa considers that
the only viable approach to the concept of tradition is to maintain a level
of healthy criticism towards it with the emphasis on creative thought and
the absolute requirement to interpret it in the light of contemporary Mus-
lim subjectivities and challenges (Moosa, 2007, 116). Moosa also strongly
criticizes the traditionalists’ view of the tradition who “confuse the
18 Poiesis imperative
knowledge of the tradition with tradition itself” reducing it to a set of
memories which “under trying and negative circumstances” give rise to
“self-pitying nostalgia” and the retrogressive weltanschauung alluded to
above (Moosa, 2007, 124).4 Furthermore, Moosa laments that those Mus-
lims who champion the Islamic ‘authenticity’ slogan too often engage in
reductionist practices by reifying the tradition to the state of either laws or
metaphysics. This view of the concept of tradition is, in turn, often articu-
lated in “formulaic phrases and repetitive practices” which strip the tradi-
tion of any elements of criticality, contestation, or conflict. Such a view of
tradition, for Moosa, at best produces sustainable knowledge that compro-
mises its creativity while at worst engenders the most aberrant forms of
authoritarianism (Moosa, 2005, 61).
The question of the content of tradition is for Moosa possibly one of the
most complex and contentious issues contemporary Muslims face and this
is nowhere better demonstrated but in his hesitation to define the content of
the ‘progressive’ Muslim tradition (Moosa, 2003b; 2007). In this context he
warns that “[t]hose who think that ‘progressive’ Islam is a ready-made ideol-
ogy or an off the-shelf creed, movement, or pack of doctrines” or “a carefully
calibrated theory or interpretation of Muslim law, theology, ethics, and poli-
tics” (Moosa, 2007, 115) are wrong. Instead, he argues that when it comes
to the question of the content of tradition, we should resist our impulses to
reify it once and for all, because such a development would transform it into
an institution and therefore an ‘orthodoxy’ with ideological interests that
would stifle its dynamism. Another reason why Moosa is reluctant to be
prescriptive in terms of the content of progressive Muslim thought is that the
process of institutionalization could potentially make it vulnerable to various
abuses of power, something that has happened to other Muslim movements
both in the past and in the present.
In this context Moosa (2007) opines:

What would certainly signal the death-knell for progressive Muslim

thought is if there were to emerge a single voice, a unifying institution,
an exclusive guild or association of scholars and practitioners who
monopolized the epithet “progressive” and dictated its operations,
debated its values and determined its content, like an orthodoxy. If so,
then the ship of progressive Islam leaves port badly listing.
(116)

An additional reason why Moosa eschews defining, in precise terms, what

constitutes a progressive Muslim tradition is that this fluidity in definition
mirrors the diversity (in terms of kind of methodologies applied, ethics, and
views of history)5 of those who are more or less associated or identified as
‘progressives’ to make it more malleable to accommodate disagreement and
difference. Importantly, for Moosa, this approach to the question of the
content of tradition ensures that progressive Muslim thought, in terms of its
 Poiesis imperative 19
interpretation of the normative sacred texts and practice, can be highly
attuned to context, indeed be context-driven, and informed by people’s his-
torical experiences, thus ensuring a “robust diversity and pluralism” (Moosa,
2007, 127).
Therefore, Moosa’s views on the nature of the concept of tradition are
entirely consistent with the spirit behind the ‘poiesis imperative’ principle.

The importance of contextualist Islamic hermeneutics

Elsewhere it has been argued that there are strong intellectual and herme-
neutical affinities between European romantic thinkers and contemporary
progressive Muslim thinkers in relation to their ‘secular’ approach to sacred
texts. This understanding of the concept of ‘secular’ is not linked to its con-
temporary overly political meaning but is best thought of as referring to an
acute sensitivity to historical context, a type of ‘comprehensive contextual-
ization’6 and humanization of sacred and religious books and writings, sig-
nifying what Wright describes as a discursive move from “theology to
cultural and anthropological hermeneutics” (Duderija, 2011, 126; Wright,
2008, 50–51).
Progressive Muslim thought places a strong emphasis on this ‘seculariza-
tion’ of sacred text, the Qur’an (and the traditional canon), without ques-
tioning its ontologically divine status. One of the fundamental premises of
the progressive Muslim approach to the interpretation of the Islamic tradi-
tion is the idea that normative textual sources operate at a human epistemo-
logical level and, hence, are by default subject to humanly constructed
interpretational processes. In other words, progressive Muslim thought
emphasizes the role of human agency in the essentially humanly constructed
and mediated processes of reading/understanding history and sacred texts.
This interpretational awareness of progressive Muslim thought translates
itself in the importance and emphasis given by it to examining the epistemo-
logical and methodological dimensions underlying and determining the
validity and soundness of various inherited interpretational models of the
overall Islamic teachings (Duderija, 2011). Bamyeh (2008) aptly notes this
phenomenon when discussing the thought of what we here term progressive
Muslim thought as hermeneutic Islam. In many ways this hermeneutic Islam
is a continuation of the classical Islamic tradition. However, unlike the clas-
sical Islamic tradition which can be described as semi-contextualist,7 progres-
sive Muslim hermeneutic is highly contextually driven (Duderija, 2011,
139–167). In addition, in the overall process of meaning derivation when
interpreting the sacred texts, it emphasizes the role of the interpreter (or
more specifically the imaginaire of the community of interpreters) and the
historical context encoded in the revelation itself (Duderija, 2011).
Moosa has addressed the issue of the importance of developing novel
Islamic hermeneutics that can resonate with the subjectivities and lived expe-
riences of contemporary Muslims in many of his writings (Moosa, 1995;
20 Poiesis imperative
Moosa, 2001/2002). The elements of this hermeneutic are very much in line
with that of the progressive Muslims’ Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutic briefly out-
lined above.8
The first element in Moosa’s Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutic pertains to the
correct understanding of the nature of revelation vis-à-vis its community of
listeners, which, according to Moosa, is per-formative, dialogical, and dia-
lectic. For Moosa, if this nature of revelation is not fully recognized and
applied hermeneutically, it can lead to what he refers to as a ‘deification of
the text’ or ‘text fundamentalism’. In this context Moosa (2003b) warns:

From the misplaced pre-occupation with the sovereignty of the text sans
community of the text, it is but a small step to the deification of the text
that unfortunately already occurs. On further reflection, it will become
apparent that the Qur’an itself prefigures a community of listeners and
participants: without this audience it ceases to be the Qur’an. In all this
a fundamental presumption persists: the Qur’an as revelation requires
an audience of listeners and speakers. In other words, a community is
integral to it being a revelation. If one does not take that audience and
community seriously, implicitly one has not taken revelation seriously.
This audience is not a passive audience, but an interactive audience that
engages with a per-formative revelation.
(124)

Similarly, in the context of commenting on the work of a noted classical legal

theorist Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi (d.1388) and his legal hermeneutic, Moosa
(2003a) argues that the renowned legal theorist understood fully that compre-
hending the mentality and ‘civilizational progress’ and worldview of the Qur’an’s
most immediate community of listeners is crucial to its proper understanding:

when the Qur’an invokes and makes references to ethics, historical

events, geographical and meteorological phenomena, and when it high-
lights a repertoire of astrology and healing, then in all these matters the
yardstick of understanding must take the cultural and historical experi-
ence of the unlettered Arab community of the seventh century as the
benchmark. Otherwise, we will be guilty of attributing meanings to
events and ideas that were not intended in the first place . . . His (i.e. Al
Shatibi’s) point is that the shari’a is organic to the Arab culture of the
time, and not a code from Mars.
(30–31)

Elsewhere, in a similar vein, Moosa (2003b, 124–125) opines that without

that voice of the communities of interpretation engaged with their scripture,
it would be nearly impossible to make sense of the revelation itself.
 Poiesis imperative 21
Furthermore, Moosa believes that all knowledge is interpretive. Draw-
ing upon the work of Bakhtin and his idea of the heteroglot nature of all
speech, Moosa argues that when interpreting Islamic normative texts,
context must be given priority over (plain) meaning, as the original
meaning of the text/speech can never be fully recovered by means of
repetition/recitation. Moosa bemoans further that the interpretational
implications for the heteroglossian nature of speech (and revelation)
have been grossly overlooked in (contemporary) Muslim thought
(Moosa, 2005, 102–103).
Another element of Moosa’s Islamic hermeneutics proper stresses the
importance of the social context and (political) history of the Qur’an in
its proper interpretation. This hermeneutical approach is described as
“more inclined to give history and the per-formative role of the revelation
a greater place in an interpretive schema” rather than to that of the text
or even its individual reader (Moosa, 2003b, 125). This is because, for
Moosa (2001/2002, 2), “[h]istory, embodiment, linguistics, time and
space are all alluded to in canonical texts”. Therefore, in Moosa’s view,
stressing hermeneutically the radical difference between the revelatory,
classical, and contemporary Muslim experiences and subjectivities (in
terms of culture, history, and reality) is another important factor to be
considered when searching for an adequate contemporary Islamic
hermeneutics.
Generally speaking, Moosa envisages the process of developing a contem-
porary Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutic employed for the purpose of arguing for
a systematic rethinking of classical Islamic hermeneutics and the theological,
ethical, and legal presuppositions underpinning it as comprising of two steps:
1.) “exploring the multiple interpretive methods that were employed by
scholars in the past to discover the creativity they invested”; and 2.) the need
to “explore and develop new ways of interpretation of especially the revealed
text in order to allow its full breadth and vision to speak to us in a transfor-
mative way” (Moosa, 2003b, 126).
In respect to the second point, Moosa places great emphasis on the com-
prehensively contextualist and interpretive communities-oriented hermeneu-
tic as the optimal antidote to what he considers to be the prevalence of text
fundamentalism among contemporary Muslims. In this context Moosa cri-
tiques the belief that ‘text fundamentalists’ share, namely the idea that the
text has the ability to provide the norms that interpreters can simply retrieve.
Instead, Moosa advances the view that (a community of) interpreters in
actual fact engender the norms through a dialogue with the revelation
(Moosa, 2003b, 125–126).
Given the above-described nature of Islamic hermeneutics proper as advo-
cated by Moosa, it becomes amply evident that the element of poiesis is
fundamental to it.
22 Poiesis imperative
Critique of contemporary Muslim thought currents
In the previous sections, it was pointed out that one element of Moosa’s
Islamic hermeneutics entails the full exploration and, at times, rediscovery
of variant interpretive methodologies that characterized the classical Islamic
heritage. Nevertheless, Moosa is also a strong critic of certain aspects and
assumptions underpinning classical Islamic interpretational approaches in
several of its versions, especially what he variously terms (dogmatic) (neo)
traditionalism/conservatism and Islamic modernism (text fundamentalism).9
In what follows, I briefly examine the grounds and reasons offered by Moosa
for this critique.
One group that Moosa subjects to critique are labelled dogmatic tradition-
alists/conservatives whom Moosa considers to be the most predominant
contemporary community of interpretation. He (2007) describes this com-
munity of interpretation as follows:

Here, the formalized legal and ethical opinions of past jurists form the
canon of normative teachings. This normativity, rooted in the past, is
regarded as universally valid and perfect as inherited from the ancients.
To depart from the views of past authorities is only permitted in very
limited instances. Furthermore, fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] is not sub-
ject to historicization. . . . The weakness of this approach, however, lies
in a static and idealistic notion of history. Authenticity lies in the experi-
ence and knowledge of the past savants of the tradition. Contemporary
experiences do not qualify to influence adaptation and change to the law
or ethics. Knowledge developed in the present is either resisted or reluc-
tantly adopted in order to supplement or update the inherited corpus of
ethical teachings.
(241)

Although seeing value in its coherent episteme, Moosa criticizes dogmatic

traditionalism on several accounts in addition to those given in the quote
above. For example, Moosa questions dogmatic traditionalism on the
grounds that its pre-modern embedded ethical models have lost much of
their utility;10 that it does not always acknowledge the challenges posed by
history (Moosa, 2001/2002, 2); that it does not sufficiently recognize the
constructed nature of tradition; and that much of it is a knee-jerk reaction,
resistance, and counterbalance to the (continuing) project of modernity
which is viewed by dogmatic traditionalists as largely incommensurate with
the concept of the Islamic tradition itself (Moosa, 2002, 25). The root cause
of this binary ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking is diagnosed by Moosa as a result
of an inherited aberrant modus of thinking that he terms a ‘theology of
empire’ syndrome, a (political) worldview which is still uncritically adhered
to by the proponents of dogmatic traditionalism. For Moosa, the conse-
quences of holding on to this worldview for Muslims are very damaging, as
 Poiesis imperative 23
this outlook on the world is responsible for creating “a paranoid, introverted
and defensive school of thought among the Muslim conservatives world-
wide” (Moosa, 2002, 26; 1999, 26). In this context, Moosa (Moosa, 2002)
writes:

The net result of this mode of thinking was the creation of an elaborate
hate-machine where Muslims viewed outsiders as potential threats or
enemies. The fact that this sort of thinking is still alive and well today is
beyond doubt. Looking at the sort of propaganda that you get from
Islamist movements in countries like Pakistan today, all we see is the
obsession with Islam’s supposed ‘enemies’ who are said to be
everywhere.
(25)

Another aspect of dogmatic traditionalism Moosa is critical of is its lack of

intellectual development and critical thinking that prevails among those
who are trained in traditional Islamic seminaries. For Moosa, this sad state
of affairs is best exemplified by numerous prosecutions of independent criti-
cal Muslim intellectuals who are seen as a threat to ‘Islam’. Moosa laments
that the root cause for this situation can be traced to the fact that large
chunks of Muslim thought today are still predicated on religious metaphys-
ics that originate from the time of the Muslim empires of the past (Moosa,
2002, 28).
An additional contemporary current of Muslim thought that has
attracted Moosa’s critique is Islamic modernism associated with figures
such as J. Al-Afghani (d.1897), M. Abduh (d.1905), and their contempo-
rary proponents such as Y. Al-Qaradawi (1926). Moosa argues that the
phenomenon of Islamic modernism was located between two traditions,
namely Islamic conservatism and secular modernity. The Muslim modern-
ists, in their efforts to modernize and reform Islam, ended up uncritically
internalizing the values, prejudices, and biases of the modern era encap-
sulated by notions of enlightenment, rationality, and progress as articu-
lated and manifested in the tradition of western positivism. Moosa
(2003b) writes:

key figures of Muslim modernism, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Shibli
Nu‘mani, and Muhammad Iqbal all from India, Muhammad Abduh,
Rashid Rida, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq in Egypt, as well as important figures in
Turkey, Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world, were tremendously
impressed by both the ideals and realities of modernity. They truly
believed that Muslim thought as they imagined it from its medieval
incarnation had an almost natural tryst with modernity. Modernity and
“Islam” were not mortal enemies, but rather, as many of them suggested,
Islam itself anticipated modernity.
(117)
24 Poiesis imperative
Moosa refers to these devoted proponents of Enlightenment rationality
within Muslim societies as not only “challenging the idea of the pre-modern
tradition or tradition itself” but also uncritically endorsing this version of
modernity as basically the only mode of living and thinking for Muslim-
majority societies (Moosa, 2003b, 111).
To complicate matters further because the Western modernist project was
grounded on a colonial discourse, many of the Islamic modernists of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries also ended up internalizing and reproduc-
ing these prejudices, such as their views towards folk beliefs, ancient tradi-
tions, the status of women, etc. (Moosa, 2002, 34). In this context, Moosa
(2003b, 117) poses a profound question whether modernist thought in gen-
eral, in light of what we have learnt about its shortcomings and problematic
assumptions discussed in the second section above, is Islam’s redeemer, nem-
esis, or perhaps a bit of both?
Islamic modernism, opines Moosa further, failed on a number of different
levels. One such failure is to be found in the inadequately theorized model
of interpretation of the normative Islamic texts with the result of flattening
of the Islamic tradition. Moosa (2014b) states:

The monumental task of recontextualizing the interpretation of Muslim

sources and doctrines to match the new realities was hardly broached.
And ijtihad remained a rallying cry for mobilization, without a convinc-
ing intellectual roadmap. This invitation to reach for new interpretations
had one failing. It did not provide for a coherent framework to interpret
the Qur’an and the hadith. The outcome was the oversimplification of
tradition.
(55)

Another important shortcoming of Islamic modernism for Moosa is its inabil-

ity to comprehensively and systematically deal with Islamic history and the
inherited historical sources of the turath. As a result, it developed an almost
exclusively Qur’an-centred hermeneutic without engaging with the equally
important lived experience of community (Sunna) as embodied in history.
Furthermore this ‘Qur’an-centred’ hermeneutic is coupled with “exaggerated
skepticism that reports of the Prophet may have been corrupted during their
transmission” (Moosa, 2007, 242), which, for Moosa, has further “under-
mined the status of historical sources and implicitly eviscerated the historicity
of tradition” (Moosa, 2007). Therefore, argues Moosa, Islamic modernists
pay “little attention to the fact that even transcendent values become manifest
in competing and diverse formats” (Moosa, 2007, 242).
By subscribing to the idea of linear and inevitable progress, Islamic mod-
ernists embody the diametrically opposite weltanschauung of the dogmatic
traditionalists. For Moosa, a priori and uncritically privileging modern sub-
jectivities Islamic modernist project is highly presumptuous and condescend-
ing toward past communities of interpretation who are seen to have failed
 Poiesis imperative 25
to discover the “true Islamic norms”. Moosa critiques this ‘transcendentalist’
approach on two main grounds. First, it presumes that “all norms are self-
explanatory and literally derived from the revealed sources” (Moosa, 2007).
Second, it does not provide a plausible explanation “for the role of the
interpreter as co-author of the normative tradition and our changing subjec-
tivity in both the interpretation and practice of ethical traditions” (Moosa,
2007). Hence, Moosa warns that it is “a short step from transcendentalism
to text-fundamentalism, with its accompanying ethical fundamentalism”
(Moosa, 2007).

Moosa’s positioning of progressive Muslim

thought in relation to other contemporary
Muslim thought currents
Moosa (2003b, 117) holds the view that contemporary progressive Muslim
thought is profoundly indebted to the labors of Muslim modernist thinkers
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as J. Al-Afghani, Sir Ahmad
Khan (d.1898), M. Abduh, and Rashid Rida (d.1935), despite their above-
mentioned shortcomings.
However, Moosa believes that important differences between the two exist
with respect to how each view the nature of reason, truth, modernity, the
attitude towards the modern episteme, and respective methodologies of
interpretation of the normative texts and ideologies. It is to the brief discus-
sion of differences as articulated by Moosa that we turn now.
Regarding the differences in the nature of reason and truth, Moosa
(Ibid, p. 118) writes:

The way Muslim modernists understood modernity presents a very dif-

ferent picture from the way we perceive it today. Some of the ways in
which we perceive reason, self, and truth might be very different from
how early modernists of all stripes construed these very concepts. Rea-
son in the past was seen as universal, held by all to articulate a set of
rational true beliefs, to distinguish reason from tradition and emotion.
Now we have to admit that reason is not a self-evident faculty but a
socially constructed one. It exists within practices and discourses; reason
is embodied. The idea of the self was once understood to be exclusively
unique and transcendent. This is no longer the case. Now we acknowl-
edge that the self is a product of language and discourses. The correspon-
dence between language and reality exerted a strong influence in the
modern period and this contributed to our understanding of truth.
Today, we have a healthy skepticism about what passes for the truth.
Truth is the result of agreement. We do not say there is no truth, or that
the truth is arbitrary. What we do say is that the truth is not static, an
end-state at which we arrive at once and for all.
(118)
26 Poiesis imperative
Hence, as argued in the second section of this chapter, progressive Muslim
thought embodies the weak version of postmodernist thought whereas
Islamic modernism shares many of the assumptions underpinning the Age of
Enlightenment and its positivist tradition discussed above.
In relation to the question of the nature of modernity, Moosa forms the
view that while the Islamic modernist thought of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries and its contemporary proponents uncritically considered
modernity as a natural ally, progressive Muslim scholars are much more
reserved and critical of it, partly because the kind of modernity the latter
inherited was markedly different from that encountered by the former
(Ibid,119).
Importantly, another significant difference between Islamic modernist and
progressive Muslim thought is to be found in their respective approaches to
the modern episteme. In this context, Moosa writes:

With some exceptions, the critical light of modern knowledge developed

in the humanities did not illuminate the Muslim modernists’ theories, as
applied to the interpretation of scriptures, history and society, the under-
standing of law, and theology. What they did not undertake or in some
instances refused to undertake was to subject the entire corpus of histori-
cal Islamic learning to the critical gaze of the knowledge-making process
(episteme) of modernity. . . .
They still felt that the pre-modern Muslim epistemology as rooted in
dialectical theology (‘ilm al-kalam) and legal theory (usul al-fiqh) was
sufficiently tenacious, if not compatible with the best in modern
epistemology.
(119)

Moosa similarly critiques Islamic modernism on its eclectic approach to

applying the advances in knowledge in (late) modernity, especially its
unwillingness and fear of applying this knowledge as it relate to the
study of religion itself because it was seen as ultimately subverting or
undermining the knowledge on which the traditional Islamic canon is
based (Ibid.).
Therefore, one important difference between progressive Muslim
thought and Islamic modernism (and dogmatic traditionalism) is its readi-
ness to critically and systematically incorporate insights from the modern
episteme and apply it across all aspects of the Islamic religious tradition
(Duderija, 2011).
With respect to how progressive Muslim thought differs from dominant
orthodoxies of Islamic modernism and dogmatic traditionalism from an
ideological perspective, Moosa contends that one of the major points of
departure between them “is the excessive ideology content evident in the
interpretations propounded by Islamic modernist and traditionalist groups”,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt or the Jamat-e Islami of India and
 Poiesis imperative 27
Pakistan in the orthodox seminaries of Al-Azhar in Egypt; the Deobandi,
Barelwi, and Ahle Hadith schools of India and Pakistan; the schools of Najaf
in Iraq; Qum in Iran, and the varieties of puritan (salafi) tendencies in the
Gulf region and elsewhere (2007, 117). As discussed above, Moosa warns
that the proponents of progressive Muslim thought not only ought not reify
the contents of tradition, but that they also must be ever so vigilant that it
does not become co-opted by or a servant of power and turned into yet
another Muslim ‘orthodoxy’ (2007, 127).11 The best method in ensuring this
for Moosa is for progressive Muslim thought not to become institutionalized
in the first place (2007, 126).
In terms of differences in methodologies of interpretation between pro-
gressive and other approaches, particularly dogmatic traditionalism, Moosa
(2007) summarizes them as follows:

In a nutshell I would say that the major differences between Muslim

progressives and their critics would be that the latter are either wedded
to dated methodologies or committed to doctrines and interpretations
that have lost their rationales and relevance over time.
(117)

Importantly, Moosa has described his approach to the Islamic tradition also
as critical traditionalism. Given the above-described views of Moosa on the
nature and the concept of ‘tradition’, this description of his approach should
not be surprising. For Moosa, this approach is distinguished by its insistence
to engage with the tradition critically, to “constantly probe and interrogate
it in a productive and constructive manner” (2007, 118). In this context,
Moosa (2007) writes:

A progressive intellectual posture involves a critical interrogation of the

conveyer belt of tradition, namely texts, practices, and histories, by pos-
ing a series of questions to the inherited knowledges of the tradition. In
other words, a critical Muslim or a progressive Muslim is also engaged
in critical traditionalism.
(126)

Elsewhere Moosa (2007, 241) describes critical traditionalist scholars as

those who “lean towards this ethical orientation”, those who “view the
juridical tradition as a work-in-progress”, those who “invoke the critical
[Muslim] thinkers of the past”, and those who “historicize and adopt con-
temporary knowledge and experience as part of tradition”. Critical tradi-
tionalists, furthermore, are those who are “engaged in new ethical and legal
interpretations of the tradition” by means of affecting “a new knowledge
synthesis” that involves a dialogical engagement between traditional Muslim
religious sciences and the modern social sciences and the humanities. What
sets the progressive Muslims’ approach to tradition apart from other
28 Poiesis imperative
versions, argues Moosa further, “is its concern for the coexistence of the
transcendent and the historical dimensions of a religious tradition”. This
critical traditionalist approach is also described as engendering norms
“through the dynamic interaction between the transcendent authority and
the mediation of human history” (Moosa, 2007). As the adjective “critical”
in “critical traditionalism” suggests, Moosa forms the view that it is impera-
tive for contemporary Muslims to engage in critical, creative, and imagina-
tive thought, poiesis, in order to engage with the turath fruitfully. In other
words, it is the embodiment of the ‘poiesis imperative’ itself.

The paragons of poiesis: Al-Ghazali and Moosa

As mentioned previously, one idea that permeates Moosa’s thought as it
relates to the subject matter of this chapter is Moosa’s ‘poiesis imperative’.
By ‘poiesis imperative’, I wish to convey Moosa’s (2011, 110; 2005; 2006,
113) diagnosis of a woeful absence of critical and creative thought among
not only the traditional religious scholars but also the mainstream Muslim
intelligentsia in general, as well as at major modern institutions in the
Muslim-majority world today. Moosa (2005) laments this state of affairs as
follows:

Today, the most dismaying picture of intellectual perfidy emerges not

only from the stereotypical images of Islam in the Western electronic
media but also from desultory images produced in what are the bastions
of Muslim traditional learning. Some of these are the renowned al-Azhar
in Egypt, Dar al-Ulum Deoband in India, the many madrasas in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, the many hazwiyas in Iran and Iraq, and similar institu-
tions around the globe.
(61)

Indeed, the lack of poiesis in contemporary Muslim thought was the stated
raison d’être behind writing of his book Ghazali and Poetics of Imagination
(Moosa, 2005, 28–29).
As mentioned above, Moosa considers that the main and most important
task of contemporary (progressive) Muslim thought is engaging in poiesis, a
process he defines variously as “the creativity of an existential threshold
position (dihliz) that enables one to engage in creative and critical thinking”,
“the craft of imagination and inventive making and creating”, “discursive
bricolage”, “the art of doing and reflecting”, “the creative and imaginative
remaking/production of tradition”, etc. (Moosa, 2005, 32, 34, 39, 42, 265,
270). Importantly, as briefly alluded to above, the task of poiesis for Moosa
is not a mere process of deconstruction as in some forms of postmodernism
but of creating emergent knowledges which have the ability to respond to
the subjectivities, epistemological, and numerous and complex ethical dilem-
mas facing contemporary Muslim communities.
 Poiesis imperative 29
Significantly, Moosa finds in the archeology of ideas and life of Abu Hamid
Al-Ghazali (d.1111 CE) a paragon of poiesis from classical Islam. Moosa
has been an interlocutor of Ghazali for several decades and unsurprisingly
for those who are familiar with Moosa’s work, it is on Al-Ghazali that
Moosa wrote his doctoral thesis. In this section, I argue that one important
reason why much of Moosa’s scholarship has focused on Al-Ghazali is
because Moosa considers him as an archetype of poiesis and critical tradi-
tionalism par excellence from the classical period of Islam.
In his book Ghazali and Poetics of Imagination, Moosa provides us with
several arguments as to why Al-Ghazali is relevant to contemporary Muslim
thought in general and progressive Muslim thought in particular. For exam-
ple, in a subsection titled ‘Ghazali as Exemplar for Critical Traditionalism’,
Moosa (Moosa, 2005) writes:

The contemporary relevance of Ghazali to Muslim thought lies precisely

in his critical engagement with tradition, but more specifically in the way
in which he modified, adjusted, recalibrated, amended, and supple-
mented the intellectual tradition. Unlike many of his contemporaries
who either uncritically romanticized tradition or, in an apocalyptic
spasm, took refuge in it, he took critical thought seriously. It was impor-
tant for him, just as it is for us, to critically engage with the canonical
tradition, a process that must culminate in radical questioning and defa-
miliarizing of the canonical tradition.
(29)

It is Al-Ghazali’s epistemological and methodological openness and fluid-

ity that characterizes both Moosa’s and progressive Muslim thought as
argued above, that renders him occupying a liminal state/threshold/inter-
stice, the dihliz, which is a source of his creative thinking and dialogical
imagination, the poiesis (Moosa, 2005, 27). Al-Ghazali as a paragon of
poiesis is indeed a recurrent theme in the book. For example, Moosa
(2005) writes:

Indispensable to Ghazali’s project was the notion of a dialogical imagi-

nation: a sense that all meaning is part of a greater whole and that the
different parts of meaning constantly interact with each other irrespec-
tive of whether those meanings are held by believer or unbeliever, agnos-
tic or mystic, male or female, friend or foe. He was also, in my view, a
courageous bricoleur, one who creatively managed to put to work dif-
ferent ideas in a coherent framework for himself, for his society, and for
the community that he served . . . His relevance primarily lies in the
architecture of his ideas. He was essentially a builder and creator of
intellectual edifices and thought structures that produced practices for
himself and societies over time.
(27)
30 Poiesis imperative
I hope that it will be clear to the reader that the above-given quote by Moosa
about Al-Ghazali applies equally to the work of Moosa himself as the major
theoretician of progressive Muslim thought.

Conclusion
The above overview of the main themes, arguments, and theories informing
Moosa’s scholarship has been fundamental to the emergence and continued
development of progressive Muslim thought. Moosa’s views of the nature of
knowledge, tradition, history, progress, and modernity, as well as his insights
into Islamic hermeneutics and ethics, have strongly shaped discourses on
progressive Muslim thought. One of the main and reoccurring messages that
are germane to Moosa’s scholarship is what I have termed ‘the poiesis imper-
ative’ as the only viable approach for contemporary Muslims to fruitfully
engage with the Islamic tradition. The imperative to engage in poiesis is a
fundamental lynchpin that underpins Moosa work as a major theoretician
behind contemporary progressive Muslim thought. The daunting challenge
of those Muslims wishing to engage in poiesis today, argues Moosa, is to
create emergent knowledges whose discovery will “require critical and ago-
nizing intellectual labour” (Moosa, 2005, 40). For reasons discussed in the
chapter, it is my contention that Moosa, with his extraordinary rich contri-
bution to contemporary (progressive) Muslim thought, alongside other pro-
gressive Muslim scholars discussed in this book, has been an indispensable
and inspirational voice in this process.

Notes
1 Yazeed Said, in the context of reviewing Moosa’s book Al Ghazali and the Poetics
of Imagination, refers to Moosa as an “obvious polymath of western thought”.
See Said (2008, 228).
2 In relation to progressive Muslim thought in particular, see Duderija (2011,
117–139).
3 For example, in relation to the concept of ‘tradition’ to which we turn in the next
section of the chapter.
4 For more on the retrogressive outlook of traditional Islamic epistemology, see
chapter two.
5 As at least partly reflected in this volume.
6 See chapter six for details.
7 See chapter six.
8 Further elaborated in chapters six, seven, and eight in particular.
9 Moosa has also criticized crude and unsystematic utilitarian-based approaches to
Islamic law. See Moosa (2003b, 123; 2014a).
10 For how this concretely plays itself out with retrospect to human rights and gen-
der issues, see chapters five, seven, and eight.
11 For more on how progressive Muslims approach the question of hegemonic
political power, see chapter four.
2 The epistemological imperative

There is a serious problem with arguing that God intended to lock the epis-
temology of the 7th century into the immutable text of the Qur’an, and then
intended to hold Muslims hostage to this epistemological framework for all
ages to come.
(El Fadl, 2015, 473)

Introduction
Mark Juergensmeyer, one of the leading scholarly voices on the concept of
post-secularism, argues that the best way to study religions in the contem-
porary postmodern, post-national, and post-secular global age is by concep-
tualizing them as epistemic worldviews.1 This is so because religious
perceptions engender very potent ways about conceptualizing the world as
a whole, including ideas about the nature of social reality and its cultural
and political dimensions (Juergensmeyer, 2010, 886). Importantly, Juergens-
meyer forms the view that the Islamic classical theology (kalam), has always
performed or assumed this function of providing an epistemic worldview
rather than being only concerned with abstract ‘properly theological’ matters
such as those pertaining to creed. In agreement with these observations, this
chapter aims to present the arguments of several progressive Muslim thinkers
in critiquing various aspects of classical Islamic epistemology and the need
to develop alternative forms of the same. These alternative approaches to
Islamic epistemology are , in turn,to be characterized with a much higher
degree of epistemological openness and which can engage in a meaningful
dialogue with what El Fadl terms contemporary ‘epistemological cosmopoli-
tanism’, or what Moosa, as we saw in the previous chapter, called ‘emergent
knowledges’.2 I refer to this aspect of progressive Muslim thought as ‘the
epistemological imperative’.
This chapter starts with a summary of the nature of the classical Islamic
epistemology and its ‘epistemic schemes’, a phrase borrowed from Dahlen
(2003, 64–84), and, for reasons made clear below, discusses the concept of
Salafism in traditional Islamic Sunni thought. This is necessary in order to
gain an accurate understanding of the progressives Muslims’ positioning
within and critique of traditional Islamic epistemological schemes.
32 Epistemological imperative
The nature of traditional epistemic schemes
Dahlen perceptively notes that like all other traditional religions, contempo-
rary Islamic tradition is embedded in and has to confront a new epistemic
and interpretative locus or set of conditions. For Dahlen (2003, 348) this
new epistemic condition was an outcome of a “radical shift of categories of
modern philosophy, science, culture and geography” and involves a revolu-
tion in the very concept of knowledge itself. This new epistemic condition
has very important and wide-ranging implications for contemporary discus-
sions pertaining to Islamic epistemology as it presents a significant challenge
to the traditional Islamic epistemic ‘schemes’, to use Dahlen’s vocabulary. In
this section, relying on the work of Dahlen3 and his terminology, a general
understanding of these traditional Islamic epistemic schemes and their
respective natures is presented.
Muslim scholars and thinkers, both past and present, may they be philoso-
phers, theologians, jurists, or mystics, have been engaged in answering the
main epistemological questions such as: What is knowledge? How do we
acquire it? How do we know if what we know is true or false? Following
Dahlen’s categorization, the answers given to these and similar questions in
traditional Islamic thought can be subsumed under the following epistemic
schemes i.) historical-empirical; ii.) theological, philosophical, and mystical;
and iii.) juristic-rational.
In the view of Dahlen (Dahlen, 2003), what is common to all of these
epistemic schemes of the traditional Islamic epistemology is that:

Traditional Islamic notions of epistemology presupposed the existence

of a religious and holistic notion of ‘subjectivity’, in the sense that Islamic
theologians and philosophers as well as mystics and jurists considered
the Divine as the fountainhead of all knowledge in the universe. Accord-
ing to their conception, knowledge is revealed to man through revelation
and through a divine active intellect (‘aql), which has cosmogonic, ethi-
cal, epistemological and spiritual dimensions denoting the innate faculty
of transcendent knowledge.
(349)

All major traditional epistemic schemes,4 therefore, subscribed to the idea

that all knowledge originates from God and that the knowledge of the Divine
law translates into God-pleasing human conduct. According to this tradi-
tional Islamic epistemology, one of the primary purposes and functions of
revelation and the recognized religious canon is to establish the proper
parameters in the exercise of the intellect (Dahlen, 2003).
According to Dahlen, the ‘historical-empirical’ epistemic scheme is strongly
transmitted sciences (ulum al-naqliyya)-oriented epistemology that bestows
to these sciences epistemological priority over those of the rational ones
(ulum ul-’aqliyya). Hence, for this epistemic scheme, naqli forms of
 Epistemological imperative 33
knowledge including biography, prosody, grammar, and especially the hadith
reports are considered epistemologically superior to rational sources of
knowledge such as ra’y (reason-based opinion), ijtihad, qiyas (analogical
reasoning), and kalam (rational theology). This epistemology is particularly
prominent among the ahl al-hadith-based approaches to interpretation of
the Islamic tradition (Duderija, 2011). Dahlen (2003) describes this epis-
temic scheme as follows:

In the primitive ‘historical-empirical’ epistemic scheme, man was con-

sidered bound by his or her built-in intellectual and existential limita-
tions to make the leap from rational capabilities to faith in the pursuit
of understanding the universe. Concerned with factual transmitted
knowledge, the revealed texts assumed literal importance rather than
understanding the whole or parts of these as metaphors in the sense that
texts were supposed to be as they appear to be.
(67)

Dahlen considers this form of epistemology as akin to naive realism as it is

known in contemporary philosophy (Dahlen, 2003).
Another epistemic scheme is that of the Islamic speculative theologians
(mutakallimun), philosophers (falsafa), and mystics (Sufis). Although recog-
nizing the importance and validity of the naqli-based epistemological
approach, the proponents of these epistemic schemes were not entirely
restricted by it because they concerned themselves with epistemological ques-
tions which stemmed from a very different theological and philosophical
framework to that of the ‘historical-empirical’-based epistemological scheme.
For example, the speculative theologians, especially those belonging to the
Mu’tazila rationalist theology school, engaged in pure rational dialectics
(jadal), made judgments on the basis of reasoned arguments, espoused ethi-
cal objectivism, conceived of the universe as a rationally integrated system,
and, generally speaking, “emphasized the authority of rational argument in
defining religious dogma and belief” (Dahlen, 2003, 72). This resulted in an
engendering of a distinctive epistemic system which was characterized by “a
unique universe of discourse with a specific terminology containing refer-
ences not generally found in legal discourse” (Dahlen, 2003).
By subscribing to ethical objectivism, the proponents of this epistemic
scheme considered humans capable of knowing/discovering the hikmat
(rationale) behind God’s commands and held the view that God is obliged
to command what is just for humanity (Dahlen, 2003, 74).
The Islamic philosophers, the falsafa, in many ways shared the epistemic
scheme of the mutakallimun as described above. In addition to that, falsafa
concerned themselves with issues pertaining to the process known as kashf-i
‘aqli (unveiling to the intellect), but, like the mutakallimun, their epistemic
scheme was not premised on a complete epistemological rupture from the
epistemic value of revelation or revealed law. Indeed, most philosophers, like
34 Epistemological imperative
the speculative theologians, were also jurists or had juristic training (Dahlen,
2003, 75). The philosophers’ epistemic scheme defined knowledge as ‘ilm
irtisami (science of representation) and this knowledge was constructed in
terms of “a mirror relationship between the knowing subject and the repre-
sented object, which is mirrored in the mental plane of existence” (Dahlen,
2003, 76).
The Islamic mystics’ epistemic scheme escaped the bounds of rational
speculation altogether and focused cognitively on the unveilings of the heart
(mukashafat-i qalbi) and the spirit by means of an esoteric initiation. This
epistemic scheme was partly a rejection of both Islamic logo- as well as
nomo-centrism. It provided no tangible criteria on which to judge validity
of knowledge because it considered God as the only true reality and source
of all knowledge (Dahlen, 2003, 77).
The final epistemic scheme in traditional Islamic epistemology as identified
by Dahlen is the ‘juristic-rational’ epistemic scheme. This epistemic scheme
was a result of a kind of reconciliation between the epistemological claims
of the ‘historical-empirical’ scheme and the idea, embraced by the jurists,
that non-textual-based sources of knowledge were useful in extrapolating,
in a logical manner, further truths from those found in the revealed texts. In
the words of Dahlen (Dahlen, 2003), in this epistemic scheme:

the domain of epistemic intellectual exercise was limited to the revealed

texts not by way of direct and comprehensive acquaintance with it, but
by way of developing the necessary skill to extrapolate from it. Similar
to the theologians and the philosophers, the jurists developed the latter
skill in the form of analogy or syllogism to make judgments over specific
issues, which are covered, in the revealed texts.
(78)

Unlike theologians whose methodology was concerned with the discovery of

daruri (immediate) knowledge, the jurists’ deductive method amounted to
no more than the muktasab (acquired) knowledge which by its very nature
is attained by means of inference and reasoning. The employment of ijtihad
(independent judgment) was permitted insofar as the questions it aimed to
find answers to were considered to be left unaddressed in the revealed
sources, as the views of the Prophet (and the Imams in the Shi’i tradition),
his major Companions and the supposed consensus of the early Muslim
generations were considered as hermeneutically most privileged.5 Therefore,
the jurists were unable to derive or engender any new legal forms but could
only engage in law-finding exercises within the epistemic limits explained
above (Dahlen, 2003, 77–78). It is important to note that throughout history
and until the present, the juristic-rational epistemic scheme was continuously
challenged and existed in tension with the historical-empirical scheme and
was becoming increasingly logocentric (Duderija, 2011) with logic overshad-
owing epistemology. In actual fact, the epistemological tensions and
 Epistemological imperative 35
dichotomies between all of the competing epistemic schemes have been and
continue to exist throughout history to the present, especially between the
two extremes of positivist historical-empirical and rationalist philosophical
schemes (Duderija, 2011).

The concept of Salafism and the nature

of traditional Islamic epistemology
In the context of describing the historical-empirical and juristic-rational6 tra-
ditional Islamic epistemic schemes, Dahlen referred to their past-oriented,
heavily textualist epistemological rationalizations and justifications of norma-
tive views and legal determinations. In the Sunni Islamic tradition, this view
has found expression in the concept of following in the footsteps of the righ-
teous early generations of Muslims known as the salaf as salih. In the sense
employed in juristic discourses, among the proponents of the juristic-rational
epistemic theme, this concept took form in the concept of taqlid; in the view
of the advocates of the historical-empirical epistemic scheme, it took the form
of ittiba’. Both of these concepts will be explained below. It is important to
note at this stage, and as shall be demonstrated below, that both of these
epistemic schemes share the common doctrine of the belief in the ‘sacred past’
and its corollary, the retrogressive nature of the post-salaf as salih history and
time. I refer to this aspect of traditional Islamic epistemology as Salafism or
the salafi worldview.
To understand Salafism and its contemporary epistemological implications
for progressive Muslim thought, we need to say more about the nature of
Islamic law and early Muslim history. Early Muslim history was characterized
by a number of very significant and, for subsequent generations of Muslims,
traumatic schisms and sectarian divisions which were both religious/theological
and political in nature. As a result of these developments, a number of compet-
ing theological and political doctrines among Muslims emerged which posed
not only a very significant political but also salvific problem for the post-early
Muslim community generations of Muslims who were strongly concerned
about establishing the correct parameters of doctrines, beliefs, and practices
considered to be in accordance with the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet.
One aspect of this struggle for religious legitimacy was by means of linking
one’s theological, political, or legal views to that of the salaf as salih which
would, thus, imbibe these competing factions with the sense of normativeness,
credibility, and authoritativeness. As a corollary, the salafi worldview can be
conceptualized in the idea of the ‘emulation-worthiness’ of the first-century reli-
gious and political authorities who were perceived as having remained faithful
to the teachings of the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet (i.e. Sunna) in
relation to ‘aqida (beliefs), manhaj (hermeneutics and legal theory), and ‘ibada
(worship), in contrast to those who were considered to have deviated from them.
Towards the end of the second Islamic century, this salafi-embedded
worldview started to significantly shape the epistemological boundaries of
36 Epistemological imperative
Islamic thought, especially in relation to the increased importance of Sunna
and its documentation in the form of hadith for the establishment of legal
and political systems in the ever-expanding Muslim empire. In this context,
in Sunnism, the mechanism that was developed to authenticate Sunna
depended epistemologically entirely on upholding the complete unblem-
ishedness of all of the Prophet’s Companions (and subsequent two early
generations of Muslims) in the above-mentioned divisions that plagued the
early Muslim community.
The increased epistemological importance of the salafi worldview is evi-
dent, for example, from the fact that the founders or initiators of the various
Islamic sciences sought the ideas and the views among the salaf as salih as
intellectual antecedents in order to bestow legitimacy to their respective dis-
ciplines (Chaumont, n.d., 901; Mourad, 2006, 199).
In this context Goldziher (1971) asserts that:

As such the imitation of the salaf, the pious ancestors who formed their
habits under the eyes and on the example of the prophet, became the
ideal of pious Muslims. Gradually Salafi, i.e. the one who imitates his
ancestors, becomes the supreme title of praise in pious society.
(31)

Similarly Ovamir (2011) highlights the centrality of the salaf in Sunni Islam:

the superiority and truth of the way of the first few generations of Mus-
lims, the salaf, has been a key theological premise of Sunni Islam, which
Sunni ulamā have tried to defend against incursions of intellectual
sophistication as well as foreign systems of reasoning and spirituality.
(344)

In the view of the traumatic divisions that characterized the early Muslim
community, the salafi worldview also implies a retrogressive view of the
nature of time and history following the period of salaf as salih “as history
was said to have been inevitably followed by a period of relaxation of stan-
dards, deviation and finally of division” (Chaumont, 1954–2003, 900).
According to this salafi mind-set, argues Al-Azmeh (1998):

[T]ime is not conceived as in itself the medium and instrument of change,

but rather as reappearance, re-enactment, after a period of abeyance,
degradation, descent into superstition and irrationalism; in other words
a combination of typology and the historicism of modernity.
(215–216)

These developments also had a profound effect on the nature of Islamic

law. In essence Islamic law can be characterized as being an accretive,
ascriptive, and socially constructed (Souaiaia, 2006, 163–164)7 discourse
 Epistemological imperative 37
embedded in the larger oral-based framework that privileges ‘authoritative
parlance’, to use Souaiaia’s phrase, of certain individuals (such as the
Prophet Muhammad, Caliphs, founders of the madhahib, etc.) considered
to be authoritative by the Muslim community (Souaiaia, 2008). By accre-
tive it is meant in a sense that Islamic law expanded over time through the
interaction between the oral discourse with the static Qur’anic enuncia-
tions to adapt to changing times and circumstances. In other words, author-
ity in Islamic law is first and foremost epistemic in nature (Hallaq, 2001,
257). As a result of the (legal) reasoning (ijtihad) of authoritative individu-
als over time, accumulation of legal precedents took place and became
considered as binding by the Muslim community, especially by the propo-
nents of the juristic-rational epistemic scheme, because these were seen to
be in accordance with the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunna. This, in
turn, gave rise to the concept of taqlid. In his discussion of this principle
and its function in Islamic jurisprudence, Jackson (1996) argues that taqlid
is not so much related to the notion of it precluding novel interpretations,
as it is commonly held, but rather as a means of validating jurist’s legal
interpretation ‘retrojectively’ (i.e. by searching to back the interpretation
with an established source of authority). Furthermore, Hallaq considers
that taqlid not only functioned as an effective means of legal change but
even more so than ijtihad itself because, unlike ijtihad, taqlid-based inter-
pretations were seen as to be loyal to and continuous with the ongoing
tradition (Jackson, 1996, 239). Taqlid is, therefore, to be seen as a herme-
neutical mechanism whereby rather than abandoning existing legal theory
rules in favor of new interpretations of the relevant textual indicants found
in the Qur’an and hadith without precedent, a jurist develops new inter-
pretations within the framework of the established madhhab-based herme-
neutic. Hallaq, therefore, considers taqlid as a reasoned defense of a
particular legal doctrine based on a madhhab-based overall methodology
and hermeneutic. This allegiance to the madhhab-based legal theory her-
meneutic by the means of taqlid was derived from the consensus of scholars
belonging to a particular madhhab.8 This legal mechanism’s primary pur-
pose was to ensure that the legal opinion of a jurist is able to gain wide(er)
acceptance by embedding it into the ‘sacred past’. For the madhhab-based
approach, this consensus of madhhab scholars is the ultimate criterion in
determining the compliance or otherwise of a particular legal principle with
the Qur’an and the Sunna and not the hadith, as in the case of the ahl al-
hadith manhaj (Brown, 1996, 20). Therefore, the jurists belonging to one
of the madhahib rather than opting for acceptance of a hadith unknown
to previous authorities belonging to the same school, the majority of
fuqaha, especially those of the lower status, were faithful and obedient
(muqallid) to their own school’s hermeneutic.9 It is important to keep in
mind that each madhhab did have scholars who were associated with it
and specialized in hadith sciences, but the predominant madhhab view was
a result of the overall madhhab legal hermeneutic (Brown, 1996).
38 Epistemological imperative
The proponents of the historical-empirical episteme, however, reject the
broader, hierarchical hermeneutic upon which the practice of taqlid is based.
Instead, they call for a supposedly unmediated return to the Qur’an and
Sunna in accordance with their above-outlined hermeneutic/epistemic
scheme. Taqlid, for them, is tantamount to innovation, bida’a, and a devia-
tion from Sunna (Brown, 1996, 28–29). Instead, the proponents of the
historical-empirical episteme consider that the uncontested adherence to
hadith, as the sole vehicle for the perpetuation and depository of Sunna,
termed ittiba’, is the only way of remaining truthful to the Prophet’s Sunna
(Robson, 1951, 101).
It is important to highlight that, these disagreements notwithstanding, the
salafi-embedded worldview understood as the ontological, epistemological,
and hermeneutical privileging of the ‘sacred past’ and the retrogressive
nature of the history and time is shared by adherents of both historical-
empirical and juristic-rational traditional epistemological schemes. Conse-
quently, for both the concept of traditional ‘authenticity’ (asala) is solely
conceptualized in terms of “contingent linking of both past and future by
the ontological void of today” (Al-Azmeh, 1998, 48). Hence, the proponents
of both epistemic schemes are trapped in a form of what I term to be episte-
mological arrest if not regressivism. In this context, it is important to note
that the progressive Muslim scholars’ critique is in large measure primarily
directed at this salafi, epistemologically static if not regressive worldview to
which both the historical-empirical and juristic-rational traditional epistemic
schemes subscribe.

Epistemic responses in the age of modernity

As outlined above with the advent of modernity, the Islamic tradition was
faced with a new epistemic condition. The Islamic tradition developed three
distinct approaches to it. Dahlen terms them Islamic traditionalism, Islamic
modernism, and Islamic postmodernism. Before we describe the Islamic tra-
ditionalist epistemic scheme, it is important to note at the very outset that
the Islamic modernist and postmodernist epistemic schemes cannot be made
sense of unless we become aware that they are deeply rooted “in modern
post-renaissance conceptions of being, knowledge and human agency”
(Dahlen, 2003, 348; cf. Duderija, 2011) which, unlike the traditional Islamic
episteme briefly described above, are based on decidedly ‘subjectivist’ epis-
temology, albeit in different forms.
Islamic traditionalism as a modern contemporary phenomenon grounds
its epistemological basis decidedly and primarily on a critique of modernity.
It is postulated on a clear delineation of the pre-modern and modern con-
cepts of reality. It insists on modernity adjusting to the imperatives of tra-
ditional religion and not the other way around (Dahlen, 2003, 113). Its view
of tradition is idealized. Moreover, the sources of this tradition are linked
to a largely rationalized range of norms which, in turn, are distinctly
 Epistemological imperative 39
contrasted to those of the modern condition (Arjomand, 1984, 195). Its
core imperative is to defend the image of Islamic law as a transcendent and
therefore immutable embodiment of the Divine Will. Hence for the propo-
nents of this epistemic scheme, any contemporary issues are to conform to
the dictates of the epistemologically pre-modern Islamic legal tradition. In
the words of Dahlen (2003):

Traditionalism places the accent on the historical continuity of ideas and

generally [does] not consider recent history as a major rupture with the
past that has decisively interrupted the pertinence of the authority of the
accumulated legal tradition. Rather than being concerned with main-
taining status quo, legal change is, in other words, past-oriented and
justified, in coherence with traditional philosophical and cosmological
principles.
(114)

While Islamic traditionalism can accommodate change and allows for new
interpretations, it does so within the confines of a pre-modern epistemologi-
cal and hermeneutical framework. Hence, Islamic traditionalist epistemology
holds firmly onto the epistemological paradigm of the classical Islamic tradi-
tion by identifying legal epistemology (which is also incorporated into its
methodology) with Aristotelian syllogism. From a philosophical vantage
point, this epistemology is pre-critical, as it views all matters pertaining to
cognition through the vista of a basic sacred cosmology. Islamic traditional-
ism is also pre-modern in the sense that it seeks to “preserve a position
anterior to modernity (that is, anti-modern, philosophically speaking) based
on traditional theological and legal philosophy” (Dahlen, 2003, 32).
The second Islamic epistemic scheme in the context of a new epistemic
condition is what Dahlen refers to as Islamic modernism. By being represen-
tative of the appearance of an autonomous critical consciousness, Islamic
modernism represents a departure from the entrenched pre-modern para-
digm in the realm of epistemology. Therefore it is to be viewed as a project
which wishes to reconcile or accommodate religion with the scientific struc-
tures of modernity which is emancipated from the traditional theological and
legal philosophy (Dahlen, 2003, 32). According to Dahlen, unlike Islamic
traditionalism, Islamic modernism employs specifically modern Western
methods of explanation and interpretation so as to expand the traditional
definition of ijtihad and istinbad (referential reasoning). Moreover, in con-
trast to the Islamic traditionalists, the proponents of the Islamic modernist
episteme seek legal change at the level of fundamentals (usul) and expand
the activities of ijtihad in the areas of theology and ethics. Islamic modernism
interprets modernity through its own religious beliefs-based conceptual vista
and as such it exhibits a strong element of eclecticism in terms of its incor-
poration of modern thought into the Islamic tradition (Dahlen, 2003, 151).
It relies significantly on secular philosophy and science to construct its own,
40 Epistemological imperative
at times, significantly distinctive religious claims. It rearranges traditional
Islamic sciences and as such represents a theoretical break from conventional
legal wisdom of classical Islam. Islamic modernist episteme is also often
dismissive of the elitist and esoteric orientations in the Islamic tradition. Its
epistemology is conceptually oriented and its interpretations of revealed
sources of law, while innovative, does not systematically engage with the
traditional discourse of Islamic law. Hence, Islamic modernism considers
the efforts of past communities of interpretation as primarily obstructing the
‘genuine’ understanding of the revealed texts and is strongly critical of the
doctrine of taqlid as espoused by the proponents of the juristic-rational epis-
teme (Dahlen, 2003). In the words of Dahlen (Dahlen, 2003):

While differentiated from one another in their concepts of religious reform,

the Islamic modernists are related in their criticism of the exclusiveness of
religion in traditional Islamic scientific inquiry and in their hailing of
human reason as qualified to deduce and enact laws that complement or
even supersede fiqh. While partly rooted in the Islamic tradition, their epis-
temological standards are given a broader (natural law) or more modern
scientific conception (codified law) than that of traditional Islam, laying the
ground for the unequivocal secularization of knowledge.
(151)

Islamic postmodernism, the final epistemic scheme in the new epistemic condi-
tion of modernity as identified by Dahlen, constitutes a further paradigm shift
from traditional Islamic epistemic schemes as well as Islamic traditionalism
and modernism. This episteme shares many but not all elements of the post-
modern de-constructivist epistemology. These common elements include the
emphasis on hermeneutical pluralism, epistemological relativism, and skepti-
cism (Dahlen, 2003, 370). This epistemic scheme considers all human knowl-
edge as hypothetical and at best conjectural. In the realm of epistemology as
well as methodology, Islamic postmodernism incorporates the paradigm of
modernity to an extent that surpasses Islamic modernism. Unlike Islamic mod-
ernism’s subscription to rational criticism for the purposes of ascertaining the
truth, Islamic postmodernism is post-critical in a sense that it accepts episte-
mological relativism and rejects metanarratives, universal reason, and cultural
essentialism (Dahlen, 2003, 32). Put succinctly, Dahlen concludes that Islamic
postmodernism problematizes modernity, but, unlike Islamic modernism, it
does not present a conscious attempt to Islamize it (Dahlen, 2003, 14).

Progressive Muslims’ critique of traditional

Islamic epistemology
The political scientist Jytte Klausen’s empirical study of some 300 leading
Muslim intellectual and prominent persons in over half a dozen European
countries conducted in the mid-2000s found out that a distinctly “European
 Epistemological imperative 41
Islam” is emerging, an Islam that is “based on a new epistemology of faith
and a new hermeneutics of textual interpretation” (Klausen, 2005, 204–
205). In line with this finding in the rest of this chapter, I present the argu-
ments of three progressive Muslim scholars who have systematically critiqued
traditional Islam’s epistemic schemes (especially the historical-empirical,
juristic-rational, and mystic)10 and who have expressed their support for the
development of alternative epistemological schemes. They include Muham-
mad Sharour, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and Abdolkarim Soroush. What is com-
mon to all of these voices is their critique of the salafi nature of traditional
Islamic epistemology and the belief in epistemological progressivism as dis-
cussed in the book’s introduction and in the first chapter.

Muhammad Shahrur
One contemporary progressive-minded Muslim scholar whose work con-
sciously aims to depart from or goes beyond the traditional Islamic epis-
teme is that of Muhammad Shahrur (b.1938). In his influential work The
Qur’an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur,11
Shahrur explicitly aims to interpret the foundational texts of the Islamic
tradition on the basis of an epistemology which goes “beyond the episte-
mology of traditional Islamic scholarship” (Shahrur, 2009, 1). Shahrur’s
understanding of Islam has been described as premised on the belief that
“Islam possesses a universal epistemology that encourages rationalism,
human liberty”, and the appropriation of knowledge based on an “abso-
lute consistency between the Qur’anic worldview and his own modern and
rational experiences of reality” (Shahrur, 2009, xxi). Generally speaking,
Shahrur views that the contemporary discussions surrounding the relation-
ship between religion and modernity are best conceived as a clash of two
types of epistemologies: “one based on modern methods of historicism,
historical-critical research, and dialectical, philosophical thinking, and one
that is based on medieval terminologies which have come to us as empty
signifiers that have lost their meaning” (Shahrur, 2009, 364). In other
words, for Shahrur, the semiotic content of latter epistemology was rele-
vant in its own political and historical context in which it was engendered.
However, for Shahrur, in the context of the new modern epistemic condi-
tion, it has become anachronistic because modern epistemologies are
rooted and stem from the study of contemporary objective reality while
traditional epistemologies avoid this reality by clinging onto the obsolete
and forever-vanished past (Shahrur, 2009)
As such Shahrur is very critical of the salafi nature of traditional Islamic
epistemic schemes that, as discussed above, Dahlen (2003, 14) has described
as “past-oriented and justified”. This is so because these traditional Islamic
epistemologies, for Shahrur, are unable to bring about any progress (in an
epistemological and civilizational sense) to the Islamic civilization. There-
fore, Shahrur considers that a new epistemological approach to interpreting
42 Epistemological imperative
Islam’s foundational texts and the inherited Islamic tradition (turath) is nec-
essary to achieve this.
The first epistemological (and ontological) tool that Shahrur employs in
favor of a new episteme is the argument that what he terms the contemporary
post-Prophetic epistemological epoch “no longer requires God’s prophets and
messengers because human beings have matured to such an extent that they
can, without direct interventions from God, confidently explore the laws of
the universe” (Shahrur, 2009, 2)12 This, in turn, continues Shahrur, enables
humankind to be sovereign legislators in their societies. Therefore, Shahrur
insists that the Qur’an,13 as the ultimate expression and the seal of the first
Prophet-dependent epistemological epoch, ought to be understood in the light
of contemporary knowledge. In this context, Shahrur (2009) writes:

Just as in the seventh-century people understood Allah’s Book with the

help of what was then contemporary knowledge, in the twenty-first cen-
tury we must understand it with what is now contemporary knowledge.
Only through such a truly contemporary rereading of Allah’s Book can
we succeed in achieving real reform and a successful renewal of Islamic
thought.
(2)

Acknowledging that he is radically departing from the existing traditional

methodologies and scholarly disciplines, Shahrur proposes a new ways of
conceptualizing and interpreting Al-Kitab (and the Sunna and hadith) based
on certain linguistic and philosophical-hermeneutical principles. Here I will
primarily focus on the epistemologico-philosophical principles due to the
subject matter of this chapter.
Shahrur’s most important epistemologico-philosophical principle with
which he approaches and interprets the Al-Kitab is his tripartite concept of
existence, which is illustrative of his thinking regarding the nature of the
concept of development and progress. Shahrur employs the model to explain
both the nature of the universe as a whole as well as to analyze the nature
of human societies. The tripartite model aims to shed light on the “dialectical
relationship between movement and stasis in cosmos and society on the basis
of three coordinates: 1: ‘being’ (al-kaynuna), 2: ‘progressing’ (al-sayrura),
and 3: ‘becoming’ (al-ṣayrura). For the purposes of this chapter, what is
relevant to our discussion is that Shahrur considers that ‘being’ (existence)
and ‘progressing’ (time) are inextricably linked to that of ‘becoming’ (trans-
formation) and that the quality of ‘progressing’ will inevitably be present in
our earthly existence until what the Qur’an calls the Final Hour. Shahrur
(2009) sums up the dialectical relationship between the three elements of the
tripartite mode as follows:

“progressing” or time cannot be removed from human existence,

“being” can ontologically not NOT exist, and becoming is historical
 Epistemological imperative 43
change (al-sayruriyya al-ta’rikhiyya) which human beings, in exercising
their free will, either accelerate or slow down but can never stop.
(16)

With this model, Shahrur challenges and wishes to free the Islamic tradition
from its traditionally embedded regressive view of the nature of history and
time embodied in the concept of Salafism as explained above.14 In this con-
text, Shahrur (2009) asserts:

In order to solve the current problems of the Arab-Muslim world we are

required to use the ideas and thoughts of our most creative minds even
if their proposals appear unusual or unfamiliar. But the familiar and the
well-acquainted are often insufficient to solve the challenging problems
of our ever-more-complex world. We want this volume to be perceived
as a relentless critique of all attempts to reform Islam by a return to
seventh-century Arabia and through an adoption of the archaic world-
views of our salaf forefathers. Such reforms, we believe, are utterly fruit-
less and bound to fail because they possess an inherently atavistic nature
that is incompatible with the modern episteme that demands plurality,
tolerance, and progressive thinking.
(1)

Based on this tripartite philosophical model, Shahrur argues that humanity,

in terms of its beliefs, has gone through a process of transformation (becom-
ing) from the belief in “personified, concrete godhead to belief in an abstract,
invisible God” (Shahrur, 2009, 17). Shahrur considers the Islamic credo of
“there is no god but God” to be the most advanced and most abstract form
of belief that can be shared by everyone. It is this belief that Shahrur terms
al-islam. Importantly, Shahrur forms the view that what pertains to the evo-
lutionary nature of beliefs is also valid for ethics, morality, and legislation.
In this context, Shahrur (2009) writes:

Think of the creation of human rights, the abolition of slavery and the
emancipation of women, all of which are indications that a new level of
civilisation has been reached as the result of a post-prophetic way of
legislation. It would be an extreme regression if we tried to establish a
modern society on the basis of premodern values and bygone norms.
Our task today is not to regress to a state of society that is less complex
than the previous one but to develop the most advanced forms of civil
society whose impact can be felt by every despotic ruler in this world.
(2)

Elsewhere he unambiguously asserts that “legal rulings do change as a result

of epistemological and scientific developments that take place in our societ-
ies” (Shahrur, 2009, 496). Therefore, in no unclear terms, Shahrur is a
44 Epistemological imperative
believer in what we can call epistemological progressivism when it comes to
understanding religion and religious sciences.
In line with this approach to epistemology, Shahrur considers that the
prophet’s understanding of the Al-Kitab is also not final because this would
imply that the prophet himself has a quality of ‘self-sufficiency’ which would
amount to shirk or blasphemy. Shahrur argues that humanity at large
through the process of ‘becoming’ gradually accumulates knowledge and
expands it (Shahrur, 2009, 485–486). Based on this understanding of the
nature of knowledge, Shahrur forms the view that Al-Kitab always allows
its readers to understand the text in a contemporary manner (qira’at
mu’assira) and therefore in the light of the contemporary episteme.
Importantly, Shahrur’s work is also a novel attempt to define the nature
and the scope of the concept of Sunna in relation to that of the Qur’an and
hadith body of texts which has important epistemological (and hermeneuti-
cal) implications. Hence they warrant examination here. Before we do so,
some broader contextualizing of the subject matter is in order.
The Islamic tradition developed a theory of Qur’an’s reliance on Sunna
(i.e. the Prophet’s example), which over time found its expression primarily
in form of ‘authentic’ hadith reports (interpreted on the basis of a particular
hermeneutic)15 about actions and utterances of the Prophet – for the pur-
poses of clarification and elaboration of the Qur’an’s theological, exegetical,
legal, and ethico-moral principles bringing Sunna to a quasi-ontologically
equal status with that of the Qur’an and privileging it hermeneutically over
everything else, including that of the reason or, at times, even other Qur’anic
evidence. Shahrur laments this development and aims “to show that the
sunna of the Prophet is culturally and historically conditioned and that it
lacks the universality of Allah’s book” (Shahrur, 2009, 72). By making a
distinction between the prophetic (nubuwwa) and messenger (risala) aspects
of Muhammad’s divine mission, he argues that the former deals with the
universalist dimension of the divine message as embodied in the Al-Kitab.
Shahrur restricts the nubuwwa aspect to eschatological and purely theologi-
cal issues that are ambiguous and transcend the earthly objective reality. The
latter dimension of Muhammad’s divine mission is concerned solely with
definite, unambiguous, and objective reality that is subject to human faculties
and senses. He argues that Muhammad’s mission as concretely manifested
in his life and example (i.e. his Sunna) consisted of both of these elements
(Shahrur, 2009, 73). Applying his tripartite model above, Shahrur argues
that only the Qur’an possesses the ontological quality of “being in and for
itself”, and not the Sunna. He defines the latter as Prophet’s own human-
bound, non-absolute ijtihad/interpretation/understanding of the Al-Kitab
(Shahrur, 2009, 101–102). After critiquing the traditional hadith-dependent
concept of Sunna,16 Shahrur argues for a specific and circumstantial nature
of the concept of Sunna of the Prophet based on five principles, including:
i) the idea that Prophet’s decisions were conditioned by his historical context;
ii) his ijtihads in restricting the allowed did not need divine revelation; iii) his
 Epistemological imperative 45
restrictions of the “unrestricted permissions” (halal mutlaq) were subject to
constant corrections as a result in change in circumstances in his own life;
iv) his ijtihads, unlike revelations, were not infallible; and v) his ijtihads,
regardless if they are of prophetic or non-prophetic nature, do not constitute
Islamic legislation (Shahrur, 2009, 101–102).
In concluding his section on Sunna, Shahrur (2009) asserts the
following:

We have demonstrated that is it necessary to place sunna into the epis-

temological, cultural and political context of seventh century Arabia. We
showed that we, living in the twenty-first century, must be critical of the
sunna’s contingent and context-bound nature as well as of formulations
and definitions of sunna that Islamic fiqh invented during the seventh to
the ninth centuries.
(108)

Coupled with his belief in the need to interpret the Qur’an in the light of our
modern episteme, such a concept of Sunna clearly presents a critique of its
epistemological status in traditional Islamic epistemic schemes and a depar-
ture from an entirely past-oriented and justified epistemology of the tradi-
tional Islamic epistemic schemes. It, instead, endorses epistemic
progressivism.

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Another progressive Muslim scholar who has recognized the need for an
‘updating’ of traditional Islamic epistemic schemes is Khaled Abou El Fadl.
Not unlike Dahlen, El Fadl divides epistemic schemes17 in traditional Islam
into: humanistic-philosophical, sufi-perennial, scripturalist (characterized by
El Fadl as heavily textualist), and Islamic law based. He forms the view that
each of these arose in a very different social context and had different objec-
tives. While the first two were elitist in nature, the third was popularistic,
arising after the numerous sectarian and creedal conflicts in early Muslim
history had already spread. Importantly, El Fadl (2014, 364) believes that
the Islamic law-based epistemic scheme often did not engage in questions of
morality and ethics for practical purposes and because of the very nature and
function of legal systems (which have to avoid the appearance of being
unmethodical, illogical, and overly subjective). This had the effect of engen-
dering a de facto separation of Islamic ethics and morality from Islamic law.
El Fadl forms the view that this separation of law from ethics in classical
Islam in the context of contemporary epistemological cosmopolitanism pro-
vides an enormous challenge for contemporary Islamic thought which needs
to be addressed urgently.
El Fadl critiques traditional epistemology, especially its Puritan-Salafi
version (which corresponds with Dahlen’s ‘historical-empirical’) on the
46 Epistemological imperative
basis of its lack of dynamism, epistemological openness, and modesty with
respect to its unrealistic and naive epistemological promises of having
access to completely determinable, objective, and unmediated access to
God’s Will. El Fadl considers that this traditional epistemology is also at
odds with the Qur’an’s own approach to epistemology, as will be shown
below.
One element of El Fadl’s epistemological critique concerns hadith episte-
mology as developed and championed in traditional Islam, whose epistemo-
logical claims in the light of contemporary epistemology, for El Fadl, become
largely untenable. In this context El Fadl (2014) states:

The mechanical and nearly mathematical methodology that Ahl al-hadith

apply to the hadith and Sunna in light of our modern epistemological
knowledge about reality, meaning, fiction, archetypes, symbolism, phe-
nomenology, and especially history is untenable. . . . In fact the oral
reports that are commonly titled the books of hadith often construct and
narrate a performance – a performance that preserves a memory of the
prophet in some form but that also documents the epistemological atti-
tude of early Muslim generations.
(317)

While he still sees value in preserving and studying this body of knowledge
as it can be mined for its historical, theological, ethical, and moral insights,
this process of study ought to be achieved by means of an “epistemological
arsenal that is available to us today – not through the epistemological tools
that existed more than ten centuries ago” (El Fadl, 2014, 318). El Fadl also
forms the view that the traditional Islamic sciences approached this body
of knowledge too literally, a feature which contemporary Muslims are, for
reasons stated earlier, to avoid at every cost. In this context El Fadl (2014)
writes:

the books of hadith are replete with dramatized performances that are
deeply embedded in the epistemological and phenomenological dialec-
tics of the first centuries of Islam and therefore are not to be understood
as strictly factual.
(318)

El Fadl strongly critiques the idea of the epistemological promise inherent in

the concept of Salafism described above. Not unlike Shahrur, El Fadl argues
that such a regressive view of epistemology is also at odds with the Qur’anic
approach to epistemology. He characterizes this approach as initially operat-
ing within the epistemological limits of the mentality and worldview of the
Qur’an’s first community of listeners. However, it also contains strong epis-
temologically progressive impulses which not only permit a break from the
 Epistemological imperative 47
original epistemic condition but are accommodative of new ones. In El Fadl’s
(2014) words:

So when the Qur’an, for example, invokes ethical and moral terminol-
ogy, it necessarily assumes a preexisting epistemological context in
which it operates and also a moral trajectory that it seeks to engage and
negotiate.
(30)

At a more general level, El Fadl basically advocates for a dynamic and progres-
sive view of human epistemology and the need for Muslims and the Islamic
tradition to seriously negotiate the moral progress and epistemological growth
which was brought about by modern historical experiences resulting in what
he calls an ‘epistemological overlapping consensus’. El Fadl forms the view
that this is epistemological overlapping consensus to be conceptualized and
considered as a product of both Muslims and non-Muslims and their respec-
tive civilizations (El Fadl, 2014, 377). In this context El Fadl (2014) writes:

Muslims have to be intimately connected with all moral progress and

epistemological growth, learning from and, in turn, influencing it. As the
Qur’an emphasizes, the imperative confronting Muslims is to under-
stand the moral and ethical and epistemological overlapping consensus
that exists in this globalized world, critique it, and improve on it – grow
with it, and seek to establish a new epistemological, moral and ethical
realization. Along this path and process, the Qur’an provides moral and
ethical directives as well as epistemological illustrations.
(388)

Moreover, El Fadl has developed a precise three-step methodology regarding

how the socio-legal, moral, and ethical commandments in the Qur’an are to
be approached in the light of this prevalent moral, ethical, and epistemologi-
cal overlapping consensus. This three-step methodology can be described as
follows:

1 the interpreter of God’s commandments and God’s higher law must

understand the epistemological paradigms that God’s commandments
had to negotiate at the time of revelation;
2 the interpreter must study and make every effort to understand the
epistemological positioning of the same problem and issues raised by
the commandment but in its contemporary context and circumstance;
and most critically
3 the interpreter must seek to understand the moral and ethical objectives
and trajectories set in motion and direction of the commandment.
(El Fadl, 2014, 373)
48 Epistemological imperative
El Fadl (2014, 373) considers this approach to be epistemological insofar as
it seeks to understand and discover “the moral objectives behind the semiot-
ics of the text and the ethical trajectories recognized and affirmed by the
divine text”.
One important element of El Fadl’s epistemic approach is his employment
of the epistemic category of ‘reasonableness’ as a criterion for evaluating of
legal, moral, and ethical determinations in the Islamic tradition in the light
of the prevalence of the overlapping epistemic consensus. El Fadl considers
that this quality of reasonableness is sorely lacking in the contemporary
approaches to Islamic law and ethics. El Fadl defines reasonableness as sig-
nifying “the idea of moderation and balance, or what is fair and sensible”
and an epistemic category that “in most cases translates into a normative
value about what ought to be actively and purposefully sought” (El Fadl,
2014, 346). However, the epistemic category of reasonableness is not the
same as rationality or rationalism. El Fadl argues that the former differs from
the latter by the virtue of it being a more contextual, less determinable, and
more subjective process of assessment about what the limits of rationality in
any specific context and its intended, context-specific objectives are (El Fadl,
2014, 347).
Importantly, from a methodological perspective, El Fadl has developed
three evaluative categories which assist in analyzing the episteme of reason-
ableness. These include:

1 proportionality (tanasub) between means and ends;

2 balance (tawazun) between all valid interests and roles; and
3 measuredness (talazum) in what determinations are tailored to claims
so as to preserve reciprocity between agents acting in a social setting.
(El Fadl, 2014, 346–347)

El Fadl adds that while we should not consider any of these categories on
their own as determinative, each can be employed as a methodological tool
to assist us in ascertaining if a particular legal judgment, decision, or inter-
pretation is balanced, fair, and relevant, and therefore reasonable (El Fadl,
2014, 347).
Based on the above-described approaches to and conceptualization of
contemporary epistemology and its function in relation to the Islamic tradi-
tion, El Fadl argues that there is a need for an epistemic reformation. El
Fadl identifies a methodology of Islamic epistemology in the modern age
which “avoids the twin evils of standardless relativism and intolerant and
despotic absolutism” (El Fadl, 2015, 480) that is closely related to his
views on the concept of reasonableness as discussed above and which can
serve as a platform for epistemic reformation. In this context he argues that
Muslims can take recourse to three epistemological concepts in the Islamic
heritage on the basis of which they can integrate shifts in human conscious-
ness into it as these shifts “are made necessary by the reality of an
 Epistemological imperative 49
ever-creative and -creating God” (El Fadl, 2014, 482). These concepts are:
haqq, hikma, and ma‘arifa. El Fadl defines haqq as “the true nature of
things or the inherent truthful nature and essence of things” (El Fadl,
2014). The concept of hikma is conceptualized as righteousness or balance
of truths in relation to haqq. It has the quality of ‘progressing’18 and being
more complex with progress and growth of human consciousness. Ma‘arifa
constitutes the way to knowing haqq. In his (El Fadl, 2014) words:

Restated, haqq is at a level of understanding that requires juhd [striving

and struggle] – a serious form of intellectual jihad; hikma is a broader
perspective of haqq in its totality; and ma‘arifa is the instrumentalities
and the mechanics of knowing.
(481)

Haqq, by virtue of the fact that it corresponds to the true nature of things,
is considered to be static and non-shifting while hikma is shifting because in
the view of El Fadl “we cannot understand the true relationship of things
before we receive a certain level of awareness and consciousness about what
actually exists” (El Fadl, 2014). Furthermore, El Fadl argues, ma‘arifa, or
knowing, “is the study of consciousness required to comprehend the haqq
and evaluate hikma, and because human consciousness is constantly shifting
and evolving, the constituent elements of hikma are constantly changing and
evolving as well” (El Fadl, 2014). Hence, knowing or ma‘arifa, is also by its
nature dynamic and evolving since it is a secondary principle in relation to
hikma. El Fadl laments the fact that in contemporary Islam the concept of
hikma has lost its element of ‘shifting’ and dynamism. This has had an unfor-
tunate effect on ma’arifa too. In this context he (El Fadl, 2014) asserts:

If one can imagine that the equations of hikma for one age become
inadequate for another, you can then say this applies tenfold or even a
hundredfold to the instrumentalities [ma‘arifa] of reaching this hikma.
(482)

Therefore, El Fadl’s scholarship provides us with important methodological

insights into how to deal with the impasse of retrogressive and static tradi-
tional Islamic epistemology in the context of the modern age.

Abdolkarim Soroush
Soroush’s scholarship is probably the most detailed and most systematic
epistemological critique of traditional Islamic epistemic schemes from a per-
spective of historicist philosophy of religion. His critique is based on two
broad epistemological cum hermeneutical theories. The first theory is known
as The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge developed in the
late 1980s and the second one is termed The Expansion of the Prophetic
50 Epistemological imperative
Experience. In general terms the subject matter of the latter concerns histori-
cal contingency of the Prophet’s own revelatory experience and its impact
on the nature of revelation and the former places the concept of religion and
its understanding on the same epistemological level as any other form of
human knowledge (Soroush, 2009, xviii).
Before we examine the two theories in some detail, a few general com-
ments regarding Soroush’s approach to knowledge and its nature and his
criticism of traditional Islamic epistemic schemes are in order.
Soroush’s approach to the Islamic tradition, like that of other progressive
Muslim scholars (Duderija, 2011), has been described as Neo-Mu’tazilite
(that is Neo-Rationalist) in nature whose implications are wide ranging and
are tantamount to a complete paradigm shift in Muslim religious thought
(Soroush, 2009, xvii). Soroush, broadly speaking, considers that questions
pertaining to the nature of religious epistemology are of paramount impor-
tance for the study of the cultural history of religion as well as philosophy
of religion because they permit religion, as a source of truth, to be potentially
reconciled with the other two sources of truth in contemporary times, namely
human science and history (Soroush, 2009, 71).
Soroush’s epistemological position has been labelled as critical realism. For
the purposes of this chapter, we shall describe and define critical rationalism
in very broad terms as this term will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter on the imperative of religious pluralism in progressive Muslim
thought. Critical realism is conceptualized by Soroush (Soroush, 2009, 157)
as a “collective, ceaseless, interminable and undogmatic process that is open
to criticism and refinement”. Importantly, for Soroush, critical realism
applies equally to all forms of knowledge, including that pertaining to reli-
gion (Soroush, 2009). Of course, this view of epistemology is in great affinity
with that of weak postmodernism discussed in the first chapter as being
representative of progressive Muslim thought. Dahlen (2003) situates
Soroush’s thought, epistemologically as follows:

While he aims to open up a critical debate on epistemology, interpreta-

tion, and historicity, predisposed by deconstructionism, he still prefers
to situate himself within the Islamic tradition and not break with it. But
the fact remains that Sorush’s effort is to largely replace, the traditional
epistemic schemes and the traditional ethico-juristic synthesis with a
post-positivistic differentiation and a poststructuralist extension of the
various scientific disciplines. By employing a similar second-order epis-
temology in the analysis of theology and law as well as mysticism and
philosophy, his purpose is also to ‘humanise’ and ‘historicise’ these reli-
gious discourses all at once.19
(251–252)

For Dahlen, Soroush’s approach to knowledge and its nature is inter-subjectivist.

This means that it shares common features with the philosophical concept of
 Epistemological imperative 51
relativism as far as this implies a process of disentangling epistemology from
metaphysics. Dahlen, however, warns us that Soroush’s rejection of founda-
tionalism does not automatically translate into epistemological relativism
(Dahlen, 2003, 314) “since the specific aim of the theory of contraction and
expansion is not to ‘periodise’ truth, but to describe the evolution of religious
knowledge” (Dahlen, 2003, 249).
Now let us explore more specifically on which grounds Soroush critiques
the traditional Islamic epistemic schemes. Soroush’s critique of traditional
Islamic epistemological schemes is a direct derivation of his respective theo-
ries identified above. He is convinced that the legal and ethical norms that
were inferred by traditional Muslim jurists and upheld as divine and sacred
are embedded in a pre-modern weltanschauung which is in complete ten-
sion with the ontology undergirding the concept of modernity (Dahlen,
2003). Moreover, Soroush forms the view that “an elementary criterion of
contemporary scientific epistemology” completely contradicts the idea sub-
scribed by the proponents of traditional Islamic epistemic schemes that
“legal norms are sacred, eternal or beyond human error” (Dahlen, 2003,
231). By basing himself on these and similar arguments, Soroush strikes at
the very heart of the classical Islamic legal tradition by questioning and, in
end effect, undermining the legitimacy of the traditional foundational the-
ory (usul ul fiqh) as espoused in traditional Islamic law (Dahlen, 2003,
250–251). Now let us briefly discuss his two theories from an epistemologi-
cal perspective.

Theory of the expansion of Prophetic experience

Soroush’s theory of the expansion of Prophetic experience is based on three
elements regarding the nature of such an experience, namely it being expe-
riential, evolutionary, and dialogical.
As to the first element of the nature of Prophethood, its experiential
nature, Soroush forms the view that Prophetic experience is a special kind
of religious experience or illumination that transcends the boundaries of
personal (and mystic) religious experience. Unlike the latter, Prophet’s reli-
gious experience has an element of ‘mission’ characterized by an unselfish
and principled sacrifice and resolute conviction to transform the world for
the better by following Divine commandments and injunctions. Although
this type of prophetic religious experience ends with the death of the Prophet,
the path to this Prophetic experience remains open to all his followers. The
Prophet’s religious experience was also evolutionary in the sense that it was
subject to further expansion and progression in terms of its excellence reach-
ing the stage where the Prophet’s persona became increasingly God-like and
whose experiences are permeated with divinity and endorsed by God. Finally,
the Prophet’s religious experience, unlike that of the hermit, was dialogical
in the sense that it was gradually forged in the crucible of the society/com-
munity in which he was fully partaking by means of dialectical interaction
52 Epistemological imperative
and dialogue (Soroush, 2009, 3–16). Based on these three elements of the
Prophet’s experience, Soroush (Soroush, 2009) asserts that:

Islam is not a book or an aggregate of words; it is a historical movement

and the history-incarnate of a mission. It is the historical extension of a
gradually-realised prophetic experience. The Prophet’s personality is the
core; it is everything that God has granted to the Muslim community.
Religion is woven through and through with this personality. . . . Reli-
gion is the Prophet’s inward and outward experience . . . Religion, then,
is the Prophet’s spiritual and social experience, and it is therefore subject
to him. And since these experiences are not arbitrary, but are founded
on the Prophet’s holy and divinely-sanctioned personality, it becomes
binding on all his followers, as well as on the Prophet himself.
(16)

Importantly, Soroush’ s theory postulates that because the path to Prophetic

religious experience is open to all of his followers who can further expand
and perpetuate it both inwardly (in the form of mystic thought) and out-
wardly in the arena of public social experiences (in the form of legal thought),
religion can be enriched and continually perfected (Soroush, 2009, 21).20
Soroush argues that although historically Islam had grown, developed, and
matured over time, from a certain historical point onwards, Muslims ceased
to develop new ideas and experiences and thus arrested its progressing epis-
temological potential. Now it is the task of all post-Prophetic-era Muslims
to take part in this process of perfection by being inspired by revelation, the
Prophet’s persona, and experience (Soroush, 2009, 21). As part of this pro-
cess, no one’s views and ideas are beyond criticism and questioning. Echoing
the views of Shahrur on the need to approach the Qur’an in the light of
contemporary knowledge and what El Fadl terms contemporary cosmopoli-
tan epistemic condition, Soroush insists that in today’s world Muslims, if
they are to stay true to revelation and the nature of Prophetic religious expe-
rience, need to develop a dynamic, non-dogmatic view of religion (including
not only fiqh but also religious knowledge and experience) and engage it in
the light of contemporary reality. This reality must be conceptualized as “a
vital element of religious experience” just as the reality of the original revela-
tory event was (Soroush, 2009, 21–23). Hence, like the other two scholars
under examination in this chapter, Soroush subscribes to the principle of
what could be termed the belief in epistemological progressivism.21

Theory of expansion and contraction of knowledge

Soroush’s second theory pertaining to expansion and contraction of religious
knowledge is in many ways an organic outgrowth of the first, although it
was developed earlier. It shifts the discourse from the discussion of religious
experience to that of religious knowledge. It is also postulated on the idea of
 Epistemological imperative 53
epistemological progressivism.22 The aim of the theory, at the most general
level, according to Soroush, is to elucidate the process “through which reli-
gion is understood and the manner in which this understanding undergoes
change” (Soroush, 2000, 34). The most foundational premise of the theory
is that “religion per se has no epistemological terrain that distinguishes it
from other fields of knowledge” (Soroush, 2009, 196). Rather, for Soroush,
religion is a conglomerate of propositions, belonging to different disciplines
all of which are humanely constructed, therefore error prone and subject to
evolution in understanding.
More specifically, the theory of expansion and contraction of knowledge
is concerned with developing a systematic methodology which would be
capable of performing a number of functions. In the words of Soroush
(2000), the most important functions include:

Reconciling eternity and temporality, the sacred and the profane; sepa-
rating constant and variant, form and substance; reviving innovative
adjudication in religion; finding courageous jurisconsults; reinvigorating
religious jurisprudence; changing the appearance while preserving the
spirit of religion; acquainting Islam with the contemporary age; estab-
lishing the new Islamic theology.
(30)

The basic point of departure of this theory, as noted above, is the idea that
while religion (al-din) is divine, complete, flawless, constant, and unchang-
ing, its understanding (ma ‘refat-e dini) is permanently subject to change and
insight. Hence, religious understanding is incomplete, error prone, culture
bound. This includes our knowledge of what constitutes the ‘constant’ and
the ‘variant’ elements of religion since these determinations a priori also fall
under the category of religious knowledge. As a corollary, the epistemic
categories of certainty and ambivalence themselves are subject to change
which would imply that certain things that were considered ambivalent
could become certain and vice versa (Soroush, 2000, 35).
Importantly, this understanding of religion, as in the case of the nature of
religious experience, itself evolves and transforms through the exercise of
reason. Since religious knowledge is basically like any other source of human
knowledge, evolution in human knowledge will affect religious understand-
ing and is in actual case the cause of its transformation and inevitable evolu-
tion (Soroush, 2000, 32). Soroush (2009) describes this aspect of his theory
as follows:

This is an epistemological/hermeneutical theory about understanding reli-

gion that accounts for the collective and human nature of religious knowl-
edge, treating it like other forms of knowledge and thus making it fallible,
constantly evolving and interactive with other human learning.
(x)
54 Epistemological imperative
Finally, Soroush considers that his theory of expansion and contraction of
religious knowledge applies across all of the Islamic epistemic schemes as
identified by Dahlen, including the theological (2000, 34–35). In this context
Soroush asserts that this theory is not merely an epistemological-interpretative
theory but that it is first and foremost a theological one (2000, 37–38). This
will become more evident when we discuss his views on religious pluralism
in the next chapter.

Conclusion
From what has been written above, we can conclude that the traditional
Islamic epistemic schemes due to their salafi and heavily textualist natures
are premised on what we term here epistemological arrest if not regression.
All three progressive Muslim scholars examined in this chapter critique these
elements of traditional Islamic epistemic schemes as they are considered to
be (epistemologically) outdated and, more importantly, present an obstacle
for a much-needed ‘reform’ of Islam in the light of the new epistemic
condition(s). As discussed above, the progressive Muslim scholars have also
put forward a number of alternative epistemological theories and method-
ologies which are premised on not only the possibility but desirability and
necessity of epistemological progressivism.

Notes
1 In the Foucault meaning of the concept of an episteme as a paradigm within a
particular discourse based on a common set of understandings about the basis of
knowledge within that discourse. See Foucault (1980, 197; 1972, 168).
2 See our discussion in the main text below.
3 This is so primarily for the sake of consistency in terminology and categories of
thought adopted.
4 They are meant to be conceived more as heuristic categories that have been sepa-
rated for analytical purposes, but in actual fact, a degree of overlap exists between
them.
5 See our discussion of the concept of Salafism in the main text below for more on
this.
6 In this section, we will refer to them as madhhab-based epistemology or
hermeneutic.
7 Meaning that Islamic law was significantly shaped by social, economic, and
political forces present during its formative period.
8 This consensus should not be confused with the later definition of it in form of
ijma’ but should be understood in terms of the agreed living practice constituting
sunna (Hallaq 2004, 110–112).
9 One of the reasons for this is the fact that the schools of law gained high prestige
in society and awarded a great deal of authority and reverence to their founding
fathers. On this, see Hallaq (2001).
10 Hence, in this chapter by the phrase ‘critique of traditional Islamic epistemic
schemes’, I exclusively refer to its historical-empirical, juristic-rational, and at
times elements of the mystic epistemic schemes.
11 This is a compilation of texts written by Shahrur over an extended period of
time. It includes the material from his controversial work Al-Kitab wa’l-Qur’an:
 Epistemological imperative 55
Qira’a mu’asira [The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Reading], pub-
lished in 1990.
12 Cf. Iqbal (2000).
13 He employs the word Al-Kitab instead for the reasons based on his broader lin-
guistic methodology which need not concern us here. By Al-Kitab, he actually
means the fixed text of the mushaf. To reflect this, I will also use the word
Al-Kitab instead of the al-Qur’an subsequently.
14 See chapter six for more on this.
15 See chapter eight for details.
16 See chapter eight for more details.
17 He refers to them as “religious trajectories on ethics and divinity”.
18 In the sense employed by Shahrur as described above.
19 It is worth repeating that the above quote from Dahlen applies equally to all other
progressive Muslim thinkers as defined in this study, as explained in the introduc-
tion and chapter one.
20 In his words, “A religion [such as Islam] that comes into being gradually will also
mature and grow sturdier and more perfected gradually”.
21 The word progressivism would have the same connotations as discussed in chap-
ter one, of course.
22 For example, Soroush (2009, 109) writes, “The history of religious knowledge is
testimony to the fact that religious knowledge constantly increases”.
3 The religious pluralism imperative

No one has considered the possibility that this unavoidable plurality of inter-
pretations, conceptions and sects, to which no religion is immune, might
have some other meaning and significance . . . Maybe it means that this plu-
rality is itself desirable. Maybe rightful guidance is broader than we had
imagined. Maybe salvation and felicity hinge on something else, something
beyond these antagonistic and divisive dogmas and particular conceptions.
(Soroush, 2009, 122)

In dealing with pluralism, Islamic tradition had actually found expression

in the pluralistic world of religions, which it acknowledged and evaluated
critically but never rejected as simply false.
(Sachedina, 2008, 124)

Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the main arguments employed by the proponents
of progressive Muslim thought for legitimizing the idea of divinely willed
religious pluralism in the context of the late modern episteme. This, by defi-
nition, involves tackling the topic of the salvation of the religious Other. In
this context, I examine the views of Abdolkarim Soroush and Tariq Rama-
dan as being most representative of this approach. However, to contextualize
the discussion, I start by briefly defining what is meant by the concepts of
‘religious pluralism’ and ‘the ethic of pluralism’ and how they played them-
selves out in Islamic history. As part of this process, I also trace the broad
approaches to the question of the salvation of the religious Other in the
classical Muslim scholarship. Since it would be anachronistic to apply, in a
epistemological sense, the modern understanding of the concept of pluralism,
including the religious,1 to that of the pre-modern sources of Islamic weltan-
schauung, I, in agreement with Mir, will make a distinction between the
concept of pluralism and ‘ethic of pluralism’ to suggest that the teachings of
the Qur’an and the normative conduct of the Prophet (specifically as mani-
fested in his Constitution of Medina document)2 while not conceptually iden-
tical with the modern concept of pluralism are, however, in complete
 Religious pluralism imperative 57
accordance with what Mir (2006, 11–12) terms the ethic of pluralism. In this
context, Mir makes the following remarks:

While it is true that the term ‘pluralism’ is a modern creation, it is also

true that the Qur’anic message is one that promotes an ethic of plural-
ism, and that the Prophet, aligning himself with the Qur’an’s vision for
society, did implement pluralist policies.
(Mir, 2006, 64)

The ethic of pluralism

Following Mir, I consider the concept of religious pluralism to be premised
on two considerations, namely coexistence of various religious groups with
their own legal and theological systems in one society and the idea that no
religious group can claim monopoly over ‘salvation’ (Mir, 2006, 11). The
notion of ‘ethic of pluralism’ is embodied in the idea of intrinsic metaphysical
unity between human beings. It is akin to the argument that in the soul of
each human being resides a spark of Divine flame which connects all of them
to the Divine as well as to each other. One consequence of this spiritual com-
monality/unity of the entire human race is the idea of respecting the religious
Other and, on this basis, working together toward the achievement of com-
mon goals and interests. This is only possible if coexistence and mutual
respect regarding the religious Other’s beliefs are the norm. This is, according
to Mir, the crux of the definition of the ‘ethic of pluralism’ and what the
concept entails or is constitutive of (Mir, 2006, 12).
Mir adduces a number of examples that this ethic of pluralism in the
Qur’an and Sunna was successfully implemented and existed in past (and
present) Muslim societies. He cites a body of scholarly work to defend this
view (Daftary, 1990; Jiwa, 2001; Menocal, 2002; Moussalli, 2001; Sajoo,
1994; Sen, 2005) and names the Umayyad Spain, Fatimid Egypt, Ottoman
Turkey, and Mughal India as examples of Muslims “who based their policies
towards minorities on the Qur’an’s intrinsically humanist ethos, exemplified
to them by the Prophet in his community at Medina” (Mir, 2006, 31).
Mir concludes that, when measured against their own temporality and their
historical situatedness, Muslim civilizations were “remarkable for their policies
of tolerance and equality” (Mir, 2006, 33). These policies, however, were not
always implemented and are, in the context of modernity, for reasons outlined in
the previous chapter, in need of further conceptual reframing and fine-tuning.

The question of salvation of the religious other:

a brief historical genealogy
As noted above, one element of the ethic of pluralism pertains to the idea of
the salvific potential of religious traditions other than one’s own. This pos-
sibility of religious ‘salvation’ of non-Muslims is one element in Mir’s
58 Religious pluralism imperative
definition of religious pluralism that directly concerns us in this chapter.
Lamptey (2011), in her recent discussion on types of historical Islamic dis-
courses on religious difference, argues that they can be categorized under
three broad categories: polemical refutations of other religions, especially
Christianity and Judaism; Qur’anic exegetical and juristic works; and mystical/
sufi works.
The first type, as embodied for example by works of Abu ʿIsa Muhammad
b. Harun al-Warraq (d. 247/861)3 and Abu Bakr Muhammad b. al-Tayyib
al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013),4 by its very nature denied the salvific status, often
the religious Other (Lamptey, 2011, 19–22). The findings from the second
discourse, whose aim was to elucidate the meaning of most relevant concepts
pertaining to the issue of faith (such as islam, iman, and kufr), are mixed in
nature with a diversity of opinions existing. Khalil (2012), in his recent book
on the topic of salvation of non-Muslims in the works of many prominent
classical and modern Muslim scholars, most of whom are exegetes and
jurists (apart from Ibn ‘Arabi who is a mystic), concludes his study as
follows:

Among some of the most prominent scholars in the history of Islam,

there does indeed exist a rich diversity of opinions regarding salvation
and the fate of non-Muslims. While scholars such as Abu Hamid
al-Ghazali, Ibn al-‘Arabi, and Muhammad Rashid Rida all maintain that
God would not take to task ‘earnest’ non-Muslims for not being Mus-
lim, they differ when it comes to explaining how such non-Muslims
would indeed be ‘tested’: Al-Ghazall seems to avoid the issue as he states
that God’s mercy will be upon them and that most of humanity will enter
Heaven; Ibn al-‘Arabi speaks not only of Divine mercy, but also of a
Messenger-of-Resurrection being sent to those who did not ‘properly’
receive the Message; and Rida argues that such individuals will be taken
to task according to their own deductions and moral standards. Other
scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, do not
seem to leave much room for Divine mercy on the Day of Judgment for
any sane, adult non-Muslim who had received the Message, as both
‘sincerity’ and ‘proper’ reception of the Message are never explicitly
factored as excuses – even if a Messenger-of-Resurrection is included in
the equation for those who simply received no Message – and as most
of humanity seems destined for Hell.
(221)

Khalil also notes that while Al-Ghazalli, Ibn al-‘Arabi, and Rida should
not be considered as “soteriological religious pluralists” in the sense
employed by John Hick (Hick and Knitter, 1987), but argues that one fac-
tor that ‘moderated’ their salvific exclusivism a la Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
al-Qayyim’s was their understanding of the perceived role of Divine mercy
(Khalil, 2012, 222).
 Religious pluralism imperative 59
As far as the last trend is concerned, described by Lamptey as ‘differenti-
ated multiplicity’, the two most influential representative voices are that of
al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muhyi al-Din ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 638/1240) – the Sufi
mystic and philosopher – and Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 672/1273) – the Persian
poet and founder of the Mawlawiyya order of dervishes. These exemplify
the most pluralist tendencies in the pre-modern Islamic historical discourse
and do not make ‘Muslimness’ (in the sense of belonging to the historical
community of followers of Prophet Muhammad) as a precondition for salva-
tion. For example, Lamptey (2011) states that:

Ibn al-ʿArabī in no way confines paradise, or Heaven, to Muslims. This

aligns with his view that followers of other prophetic paths can achieve
felicity and become friends of God. As with Rūmī, the divine attribute
of mercy is seen as taking precedence over divine wrath.
(57)

Lamptey concludes, much like Khalil, that the pre-modern historical Islamic
discourse on religious difference is indicative of a variety of approaches to
the question of the salvation of the religious Other but with strong exclusivist
tendencies when compared with modern pro-religious, pluralism-based argu-
ments (Lamptey, 2011). Khalil (2013, 3) echoes these words but makes an
important observation that today there exists a group of theologians whose
views are in line with these modern arguments in favor of religious
pluralism.5

Progressive Muslims on religious pluralism

It is my contention that these groups of theologians referred to by Khalil
are progressive Muslim theologians. A number of them have criticized the
exclusivist tendencies evident in the pre-modern Islamic historical dis-
courses (Lamptey, 2011)6 on the question of Salvation. Asani (2002, 59)
argues for example that this religious exclusivist tendency in the works of
(pre-modern) Muslim scholars could only be a result of a complete disre-
gard of the revelation’s original historical context on the basis of which
“the exclusivist Muslim exegetes have been able to counteract the pluralist
ethos that so thoroughly pervades the Quran”. Esack goes a step further
by asserting that the Qur’an’s emphasis on pluralism was intentionally
ignored by many traditionalist and conservative Muslim scholars, both
past and present, as a result of willful ignorance. In this context, he (Esack,
1997) writes:

traditionalist and conservative scholars have resorted to what can only

be described as forced linguistic and exegetical exercises to compel inclu-
sivist texts to produce exclusivist meanings.
(47)
60 Religious pluralism imperative
This sentiment is echoed by another progressive Muslim scholar, A. Sache-
dina (2008), who in this context writes:

Some classical Muslim scholars of the Qur’an attempted to separate the

salvation history of the Muslim community from other Abrahamic faiths
by attesting to the superseding validity of the Islamic revelation over
Christianity and Judaism. In an attempt to demand unquestioning accep-
tance of the new faith, Muslim theologians had to devise terminological
as well as methodological stratagems to circumscribe those verses of the
Qur’an that tended to underscore its ecumenical thrust by extending
salvific authenticity and adequacy to other monotheistic traditions.
(201)

Importantly, progressive Muslim theologians do build upon the pluralist

tendencies in the turath most clearly evident in the pre-modern mystical
trend briefly referred to above.7 By doing so, progressive Muslim scholars
wish to recapture the ethic of pluralism in the Qur’an and Sunna and develop
it further in the context of the (late) modern epistemic condition. They do so
on the basis of a number of sophisticated philosophical and epistemological
theories. To demonstrate this, we will examine the works of Abdolkarim
Soroush and Tariq Ramadan.

Soroush’s religious pluralism as part

of epistemological pluralism
To have an accurate understanding of his approach to religious pluralism, a
few words about its broader basis in Soroush’s thinking are in order beyond
those presented in chapter two which deal with epistemological pluralism.
Critical realism, or what Soroush also terms reasoned pluralism, as an epis-
temological basis for religious pluralism is, at the most general level, an
extension of his two theories on the nature of religion, religious understand-
ing, and religious experience discussed in chapter two. Critical realism is
based on the premise of the real epistemological implications of fallibility of
human reasoning/understanding without thereby embracing the philosophy
of postmodern relativism. Critical realism is in this regard akin to the weak
version of postmodernism discussed in chapter one.8
Soroush considers religious pluralism as a decidedly modern phenome-
non with some historical roots in pre-modernity. For Soroush, religious
pluralism is a part of a larger set of pluralisms, namely cultural and social
pluralism, all of which are, however, organically linked. He uses the meta-
phor of a world as a garden filled with flowers, each with a unique host of
colors and scents to explain the irreducible and incommensurable nature
of contemporary pluralism in general (Soroush, 2009, 119) As discussed
below, Soroush employs a similar metaphor of an orchard with different
 Religious pluralism imperative 61
kinds of fruit trees to explain the irreducible nature of religious pluralism
in particular.
Soroush argues that in contemporary epistemology incommensurable reli-
gious pluralism is premised on two ideas. The first pertains to diversity of
understanding of religious texts and the second to the diversity of our inter-
pretation of religious experiences. In addition Soroush identifies a number
of other principles in support of irreducible religious pluralism that he sub-
sumes under two broad categories, namely positive pluralism and negative
pluralism. These will be discussed shortly. The foundational pillar on which
both type of pluralism are justified is encapsulated in Soroush’s idea that each
human being is imprisoned into an inescapable state of ‘point of view-ness’
which is the driving force behind diversity and pluralism both in the realm
of textual hermeneutics as well as in the sphere of the human’s experience of
transcendence (Soroush, 2009, 119–120).
This is so because Soroush subscribes to a particular view of the nature of
reality. He does not consider the mind to be a tabula rasa and that humans
can objectively and simply retrieve facts from reality (Soroush, 2009, 158).
For Soroush there are no definite, objective and unambiguous sign posts
available to humans which would be fully indicative of the nature of true
reality because thinking about, interpreting, and understanding reality is an
interminable, collective, and forever dynamic process. In his own words:
“[W]hatever the reality may be (in itself), we are faced with complications
and difficulties in terms of its verification (for us)” (Soroush, 2009, 157).
However, such a view of reality, insists Soroush, does not amount to
embracing postmodern relativist epistemology, or what he terms ‘caused
relativism’. In this context of explaining the genesis, essence, content, and
nature of knowledge (i.e. epistemology), Soroush makes a distinction
between two types of pluralisms and two types of epistemologies, namely
reasoned and caused. Relativist epistemology privileges the role of causes9
(such as the role of culture, geography, emotion, interests, internal and
genetic factors, the subconscious, power) over that of reasons resulting in an
‘everything is true’ kind of argument (Soroush, 2009) A non-relativist epis-
temology (and therefore reasoned pluralism) attaches much more impor-
tance to reasons in attainment and criticism of knowledge without eliminating
the role of causes entirely (Soroush, 2009, 159). In his (Soroush, 2009) own
words:

In the midst of all this, my own epistemological position, put briefly, is

that reasons play a role in the attainment of knowledge and the genesis
of its contents; however, when reasons have completed their work and
arrived at parity, causes then come into play. In other words, after you
have rejected a number of views on the basis of reasoning and kept a
number of others, you will ultimately be left with a number of views that
are equally tenable. . . . This is the point at which cause may intervene
62 Religious pluralism imperative
(or will per force intervene), favouring one of the views over the others
based on causes, not reasons. Hence, both reasons and causes play a part
in the realm of knowledge. It may also happen on occasion that the
reasons are strong enough from the start to eliminate all the rivals, leav-
ing only a single view in place. But if the reasons are such that they
cannot overcome one another, you will undoubtedly arrive at a reasoned
pluralism, which is different from a relativist or post-modernist plural-
ism, which is causal. This is a crucial and profound difference.
(160)

Just like there is causal and reasoned pluralism, there is also caused and
reasoned certitude and caused and reasoned truth. Caused certitude is a
result of certain causes which are basically the same as that of caused epis-
temology. These causes are responsible for engendering and perpetuating in
believers of a particular truth a certain mental state Soroush terms ‘dogmatic
conviction’ which causes them to continue to believe in their particular truth.
Reasoned certitude is a very rare phenomenon, especially in the realm of
religion as evident in the various intra-religious sources which point to this
fact. Soroush refers to it as deep conjecture of reasoned certitude in contrast
to superficial conjecture of caused certitude. Importantly, Soroush argues
that from the perspective of God both of these certitudes are acceptable for
the purposes of salvation (Soroush, 2009, 164).
Furthermore, for Soroush, truth, including religious truth, is relative or
conditional in the sense that it corresponds to the truth of indexical proposi-
tions. He argues that there is no such thing as intrinsically true or intrinsi-
cally false religion/religious truth, as religions do not stand in a diametrically
opposite but relational relationship to one another (Soroush, 2009, 167).
Therefore, the difference between two religious truths is analogous to that
of the difference between two indexical systems (Soroush, 2009). Once the
process of critical realism is applied to religions, what we are left with are
species of irreducibly plural religions (Soroush, 2009, 170–171).
As noted briefly above, Soroush divides religious pluralism into positive
and negative kinds. He further subdivides positive religious pluralism, which
he also terms irreducible plurality, into two sub-categories, namely pluralism
in understanding religious texts and pluralism in interpreting religious expe-
riences. In relation to the former, generally speaking, Soroush makes refer-
ence to his theory of “the contraction and expansion of religious knowledge”
as the explanatory method in which this takes place. More specifically,
Soroush argues that we cannot deny that the Qur’an and hadith are ‘multi-
layered’ and can be interpreted in a number of different ways (Soroush,
2009, 120). He argues that this also applies to every religion in history, as
testified by the study of history of theology/religion itself (Soroush, 2009,
122). Soroush laments that this phenomenon of inevitable plurality of inter-
pretations has not been sufficiently theorized from the vantage point of it
 Religious pluralism imperative 63
being something to be welcomed and embraced rather than disparaged. In
this context, he (Soroush, 2009) writes:

No one has considered the possibility that this unavoidable plurality of inter-
pretations, conceptions and sects, to which no religion is immune, might
have some other meaning and significance. Maybe it means that this plurality
is itself desirable. Maybe rightful guidance is broader than we had imagined.
Maybe salvation and felicity hinge on something else, something beyond
these antagonistic and divisive dogmas and particular conceptions.
(122)

Soroush argues that the origins of modern pluralism are the outcome of the
critical reflection which takes the inevitability of interpretational plurality seri-
ously in the epistemological and hermeneutical senses (Soroush, 2009, 122).
Apart from unavoidable pluralism in the realm of understanding of reli-
gious texts, another element of positive pluralism identified by Soroush is
diversity of interpretation of religious experience (Soroush, 2009, 123). In
this context, Soroush argues that “[j]ust as we have no such thing as un-
interpreted religion, we have no such thing as an un-interpreted experience,
whether in the natural world or in the world of the soul” (Soroush, 2009,
123). Since religious experience is transcendental in nature, this transcen-
dence takes on different forms. Soroush (Soroush, 2009) explains:

whether we take religious experience to be a single entity, which has been

interpreted in countless different ways, or whether we consider religious
experience itself to be diverse and manifold, either way, we find ourselves
before a diversity that is by no means reducible to unity; we must take
this fact on board and not disregard it. We must, furthermore, have a
theory for this diversity.
(127)

As noted above, Soroush considers that humans ‘suffer’ from the condition
of being confined to the state of what I term ‘point of view-ness’ which inevi-
tably gives rise to plurality to views. Soroush, like in many other instances
of discussing his theories concerning the phenomenon of irreducible religious
pluralism, cites Rumi (such as his famous elephant and blind men analogy
as well as others) to argue that plurality of points of view will inevitably lead
to plurality of views.10 In this context, he (Soroush, 2009) writes:

In fact, just as the different worldly manifestations of God have imbued

the natural world with diversity, so they have lent diversity to religions.
The diversity of viewpoints will lead to a diversity of views. And these
viewpoints are in fact nothing but the individuals themselves.
(127)
64 Religious pluralism imperative
Importantly, therefore, Soroush forms the view that the “first sower of the
seeds of pluralism” was God by virtue of sending us different Messengers to
whom he manifested Himself differently given their own conditions (Soroush,
2009). Furthermore, Soroush finds himself in agreement with John Hick’s
(1993) employment of a Kantian distinction of noumena/phenomena to
explain how the multifaceted nature of interpretation is related to the mul-
tifaceted nature of reality.
Another way Soroush explains positive pluralism is by means of the
idea of “immersion of truth within truth”. Here Soroush again cites Rumi
to argue that pluralism is an inevitable result of “accumulation of truths
and their intricate interconnectedness”. Soroush, in this context, cautions
his readers against conceptualizing the world as a series of straight, bro-
ken, or crooked lines, but as “consisting of an aggregate of straight lines
which meet, run parallel and overlap” immersing truths within truths
(Ibid, 136).
In summary of this section on positive pluralism, this is how Soroush (Ibid,
137) himself summarizes this aspect of epistemological pluralism:

Since religious texts and experiences naturally admit of a multitude of

interpretations, since reality is intricate and multifaceted, since divine
providence and protectiveness dictate multiplicity and rivalry, we have
consented to plurality and accepted it, and we have no other alterna-
tive. . . . Of course, we also allow a role for reason and we do not
forego intelligent criticism, for this, too, is dictated by divine provi-
dence and protectiveness. Positive pluralism also has another sense
and source. It is that the existing alternatives and rivals are unique in
kind and irreducible. None of them can be swallowed up or dissolved
by any of the others, and each of them has incommensurable
particularities.
(137)

The second kind of pluralism identified and theorized by Soroush is negative

pluralism, whose basis is premised on the concept of something ‘lacking’, be
it compatibility, truth, or certitude. Negative pluralism, just like positive, is
unavoidable, divinely willed, and, therefore, to be welcomed (Ibid).
One element of Soroush’s negative pluralism is based on the idea of there
being one destination but many different paths leading to it.11 What matters
according to this idea is the sincerity of the truth-seeker in his/her search for
ultimate salvation and not whether or not the seeker follows the teachings
of an absolutely correct religion (Ibid, 139). This theory, in part, relies on
the idea that the compassionate God as a Guide does not withhold His
guidance from the truth-seeking people and only reserves it to those who
belong to the ‘correct’ religion, as this would amount to excluding those
who do not follow that ‘correct’ religion. Since no single religion, let alone
 Religious pluralism imperative 65
sect, can claim to represent the majority of humanity, God would be exclud-
ing a large majority of people from His guidance, signaling the triumph of
the forces of evil. In this context, Soroush (Ibid, 141) writes:

If we look at things from this perspective, pluralism means nothing more

than acknowledging God’s boundless compassion, the triumph of proph-
ets, the feebleness of Satan’s treachery, and the extension of God’s kindly
hands over the heads of all the world’s people.
(141–142)

Soroush therefore asks us to look at the world from the conceptual vista of
God’s attribute of the Guide (Hadi) and to conceptualize the success or oth-
erwise of guidance and salvation as contingent upon “the sincerity of the
quest and the determination to worship God, not on devotion to this or that
person or the practicing of this or that ritual or attachment to this or that his-
torical incident” (Soroush, 2009, 141).
Another aspect of negative pluralism employed by Soroush is the idea of
what he terms an inextricable mix of truth and falsehood. Soroush starts by
saying a la Kant that no single phenomenon (‘true’ divine religion as a meta-
historical category does not belong to this class) is free of impurities (he
names language, race, religion, even nature as examples) and that nothing in
the world exists in a pure form (Ibid, 142). Accordingly, people’s understand-
ing of divine religion is ipso facto tainted and impure because of what
Soroush terms the process of ‘humanization of religion’ as it descends from
heaven to the realm of human existence (Ibid., 143–144). Soroush is quick
to point out that this does not result in embracing the view that truth and
falsehood are emptied of meaning or that every belief is true. It means that
only God at Judgment Day will adjudicate what is true and false belief.
Therefore, those who follow a particular path are entitled to continue doing
so and the entire purpose of the principle of impurity is to gain a better
understanding of one’s chosen path and to come to terms with the idea “that
plurality and diversity are natural, human, this-worldly and inevitable”
(Ibid., 143–144). For Soroush, the impurities and distortions exist at both
the level of understanding religion as well as religion itself as a human con-
struct which, as shown in the previous chapter, unlike what he terms “pure
Divine religion”, is subject to expansion and contraction. Despite these real
and significant impurities there remains, however, the necessary minimum of
spirituality and guidance which humans do have at their disposal (Ibid,
144–145).
An additional element of negative pluralism as theorized by Soroush is the
idea of compatibility of all truths because of the virtue of their relatedness
and incompatibility. In this regard, Soroush opines that truths are like stars
that belong to the same constellation and that reside under the same roof.
Hence, truth seekers must ensure that their truth is compatible with that of
66 Religious pluralism imperative
others.12 Soroush (Ibid, 146.) uses another metaphor to explain this idea of
complementarity of all truths in the following manner:

The contention being made here is that everyone participates in building

the wondrous castle of truth; or, even more, that everyone should be
invited to participate and that the castle should be carried on the collec-
tive’s shoulders.
(146)

Pluralism in the realm of values and causes is another pillar of negative plu-
ralism. In this context, Soroush theorizes that there are “irreconcilable dif-
ferences” between values, virtues, and rites. In relation to values, he gives an
example that the values of social justice and freedom are not entirely or
always compatible with each other. Furthermore, in the realm of ethical
problems, which are quintessential features of humanness, intrinsic irrecon-
cilability of values exists as a function of causes (e.g. poverty, education, etc.)
but not of reasons. This is true at both the level of individuals as well as
communities. In this context, Soroush (Ibid.) writes:

Every individual is a world composed of individual principles and yard-

sticks and an individual ideal. And this independence and plurality of
worlds displays itself in particular in the realm of values and cultures.
This is what cultural incommensurability means and cultural pluralism
is built upon it. And it is a small step from cultural and moral pluralism
to religious pluralism.
(148)

An additional argument in favor of negative pluralism is the idea that religi-

osity is by large caused and not reasoned. By caused religiosity, Soroush
means that for most people their belief is inherited and emulative, hence it
is a result of a cause not as a result of reason, evidence, argument, and proof
(Ibid., 149–150).
Finally, negative pluralism for Soroush is also a result of plurality pro-
duced by rational theology as evident in the study of history of theology. In
this context, Soroush argues that because rational theology breeds and is
built on doubt and can lead to or generate a healthy dose of beneficial skep-
ticism, it leads to negative pluralism because it lacks certitude (Ibid,
150–151).
While positive and negative pluralism are two aspects of Soroush’s epis-
temological pluralism, Soroush also talks about another kind of epistemo-
logical pluralism, namely hermeneutical or interpretational pluralism. This
pluralism for Soroush is a function of the very nature of symbols (language
and texts being parts of this system of symbols) which are both actually
and intrinsically ambiguous. Hence, these symbols can elicit different
 Religious pluralism imperative 67
meanings (Ibid., 176). Soroush in this respect makes a distinction
between ‘correct’, ‘alien’, and ‘true’ meaning (which is not accessible to
humans). The ‘correct’ meanings can be several and each is a result of
employment of certain methodologies and hermeneutics. An ‘alien’ mean-
ing is that meaning which cannot be arrived at as a result of the chosen
applied hermeneutic but this meaning is not necessarily incorrect (Ibid.,
176–177). While texts do contain structural limitations which limit the
possibility of any meaning being correct, Soroush forms the view that it is
not possible to argue that the indented meaning of the author, if it can
be identified, exhausts all the possible meanings of a piece of text. In his
(Ibid.) words:

In the realm of texts, there is no such thing as “truth” in the sense of

correspondence with the author’s intention. When an author uses a
phrase to convey a meaning, he has understood one of its meanings and
chosen it on that basis. Nonetheless, that phrase can have other
meanings.
(177)

Hence, the inevitability of interpretive pluralism becomes evident. Impor-

tantly, Soroush argues that this interpretive pluralism is divinely willed and
intended since “if God made it incumbent on people to discover His ‘true
meaning’, it would be asking something of them that is beyond their capac-
ity” (Ibid., 178) as language inherently does not permit the discovery of a
single meaning. In other words and arguing philosophically, Soroush states
that texts have not been actualized but merely have potential which lends
itself to many meanings (Ibid., 178).
In conclusion of this section, we can deduce that Soroush’s affirmation
of irreducible religious pluralism, at the most general level, is a product
of his broader views on epistemological pluralism discussed in the sec-
ond chapter. More specifically, Soroush theorizes religious pluralism at
several other levels, namely that of understanding religious texts, reli-
gious experiences, and meaning itself as embodied at the level of sacred
texts. He is a strong advocate of a positive pluralism which denies post-
modern relativism, celebrates difference, and argues for a reasoned plu-
rality of truths.

Tariq Ramadan
Tariq Ramadan is a well-known contemporary Muslim academic and public
intellectual. His philosophy of pluralism, including the religious kind, is most
systematically presented in his book The Quest for Meaning (Ramadan,
2010) which will be our primary subject of inquiry into his thinking on
pluralism.
68 Religious pluralism imperative
This is how one scholar (MacDonald, 2012) describes the nature and
purpose of the book in question:

The Quest for Meaning is pluralist in references and universalist in out-

look. Broadly, it merges the religious with the philosophic and central-
izes the human. No particular religious or philosophy is focalized. They
are considered as one, because they all have to serve the individual in
achieving an understanding of the self in the pluralist universe. It bridges
gaps and seeks meaning of the self in the diverse universe. It raises exis-
tential questions in the modern area which experiences “conflicts of
perceptions” and “lack of meaning and confidence.”
(203)

Hence the main idea of the book is to embark on a journey of discovery of

diversity and pluralism both in the realm of human beings (including the
religious) and the universe as a whole, and to understand its functions and
purposes. This journey of discovery of pluralism entails a quest for meaning
as an inseparable entity because meaning finds its significance in the concept
of pluralism itself.
Ramadan starts his discussion on pluralism by aptly noting a contemporary
paradoxical situation that is premised, on the one hand, on an uninformed and
laissez faire celebration of diversity and plurality alongside entrenched exclu-
sivist identities and difference. For Ramadan, this condition can lead to ‘con-
flict of perceptions’ (Ramadan, 2010, ix–x) based on fear, doubt and distrust,
and self-other mutually exclusivist identity construction processes that must
be avoided by understanding the true nature of diversity and pluralism, their
functions, and their purposes. Ramadan highlights the importance of the word
‘perception’ in this conflict by suggesting that this type of conflict is more
dangerous than one based on ignorance because the former, apart from being
based on a lack of knowledge, involves phenomena such as feelings, emotions,
convictions, and psychology that are much harder to dislodge (Ramadan,
2010).The only way to prevent this clash from happening is to understand the
nature of truth itself which, for Ramadan, can only be approached from the
perspective of the observer’s point of view or what he also terms ‘a window’
from which to look at the world. In his (Ramadan, 2010,) own words:

We have to begin, humbly, by admitting that we have nothing more than

points of view, in the literal sense, and that they shape our ideas, our
perceptions and our imagination. Coming to terms with the very essence
of the relativity of our gaze does not imply that we have to doubt every-
thing and can be sure of nothing. It might mean quite the opposite, and
the outcome might be a non-arrogant confidence, and a healthy, ener-
getic and creative curiosity about the infinite number of windows from
which we all observe the same world.
(x)
 Religious pluralism imperative 69
Ramadan argues that there are two pathways to approaching or understand-
ing pluralism. One entails examining each philosophical/religious tradition
comparatively (as an outsider of all of them) and thereby noting many simi-
larities and commonly shared values. The other comprises of plunging deep
into one tradition (as an insider, i.e. a confessional believer) and examining
a diversity of viewpoints (both inside and outside of that tradition) through
its lens. Ramadan adopts the second approach and describes his philosophy
of pluralism as signifying a process which starts off by identifying common
existential questions and philosophical notions and traces the plurality of
answers and views (Ramadan, 2010, xi). The book’s content is structured
around these common philosophical notions which are shared by all tradi-
tions and philosophies but whose absolute truth is not an exclusive province
of any of them. These notions which constitute what Ramadan terms ‘shared
universals’ include concepts such as fraternity and equality, freedom, human-
ity, reason, tolerance, and respect for others. In this context, he (Ramadan,
2010) asserts:

The notions of equality, freedom, humanity, emotion and memories

belong, for instance, to all traditions and all philosophies, but their abso-
lute truth is in no one’s possession. And, as we shall demonstrate, the
universal can only be a universal that is shared.
(xi)

In other words, the existence of the shared universals established through

the means of plurality of perspectives is the very basis and justification of the
philosophy of pluralism. In Ramadan’s (Ramadan, 2010, 15) words: “I must
experience other truths if my responsibility for having chosen my truth in all
conscience is to be meaningful”.
All (non-theistic) spiritual and religious traditions, argues Ramadan fur-
ther, share certain a priori universal principles which can also be arrived at
by means of rational analysis. This does not mean that all traditions express
the shared universals in the same manner or that their paths never converge.
The task of ‘the self’ is to recognize by listening and understanding how ‘the
other’ apprehends this shared universal and its different forms by engaging
in a quest for meaning or the quest for the shared universal. Importantly,
Ramadan warns the readers that the quest for the universal is all too often
instrumentalized for evil purposes. In this context, he (Ramadan, 2010)
writes:

Acknowledging the existence of the universal does not preclude the pos-
sibility that it might be appropriated, monopolized or transformed into
an instrument of power or even oppression. We have already stated that.
Asserting and recognizing the existence of a shared universal implies, in
contrast, a twofold recognition of both the common (the universal) and
diversity (the shared). We must therefore regard the universal as a
70 Religious pluralism imperative
common space where several roads, several paths, several religions meet,
and where reason, the heart and the senses meet. Appropriating the
centre by denying the legitimacy of other points of view is out of the
question.
(24)

Evoking religio perennialis teachings and their particular manifestation in

the Islamic (sufi) tradition, Ramadan uses the analogy of the mountain
peak and the many roads leading to it to explain the nature of truth. The
idea is that while there are many ways to truth, this does not detract from
its essential nature just as the fact that many mountain paths still reach
the same summit (Ramadan, 2010, 22–24). Ramadan finds affirmation of
this nature of truth in the Qur’anic verse, “Had God so willed, He would
have made you a single community” (The Table Spread V 48) and argues
that the same message is to be found also in the ancient teachings of Hin-
duism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (Ramadan, 2010, 14). Elsewhere,
Ramadan argues that the finality of diversity is also expressed in other
verses such as: “Had not God checked some groups of people [nations, soci-
eties, religions] by means of others . . . the earth would have been corrupted”
(2: 251) (Ramadan, 2010, 16); “monasteries would have been pulled down
as well as synagogues, churches and mosques” (22: 40) (Ramadan, 2010,
48); and “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other
(not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honored of you in the
sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full
knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)” (49:13). With respect to
49:13, Ramadan asserts that the God-sanctioned universal plurality and the
excellence of mastering and managing it is the universal message of all phi-
losophies, spiritual traditions, and religions (Ramadan, 2010, 45). “Diversity
of religions, nations, and peoples”, Ramadan writes, “is a test because it
requires that we learn to manage difference” (Ramadan, 2004, 202). Accord-
ing to this philosophy, therefore, the other is a positive necessity and not a
threat. Ramadan also uses the parable of the blind men and the elephant,
which he notes is also found in the Buddhist tradition, as another example
of the perspective-based nature of truth (Ramadan, 2010, 43).
Ramadan’s philosophy of (religious) pluralism also has strong affinities
with the tradition of religious humanism, whose teachings he considers to
be the very heart of every religion, philosophy, or tradition. For Ramadan,
it is the task of scholars, theologians, philosophers, and intellectuals to cease-
lessly strive to embody and safeguard the essence of these teachings (Rama-
dan, 2010, 70).
Those who think in terms of absolutes, who view things from one exclu-
sive angle, who monopolize truth and who think that their reasons alone are
rational are described as having a dogmatic mind. The dogmatic mind, for
 Religious pluralism imperative 71
Ramadan, is binary in nature in the sense that it not only considers its own
truth as the only truth, its universal as the only universal, but also simultane-
ously holds that any other view which does not coincide with this particular
truth/universal is “at best, absolutely ‘other’ and, at worst, culpably mis-
taken” (Ramadan, 2010, 22).
Ramadan emphasizes the role of “autonomous and critical reason” as a
tool to be employed against the dogmatic mind and its aids, namely accep-
tance of “absolute authority, imposed dogmas, blind certainties and human
pretensions to the absolute” (Ramadan, 2010, 46). Significantly, Ramadan
argues that adopting a pluralist mind is not an inherent characteristic of
humanity but something that is achieved through personal effort, education,
self-mastery, and knowledge (Ramadan, 2010, 45).
One important element of Ramadan’s philosophy of pluralism is the con-
cept of diversity that stems from his view of the dual nature of revelation
(Ramadan, 2009, 11–26). According to Ramadan, the concept of revelation
should not be reduced to that of the texts only but also should include the
Universe at large because the Universe with its laws, rules, principles, and
signs imposes itself on the human intellect just as the Book of Revelation
does. Hence it must be considered as a fundamental source of law. In this
context, Ramadan (Ramadan, 2009) writes:

The point is then to clearly place the two Books, the two Revelations,
the text, and the Universe on the same level – as sources of law – and
consequently, to integrate the different universes of the sciences and their
various areas of knowledge and specialties into the formulation of legal
rulings about very specific scientific, social, or economic issues.
(82)

Ramadan laments the fact that the status of the Universe as a self-standing
source of law and of its production (Ramadan, 2009, 86) has never been
fully recognized in the Islamic tradition. Equipped with this concept of Rev-
elation, Ramadan argues that diversity in nature in relation to beings (includ-
ing the human) and forms is established a priori and is part of its unalterable
law of the Universe that is affirmed in the Qur’anic revelation (Ramadan,
2009, 93). Addressing himself to a Muslim readership in his book Radical
Reform, he (Ramadan, 2009) writes:

We need to reconcile with an Islamic universality whose essence is plu-

ralistic. The function of its truth, naturally acknowledged by believers,
is not to standardize truths and values beyond Islam itself, but to estab-
lish correspondences, intersections, bridges. Confirming its universality
as the last Revelation does not mean denying what came before it or
what appeared elsewhere outside of its Universe of reference, but rather
being able to say and repeat what was formulated in the past and/or
72 Religious pluralism imperative
establish positive interactions with what is produced by other traditions
or civilizations today.13
(294–295)

What is required of human conscience is therefore to respect this natural

order of a priori and irreducible diversity, including the religious, by means
of respectful coexistence and to approach differences with perspicacity.
Ramadan argues that this fundamental principle of irreducible religious
diversity is to be conceptualized as a universal general law, as an integral part
of respect for freedom of conscience. Ramadan finds support for this univer-
sal law also in the Qur’anic maxim of there being no compulsion in religion
(Ramadan, 2009, 94).
For Ramadan, human diversity, including in the realm of religious tradi-
tions, performs two important functions in the divine plan. Apart from it
being necessary for human recognition and remembrance of God, it “encour-
ages humility and the corresponding responsibility to be moral and act ethi-
cally” (MacDonald, 2012, 213). Hence, the safeguarding of diversity is an
imperative for humanity since it is a defining characteristic of existence as
we know it (MacDonald, 2012, 218).
Ramadan’s view on diversity, as in the case of Soroush, however, is not
Panglossian in nature or tantamount to absolute relativism. There are indeed
criteria on which we can judge acceptable from unacceptable forms of diver-
sity. The acceptable diversity is that which is consistent with the primary
requirements of humility and shared responsibility whose relationship must
be balanced by means of engaging in dialogue.
Ramadan’s model for dialogue is in accordance with his overall philoso-
phy of pluralism described above. It is a quest for truth itself based on the
recognition that diversity is necessary for us to know anything as true and
that therefore we may never possess the truth completely (MacDonald, 2012,
219–220).
As a summary of the above, the following statement by MacDonald (2012)
summarizes the main characteristic of Ramadan’s philosophy of pluralism
in a very useful manner:

Ramadan’s philosophy of pluralism is radical because, unlike modern

liberal theories, it is premised on a truth claim about the nature of ulti-
mate reality. This is the claim that we can only be fully human to the
extent that we are humble and sincerely attempt to respond to the call
to be responsible and just. This call, in turn, can only be discerned
through the humility that comes through the recognition of human
imperfection, self-insufficiency, and diversity, which leads a person
beyond themselves and, indeed, beyond existence, to that unifying prin-
ciple underlying Being itself. Thus, we must learn to live and deal with
diversity and each other – to accept others and their differences – not
because doing so is simply prudent or respectful of some transient,
 Religious pluralism imperative 73
contingent human understanding of human dignity, but because the
nature of Ultimate Being, or God, demands it.
(221)

Hence, for Ramadan, in the Islamic frame of reference, pluralism and diver-
sity, including in the realm of religion, play a number of very important
functions. They do not only form the basis for human moral responsibility
to be just and humble, but they are also necessary preconditions, philosophi-
cally speaking, for understanding “the full and ontologically true meaning
of being human” (MacDonald, 2012, 222) as both pluralism and diversity,
in the ultimate analysis, are divinely willed.

Conclusion
Soroush and Ramadan, on the basis of their respective philosophies of plu-
ralism, and in their embrace of its irreducible nature, consider themselves to
represent the spirit behind the ethic of pluralism Mir argues to be inherent
in the foundational texts of the Islamic weltanschauung and to which pro-
gressive Muslim scholars consider themselves to be connected. Additionally,
Soroush and Ramadan, in their affirmation of the concept of incommensu-
rable religious pluralism (in its modern episteme sense) as an expression of
the Divine Will, also find inspiration and precedent for their views in Islam’s
classical tradition, especially in its mystical trends as embodied in the works
of scholars such as Ibn al- ‘Arabi and Rumi as discussed briefly above.

Notes
1 See the previous chapter.
2 http://www.constitutionofmadina.com/
3 Abū ʿĪsā Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Warrāq. Kitāb al-radd ‘alā l-thalāth firaq min
al-Naṣārā, edited and translated by David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in
Early Islam: Abū ʿĪsá al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”, University of Cambridge
Oriental Publications, no. 45 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1992).
4 Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī. Kitāb al-tamhīd, edited by Rich-
ard J. McCarthy, S.J. (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya, 1957).
5 “Most [Muslim theologians] maintain that while faith in the fundamental doc-
trines of Islam is theoretically required for salvation, God will excuse non-Muslims
who never encountered the divine message conveyed by the Prophet Muḥammad.
(Whether such ‘unreached’ non-Muslims still exist is a subject of debate.) Some
scholars go a step further and assert that God may redeem non-Muslims who
were never exposed to the message in a manner that would prompt contemplation
and encourage conversion. A third group of theologians – not the kind one would
typically find at major Islamic seminaries and universities – argue that God may
even save and reward non-Muslims who had a ‘compelling’ encounter with the
Islamic message yet chose to remain outside the fold” (Khalil, 2013, 3).
6 Chapter three in particular.
7 One contemporary scholar who has delved deeply into the mystical strand to
bring forth arguments in favor of religious pluralism is Shah-Kazemi (2006).
74 Religious pluralism imperative
8 In the context of theological thinking in contemporary Iran, Banafsheh Madanine-
jad refers to Soroush’s type of ‘new theology’ (kalam-e jadid) as postmodern
theology in contrast to the other type of kalam-e jadid, which she terms ‘theology
of selectivity’, as represented by the works of Mohsen Kadivar (Madaninejad,
2011).
9 Generally speaking, by ‘causes’ Soroush means ‘non-rational factors’ which
engender ideas and actions (Madaninejad, 2011, 158).
10 “From the place of view, O (thou who art the) kernel of Existence, there arises
the difference between the true believer and the Zoroastrian and the Jew”. Math-
nawi, 3: 1256. Cited in Madaninejad (2011, 127).
11 Reminiscent of the kind of arguments employed in Sophia perennials’ approach
to truth. See Sacred Web: Journal of Tradition and Modernity, http://www.
sacredweb.com/
12 Ibid., 146.
13 In this context, he makes reference to the Qur’anic verse: “And among His signs
is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages
and your colours: in that indeed there are signs for those who deeply know”
(49:13).
4 The Islamic liberation
theology imperative

In fact, in my opinion, if one would be interested in developing a compre-

hensive and systematic theory of Islamic justice, such a theory would have
to be constructed around the principle of protecting the least privileged. The
Islamic tradition is replete with narratives attributed to the prophet or one of
the companions asserting that the rights recognized by the collectivity must
be measured in accordance with the needs of the weakest or least privileged
in the community.
(El Fadl, 2014, 332)

Islamic and Christian liberation theologies

In the introductory part of this book, I stated that progressive Muslim
thought finds inspiration in movements and schools of thought that are not
necessarily part of the historical experience of Islam’s concrete historical
trajectory but which are considered as being in accordance with its overall
ideals, values, objectives, and, therefore, imperatives. This aspect of progres-
sive Muslim thought is, perhaps, nowhere better exemplified than in the case
of Christian (or more precisely Catholic) liberation theology with which
progressive Muslim thought has many affinities. In fact the emergence of
Islamic liberation theology as conceptualized by progressive Muslim scholars
examined below has been inspired in significant part through their engage-
ment with the pioneers of liberation theology in the Christian majority world
context such as G. Gutiérrez, C. Torres, and L. Boeff, to name but the most
prominent few. Shabbir Akhtar (1991), one of the main proponents and
pioneers of Islamic liberation theology whose views we shall examine in
some detail below, goes as far as to suggest that Islamic liberation theology
is an actual fact an Islamization of Christianity.
Mehmet Ciftci (2014, 1) in his comparative study of liberation theology,
which focuses on Christian and Islamic approaches, has demonstrated that
both liberation theology traditions, the Christian and the Islamic, share
many principles central to theologies of liberation, including “the need to
reinterpret their own religions from the perspective of the poor; the inter-
related emphases on action, orthopraxy and the agency of the oppressed;
76 Islamic liberation theology imperative
and thirdly a rejection of excessive other-worldliness”. Palombo (2014),
similarly considers that the commitments of Islamic liberation theology
can be placed under three broad categories: liberation theology as peoples’
theology, liberation theology as critical theology (in the sense of cultivat-
ing critical consciousness), and liberation theology as political theology
(in the sense that it presupposes religion-inspired political activism for
realization of a just society). In my discussion of the progressive Muslim
thinkers, I will attempt to cover most of these aspects of Islamic liberation
theology.
Before I do so, a few general remarks regarding the nature of liberation
theology are in order. Briefly stated, liberation theology is a theory, having
originated amongst certain Roman Catholic theologians in Latin America,
which interprets liberation from social, political, and economic oppression
as anticipating the historical process of eschatological salvation. Its advo-
cates believe that the Christian Gospel demands “a preferential option for
the poor”, and that the church should be involved in the struggle for eco-
nomic and political justice in the contemporary world – particularly in the
Third World (Smith, 1991). G. Gutiérrez (1988, 13), one of the major theo-
reticians behind liberation theology, defines it as a “critical reflection on
praxis in the light of the word of God”. In other words, liberation theology
aims at exploring the relationship between religion, theology, and political
activism, particularly in the areas of social justice, poverty, and human rights.
In this context, it seeks to re-examine the very purpose of revelation and
tradition in order to engender the social and liberating dimensions implicit
in both sources.
Liberation theology opposes dominant theology in that the latter emerges
from a position of privilege and affluence. Hence, it is elitist in nature and
thought oriented. The former, on the contrary, surfaces among the oppressed,
is non-elitist, this worldly and action oriented. It aims to bring about politi-
cal, social, and economic change in order to undo what it considers to be an
unjust status quo. It works to dismantle the existing structures which prevent
the oppressed from being liberated and being fully human. As noted by
McAfee, “liberation theology threatens the dominant theology and demands
its elimination” (McAfee, 1993, 138).
Given such a view of liberation theology, it is not surprising that non-
Catholic/Christian forms of liberation theology could exist. Indeed, as noted
by a leading scholar of liberation theology movements, McAfee (1993), there
is nothing uniquely Christian about liberation theology. In his words:

I stress context lest the impression be given that liberation theology is

an exclusively Latin American reality. Nothing could be further from the
truth; liberation theology exists wherever there is oppression, and there
are few parts of the globe, as a consequence, where movements for lib-
eration are not this very day growing in size and intensity.
(McAfee, 1993, ix)
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 77
Islamic liberation theology, therefore, like its Christian equivalent, chal-
lenges what it considers to be an unjust status quo and systems of oppres-
sion faced by Muslims (as well as non-Muslims) in their various contexts.
Thereby they partake in the process of what Gutiérrez calls the “critical
reflection on praxis in the light of the word of God”. They do so by nego-
tiating with the sacred sources of the Islamic tradition, namely the Qur’an
and the Sunna.

The imperative for an Islamic liberation theology for

Muslims living in the twenty-first century
The proponents of progressive Muslim thought find a plethora of reasons as
to why the development of an Islamic liberation theology is sorely needed
for Muslims living in the twenty-first century. These include the traumatic
legacy of colonialism; the growing gap between the rich and poor in general
and between rich and poor Muslims in particular; the aggressive spread of
forms of Islamic puritanism/fundamentalism and their alliance with imperi-
alistic neo-liberal capitalism whose epicentre is in the West (and more specifi-
cally in the United States of America); and the political, economic, and social
impotence of various secular/liberal/modernist as well as conservative main-
stream forms of political Islam.1
As aptly noted by Abdenur Prado, a vocal supporter of and an important
contributor to the development of Islamic liberation theology (and the presi-
dent of the Catalonian Islamic Board), the proponents of the contemporary
mainstream non-progressive currents in Islam are neither willing to nor
capable of bringing about the change theologies of liberation seek. In fact,
with their views regarding Islam as religion, they are an obstacle to the ideals,
aims, and objectives of Islamic liberation theology. In Prado’s words:

The obsession over religion understood as extreme morality, a suffocat-

ing puritanism obsessed with honor and sexuality, is a means to alienate
Muslim populations, it acts as a veil that prevents the analyzing of the
real causes of the social injustices they suffer, and presents those respon-
sible for these injustices as guarantors of their identity and national
honor. We are witnessing an extreme form of obscurantism, brought
upon by reactionary ulemas, who occupy positions based on their sig-
nificance in the history of Islam, such as the University of Al-Azhar or
the Mosques of Mecca and Medina. An obscurantist vision of Islam that
intercepts any critical thought among believers, condemning their com-
munities to remain in ignorance.2

Similarly, Samir Amin, a noted critic of neo-liberal capitalism, imperialism,

and mainstream (political) Islam, considers that when it comes to socio-
political questions, conventional forms of political Islam have taken a purely
reactionary stance, and have been co-opted by and are dependent upon
78 Islamic liberation theology imperative
capitalism and dominant imperialism. In this sense, Amin forms the view
that non-progressive political forms of Islam are incompatible with the ide-
als, objectives, and values of what we term here Islamic liberation theology,
as they are not anti-imperialist but merely anti-western and/or anti-Christian
in nature (Amin, 2007).3 In his (Amin, 2007) words:

Political Islam is not only reactionary on certain questions (notably con-

cerning the status of women) and perhaps even responsible for fanatic
excesses directed against non-Muslim citizens (such as the Copts in
Egypt) – it is fundamentally reactionary and therefore obviously cannot
participate in the progress of peoples’ liberation.

The deep economic ties between the neo-liberal capitalist market economy
and the Muslim-majority world are also noted by Tariq Ramadan (2002 in
Prado), who asserts:

The whole of the Islamic world is under the tutelage of market economy.
Countries apparently Islamic from the viewpoint of laws and govern-
ment, for example Saudi Arabia or other petro-kingdoms, are the most
integrated economically with the neoliberal system founded on specula-
tion and immersed in interest transactions (in reference to usury).

Apart from critiquing conservative and fundamentalist forms of (political)

Islam, Islamic liberation theology also calls into question its liberal/mod-
erate incarnations that are in many ways supported by imperialists. This
is so because these forms of Islam, which call for a strict separation of
politics and religion, neutralize Islam’s revolutionary (of a primarily but
not a priori non-violent kind) potential to change the unjust status quo.
Liberal/moderate Islam is also problematic from an Islamic liberation the-
ology point of view (and hence progressive Islam) because its critique of
Islamic fundamentalism is not accompanied by a similar critique of insti-
tutions and systems at the heart of global neo-liberal capitalism (Dabashi,
2011; Mamdani, 2004).
Another prominent voice which has spoken about the need for an Islamic
liberation theology in the twenty-first century is that of Hamid Dabashi, an
Iranian-American academic at Columbia University in New York. The larger
context in which Dabashi articulates this need is its function as a means of
resistance to a globalized, predatory empire whose epicentre is in the United
States. In this regard, Hamid maintains that the United States spares no effort
in employing military aggression in pursuit of global capital, thereby engag-
ing in various forms of illegitimate violence whose victims are often, but not
only, Muslims. Hence, Muslims, alongside and in cooperation with other
regional and cross-cultural actors, must resist this destructive force by means
of Islamic liberation theology but without adopting “an absolutist, puritani-
cal, and totalistic disposition” (Dabashi, 2008, 9). Rather, for Dabashi
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 79
(2008), the task of the Islamic liberation theology in challenging this US
empire in pursuit of global capital is in:

Resisting the US-inspired globalized empire (which should never be

equated with Americans at large, the overwhelming majority of which
have a healthy dose of either active resistance to or else nagging suspi-
cion about its efficacy) can no longer be in terms of a singular ideology
embedded in a medieval theology, or an ideologically updated version
of it to resist a center-based “Western” empire, or else contingent on
spectacular acts of senseless and iconic violence. Resisting that empire
requires regional alliances based on crosscurrents of ideas, sentiments,
ideologies, and cultures. The worst aspect of Islamic ideology was its
persistent reliance on Islamic Law (Shari’ah), the consequences of which
for a free and democratic society is simply catastrophic, for it mutates
the free and autonomous citizens of a potential republic into the legal
subjects of a medieval jurisprudence that no matter how liberally it is
interpreted it remains deadly contrary to creation of free and autono-
mous citizens of a republic. The only way that an (Islamic) liberation
theology can be part of a global resistance to the US (or any other)
empire is to be party to an equally liberating and global conversation,
safeguard its theological monotheism by embracing it within a multifac-
eted theodicy that instead of trying to account for the existence of evil
in the world in fact embraces its own alternatives and oppositions.
(263–264)

For reasons outlined above, the imperative for reviving an Islamic liberation
theology becomes ever so pertinent for the proponents of progressive Muslim
thought. The imperative is based on progressive Muslims’ ‘multiple critique’
approach discussed in the introduction of this book, which simultaneously
resists the hegemonies of imperialism, corporate globalization, and forms of
Islam which are its bedfellows. Progressive Muslims as proponents of Islamic
liberation theology, instead, seek to construct alternative alliances with the
Global Left and like-minded social movements in order to resist these hege-
monic forces.
For the proponents of progressive Muslim thought, reviving Islamic libera-
tion theology necessitates a radical reform of the traditional understanding
of Islamic law (Shari’a) in the interest of protecting the marginalized, weak,
and underprivileged. This, as partly evident in this book, could involve issues
as diverse as reformulation of the concepts, aims, and objectives of Islamic
theology, ethics, and law (especially Muslim family laws); the transformation
of Islamic finance and economics for the purposes of real economic justice;
and the recasting of Islamic politics in order to align them with the values,
ideals, and objectives of Islamic liberation theology.
With this context in mind, the rest of the chapter discusses four prominent
proponents of progressive Muslim thought who have systematically engaged
80 Islamic liberation theology imperative
with liberation theology and have contributed to its development in the
context of the Islamic religious tradition. They include Shabbir Akhtar, a
British-Pakistani philosopher and specialist in Christian-Muslim compara-
tive religion; Hassan Hanafi, an Egyptian philosopher and a major theoreti-
cian behind the Islamic Left; Farid Esack, a South African theologian who
employed Islamic liberation theology as a means to resist and dismantle the
apartheid system; and Ali Ashgar Engineer, who developed his liberation
theology in the context of political violence between Muslims and Hindus in
India as well as in response to the ethnic and communal violence engendered
by the caste system.

Ali Ashgar Engineer

As noted briefly above, Engineer (d.2013) developed his theology of libera-
tion as a response to oppression engendered by the caste system and political
conflict between Muslim and Hindu communities in modern India. His
understanding of Islam was significantly shaped by his engagement with
movements struggling for social justice, reform, and interreligious solidarity,
especially in the context of contemporary India. As evident in his many writ-
ings, Engineer’s understanding of Islam was influenced by Marxism, western
liberalism, and Christian liberation theology.
Before we examine his ideas on Islamic liberation theology, a few brief
remarks regarding his criticism of mainstream Islamic theology and some
general points on how (Islamic) liberation theology can be achieved are in
order.
Like other progressive Muslim theologians examined in this chapter,
Engineer holds the view that theology is a human construct. As such it is
entangled in and often reflective of the interests and attitudes of the domi-
nant segments of society. Moreover, as Islam over time became an empire
faith, mainstream Islamic theology and its proponents acted as reinforcers
rather than challengers of the unjust status quo, doing little to confront and
resist sources of oppression. So, for Engineer (1990, 1–4, 69–71), instead
of it performing the function of a tool for liberation of the oppressed, tra-
ditional Islamic theology became the opiate of the masses. In this context,
Engineer asserts:

The Islamic thought became inward looking on one hand, and, lost some
of its most fundamental concerns like justice for weaker sections of
society. These centres of civilization were centres of feudal culture and
along with feudal sophistication, feudal values were also imbibed. Thus
what Islamic thought gained in swing, [it] lost in its sweep. Islam spread
with great rapidity because of its great concern with justice for weaker
sections of society but now it became an integral part of a huge Islamic
empire and nearly lost its sensitivity towards suffering of the downtrod-
den of the society.4
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 81
According to Engineer, Islam is an inherently revolutionary religion. Its only
‘authentic’ theology is that of liberation of all the oppressed, weak, and
marginalized segments of society because of the centrality of the concept of
justice in the Qur’an which is conceptualized not as a purely abstract term
but one that has tangible socio-political and economic implications. Hence,
in the view of Engineer (2004, 180), the label of true believers (mu’minun)
can apply only to those who simultaneously profess faith in God’ firmly
believe in and are committed to (Islamic) values of compassion, peace, jus-
tice, equality, and benevolence; and are willing and prepared to struggle to
change the world in accordance with them.
On the basis of his overall understanding of the Qur’anic message and
Prophet Muhammad’s example (Sunna) to create a new society based on
socio-economic justice, Engineer forms the view that justice is the most fun-
damental value in the sight of God. He cites the verse 5:8 in support of this
claim (Engineer, 1990).5 Justice, for Engineer, is even more important than
religion/belief itself. This is, for example, evident from his statement that
“the world can endure with justice and unbelief, but not with injustice and
Islam” (Engineer, 1990, 26).
In the context of arguing for reconstruction of Islamic thought, Engineer
writes that the Qur’an’s concept of justice is universal to the extent that it
requires the believers to bear witness for justice even if it is against one’s own
interests. Furthermore, for Engineer, the concept of justice in the Qur’an is both
absolute as well as relative (Engineer, 1990). Hence, while medieval Muslim
concepts of justice might have made sense in their particular socio-historical
contexts, modern notions of justice are no less authentic or imperative.
To demonstrate this important point, he (Engineer, 1990) asserts:

The Qur’an gives the principle of justice as a norm; the legal doctors
applied it to various issues which arose from time to time, according to
their own ability, understanding and socio-cultural background. . . . It is
necessary to understand that it is justice which has to be rigorously applied
to all the issues in framing laws. It is the very foundation of the juris cor-
pus of Islam. It is more central than the corpus of laws inherited by us. As
the legal doctors applied the notion of justice in keeping with their own
circumstances we must rethink the issues in Shari’ah laws based on the
notion of centrality of justice particularly in the sphere of family laws.
(26)

In Engineer’s thought, for true justice to reign, certain condition must be met.
The most fundamental element of true justice is its comprehensiveness as
evident in the content and the message of the Qur’an. In this regard, Engineer
(2004) asserts:

The Qur’an gives us the highest form of moral consciousness and a very
comprehensive concept of justice. For comprehensive justice one needs
82 Islamic liberation theology imperative
fulfillment of several other conditions – like freedom of conscience, and
freedom of conscience is possible only when one accepts human dignity,
and human dignity is possible only when racial, tribal, and national
discriminations are rejected.
(261)

Importantly, for Engineer, the surest and most practical way to protect and
enable (Islamic) liberation theology principles to take root in society, in the
context of our contemporary world, is by means of adopting democratic
governance principles which have the capacity to accommodate pluralism,
protect minority rights, and embody the Qur’anic spirit of justice (2004,
213–216).
Generally speaking, Islam’s liberation theology credentials are justified and
explained by Engineer on the basis of three considerations: its emphasis on
socio-economic justice, its emphasis on peace and compassion, and the idea
of there being an organic and symbiotic relationship between orthodoxy and
orthopraxis in its belief system.6
In reference to the Qur’an’s approach to socio-economic justice, Engineer
considers that the Qur’an lays great emphasis on distributive justice by con-
demning in the strongest terms possible7 accumulation and hoarding of
wealth and its exhortation to people “to spend taking care of orphans, wid-
ows, needy and the poor”. He singles out the Qur’an’s prohibition on usury
and denunciation of zulm (injustice/oppression) as evidence for considering
the Qur’an as “a charter of liberation for the oppressed” (2004).
Writing in the context of developing a theology of peace8 in Islam Engineer
identifies the Qur’an’s preferential treatment for the poor as the backbone
of the Islamic liberation of theology. He argues that one way in which the
Qur’an aims to strengthen the social roots of peace is by tackling “the very
socio-economic roots of conflict”. Here Engineer argues that economic
inequalities between the weak (mustad’ifin) and the arrogant/selfish domi-
nant (mustakbirin) will inevitably result in injustice and oppression, which
will lead to violence. Furthermore, Engineer notes that the conflict between
the two parties is a recurrent theme in the Qur’an (the arrogant and powerful
are, for example, represented by Nimrod and Pharaoh and the weak and
oppressed by Abraham and Moses). Significantly, for Engineer, the Qur’an’s
call for liberation of the oppressed should never be confined to Muslims
alone. Hence Engineer (2004) writes:

It is quite significant for theology of peace in Islam that throughout the

text of the Qur’an we find the words mustakbirun and mustad’ifun i.e.
arrogant and the weak or oppressors and the oppressed without an
qualification of being Muslim or not. Thus even if arrogant and oppres-
sor is a Muslim, one will have to struggle against him and even if an
oppressed and persecuted is non-Muslim Muslims will have to wage
struggle against him.
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 83
In Engineer’s understanding, the concept of jihad in the Qur’an is in agree-
ment with the overall Qur’anic call for the protection of the cause of the
weak and the oppressed. Engineer cites the following Qur’anic verse (4:75)
as evidence for such a nature of jihad:

Why should you not fight in God’s cause and for those oppressed men,
women, and children who cry out, Lord, give us a protector and give us
a helper!? The believers fight for God’s cause, while those who reject
faith fight for an unjust cause.

Hence, for Engineer, the struggle in God’s way means that Muslims are to
engage in defensive jihad against injustice in all its forms. The manner in
which this is to be done, however, is context dependent. Sometimes it could
be violent – albeit as a last resort – but in the majority of cases it would not.
He argues further that the wars in which the Prophet engaged, if considered
in their historical context of a seventh-century tribal society in which war
was the rule rather than the exception, were legitimate as they ensured the
continued existence of a minority community constantly under threat. How-
ever, in today’s world, especially in the democratic and pluralist India, peace
and forgiveness are the only viable option for the creation of a lasting just
society (Engineer, 2004, 154–155).
Writing in the context of developing a theology of compassion in Islam,
Engineer once again reaffirms his view that the Qur’an repeatedly shows “its
sympathy for the weaker sections of the society in which it includes, among
others, the orphans, the widows, the poor and the exploited, the slaves and
other politically or socially and economically oppressed people”.9 Moreover,
he considers that the Qur’an has taken concrete steps to mitigate and ame-
liorate their condition by means of instituting the obligatory toll tax (zakat)
which is part of Islam’s ‘ibada (rituals). Hence, for Engineer, the Qur’an
intimately links faith and worship firmly with justice-based praxis.10 Wor-
shipping, for Engineer, is merely the means and not the goal of Islam. He
cites Qur’an 29:45 (“Surely prayer keeps (one) away from indecency and
evil; and certainly the remembrance of Allah is the greatest ‘act’ to argue that
the real objective of Islam is true moral and ethical conduct”).
Furthermore, Engineer opines that, because Allah describes Himself as the
Just (al-‘adl), justice itself is part of worship. To live and, if necessary, to die
for the cause of justice is “the highest form of worship one can think of”
(Engineer, 2004, 10). Thus, the function of canonical rituals in Islam is not
just spiritual but also social. They serve as means of perfecting the believer’s
character and conduct in creating a just and prosperous society for all. An
important part of this process is the willingness to stand up and fight against
untruth and injustice for the sake of safeguarding human freedom and dig-
nity (Engineer, 2004).
Importantly, Engineer forms the view that the Prophet Muhammad faith-
fully embodied Qur’anic liberation theology principles described above. In
84 Islamic liberation theology imperative
his article on the role of the Prophet as a liberator in the sense employed in
liberation theology, Engineer argues that it is the Prophet who liberated his
people from ignorance, poverty, superstition, oppression, slavery, and injus-
tice. In these struggles, Engineer emphasizes, the Prophet Muhamad did not
just assume the role of a teacher or philosopher but that of an activist, a fully
fledged participant and fighter for these causes. As one part of this engage-
ment, the Prophet, through his actions, embodied and laid great emphasis
on distributive justice. Engineer provides examples such as the Prophet’s
disapproval of the exploitative practice of share-cropping (mukhabira,
muhaqila) and banning of various forms of speculation (such as the buying
of un-ripened dates) to curb exploitation of the poor for the benefit of the
rich as evidence for this view. In Engineer’s thinking, the Prophet only
approved of “legitimate margin of profit (as a reward for one’s work and
entrepreneurship) and strongly disapproved of hoarding, black-marketing
etc”. (Engineer, 2004) Engineer also highlights that the Prophet not only
allowed the hungry to snatch food from those who have more than enough,
but that those who died as a result of this were to be considered martyrs.
Moreover, writing in the context of the importance of compassion in
Islam, Engineer considers that this quality was central to the Prophet’s legacy
and character. As evidence for this view, Engineer (2004) writes:

Prophet used to say that even if one person remains hungry in a locality
no angel will descend in that locality until that hungry person is fed. Also
the Prophet is reported to have said that it is more meritorious to feed a
hungry widow than to pray [the] whole night. Thus one can see the
intensity of the Prophet’s compassion towards others’ suffering, particu-
larly those of the weaker sections of society. It was for this reason that
even for expiation of one’s sins the Qur’an as well as the Holy Prophet
requires to feed the hungry or to liberate the slaves.

In summary, Engineer has developed a number of systematic arguments as

to why the noblest teachings of the Qur’an and Sunna are best to be concep-
tualized in accordance with the principle of liberation theology.

Farid Esack
Esack’s (b.1959) theology of ‘religious pluralism for liberation’ was forged
in the crucible of both apartheid South Africa and his time as a student in a
Pakistani madrassa. While in Pakistan, he experienced a conflict between his
belief in a God whom he conceptualized as just and siding with the marginal-
ized and the oppressed irrespective of their religion or gender and his con-
crete experiences of a religiously exclusivist and dominant society which
treated religious minorities, many of whom were poor and marginalized, as
pariahs (Esack, 1997, 5). It is in Pakistan that he became acquainted with
the work of Gutiérrez through his close friendships with some Catholic
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 85
Pakistanis. These experiences had a great influence on his life as both a theo-
logian and anti-apartheid activist (Esack, 1997).
Upon his return to South Africa in 1984, he joined a group of co-religionists
who founded the organization the Call of Islam. Call of Islam was a
religious-political group which engaged in interfaith work and in organizing
nationwide campaigns against apartheid and gender inequality. As a member
of the Call of Islam, Esack spent several years as an activist and liberation
theologian and was heavily involved in their activities. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, he pursued his academic career, obtaining a doctorate degree in
theology from the University of Birmingham. He also completed postdoc-
toral studies in biblical hermeneutics in Germany (Esack, 1997). Not surpris-
ingly, Esack’s Islamic liberation theology has a strong hermeneutical
component, to which we will turn in due course.
For Esack, theology of liberation is a theology that has two main objec-
tives. The first entails a proactive stance in securing the freedom of all people
from oppressive and exploitative systems and structures regardless of their
gender, race, or religion. The second objective pertains to its function of
freeing religion from what he terms theological obscurantism and passivism.
Both of these objectives require concrete efforts to be exerted before they can
be realized.
With respect to the second objective of liberation theology, like in the case
of other progressives examined in this chapter, Esack’s liberation theology is
a marked departure from both traditional Islamic theology and modern
‘secular-academic’ theology for a number of reasons. The first concerns the
location of the interpreter of the sacred texts. In Esack’s view, the traditional
theologian interprets the sacred texts from the vantage point of someone
who does not want to have their religious authority put into question and
therefore maintains the unjust status quo by downsizing Islam to a politically
acquiescent, ritual-obsessed religion. The modern theologian interpreter,
who is situated (and isolated) within the realm of secular academia, engages
in an elitist and detached discourse that is bereft of any tangible socio-political
dimensions. Hence, both modes of discourse are unable or unwilling to bring
about change at the social and political level. They are in Esack’s words
‘accommodationist theologies’. An interpreter who adopts a liberation theol-
ogy approach, by contrast, engages with the sacred texts from the vantage
point of solidarity with the marginalized and the oppressed. From this per-
spective, religion becomes a vehicle of liberatory praxis based on a non-elitist
approach to theology making (Esack, 1997, 110). In this context, in part
citing one of the pioneers of Catholic liberation theology, the brothers Boff
(1985, 25–26), Esack (2003, 91) writes:

A progressive rereading of our theological heritage does not take its

point of departure from the concerns of dominant and dominating
classes nor from yearnings to join “the club” but “in a perception of the
real situation of the poor, and, with new eyes, bestowed by this
86 Islamic liberation theology imperative
experience, it rereads the foundational texts of the faith.” The location
of the progressive Muslims among the marginalized of the world is the
Sunnah (precedent) of the all the Prophets of God and the choice that
God himself exercises.
(Q. 7:136–7; 34:31–33)

Another reason why, for Esack, liberation theology is different from the
traditional and the modern, is premised on the idea that liberation theology,
by being a ‘second act’ to use the phrase employed by Gutiérrez, is contextual
in nature and not a theology founded on a set of ahistorical and eternally
fixed guidelines. Therefore, for Esack, as for Gutiérrez, in circumstances of
oppression, an interpreter’s theology is a direct outcome of his/her status of
being oppressed. Hence, the context of oppression/exploitation exists in a
symbiotic relationship with the nature of theology itself. A specific Islamic
liberation theology, therefore, takes inspiration from the Qur’an and by
means of reflection it employs it as a mechanism or a tool of/for liberation
(Esack, 2003, 83). The final reason why liberation theology for Esack is dif-
ferent from accomodationist theologies is premised on the idea that libera-
tion theology is non-absolutist in its approach to the question of truth, which
is considered to be the sole prerogative of God. It is by means of engaging in
hermeneutics that the proponents of liberation theology can seek to ever
approximate the truth by creating an ever more just world as intended by
God (Esack, 2003, 111).
As a liberation theologian living in apartheid South Africa, Esack percep-
tively observed that the main role religion, in this case both dominant Chris-
tianity and to a lesser extent conservative Islam, played was that of
accommodation rather than liberation. In fact, for Esack, there was an
organic and symbiotic relationship between accommodation theology and
the ideology of apartheid. However, as history testifies, over time, liberation
theology gradually started to emerge and became triumphant, dismantling
the ideology of apartheid and the structures supportive of it.
As part of the first objective of Esack’s liberation theology as a tool of
fighting oppression, he has also been a vocal critic of neo-liberal capitalism
and the imperialism, both economic and cultural, it has spawned. In this
connection, one important aspect and objective of progressive Muslim
thought as an embodiment of Islamic liberation theology, argues Esack, is
the “speaking truth to power” by engaging: i.) “in relentless self-critique that
enables the adherent of progressive Muslim thought to be true to the ideals
of a just society in a way that also prevents his or her co-optation by those
who have their own agendas or the expansion of the Empires as their pri-
mary reason for wanting to engage Islam”; ii.) engaging the Empire in the
light of i.) without jeopardizing the inherent humanity of those comprising
it; and iii.) engaging the ummah (global Muslim community) by confronting
those within it who, in the guise of protecting Muslim societies from the
Empire, violate Muslims’ basic human rights (2006, 125–126).
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 87
Criticism of the ‘Market Capitalism’ as a fundamentalist form of ‘religion’,
akin to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan or Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia,
as the defining feature of the Empire is a dominant theme in Esack’s writ-
ings.11 In one poignant example of criticism directed at the Market, Esack
cites the work of Harvey Cox (in Esack, 2003, 88), Harvard-based Christian
economist scholar, who argues that the Market is becoming “the first truly
world religion, binding all corners of the globe into a world-view and set of
values whose religious role we overlook only because we insist on seeing
them as ‘secular’, and who uncovered remarkable similarities between
descriptions of God in traditional theologies and that of the Market as God
and Market Capitalism as religion.” In this context, Esack (2003), summa-
rizing Cox’s findings, writes:

Adherents of the Free Market see their lives driven to the worship of
the One All-Powerful and Jealous God: Capital. Underpinned by its
theology – economics – it has numerous huge temples in the form of
shopping malls to which people are increasingly being drawn by deeply
unfilled inner needs, for which the temple, church, or mosque are now
perceived as inadequate. (“I shop to feel good”; “I go to the mall to hang
out”). The connectedness with both God and community provided by
the temple has now been supplanted by the highly individualized and
anonymous encounters between cashier and consumer. These temples of
consumerism often display a determination to drive out all the smaller
little corner churches propounding insignificant little heresies such as
“the humanness of chatting to your own friendly butcher.” The major
symbol of this religion, the “Golden Arches” of McDonalds, has driven
out that other symbol of a now old-fashioned religion, the crucifix of
Christianity, as the most widely recognized symbol in the world. The
arches are telling the crucifix “The Lord, your God is One; you shall
have none others in my presence.”
(89–90)

One of the most prominent of the ideals and practices of progressive Muslim
thought for Esack is its commitment to what he terms ‘principled or pro-
phetic solidarity’, that is, the engagement with the marginalized and the
oppressed communities of the world which are confronted with the actual
context of injustice. This principled solidarity ought not be confused with
and must be distinguished from what Esack labels the ‘expedient or situa-
tional ethics’ that, in his view, dominate current Muslim public discourses
which are strategic, utilitarian, and accommodationist in character (Esack,
2006, 125–126). In the words of Esack (Esack, 2006), the primary concerns
of progressive Muslim thought therefore:

[r]elate [far more directly] to global structures of oppression whether eco-

nomic, gender, sexual etc., and ensuring that the oppressed are once again
88 Islamic liberation theology imperative
active agents of history. This fight for us [Progressive Muslims] involves
the centrality of God, the imagining of mankind as al-nas – a carrier of
the spirit of God and an appreciation of Islam as a liberatory discourse.
(127)

Furthermore, for Esack, the discourse on democracy and human rights stem-
ming from the geographical regions of the Empire’s centre should be viewed
by progressive Muslims with a great deal of suspicion, as it is seen as often
functioning as a “Trojan Horse of Recolonisation” as well as because it often
does not live up to its own standards (Esack, 2006, 117, 120–121).
With respect to the ‘Trojan Horse of Recolonisation’ phenomenon, Esack
sharply criticizes the efforts, both in the realms of academia and outside of
it, attempting to construct a ‘moderate Islam’ (versus extremist) and/or the
concept of a ‘Good Muslims’ (versus ‘Bad Muslims’) in the manner of an
entirely Empire-friendly faith based on acommodationist theology and ideo-
logical amnesia. Using a play-of-words technique, he terms these efforts as
“redeeming Islam” (2013, 37). In this context, he defines accommodationist
theology as “the attempts to present Islam in a form acceptable to dominant
powers by removing elements that are found offensive by the shifting needs
of those powers” (2013, 38). Esack also problematizes the attempts of the
political leaders of western liberal democracies, as well as influential voices
in academia who work on Islam, to foreground the themes of pluralism,
human rights, democracy, peace, and non-violence from the perspective of
western political liberalism onto Muslims as the ‘true’ Islam of ‘Good Mus-
lims’ who have no other choice but to internalize this discourse in a manner
that is bereft of the awareness of the larger ideological agendas these noble
principles might serve for the same (2013, 51–52). Furthermore, Esack
(2003) extends the same kind of critique to those ‘liberal’ Muslims who seem
to be unaware of or willing to be co-opted by these forces. Writing in the
context of ‘liberal’ Muslims’ response to 9/11, he writes:

While the way the North, particularly the U.S.A., responded to those
events ensured that it was going to be a decisive moment in world his-
tory, liberal Muslims did nothing to challenge the idea that this was
inevitable and that the U.S.A.’s pain was not or should not be – the axis
around which the earth rotates.
(83)

In this context, Esack (2003) points out that one of the most significant dif-
ferences between progressive Muslims and liberal ones pertains to the ques-
tion of what forms the primary subject of discourse. In his own words, this
difference is described as follows:

In owning the obsession of the powerful as theirs, liberal Muslims made

the powerful their own primary subject and issues of authenticity and
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 89
meaning the central crisis for their understanding of Islam. Progressive
Muslims insisted that the primary subject and focus of their Islam were
the “non-subjects of history.” In effect, liberal Islam has functioned as
an ideology of and for the bourgeois, struggling to secure freedom as
individual and ahistorical.
(84)

Esack, citing Chopp (1989, 34), therefore takes issue with liberal Muslims
because their theology approaches religion in such a manner as to reinforce
the “often unstated ideological assumptions of the dominant classes and
corporate interest on the one hand and to placate those who are marginalized
by siphoning of ‘any critical energy through charitable goodwill’ on the
other” (Esack, 2003, 84).
As noted above, Esack’s liberation theology has a strong hermeneutical
grounding. For the purposes of this chapter, we do not focus on all of the
hermeneutical elements Esack presents when developing his vision of
the relationship between the Muslim Self and the Religious Other, but only
those that are directly relevant to liberation theology.12
Esack (1997, 13–14) believes his liberation theology to be a part of a
larger, universal struggle that requires a reinterpretation of religion in order
to use it as a tool for creating and maintaining justice. As part of his ‘con-
textual hermeneutic of religious pluralism for liberation’, Esack develops
three important ‘hermeneutical keys’ which underpin the broader hermeneu-
tic task and form what he terms ‘keys to understanding’. The hermeneutical
keys are based on assumptions that the process of meaning derivation is
dynamic and is significantly affected by the reader/interpreter or a commu-
nity of readers/interpreters and her/their ‘prior text’.
The first set of terms constituting the first key are the concepts of taqwa
(awareness of accountability to God) and tawhid (God’s absolute unity
implying an inherent dignity of all humanity). They are ‘theological glasses’
with which to examine the Qur’an in general and, more specifically, the texts
dealing with the religious ‘Other’. Their hermeneutical function is to couple
the notion of belief with that of social justice activism, the process of ‘walk-
ing the walk’ not just ‘talking the talk’. In particular, they act as an aspiration
to be acquired ‘beyond the immediate task of interpretation’, thus establish-
ing a symbiotic relationship between orthopraxy and orthodoxy. The her-
meneutical keys also force an interpreter to be introspective and engaged in
social and self-transformation alongside principles of justice, freedom, hon-
esty, and integrity. Importantly, the hermeneutical keys are also meant to
prevent the ‘activist as an interpreter’ “from becoming a mirror image of the
very tyrant being fought” (Esack, 1997, 90). Finally, the hermeneutical keys
are an insurance policy against monopolisation of meaning/interpretation
and the notion of a final or absolute meaning or interpretation. As such these
principles are seen as both ‘necessary components of pre-understanding’ as
well as hermeneutical principles.
90 Islamic liberation theology imperative
Another relevant hermeneutical key identified by Esack is the Qur’anic
concept of al-nas. Esack argues that this Qur’anic concept is grounded in the
principles of taqwa and tawhid. It refers to ‘the people’ as a social collective
who assume the function of God’s stewards on earth. Therefore, humans are
the protectors of God’s creation and responsible for carrying out his will on
earth (2:30). The hermeneutical keys of taqwa, tawhid and al-nas combined
imply that the Qur’an is to be interpreted in the interest of the people. As
part of the al-nas hermeneutical key, the question of the mustad’afun, the
segment of a society which is socio-economically oppressed and marginal-
ized, arises. Esack argues that the category of mustad’afun is not willed or
pre-determined by God but is a direct outcome of exploitative and oppressive
practices of the powerful and the wealthy. As affirmed in the history of the
legacies of prophets of God (partly found in the Qur’an), God has a prefer-
ential option for the marginalized. Esack refers to the fact that numerous
Qur’anic verses denouncing the accumulation and hoarding of wealth, and
those that link faith to humanism and socio-economic justice, as evidence
for this preferential treatment. Importantly, for Esack, the significance of the
hermeneutical category of mustad’afun lies in the fact that it requires the
interpreter to interpret the Qur’an through their experiences of suffering.
The result of such an approach to interpretation should result in believers
engaging in a struggle (jihad) for justice and liberation. For Esack, jihad
signifies this struggle to transform oneself and one’s society in accordance
with these values. Jihad is therefore an indispensable part of Islamic libera-
tion theology praxis. Importantly, Esack also argues that in the Qur’an, the
concept of justice, or qist, is synonymous with truth and faith. Therefore it
serves as a basis for the natural order of the universe. Esack points out that,
for example, 56:25 Qur’an describes the enforcement of qist as one of the
primary objectives of revelation and a step on the path to taqwa. All of the
above-discussed hermeneutical keys imply that Muslims are accountable to
God and have the social responsibility to uphold justice and ensure that
God’s will is manifest on earth for all people irrespective of their faith or
gender (Esack, 1997, 103–107).
In closing this section, we could not do better than to quote Van den
Heever (2014), who aptly summarizes the hermeneutical aspects of Esack’s
liberation theology as follows:

Esack and his fellow progressive Islamists utilized hermeneutical keys to

remain self-aware and engage in an authentic reading of the text that
kept them aligned with God’s will in their struggle against injustice.
Faithful activists were required to respect tawhid and taqwa while sup-
porting God’s preferential option for the poor through jihad in collabo-
ration with the religious other. These hermeneutics not only guided their
liberative praxis, but also served to liberate the interpreter and the
Qur’an itself from theological obscurantism and chauvinism that per-
petuated injustice and demonized the religious other. Esack believed that
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 91
liberation theology was authentic in its mission and commitment to God
and his creation, but recognized that interpreters are fallible and unable
to remain totally objective, especially in situations of oppression.
(258)

Hassan Hanafi
Hanafi (b.1935) is another pioneering voice of Islamic liberation theology.
His scholarship spans many fields. As aptly surmised by Boullata (in Esposito,
1995), it simultaneously:

reconstructs the Islamic heritage in a new historicist and critical inter-

pretation; it reassesses Western culture within a de-centering and down-
sizing critical approach; and it builds a new hermeneutic of religious
culture on a global scale in which Islam is the ideological foundation of
a modern humanity liberated from alienation and provided with a com-
prehensive program of positive action leading to happiness, peace, pros-
perity, and justice for all.
(2:98)

One important part of his herculean efforts to establish “a general Islamic

method based on the rationality of good and bad, and the unification of
truth, goodness, and beauty” (in Voll and Esposito, 2001, 74) by systemati-
cally reviving the tradition (turath) in the light of modern imperatives (his
lifelong project known as al-turath wal tajdid) concerns the process of recon-
necting or rediscovering the hidden turath values which are consistent with
the ideals and objectives of liberation theology.
This peculiarly Islamic liberation theology in Hanafi’s thought takes form
in what he terms the Islamic left (al-Yasar al-Islami). As noted by Wahyudi
(2002):

Hanafi’s vision is that of a comprehensive renaissance of [Islamic] civi-

lization (nahda hadariyya shamila) to be realized through his projects
known as al-Turath wa al-Tajdid (Heritage and Modernity) and al-Yasar
al-Islami (the Islamic Left).
(114)

The name al-Yasar al-Islami comes from the journal set up by Hanafi with
the same name that only saw one issue being published.13 It is important to
state at the outset that by being a constituent and integral element of
al-turath wal tajdid discourse as conceived by Hanafi, the Islamic Left is self-
consciously grounded in the turath and is not a rejection of it (Wahyudi,
2002, 202).
The Islamic Left of Hanafi as a progressive discourse as employed in this
study situates itself as part of an international movement of liberation
92 Islamic liberation theology imperative
(Mansoor, 2000, 146). The broad themes of the Islamic Left as a theologico-
political movement deal with the examination of issues pertaining to the
relationship between religion and revolution, Islamic unity, social justice,
and freedom of speech (Mansoor, 2000, 143–144). Its multiple critique is
aimed at forces such as imperialism and its subtypes such as Zionism and
capitalism as well as their by-products affecting the Muslim-majority world
including poverty, oppression, and underdevelopment (Voll and Esposito,
2001, 83). The key element of the Islamic Left, Hanafi emphasizes, is its
socio-economic justice imperative (Voll and Esposito, 2001). In this context,
Hanafi, by noting the vast disparities between exceedingly rich and poor
Muslims, views the Islamic Left as a theologically underpinned theory that
demands wealth distribution to bridge the gap between those who have and
those who have not (Mansoor, 2000, 155). According to Hanafi (in Voll and
Esposito, 2001):

[In Islam] wealth is the wealth of God with which we are entrusted. We
have the right to use, to invest, and to utilize; we do not have the right
to exploit, misuse, or monopolize. . . . The mission of the Islamic Left is
the redistribution of the wealth of Muslims among all Muslims as Islam
prescribes, according to work, effort, and sweat.
(83–84)

As evident from the above, Hanafi’s Islamic Left has great affinities with the
Christian theology of liberation. Indeed, Hanafi while lecturing in Belgium,
became well acquainted with theoretical architects of Catholic liberation
theology such as Camillo Torres. As a result, he was keen to introduce this
body of knowledge to Muslims too. In many ways, his reading of Christian
liberation theology was germane to his broader attempts to develop an
Islamic equivalent of the same (Voll and Esposito, 2001, 78). In Hanafi’s
view, the main function of theology is to act as a springboard for garnering
support to end all kinds of oppression and exploitation. Importantly, opines
Hanafi, for Muslims to achieve this goal, an internal re-examination of inher-
ited belief systems is necessary because these often mirror(ed) existing gen-
eral power structures within Muslim societies which were elitist in nature.
Hence, for Hanafi (1995b):

Theology as hermeneutics is not a sacred science but a humanly con-

structed social science. It reflects sociopolitical conflicts. Every social
group in a believing society has its own interests and defends them in its
belief-system. This is what is known as Theology.
(2:110–111)

Hanafi, therefore, subsumes theology under socio-political disciplines

because “every social group in a believing society has its own interests and
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 93
defends them in its belief-system” (Hanafi, 1995a). With respect to this,
Hanafi proposes that the interests of the masses need to be defended by
educating them in the belief systems of opposition (Voll and Esposito, 2001,
86). He remarks further that this pedagogical function of political theology
is sorely needed in the context of the contemporary Muslim world because
the ruling state powers are employing what he terms an ‘Absolutist Theol-
ogy’ to maintain the unjust status quo which can only be dislodged openly
from within. Hence such an understanding of theology provides the basis for
how Muslims can move from creed to non-violent revolution (min al aqida
ila ‘l thawra).14
Hanafi finds inspiration in Mu’tazilite public opposition to power on the
basis of their view of God as embodying the Universal and Rational Principle
and their justice-based theory of Unity as a kind of pre-modern form of
Islamic liberation theology that he wants to revive among contemporary
Muslims (Voll and Esposito, 2001, 86).
In order to go from creed to a revolution, Hanafi takes the view that it is
imperative to reformulate and reinterpret the major concepts in Islamic the-
ology such as tawhid, wahy, ‘aqida, and the so-called five pillars of Islam.
By criticizing the mainstream understanding of the concept of tawhid,
Hanafi considers that the concept is constitutive of an action-oriented belief
system which “negates oppression, tyranny, division and injustice, and on
the other hand, affirms freedom, responsibility and liberation” (Mansoor,
2000, 134–135). For Hanafi, tawhid is a means of liberation for the entire
humankind. More specifically the power and the function of tawhid is con-
ceptualized as liberation of the occupied lands, harbinger of justice, and a
force which will enhance the power of reason in Muslim affairs. Such a view
of tawhid is anti-salafi in nature, as it prioritizes the present over the past
and demands a state of awakefulness and activism in contrast to that of
resignation and passivism (Mansoor, 2000).
Such a human and action-centred view of tawhid requires also a
rethinking of the traditional concept of revelation, wahy. For Hanafi,
wahy is not a theo- but an anthropocentric concept which brings human-
ity rather than God into the full historical limelight as a subject of study.
Hence for Hanafi, “man and history should be at the center of the Islamic
religious consciousness” (Mansoor, 2000, 88). Similarly, while Hanafi
views Islam’s five pillars as religious in their form, in terms of their con-
tent, he considers them to be political in nature as they imply free will,
freedom to act, responsibility for one’s actions, and the need to establish
justice and fight injustice (Wahyudi, 2002, 130–131). In his efforts to
develop an Islamic liberation theology concept of praxis, Hanafi also
seeks to reconstruct the traditional Islamic understanding and function
of the mystic experience (tasawwuf) by rescuing it from its strong fatal-
istic and passive tendencies and bringing it into that of a social justice-
oriented one (Wahyudi, 2002, 138–141).
94 Islamic liberation theology imperative
Summarizing the goals of the reinterpretation of Islam’s major theological
concepts, Hanafi (in Voll and Esposito, 2001) writes:

The purpose of this new construction of the traditional belief-system is

not to obtain eternal life by knowing the truth, but to acquire success in
this World by fulfilling the hopes of the Muslim world for liberation,
freedom, justice, social equality, reunification, identity, progress, and
mass mobilization. Therefore, Theology as a science is of first impor-
tance because it is the theoretical analysis of action.
(87)

As noted by Wahyudi (2002, 208), in Hanafi’s efforts to develop an Islamic

liberation theology, Hanafi relies on what Hans Kung calls the “liberating
role of Scripture” (Kung, 1991, 448). Mansoor (2000, 123), on the other
hand, compares Hanafi’s life-project to that of the work of Paulo Freire, a
Brazilian educator and philosopher, whose critical pedagogy work aims to
develop a methodology that would enable the oppressed to overcome the
internalization of the relation of domination, “a pedagogy through which
the oppressed can learn how to interpret the world, since interpretation is an
act of liberation”.

Shabbir Akhtar
Akhtar (b.1960) is another progressive Muslim scholar who has not only
systematically engaged with Christian theories of liberation theology but has
also proposed an Islamic equivalent. In chapters three and four of his book
Islam as a Political Religion, Akhtar (2010, 7–8) aims to lay out “a complete
conceptual framework for an Islamic liberation theology”, and we discuss
some of its main elements in accordance with the aims of this chapter.15
Akhtar, without resorting to apologetics, considers Islam, unlike Christi-
anity, to be a robustly and paradigmatically political religion in the sense of
absorbing and sanctifying politics into religion. For Akhtar, as in the case of
all the other Muslim scholars discussed in this chapter, Islam embraces prin-
cipled, rational, accountable, limited, and morally constrained power, as well
as permits the use of violence and even resorting to violent revolutions
(although it favors non-violent means whenever possible) in order to remove
injustice and hence secure just social, political, and economic conditions
(Akhtar, 2011, 90–91, 120–122). In this context, he (Akhtar, 2011) asserts:

Between the extremes of absolute principled pacifism and unconstruc-

tive, motiveless violence, we must embrace the justifiable option of vio-
lent revolution for the sake of an enduring and just peace. Constructive
violence, motivated by mercy rather than malice, has been central to the
Islamic defense of Muhammad’s militancy.
(142)
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 95
Moreover replying to the (Protestant) critics who viewed the Prophet of
Islam’s involvement with power and politics as antithetical or compromising
‘genuine’ faith, Akhtar (2010) writes:

Muhammad recognized power as part of the religious arsenal in a world

where impiety brazenly embraces militant forms. He was commanded
to hold his ears and eyes close to the texture of real life in order to dis-
cern the true scope of human perversity and injustice established by
coercion. Enabled and inspired by the Quran, he sought to achieve an
empirically validated assessment of the actual, as opposed to desired or
imagined, relationship between ideal and reality, between divine demand
and the human will to subversion, between the imperative of justice and
the determination of unjust powers and principalities to resist and reject
it. Faith is as faith does; and it can do little without the power to protect
its heritage and ensure its future.
(122)

Therefore, for Akhtar, Muhammad’s involvement with power and politics

cleansed both from their Machiavellian ruthlessness on the basis of a moral
commitment to confront and resist economic and political oppression was
all in the name of and in accordance with liberation theology principles
(Akhtar, 2011, 125).
Moreover, Akhtar considers that there is indeed virtue in Islam being a
political religion when it is approached from the perspective of liberation
theology. This virtue is accounted for in terms of Islam’s realistic and prag-
matic view about the nature of human experience, which is prone to moral
failures and perpetuation of various forms of injustice against which the
oppressed and the marginalized must be protected (Akhtar, 2011, 144).
Hence, the virtue of a political religion such as Islam is defended on the vari-
ant of the famous quote by Edward Burke according to which evil will thrive
or triumph if good men (and women) do nothing (Akhtar, 2011, 144). Thus,
Islam’s unique political monotheism challenges the unjust power structures
that patronize the inequities not only on purely theoretical and metaphysical
grounds but also on practical and political ones. In this context, Akhtar
reminds us that among all the faiths it is only Islam which “formally con-
demns a usurious economic order (Q: 2:278–80)” and teaches us that the
exploited and the oppressed are, by God’s grace, to be transformed into the
agents and subjects of history (Q: 28:4–6) (Akhtar, 2011, 125). That is why,
Akhtar observers further, that for Muslims “justice is a structural public obli-
gation that flows from private religious confession” (Akhtar, 2011, 126).
For Akhtar, as for other progressive Muslim scholars examined in this
chapter, Muslims possess a scripture “whose only theology is liberation the-
ology” (Akhtar, 2011, 127). By quoting Qur’anic verses such as, “We sent
aforetime our messengers with Clear Signs and sent down with them the
Book and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that men may stand forth in
96 Islamic liberation theology imperative
justice” (Q:57:25), and, “O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as
witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you
swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and
fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do (5:8)”,16 and oth-
ers, Akhtar alerts his readers to the idea, shared by all other Muslim libera-
tion theologians examined in this chapter, that justice is the most fundamental
element of the Qur’anic weltanschauung. Moreover, justice and faith accord-
ing to this worldview are intricately linked since the Qur’an is highly critical
of worshippers who engage in worship but recoil from their duty to take care
of the poor and the needy (Q:74:42–4; 107). He even goes to assert that,
Qur’anically speaking, partaking in injustice or doing nothing to prevent it
is tantamount to blasphemy against God. Furthermore, for Akhtar, the five
pillars of Islam are nothing but means for achieving justice on this earth
because for Muslims the cause of justice is “a universally human and wholly
public cause” (Akhtar, 2011, 126). For the Muslim perspective, it is the just
who are the true peace-makers, argues Akhtar.
Importantly, in accordance with Gutierrez’s thesis of ‘God’s preferential for
the poor’ as the foundational creed in Christian liberation theology, Akhtar
observes that God in the Qur’an is not neutral in the fight between the forces
of justice and oppression. God is on the side of those who are his party, a refer-
ence to the Qur’anic phrase hizb Allah (Q:58:22). Akhtar, to further bolster
the Qur’an’s liberation theology credentials, makes reference to the Qur’an’s
frequent contrasting of the oppressors and oppressed (Q:14:21; 28:5) and it
glorification of God as the King of “the masses” (Q:114:2–3) (Akhtar, 2011,
126). In Akhtar’s (2011, 270) view, the Qur’an therefore “articulately con-
demns injustice and calls for an ethical religious politics”.
The value of justice in the sense of due balance and impartiality, argues
Akhtar, is also a prominent theme in the reports purporting to document the
life of the Prophet. For example Akhtar argues that the Prophet warned the
believers against the selfish pursuit of power (hirs) but encouraged them in
the selfless pursuit of power (quwwah, taqah) for the sake of establishing
justice for all. This is how Akhter (2010) depicts the Prophet’s overall
approach to justice and oppression:

The Prophet preached that oppressed individuals, whether human or, for
rhetorical effect, animal, can all seek redress. This is the doctrine of radd
al-mazalim (restitution for the wronged): the Prophet (Peace be upon
him) prayed for pardon for his people, and received the reply: ‘I have
forgiven them all but acts of oppression, for I shall exact recompense for
the one who is wronged, from his oppressor.’
(126)

For Akhtar, therefore, one of the most important legacies of Prophet Muham-
mad was to instill in Muslims a sense of immense social responsibility which
would leave them with no option but to engage in the political (2010, 239).
 Islamic liberation theology imperative 97
In summary, in Akhtar’s view, Islam is a paradigmatically political religion
whose theology is nothing but a theology of liberation which he aptly and suc-
cinctly describes as a political religion which “agitates the masses, demands revolt
and enjoins self-sacrifice and jihad against militant oppressors” (2010, 240).

Conclusion
For a number of reasons discussed above, progressive Muslims consider
theology of liberation to be an absolute imperative for Muslims living in the
current socio-political and wider geo-political context. Each in their own
respective contexts, much like their Christian liberation theology counter-
parts in whose work they find sources of inspiration, considers faith to be an
indispensable and vital stimulus for struggle against oppression and injustice
at the grassroots level. Hence, in Islamic liberation theology, orthopraxis
precedes and is an inseparable part of orthodoxy. Progressive Muslim schol-
ars examined in this chapter, therefore, have found it inevitable to move
away from many aspects of mainstream accommodationist interpretations
of Islamic theology because these interpretations are viewed to be at odds
with the ideals, values, and objectives of (Islamic) liberation theology. In this
respect, the progressive Muslim scholars whose ideas were examined above
have engaged in systematic and creative efforts to reinterpret, on the basis
of often sophisticated methodologies and hermeneutics, many fundamental
concepts of their creed including concepts such as tawhid, jihad, wahy, and
mu’min, to name but a few. Engaging in a quintessential progressive Mus-
lim’s ‘multiple critique’, they also relentlessly scrutinize forces and structures
responsible for perpetuation of oppression and injustice regardless of whether
these emanate from outside of the turath or from within and irrespective of
the faith-, race-, or gender-based identities of their victims.

Notes
1 Abdennur Prado, The Need for an Islamic Liberation Theology, http://www.
dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Prado-The-need-for-an-Islamic-liberation-
theology.pdf
2 http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Prado-The-need-for-an-Islamic-
lieration-
3 Samir Amin, Political Islam in the Service of Imperialism, http://monthlyreview.
org/2007/12/01/political-islam-in-the-service-of-imperialism/
4 Engineer, Reconstruction of Islamic Thought, http://andromeda.rutgers.
edu/~rtavakol/engineer/recon.htm, n.p.
5 Engineer, Reconstruction of Islamic Thought, http://andromeda.rutgers.
edu/~rtavakol/engineer/recon.htm, n.p.
6 Asghar Ali Engineer, Muhammad as Liberator (Islam and Modern Age, July,
2000), http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~rtavakol/engineer/muhammad.htm
7 He cites Qur’anic verses such as 59:7; chapter 104; 9:34 and 2:219.
8 Asghar Ali Engineer, On Developing Theology of Peace in Islam (Islam and
Modern Age, October, 2001), http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~rtavakol/engineer/
theology.htm
98 Islamic liberation theology imperative
9 Asghar Ali Engineer, On the Concept of Compassion in Islam, http://andromeda.
rutgers.edu/~rtavakol/engineer/compassion.htm
10 Asghar Ali Engineer, Meaning of Islamic Worship, http://andromeda.rutgers.
edu/~rtavakol/engineer/meaning.htm
11 Esack, In Search of Progressive Islam, 88.
12 See Duderija (2011) for these other elements.
13 Al-Yasar al-Islami. Kitabat fi alNahdah al-Islamiyah (Cairo), no. 1 (1981). His
subsequent work on these issues was published in the work Min al-’aqidah ila
al-thawrah: Muhawalah li-i’adat bina’ ‘ilm usul al-din (From Doctrine to Revolu-
tion: An Attempt to Rebuild the Science of Religious Fundamentals, 5 vols.,
Cairo, 1988).
14 Which is the title of one of his most prominent books on Islamic liberation theology/
the Islamic left.
15 He has also dealt with this issue in his much earlier book The Final Imperative:
An Islamic Theology of Liberation. Bellew Pub., 1991.
16 I am using Y. Ali’s translation.
5 The human rights imperative

A religion that is oblivious to human rights (including the need of humanity

for freedom and justice) is not tenable in the modern world. In other words,
religion needs to be right not only logically, but also ethically . . . Simply put,
we cannot evade rational, moral, and extra-religious principles and reason-
ing about human rights, myopically focusing on nothing but the primary
texts and maxims of religion in formulating our jurisprudential edicts.
(Soroush, 2000, 128)

Unless people share life experiences framed by the same moral and meta-
physical assumptions, it is impossible to discover common moral premises
and rules of moral evidence to solve problems of social and political injus-
tices around the globe.
(Sachedina, 2008, 127)

Introduction
The task of this chapter is to present the main arguments and theories devel-
oped by leading progressive Muslim thinkers which theoretically affirm the
conceptual compatibility between Islamic doctrine and the modern human
rights scheme.1 Before I do so, as in the case with all previous chapters, some
broader contextualizing of the topic under discussion is in order.
The last three to four decades have witnessed an increasing international-
ization of human rights discourse as a global platform for the contemporary
language of progressive politics and its focus on eradication of all types of
inequalities which perpetuate or are complicit in perpetuation of various
social injustices around the world. The question of the compatibility of Islam
and human rights at a theoretical cum conceptual level has been a prominent
theme in this regard. Speaking in broad terms, progressive Muslim scholars
approach the issue of compatibility or the relationship between modern
human rights discourse and the Islamic tradition by placing both in a histori-
cal perspective. In the words of Senturk (2005):

Without putting the issue [of human rights] into an historical and socio-
logical perspective, the confusion on and deprivation of human rights
100 Human rights imperative
cannot be understood and solved in the Muslim world. Nor can the
human rights dependency, on the part of Muslims who believe in human
rights, be overcome without linking the chain of memory to the past
cultural reservoir. Human rights discourse in the Muslim world needs
philosophical, moral, and historical roots to grow on, gain strength, and
bear fruits. Otherwise, its defenders will remain dependent on the West-
ern discourse and consequently will get easily dismissed by the conserva-
tive population, traditional Ulama, and the authoritarian rulers. The
power of precedence, on the theoretical and historical levels, must be put
in use in justifying human rights in Islam today.
(28)

A number of progressive Muslim scholars examined in this chapter have

taken precisely this task of developing Islamic human rights discourse upon
themselves in accordance with the approach outlined by Senturk in the
above-given quote.
In agreement with the proponents of non-western forms of human rights
schemes such as that of Santos (2002, 46),2 progressive Muslim scholars,
while acknowledging the rift in the epistemological and theoretical assump-
tions underpinning the hegemonic secular modern human rights schemes
and those which can be derived from a creative and reconstructive interpre-
tation of the Islamic tradition, are engaged in developing a theoretical
framework for a constructive encounter between the two human right
schemes at the level of abstract concepts. In doing so, progressive Muslim
scholars seek to weave the ethos and the culture of human rights discourse
into the social and cultural fabric of Muslim-majority societies in order for
the same to be more effectively realized in the political and legal realms of
these societies. As such, progressive Muslim scholars are interested in engen-
dering Islamic human rights schemes which are sensitive to the historical,
ethical, and religious sentiments of Muslims but which at the conceptual
level are in agreement with or compatible with those of the modern human
rights schemes. For this to take place, progressive Muslim scholars argue
that a serious rethinking of some of the main interpretational assumptions
in the realm of classical Islamic theology, ethics, and jurisprudence is neces-
sary. As alluded to above, the aim of this chapter is to present the views of
four leading progressive Muslim scholars in this regard. These include
Muhammad Abed Al-Jabiri, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Khaled Abou El Fadl,
and Ebrahim Moosa.

M. Abed Al-Jabiri (d. 2010)

Al-Jabiri is one of the most eminent contemporary Arab Muslim philoso-
phers. Most of his writings focus on the complex relationship between
Islamic heritage (turath) and modernity,3 and his ideas regarding the question
of compatibility of modern and Islamic human rights concepts should be
 Human rights imperative 101
seen in this larger context. With respect to the conundrum of compatibility
between the two human rights schemes, Al-Jabiri’s theoretical cum method-
ological framework is that of comparative philosophy whose overall aim is
to develop a culturally specific theoretical framework deemed necessary for
effective cultural implantation of modern concepts of human rights into the
contemporary Arabo-Islamic conscience (Al-Jabiri, 2009). In broad terms,
his approach is to simultaneously demonstrate the historicity, and therefore
cultural particularity, of the concepts of ‘rights’ as they developed in both
European and Arabo-Islamic contexts as well as their universality on the
basis of his contention that beyond every particularity lies a universality
whose philosophical principles are shared by all (Al-Jabiri, 2009,
176–177).
It is precisely on the basis of this conceptualization of the cultural
particularity-universality dynamic that Al-Jabiri considers the process of
cultural implantation of human rights at an institutional level to be pos-
sible in the case of the Arabo-Islamic civilization. Al-Jabiri explains the
cultural specificity of the respective conceptualizations of human rights
schemes, to borrow Moosa’s term,4 to have been a result of social, eco-
nomic, political, and intellectual circumstances specific to each. Hence,
each scheme justifies and rationalizes its concepts of human rights differ-
ently and in reference to its culturally specific points of reference. Al-Jabiri
repeatedly highlights that these differences in rationale have important
methodological implications as to how each human rights scheme is to be
theorized. We shall address this question in some detail below.
Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009) defines the process and the function of cultural
implantation of human rights into the contemporary Arabo-Islamic con-
science in the following manner:

It is to stimulate the awareness of the universality of human rights within

our culture by highlighting the universality of their theoretical bases,
which are not radically different from the bases of human rights in West-
ern culture. This would underline the universal, comprehensive and
absolute nature of human rights within the cultural particularity itself.
It would also affirm, once more, that particularity and universality are
not two opposite attributes but two integral ones. Every ‘particular’ has
something of the ‘universal’, as the universal is so only because it includes
what is universal in all that is particular.
(177)

As part of his comparative philosophy approach to understanding the gen-

esis and nature of modern and Islamic human rights schemes, Al-Jabiri
examines and compares the points of reference of each. In this context, he
argues that for each scheme different but not contradictory points of refer-
ence have been referred to. In relation to the human rights scheme from the
vantage point of the European philosophers of the eighteenth century,
102 Human rights imperative
Al-Jabiri notes that the scheme is premised on two major human rights from
which all others have been derived. These are the right to freedom and the
right to equality which, in principle, for Al-Jabiri, are also parts of the
Arabo-Islamic human rights scheme as explained below. However, the man-
ner in which European philosophers established the universality of those
two rights with respect to what he calls their ‘authoritative referent’ is dif-
ferent from that in the Islamo-Arab human rights scheme. The former did
not use institutionalized religion (in the form of the Medieval Church) as
the universal referential authority, but have developed such on the basis of
“an independent rational referential authority which transcends the author-
ity of the Church” (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 179). The building blocks and the
assumptions informing this universal referential authority consist of the
correspondence between the rational and the natural systems, the idea of a
hypothetical ‘natural condition’ (as per John Locke), and the concept of the
‘social contract’ (as per Jacques Rousseau). Al-Jabiri argues that, on all of
these three points, correspondence with the Islamic human rights scheme
exists. The idea of the correspondence between the rational and the natural
systems is justified on the premise of a particular nature of the Qur’an’s
discourse which, in Al-Jabiri’s assessment, is suggestive that “the natural
system is, itself, the rational system” (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 184). The concept of
‘a natural state’ is identified with the concept of al-fitra (innate nature)
which for Al-Jabiri is “almost identical, in Qur’anic discourse, with it [i.e.
the concept of a natural state]” (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 184–185). The concept of
‘social contract’ is correlated with that of the Qur’anic covenant (mithaq)
according to which God honored humanity with vicegerency (khilafa) to be
exercised on the basis of consultation (al-shura). This nature and function
of God’s covenant with humanity, for Al-Jabiri, is akin to the purpose and
the function of the concept of ‘social contract’ (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 188–190).
Hence from his comparative philosophy perspective, the concept of human
rights is, despite the different rationales, culturally specific referents and
implantations, universally shared. In this context, Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009)
writes:

The cultural, civilizational dimensions of human rights are human

dimensions shared by all cultures and they transcend the current civili-
zational, cultural reality and all civilizations. The demand to respect
human rights is always directed against a certain cultural civilizational
reality (an intellectual, political, social, economic reality and a call to
change that reality). All cultures and civilizations join in establishing this
call, based on an authoritative referent which presents itself as the begin-
ning and the origin, like the natural state or the religion of al-fitrah.
(191)

Al-Jabiri is acutely aware that his comparative philosophy approach, whose

delineating features were briefly described above, can be challenged on
 Human rights imperative 103
methodological grounds unless this approach is based upon a broader phi-
losophy of human rights and its relationship to religion. Hence, Al-Jabiri
pre-empts this criticism by carefully deconstructing two possible major
objections to his arguments, namely the idea of the secular nature of modern
human rights and the argument of affirming the particularity of Islamic
human rights. To tackle these objections, Al-Jabiri makes a general method-
ological observation pertaining to the above-mentioned idea of difference in
rationales vis-à-vis the theoretical justification of two human rights schemes.
In this context, Al-Jabiri argues that the differences in rationales which, as
was shown above, do exist between the two human rights schemes are not
inherently permanent and static but relative and thus subject to change
(Al-Jabiri, 2009, 192).
With respect to the supposed secularism of modern human rights schemes,
Al-Jabiri argues that the concept of secularism as employed by European
philosophers “who initiated the Enlightenment and worked towards the
establishment of human rights in modern thought”5 did not oppose religion
per se but institutionalized religion, specifically in its medieval Church form.
European philosophers’ concept of human rights has origins in natural reli-
gion which they considered to be Divine. Hence, this concept of secularism
does not preclude a religion-based referential authority per se (Al-Jabiri,
2009, 193–195).
In relation to affirmation of the particularity of the Islamic human rights
scheme as a reason for justification of rejection of modern human rights
schemes on the basis of the fact that the latter is both in form and substance
specific to western culture and on the basis of the fact that both human rights
schemes clash on a number of points (such as in relation to apostasy, slavery,
and women’s rights), Al-Jabiri objects to this view by demonstrating how a
historically informed interpretation of the Qur’an, hadith, and Islamic juris-
prudence does not make this clash inevitable.
To explain his position, Al-Jabiri adopts two methodological orientations.
The first is a heuristic to account for the chronological and conceptual gap
between the modern concept of human rights and the concept of rights in
pre-modern Islamic tradition. The second pertains to establishing the ratio-
nal nature of rulings in Islamic jurisprudence.
In relation to the first point, Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009) asks:

How can we look for origins to such a modern concept, so unrelated to

the past and its concepts in a thought informed by texts and anecdotes
14 centuries old?
(209)

He answers the question by maintaining that this methodological problem

is also a theoretical one which cannot be completely divorced from ideology
in its “broad and flexible sense” since religious texts, regardless of which
religion is in question, are, generally speaking, always open to interpretation
104 Human rights imperative
(Al-Jabiri, 2009, 209). In reference to the first methodological concern,
Al-Jabiri, akin to Arkoun (2002), introduces concepts such as ‘what was/is
thought of’ and ‘what was/is thinkable’ and their antonyms to avoid artifi-
cially imposing/validating contemporary concepts and sensibilities onto the
past and to explain why pre-modern jurists interpreted the tradition in the
manner that is today often not compatible with the concept of modern
human rights. In this context, Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009) notes:

our work is like compiling a dictionary of the thought of the past, about
man and his rights, which could act as a mirror that reflects today’s
thought on the same subject, without exaggeration or distortion.
(210)

In relation to the second point, Al-Jabiri forms the view that the rationality
of Islamic jurisprudence and the rulings it adopts are established by taking
recourse to three ‘keys’ which are necessary for a proper understanding of the
inherent rationality of Islamic law. These include the distinction between gen-
eral fundamentals (kulliyat), particular rulings (juziyat), the concept of intents of
Islamic law (maqasid al-shari’a), and the concept of “occasions of revelation”
(asbab al-nuzul) (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 196). The relationship between these is
explained by Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 2002) in the following manner:

The origin of a ruling issued in a particular case is an application of a

general, fundamental principle. Should a discrepancy exist, it must be
for a reason. The reasons that justify the particular ruling and show its
rationality are either the ‘occasions of the revelation’ (asbal al nuzul)
which are normally the special circumstances that necessitated the rul-
ing, or they may be the general intents (al-maqasid) which stem from the
public good.
(196)

It is on the basis of this methodology the Al-Jabiri explains the cultural

specificity of Islamic laws pertaining to apostasy, slavery, and various laws
that discriminate on the basis of gender and the universality of the principles
of freedom and equality in the Islamic rights scheme (Al-Jabiri, 2009,
199–205).
Al-Jabiri defends his usage of the concepts of asbab and maqasid for the
purposes of establishing the rational nature of Islamic jurisprudence as a
platform for contemporary Islamic human rights schemes by maintaining
that the former in modern philosophical (or we could say scriptural reason-
ing/theological hermeneutics) jargon pertains to the concept of ‘historicity’
of scripture which aims at “avoiding a projection of the present on the past
or transferring the past to the present arbitrarily” (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 210).
The latter corresponds to the idea of ‘incentives’ of the spirit of the law
(Weiss, 1988); that is, the aims and objectives behind the ruling.6 The
 Human rights imperative 105
relationship between the ‘(not) thought of’ and the ‘thinkable’/not-thinkable’
in relation to asbab and maqasid is further explained as follows (Al-Jabiri,
2009, 210):

Both the ‘thought of’ and the ‘thinkable’ in a certain age had occasions
of revelation and intents, but what had neither is termed as ‘what is not
thought of’ and could also be ‘unthinkable’. Close to this is what the old
logicians termed as ‘the possible’ and ‘the impossible’, simultaneously.

Based on the above-outlined methodological mechanisms, Al-Jabiri finds it

only ‘natural’ that the concept of what is means to be ‘human’ and the con-
cept of ‘rights’ in Islamic religious texts does not carry the same implications
as those in the modern world (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 210–211). And it is on these
methodological considerations that Al-Jabiri develops his own theory of
human rights in Islam which, in his mind, is fully compatible with that of
the modern European concept as described next.
In line with the methodological caveats referred to above and the textual
evidence from the Qur’an and hadith that he brings forth to argue for com-
patibility between the two human rights schemes, Al-Jabiri argues that while
the interpretations he gives to the texts today, theoretically speaking, have
always fit into the category of ‘thinkable’ and ‘thought of’, they could not
have been interpreted in the same manner in pre-modern Islamic thought as
they belonged to the category of ‘not thought of’ or ‘not thinkable’ (Al-Jabiri,
2009, 212). In this context, Al-Jabiri (Al-Jabiri, 2009) asserts:

If human rights in the modern sense did not belong to the field of ‘what
is thought of’ in the past Arab-Islamic texts, it was and still is apt to be
so, especially as seen in the Qur’an and ahadith. Needless to say, what
kept those rights within the limits of ‘what is not thought of’ is the fail-
ure of Arab-Islamic thought, due to certain objective, historical, eco-
nomic, social and cultural conditions, to disregard the concept of ruler
and subjects, which regulated the social hierarchy and controlled the
relation between the ruler and the ruled.
(249)

As part of his case for establishing the concept of ‘rights’ (haqq/huquq) in

the Islamic tradition, Al-Jabiri refers to the Qur’anic concept of the ‘honor-
ing of humanity’ (takrim al-insan) as promulgated in the verses such as (17:
61–2; 70) and (2: 30–2). This honoring of humanity, in both its spiritual and
corporeal dimensions, translates to humanity’s entitlement to enjoy a num-
ber of rights (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 215–216). However, in this regard, with respect
to the concept of a ‘right’, Al-Jabiri calls our attention to the cultural specific-
ity of the term in the pre-modern Arabo-Islamic thought which contains
aspects of ‘thought of’ as well as ‘not thought of’. Here Al-Jabiri highlights
that in pre-modern thought, the concept of ‘rights’ was interchangeable with
106 Human rights imperative
that of the concept of ‘duty’ (wajib), which is not the case in the modern
concept of human rights. From the perspective of pre-modern Arabo-Islamic
thought, the modern concept of human rights therefore belongs to the cat-
egory of ‘not thought of’ or it was conceptually conflated with the concept
of duty. The implication of this is that in order to look for the rights in the
Arabic-Islamic ‘thought of’, we have also to look at the duties rather than
rights. So from the perspective of pre-modern Islamic thought, the idea of
‘human rights’ refers to the sum of all the material and moral duties due to
humanity in accordance with God’s honoring and favoring of them above
all other creation. But, significantly, if we approach the question of human
rights in Islam from the perspective of ‘what is thought of’ today, argues
Al-Jabiri, in the Qur’an two types of rights can be derived, namely general
and specific. The former apply to all humanity and the latter to specific
groups of people, such as the rights of the weak and oppressed, the rights of
women, and the rights of non-Muslims in a Muslim society (Al-Jabiri, 2009,
217–218).
Al-Jabiri identifies general rights (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 221–249) to include the
right to life; right to enjoy life; freedom of belief, knowledge, and difference
(including at the level of creed and belief7); the right to disagreement within
the locus of Islam; the right to equality;8 the right to justice; and the rights
of the weak, oppressed, and poor.9
The final point Al-Jabiri makes is that, while the above-given general and
specific rights that have been derived from the Qur’an and hadith are, in and
of themselves, not sufficient for a comprehensive modern human rights the-
ory, the development of such a theory in the Arabo-Islamic conscience could
be facilitated by means of building further on the pre-modern maqasid
al-shari’a theories (such as that of Al-Shatibi; see Duderija, 2014) whose
scope, however, would need to be significantly broadened and whose theo-
retical vantage point would need to be adjusted from the focus on punish-
ments to that of the rights (Al-Jabiri, 2009, 249–250).
In summary, Al-Jabiri’s comparative philosophy approach argues for com-
patibility of modern and Islamic human right schemes on the basis that, in
every cultural specificity, a shared universality resides. Al-Jabiri highlights
the importance of adopting a proper methodology in rationalizing and jus-
tifying the modern concept of human rights on the basis of ‘ancient’ sacred
texts.

Abdulaziz Sachedina
Sachedina offers one of the most systematic and comprehensive discussions
on the subject matter of this chapter in his book Islam and the Challenge of
Human Rights (Sachedina, 2008). Consistent with the aims of this chapter,
I am only in a position to focus on the arguments Sachedina proffers to
maintain that compatibility between the two human rights schemes is theo-
retically plausible.
 Human rights imperative 107
Sachedina, generally speaking, not unlike Al-Jabiri, in his approach to
the question of compatibility of modern human rights with Islamic thought,
conceptualizes the process as that of involving a cross-cultural transmission
of ideas which highlights the importance of contextualist historical per-
spective in this respect. For Sachedina, this process of cross-cultural trans-
mission of ideas about universal human values must include the analysis
and unearthing of the philosophical and metaphysical origins and legitimiz-
ing sources of such values because, without such an approach, the implan-
tation of these ideas will not take place (Sachedina, 2008, 5). Hence,
Sachedina aims to examine and make tangible these origins and to demon-
strate that compatibility is possible once due recognition of the metaphysi-
cal foundations of modern human rights and a critical evaluation of
traditional Islamic theological and jurisprudential anthropology is ade-
quately theorized.
In relation to the question of the metaphysical foundations of modern
human rights discourses, Sachedina considers it imperative that these foun-
dations are not denied, regardless of whether this is done using a secular or
religious idiom and terminology, since without such an approach the univer-
salist character of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
“would lack moral enforcement in the world community” (Sachedina, 2008,
7–8). In this respect, Sachedina, as a staunch proponent of the universalist
aspirations of the UDHR, is very critical of those voices from western liberal
democracies which eschew any attempts to ground the theory of human rights
in abstract metaphysical arguments such as the concept of inherent human
dignity bestowed by God. He considers that the arguments stemming from
these voices which advocate the universality of modern human rights dis-
courses purely on grounds of political pragmatism, in which Sachedina
includes the voices of Islamic traditionalism, are in actual fact undermining
the universality of the UDHR as they are playing into the hands of those who
promote cultural relativism at the expense of the universal moral values
enshrined in the UDHR (Sachedina, 2008, 10–16). In this context, Sachedina
argues that the identification of what he terms the “foundational consider-
ations” are of paramount importance in erecting an overlapping consensus
between secular and religious norms that support the concept of human rights
(Sachedina, 2008, 13). In his (Sachedina, 2008) words:

An appeal to metaphysical foundation of human nature that leads to

recognizing common moral terrain among divergent cultural groups
may actually enhance the validity of a minimum dignity to which all
humans are entitled by a simple fact of being created equal.
(14)

Furthermore, Sachedina calls our attention to the fact that the existing schol-
arship has already, in his mind, convincingly demonstrated that the idea of
universal human rights can only be sustained if theological principles are
108 Human rights imperative
taken into account in the overall argument for their universal
applicability.10
Hence, Sachedina sees it as his task to develop such a foundation, no
matter how minimalist, from the perspective of the fountainheads of the
Islamic weltanschauung and to demonstrate to both Muslims as well as
non-Muslims that the Islamic tradition can be conceptualized in a manner
in which it shares the universal language of morality, human agency, and
human dignity with that of UDHR, and thereby contribute to and play its
role in the protection of universal human rights, especially in the context
of the Muslim-majority world. (Sachedina, 2008, 14–15). Sachedina argues
that the literature on human rights written either by ‘Muslim traditional-
ists’ or ‘secular Muslims’ has failed to deal with the challenge of human
rights on the basis of the above-explained theoretical considerations
(Sachedina, 2008, 18). Sachedina, therefore, proposes an innovative under-
standing of Muslim theology whose theological cornerstone is premised on
the idea that human rights have universal appeal simply on the basis of
inherency and inalienability of the rights that accrue to all humans as
humans (Sachedina, 2008, 16).
Generally speaking, Sachedina delineates three major tendencies in con-
temporary Islamic thought in relation to human rights discourse develop-
ment that he (Sachedina, 2008) describes as follows:

the tendency to view the discourse in liberal, secular terms; the ten-
dency to compare the UN Declaration with the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam of 1990 without engaging the philosophical-
theological underpinnings of either document; and the tendency, mostly
among the traditionalists, to challenge the foundational sources of the
Declaration in terms of Western politics against the Islamic world and
to present an alternative revelation-based foundation for the inherency
of human rights.
(22–23)

Sachedina’s theory, which shall be described next, being representative of

the progressive Muslims’ approach, falls into the third category. He
embeds his theory in relation to the emergent, broader “new theological-
ethical vision of politics” as taking root among some reformist-minded
traditional authorities that is fundamentally different from political soci-
ety as formulated in (neo)traditional Islamic thought, as it does not dis-
criminate on the basis of religion or gender (Sachedina, 2008, 35). This
new theological-ethical vision of politics for the development of human
rights discourse in the Muslim-majority world, in Sachedina’s assessment,
necessitates “a major epistemic shift” in the manner in which the concept
of human personhood is conceptualized, namely a shift from what he
terms a “juridical to a theological-ontological status of human person-
hood” (Sachedina, 2008, 23).
 Human rights imperative 109
One question Sachedina considers to be crucial in any development of
Islamic human rights theory is whether or not such a theory can be based on
the idea of natural rights and natural law. In this context, Sachedina (Sache-
dina, 2008) asks:

Can there be a rationalist-naturalist theology in Islam that can actually

support an Islamic theory of natural law and natural rights that can
function as the foundation for universal human rights?
(30)

Sachedina answers the question in the affirmative on a basis of a particular

conceptualization of Muslim ethico-political theology for human rights
whose lynchpin is premised on the Islamic idea of natural law.
In broad terms, Sachedina’s hermeneutic has two distinct elements. The
first is a critical engagement with the contextual aspects of classical fiqh
which are responsible for a kind of obfuscation of the universal intents of
the primary sources of Islamic cosmovision for the purposes of advancing
particularistic political agendas. The second comprises a novel interpretation
of the sources which are consistent with their inclusive intent and which are
in harmony with the modern discourse on human dignity and justice (Sache-
dina, 2008, 111).
Let us examine the arguments of Sachedina puts forward in relation to
each of these hermeneutical dimensions.
In no uncertain terms, Sachedina makes it clear that a dogmatic approach
to classical fiqh espoused by Muslim (neo)traditionalists is a formidable
obstacle to both the letter and spirit of a number of articles in the UDHR
which have great socio-political and legal consequences, including religious
freedom and the rights of (Muslim) women and minorities. Sachedina’s diag-
nosis for this state of affairs relates to the nature of the curriculum in the
major traditional centres of Islamic learning. In this regard, he argues that
the process of systematic marginalization of ethical inquiry in relation to
both nature of moral epistemology/moral ontology as well as methodological
reluctance to critically assess what Sachedina terms the theological-ethical
underpinnings of classically formulated juridical methodology is to be
blamed (Sachedina, 2008, 41). Resultantly, Sachedina laments the fact that
classical fiqh has not affirmed the equal moral worth of all human beings
regardless of their secondary sources of identity (e.g. religious identity, gen-
der) and the idea that the universal moral law or natural law corresponds
with or is the actual embodiment of the Divine Will itself (Sachedina, 2008,
109). Furthermore, Sachedina forms the view that traditionalist and funda-
mentalist Muslims have, in actual fact, ignored the possibility of developing
such a foundational theory of human rights in Islam (Sachedina, 2008, 39).
Therefore, Sachedina takes it upon himself to develop such a theory primar-
ily on the basis of a rational ethico-theological approach to revelation whose
antecedents can be found in the writings of the Sunni-Mu‘tazilite and the
110 Human rights imperative
Shı‘ite theologians (Sachedina, 2008, 91). It is these theologians, argues
Sachedina further, who on the basis of their theological doctrine of justice,
were aware of the fact that the function of reason in Islam is that of God’s
gift to the entire humanity on the basis of which they are able to not only
develop their moral consciousness but also on the basis of which their full
human moral agency is to be acknowledged. The political implications of
this doctrine Sachedina (Sachedina, 2008) describes as follows:

The theological doctrine of justice is a comprehensive notion that speci-

fies an entire program for the spiritual and moral development of an
individual in society that reflects God’s will and especially God’s pur-
poses for humanity. Accordingly, God’s purposes for humanity include
providing necessary guidance to all human beings, without exception,
to achieve the stated goal of establishing a just society. Humanity’s
endowment with innate moral cognition and volition to carry out its
intimations is part of God’s justice, so that no one can escape the respon-
sibility for working toward a just public order, regardless of religious
affiliation. This doctrine is foundational for a comprehensive political
system based on the equality of all human beings; all are endowed with
minimal moral apprehension as part of their nature that precedes the
revelatory guidance that comes through God’s envoys, the prophets.
(60)

The elements of and the evidence for such a human moral agency, for Sache-
dina, can be found in the Qur’an itself. These include the idea of al-fitra or
innate human nature/moral sensibility/intuition as a general God-bestowed
form of ethical and moral guidance that is pre-revelatory and applicable to
the entire humanity. Hence, the concept of al-fitra can serve as the source of
universal moral values which humans are capable of recognizing irrespective
of revelation and which is but a particularistic form of the same whose func-
tion is to merely reconfirm or assist al-fitra (Sachedina, 2008, 46–50, 74).
The concept of al-fitra is, in fact, for Sachedina, the source of natural religion
(Sachedina, 2008, 94–95, 176). Moreover, in Sachedina’s assessment, the
Qur’an’s honoring (karama) of humans as a whole irrespective of whether
they believe in its message or not further points to the idea of human moral
agency (Sachedina, 2008, 71–72).
Another element of human moral agency identified by Sachedina is
al-ilham or divine inspiration (Q. 91:8) which he defines as an “epistemic
tool for practical reason to get to that which is desirable and which enables
the nature to become receptive to moral cognition and volition” (Sache-
dina, 2008, 97). Hence al- fitra in combination with al-ilham creates a
picture of a human being who is a free moral agent to either reject or fol-
low innate moral guidance with all the implications this freedom entails.
Importantly, for Sachedina, the same verse (91:8) gives credence to the
idea that precisely because of humanity’s intuitive reason, they “possess
 Human rights imperative 111
natural dignity based on the self-evident universality of the moral worth
of each person” (Sachedina, 2008). Sachedina identifies an additional fun-
damental Qur’anic concept that can be used to argue in favor of God’s
natural guidance being available to all human beings equally, namely the
concept of al-qalb al-salim,11 which Sachedina translates as a “sound
mind, moral disposition, the recesses of the mind the seat of conscious-
ness, thoughts, volitions and feelings, the reason” (Sachedina, 2008, 97)
that God bestowed upon all of humanity. This cognitive faculty not only
equips human beings to make sound ethical judgments independently of
revelation but is also the symbolic locus of humans’ metaphysical meaning
and significance (Sachedina, 2008). Given that every human being pos-
sesses conscience, she or he is ipso facto bound by its dictates (Sachedina,
2008, 98). In addition to the al-qalb al-salim, the locus of human’s spiri-
tual and moral life is also embodied in the Qur’anic metaphor of al-nafs
(‘soul’) which essentially performs a complementary function to that of
al-fitra and al-qalb al-salim.
Al-fitra, al-qalb al-salim, and al-nafs all constitute part of God’s primor-
dial, extra-revelatory guidance in the form of spiritual and moral conscious-
ness which is universal in nature and therefore is available to all human
beings (Sachedina, 2008, 99). It is on the basis of this understanding of
human moral agency in Islam that the idea of human beings possessing
inalienable human rights simply on the basis of their humanity becomes
readily apparent. Hence, it is perfectly possible, on a basis of Islamic ratio-
nalist theological ethics, to develop a theory of Islamic natural law (Sache-
dina, 2008, 87).
The political ramifications of this conceptualization of human moral
agency for Sachedina are significant in relation to the question of regulating
the function of religion in the public sphere. In this context, Sachedina forms
the view that even within the confines of classical fiqh discourses, the recog-
nition of the concept of separate jurisdictions (nitaq sulta) existed which
gives credence to the idea of the plausibility of making a clear delineation
between the religious and political jurisdictions, as well as the private and
the public domain in Muslim societies (Sachedina, 2008, 153). This form of
secularity in Islam, when approached from a vantage point of the above-
described Muslim political theology advocated by Sachedina, can, in turn,
enable the development of a democratic and politically inclusive society
(Sachedina, 2008, 166).
Moreover, Sachedina avers that only Muslim political theology which rec-
ognizes the equal moral worth, dignity, and rights of all humans on the basis
of their common humanity has the necessary intellectual and conceptual
resources to meaningfully engage the secularly derived universal morality of
the UDHR. In Sachedina’s assessment, the assumptions underpinning the
Islamic and secular universal human rights discourses regarding innate
human dignity, human moral agency, and the function that intuitive reason
plays in ethical cognition are shared (Sachedina, 2008, 53), and therefore it
112 Human rights imperative
is possible to theorize a relationship of compatibility between the two. In this
regard, Sachedina (Sachedina, 2008) asserts:

Since the Qur’an makes reason a separate source of moral guidance, not
to contradict but rather to complement the revelation, it is possible to
speak about a universal morality based on religious premises. Here,
religious premises provide the foundation for an ideal public order that
acknowledges human moral agency as well as the human’s inherent dig-
nity as part of God’s natural endowment through equal creation of all
humans as human. Such a concept of morality is akin to the secular view
of universal morality that undergirds the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
(100)

In summary, Sachedina’s theory of Islamic natural law which recognizes the

equal moral worth and moral agency of all humans on the basis of a rational
political theology anchored in the Qur’anic concepts of al-fitra, karama,
al-ilham, al-qalb al-salim, and al-nafs paves the way for the development of
an Islamic human rights scheme which is conceptually compatible with that
of the UDHR.

Khaled Abou El Fadl

El Fadl’s “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam” (in Anwar,
2009) offers important theoretical insights into the question of compatibility
of Islamic and modern human rights schemes, and as such it deserves inclu-
sion. Like all other progressive Muslim scholars discussed in this chapter, it
explores the conceptual cum theoretical possibility of accomplishing a nor-
mative reconciliation between the modern and Islamic human rights schemes
without apologetically dismissing some real tensions between the dominant
classical interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence and theology and the ethical
and philosophical assumptions underpinning the modern human rights
discourses.
El Fadl repeatedly highlights the fact that his theory of human rights com-
mitment in modern Islam operates at the level of conceptual ‘potentialities’
which he defines as “the doctrinal aspects in Muslim thought that could
legitimize, promote, or subvert the emergence of a human rights practice in
Muslim culture” (in Anwar, 2009, 115). The realization of potentialities
which could promote a culture of human rights in Islam, argues El Fadl,
depends, among others, on their adequate theorization. Their actual imple-
mentation goes well beyond the realm of ideas as it requires the support of
concrete and “cumulative social practices” (in Anwar, 2009).
El Fadl explicitly admits that the human rights challenge is the most
important moral challenge that confronts Islam in the current age. Nonethe-
less, speaking broadly, El Fadl is optimistic that it is possible to develop an
 Human rights imperative 113
internal intellectual Islamic discourse which honors the social and moral
faithfulness to the modern concept of human rights (in Anwar, 2009, 113).
In El Fadl’s (in Anwar, 2009) words:

I do believe that even if Islam has not known a human rights tradition
similar to that developed in the West, it is possible, with the requisite
amount of intellectual determination, analytical rigour, and social com-
mitment, to demand and eventually construct such a tradition.
(115)

His belief in the possibility and plausibility of human rights commitment in

modern Islam is defended on the basis of two interrelated premises. The first
one is the idea that one can divorce religious doctrine from its particular
socio-political-historical practice and authentically reinterpret it for
purposes of engendering “new socio-political traditions” (in Anwar, 2009).
Second, the same belief is justified on the basis of viability of the practice of
transferability of ideas, and the possibility of cultural transplants (in Anwar,
2009, 115).
El Fadl identifies a number of reasons as to why there has been a relative
lack of discourse on universal human rights in the Islamic tradition and why
such a discourse presents a challenge to it. These include factors which are
both internal and external to the Islamic tradition itself. The latter include
the experience of colonialism, the persistence of non-democratic forms of
governance and the double standards in the application of human rights in
the West. The former include the prevalence of puritan interpretations of
Islam which argue for Islam’s moral supremacy and exceptionalism and a
near total absence of theorizing of human rights discourse, apart from its
apologetic mode, from the perspective of Islamic philosophy and theology
(in Anwar, 2009, 119–123).
Although he does not directly examine the issue of the foundation of
human rights, El Fadl, in principle, believes in the concept and the theory
of universal and objective set of rights to which each human being is enti-
tled. However, El Fadl is keenly aware that tensions do exist in relation to
the standards and points of reference each modern and Islamic system of
values/worldview operates under, at least in their respective predominant
interpretations. In relation to the contemporary proponents of modern
human rights, their theoretical framework is very much embedded in a secu-
lar paradigm12 whereas the mainstream Islamic approach is not interpreted
in accordance with theistically grounded natural law tradition (in Anwar,
2009, 125). One element in which discrepancies become particularly evi-
dent is in the very concept of individual ‘rights’. In the case of the former,
El Fadl notes, the notion of individual rights as privileges, entitlements, or
immunities is an alien construct whereas it is integral to the latter. Apart
from making reference to the elusiveness of the notion of individual rights
in relation to both their origins and their nature, El Fadl clarifies that, when
114 Human rights imperative
he talks about individual human rights, he uses a minimalist definition
which conceptualizes these rights as ‘qualified immunities’. He (in Anwar,
2009) explains the idea behind the meaning of this concept of individual
rights as being encapsulated by:

the idea that particular interests related to the well-being of an individual

ought to be protected from infringements, whether perpetuated by the
state or other members of the social order, and that such interests should
not be sacrificed unless for an overwhelming necessity.
(48)

This understanding of the concept of rights would, however, admits El

Fadl, necessitate a paradigm shift in terms of transforming its meaning as
per classical fiqh ( wajib / huquq ) as discussed above in the context of
Al-Jabiri’s thought, to that of a notion of immunities and entitlements (in
Anwar, 2009, 153).
Methodologically speaking, El Fadl argues that it is possible to develop an
Islamic version of natural law tradition and therefore an Islamic theory of
universal human rights that is conceptually compatible with that of the mod-
ern human rights scheme. To do so, however, new methodologies of inter-
pretation of the classical Islamic theological and jurisprudential heritage are
in order which would need to be informed by but also go beyond the existing
purely utilitarian and teleological-based hermeneutics (in Anwar, 2009, 126–127).
In this respect El Fadl’s approach itself focuses on rethinking the nature of
divine ontology in Islam and the contribution it can make in engendering
human rights commitment in Islam.
A central core of El Fadl’s theory therefore relates to discussions pertaining
to the nature of the divine (and therefore moral) ontology rather than some
kind of human-centred theology (in Anwar, 2009, 127). In this context,
he (in Anwar, 2009) avers as follows:

in order to create an adequate potential for the realization of a human

rights commitment in Islam, it is important to visualise God as beauty
and goodness, and that engaging in a collective enterprise of beauty and
goodness, with humanity at large, is part of realizing the divine in
human life.
(128)

Rethinking and reimagining the nature of divinity and what it means entails
an accurate understanding of the concept of Shari’a as Islamic law which he
defines as “a general term for a multitude of legal methodologies and a
remarkably diverse set of interpretive determinations” (in Anwar, 2009,
131). Because of the undeniable interpretive element in the very nature of
the understanding of the concept of Shari’a as Islamic law, which in Islamic
jurisprudence is referred to as fiqh, the crucial element for implantation of
 Human rights imperative 115
human rights culture in modern Islamic discourse is the process of engender-
ing a normative commitment by the subjective interpreters of Shari’a as
Islamic law in favor of such rights. Hence, El Fadl maintains, it is essential
to probe the very concept and epistemology of Shari’a as Islamic law, the
possibility of moral commitments within such an epistemology, and the sub-
jective moral commitments that underlie its implementation (in Anwar, 2009,
131–136). Put differently, El Fadl makes a conceptual and ontological dis-
tinction between Shari’a and fiqh. He (in Anwar, 2009) explains the distinct-
ion in the following manner:

I would suggest that Shari’ah ought to stand in an Islamic polity as a

symbolic construct for the divine perfection that is unreachable by
human effort. It is the epitome of justice, goodness, and beauty as con-
ceived and retained by God. Its perfection is preserved, so to speak, in
the mind of God, but anything that is channeled through human agency
is necessarily marred by human imperfection. Put differently, Shari’ah
as conceived by God is flawless, but as understood by human beings it
is imperfect and contingent.
(139)

Drawing a distinction between divine morality (Shari’a) and humanly con-

structed law (fiqh) as a product of cumulative interpretive communities is,
in El Fadl’s assessment, a major step forward for the purpose of devising and
rationalizing a paradigm of human rights in Islam (in Anwar, 2009, 141).
El Fadl also argues for a minimalist role of God in His function as a Sov-
ereign Legislator in regulating human affairs. Rather it is the human them-
selves who are charged with this responsibility on the basis of acting
morally. Part of this process is to promote and preserve human dignity and
honor since these are part of the Qur’an’s universal teachings. Importantly,
El Fadl identifies the human intellect as the source of this human dignity
since the human intellect is “the microcosm of the abilities of the divine
itself” and human beings in general are a (potential) symbol of divinity (in
Anwar, 2009, 134).
Upon reflecting on the nature of divinity, El Fadl identifies justice and
mercy as objective and universal moral values which are deemed to be central
to Islamic weltanschauung and therefore should be considered as corner-
stones of any Islamic human rights scheme (in Anwar, 2009, 141–142). In
doing so, like Sachedina, he adopts a Mu’tazilite view of the nature of ethical
value and hence of Islamic ethics. In addition to these two core values, El
Fadl argues that Qur’an’s celebration and sanctification of human diversity
(11:118; 49:13) and emphasis on attainment of righteousness by means of
competing for goodness, the strong emphasis on Divine mercy as sole pre-
rogative of God, (in Anwar, 2009, 156) the concepts of human vicegerency
(khilafa), human dignity, and honor (karama) all can be employed for the
purposes of developing a theory of a human rights commitment in Islam
116 Human rights imperative
(in Anwar, 2009, 144). With respect to the question of the purpose and func-
tion of justice and mercy in the Islamic paradigm, El Fadl writes that it is the
principles of mercy and justice which become “the primary divine charge”
and it is the task of humans to embody them by approximating and reflecting
these Divine attributes in their pursuit of creating a just society (in Anwar,
2009, 147). Hence, for El Fadl, “a commitment in favour of human rights
is a commitment in favour of God’s creation, and ultimately, it is a commit-
ment in favour of God” (in Anwar, 2009, 158).
By rethinking the nature of divine ontology as based on a central concept
of a Just and Merciful God and by making an epistemological distinction
between Shari’a and fiqh, El Fadl develops arguments for an Islamic natural
law theory which conceptually affirms the normativity of universal morality
and universality of individual human rights regardless of their religious or
any other affiliation. In other words, his main argument is that the Islamic
tradition contains “institutions that could be utilized in a systematic effort
to develop social and moral commitments to [modern] human rights”
(Anwar, 2009, 113). Hence, plausibility of conceptual compatibility between
the two is the underlying assumption.13

Ebrahim Moosa
In his work titled “The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes” (2004), Moosa
initiates the discussion on the compatibility between secular and Islamic
perspectives over the meaning of human rights by noting an increasing gap14
in the perception between two human rights ‘schemes’ and argues that, in
the writings of Muslim scholars on the subject, two approaches predominate:
apologetic and those based on uncritical appropriation. Like all other schol-
ars examined in this chapter, Moosa forms the view that both are unsatisfac-
tory because they do not critically examine the different ontological,
theoretical, and ethico-moral presuppositions governing the worldviews
behind these two different schemes. However, for Moosa, as shall be argued
below, this critical appraisal of the differences between the two human rights
schemes does not a priori lead to a conclusion that there are fundamental
differences in terms of outcomes.
In this context, Moosa appeals to the legacy of M. Iqbal whose critical
reconstructive approach to Muslim philosophical tradition and epistemic
openness to modern forms of human knowledge has the potential to “open
new frontiers of thought and human understanding” which could be used as
a platform for developing an Islamic human rights scheme which, in terms
of its outcomes, would be compatible with that of the secular human rights
scheme (Moosa, 2004, 2).
Moosa repeatedly highlights that when discussing the issue of compatibil-
ity of the modern secular human rights and Islamic rights ‘schemes’, we must
be ever be conscious of the fact that the assumptions and intellectual founda-
tions of pre-modern Islamic law differ entirely from the legal and political
 Human rights imperative 117
assumptions which undergird modern human rights codes (Moosa, 2004, 3).
These differences in intellectual ‘genesis’ and ‘pedigree’ between the two
schemes, argues Moosa further, have been grossly overlooked by many Mus-
lim human rights theorists. This fact, in turn, has contributed to the regret-
table situation of creating a lot of confusion and misunderstanding in dealing
with the issue of ‘compatibility’ between the two human rights schemes.15 In
this context, Moosa (Moosa, 2004) writes:

One of the weaknesses in contemporary Muslim human rights literature

is the attempt to conflate the two very different legal, ethical and moral
traditions so that they look instantly compatible. I concede that there is
considerable overlap in some of the concerns and objectives that both
rights traditions address. However, these similarities do not in them-
selves justify the grafting of presumptions from one system to the other
and in so doing packaging Muslim notions of rights as compatible to
modern human rights practices. To the extent that these perspectives can
be shared, rejected, appropriated or modified depends on the cross-
cultural dialogues that are made possible by concrete contexts.
(3–4)

Moosa notes that the modern human rights scheme in terms of its intellectual
pedigree is a product of the concept of shared citizenship in the context of a
modern, secular nation state. The concept of human rights in this scheme is
derived from and is traced back to the concept of natural law, which theoreti-
cally at least does not permit any political, social, economic, or religious
sentiments to encroach upon these rights (Moosa, 2004, 4–5).
In the Islamic frame of reference, the concept of rights is, however, con-
ceptualized differently. Moosa forms the view that the concept of ‘rights’
(‘haqq’/huquq)16 existed very early on in the Islamic tradition which, unlike
in the case of the modern human rights scheme, are created and exist within
a religious moral framework because they are conferred onto individuals by
God (by means of a humanly mediated revealed authority) with the implica-
tion that both civil and devotional aspects of ‘huquq’ enjoy the same moral
standing. Importantly, Moosa makes reference to the fact that apart from
God-conferred rights, modern Muslim scholars (Al-Zarqa in Al-Zuhayli,
1985) have argued that political authority (sulta) and reason (in the form of
moral responsibility and public interest) can also be considered as grounds
for the same (Moosa, 2004, 6).
Given the above, Moosa opines that in order to deal with the question of
compatibility between the two human rights schemes in a credible manner
from the perspective of Islamic tradition, a focus on reconstructing method-
ologies underpinning classical legal philosophies and theology are necessary.
With respect to this point, Moosa refers to the fact that even in the context
of the classical Islamic tradition, multiple legal philosophies exist (those asso-
ciated with Mu‘tazilites, Ash‘aris, Hanbalis) which have fundamentally
118 Human rights imperative
different approaches or assumptions on the subject of what constitutes an
Islamic human rights scheme and how they are to be implemented at socio-
political and legal levels (Moosa, 2004, 6–7). In the modern context, Moosa
delineates three main methodological approaches to human rights in the
Islamic scholarship: i.) an approach which assumes that the pre-modern
juristic discourses have the final say which inevitably leads to methodological
eclecticism; ii.) an approach which insists on circumventing the pre-modern
juristic canon and frames the terms of discussion directly on the Qur’an and
hadith texts17; and iii.) the third approaches which combines the first two by
taking the pre-modern juristic canon seriously but non-bindingly and by
creatively engaging the primary texts (Moosa, 2004, 7–8). As noted above,
Moosa favors this third re-constructivist approach because it alone is capable
of creatively adopting the contemporary empirical realities and bringing
them into productive dialogue with the Islamic tradition, thus reinventing it
in a manner suitable for new contexts (Moosa, 2004, 16).
Apart from noting, alongside all other progressive Muslim scholars exam-
ined in this chapter, that the championing of secular human rights is often
linked with imperialism, for Moosa the solution to the problem of ‘compat-
ibility’ is in accepting multiple or parallel models of human rights schemes
which operate under different moral systems and which might afford differ-
ent meanings to the very concept of ‘rights’. In this regard, Moosa refers to
the work of a Catholic thinker Raimundo Pannikar as a viable model of a
culturally sensitive human rights scheme in general. Moosa argues that, for
Pannikar, there are culturally specific but not fixed18 ways of protecting and
showing respect for human dignity which is a common feature of all human
rights schemes. What matters most is to establish cross-cultural consensus
around a mutually understandable intercultural language as a precondition
and platform on which genuine cross-cultural dialogue on human rights can
be had (Moosa, 2004, 16).
Specifically in the context of the nature of the relationship between modern
and Islamic human rights schemes, Moosa reiterates that the relationship is
not that of the supposed inherent compatibility or otherwise. Much depends
on various contingencies and contexts. In his (Moosa, 2004) own words:

It should become evident that nothing about either the Islamic or the
secular human rights traditions make them inherently compatible or
incompatible with each other. In fact, it is the location of the interpreter,
the reading of the text and the social conditions that generate different
responses to issues such as human rights.
(17)

In this regard, Moosa makes an interesting proposal on which type of Islamic

rights scheme could be implemented in Muslim-majority societies depending
upon the kind of political and economic system the society in question is
based on and to which Islamic law and ethics are responsive in terms of how
 Human rights imperative 119
they regulate the lives of those who live within the system. Here Moosa
argues that in contemporary Muslim-majority societies, two models pre-
dominate, namely, status-based and contract-based,19 as well as hybrid vari-
ants. The type of Islamic rights scheme implemented will depend upon the
kind of model that is preponderant. Moosa (Moosa, 2004) writes:

To the extent that a society successfully implements a political system that

resembles a contract model between state and citizen, it may be more pre-
disposed to interpret Islamic law as compatible with contract and hence
open to modern human rights. In such instances, the Islamic “text” would
be read as supporting individual liberty, given that traditional Islamic law
does make provision for the will of the individual to be authoritative in a
contract . . . In places where society, ethnicity, religion, class and gender,
largely determines the reciprocal duties and obligations, not the will of the
individual, such Muslim communities would find the concept of “status”
abundantly evident in the traditional interpretation of Islamic law, mainly
to reinforce their social conditions and expectations. Such communities
might find modern human rights to be too individualistic and incompatible
with their communitarian culture and religious values.
(17)

The central pillar of Islamic human rights schemes for Moosa, regardless of
which model is adopted, lies in the preservation of human dignity (karama)
as a “fundamental ethical norm in human conduct” (Moosa, 2004). Moosa
forms the view that the concept of karama is central and well established in
the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the overall Islamic ethical and legal philosophy.
Importantly, Moosa adds that theoretically speaking the means of protecting
karama are subject to change as long as the outcomes are in accordance with
the principles of justice and fairness values which epitomize the highest and
most noble principles of Islam (Moosa, 2004, 17–18).
In summary, Moosa’s stance on the issue of compatibility of modern
human and Islamic rights schemes is nuanced and cognizant of the fact that
both schemes are products of different histories and worldviews, and which
are discursive in nature and thus subject to evolution and change. Moosa
emphasizes the imperative of developing a culturally sensitive form of Islamic
rights which, despite being theoretically and conceptually justified on differ-
ent terms from that of the modern human rights schemes, nevertheless, in
terms of its outcomes, mirrors the same concerns and values of the modern
human rights scheme.

Conclusion
All of the progressive Muslim scholars examined in this chapter profess, on
the basis of their respective theories, a conceptual compatibility between
Islamic and modern human rights schemes. Far from being apologetic, this
120 Human rights imperative
belief is developed upon a critical reinterpretation of many assumptions
underpinning classical Islamic theology, ethics, and jurisprudence as well as
the nature and the origins of modern human rights discourses. With respect
to the former, progressive Muslim scholars highlight the importance of devel-
oping a rigorous and systematic methodology of interpretation of the foun-
tainheads of the Islamic weltanschauung which often entails significant if not
radical departures from the classical Islamic theological, juristic, and ethical
heritage. Its main delineating features are based on an ethically objectivist
approach to Islamic ethics and Islamic theology, and a particular conceptu-
alization of divine ontology whose central tenets are justice and mercy as
sources of universal moral values to be extended to and applicable to all
human beings. This is so simply on the basis that each and every human
being is a unique creation of God having equal moral worth, dignity, and
moral agency. Hence, each is entitled to enjoying the same inalienable rights
both at the level of individuals as well as members of different communities,
including the political.

Notes
1 As embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
document.
2 Santos writes: “counterhegemonic human rights discourse and practice have been
developing, non-Western conceptions of human rights have been proposed, cross-
cultural dialogues on human rights have been organized . . . [the] central task is
transforming the conceptualization and practice of human rights from a global-
ized localism into a cosmopolitan project”.
3 As encapsulated in his multivolume work The Critique of Arab Reason. For an
excellent overview of his work, see Wahyudi (2002).
4 See below.
5 Al-Jabiri considers the UDHR to have its authoritative historical point of refer-
ence in the thought of these European philosophers of the Enlightenment era.
Wahyudi (2002, 176).
6 This will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.
7 Al-Jabiri argues in this regard that the Qur’an recognizes the multiplicity of reli-
gions and the differences among them in several verses. He adds that by the word
‘Islam’, in the verse, ‘If anyone desires a religion other than Islam [submission to
Allah] never will it be accepted of him’ (3, 85), is meant Islam as the absolute
monotheistic religion, the religion of Abraham as indicated by the context of the
verse. He also argues that the non-reified interpretation of ‘Islam’ is an interpreta-
tion agreed upon by consensus of commentators, 224.
8 Including gender equality. Preference is only due to matters which fall under the
meaning of the Qur’anic verse, ‘The most honoured amongst you in the sight of
God are the most pious’ (49:13). Wahyudi (2002, 230).
9 In this context, Al-Jabiri argues for the need for social security. Wahyudi (2002,
245–248).
10 In this context, Sachedina refers to Stackhouse’s “Human Rights and Public The-
ology: The Basic Validation of Human Rights” in Religion and Human Rights:
Competing Claims?, edited by Carrie Gustafson and Peter Juviler (Armonk, NY:
M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 12–30.
11 Literally a heart full of content.
 Human rights imperative 121
12 Although he does highlight that, as argued by Al-Jabiri, above, the secular para-
digm originally was enshrined in classical natural law theory which had a theistic
grounding. Wahyudi (2002,125).
13 He has defended this view also in Abou El Fadl (2007, 49–56).
14 Arguably as a result of frequent abuses of human rights in the Muslim-majority
world.
15 As an example of this, Moosa, like Sachedina, notes the tensions between the
United Nations Charter of Human Rights and the Universal Islamic Declaration
of Human Rights, especially in the area of language idiom, freedom of religion,
women’s rights, and minority rights.
16 Which also has the meaning of duty/obligation as discussed above.
17 Which results often in uncritical appropriation and grafting of human rights
schemes into the Islamic tradition.
18 Since cultures are considered to be dynamic in nature.
19 This distinction argues Moosa has precedents in classical Islamic law.
6 The ethical imperative
in Islamic jurisprudence/law

Whether in a Muslim or non-Muslim country, the reality of modern Islam is

beset with pathology of contradictions that are powerfully demonstrative of
the fact that a serious void exists between the lived experience of Muslims
and contemporary Islamic theological, ethical, and legal thought. Confront-
ing these contradictions and treating them requires honesty and openness in
discourse that is woefully absent in the contemporary Islamic context.
(El Fadl, 2014, 27–28)

Introduction
The issue concerning the nature of socio-ethical norms and values and their
relationship with Islamic law and jurisprudence is another prominent theme
in progressive Muslim thought. In many ways, the proponents of progressive
Muslim thought consider the issue of ethics in general to be one of the most
pressing challenges to the Islamic tradition in the contemporary age (e.g. Ali,
2006; El Fadl, 2014; Ramadan, 2009).
The lack of theorizing on the nature and evolution of ethics among the
proponents of (neo)traditional Muslim thought in the context of an ever-
more-complex array of ethical issues emerging in multifold areas of human
experience has prompted a number of progressive Muslim scholars to devote
their intellectual energies to issues pertaining to Islamic ethical theory, espe-
cially as it relates to Islamic jurisprudence and to a lesser extent theology. In
this regard, as evident from the above epigraph, a number of conflicts
between contemporary Muslim ethical sensibilities and values and those
embedded in classical Islamic jurisprudence have been identified as requiring
serious rethinking of the ethical and ontological assumptions which underpin
traditional Islamic jurisprudence. This chapter focuses on hermeneutical
mechanisms progressive Muslim scholars have devised in search for what I
term here the ethical imperative in Islamic jurisprudence in order to address
these conflicts. What I mean by the phrase ‘the ethical imperative in Islamic
jurisprudence’ are the efforts of progressive Muslim scholars to reconcile
their contemporary ethical sensibilities and values with their Islamic beliefs
on the basis of a fresh interpretation of the normative sources of Islamic
 Ethical imperative 123
worldview and, as a part of this process, a critical and serious engagement
with the relevant aspects of traditional Islamic thought in the field of ethics,
theology, and jurisprudence. With respect to this dynamic, I highlight two
important hermeneutical mechanisms progressive Muslim scholars take
recourse to in order to discover or recover the ethical (and the rational) in
Islamic ethics and jurisprudence. These include what I term comprehensive
contextualization and teleological (i.e. maqasid-driven) Qur’an-Sunna
hermeneutics. In this regard, the scholarship of two progressive Muslim
scholars, Hashim Kamali and Abullah Saeed, are showcased.

The nature and limits of classical Qur’an-Sunna

hermeneutics and its interpretational implications
In the second chapter, I discussed the interpretational implications of tradi-
tional Islam’s subscription to the salafi worldview in terms of its epistemol-
ogy, which I characterized as existing in the state of epistemological arrest
if not regressivism. This aspect of traditional Islamic hermeneutics has
important implications in terms of its ability to incorporate ethical values
and system of ethics that were not prevalent at the time of the formative
and classical periods of Islamic thought into its ethical and legal canon
(Duderija, 2011), and has resulted in another kind of arrest, namely an
ethical one. I shall demonstrate this with the example of gender-related
issues in the final two chapters. There are other aspects of classical Islamic
hermeneutics that were prevalent in classical Islam which also contributed
to the same ethical arrest phenomenon. These pertain to the role and scope
of reason in interpretation of revelation, the limits of classical Islamic
hermeneutics in terms of contextualization of normative texts, and the her-
meneutical positioning and scope of teleological hermeneutics in it. Given
the nature and scope of this book, I shall discuss them here only briefly and
in a perfunctory manner.1
In relation to the role and the scope of reason in interpretation of norma-
tive texts, classical Muslim scholars heavily restricted this role to primarily
its analogical form. The underlying assumption behind this approach is that
ethico-legal knowledge must always be derived from revelation and that
humans cannot know what is ethically or legally right by independent rea-
son. The role of reason, thus, was seen as strictly instrumental. This position
is known as ethical voluntarism or Divine Command Theory, and has been
and still is a dominant position in traditional Sunni ethics/theology/jurispru-
dence (Al-Attar, 2010). The Divine Will, as embodied in the normative texts,
was considered by the majority of legal philosophers as the sole determinant
in the realm of law and “no concept of human reason as [being] author of
ultimate source of law” was developed (Weiss, 1998, 36).2 Indeed, in the
context of characterizing classical Islamic law, argues Weiss, “between
human reason and the law of God there stretched an essentially unbridgeable
gap” (Weiss, 1998, 37). According to Weiss, voluntarism permeated the way
124 Ethical imperative
in which the nature of law, ethics, morality, and ontology was conceptualized
(Weiss, 1998, 53–65). Jackson (2002) employs the term ‘classical legal for-
malism’ to describe this approach.
The subscription to voluntarism has important interpretational implica-
tions. Firstly, it affects the way in which the nature and the character of
Qur’anic revelation is perceived and interpreted. Voluntarism was respon-
sible for infusing the Revelation with a comprehensive legalistic ethos and
subsequent marginalization of some of its other dimensions, such as those
which could be broadly termed ethico-religious in nature. This distorted the
way in which the overall nature, character, and ‘purpose’ of the Qur’anic
Revelation and its message were perceived and subsequently conceptualized.
Secondly, voluntarism also implies a legalistic expression of the Will of God
which can only be known from commands and prohibitions. This approach
renders the law entirely dependent upon a sovereign and unbound Divine
Will (Weiss, 1998, 35). An interpretational model premised on voluntarism
also assumes that the text includes the complete knowledge and that the role
of reason in interpretation of the text is minimal. All four Sunni pre-modern
major schools of jurisprudence and theology adopted in various degrees a
‘voluntarist’ view of the relationship between reason and revelation (Dud-
erija, 2011).
Classical Islamic hermeneutics were also heavily philologically driven
(Gleave, 2013; Vishanoff, 2011), and as such tended to marginalize the his-
torical context in which the Qur’an text was revealed when exploring the
full significance of its meaning(s). Although there is recognition of the his-
torical character and development of the Qur’an when speaking of ‘occa-
sions of revelation’ (asbab al-nuzul) and ‘abrogation’ (naskh), there are no
clear hermeneutical models for fully taking into account the contextual sig-
nificance or contingency of the texts. As a result, there is a strong tendency
to hermeneutically decontextualize what, from a contextualist perspective,
would be seen as contextually contingent meaning. The interpretational con-
sequences of this methodological approach resulted in an inadequate appre-
ciation of the importance of the socio-cultural milieu and the prevailing
norms, customs, beliefs, and traditions of pre-Qur’anic Arabia (i.e. the entire
pre-Qur’anic worldview) in the understanding of the actual intent, nature,
and character of Qur’anic revelation and the significance of its meaning(s)
(Saeed, 2006, 117). In this context, the words of Soualhi (2002) are very
instructive:

Most lacking in classical legal hermeneutics was the articulation of con-

text based theory or legal hermeneutics that genuinely read the text both
in letter and spirit.
(597)

An inadequate understanding and appreciation of these socio-cultural,

moral, intellectual, political, and economic forces within which the Qur’an
 Ethical imperative 125
operated yields an approach which fails to understand the actual nature of
Qur’anic revelation and the intent behind the newly developing Qur’anic
worldview. This dominant hermeneutical tendency resulted in the develop-
ment of classical hermeneutical theory, including in the area of theory of
law (usul ul fiqh) which “fell short of integrating the time space factor into
the fabric of its methodology” (Kamali, 1996b, 9). Relatedly, the concept
of legal philosophy and its purposes remained underdeveloped and its her-
meneutical positioning was heavily curtailed consistent with the above-
described features of classical Islamic hermeneutics. In this regard, Duderija
(2013) notes:

When engaging in the process of developing Qur’anic hermeneutics and

Islamic legal theory (usūl ul-fiqh) and, generations upon generations of
Islamic legal theorists (usuliyyūn), jurists (fuqahāʾ) and exegetes
(mufassirūn) have primarily concerned themselves with the questions of
what the Qur’an has to say on a particular issue or theme but not what
the Qur’an tacitly assumes to be normative as understood by its direct
audience and as evident in the Qur’an’s content. They did not fully rec-
ognize the interpretational implications of the Qur’anic pre-suppositions
present in its discourse, especially in relation to developing a Qur’anic
hermeneutic and Islamic legal theory whose most powerful hermeneuti-
cal tool would entail an ethico-religious values and purposive (qasd)
based-approach [sic] to interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna and the
purposive nature of Islamic law and its philosophy.
(58–59)

By ethico-religious, values-based approach, Duderija refers to a broader her-

meneutical method, which stipulates that the actual nature and character of
the Qur’an-Sunna discourse is hermeneutically best served and privileges its
own interpretation on the basis of certain ethico-religious principles such as
justice, righteousness, equality, etc. as based on the ethically objective nature
of these values. By purposive nature of Islamic law and its philosophy, Dud-
erija implies that the primary function of Islamic law and the most funda-
mental element in its methodology is based upon a realization and fulfillment
of its purposes (maqasid) which, in turn, is identified on the basis of a legal
theory methodology that hermeneutically privileges an ethico-religious,
values-based approach to the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna mentioned
above. The ethico-religious-valued and maqasid-based approaches to Islamic
legal philosophy and Qur’anic hermeneutics, therefore, are very closely her-
meneutically interrelated. As noted by Kamali (1996a), they are derived from
the idea that the laws and the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunna, both in
the realm of muʾamalat (civil transactions) and the ʿibadat (rituals), are in
essence goal oriented and rational (taʾlili) in nature.
Progressive Muslim scholars, as shall be discussed below, seek to erect
such a Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutic and thereby overcome both the
126 Ethical imperative
epistemological and the ethical state of ‘arrest’ in order to reclaim the ethical
in Islamic ethics and jurisprudence.

Progressive Muslim Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics:

aiding the search for the ethical in
Islamic jurisprudence
Generally speaking, there are two broad hermeneutical mechanisms progres-
sive Muslim scholars rely on in order to overcome the above-described limits
of classical Islamic hermeneutics. One element of progressive Muslim schol-
ars’ Islamic hermeneutics consists of ethico-religious values and maqasid-
driven hermeneutics whose delineating features and definition have been
given above. The second I refer to as ‘comprehensive contextualization’ in
contrast to the above-described traditional semi-contextual Qur’an-Sunna
hermeneutics. By comprehensive contextualization, I mean hermeneutically
recognizing in a methodical manner the role of context in shaping of the very
content of the Qur’an and its worldview. For this to take place, we need to
recognize the Qur’an’s orientation towards the assumed operational dis-
course of its revelational context that manifests itself in the Qur’anic content
and is reflected in the grammatical and syntactical structures employed in
the Qur’an’s language. This Qur’anically assumed operational discourse
must be seen as often reflecting but not necessarily endorsing the prevalent
religious, cultural, social, political, and economic situation of its direct audi-
ence, its first community of listeners, and participants upon which a dialogi-
cal nature of the Qur’an’s discourse is premised. This dialogical nature of the
Qur’an and its relationship with its first listeners is, in turn, based upon the Qur’an’s
essential orality. The hermeneutical importance of this idea of the Qur’an’s
recognition of the prior knowledge and mentality resident among its first
audience has important hermeneutical implications as it hermeneutically
privileges the second hermeneutical element, namely a maqasid-driven her-
meneutic (Duderija, 2014b).
In the next section, we turn to the first element of this progressive Qur’an-
Sunna hermeneutic aiding the search for the ethical in Islamic law, namely
comprehensive contextualization as embodied in the scholarship of Abdullah
Saeed, Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of
Melbourne.

An example of comprehensive contextualization

in the works of progressive Muslim scholars:
the case of Abdullah Saeed
Abdullah Saeed is one of the leading progressive Muslim scholars writing
on and advocating for a contextualist approach to Qur’anic interpreta-
tion as defined above. His scholarship on this subject matter spans well
over a decade.
 Ethical imperative 127
Prior to describing the main delineating features of Saeed’s contextualist
approach relevant to the aims of this chapter, it should firstly be noted, as a
means of broader contextualizing, that Saeed’s interpretive methodology is
clearly influenced by and builds on ‘the double movement’ hermeneutical
theory of one of the great modernist Muslim scholar Fazrul Rahman (d.1998)
(Saeed in Taji-Farouki, 2004; Saeed, 2006).3 Secondly, it is important to
outline at the outset that Saeed’s contextualist approach is restricted to what
he terms the ethico-legal elements of the scripture (Saeed, 2014 6–7, 9, 11).
These, in Saeed’s (2006, 1) view, relate to the “Qur’an’s beliefs, rulings, laws,
commandments, prohibitions and instructions”. The examples of ethico-
legal texts in the Qur’an identified by Saeed include regulations related to
marriage, divorce, and inheritance; what is permitted and prohibited; com-
mandments relating to fasting, spending, jihad, and hudud (corporal punish-
ments); prohibitions related to theft, dealing with non-Muslims; and
instructions relating to etiquette, interfaith relations, and governance (Saeed,
2006, 1). Saeed (2014, 6–7) contrasts the ethico-legal texts in the Qur’an to
“theological” and “trans-historical”, which do not require a contextualist
approach as their meaning or more precisely the significance of their meaning
is not context contingent.
For Saeed, there exist three approaches to interpretation of ethico-legal
texts among Muslims in the modern period, namely textualist, semi-textualist,
and contextualist. Saeed’s (2006, 3) typology is based on two criteria which
delineate between the approaches, namely the extent to which the interpret-
ers “(1) rely on just the linguistic criteria to determine the meaning of the
text, and (2) take into account the socio-historical context of the Qur’an as
well as the contemporary context of today”.
In Saeed’s (2006, 3) assessment, ‘textualists’ advocate a rigid following of
the literal meaning of the text whose meaning is considered as static and
universal in its application regardless of changes in context. ‘Semi-textualists’
also adopt a literalist approach to interpretation but “package the ethico-
legal content in a somewhat ‘modern’ idiom, often within an apologetic
discourse.”
Elsewhere Saeed (2014, 3) has adopted slightly different typology, subdi-
viding the textualist approach into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ textualism. The former
is considered to “place an almost exclusive reliance on the literal meaning of
the Qur’anic text” whereas the latter “take[s] some contextual into account”
when interpreting. Furthermore, hard textualists are also oblivious to the
concept of meaning complexity and consider meaning to be static and avail-
able to the interpreter in a completely objective fashion (Saeed, 2014, 20) in
accordance with the referential theory of meaning (Saeed, 2006, 102). Soft
contextualists do show some interpretational flexibility, but in essence sub-
scribe to similar interpretations as do the hard textualists. Importantly, Saeed
argues, textualist-based Qur’anic hermeneutics often either do not recognize
the more general Qur’anic ethico-moral values and principles or, even worse,
subject the same to the textualist hermeneutic itself, thereby running the risk
128 Ethical imperative
of significantly weakening the actual ethico-moral foundations of Islamic law
(Saeed, 2014, 21).
The contextualist approach for Saeed provides ‘a critical alternative’ to
dominant textualist-based approaches. It highlights contextual contingency
of the ethico-legal content of the Qur’an as well as its interpretations from
the classical period. In Saeed’s (2006) own words:

They [the contextualists] argue for understanding the ethico-legal con-

tent in the light of the political, social, historical, cultural and economic
contexts in which this content was revealed, interpreted and applied.
Thus they argue for a high degree of freedom for the modern Muslim
scholar in determining what is mutable (changeable) and immutable
(unchangeable) in the area of ethico-legal content.
(3)

One important element of Saeed’s contextualist hermeneutic pertains to how

Contextualists approach theories of meaning and the process of meaning
derivation. In this regard, Saeed asserts that the contextualist hermeneutic
recognizes several important traits or delineating features of the concept of
meaning determinancy, namely: i.) an inevitable degree of indeterminacy and
complexity in meaning; ii.) the importance of context (linguistic, socio-
historical, and cultural); and iii.) the legitimacy of multiple understandings
(Saeed’s, 2006, 102).
As part of their subscription to the idea of the polyvalent nature of mean-
ing, the contextualist approach acknowledges the inevitability of subjectivity
as being inherent in the process of derivation of meaning, especially in rela-
tion to ethico-legal texts. This process is acknowledged to be governed by a
complex interplay between the author, text, interpreter, and the context
(Saeed, 2006, 103; Saeed, 2014, 87–88). Hence, as noted above, the contex-
tualist approach recognizes the complexity of meaning determinancy or deri-
vation (Saeed, 2006, 105). However, the contextualist approach, while
acknowledging multiplicity of meanings/understanding of texts and its com-
plexity (Saeed, 2014, 11–112), does not regard all interpretations as equally
contextually legitimate, especially those which pertain to interpretations of
ethico-legal texts because these texts can elicit a relatively narrow spectrum
of reasonable (in sense of contextually legitimate) interpretations (Saeed,
2006, 108). Significantly, Saeed identifies cultural context as one important
element in evaluating the reasonableness of an interpretation and texts’
meaning(s). In his (Saeed, 2006) words:

It may also be argued that cultural context plays a significant role in

limiting the meaning of a text. To understand the limits of the meaning
of the Qur’an, it is necessary to understand the cultural traditions
regarding the sacred text and its production and reception. Because the
text is a social phenomenon functioning within a given society, the
 Ethical imperative 129
meaning of the text depends also on the expectations and conditions of
that society.
(109)

Another delineating feature of a contextualist approach to the question of the

nature of meaning is that, unlike some radical post-structuralist approaches
to meaning and interpretation, it subscribes to the idea that meaning can in
principle be discovered and that it is knowable. However, as explained above,
this meaning is contextually contingent and can change as a result of the
change in context (Saeed, 2006). Importantly, contextualists subscribe to the
idea that meaning has contextual significance and that this significance can
change as result of change in context. Therefore, from a contextualist perspec-
tive, the meaning of a word, including its ‘core’ meaning, or more specifically
its significance, is not considered as static (Saeed, 2006, 106). In this regard,
Saeed (Saeed, 2006, 116) makes an important distinction between the two
dimensions of meaning in the Qur’an, the historical and contemporary mean-
ing. The former pertains “to the meaning at the time of the Prophet and earli-
est Muslims” and the contemporary refers to the “meaning of the Qur’an for
people today”. They could be but are not a priori the same. Although con-
textualists emphasize the importance of taking into account the context in the
process of meaning derivation, they nevertheless consider that literal meaning
also plays an important role but that its potential discovery is in relation to
ethico-legal texts is often only the starting rather than the end point of inter-
pretation (Saeed, 2006, 113–114). Finally, for contextualists the Qur’an,
including its ethico-legal texts, should be treated as not merely language but
also a discourse, an aspect of the nature of the Qur’an which further favors
a contextualist approach to its interpretation (Saeed, 2006, 107).
All of the above elements of a contextualist approach to meaning and its
derivation/determinancy as advocated by Saeed emphasize the crucial impor-
tance of taking into consideration socio-historical context in which the
Qur’an initially operated and its hermeneutical implications, especially in
relation to the ethico-legal texts of the Qur’an (Saeed, 2006, 116, 122–123).
As a corollary, the contextualist approach presupposes that socio-cultural
norms and values are subject to change. This, in turn, necessities a re-evaluation
of past interpretations and engendering of fresh interpretations which reflect
these changes. In the words of Saeed (2006):

Values change according to social, economic, political, legal and intel-

lectual circumstances. When this happens, there should be a change in
how we approach the foundation texts that relate to those values. The
Qur’an was given in a specific context, within the framework of a world-
view that was appropriate to first/seventh-century Arabia, and in a lan-
guage and symbolism that its audience understood. The Qur’an should
be seen as embedded in the context in which it was received.
(124)
130 Ethical imperative
Therefore, for contextualists, in the overall process of interpretation of ethico-
legal elements of the Qur’an, it is imperative to take into account social
change that has taken place since the time of revelation (Saeed, 2006, 4).
Saeed provides a number of reasons as to why this is the case. One important
consideration has to do with the premise that a contextualist approach per-
mits more interpretational flexibility which is seen as very important in meet-
ing the various needs and addressing the various challenges of contemporary
Muslims (Saeed, 2006, 1). One of the social changes Saeed identifies relate
to ethical and moral issues such as understanding of the dignity of the human
person and in the area of gender relations which have important socio-political
and legal implications. These changed perceptions and institutional struc-
tures have repercussions for law and governance (Saeed, 2006, 2–3). Another
reason as to why a contextualist method is necessary pertains to the idea that
only a contextualist-driven Qur’anic hermeneutic is able to fully capture the
spirit and underlying objectives of the Qur’anic message (Saeed, 2014, 179).
In adopting this contextualist approach, Saeed (2006, 1–2, 5, 146; 2014,
179) maintains further, Qur’an and its message will be more applicable to
the lives of Muslims and hence maintain its relevance, something that many
Muslims earnestly desire. Importantly, Saeed (2014, 53–64) considers the
contextualist approach to be in harmony with the actual nature of the
Qur’anic revelation and that it is “deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition”
(Saeed, 2014, 182) from its earliest times (Saeed, 2014, 26–38). Another
argument in favor of a contextualist Qur’anic hermeneutic provided by
Saeed (2006, 4) is premised on the idea that classical non-contextualist
approaches and methodologies should not a priori be considered as invari-
ably applicable or forever valid. Hence, for Saeed there is an urgent need for
contemporary Muslim scholars “to explore the tradition in the light of con-
temporary experience, including modern knowledge and methods of
research” (Saeed, 2006) including rational, historical, and critical scholar-
ship as part of relevant modern-day academic endeavors (Saeed, 2006).
Such an approach, however, Saeed repeatedly underscores, does not a
priori reject the legacy of classical Islamic scholarship. In his (Saeed, 2006)
words:

when interpreting ethico-legal texts in the Qur’an I argue that the inter-
pretation of the ethico-legal content of the Qur’an needs to take social
change into account in order to sustain the close relationship between
the Qur’an and the Muslim today. The Qur’anic interpretation up to
now, which has been to a large extent philological, needs to give way to
a more sociological, axiological and anthropological exegesis in order
to relate it to the contemporary needs of Muslims today. However, a
search for acceptable methods in the modern period should not neglect
the classical Islamic exegetical tradition entirely. On the contrary, we
should benefit from the tradition and be guided by it where possible
without necessarily being bound by all its detail. Contemporary scholars
 Ethical imperative 131
must be informed about the ways in which the texts have been inter-
preted throughout history. That understanding can be helpful in our
formulation of new interpretations in the light of new circumstances and
challenges.
(4)

Saeed has also developed a concrete step-by-step model representative of a

contextualist interpretation whose delineating features I describe next.
As a preliminary remark, it is important to underscore that for interpretive
purposes Saeed (2014, 83) considers the Qur’an to be a communicative act
that has a particular purpose. It, therefore, has an intended audience and its
context is “deeply connected to the specific context in which it occurred”
(Saeed, 2014, 94). Hence, the Qur’an has a quality of contextuality which,
for interpretational purposes, needs to be systematically approached by
means of developing a coherent theoretical framework. And this is what
Saeed’s contextualist model of Qur’anic interpretation does.
The model consists of four steps, most of which consist of a number of
sub-steps. Step number one relates to what Saeed terms “the broader context
in which interpretation occurs” (Saeed, 2014). There are there elements to
this step, namely: i.) understanding the interpreter’s own subjectivity, which
he also terms “the world of the reader”, which includes ideas such as the
reader’s existing life experiences, education, values, and various presupposi-
tions; ii.) the interpreter’s preliminary understanding of the texts to be inter-
preted, also referred to as “the world of the text”, which include questions
pertaining to what constitutes a ‘text’, its status, and its importance in soci-
ety, the text’s author, and the text’s general meaning and general message;
iii.) beliefs pertaining to the nature of language, how meaning is constructed,
and which factors are involved in its determinancy, as explained above
(Saeed, 2014, 94–98).
The second step is when the actual process of engaging with texts directly
begins and consists of determining the authenticity of the text in question.
In the case of the Qur’an, it also ideally means interpreting the text in its
original language (i.e. Arabic).
Step three seeks to identify the historical meaning of the text by means
of employing “various exegetical principles, tools and ideas” (Saeed,
2014, 98). The first sub-step involves reconstructing the original context
of the Qur’anic text that Saeed terms “macro context 1” (MC1). He
defines this phrase to refer to “the original social, political, economic,
cultural, and intellectual settings of the Qur’anic text under consider-
ation” (Saeed, 2014) The reconstruction of MC1 is inclusive of discover-
ing, as much as it is possible to do so, the prevalent “relevant ideas, values
and views” (Saeed, 2014)4 which can be deduced from the study of histori-
cal information that the interpreter has access to from a variety of differ-
ent sources. The reconstruction can never be entirely complete, but it
nevertheless has the potential to provide the interpreter with “a good sense
132 Ethical imperative
of the overall setting in which the text was given” (Saeed, 2014, 95). The
second sub-step consists of delineating the “immediate literary5 context”
of the text to be subjected to interpretation with the aim of identifying any
broader thematic units or messages inherent to that very context (Saeed,
2014, 99). The importance of adopting a thematic approach is justified on
the basis of the very nature of the Qur’anic text (or discourse) which is
considered not to be organized thematically as well as on the premise that
its ‘chapters’ (suras) contain a number of different themes. Saeed defines
a thematic unit as a set of texts (which can be few or many) that are placed
(either) right in front of and/or right after the text under interpretation
and which are thematically relevant to it. By means of a careful reading,
the interpreter should be in a position to delineate the start and the end
points of the thematic unit. Importantly, each thematic unit may contain
‘dominant’ as well as ‘secondary’ themes with their own set of ‘ideas’,
‘values’, ‘messages’, and ‘issues’ (Saeed, 2014, 99). The next sub-step is to
identify the specific time and place in which the text was communicated.
This process involves, as much as it is possible, cautiously determining the
specific addressees the texts are referring to, the dating of the text, and
any specific event(s) associated with their revelation (Saeed, 2014). The
next sub-step concerns deciding as to what type of text is in question, that
is, is it historical, ethico-legal, or a parable, or does it relate to the issues
pertaining to non-earthy life. This is followed by another sub-step which
focuses on the linguistic aspects of the text and entails “an understanding
of the morphological, syntactic, semantic and stylistic features of the text”
(Saeed, 2014, 101). The aim here is to identify dominant terms and ideas
in the text as well as to determine which meanings are more appropriate
in case there is polysemy or semantic ambiguity. Consulting classical Ara-
bic lexicons and dictionaries such as that of Ibn Manzur’s Lisan al-Arab
is of crucial importance here so that the interpreter can get the idea of the
usage(s) of particular words at certain points in time (Saeed, 2014). The
next sub-step consists of identifying any other ‘parallel’ Qur’anic texts
which deal with similar issues to that of the primary text in focus. This
involves compilation and comparison of other Qur’anic texts on the basis
of which it could be possible to delineate “the key ideas that emerge from
all of these different texts: dominant messages, ideas and values; how each
text relates to other relevant texts; and the chronological sequence of the
texts” (Saeed, 2014). Once the conveyed messages have been identified,
the dominant values that may emerge from them will be organized hier-
archically as based on the criterion of their respective relevance (Saeed,
2014, 101–102). This process is followed by consulting non-Qur’anic
texts that relate to the topic of the primary text under interpretation. In
this context, Saeed argues for caution as many hadith texts are of ques-
tionable authenticity and reliability. He advocates for them to be subjected
to scrutiny not only in accordance with the classical hadith criticism meth-
odologies, but also those of Muslim scholars developed in the modern
 Ethical imperative 133
period. The criteria Saeed adopts in this regard are that the hadith in
question be interpreted in the light of the Qur’an, that they be used when-
ever possible thematically, and that they are consistent with the prophet’s
Sunna6(practice). The final sub-step relates to examining how the Qur’an’s
direct audience understood and applied the texts, including any variations
and disagreements between them. This is achieved by means of consulting
the relevant biographical, historical, exegetical, or hadith-based literature
(Saeed, 2014, 105).
The final step of the contextualist model entails relating the past interpre-
tations of the text to the recent or modern macro context (MC2). With
respect to examining the interpretations of past communities of interpreta-
tion, the modern interpreter will examine if there have been any competing
understandings of the text in the entire tradition as a whole and how they
have been justified, especially if reference to the change in context has been
employed to argue for differences in interpretation. If and when significant
differences between MC1 and MC2 can be identified, then contextualists will
have a case for developing novel interpretations which are in line with the
overall contextualist methodology explained above. In this regard, Saeed
argues that the broader the range of interpretation in the extant tradition of
the text under consideration, the larger the degree of flexibility a contextual-
ist interpreter has for providing a fresh interpretation.
This final step comprises of three sub-steps. It begins by evaluating the
majority or dominant interpretation of the text in the accumulated Islamic
tradition, being fully cognizant of the fact that in the case of Qur’anic exe-
getical tradition (tafsir), the interpretation of a particular exegete (mufassir)
was often a function of, or was influenced to various degrees by, him belong-
ing to a particular theological or legal school or mystical order. Due to the
fact that the dominant interpretation is viewed as but one among several
others, a contextualist will also examine the rationale of peripheral or minor-
ity interpretations.
The second sub-step proceeds to relate the understanding of MC1 to that
of MC2. This involves their respective comparison with the aim of determin-
ing “the values, norms, and ideas that are specific to each context and to
identify any similarities or differences between the two contexts” (Saeed,
2014, 106). Once this has been done, the interpreter examines whether the
values the text seeks to convey are of universal (or immutable) or particular
(or mutable) in nature. This element of interpretation is described by Saeed
(2014) as follows:

As part of this process, it is useful to identify the messages that appear to

be specific to macro context 1 (early seventh century); the universal mes-
sages that seems to be the objective of the message for macro context 1;
and the ways in which the message can be applied to macro context 2
(twenty first century).
(106)
134 Ethical imperative
The greater the similarity between MC1 and MC2, the more likely it is that
the ‘key message’ has remained the same. Moreover, if the disparity in the
respective contexts is great, then the ‘key message’ (in its literalist sense and
application) will no longer be relevant, but only its underlying objective if
the value conveyed by the message is deemed to be universal in nature (Saeed,
2014, 107). In case that this indeed is so, the new interpretation will need to
be evaluated in terms of its reasonableness, which is the final sub-step. The
reasonableness of the new interpretation is evaluated on the basis of several
considerations, namely:

1 Is the new interpretation contrary to any fundamental principles (asl)

or context-independent value of religion?
2 Does the new interpretation take into account the ‘needs’ and ‘concerns’
of the contemporary context and whether it is likely going to garner
the support of a “significant part of the community of believers (Mus-
lims)?” (Saeed, 2014).
3 Is the new interpretation in line with “common sense or with what
believers in general would consider to be reasonable, fair, and just
today?” (Saeed, 2014).

To fully appreciate the first point, we need to explain how Saeed defines
the nature and contents of fundamental principles of religion, which in
turn necessitates understanding of his hierarchy of Qur’anic values
model.
One of the delineating features of Saeed’s contextualist interpretation of
the Qur’an concerns identifying Qur’anic “values”7 and establishing a rela-
tionship of hierarchy between them in terms of their nature and relative
importance. Saeed uses the concept of ‘value’ somewhat idiosyncratically to
encompass not only culturally contingent standards of “what is good or bad,
desirable or undesirable, beautiful or ugly” but all that which “a Muslim is
expected to adopt, follow and put into practice or reject in terms of beliefs,
ideas, and practices” (Saeed, 2014, 64). The function of the hierarchical
nature of Qur’anic values is described as follows:

One of the most challenging issues in the contextualization is determin-

ing the degree of importance that should be attached to a particular
Qur’anic value or values that have been identified in the text under
consideration. Failure to recognize the existence of a hierarchy of values
may lead to interpretations that conflict with the important universal
values of the Qur’an.
(Saeed, 2014)

Saeed identifies five different types of values in decreasing order of impor-

tance: obligatory, fundamental, protectional, implementational, and
instructional.
 Ethical imperative 135
Obligatory values are “basic values” that are “emphasized throughout the
Qur’an” and are contextually independent. Furthermore, they are recognized
by Muslims from different “backgrounds” to constitute “an essential part
of Islam” (Saeed, 2014, 65).The obligatory values include the fundamental
beliefs (the six pillars of iman8), fundamental devotional practices (‘ibadat –
daily canonical prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage), and the “clearly spelt out
and unambiguous specifics of what is permissible (halal) and what is prohib-
ited (haram) in the Qur’an9 and supported in the actual practice of the
Prophet” (Saeed, 2014, 65). Importantly, Saeed argues that in relation to the
haram/halal aspect of obligatory values, their universalist character applies
only in relation to the basic concept of permissibility or prohibition inherent
in and not in the “many details associated with the command” (Saeed, 2014,
65).10 In this context, Saeed warns that the “long lists of halal and haram
that can be found in standard Islamic texts” are not necessarily to be con-
sidered as universally applicable, as they are based on interpretations of the
relevant Qur’an and Sunna evidence or were a product of analogical reason-
ing (qiyas) or consensus of previous scholars (ijma’) (Saeed, 2014, 66).
Fundamental values are defined as “those values that are emphasized
repeatedly in the Qur’an and for which there is substantial textual evidence
to indicate that they are among the foundations of Qur’anic teaching”
(Saeed, 2014, 66). Saeed labels these values as “basic human values” which
are more or less those identified by the literature on the aims and the objec-
tives of Shari’a (maqasid al-shari’a).11 Fundamental values are arrived at on
the basis of an inductive corroboration method known in classical Islamic
literature under the term istiqra’. Importantly, Saeed argues these universal
values ought not to be limited to those identified in the classical literature
but also include “a range of new human rights” (Saeed, 2014) which have
contemporary relevance such as freedom of religion. The main function of
fundamental values is to protect fundamental human rights of all human
beings regardless of any other considerations (Saeed, 2014).
Protectional values are defined as “values which provide legislative sup-
port to the fundamental values”. The main difference between fundamental
and protectional values in terms of their importance and identification is that
while the former are established on the basis of having support in a multiplic-
ity of textual proofs, the former depend on only one. Nevertheless protec-
tional values are also universal since they are largely derived from fundamental
values and are indispensable in terms of their maintenance (Saeed, 2014,
66–67).
Implementational values “are specific measures that are used to implement
the protectional values in society” (Saeed, 2014, 67). In this scenario, the
specific measure itself (such as amputation as a form of punishment for theft
as per the Qur’an or lashing for fornication) is not part of the “fundamental
value or objective of the Qur’an” and is therefore contextually contingent.
Thus, a different form of measure can be adopted as long as the fundamental
value or its objective is not undermined (i.e. determent). Saeed finds support
136 Ethical imperative
for this view in the Qur’an itself as well as certain options from classical
Islamic scholarship (Saeed, 2014).
Finally, instructional values pertain to “specific instructions, suggestions,
advice, and exhortations in the Qur’an in relation to particular issues, situ-
ations, circumstances and contexts” (Saeed, 2014, 68). Saeed considers these
values to make up the ‘bulk’ of the Qur’an (Saeed, 2014). They include
Qur’anic instructions such as the one permitting men to enter into polyga-
mous marriages under certain circumstances, to be good to parents, not to
take ‘unbelievers’ as allies, and so on. Saeed considers dealing with these
values from a contextualist perspective to be very difficult since they are not
clear cut and are often ambiguous, even at the level of pure linguistic analy-
sis. In order to decide if these have universal applicability or not, Saeed
proposes that they need to be evaluated in terms of the following criteria:
frequency of occurrence, salience, and relevance. The first criteria refers to
“how often an instructional value is mentioned in the Qur’an”; the second
to how consistently or prominently the value associated with a particular
question features in the Qur’an and/or Sunna; and finally to whether or not
certain value was merely culturally relevant or universally relevant. In case
of frequency and salience of instructional values, the higher they are, the
more importance is attached to that Qur’anic value (and those terms/con-
cepts associated with it); and in case of relevance, it is only those which are
deemed to have universal relevance that can be used for the purposes of
identifying universal values (Saeed, 2014, 69–70).
So, having explained Saeed’s hierarchical model of Qur’anic values, we are
in a position to better understand what he means by reasonableness of the
new interpretation in general and the idea of fundamental principles of reli-
gion in particular. As noted above, one of the criteria for evaluating the
reasonableness of the new interpretation is that it does not contradict the
fundamental principles of religion, which are defined as “the obligatory,
fundamental, and protection values as well as universal values that emerge
from the instructional values” (Saeed, 2014, 91). In other words, the new
interpretation will only be reasonable if it does not contradict those values
whose content and nature was explained above.
In order to illustrate how the contextualist hermeneutic works in practice,
Saeed uses a number of examples, one of which is the Qur’anic verse 4:3 that
deals with the issue of polygamy. We describe its key features below. After
acknowledging the influence of the reader’s various subjectivities in interpre-
tation, Saeed, relying on Rahman, describes the general character of the
Qur’anic weltanschauung and its central message as based on the recognition
of God as a merciful and compassionate God who is the creator and sus-
tainer of the entire universe. The Qur’an is considered as being primarily
concerned about the ethical consequences of human behavior because
humans act as God’s stewards on earth and have been endowed with free
will to attain ‘taqwa’ or moral consciousness, the master concept in the
Qur’an, which not only encompasses the proper relationship between
 Ethical imperative 137
humans and their Creator but more importantly human inter-relationships,
including an individual’s relationship with his/her own self. The creation of
an ethical, just, and egalitarian society is identified as the Qur’an’s primary
goal. It is through this lens that all the Qur’anic ethico-legal injunctions,
including 4:3 are to be understood/interpreted.
At the level of meaning derivation, Saeed acknowledges the importance of
the revelatory context and especially the impact of the Qur’an’s first com-
munity of listeners on the nature of the Qur’anic texts. In this regard, Saeed
underscores a key point that meanings can evolve as a result of change in
context. With respect to identifying the meaning of the verse 4:3 in relation
to its MC1, Saeed asserts that large socio-economic disparities were evident
in Mecca at the time of revelation, where several segments of society (such
as girls, orphans, women, and slaves) were the subaltern – something that
the Qur’an attempted to reform. Saeed investigates the asbab ul nuzul litera-
ture in order to possibly ascertain the specific time and place as well as the
specific context behind the revelation of the verse as an important part of
the contextualist hermeneutic. Again relying on Rahman, Saeed argues that
the verse was revealed in the context of the rising number of orphans as a
result of constant battles in which male soldiers were dying in significant
numbers accompanied by the failure of guardians to justly handle the prop-
erty rights of orphaned women. This was the raison d’être behind the
Qur’an’s permission for men to engage in polygamous marriages with
orphaned women only. After considering all of the relevant thematically
related textual units, their context, and their rationale, the Qur’an’s allow-
ance is viewed to be conditioned by men’s responsibility to be just to all of
them, which the Qur’an suspects to be beyond the pale of most men and
hence should be avoided. Saeed then proceeds to ascertain what type or genre
of texts 4:3 belongs to (historical, ethico-legal, etc.) and agrees with Rah-
man’s distinction between purely ‘legal enactments’ (which are not immu-
table) and ‘moral injunctions’ to argue that, while in the strict legal sense the
Qur’an permits polygamy, if approached from a teleological hermeneutic, it
does not. Saeed goes on to explore parallel texts which might be relevant to
the verse under consideration and which in their totality give rise to certain
central ideas, values, and messages which can be organized in a hierarchical
manner in terms of their relevance, as described above. Again relying on
insights from Rahman, Saeed argues that this process of consulting parallel
texts (including other Qur’anic verses, hadith,12 and works of Qur’anic com-
mentary) yields a value regarding the Qur’an’s abiding concern for the wel-
fare of orphans and the poor, and that the verse 4:3 ought to be interpreted
in the light of this concern. When attempting to understand the meaning or
the significance of the verse 4:34 in the present, the interpreter should not
only explore how the original audience understood the text but also how the
past communities of interpretation did so, as well as relate these interpreta-
tions to the contemporary one (MC2). A comparison of MC1 with that of
MC2 in terms of their respective values and their status (universal versus
138 Ethical imperative
specific) in the context of polygamy yields that its universalist message is that
of equality, and not the actual practice of polygamy as such. Finally, this
concept of equality to be reasonable must accord with what contemporary
(groups of) Muslims consider to qualify as such, and not just those of the
past. Saeed does acknowledge that values such as fairness, justice, and equal-
ity can vary from time to time and from one community of believers to
another, but does not explore the full implications this has on the interpreta-
tion of 4:3 (Saeed, 2014, 94–107).

An example of maqasid-driven hermeneutics

in the writings of progressive Muslim scholars:
the case of Hashim Kamali
The second element of progressive Muslims’ search for the ethical in Islamic
jurisprudence is a maqasid- or goals/objective-driven Qur’an-Sunna herme-
neutic. Hashim Kamali is the Director of the Institute of Advanced Islamic
Studies in Kuala Lumpur. Kamali has written on the topic of maqasid
al-shari’a for well over two decades and has written extensively on the maqa-
sid-driven approach to the reform of Islamic law (Duderija, 2014c). He has
developed sophisticated arguments in favor of such a reform, which I high-
light in this section.
Before I do so, I briefly examine why Kamali considers the reform of clas-
sical usul ul fiqh (Islamic legal theory/hermeneutics) to be necessary, as this
will provide us with a broader context of his ideas. In this regard, Kamali
repeatedly states that the classical usul ul fiqh methodologies suffer from a
number of weaknesses which make them unsuitable for meeting the manifold
contemporary challenges Muslim societies (and therefore Islamic law) are
facing. One such problem is that classical usul ul fiqh is burdened with ‘tech-
nicalism and literalism’ and that the methodologies on which usul ul fiqh and
ijtihad are premised are based on medieval societal values. Another signifi-
cant factor which impedes the contemporary viability of classical usul ul fiqh,
according to Kamali, is the doctrine of taqlid, which is responsible for the
purely textualist approach to Islamic law and a decline of ijtihad. Addition-
ally, Kamali forms the view that there has been insufficient theorizing about
the philosophy of maqasid in classical usuli thought. Finally, Kamali (2011,
245) considers that the classical usul ul fiqh methodologies have neglected
the concept of maqasid and have subsumed it under a very literalist legal
methodology apparatus. In this context Kamali (2001) laments as follows:

Since the legal theory of usul is meant to translate the value structure of
the revelation (wahy) into operative formulas and ensure that ra’y and
ijtihad are the carriers of these values, it would follow that the objectives
and values, rather than technicality and literalism, should have been the
overriding theme and preoccupation of usul al fiqh. But the legal theory
of usul actually traversed a different course, and it was not until Abu
 Ethical imperative 139
Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Musa al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388) and his predecessors,
‘Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd al-Salam (d. 660/1262) and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali
(d. 505/1111) that maqasid were added as a new chapter to the legal
theory of usul. Yet even these developments proved to have had a limited
impact. A certain degree of attention that was paid to the maqasid seems
to have come somewhat late, that is, at a time when the climate of imita-
tion and taqlid was too entrenched for this fresh development to bring
about any significant change in the generally accepted formulations of
usul al fiqh from their conventional mould.
(14)

Kamali builds his maqasid-oriented Islamic hermeneutic on the basis of a

particular conceptualization of the concept of Shari’a, the nature of the
Qur’an and Sunna, and some important principles and tools from the clas-
sical Islamic legal tradition. We turn our discussion to them now.
The concept of Shari’a13 itself is founded on its purposive nature because,
at the most general level for Kamali (2008, 232), the concept of Shari’a as
Islamic law serves the purpose of securing the benefits of people (maslaha)
both in the earthly life and the hereafter and to protect people from the
corruption and evil (mafsada). Significantly, such a conceptualization of the
purposes of Shari’a as Islamic law for Kamali (1999, 194–196) encompasses
both the realm of rituals (‘ibadat) and civil transactions (mu’amalat).14
Moreover, Kamali conceptualizes the nature of concept of Shari’a as being
primarily an ethico-religious, values-based construct rather than just posi-
tive law. Unlike fiqh, Shari’a comprises in its scope not only law, but also
theology and moral teaching. Fiqh, in contrast, is a “mere superstructure
and a practical manifestation of commitment to Shari’a values” (Kamali,
2008, 16, 39, 41).
Moreover, for Kamali, the nature of the Qur’anic and Sunnaic message is
such that their laws are goal oriented. Thus, they embody certain ethico-
religious values (Kamali, 2008, 194). For Kamali, this implies that to main-
tain harmony with the spirit of Shari’a, it may at times be required to depart
from the letter of the Qur’an (Kamali, 2008, 135, 229). In his (2001) words:

A cursory perusal of the Qur’an would be enough to show that the

Qur’an’s primary concern is with values and objectives such as justice and
benefit, mercy and compassion, uprightness and taqwa, promotion of
good and prevention of evil, fostering goodwill and love among the mem-
bers of the family, helping the poor and the needy, cooperation in good
work, and so forth. The Qur’an may thus be said to be goal-oriented, and
that it seeks to foster a structure of values which has a direct bearing on
human welfare. It is, for the most part, concerned with the broad prin-
ciples and objectives of morality and law, rather than with specific details
and technical formulas that occupy the bulk of the usul works.
(13)
140 Ethical imperative
He considers that this maqasid-oriented nature of the Qur’an is also signified
by the fact that there exists a thematically oriented Qur’anic commentary
genre known as tafsir mawdu’i whose approach is conceptualized by Kamali
(2011, 250) as being goal oriented.
Kamali (2008, 247) also forms the view that the most notable companions
of the Prophet, as embodiment and perpetuators of the Sunna of the Prophet,
especially Caliph Umar, took a rational approach towards the text and mes-
sage of the Qur’an and Sunna, and that their understanding and interpreta-
tion of the text was not confined to the meaning of words but also included
its underlying rationale, effective cause, and purpose. The nature of ethical
value in Islamic law (or in the Qur’an and Sunna), which Kamali does not
explicitly discuss in his works, is generally conceptualized as being objective
in nature (Kamali, 2008, 17). This reasoning leads Kamali to the conclusion
that there exists convergence of values between the Shari’a and natural law,
and of Islam as din al-fitra (the natural religion) with natural values. He
(2004, 570) emphasizes that although each moral-legal system has distinct
approaches to the question of right and wrong, the values upheld by both
are substantially in agreement as both presuppose and are based upon the
notion that the moral values are derived from eternally valid standards
“which are ultimately independent of human cognizance and adherence”.
The only difference between the two lies in the locus and manner of their
attribution/justification (moral values determined by God versus being inher-
ent in nature) (2004).
Another important delineating feature of the Qur’an and Sunna, inclusive
of their verses which have socio-legal import, which facilitates a maqasid-
driven Islamic hermeneutics is the idea that they are rationalist in essence.
Kamali refers to the concept of ta’lil (ratiocination) in the Qur’an as evidence
to support this view. In this context he asserts that the Qur’an “expounds on
numerous instances and in a large variety of themes, both legal and non-legal,
the rationale, cause, objective and purpose of its text, the benefit or reward
that accrues from conformity to its guidance or the harm and punishment that
may follow from defying it” (Kamali, 1996b).15 Importantly, Kamali links the
ta’lili nature of the Qur’an and its laws to the concept of maqasid al-shari’a
(and maslaha). In this context, he (Kamali, 2008, 55) argues that ratiocination
in the Qur’an means that the laws of Shari’a are “not imposed for their own
sake, nor for want of mere conformity to rules, but that they aim at the realiza-
tion of certain benefits and objectives” and, “when the effective cause, ratio-
nale and objective of an injunction is properly ascertained, they serve as basic
indicators of the continued validity of that injunction”. This, in turn, implies
that when a ruling of Shari’a “no longer serves its original intention and pur-
pose, then it is the proper role of the mujtahid to substitute it with a suitable
alternative because the failure to do so would mean neglecting the objective
(maqsud) of the Lawgiver” (Kamali, 2008).
Kamali has also identified additional principles in classical Islamic legal
theory which can facilitate a maqasid-driven Islamic hermeneutics. These
 Ethical imperative 141
include maslaha, istihsan, ijtihad, ijma’, qawa’id (legal maxims), hikma, ‘illa,
and asbab al-nuzul.
Consistent with his approach described above, Kamali employs and adapts
the above-outlined maqasid-allied concepts existent in classical usul ul fiqh
to argue for a maqasid-oriented usul ul fiqh as an authentic and legitimate
way of reforming Islamic law. I turn my attention to each of them by primar-
ily highlighting their links with the concept of maqasid al-shari’a/maqasid-
based usul.
The first maqasid-allied concept is that of maslaha, which is premised on
the idea that laws exist first and foremost for the purpose of serving public
welfare and the interest of people. Kamali argues that maslaha as a legitimate
Islamic law doctrine has been under-utilized by the traditional scholarship.
Having systematically outlined and analyzed the traditional maslaha doc-
trines as evident in major Sunni schools of thought, he argues against the
restrictive understanding of this legal mechanism which, as the bottom line,
states that the general principles of the Qur’an, from which maslaha prin-
ciples and values can be derived, can only be applied to special cases grounded
in or supported by explicit dalal (indicants) found in scriptural texts. He
makes this assertion because, in Kamali’s view, this doctrine unjustifiably
confines the general objectives (maqasid) of the Lawgiver as illustrated in the
Qur’an itself.
Kamali (1988, 287–303) also forms the view that the doctrine of
maslaha, when it is conceptually and methodologically in agreement with
the principle of the maqasid al-shari’a, is indispensable for the contempo-
rary relevance of the Islamic law. Kamali, following Abu Hamid Al-
Ghazali (d.1111), understands and employs the doctrine of maslaha
almost interchangeably with maqasid “as the benefit or interest behind the
introduction of law”. He describes maslaha as primarily a utilitarian con-
cept associated with the notion of securing material benefits but also asso-
ciates it as a cause that leads to the Shari’a’s maqasid or indeed at times
identifies it as the maqasid itself. He (2011, 248), therefore, considers that
the maqasid are the “ultimate purpose of maslaha and degree higher than
it”. The only distinction he makes between the two is that maslaha is
circumstantial and changeable whereas maqasid have more constancy and
permanence. On this basis Kamali views maslaha as an important legal
mechanism which can be employed for Islamic law reform purposes.
Maslaha, furthermore, for Kamali, is in essence a rational concept because
most of the benefits of this world are identifiable by human intellect, expe-
rience and custom, even without the guidance of Shari’a. Importantly, he
(2008, 35) considers this principle of maslaha to be valid in relation to the
making of moral judgments pertaining to right and wrong as well. In this
context he states that the function of Shari’a in essence is to only provide
a “set of criteria and guidelines so as to prevent confusion between per-
sonal prejudice and maslaha”. This is, however, not the case regarding
benefits pertaining to the hereafter, and those which combine the benefits
142 Ethical imperative
of this world and the next, for these, argues Kamali, can only be identified
by the Shari’a (Kamali, 2008)
Istihsan, the doctrine of juristic preference for certain interpretations
of Islamic law over others, is another maqasid-allied concept. Asking the
question whether istihsan can be used as an instrument of coherence and
consolidation between the usul ul fiqh and the maqasid, Kamali answers
in the affirmative. This is so because, unlike the concept of maqasid,
Kamali is of the view that istihsan forms an integral theme and topic of
usul ul fi qh , which is inherently generic and versatile. Furthermore,
Kamali (2004, 575) asserts that istihsan has strong affinity with the con-
cept of maqasid because “the evidential basis, rationale and purpose of
istihsan are almost identical with those of the maqasid al-shari’a”. Kamali
(2004) forms the view that there is “a considerable parity, both of sub-
stance and form”, between istihsan and the ends and purposes of Shari’a
(i.e. maqasid al-shari’a) because the basic theme and philosophy of the
maqasid are almost identical with that of istihsan. These include securing
justice, benefit, and dignity; finding ways to remove and eliminate hard-
ship; and finding ways to respond to the exigencies of necessity and cus-
tom. As such istihsan can be seen as an important tool of harmonizing
usul ul fiqh with maqasid (in addition to fine-tuning maqasid-oriented
methodology) into a more coherent and organic unity, including in the
areas of ahkam.
In his (2004) words:

Since istihsan is endowed with a methodology that looks in two direc-

tions: the textual proofs, ijma, qiyas, maslaha and custom on the one
hand, and the goals and purposes of al-shari’a, such as equity and
fairness on the other, and since it seeks to realize the ends of Shari’a
through the evidential support of its means, it offers a unique method-
ology for synthesizing the two undigested chapters of Islamic jurispru-
dential thought. The theory of istihsan is focused on finding a better
alternative to a ruling or evidence of Shari’a when its application has
frustrated one of the objectives or maqasid of the same. The maqasid
lacks this focus and does not provide for a modus operandi and istih-
san can fill in this gap.
(576)

Reconceptualization and innovative thinking about ijtihad (independent

legal reasoning) is another important mechanism in his maqasid-oriented
Islamic hermeneutics. His view of the nature of the concept of ijtihad is
closely link with the idea of maqasid. Indeed, maqasid are seen as the prin-
cipal extension of ijtihad. In this context, he (2001) argues:

In a real sense, almost the whole of our discussion of the maqasid is

focused on ijtihad. The maqasid only serve the purpose of opening up
 Ethical imperative 143
the avenues of ijtihad and enhance the ideational substance and founda-
tion of ijtihad.
(14)

Kamali proposes that the maqasid al-shari’a should be utilized as a frame-

work for ijtihad in all its varieties, especially in respect to issues on which
the Qur’an and hadith texts may be silent but which fall under the umbrella
of its broader goals and objectives. Kamali identifies the need to open up the
theory of ijtihad by reducing its heavy reliance on the methodology of usul
and qiyas (analogical reasoning) in the direction of greater flexibility and
resourcefulness that the maqasid approach offers. This maqasid-oriented
ijtihad would, according to Kamali (2008, 303–304), indeed encourage inno-
vative thought and legislation not only in the area of Islamic law but also
economics, sociology, and science. For this to take place, Kamali argues that
the classical doctrine of ijma’, as one important source of Islamic law, should
be opened up so as to represent the consensus of the community in general
(i.e. both political and religious leadership) as a legislative vehicle for the
maqasid-oriented ijtihad instead of it being confined to the consensus of the
religious elite as per traditional doctrine. As such, ijma’ can play a positive
role in the democratization of the legal theory and the entire political system
in the Muslim world (Kamali, 2001, 19–20). Moreover, Kamali proposes
that ijtihad and ijma’ should be merged into a unified formula known as
“ordinances of the ulu l-amr”16 who constitute the above-described modified
ijma’ and who are in charge in the formulation of such ordinances. These
ulu l-amr, in turn, are to be guided in their decision-making, including in the
sphere of the ahkam, both by specific injunctions as well as the general objec-
tives, philosophy, and the spirit of the Shari’a. He refers to this modified
ijtihad-ijma’ concept as ahkam ulu l-amr and derives it from the Qur’anic
principle of tawhid. Kamali forms the view that this concept of ahkam ulu
l-amr is very comprehensive and unifying (hence tawhid) as it “seeks to
comprise and subsume, in addition to ijma’ and ijtihad (and its sub-varieties
such as istihsan, qiyas, istisla), the juristic principle of blocking the means to
all that is reprehensible, the fatwa of the Companion as well as the goals and
purposes, or maqasid of the Shari’a”. Kamali finally argues that “all of these
are visualized as sources and formulas that may be utilized as basic data, or
selected directly for enforcement, through the modality of ahkam ulu l-amr”
as a modified form of ijma’ (Kamali, 2001, 22).
Legal maxims (qawa’id) are another maqasid-allied concept and a juristic
mechanism which can be utilized for the purposes of arguing for a maqasid-
oriented Islamic hermeneutics. He defines legal maxims as “theoretical
abstractions in the form, usually, of short epithetical statements that are
expressive, often in a few words, of the goals and objectives of al-shari’a”
(Kamali, 2006, 80). They consist mainly of statements of principles that are
derived from the detailed reading of the rules of fiqh on various themes.
Kamali forms the view that there is great affinity between legal maxims and
144 Ethical imperative
the maqasid by the virtue of the fact that legal maxims provide useful insights
into the goals and purposes of al-shari’a. This is so for the reason that legal
maxims consist mainly of abstract ideas and as such are not particularly
affected by the legacy of taqlid. Kamali goes on to say that that is the reason
why they can be more readily utilized as aids in the renewal of fiqh and
contemporary ijtihad and serve as an effective tool for a better understanding
of maqasid al-shari’a (Kamali, 2006, 78–80). This usefulness of legal maxims
in relation to maqasid is well evident in the following statement of Kamali
(Kamali, 2006):

It is due to their versatility and comprehensive language that legal max-

ims tend to encapsulate the broader concepts and characteristics of the
Shari’a. They tend to provide a bird’s-eye-view of their subject matter in
imaginative ways without engaging in burdensome details.
(82)

Another legal mechanism supportive of a maqasid-oriented usul ul fiqh is the

concept of hikma (wisdom) as conceptualized by Kamali. He defines it as a
beneficial consequence of Shari’a and as a whole or part of it. Significantly,
Kamali asserts that Islamic legal rulings are informed by underlying hikma
which, in essence, are the maqasid (Kamali, 2009, 24–25). Hikma, accord-
ing to Kamali (2011, 247), is something goal and purpose oriented, and as
such it can also signify the objective of legislation. He adds that in this sense
hikma is identical to maqasid.
The concept of ‘illa gives further credence to the concept of a maqasid-
driven usul ul fiqh that is necessary for meaningful reform of Islamic law
because, opines Kamali, in the terminology of legal theory, one of its mean-
ings is the effective cause and attribute of a ruling (hukm) of Shari’a for
which it was legislated as well as its hikma. As such, ‘illa, when not restricted
to its purely analogical function as in the case of classical usul ul fiqh, is
related to and supportive of the concept of maqasid (Kamali, 2011).
The Qur’anic science of asbab al-nuzul or the occasions behind revelation
is another principle which buttresses Kamali’s maqasid-oriented Islamic
hermeneutics. The importance of the asbab al-nuzul genre lies in the fact that
it provides a vista to detach Islamic law from analogy, speculative thought,
and literalism; and in turn shifts the interpretational focus onto the broader
context of revelation instead of serving the purpose of identifying the rationale
and purpose behind Islamic laws. He also argues that a rationalist approach
based on the maqasid is supported by asbab al-nuzul literature because this
literature is an elucidation of original intent and context of law (2001, 30).
To demonstrate how asbab al-nuzul are differently employed in classical
usul ul fiqh to that of a maqasid-oriented one, Kamali discusses the example
of mutilation for punishment for theft and argues that the classical usuli
approach that relies on semantics and analogy would be unable to identify
the ‘illa behind this law or to provide a satisfactory response beyond mere
 Ethical imperative 145
speculation to such questions as to why theft was made punishable with
mutilation and not, for example, by imprisonment or whipping. A maqasid-
oriented approach instead would employ the asbab comprehensively. There-
fore, argues Kamali when attempting to formulate a rational response that
could explain the punishment of mutilation for theft, the jurist would reflect
on the time, place, and circumstances in which the law in question origi-
nated. As such, the jurist would consider a variety of factors, such as the
fact that the punishment of mutilation for theft was practiced by the Arabs
before the advent of Islam. Another factor to consider would be that Arab
society consisted largely of nomads who travelled with their camels and
tents in search of pastures, and it was not feasible under the circumstances
to penalize the thief with imprisonment because this would require durable
structures and guards, feeding, care of inmates, and so on. He further adds
that since there were no protective barriers to safeguard the property of
people, society could not afford to tolerate the proliferation of theft. Mutila-
tion of the hand of the thief also provided the kind of punishment that
disabled the thief from persisting in his wrongdoing,17 and it served as a
“visible mark on the offender to warn people against his menace”. There-
fore, concludes Kamali (2008, 130–131), the physical punishment of muti-
lation was the only reasonable option and thus an eminently rational
punishment for theft. With this analysis, Kamali implies that this form of
punishment for theft is no longer the only or the most reasonable manner
of punishment in this day and age.
Finally, the vital importance of a maqasid-driven Islamic hermeneutics for
Muslims living in the twenty-first century is justified on the consideration
that the maqasid are dynamic in nature and can therefore effectively and
appropriately respond to social change. Hence, they can resonate more
strongly with the advancement of essential human rights. In other words,
Kamali subscribes to the view that the maqasid can evolve with the evolution
of civilization. As such, he argues for an open-ended scale of values for
maqasid because “as Shari’a has no limit nor do the maqasid values”. In this
context, his (2011) words are instructive:

Our understanding of Shari’a is one of continuing relevance, develop-

ment and growth through independent reasoning (ijtihad), renewal and
reform (tajdid, islah). Hence the goals and purposes of Shari’a must
also remain an evolving chapter of the juristic and civilisational edifice
of Islam.
(266)

As such, in addition to the maqasid identified by classical and some modern

scholars, he identifies social justice, equality, fundamental freedoms and
rights (Kamali, 2009, 31), cultivation of human intellect through education
and science, and cooperation as additional maqasid (Kamali, 2011,
255–256).
146 Ethical imperative
Therefore, Kamali, as evident in his approach to the theory of the maqa-
sid, like Saeed through his contextualist approach, adopts a decidedly anti-
salafi worldview and anti-salafi epistemology that has the potential of
reconciling the contemporary ethical sensibilities of Muslims with that of
the turath.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I sought to demonstrate and explain the two elements of
progressive Muslims’ Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics which have been employed
for the purposes of discovering or recovering the ethical (and the rational)
in Islamic ethics and jurisprudence. I argued that Saeed’s contextualist model
of Qur’anic interpretation based on a hierarchical nature of its values and
on a particular approach to meaning derivation, as well as Kamali’s maqasid-
driven Islamic jurisprudence, are representative and embody these efforts
particularly well. Having an anti-salafi worldview and being rationalist
(ta’lili) in nature, they enable progressive Muslim thought to escape the her-
meneutical confines of traditional Islamic law and ethics. Furthermore, these
approaches are accommodative of and exist in harmony with contemporary
conceptualizations of ethico-moral values such as contemporary conceptu-
alizations of justice and equality. This will be further demonstrated in rela-
tion to gender issues in the next two chapters of this book.

Notes
1 For a fuller treatment, see Duderija (2011).
2 A minority of legal theorists theorized about and developed natural Islamic law
theories which conferred ‘ontological authority’ on reason; i.e. they considered
reason to be an authoritative source of normative teachings of Shari’a. This
would include the works of Abu Bakr al-Jassas (2000), a Hanafi jurist, and Abd
Al-Jabbar (n.d.), a Mu’tazila theologian.
3 Rahman’s double movement theory has two elements to it. The first movement
consists of moving from the present situation to the Qur’an to elicit and arrive
systematically at its “general principles, values and long-range objectives”. The
second movement entails moving from this derived general principle and applying
it to the specific which is to be formulated and realized in the present. See Rahman
(1982, 5–7). Saeed acknowledges his indebtedness to Rahman in his writings
repeatedly. See Saeed (2014).
4 Elsewhere, he also includes ‘practices’ in this definition. Saeed (2014, 95).
5 Here, Saeed makes reference to and follows Abu Zayd in considering the Qur’an
to be, for interpretational purposes, a “literary text”. Saeed (2014, 107–108).
6 In a separate chapter, Saeed summarizes the work of scholars who have made a
conceptual, epistemological and methodological distinction between the concept
of Sunna and hadith. Saeed (2014, 73–83).
7 These are, in general terms, traced back to the Qur’anic concept of ‘righteous
action’ (al-amal al-salih) as the basis for many Qur’anic ethical and moral values.
Saeed (2014, 64).
8 These pertain to the Islamic creed such as basic belief in one God, prophets,
scriptures, and life after death. Saeed (2014, 91).
 Ethical imperative 147
9 By use of terms such as uhilla/uhillat/ahalla Allah (it has been made permissible/
God has made it permissible) or harrama (God prohibited). (Saeed, 2014, 65).
10 Saeed uses the example of riba (usury) to argue that the principle of riba is uni-
versality applicable but what constitutes riba, its definition, its scope, or its actual
implementation are subject to interpretation and disagreement.
11 See below.
12 Saeed makes a conceptual distinction between hadith and Sunna, relying on the
work of Duderija (2012), as discussed in chapter seven.
13 By this, I mean both as Islamic law as well as Islamic ethics. I shall qualify the
term ‘Shari’a’ when necessary if one particular meaning is intended, e.g. Shari’a
as Islamic law.
14 On the link between maslaha and maqasid Shari’a, see the main text below.
15 Qur’anic evidence Kamali provides for the ta’lili nature of the Qur’an and its laws
are reference to the proclamation on just retaliation (qisas) that “in qisas there is
(saving of) life for you, you men of understanding” (2:179), and the prohibition
of wine-drinking and gambling being premised on the rationale of preventing
“hostility and rancor” among people and interference with the remembrance of
God (5:91). Legal alms and charities are levied in order to prevent the concentra-
tion of wealth among the rich (57:7). With reference even to the prophethood of
Muhammad, “We have not sent thee but a mercy to mankind” (21:10). Mercy
in this text and communication (5:92) and warning in other places (22:49) Kamali
(1996b).
16 A Qur’anic designation of those who are in charge of public affairs of the
people.
17 In this context, he notices inconsistency between the Qur’anic punishment for
illegal intercourse with that of theft since the former did not require mutilation
of the relevant organ while the latter did. Hence, the argument about the specula-
tive nature of classical usuli qiyas.
7 The gender-justice imperative

[I]t would be a severe misrepresentation to claim that all the work done to
date under the rubric of progressive Islam has been confined to the realm of
academic discourse. A number of feminist writers, in particular, have very
profitably combined innovative textual work with social activism in ways
that usefully illustrate the mutual constitution of theory and practice.
(Mandaville, 2003, 34)

Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss three themes. First, I briefly describe the arguments
behind classical gender ideologies in Islam and outline the progressive Mus-
lims’ alternative conceptualizations of the same. Next, I move onto the
debates among progressive Muslims scholars surrounding the viability of (re)
emergence of a religiously indigenous Islamic feminism as a way of bringing
about gender justice in Islam. Finally, I discuss two examples of grassroots
gender-justice ‘social hermeneutics’ engagement by progressive Muslim
scholars; first I describe Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s involvement with Musawah,
the global movement for equality in Muslim family law, and Farid Esack’s
work with Positive Muslims, an NGO that provides counselling and support
for Muslims infected with HIV/AIDS.
I start by elaborating on what is meant by the phrase ‘gender-justice-
imperative ’ in the context of progressive Muslim thought as employed in
this study. In accordance with the arguments about the ethical imperative in
Islamic law discussed in the previous chapter by the phrase gender-justice
imperative, I mean the urgent need progressive Muslims scholars see in devel-
oping a legal system grounded in Islamic cosmology which is ever responsive
to the contextually sensitive social realities in which Muslim women (and
men) find themselves so that gender-based inequalities are not structurally
disadvantageous to any of the sexes. Gender justice is therefore predicated
on the idea that ethical values such as equality and fairness are non-gender
hierarchical and ethically objectivist in nature, but can have at times signifi-
cantly contextually dependent meanings based on prevalent social, eco-
nomic, and political webs of relations affecting power distributions. Thus,
 Gender-justice imperative 149
they should be open to interpretation accordingly. Muslim family laws, as
formulated by classical Muslim jurists, are predicated on Aristotelian view
of ethics, derived primarily through revelatory texts based upon certain
scriptural hermeneutics and certain beliefs regarding the nature of maleness
and femaleness which have been incorporated, for reasons outlined in the
next chapter, into the Islamic canon. The hermeneutics and beliefs thus were
not considered subject to evolution in terms of their meaning and concrete
implications. As such they have lost the ability to respond to the changes in
context and accommodate alternative views of gender roles and norms, ulti-
mately producing structural inequalities disadvantageous to women, espe-
cially but not only those living in modern urban contexts.

7.2 Gender ideologies in classical Islam

The conceptualizations of genders in the classical Islamic tradition are based
upon a number of assumptions regarding what are considered ‘inherent’
male and female natures.
Most of these gender-based assumptions can be traced back to the clas-
sical Muslim scholars’ subscription to the theory known in the relevant
literature as ‘gender complementarity’ which, for reasons outlined below,
I refer to as ‘gender oppositionality’. By this phrase, I wish to convey the
idea that (neo)classical Muslim scholars, who were all males, construct(ed)
normative masculinity almost exclusively in terms of anti-femininity and
vice versa.
This ‘gender oppositionality’ theory has several dimensions to it. One ele-
ment relates to theories on supposed gender-specific emotional and cognitive
capacities. In a nutshell, with respect to the latter, the gender ‘oppositional-
ity’ thesis states that women, unlike men, are highly emotional beings with
weak and easily befuddled or, according to some, deficient rational faculties.
One striking example of this belief can be found in Ibn Manzur’s (1992, 97)
authoritative lexicon of the Arabic language, Lisan Al-’Arab, who in his
entry on ra’y, which he defines as “well considered opinion, mental percep-
tion and sound judgment”, applies this description to some males only and
considers that women as a general category of humanity could not possess
ra’y.1 We find similar views expressed in authoritative hadith books includ-
ing those composed by Muslim, Abu Dawud, and Al-Tirmidhi (Nasruddin,
2004).
Another example of the ‘gender oppositionality’ thesis can be found in the
writings of the celebrated and highly influential classical Muslim scholar
Al-Ghazali (2012, 78; cf. Bauer, 2008) (d.1111), who relates that the fourth
Sunni caliph Ali and the first Shi’i Imam said the following:

The worst characteristics of men constitute the best characteristics of

women; namely, stinginess, pride and cowardice. For if a woman is
stingy, she will preserve her own and her husband’s possessions; if she is
150 Gender-justice imperative
proud, she will refrain from loose and improper words to everyone; and
if she is cowardly, she will dread everything and will therefore not go
out of her house and will avoid compromising situations for the fear of
her husband.
(Al-Ghazali, 2012, 78)

Another important assumption behind the ‘gender oppositionality’ theory

pertains to the nature of female and the male sexuality. According to this
view, sexuality is a crucial (but as we saw above, not the only) marker of
what constitutes normative masculinity and femininity. These sexual differ-
ences are said to be based on biological and mental functions and capacities
that strongly differentiate the sexes, as exemplified in the idea of ‘gender
oppositionality’. According to this view, the category of ‘woman’ is posited
on an artificial split between body and mind, sexuality and spirituality
(Shaikh, 2004). The category of the female gender is constructed primarily
in sexual terms. Women are identified with the ‘irreligious’ realm of sexual
passion, as repositories of all ‘lower’ aspects of human nature, the very
antithesis of the ‘illuminated’ sphere of male (religious) knowledge, as men
are the sole bearers of religious authority. This ‘gender oppositionality’ thesis
also considers the female nature to be derivative vis-à-vis the male, whose
superiority is at times conceptualized to be both ontological and socio-moral
(Shaikh, 2004).
Importantly, women and their sexuality are conceptualized and con-
structed as sources of socio-moral chaos (fitna), the embodiments of
seduction and a threat to a healthy, exclusively male public social order
(Sabbah, 1984).2 The concept of women as sources of fitna proceeds from
the premise embraced by (neo)classical Muslim male scholars that the
female sexual allure to men and women’s reputed looseness can have cata-
strophic consequences for the wellbeing of all human societies. For exam-
ple, this belief is exemplified by a noted ‘neo’-classical Islamist from
Pakistan, Al-Maududi (d.1979), whose insistence on women’s confine-
ment to their homes was argued on the basis of his belief that their entry
into the public domain caused immorality of immense proportions, lead-
ing to the decline and fall of a once-mighty power like Greece. As noted
by Ahmad (2012):

Mawdudi saw woman’s body as a source of fitna and destructive of

nature’s wish for a pious civilization. Outside of her home the sight of
an unveiled woman is a visual sin inevitably inciting sexual storm in
men, which in turn prefaces the ultimate sin – copulation. According to
him, Islam at most allowed a woman to unveil only her face and palms.
Even in the presence of mahram3 in the home, she was obliged to observe
this norm. A pious woman in the era of the Prophet, Mawdudi noted,
covered herself from head to toe by wearing neqab. She also wore gloves
to hide her palms. Further, a woman’s voice, gait, smell, not to speak of
 Gender-justice imperative 151
gaze, was all fitna. He made no difference between a woman and her
photograph for the consequence of both was chaos.
(556)

Women as fitna discourse did find its expression in parts of the hadith litera-
ture. For example, the Prophet reportedly made a statement found in a much
revered collection of the sayings attributed to him that there was no “fitna
more harmful to men than women”. (Al-Bukhari, 1970, 2, 419) A similar
hadith (An-Nawawi, 1998) narrates that the Prophet had stated as
follows:

The life of this world is sweet and green, and verily Allah has appointed
you as His vicegerents in it so that He may see how you act. So beware
of the world and beware of women. For certainly, the first trial (awwal
fitna) of Banu Isrā‘īl was through women.
(90)

The centrality of this ‘women-as-sources-of-fitna discourse’ in the (neo)clas-

sical Arabo-Muslim worldview is argued by a number of scholars (El-Cheikh,
1997; El Fadl, 2001; Mernissi, 1991; Sabbah, 1984). For example, El-Cheikh
(1997, 240) states that this discourse “is a key concept defining the dangers
that women, and more particularly their bodies, provoked in men and is a
constant theme in Arabo-Islamic literary tradition”.
This concept of women as fitna is, in turn, constructed on the idea of
women’s superior sexual desire (shahvat) to that of men which, according to
several hadith, God supposedly endowed upon women but counterbalanced
it with higher levels of modesty (Al-Kulayni, 2007, 5:203).4 These types of
hadith have found expression in and have been accepted as normative by
both Shi’i and Sunni branches of Islam on the basis of which certain ‘modesty
laws’ such as gender segregation, public invisibility of women, and their
constant surveillance were/are being upheld as the religious ideal.
These assumptions, in turn, have given rise to a number of gender-specific
rights and responsibilities and have engendered certain normative gender-
based roles and norms. Significantly, these gender-based assumptions have
found their expression in virtually all spheres of classical Muslim societies,
both private and public, including the legal, socio-cultural, political, educa-
tional, and religious, as well as in terms of general conduct and behavior
(Mahallati, 2010).
Importantly, classical Muslim ethics and law differentiate on the basis of
gender, religion, and social status as a priori, general, and fixed categories.
In relation to gender, classical Muslim family laws are predicated on strong
gender-rights imbalances or asymmetries, generally favoring husbands as in,
for example, the case of divorce and child custody, and the wife’s male kin
in the case of inheritance (Mir-Hosseini, 2004). The cumulative net effect of
classical Muslim family laws has resulted in structural discrimination of
152 Gender-justice imperative
Muslim women (Mir-Hosseini, Al-Sharmani and Rumminger, 2015; Mir-
Hosseini, Vogt, Larsen and Moe, 2013).
The gender-differentiated and patriarchal aspects of classical Muslim laws
are also premised upon a certain interpretational model of the Qur’an and
Sunna; the progressive Muslims’ critique of the same will be discussed in
length in the next chapter. In what follows, I describe the critique of progres-
sive Muslim scholars leveled at the (neo)classical conceptualization of gender
ideologies described above.

Progressive Muslims’ critique of (neo)traditional-

based gender ideology constructions
Progressive Muslim scholars have developed strong critiques of these (neo-
classical) gender ideology constructions. This section presents an overview
of the major arguments developed by three progressive Muslim scholars in
arguing for the need to reform these gender ideologies and provide alterna-
tive gender-just explanations of gender relations in Islam. The choice is based
primarily on the representativeness of the arguments expressed by these
authors as well as how systematic they are.

Ziba Mir-Hosseini
Ziba Mir-Hosseini (b.1952), an Iranian-born legal anthropologist, is one
such strong voice in which we find a critical engagement with and a system-
atic critique of the major concepts, epistemological assumptions, and broader
theological and philosophical worldviews and methodologies on which the
classical gender ideologies are based.
Mir-Hosseini argues that the (neo)traditional approaches to gender rights
found in classical fiqh texts embody the patriarchal construction of gender
rights, in which gender inequality is taken for granted, a priori, as a principle,
reflected in the world in which their authors lived. Mir-Hosseini forms the
view that classicalist jurists subscribed to a meritocratic concept of justice
that discriminates on the basis of gender, social status, and religion, and
considered this concept of justice to be a true reflection of the ‘natural’ or
God-given state of affairs. She considers that the salient assumptions that
underlie jurisprudence rulings on gender rights and which gave rise to wom-
en’s social and moral subjugation are based on the following
presuppositions:

1 Women are created of and for men.

2 God made men superior to women.
3 Women are defective in reason and faith.
4 Femininity is defined by women’s haya (modesty and shyness) and
masculinity is constructed in relation to man’s ghira (sexual honor and
jealousy).
 Gender-justice imperative 153
She argues that, although these concepts/theories are not based on Qur’anic
teachings, nonetheless they became the main theological assumptions under-
lying classical jurists’ efforts to deduce legal rules from the sacred texts.
Moreover, these theories became the justification for controlling women and
the rationale for their exclusion from public life (Mir-Hosseini in Anwar,
2009, 34–35). Women’s rights were only discussed in the context of a mar-
riage contract, which was likened to that of a slave contract or an exchange
(bay’a), according to which, in essence, a woman’s sexual and reproductive
rights are exchanged for her maintenance. Similarly, women’s sexuality was
considered a commodity. This state of affairs fundamentally shaped ques-
tions pertaining to a wife’s rights to her body/reproductive organs/sex (and
by extension her mobility), rendering it under the complete authority (‘isma)
of her husband and determining the overall spousal rights and obligations in
marriage for both husbands and wives (Mir-Hosseini, 2013, 1). Importantly,
Mir-Hosseini forms the view that additional gender-rights asymmetries, such
as men’s rights to polygamy and unilateral repudiation, women’s lesser share
in inheritance, and the ban on women being judges or political leaders,
were not a result of a deliberate conspiracy among classical jurists to under-
mine women but an outcome of the same gender-related theories described
above and of the worldview assumptions subscribed to by (neo)traditional-
ists (Mir-Hosseini, 2013, 11).
Mir-Hosseini (2009, 25) traces the origins of gender inequality in the
Islamic legal tradition by noticing a tension, if not outright contradiction,
between what she considers to be the ideals of Shariʿa (e.g. justice, wisdom,
compassion, common good, equality) and “the patriarchal structures in
which these ideals unfolded and were translated into legal norms” which
have derailed the underlying higher intents and lofty values of Islam. With
regards to this point, she forms the view that the contemporary notions of
justice, informed by the ideals of human rights, equality and personal free-
dom, differ significantly from those that underpin rulings in classical juris-
prudence. She (2013, 7–8) considers that this disparity between the classical
and contemporary system of ethics “is a central problem that permeates
debates and struggles for an egalitarian family law in Muslim contexts”.
Mir-Hosseini argues that although there is complete agreement among all
Muslims that justice is the most important and defining value in the Islamic
tradition, there is considerable disagreement among Muslims as to the nature
of the concept, its scope, and how it should manifest itself in laws. Arguing
against the ethical subjectivist position that has been and remains the major-
ity view in the Islamic tradition (Duderija, 2011), Mir-Hosseini subscribes
to the ethical objectivist understanding of justice that had its roots in the
rationalist theology of the Mu’tazila, a religious movement that goes back
to the early days of Islam, which considers that the concept of justice has a
rational basis, and thus exists independently of revealed texts. According to
this view, humanity’s understanding of the concept of justice operates outside
of the realm of religion, is subject to change, and is dependent upon
154 Gender-justice imperative
evolution in human knowledge and morality/ethics. Hence, Mir-Hosseini
(2009, 26–27) opines that “any religious text or law that defies our notion
of justice should be reinterpreted in the light of an ethical critique of their
religious roots”.
Therefore, Mir-Hosseini suggests that arguments and strategies for the
reform of Muslim family laws need to be concurrently placed within both
the Islamic and human rights frameworks. Significantly, she reminds us that
it is important to keep in mind that we should not seek to define what justice
is once and for all, but to raise our voices when women face and experience
injustice and discrimination because of their gender (Mir-Hosseini, 2009,
46–47; cf. Mir-Hosseini, 2003, 3). So, for Mir-Hosseini, gender roles and
relations, and women’s rights, are “not fixed, not given, not absolute”. Mir-
Hosseini conceptualizes these as “negotiated and changing cultural con-
structs, produced in response to lived realities, through debates that now are
going on all over the Muslim world, through the voices of women and men
who want either to retain or to change the status quo”. In the final analysis,
she (1998, 59) believes that “gender in Islam” is what Muslim men and
women make it to be.
It is important to be aware that Mir-Hosseini’s views on reform are
nuanced and do not necessarily imply a complete epistemological and
hermeneutical break with classical Muslim family laws. She argues that
since the purpose of jurisprudence in essence is to respond to social reali-
ties and to the situation on the ground, the reality should dictate how
legal mechanisms ought to be employed. In this context, she argues that
Islamic jurisprudence or jurisprudence has both the potential and the
legal mechanisms to deal with women’s demand for equality in law,
including:

i the insertion of compulsory and unconditional stipulations by the state

in the marriage contract to place a woman in a better negotiating situ-
ation if her marriage breaks down;
ii redefining the boundary between the moral and legal rights in marriage
to expand the wife’s rights and limit the husband’s arbitrary power. In
this context, she cites the example of how the concept of ’usur wa
haraj or zarar – that is, prevention of hardship or harm5 – can be
defined so as to give women better access to divorce;
iii invoking arguments for change based on the idea on Qur’anic and
legal theory ratiocination (ta’lil6), which links the cause with the ruling
as discussed in the context of Kamali’s maqasid-driven Islamic herme-
neutics (see the previous chapter). With respect to the last point, she
argues that many rulings need to be re-examined in the light of changes
that have occurred in modern times with respect to women’s status in
society and gender relations; and
iv male epistemic privilege in the area of jurisprudence in particular must
be challenged (Mir-Hosseini, 2003, 25–26).
 Gender-justice imperative 155
Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari
It is not only progressive Muslim female scholars who have critiqued (neo)
classical Muslim gender constructions and advocated for gender-just inter-
pretations of Islam. Increasingly progressive Muslim male scholars have
done so too. Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari (b.1949/1950), a former Iranian
cleric, is a good case in point. Eshkevari has contributed some important
theoretical insights which critically deconstruct the (neo)classical gender ide-
ologies and the assumptions that underpin them. Eshkevari argues vehe-
mently against the idea that in Islam there is a set of gender-hierarchical
values that do not allow equal rights for women and that the laws in classical
Islam that do endorse these values have been constructed in the course of
history and are a result of system of patriarchy. In this context, he forms the
view that there is a need for a hermeneutic Islam that re-examines the many
epistemological assumptions of classical jurisprudence, especially in relation
to women (Eshkevari, 2013).
Eshkevari (2013) presents the most sustained recent discussion which
deconstructs classical assumptions in relation to gender relations in relation
to the question of qiwama and wilaya. He identifies the three most salient
epistemological assumptions on which the idea of male authority and guard-
ianship over women in Islam is premised:

• the idea that men are ontologically superior to women and that women
either have evil natures or engender evil and hence must be controlled.
This ontological superiority is justified on the basis of men’s supposed
higher intelligence and rationality, women’s potent sexuality and its
ability to corrupt men, and women’s ‘polluting’ bodies as a function
of their reproductive biology.
• the argument that the patriarchal family serves as the most essential
element of society and without which the society cannot continue to
exist.
• the Aristotelian meritocratic concept of justice discussed above.
(Eshkevari 2013)

Eshkevari forms the view that these assumptions have been incorporated
and subsequently canonized into classical Islamic law in the form of prac-
tices/laws such as men’s qiwama and wilaya over women, polygamy for
men, prevention of women to become judges or political leaders, different
inheritance shares, and full body cover for women (Eshkevari, 2013,
191–192).
In this context, he (Eshkevari, 2013) states:

These epistemological assumptions, shaped and consolidated over sev-

eral millennia, became the basis of an authoritarian ethical and legal
system that is premised on the notion that, if women fail to obey men in
156 Gender-justice imperative
the family and society, justice will be compromised, as both family and
social order will disintegrate.
(191–192)

Furthermore, Eshkevari argues that the above assumptions regarding the

sexes are defective, that they had a significant role in determining gender
relations, and that they were an outcome of certain historical and legal lega-
cies which ought to be changed or interpreted differently in the interest of
both women and the wellbeing of society. An alternative set of assumptions
is necessary to achieve this. Eshkevari formulates these alternative assump-
tions as follows:

1 ‘Men and women enjoy ontological equality’. In this context, he asserts

that there is no “sound argument or textual proof” (Eshkevari, 2013,
196) that would question this assumption. He continues to argue that
in Islam in fact that is ample evidence to support this assumption and
identifies a number of Qur’anic verses as constituting such evidence
(4:1; 6:98; 7:189; 31:28; 39:6). He forms the view that the Qur’anic
ontology, in agreement with the UNHRC, does not recognize any
secondary human characteristics as a basis for discrimination and that
only things that matter from the perspective of ‘religion’ are righteous-
ness (taqwā) and righteous action (‘amal ṣāliḥ).
2 ‘Women are not inherently weak in reason or ruled by their emotion’.
In this regard, Eshkevari forms the view that the belief in the contrary
is a historical construct and product of a particular patriarchal mind-
set that “influenced the religious sources” and was “attributed to the
Prophet or other religious personalities” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196). He
adds that the same mind-set was also incorporated into the Muslim
countries from western science. Any differences must be viewed as
result of historical processes which restricted the women’s opportuni-
ties for intellectual and rational growth. Finally, differences in biology
and genes cannot act as a basis for differences in rights between the
two sexes.
3 ‘The family is a joint enterprise’. Eshkevari states that the concept of
family has always been subject to change as a result of changing socio-
historical processes and that the patriarchal family and its assumptions
“are no longer valid” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196), which requires us to
develop a new set of family law related rulings. He continues to argue
that Islam does place a strong emphasis on the family and “its integ-
rity” and that, at the time of revelation, Islam, relative to the pre-Islamic
period, “enhanced women’s position in the family and society, and
gave them more rights” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196). However, what Esh-
kevari calls “the archaic traditions and rulings whose time is past”
(Eshkevari, 2013, 196) (Eshkevari, 2013, 196) associated with classical
Muslim family laws can no longer be the basis of a healthy family
 Gender-justice imperative 157
unit and society because they are neither compatible with “our theo-
logical and epistemological assumptions nor contemporary notions of
justice” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196). The way forward is to recognize as a
religious principle that the sphere of family is a joint enterprise in
which every member has the same basic human rights and that addi-
tional rights and responsibilities are to be decided according to “cumu-
lative human reasoning” and contemporarily accepted understandings
of “good practice” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196). In the context of defining
what such ‘good practice’ means, Eshkevari forms the view that one
must always take a rational approach and be open to more just and
better alternatives because “what is important is that, in the theory of
the family as a joint enterprise, it is the collective logic and custom of
the time that determines rights within the family, not a set of fixed
and immutable laws” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196).
4 ‘No one should dominate another’. In this context, Eshkevari explains
the detrimental effects of patriarchy conceptualized as ‘right of domin-
ion’ based on ideas of hierarchy and superiority of men over women,
which to Eshkevari’s mind are antithetical to all monotheistic religions
and their teachings. He uses the concept of tawhid, which constitutes
“an undeniable religious tenet”, as an example of “negation of domin-
ion” in Islam (Eshkevari, 2013, 193–197). In the light of this, he argues
that, in Islamic legal discourse and Muslim family law in particular,
the dominion of men/husbands over women/wives is clearly present,
such as with respect to the usage of words such as tamlik (possession)
and tamattu’ (enjoyment) in the marriage contract (‘aqd) and tasarruf
(conquest) in relation to sexual intercourse in which “a woman is the
object of male pleasure” (Eshkevari, 2013, 196).
5 ‘Women’s right for economic autonomy’. Here, Eshkevari argues that
despite the fact that the ‘religious legal discourse’ in theory recognized
women’s right to economic autonomy in practice, this was largely
denied to most of them. Furthermore, he asserts that since women
have the right to be educated and work, the classical legal rulings
pertaining to inheritance, men’s polygamy, mahr, men’s obligation to
provide maintenance for his wives, women’s obligation to obey their
husbands, and men’s right to prevent their wives from leaving the
house without permission can no longer be justified and must all be
revised.
6 ‘Jurisprudence should not be maximalist’. In this respect, Eshkevari
maintains that the classical interpretations of the meaning of Islam’s
universalism, its comprehensive nature, and “totalizing laws” (Eshke-
vari, 2013, 196), including in the realm of social laws, is a jurists’
construction that took place over several centuries and must be ques-
tioned. He also considers that these ideas were responsible for many
problematic laws in the sphere of women’s rights and the rights of
spouses in marriage.
158 Gender-justice imperative
7 ‘Mutability of social rulings in the shari’a’. After outlining the argu-
ments from past and present Shi’I jurists on the question of the
incongruity between rulings and changing contexts, Eshkevari favors
the idea of changeability of social Shari’a rulings which stipulate that
no rulings related to social life – that is to say laws legislated and
implemented in the realms of politics, society, family – are eternal;
rather they all have the capacity to evolve and be transformed. In
essence, the fundamental premise of this theory is that, from the outset,
these rulings were not meant to be forever; and after the death of the
Prophet, Muslims have misinterpreted them for certain reasons (Esh-
kevari, 2013, 201).

Based upon the above-outlined alternative assumptions, Eshkevari provides

a very different understanding of the concepts of qiwama and wilaya to that
of classical Islam. He argues that in the Qur’an the concept of wilaya “is not
used in the sense of male superiority or a man’s unilateral and authoritarian
guardianship rights over his wife and daughters” (Eshkevari, 2013, 203).
Instead, Eshkevari considers, citing 9:71, that gender relations in the Qur’an
are characterized by equality and bilaterally. In relation to qiwama, Eshke-
vari argues that the superiority or preference (faddala) mentioned in 4:34 is
not inherent but an outcome and a response to particular socio-cultural and
economic realities prevalent at the time of revelation. Since these realities are
no longer existent and the nature and the very definition of a family is chang-
ing, the rulings associated with it are also subject to change. Eshkevari also
questions the rationale behind Muslim marriage laws, including the philoso-
phy of and nature of the marital act premised as it is on the idea of women’s
sexuality as a good to be enjoyed by men once certain conditions have been
met (Eshkevari, 2013, 201–205).
Hence, in order to bring about gender justice, Eshkevari, in end effect,
advocates for the abrogation of the legal rulings associated with the classical
understanding of gender relations in Islamic law, especially those pertaining
to wilaya and qiwama.

Progressive Muslim thought and the

question of Islamic feminism
Gender-justice issues have also brought into the limelight discussions pertain-
ing to the meaning and viability of the concept of Islamic feminism. Many
worthy discussions on the possibility, the meaning, and the adequacy of the
concept of ‘Islamic feminism’ over the last decade or so have taken place,
often generating diametrically opposing views on the same (Seedat, 2013a).
This also holds true among progressive Muslim scholars. For example, a
recent overview of the literature on theorizing about Islamic feminism by a
progressive Muslim scholar suggests that “a carefully articulated and tenta-
tive convergence of the two (i.e. Islam and feminism) intellectual traditions”
 Gender-justice imperative 159
is both possible and potentially beneficial because such a convergence has
“the potential to advance Muslim women’s struggles for equality” (Seedat,
2013b). On the other hand, the latest scholarship by other progressive-
minded scholars such as Chaudhry (2014) and Hidayatullah (2014a) has
highlighted, if not re-affirmed (Ali, 2006), the difficulties and ‘feminist
impasses’ in espousing gender-egalitarian and/or feminist interpretations of
the Qur’an that are instrumental to the project of Islamic feminism.
In this section, I discuss some of the main representative arguments
espoused on both sides.
Hidayatullah, following in the footsteps of Ali (Ali, 2006), critically exam-
ines the central presuppositions upon which feminist interpretations of the
Qur’an advocating gender equality was based in the 1990s and 2000s.
Reflecting on her book on the subject matter, she (2014b) concludes as
follows:

In the process of writing my book, I came to the difficult conclusion that

the contemporary expectations for gender equality at the heart of the
feminist exegetical project perhaps cannot ultimately be reconciled with
the Qur’anic text. A claim to the contrary is often based on distortions
of the text and anachronistic positions.
(117–118)

The reasons for this diagnosis is that, despite the existence of what she terms
‘mutuality verses’ (e.g. 4:1; 30:21; 9:71; 33:35) which are agreeable to our
contemporary understandings of gender justice, there exist in the Qur’an
‘hierarchy verses’ (such as 2:223; 2:228; 4:34) that “endorse male control
over women and presume hierarchical male-female relations” (2014b, 118)
and hence perhaps present an insurmountable obstacle for the project of
Islamic feminism. Hidayatullah considers that the manner in which the Mus-
lim feminist interpreters have hermeneutically attempted to deal with these
hierarchy verses on the basis of various hermeneutical principles,7 in end
effect, amount to nothing more than apologetics. Hidayatullah also argues
that we must accept the ‘hierarchy verses’ as “real elements” (2014b, 120)
of the Qur’an and come to terms with what this means for the Qur’anic
feminist project. Hence, she concludes that the Muslim feminist attempts to
find support for gender equality in the Qur’an have been inadequate (since
these inequalities are ontological rather than functional) and have resulted
in a kind of ‘text fundamentalism’ which ascribes to text the meaning that
the text itself does not support. This ‘text fundamentalism’, adds Hidayatul-
lah, is also contradictory to the kind of hermeneutics the Muslim feminist
theologians subscribe to in the first place. As a result, Hidayatullah opines
that the manner in which Muslim feminists have interpreted the text has
marginalized the importance of extra-textual hermeneutical principles in
their overall hermeneutical models, which in actual fact hold a better prom-
ise for their ultimate aim (2014b. 121–122).
160 Gender-justice imperative
Ali (2006, 131–132) also has very real reservations about the possibility
of Islamic feminism if this concept is to be derived on the basis of scriptural
reasoning and hermeneutics. She argues that the Qur’an and hadith are patri-
archal, especially in relation to the question of sexual autonomy of females.
Ali points to verses such as 2:237 and 2:223 and argues that they “presup-
pose male agency and female passivity with regard to the initiation of sex”
(Ali, 2006, 129). Hence, it would be anachronistic to talk about Islamic
feminism derived from scriptural reasoning.
Contrary to Hidayatullah and Ali, scholars such as Mir-Hosseini and
S’adiyya Shaikh have, generally speaking and not without reservations,
affirmed the possibility of Islamic feminism and its usefulness as a conceptual
category in the Islamic tradition.
Mir-Hosseini (1996, 146) defines feminism as “a broad concern with
women’s issues and an awareness of their oppression at work, in the home,
and in the society, as well as action aimed at improving their lives and chang-
ing the situation”. Importantly, Mir-Hosseini considers both feminism and
Islam as highly contested, evaluative concepts which elicit and hold various
meanings to different actors participating in the debates on Islam and gender.
The concepts “involve endless disputes about their proper use on the part of
their users and are the subject of multiple discourses and widely ranging
perspectives that can be addressed at different levels” (Mir-Hosseini, 2011,
68). She argues that it is misleading to frame the relationship between Islam
and feminism, understood as reified and static concepts, as one of ‘compat-
ibility’ because this approach obscures the realities of global and local power
relations and structures within which both Islam and feminism as concepts
operate, and within which Muslim women have to struggle for justice and
equality. Instead, Mir-Hosseini (2011) suggests that it is much more mean-
ingful to frame the issue in relation to largely unaddressed questions such as:
‘Whose Islam? Whose feminism? Who is speaking for Islam? Who is speak-
ing for feminism?’
Mir-Hosseini has herself questioned the usefulness of the concept of
Islamic feminism as an analytical or descriptive tool because of the heavy
political and rhetorical baggage it has since acquired (Mir-Hosseini, 2011).
Her reservation (1996) about the concept of feminism, but not indigenous
feminist consciousness among Iranian women, are evident most clearly when
she asserts:

It is with great reservation that I use the term feminism . . . There is

no equivalent term for it in Persian although as a consciousness it has
always existed. This consciousness in its indigenous form remains
largely unexplored in the Muslim context. Studies of feminism in the
Muslim world predominantly deal with its expression among the
Westernised and educated elite and align it with its Western
counterpart.
(166)
 Gender-justice imperative 161
Mir-Hosseini traces the birth of Islamic feminism to the early 1990s as one
of the paradoxical and unwanted consequences of the rising, politically ori-
ented classical Islam. She (2009, 28) argues that, by the early 1990s, there
were clear signs of the emergence of a “new consciousness, a new way of
thinking, a gender discourse that is feminist in its aspiration and demands,
yet Islamic in its language and sources of legitimacy, versions of which came
to be known or described as ‘Islamic feminism’”. For reasons discussed
above, Mir-Hosseini argues that today it is not easy, or that it is perhaps even
futile, to categorize these various discourses into neat categories, and to try
to generate a definition of Islamic feminism that captures the diversity of
positions and approaches of the so-called Islamic feminists. She notes in this
context that, as with other feminists, Muslim feminists’ positions are local,
multiple, and evolving. What is common to all is that they seek gender justice
and equality for women, although “they do not always agree on what con-
stitutes ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ or the best ways of attaining them” (2009, 29).
Mir-Hosseini does, however, take the view that feminist scholarship in Islam
or in any other religious tradition is important for a number of reasons,
including the ideas that:

1 It facilitates a better understanding of religion and the search for

justice.
2 As a knowledge project, it reveals and explains why certain interpreta-
tions (i.e. patriarchal) of Islamic legal tradition became more prevalent
and others were suppressed (e.g. egalitarian). This argument is extended
further to assert that historically predominant interpretations of the
normative religious sources, which were premised on gender inequality
and asymmetry, are neither inevitable nor the only possible
interpretations.
3 From a political vantage point, feminist scholarship in Islam is impor-
tant because “it can both free Muslims from taking a defensive position
and enable them to go beyond old jurisprudential dogmas in search
of new questions and new answers” (Mir-Hosseini, 2011, 72–73).
4 Its importance also lies in the idea, repeatedly highlighted by Mir-
Hosseini, that as the recent history of the Muslim-majority world has
testified (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, and Iran), there can be no
long-lasting and sustainable gains in women’s rights unless patriarchal
notions of family and gender relations are debated, challenged, and
redressed within an Islamic framework. Otherwise, “Muslim women’s
quest for equality will remain a hostage to the fortunes of various
political forces and tendencies, as was the case in the twentieth century”
(Mir-Hosseini, 2010). As most Muslim women do not have the choice
of either accepting or rejecting or indeed challenging the patriarchal
beliefs and laws, feminist scholarship in Islam empowers women to
become the proponents of egalitarian and gender-just visions of Islam
(Mir-Hosseini, 2006, 644–665).
162 Gender-justice imperative
5 In agreement with Margot Badran (2009), Mir-Hosseini considers that
feminist scholarship on Islam is also important because the idea of
Islamic feminism transcends and destroys the inaccurate and artificial
conceptual dichotomies and polarities between religion versus secular-
ism, ‘east’ versus ‘west’, modernity versus Tradition, which have been
employed to deny rights to Muslim women.
6 Importantly, Mir-Hosseini (1998, 50–51) is of the view that feminist
readings of the Shari’a “become possible, and even inevitable, when
Islam is no longer an oppositional discourse in national politics”
because, once classical jurisprudence-based Shari’a becomes a source
of legislation, its custodians have to deal with contradictions inherent
in upholding the family and restoring women to their ‘true and high’
status in Islam, while at the same time retaining the patriarchal man-
dates of the classical jurisprudence-based Shari’a legal rulings. This is
especially so in the context of a contemporary Islamic nation invested
with the power to make laws. This inherent contradiction in turn
makes space for novel interpretations on a scale unprecedented in
Muslim history.

Sa’diyya Shaikh, a contemporary South African Muslim scholar, simi-

larly considers that the term ‘feminism’ has currency in the context of
Islamic tradition for a number of reasons. She (2003) defines the concept
of feminism as:

critical awareness of the structural marginalization of women in society

and engaging in activities directed at transforming gender power rela-
tions in order to strive for a society that facilitates human wholeness for
all based on principles of gender justice, human equality, and freedom
from structures of oppression.
(148)

Although Shaikh (2012, 23) duly acknowledges that Muslims, by belonging

to very heterogeneous groups, have at times very different conceptualiza-
tions of gender justice, their concept of Islamic feminism is rooted in the
idea that “gender justice is a priority in the understanding and embodiment
of Islam”.
Shaikh identifies a number of benefits of partaking in feminist discourses
including the idea that these discourses connect feminist-minded Muslim
women and their praxis with global pan-religious feminist ones and the poli-
tics surrounding them, the premise that the employment of feminist language
engenders a variety of ideas and a ‘vocabulary’ that highlight and nurture “a
critical consciousness surrounding gender politics” (Shaikh, 2003, 155), the
argument that indigenous Islamic feminism also counteracts the idea that
feminism is entirely a ‘western concept’ which would sideline the rich and
variegated legacy of non-western women’s resistance to patriarchy (Shaikh,
 Gender-justice imperative 163
2003, 155), and the idea that “feminist commitments are responsive to the
broader Qur’anic call to justice and to the advancement of just Muslim com-
munities” (Shaikh, 2012, 23). Hence, Shaikh employs the concept of (Islamic)
feminism and/or ‘feminist’ as “a description of Muslim women’s activities
that are aimed at transforming masculinist social structures” (2003, 55).
Simultaneously, however, Shaikh is acutely aware of how arguments on
gender justice in Islam can be easily instrumentalized by some, including
Muslim women, for the “hegemonic imperial interests” (Shaikh, 2013). In
this regard Shaikh (2013, 23–24) identifies three tasks for Islamic
feminism:

1 as a continuation of “a rigorous internal critique of sexism and gender

inequalities extant in their societies and within Muslim tradition” for
the purposes of engendering “more and gender-egalitarian norms”;
2 relentless engagement in the (re-) discovery of Islamic humanism which
contains “hidden histories of gender justice and human equality”;
3 ceaselessly resist and critique the multiple facets of neo-colonialism
and imperialism and their accompanying enunciations of feminism
which are reductionist in nature and totally devalue “Muslim lives and
do so in ways that enable the political ambitions of the globalizing
North”.

Apart from Mir-Hosseini and Shaikh, I have also argued that Islamic feminist
project as embodied in the concept of gender-justice can be based on a par-
ticular Islamic hermeneutic which privileges a contextual, thematic, and pur-
posive approach to the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna. This element
will be examined in more details in the next chapter.

Progressive Muslims social hermeneutics in action:

the case of Musawah and Positive Muslims
While progressive Muslim scholars disagree on the usefulness, viability, and
meaning of Islamic feminism as a theoretical construct, they are strongly
committed to making gender justice a reality at the grassroots level of Mus-
lim lived experiences. To demonstrate this commitment, I discuss two exam-
ples of such commitment to what we termed in the introduction ‘social
hermeneutics’. First, I describe Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s involvement with
Musawah, the global movement for equality in Muslim family law, followed
by Farid Esack’s work with Positive Muslims, an NGO that provides coun-
selling and support for Muslims infected with HIV/AIDS.

Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Musawah

Mir-Hosseini has been an active voice in a number of Muslim women’s
organizations, notably Women living Under Muslim Laws8 and Musawah
164 Gender-justice imperative
(www.musawah.org). For reasons of space, I shall limit my analysis to that
of her involvement with Musawah and her thoughts on what it represents
for the future of discourses on gender-just interpretations of Islam.
Musawah9 was initiated in 2007 by the pioneering Malaysian women’s
group “Sisters in Islam”10 and was launched in Kuala Lumpur in February
2009, bringing together Islamic and human rights frameworks “to build an
overlapping consensus among Muslim women from diverse backgrounds
and perspectives, and to push for legal reform” (Mir-Hosseini, 2011).
According to its website:

Musawah is a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim

family. We call for equality, non-discrimination, justice and dignity as
the basis of all human relations; full and equal citizenship for every
individual; and marriage and family relations based on principles of
equality and justice, with men and women sharing equal rights and
responsibilities.11
(67)

Mir-Hosseini (2011, 74) affirms in strong terms that women in Musawah

believe that their own arguments are better grounded in both the Islamic
tradition and the sources of International Human Rights law than are those
voices of patriarchy. Musawah advocates also subscribe to the view that any
Islamic authority that denies justice as it is understood today cannot be per-
suasive and should be challenged.
One of the main objectives of Musawah, according to Mir-Hosseini, is to
include women’s concerns and voices in the production of religious knowl-
edge and legal reform in Muslim contexts. Musawah achieves this by linking
scholarship with activism and by bridging what Mir-Hosseini considers to
be two gaps in the contemporary Muslim family law debates and in Muslim
legal tradition. The first is that the majority of Muslim religious scholars are
gender blind, ignorant of feminist theories and unaware of the importance
of gender as an analytical category of thought. The second gap is that many
women’s rights activists and campaigners in Muslim contexts, in line with
mainstream feminism, have long believed that working within a religious
framework to be counterproductive, which, for reasons discussed above,
Mir-Hosseini considers to be misguided and ineffective for securing the long-
term goals of Islamic feminism (Mir-Hosseini and Anwar, 2012).
Musawah’s activism is therefore embedded in a critical feminist perspec-
tive and is multifaceted, involving knowledge building, outreach, interna-
tional advocacy, and communication branches.12 Its current project is on
rethinking the classical understanding of the concepts of qiwama and
wilaya. These concepts have been identified by the Musawah leadership as
the linchpins of gender inequality in the Muslim legal tradition. This project
has three interrelated components: the production of new feminist knowl-
edge that critically engages with classical jurists’ interpretations of qiwama
 Gender-justice imperative 165
and wilaya, a ‘Global Life Stories Project’ to document the life stories of
selected women and men in eleven countries, focusing on how qiwama and
wilaya are experienced, understood, and contested in their lived realities;
and the use of quantitative and qualitative data to show the disconnect
between law and the socio-economic realities of Muslim women today (Mir-
Hosseini and Anwar, 2012). According to Mir-Hosseini, this project criti-
cally engages with classical Islamic legal thought to enable us to understand
the construction of male authority by Muslim jurists, as manifested in fam-
ily law, and as embodied in the concepts of qiwama and wilaya. It argues
that qiwama and wilaya, as concepts employed to religiously justify male
authority over women, are not Qur’anic concepts but juristic constructs,
and that laws based on these constructs no longer reflect the justice of Islam.
It intends to promote other interpretations that are both possible and more
in tune with contemporary lived realities. One result has been the publica-
tion in 2013 of a book entitled Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law:
Justice and Ethics in the Islamic Tradition, whose main editor was Mir-
Hosseini. Another volume was released in early 2015 (Mir-Hosseini,
Al-Sharmani and Rumminger, 2015).
Finally, Mir-Hosseini considers that the launch of Musawah, in addition
to other developments in the world, has ushered in an important new phase
in women’s struggle for justice and equality, shifting the politics of religion
and feminism onto new ground, both globally and locally (Mir-Hosseini,
2011, 74).

Farid Esack and Positive Muslims

Another prominent example of progressive Muslim scholars’ commitment
to social hermeneutics is the work of Farid Esack with the organization Posi-
tive Muslims, which he co-founded in 2000 and which operated indepen-
dently until 2011.13 One of the main aims of the NGO was raising awareness
about HIV/AIDS and offering support to Muslims living with the disease. Its
main task was in counselling and providing support for HIV/AIDs-infected
people. However, the NGO also developed programs focusing on prevention,
lobbying, and research activities. Esack authored a number of papers and
edited books to fight against the widespread stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS
in the Muslim community that is particularly prejudiced against Muslim
women. To do so, he developed a ‘theology of compassion’ that emphasizes
a non-judgmental approach to HIV/AIDS-infected people and a concrete
action plan for how to deal with this problem.14 Esack (2004, 4) defines this
type of theology as “a way of reading the Qur’an and understanding the
Sunnah (prophetic precedent) that focuses on Allah who cares deeply about
all the creation”.
Unlike the moralizing ‘return to Islam’ approach to the issue espoused by
classical Muslims that is blind to the larger operative forces behind HIV/AID
infections, Esack’s theology of compassion calls for all Muslims not only to
166 Gender-justice imperative
lead responsible lives but to demonstrate commitment to justice by address-
ing the core social and economic conditions which are responsible for per-
petuation of the illness and by lobbying for affordable treatment for all
(Esack, 2004; cf. Esack and Chiddy, 2009). In the words of Esack (2004):

The idea of a ‘return to Islam’ as a complete solution by itself misses the

point of the structural violence of inequality and lack of access to
resources. And when these issues are not dealt with, even the most fer-
vent Islamic speeches will be of limited value. Yes, we must return to
Islam; however, Islam is also a religion of compassion and justice and a
struggle to make these real in the world.
(47)

The theology of compassion resonates strongly with the kind of Islamic

liberation theology described in the fourth chapter, in which we also focused
on Esack’s scholarship. As aptly noted by Svensson (2013):

The placing of unjust social power structures at the core in explaining the
HIV/AIDS epidemic – an important part of the ‘theology of compassion’ –
above issues of sexual morality and sin, shifts the focus in terms of solu-
tions from calls for religious moral reform to social reform.
(103)

Esack (2004, 35–36; cf. Esack and Chiddy, 2009) considers that this
approach is necessitated not only because of endemic poverty issues that
plague (Muslim) communities (in South Africa) but also because of certain
interpretations of the Islamic tradition, especially those which are premised
on non-recognition of women’s sexual autonomy in matters regarding sex
and sexuality. This is important, because it is women, themselves, who often
become victims of HIV/AIDS due to irresponsible behavior of their HIV-
infected husbands.
Hence, as in the case of Mir-Hosseini’s work with Musawah, Esack’s
engagement with Positive Muslims has a strong focus on engendering gender-
just interpretations of Islam and applying them at the level of Muslim lived
realities.

Conclusion
The imperative of gender justice in progressive Muslim thought can be
encapsulated in its critique of gender ideologies embedded in classical Mus-
lim family laws and in the engendering of alternative views on normative
gender relations which are receptive to international human rights under-
standings of justice and fairness as concepts, and which are seen to be more
in tune with the values underpinning the normative Qur’an-Sunna teachings.
While progressive Muslims are divided on the issue of whether the concept
 Gender-justice imperative 167
of Islamic feminism should be part of their theoretical and conceptual vocab-
ulary when advocating for gender-just interpretations of Islam, they are com-
mitted to making gender justice a reality not only at the level of theory and
interpretation (which is the subject matter of the next chapter), but also at
the grassroots level, as briefly illustrated in this chapter in the social herme-
neutics of Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Farid Esack.

Notes
1 Other culturally contingent and androcentric definitions of terms in the same
lexicon include words such as al-untha for woman (meaning ‘weak’, ‘limp’), as
well as entries on imam ‘prayer leader’ and khalifah (leader/vicegerent) as refer-
ring solely to men. See Nasruddin (2004, 349).
2 In the Qur’an, the term fitna and its derivatives are used to mean ‘trial’, ‘tempta-
tion’, ‘sedition’, or ‘persecution’. The term fitna in non-Qur’anic usage has
acquired other meanings such as ‘civil war’, ‘revolt’, ‘affliction’, and ‘distress’.
According to Lisan al-‘Arab, one of the meanings of fitna translates into “a trial,
tribulation, test, examination”. Another definition offered is “straying from the
right path, error, a sin, offense, crime” (Ibn Manzur, 1968, 13:317).
3 A male relative whom a woman cannot marry according to traditional Islamic
law.
4 In Lali al-Akhbar, it is quoted that Imam Ali said: “What motivates the beasts of
prey is their hunger, and what motivates women and draws them to men is to
extinguish the fire of their desire (shahvat). Modesty (haya) has ten parts, of
which nine parts are in women and one part in men. Then, when a woman is
asked for in marriage, one part of her modesty goes; when she is contracted in
marriage, another part goes; when she gives birth, another part goes; when her
husband has intercourse with her, another part goes; she is left with five parts,
and if she commits the hideous act of zina, all her haya is removed. Pity the
people, when all haya is taken from women”. As cited in Mir-Hosseini (2004, 3).
5 ’usur wa haraj or zarar is one important ethico-legal principle or rule that Muslim
jurists employ when deliberating on certain aspect of Islamic law and ethics. It is
based on the idea that the purpose or philosophy of Islamic law is to prevent
undue distress and constriction. It is often associated with another such principle,
namely the principle of refraining to cause harm and loss to oneself and others
(la darar wa la dirar). In this context, this would translate into arguing that wives
could take recourse to these juristic mechanisms to demand better access to juridi-
cal divorce mechanisms on the basis that marriage is a source of harm and undue
distress to them, may it be psychological, physical, or emotional.
6 See chapter six.
7 Such as prioritization of ‘mutuality’ over hierarchy verses, the idea that the
alleged dissonance between the two types of verses is a product of our own con-
temporary egalitarian ethics rather something inherent to the Qur’an and the idea
of moral trajectories in the text which are, for Hidayatullah, nothing else than
the projection of contemporary gender ideals into the Qur’anic text. Mir-Hosseini
(2004, 119–120). For a contrary view, see Duderija (2015).
8 For example, she co-authored a text with Vanja Hamzić (2010) which examines
zina laws in some Muslim contexts and communities in order to explore connec-
tions between the criminalization of sexuality, gender-based violence, and wom-
en’s rights activism.
9 Meaning “equality”’ in Arabic.
10 http://www.sistersinislam.org.my
168 Gender-justice imperative
11 http://www.musawah.org
12 http://www.musawah.org/what-we-do
13 The organization was formally dissolved in late 2011. All its assets were trans-
ferred to the larger ‘non-faith-based’ NGO, Treatment Action Campaign, with
which Positive Muslims had close cooperation throughout. According to Farid
Esack, the reason for this was that the organization could not find a competent
director and were struggling to keep the organization going generally. See Svens-
son (2013).
14 Most sustained discussion on what theology of compassion means can be found
in Esack (2004).
8 The imperative of non-patriarchal
Islamic hermeneutics

I argue that descriptions of Islam as a religious patriarchy that allegedly has

“God on its side” confuse the Qur’ān with a specific reading of it, ignoring
that all texts, including the Qur’ān, can be read in multiple modes, including
egalitarian ones.
(Barlas, 2002, 4)

Definition of non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna

hermeneutics
In this chapter, I discuss the scholarship of progressive Muslim scholars
who have developed important hermeneutical principles which critique
both the past and present patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an and
sunna/hadith and who have simultaneously put in place sophisticated non-
patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutical models. Before I examine their
arguments, a brief note on how I define non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna
hermeneutics is in order.
I define non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics as a body of scholar-
ship that advocates for gender-just formulations of legal rights for Muslim
women (as explained in the previous chapter) from within the Islamic epis-
temic and methodological framework by systematically deriving and justify-
ing these rights on the basis of a particular conceptualization and
interpretation of the inherited Muslim traditions (turath), especially its pri-
mary fountainheads, the Qur’an and the Sunna.
In what follows, I will divide the discussion into those pertaining to the
Qur’an and sunna/hadith separately for heuristic purposes because I am
focusing on the most systematic arguments espoused by progressive Muslim
scholars in relation to either non-patriarchal Qur’anic or to non-patriarchal
sunna/hadith hermeneutics. This is not to say that those scholars who have
written on non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics have not done so in rela-
tion to hadith, and vice versa.
170 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
Non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics
In what follows, I focus on the actual interpretational models employed by
leading progressive Muslim scholars which can pave the way to the formula-
tion of non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics.

Amina Wadud
A major contribution to non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics from a pro-
gressive Muslim perspective is Amina Wadud’s The Qur’an and Woman:
Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (Wadud, 1999). In
her preface to the book’s 1999 edition, the author gives us an insight into
the various methodological and hermeneutical principles and strategies she
employed in the book in order to develop a female-inclusive Qur’anic exege-
sis. These pertain to questions such as the nature of (Arabic) language, deri-
vation of meaning, and philology. The first such principle she calls the
‘hermeneutics of tawhid’ which emphasizes a ‘holistic’ approach to the
Qur’anic discourse based upon its textual ‘unity’ in contrast to what she terms
an ‘atomistic’ approach, a term borrowed from modernist Muslim scholar
Rahman (1982). Making a systematic distinction between ‘fundamental’ and
‘unchangeable’ Qur’anic ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ by means of its com-
prehensive contextualization1 so that each Qur’anic term “be examined on
the basis of its language act, syntactical structures, and textual context in
order to more fully determine [its] parameters of meaning” is another
methodological tool employed in the work. Closely related to this is
another hermeneutical strategy employed by Wadud, termed ‘textual devel-
opment’ (1999, 5–7). By textual development, Wadud wishes to alert the
reader/interpreter to be sensitive to how the Qur’anic text establishes tra-
jectories of new moral, social, and political trajectories which go beyond
the literal and concrete meaning and searches for the underlying rationale
(ratio) or what Rahman (1979) has termed the élan or the spirit of the
Qur’an.
The idea of new moral trajectories leads Wadud to take a hermeneutical
recourse to ethical principles such as equity, justice, and human rights as
being constitutive of the Qur’anic ethos as well as being its hermeneutically
most powerful principles of interpretation. Another important hermeneutical
strategy noted by Wadud is the notion of textual silences or ellipses in the
Qur’an which, although not articulated in it, can be deduced from the
Qur’an’s existing structural forms which primarily exist in form of gram-
matical constructs. Wadud, in this context, pays close attention to the gender-
specific language of the Qur’an, especially the grammatical constructs of
female and male noun forms the Qur’an employs and their hermeneutical
implications. In particular, Wadud does not consider the Qur’anic Arabic to
be a sacred language per se. Instead she forms the view that its main function
is to ensure its comprehensibility and that the gendered nature of the Arabic
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 171
language ought not to restrict the meaning of a Divine revelation. Wadud
also shows awareness of the importance of the interpreter/reader in the pro-
cess of interpretation and incorporates it into her hermeneutical model by
referring to it as the ‘prior text’. She defines ‘prior text’ as “a language and
cultural context in which the text is read” (Wadud, 1999, 1). Furthermore,
Wadud considers that the gender-specific language, namely Arabic, is respon-
sible for creating particular ‘prior texts’ that affect the Qur’an’s interpreta-
tion. Finally, she also makes an important distinction between textual
relativism and legitimate contextual readings of the Qur’an by acknowledg-
ing that textual relativism is curbed by the process of ‘points of convergence
in interpretation’. She (Wadud, 1999) summarizes her hermeneutical
method in relation to the analysis of each Qur’anic verse in the following
manner:

in its context; in the context of discussions on similar topics in the

Qur’an; in the light of similar language and syntactical structures used
elsewhere in the Qur’an; in the light of overriding Qur’anic principles;
and within the context of the Qur’anic Weltanschauung, or
world-view.
(5)

In addition to these broader hermeneutical principles, Wadud employs a

number of gender-neutral or inclusive concepts in the Qur’an, including
islam (defined as an act of voluntary ‘engaged surrender’), which is enabled
through the concept of khilafa (moral agency) and taqwa, all of which oper-
ate under the umbrella of Qur’anic concept of tawhid, or what she terms the
‘tawhidic paradigm’ to develop gender non-patriarchal Qur’anic
hermeneutics.
Let us start by discussing what Wadud understands by tawhidic paradigm2
and see how she links it to other concepts such as khilafa and taqwa. The
first thing we need to note in this context is that she does not consider tawhid
to be a purely theological concept but also an ethical one with concrete socio-
political implications and relevance. Tawhid for Wadud “is the operating
principle of equilibrium and cosmic harmony . . . [T]awḥid relates to rela-
tionships and developments within the social and political realms, emphasiz-
ing the unity of all human creatures beneath one Creator” (Wadud, 1999,
28). The only distinctions between people are on the basis of taqwa
(Q 49:13), and hence the primacy of social justice, with the objective of
eradicating all barriers to discrimination, and, here specifically, on the basis
of gender (Wadud, 1999, 185). She forms the view that if human beings are
truly created to be God’s trustees (khilafa) on earth (Q 2:30), then the pur-
pose of this human agency is to work in harmony with God’s purposes of
justice and equity. “Being khalifah is equivalent to fulfilling one’s human
destiny as moral agent, whose responsibility is to participate in upholding
the harmony of the universe” (Wadud, 1999, 34). So the Qur’anic concept
172 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
of khilafa or human agency in Wadud’s thinking is not restricted to that of
the male. It is a means of acquiring taqwa by being just and doing good deeds
on earth, which, in turn, by definition, implies establishing human relation-
ships of equality, including in the context of marriage.
In arguing against patriarchy and patriarchal understandings of Islam, she
(Wadud in Anwar 2009) furthermore asserts the following:

To go beyond these attitudes and structures of inequality we have to

move towards reforms that acknowledge the equal significance of wom-
en’s creation, women’s ways of thinking and being, and their equal
responsibility in judgment. We can do this by establishing a system of
social justice that practices muwada, relations of reciprocity, and equal-
ity between men and women. This system would acknowledge both men
and women as competent contributors in both the private and public
spheres of activity. In such a system women and men would be encour-
aged to excel in whatever that do and would not restrict them to one
sphere over another. The basis of this reciprocity is central in Islam under
the rubric of tawhid.
(103–104)

Wadud uses the values of gender-based reciprocity and symmetry in the

Qur’an (as per 33:35 and 30:21) as an additional tool for establishing non-
patriarchal Muslim family laws and relationships that are not based on
domination but on cooperation and partnership.
She also employs the theological meaning of God’s tawhid to argue for
equality of human relationships by arguing that the concept of tawhid
implies that the only ontologically hierarchical relationship is that between
the Creator and the creation, and that hierarchical relationships between
genders would constitute shirk (2009, 104–109). In this context, she (2008)
asserts the following:

Since God is the highest conceptual aspect of all, then no person can
be greater than another person, especially for mere reasons of gender,
race, class, nationality, etc. The tawhidic paradigm then acts as a basic
theoretical principle for removing gender asymmetry, which is a kind
of satanic logic or shirk, positing priority or superiority to men.
Instead, women and men must occupy a relationship of horizontal
reciprocity, maintaining the highest place for God in His/Her/Its
uniqueness.
(437)

Hence, Wadud’s scholarship contains an array of hermeneutical mechanisms

which can be employed for the development of non-patriarchal Qur’anic
hermeneutics embedded in her tawhidic paradigm concept and its non-gender
hierarchical hermeneutical implications.
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 173
Asma Barlas
Another important work in non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics is A.
Barlas’s (2002) Believing Women in Islam – Unreading Patriarchal Interpre-
tations of the Qur’an. The book purports to restore what the author views
as the Qur’anic basis of sexual equality in Islam by freeing the Qur’an from
the patriarchal nature of its classical and some modern exegesis (or as Barlas
would argue, eisegesis). She does so systematically on both historical and
hermeneutical grounds. I am only interested in the latter for the purpose of
this chapter.
Barlas develops a systematic anti-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutic of lib-
eration to argue that the Qur’an can be:

1 read in a sexually non-patriarchal manner (in the sense that “the Qur’an
considers sex as irrelevant to moral agency”) and
2 moreover, that it is anti-patriarchal in nature (147).

To demonstrate this, Barlas first develops a comprehensive definition of

patriarchy as “a continuum at one end of which are misrepresentations of
God as Father, and of fathers as rulers over wives and children, and at the
other hand, the notion of sexual differentiation that is used to privilege males
while otherizing women” (Barlas, 2002, 2004).
Barlas puts in place a number of perceptive theological and methodologi-
cal precepts in order to demonstrate that the Qur’an is anti-patriarchal.
Central to this is a theological argument/postulate derived from the Qur’an
which Barlas terms ‘God’s self-disclosure’ that encompasses principles of
Divine Unity, Justice, and Incomparability/Unrepresentativeness as the her-
meneutically privileged site from which to read the Qur’an’s anti-patriarchal
nature. Barlas links ontology with hermeneutics to argue that the Qur’anic
God as manifest in God’s self-disclosure does not advocate any of the patri-
archal dimensions as found in her definition.3 Moreover, on this account,
Barlas argues that the Qur’an can be seen as anti-patriarchal because it insists
on God’s sovereignty. This is important because the way humans conceptual-
ize God has important implications for humanity’s own moral, social, and
sexual self-worth and relationships. She (2002) asserts the following in this
context:

When sacred knowledge is used to engender or sexualize God (humanize

or anthropomorphize God) as male, it also underwrites male privilege since
men acquire power from “the fact that the source of ultimate value is often
described in anthropomorphic images as Father or King” (Daly, 1973, 4).
Indeed, feminists believe that it is the “exclusively masculine symbolism for
God, for the notion of divine ‘incarnation’ in human nature, and for the
human relationship to God” that reinforces sexual oppression.
(94)
174 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
Furthermore, Barlas maintains that “not only does Islamic monotheism
[tawhid], properly understood, serve to liberate women from the tyranny of
male rule, but, by privileging the rights of God, it dislocates rule by the father
as well as theories of male sovereignty, which are at the roots of women’s
oppression” (Daly, 1973, 205). The importance of the Qur’anic concept of
tawhid for non-hierarchical gender relationships is also highlighted in this
passage (Daly, 1973):

The single most essential aspect of God’s Self-Disclosure in the Qur’anis

that God is One, hence Indivisible; this principle of Divine Unity (Taw-
hid) extends to the idea that God is Incomparable, hence Unrepresent-
able. Both separately and together, these doctrines preclude associating
forebears, partners, or progeny with God, or misrepresenting God as
father, son, husband, or male.
(95)

Similar to Wadud, Barlas considers that one important implication of this

concept of tawhid is that gender-hierarchical relationships in patriarchal
societies systematically privilege males by awarding them a higher degree of
agency and moral worth. These, in turn, manifest themselves concretely at
the societal level in classical Muslim tradition’s understanding of the con-
cepts of men’s qiwama, tafdil, darajat, or wilaya. Both Wadud and Barlas
consider these gender hierarchies as tantamount to idolatry (shirk). This is
so because they undermine the concept of tawhid by transferring the indivis-
ible God’s Sovereignty onto males.
Barlas also discusses the idea of khilafa, arguing that this concept, in the
way it is employed in the Qur’an, is not contingent on sex and, while being
a relational term (i.e. human as representatives of God and acting as His
trustees), it does not imply that certain humans are vicegerents over others
or more specifically that males enjoy the status of khilafa over women (Daly,
1973, 106). In this context, she remarks, “[t]here is thus no reason to assume
that only males are vice-regents on earth, much less vicegerents over women”
(Daly, 1973, 107). She concludes by saying that, on the Qur’anic concepts
such as tawhid and khilafa, it is possible to reject gender dualisms and bina-
ries and to develop interpretations of Islamic tradition founded on the com-
plete equality and humanity of women and men (Daly, 1973, 108).
Another methodological principle employed by Barlas to read the Qur’an
for women’s ‘liberation’ is her subscription to the view of the polysemic
nature of the Qur’anic text, which she uses to argue that the Qur’an may be
read in a number of different contextually legitimate ways, patriarchal as
well as liberatory modes. Barlas also utilizes the intra-Qur’anic hermeneuti-
cal principle of reading for best meanings and textual holism to argue that
the Qur’an cannot advocate zulm (injustice) against women, as in the case
of patriarchy. Faced by the conundrum of the Qur’an’s own potential respon-
sibility for its misreading based on patriarchy, in the postscript, Barlas
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 175
develops a theory of textual responsibility underpinned by the above-
mentioned methodological and theological principles to argue that the
Qur’an both anticipated its misreading and formulated a ‘hermeneutic’ for
its own proper reading (for best meaning and textual holism) and as such
cannot be held responsible for the abuses of its signs.
Barlas also makes use of F. Rahman’s hermeneutic discussed above in rela-
tion to the work of Wadud to argue against patriarchal readings of the
Qur’an.
It is not only progressive Muslim women scholars who have developed
systematic non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics, but also progressive Mus-
lim male scholars, to whose views we turn next.

Nasr Abu Zayd

Nasr Abu Zayd (d.2010) was a prominent Egyptian Muslim reformist
scholar who, prior to his exile in 1995 to Europe necessitated by accusa-
tions of blasphemy, taught at Cairo University. In what was to be his final
contribution to scholarship before his death, Abu Zayd developed a sys-
tematic conceptual model of what he terms ‘the intricately interwoven
domains of Qur’anic meaning’ and its ‘multi-dimensional worldview’
which help Muslims systematically distinguish between the Qur’an’s uni-
versalist and temporal elements. He developed this model with a clear view
to employ it for the purposes of drawing a distinction between traditional
fiqh laws pertaining to women and what he considers to be normative
Qur’anic values.
The five domains of Qur’anic meaning identified by Abu Zayd (2013,
155–156) consist of :

I the cosmological: this domain encompasses the Qur’anic worldview of

“the cosmos, the universe, nature, creation and recreation, the creator,
death and resurrection”.
II the divine-human relationship: this domain emphasizes both closeness
and distinction in this relationship represented, for example, by nar-
ratives in the Qur’an.
III the ethical and moral dimension: in this domain, Abu Zayd notes a
certain tension between the possibility of human perfection and the
reality of human moral deficiency.
IV the societal level: Abu Zayd considers that, at this level, the Qur’an
deals with specific practical issues such as marriage, divorce, inheri-
tance, etc., and that this constitutes the domain of meanings connected
to legal rulings. For Abu Zayd, this is completely a domain of inde-
pendent rational reflection (ijtihad) which is not to be limited to
analogical reason (qiyas) of classical Islam. He argues that the legal
stipulations in the Qur’an originally addressed to the seventh-century
milieu and the nascent Muslim community are specific to this context,
176 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
whose totality must always be kept in mind. Abu Zayd laments that
classical usul ul fiqh, including its maqasid theory,4 did not do so
because ijtihad had a very limited space in their overall interpreta-
tional schemes. He notes further that, at this level, legal rulings are
interwoven with ethics, as in the case of divorce verse (2:229), and
insists that the meanings of this verse should be understood in the
light of prevalent ethical common sense (ma’ruf)5 and in accordance
with the principle of benevolence (ihsan). As argued above, Abu Zayd
has elsewhere argued that the socio-legal injunctions mentioned in
the Qur’an merely reflect the seventh-century civilizational reality the
Qur’an confronted and ought not to be considered Qur’anic in a
normative sense.
V punishments (hudud): this is the final domain that exists in the Qur’an,
but it does not belong to the Qur’anic worldview proper, including
the category of ‘legal rules’, as these punishments existed before the
Qur’an. The Qur’an merely borrowed them in order to protect society
against certain crimes.

Based on this five-domains model, Abu Zayd argues that, at the cosmological
and ethical-spiritual levels, the Qur’anic worldview sustains absolute gender
equality. At the societal level, gender differentiation “is acknowledged” in
the Qur’an but is “free from any discrimination” (Abu Zayd, 2013, 161–
162). Abu Zayd laments the fact that this, however, was not the case in the
fiqh literature, which does discriminate on the basis of gender “due to certain
cultural and socio-historical context” (Abu Zayd, 2013, 161–162). He dis-
cusses the examples of inheritance and guardianship (qiwama) as examples
of this gender discrimination in the fiqh literature and presents alternative
points of view. In relation to inheritance, Abu Zayd argues that on the basis
of a “contextual reading” of the Qur’an, one can deduce that “equality” is
“one of the objectives of Islam” and that when interpreting Qur’anic legal
injunctions in relation to inheritance (e.g. 4:11–12), one must “take into
account the immediate context of revelation” (Abu Zayd, 2013, 161–162)
and the underlying objective or direction in which the Qur’an was moving
on the basis of which new interpretations can be developed. He (Abu Zayd,
2013) considers this to be one example of an ‘ijtihad method’ that he advo-
cates for and describes as follows:

[it s]tarts by contextualizing the passage not only in the micro-context

of ulum al-Qur’an, but also in the macro-context of Arabia in the sev-
enth century milieu. This step will allow unearthing the original histori-
cal meaning, that is, the meaning addressing the early community. . . .
The second step is to discern the significance of the uncovered meaning
in the context of our modern milieu, taking into account the different
socio-political and cultural context of every society.
(162)
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 177
In relation to the issue of qiwama in 4:34, Abu Zayd argues that while the
traditional exegesis would endorse the view of a “divine, unconditional
preference for males over females”, he translates the operative word faddala
not as “preference” but as “strength” to argue that it is the physical power
of males versus the tenderness of the females which justifies men being qaw-
wamun.6 Abu Zayd adds that “modern exegesis” should try to either “con-
dition or to contextualize” (2013, 163–164) the concept of qiwama as not
being divine. Importantly, Abu Zayd asks the question as to “why we should
demand of the Qur’an that it violate the established rules in the societal
domain of meaning?” (Abu Zayd, 2013, 163–164). He answers this ques-
tion by averring that the Qur’an’s maintenance of absolute equality of gen-
ders at the cosmological and the ethical-spiritual domain should be sufficient
to the (Muslim) reader in recognizing the “direction in which the Qur’an
would like Muslims to upgrade the societal domain of inequality” and that
Islamic jurists failed to do so “because there was no socio-cultural develop-
ment in this direction” (Abu Zayd, 2013, 163–164). Hence, for Abu Zayd,
the normative Qur’anic ethics and values underpinning it make non-
patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics an imperative interpretation.

Mohsen Kadivar
Another important scholarly contribution to non-patriarchal Qur’anic
hermeneutics is that of Mohsen Kadivar (b.1959), who is a well know Ira-
nian scholar and former high-ranking Shi’i cleric currently teaching at Duke
University.7 In his recent writings, Kadivar has taken a strong interest in
writing on gender-just interpretations of Islam. To that effect, he has devel-
oped a certain approach to Islamic hermeneutics which is premised on a
number of hermeneutical principles discussed below.
One such principle is a conceptual differentiation between what he calls
‘traditional Islam’ and ‘Islam as an end in Itself’. Kadivar defies traditional
Islam as “the domination of the culture and exigencies of the time, place,
and special circumstances of the Age of the Revelation as the immutable,
sacred, and idealized framework for Islamic thought” (2011, 459). As a
result of this “retrospective utopia”, any reform efforts are only meaningful
insofar as they are able to mimic these conditions (Kadivar, 2011, 459). On
the other hand, ‘Islam as an end in itself’ goes well beyond “the temporal
and spatial conditions of the age in which the religion arose” and views
religiosity “through the cognition and realization of the spirit of religion and
the goals of Islam” (Kadivar, 2011, 160).
The core teachings of this understanding of Islam are based on reasonable-
ness, justice, and facilitation of public interest in accordance with modern
human rights-era consciousness. In this context, Kadivar (Kadivar, 2011) avers:

by accepting the Perspective of Islam as an End in Itself, the actual teach-

ings of Islam will not be ranged against justice, the way of reasonable
178 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
people, and modernity. Moreover, the commandments of the shari’a will
become a path towards the spread of justice, the achievement of the
criteria of the reasonable (‘uqala’i), and advocacy of the public
interest.
(482)

Another hermeneutical mechanism Kadivar employs for engendering gender-

just interpretations is a maqasid or spiritually oriented approach to Islamic
jurisprudence. As alluded to above, Kadivar’s definition of ‘Islam as an end
in itself’ places a very strong emphasis on the idea of the objectives or goals
of Islam. Kadivar considers that only this approach can truly serve the
“faith’s lofty purposes”, as it emphasizes “the essence of religious teaching
(Kadivar, 2011, 460). For this to take place, new dynamic jurisprudence
(known in Iran as fiqi-e puya) needs to be constructed which stresses the
“meaning and the spirit of the religion”, the “purpose of the Prophetic mis-
sion”, the “exalted objectives of Shari’a” and, above all, the “exalted goals
of the [Islamic] religion” (Matsunaga, 2011, 371).
An additional important hermeneutical principle put in place by Kadivar
pertains to the redefinition of the normative scope of “religion” itself. In this
context, Kadivar asserts that one of the aims of fiqi-e puya is to replace “the
epistemological, religio-logical and anthropological bases and premises of
the traditional exegesis of Islam” that were very ‘theo-centric’ with a human-
centric exegesis modeled in the image and spirit of a “modern conception of
a human” in which normative aspects of Islam are restricted to that of the
sphere of ‘religion’. What underlies this concept of ‘religion’ is the idea cham-
pioned by Kadivar that Islam as religion merely answers “specific needs of
human[s], not all human needs” and that, therefore, the task of religion is
to enable “faith, righteous conduct and human development” (Masunaga,
2011, 371). ‘Religion’ should not be used as a solution to all problems of
human societies. Hence Kadivar is a strong proponent of ‘minimalist fiqh’
embodied in this idea of Islam (Masunaga, 2011). Based on such a view of
a normative scope of religion, Kadivar argues that we should consider the
nature of socio-legal injunction in the Qur’an as being custom based (‘urfi)
and therefore subject to evolution.
Furthermore, Kadivar forms the view that the socio-legal injunctions in
the Qur’an have been erroneously canonized in traditional Islam into ‘fixed’
and eternal precepts of Shari’a. In order to properly distinguish between the
two, Kadivar argues that it is necessary to begin from the premise that “all
precepts of Shari’a have been enacted by the Lawgiver in accordance with
the interests of the servants of God – namely the benefit and harm to human-
kind”. It is only “those precepts whose benefits or harms are permanent such
as the obligation of fairness and the prohibition on injustice and treachery”
that are immutable. The principles “concerning actions whose goodness
(husn) may change into mischief (qubh) or vice versa” are, however, subject
to revision and reinterpretation depending upon their effect and context.
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 179
(Matsunaga, 2011, 371–374). Kadivar argues that the majority of Islamic
law precepts fall into the non-immutable category. On which methodology
does one determine which precepts are immutable and which are not? Kadi-
var answers this question by asserting that an immutable principle has to
pass three criteria in order to qualify as such. These are an ethically objectiv-
ist concept of ‘reason of humanity’ (aql-i jami-yi adamiyan); being reason-
able and just for time, place, and culture; and being better than other
solutions offered by other religions.8 Importantly, Kadivar stresses that it is
possible to identify and determine these immutable principles on the basis of
pure reason and independently of transmitted sources of knowledge (naql)
(Matsunaga, 2011, 371–374).
Kadivar has employed the above-described principles in relation to the
question of gender reform. In a recent publication, he (2013, 213) tackles
the issue of whether or not Muslims are able to faithfully “reread the Qur’an
and the traditions” through the lens of contemporary egalitarian conceptions
of justice that are premised on fundamental equality between women and
men (rather than proportional equality as per classical fiqh).
He (Kadivar, 213–214) argues that this is indeed possible if approached
from an usuli Shi’i ijtihad in foundations (al-ijtihad fi al-usul) perspective
which affirms the following premises:

1 that “the rulings (ahkam) on women in the Qur’an and the traditions
(Sunna) strongly defend the principle of justice”;
2 that these ahkam are explained by rational arguments and proofs;
3 the issue of what constitutes justice or ‘what is just’ is determined by
means of reason and philosophy-based inquiry and not by ‘principle
of religion’ since justice is prior to religion.
4 some pieces of textual evidence from sacred texts are based on the
principle of justice and are non-discriminatory in nature while others
are based on a proportional equality-based concept of justice/ethics;
5 that the vast majority of Muslim religious scholars have been men who
subscribed to proportional equality-based concepts of justice/ethics;
6 there exist biological and psychological differences between the two
opposite sexes which cannot be denied; and
7 that the only debatable/contested rulings are those which award women
on the basis of being women greater or lesser rights than men as found
in civil and penal Islamic law.

Kadivar then explores textual and rational arguments for legal equality and
inequality. In the context of examining Qur’anic arguments, he concludes
that there is no (implied) (legal) inequality in the spheres of creation, in the
hereafter, in the sphere of rights and duties; nor rewards and punishments in
both this life, the hereafter, and marital life. In relation to rational arguments
for justice in the sphere of women’s rights, Kadivar, in light of his rational
views of justice and subscription to ethical objectivism noted above, affirms
180 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
the autonomous role of reason in determining ethical values and, on this
basis, makes an argument that legal justice is ethically good and injustice and
discrimination in general and in relation to gender specifically are ethically
bad (Kadivar, 215–217).
Kadivar outlines the textual arguments for the legal superiority of men
over women as found in the Qur’an (2:228; 4:32; 4:34 and 43:18) and a
couple of hadith (one from a Sunni and the other from a Shi’I source);
engages with the views of contemporary traditional Shi’I scholars such as
Tabataba’i (d.1981), Motahhari (d.1979), and Najafabadi (d.1943) on these
issues; and argues that although these scholars agreed that classical fiqh rul-
ings on women are “essential to justice” both from a textual and rational
perspective by virtue of subscribing to an Aristotelian-like proportional view
of the justice of natural rights, they consider legal equality of men and
women to be “rationally and religiously unacceptable” (Kadivar,
217–222).
Kadivar mounts a strong critique of the views of these traditional schol-
ars on both textual and rational arguments. In relation to the latter, Kadi-
var argues that the Aristotelian notion of ‘distributive justice’ that has been
canonized in traditional Islam is outdated and must be replaced by new
ideas about distributive justice which were forged in the wake of the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution of
1789. Kadivar argues that the new distributive justice theory, which awards
all people fundamentally equal statuses, respect, and rights (the sources of
which can be interpreted as either divine or natural) and the foundation of
which is legal equality unless “there is sufficient reason for unequal treat-
ment”, is to be normative. For Kadivar, the implications of this new con-
cept of justice for women’s rights do not question the existing biological
and psychological differences between the two sexes and that, unlike in the
case of the ‘old’ Aristotelian concept of justice, these differences ought not
be used as a justification for awarding lesser rights to women (or men).
Hence, women by their very virtue of being human beings have the right
to be treated equally in a fundamental way and that positive discrimination
is the only mechanism which can supersede the new concept of justice if
sufficiently warranted. Moreover, Kadivar considers that this new post-
French Revolution concept of distributive justice and its attendant funda-
mental equality are more reasonable both on both purely rational grounds
as well as being more consistent with “the spirit of the Qur’an and Islamic
standards” (Kadivar, 222–223). In relation to the former, the arguments
Kadivar brings to the fore include the above-discussed idea of religion
being in the service of justice and not vice versa, as justice is defined on
“the basis of experience and collective and historical reason”, and that
according to contemporary egalitarian justice standards, no secondary
human characteristic, such as his/her sex, is an obstacle for legal equality
or should be used as a reason for legal discrimination. In this context,
Kadivar avers that “just as being black is no justification for legal
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 181
inferiority, so being female is also not a valid reason for legal inequality”
(Kadivar, 224). Kadivar also faults proportional justice on philosophical
grounds as it does not provide a coherent and sound explanation why the
existing differences between the sexes in and of themselves should ipso
facto be the basis of unequal rights and, finally, that in traditional Islam,
legal discrimination was not seen as unjust because fundamental equality
between the sexes was not considered the sine qua non of their concept of
justice (Ibid.).
With respect to the question of why egalitarian justice is more consistent
with the ethos of the Qur’an and Islamic ethical standards, Kadivar argues
that a proper understanding of Islam’s normative sources reveals that the
idea of a rational system of ethics, including religious/theological ethics
whose source is God and who embodies this concept of justice, is inherent
to them. In this context, Kadivar asserts:

Justice (‘adala), equity (qist) and fairness (insaf) are not defined in the
Qur’an and the Sunna, but they have been strongly advocated and
endorsed. Clearly, God supports the kind of justice that human beings
understand with their God-given reason. If God intended another mean-
ing of justice, different from ordinary meanings, He would have informed
Muslims of this new meaning . . . If egalitarian justice is the dominant
paradigm of our time, then, without doubt, justice in the Qur’an and
Sunna should be understood in this context, unless there is definite con-
textual evidence to the contrary.
(226)

Keeping the above discussion in mind, Kadivar re-reads the textual evidence
on legal differentiation between the sexes from the perspective of egalitarian
justice to argue that the rulings on women in traditional Islam are subject to
change because they are no longer just, ethical, or reasonable. He includes
men’s privilege and qiwama over women, corporal punishment of a disobedi-
ent wife, child marriage, men’s unilateral right to divorce, the differences in
women’s versus Men’s testimony, inheritance, and ‘blood money’ as some
examples.
In relation to 4: 34 and its sister verse 2:228, Kadivar forms the view that
the preference (faddala) was a result of concrete socio-economic conditions
that the Qur’an was addressing and not a scripture-bound (tawqifi) or
unquestioned (ta’abbudi) rule. In other words, it was situational and time
specific. He extends this analysis and line of thinking to all other verses and
hadith that “imply legal discrimination against women” as “situational and
not absolute premises” and that “do not affirm innate characteristics of men
and women for all time and all places” (Kadivar, 2011, 229–230). Interest-
ingly, Kadivar notes further that even if we do not accept his argument about
the temporary nature of the socio-legal injunctions/rules in the Qur’an and
hadith, the “arguments for egalitarian justice and fundamental equality are
182 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
strong enough to lead to their provisional abrogation” on the basis that their
validity has “expired” (Kadivar, 229–230).
Kadivar concludes that contemporary ideas of egalitarian justice and fun-
damental equality based on the post-French Revolution concept of distribu-
tive justice, with all of its implications for women’s rights alluded to above,
are on both rational and textual grounds preferable and to be identified as
rightfully belonging to normative Islamic teachings.

Adis Duderija
Duderija, in the context of developing a case for a scriptural hermeneutic of
Islamic feminism, has also developed a systematic non-patriarchal Qur’an-
Sunna hermeneutic which consists of the following delineating features:

i an interpreter-centred textual hermeneutics:

Duderija argues that the hermeneutical recognition of the importance of

the reader in creating meaning (in contrast to objectively retrieving mean-
ing from the text or the author’s intent) is important for both understand-
ing the patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an in the past and for its
contemporary non-patriarchal interpretations. In this context, relying on
the work of Bauer (2008) and others, Duderija notes that most classical
scholars had clear androcentric and at times, crude, patriarchal biases
through which they interpreted the foundational texts, resulting in the
engendering of patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics. On the other hand, the
idea that readers at least help create meaning, in the context of readers
whose system of ethics is based upon contemporary gender-egalitarian sys-
tem of ethics (in addition to a set of other hermeneutical mechanisms),
translates itself into the hermeneutical possibility of engendering non-
patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an.

ii a comprehensive contextualization approach to textual sources:

As discussed in the fifth chapter by comprehensive contextualization,

Duderija draws attention to the hermeneutical importance of investigat-
ing, in a methodical manner, the role of context in shaping of the very
content of the Qur’an and its worldview. For this to take place, we need
to recognize the Qur’an’s orientation towards the assumed operational
discourse of its revelational context that manifests itself in the Qur’anic
content and is reflected in the grammatical and syntactical structures
employed in the Qur’an’s language. This Qur’anically assumed opera-
tional discourse must be seen as often reflecting the prevalent religious,
cultural, social, political, and economic situation of its direct audience
(its first community of listeners and participants), upon which a dialogical
nature of the Qur’an’s discourse is premised. Duderija argues that this
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 183
context was patriarchal in nature and was mirrored as such in the Qur’an,
but ought not to be considered as normative for reasons discussed by Abu
Zayd above.

iii a thematico-holistic approach to textual sources and the dialogical

nature of the Qur’ānic discourse:

This approach is based on the premise that a proper understanding of a

Qur’an- and/or Sunna-based concept is gained only if all the relevant
verses dealing with that concept are analyzed and subsequently synthe-
sized into a larger framework of its interpretation by means of a corrobo-
rative induction. This is referred to as thematic or systematic method of
interpretation (Al-Awa, 2006). According to this view, the text is con-
ceived as being web-like within which ideas are interwoven and the task
of reading is to uncover ‘the comprehensive constant’ through thematic
and corroborative inductive approaches to textual evidence. The eventual
uncovering of ‘the comprehensive constant’ would, in turn, be the aim or
the objective of the reading/interpreting process (Mabrook in Abu Rabi’i,
2006, 280; cf. Barlas 8, 23, 41, 60, 81). Such an approach, argues Dud-
erija, reveals to us that the Qur’an mitigated existing patriarchal practices
and did not initiate them, which is strongly suggestive of the idea that
these practices are not integral to its message. A thematic-holistic approach
to interpretation actually suggests that the ‘comprehensive constant’ to all
textual evidence uncovered by such an approach amounts to an incremen-
tal, progressive improvement of the existing practices pertaining to women
on the basis of which non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics can be
developed.

iv an ethico-religious values and purposive-based interpretation (i.e. teleo-

logical hermeneutics):

Duderija forms the view that on the basis of the previous two principles, a
purposive-oriented Qur’anic hermeneutic can be developed which herme-
neutically privileges the intended meaning of the text, which is considered
to better embody the spirit or the purpose of the text rather than the actual
literal meaning itself. On this basis, an argument for the teleological nature
of Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics is advocated according to which the pri-
mary function of Islamic law (and legal philosophy in general) and the most
fundamental element in its methodological philosophy is based upon a
realization and fulfillment of its purposes (maqasid), which, in turn, are
identified on the basis of a legal theoretical methodology that hermeneuti-
cally privileges a rationalist, ethico-religious, values-based approach to the
interpretation of the Qur’an. In this case, a patriarchal Qur’an hermeneutic
would be contrary to the relevant legal determinations based on such an
approach.
184 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
v a non-salafi-based weltanschauung:

Duderija also deconstructs the concept of Salafism in traditional Muslim

thought, as discussed in the second chapter, which implies a subscription
to an epistemologically entirely pre-modern episteme that lacks internal
hermeneutical mechanisms to incorporate ethical values and a system of
ethics that were not prevalent at the time of the formative and classical
periods of Islamic thought into its ethical and legal canon (Duderija, 2010).
In part because of its salafi weltanschauung, the classical Muslim thought
considers this ethical system to be reflective of Divine Will and as such the
most just system there could ever be. Hence, no evolution of thinking with
respect to possible evolution of theories of ethics occurred in classical
Islamic thought and its contemporary manifestations. In this context, Dud-
erija argues that the entire edifice of this traditional/classical/pre-modern
Islamic law, legal theory, and ethics was based on an Aristotelian, ethical
voluntarist-based system of ethics.9 This system of ethics awarded women
an ontologically, ethically, legally, religiously, socially, and politically infe-
rior status vis-à-vis men.
However, a rejection of this salafi worldview on the basis of an ethically
objectivist, post-Aristotelian system of ethics and progressive (in the sense of
possibility of change)10 worldview, informed by contemporary discussions
on gender justice considered to be embodying the spirit and values of the
Qur’an and Sunna, is possible. The adoption of such a worldview and system
of ethics as a theoretical lens through which the Qur’an (and Sunna) are
interpreted would enable non-patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an (and
Sunna) (Duderija, 2015).
So far we have described major hermeneutical mechanisms by three pro-
gressive Muslim scholars which can aid us in developing non-patriarchal
Qur’anic hermeneutics. As it is widely known, the Islamic tradition came to
recognize the concept of sunna/hadith as an additional normative source of
Islamic ethics and law. In the next section, I examine important hermeneuti-
cal mechanisms progressive Muslim scholars have developed in relation to
non-patriarchal interpretations of the hadith literature.

Non-patriarchal sunna/hadith hermeneutics

With respect to non-patriarchal sunna/hadith hermeneutics, I outline the
views of Khaled Abou El Fadl, Sa’diyya Shaikh, Faqihuddin Abdolkodir, and
Adis Duderija.

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Khaled Abou El Fadl (b.1963) is one of the most distinguished scholars of
Islamic law today.11 He is also one of the few progressive Muslim scholars
who has fully engaged with the postmodern episteme, post-enlightenment
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 185
hermeneutics, and literary theory, as well as applied them in relation to gen-
der issues in Islam.12 Much of his Qur’anic hermeneutics and approach to
Islamic jurisprudence is in agreement with those of Abu Zayd and Kadivar,
and need not be repeated. However, El Fadl’s work also includes discussions
pertaining to (in)determinacy of meaning, ambiguity of textual hermeneu-
tics, and the process of meaning derivation as employed, for example, in
literary theory and semiotics (which he has applied to both Qur’an and
hadith texts) (El Fadl, 2001, 88). El Fadl has systematically engaged in these
discussions and has applied them to the issue of women’s rights in Islam.
With reference to determinacy of meaning process, El Fadl makes a distinc-
tion between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘authoritative’ textual hermeneutics. To
substantiate this distinction, El Fadl cites Qur’anic verses upholding the prin-
ciple of God’s Sovereignty and Omnipotence, as well as the ontological rela-
tionship between The Creator and the created, namely that of the Lord and
His vicegerent. In this context, he claims that due to this very hierarchy in
the natural order, the human representatives of God on earth can never self-
identify themselves with God’s intent or profess to have grasped His Knowl-
edge beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity – a practice that has, in his
opinion, become quite widespread among present-day authorities on reli-
gious issues (El Fadl, 2001, 170–177). In this context, he asserts that the
prevalent ‘Wahhabo-Salafi’ ‘authoritarian hermeneutics’ is oblivious to the
intricate and subtle relationships existing between the author, text, and
reader regulating the process of determinacy of meaning of God’s indicators
(adilla), and thus is guilty of equating the author’s intent with that of the
reader, thereby violating the principles inherent to the Qur’anic weltanschau-
ung and its ethico-religious foundation.
In contrast, El-Fadl, in affinity with the views of Saeed,13 proposes a more
balanced approach when engaging in the task of interpreting texts in which
neither the author’s intent, the language, nor the reader have the upper hand
in determining the meaning that he terms ‘authoritative’. It is the balance
between these three which upholds the ‘inherent ambiguity’ embedded in the
textual sources, thus acting as an anti-authoritarian interpretative measure.
He advocates what Umberto Eco (1979) has termed as ‘an open’ (versus
closed) interpretation which is capable of sustaining ‘multiple interpretative
strategies’. El Fadl terms this ‘authoritative hermeneutics’.
Importantly, El Fadl (2001) applies some of these insights to deconstruct
misogynist interpretations of Islamic law as espoused by contemporary Saudi
Arabian scholars (whom he refers to at times as ‘puritans’ or ‘Wahhabo-
Salafis’), especially those based on a particular approach to and interpreta-
tion of hadith literature.
In this context, El Fadl (2005) elsewhere asserts:

The consistent practice of puritans is to collect, publish, and disperse

traditions, attributed to the Prophet or the Companions, that are
demeaning to women. Such collections act as a foundation for issuing
186 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
deprecating determinations in regard to women. Muhammad bin ‘Abd
al-Wahhab himself, the founder of the Wahhabi movement, set the prec-
edent by collecting a group of these women-deprecating traditions and
listing them under the subheading “Living with Women.” But these
women-deprecating traditions, without exception, are of weak authen-
ticity, if not pure fabrications . . . The traditions utilized by the puritans
invariably are of a single transmission, which means that the possibility
exists that the Prophet actually authored them, but the possibility is
remote and far-fetched.
(257–258)

Apart from this epistemological critique of the hadith body of literature, El

Fadl, importantly, has introduced some novel hermeneutical principles in the
evaluation of authenticity of the hadith which go outside of those established
by the classical hadith sciences and has applied them to argue for gender-just
interpretations of Islam.
The concepts of ‘multiple authorship’ and ‘authorial enterprise’ are such
an example. According to El Fadl, the term ‘authorial enterprise’ refers to
the process of determining to what extent the Prophet’s role in the historical
transmission of the report can safely be established. In this context, he argues
that when evaluating reports attributed to the Prophet, we need to keep in
mind that these reports are a result of what a number of Companions have
“seen/heard, recollected, selected, transmitted and authenticated in a non-
objective medium”, hence they have multiple authorship. This view is further
supported by classical Islamic scholarship’s view of hadith as not being the
actual words of the Prophet but recollections and interpretations of the
Prophet’s words which (often/sometimes/at times) retained the core meaning
by the individuals reporting them. Hence, hadith can be a result of several
authors and various collateral influences, each impacting upon both the
structure and the meaning of the report. Therefore, in each report, a person-
ality of the transmitter is indelibly imprinted, a process he terms ‘authorial
enterprise’ (El Fadl, 2001, 88). El Fadl (2014, 316–317) argues that due to
this nature of the hadith, “it is virtually impossible to attribute any specific
report to a particular person in history, whether the Prophet or any of the
early generations of Muslims”. Rather, these reports, which might retain
kernels of truth from the Prophet, are more indicative of the memory of the
early generations of Muslims and the contesting ideological currents that
were prevalent at the time.14
Additionally, El Fadl applies another regulatory mechanism relating to the
normative effect of hadith reports. According to this rule, reports having
“widespread moral, legal, or social implications” must be of the highest rank
of authority and “require [the] heaviest burden of proof” (El Fadl, 2001,
89). When approached with certain morally repugnant but ‘sound’ hadith
(from the perspective of classical hadith sciences, ‘ulum ul hadith) that has
wide-ranging implications for society, the proof must be the highest
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 187
otherwise the hadith will not be considered as normative. Lastly, when deal-
ing with morally repugnant hadith (e.g. misogynist), as the very last meth-
odological resort, El Fadl introduces the concept of a ‘conscientious pause’,
which is a faith-based objection to textual evidence based upon the overall
understanding of the Qur’an-Sunna weltanschauung and its élan/ethos (El
Fadl, 2001, 93). He utilizes these hermeneutical principles to reject the nor-
mative nature of misogynistic hadith that are relied on Saudi Arabian schol-
ars to deny gender-just interpretations of Islam (El Fadl, 2001).

Sa’diyya Shaikh
Shaikh is another prominent progressive scholar who has offered us system-
atic non-patriarchal interpretations of the hadith literature. Anchored in a
fundamental commitment to justice as a spiritual core of Islam and inspired
by a feminist hermeneutic derived from this spiritual core, Shaikh critiques
the implicit androcentric and patriarchal gender ideologies embedded in a
selection of hadith found in a traditionally highly esteemed hadith collection,
Sahih of Bukhari. She (2012, 26–27) elsewhere terms this approach as a
feminist ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ which “exposes discriminatory struc-
tures and values embedded within texts emerging from an exclusively male
experiential reality”.
Importantly, on the basis of a ’hermeneutics of reconstruction’ (2012, 27),
she also teases out gender-egalitarian interpretations of the same hadith
which run contrary to the dominant one to show “how these texts have
potential to not only buttress the functioning patriarchy but also provide
alternative liberatory positions of gender within the legacy” (Shaikh, 2004,
99). In this regard, Shaikh (2004, 99) argues that her approach represents
“part of an Islamic feminist approach that destabilizes patriarchal gender
constructs and provides alternative approaches to the tradition informed by
a religious commitment to gender justice”. As such it offers counter-narratives
to dominant constructions of gender-unjust ideologies. Her method is best
described as contextualist and is based on a critical, feminist analysis15 that
is sensitive to the manner in which hadith literature is viewed as a vista
through which the reader gains an insight into the competing and contesting
gender dynamics during the formative period of the Islamic civilization char-
acterized by a tension between the budding Islamic gender-egalitarian ethos
and the established and aggressive androcentric Arab culture (Shaikh, 2004,
100). She argues that the strong androcentric model of an ideal human being
that permeates classical Islamic thought and that, in contemporary Muslim
thought is often taken by many for granted, is contrary to the very core of
gender-egalitarian Qur’anic ethics. Based on her contextualist, feminist
‘hermeneutics of suspicion and deconstruction’, Shaikh advocates for an
alternative ‘religious anthropology’ of a human person in Islam in “which
humanity, male and female, is presented in ways that are holistic, non-
hierarchical and egalitarian” (Shaikh, 2004, 107).
188 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
Faqihuddin Kodir
A contemporary Indonesian progressive Muslim scholar, Kodir is another
important contributor to a non-patriarchal approach to hadith literature.
Kodir’s starting premise is that classical hadith sciences and principles of
Islamic jurisprudence contain useful mechanisms for a contextualist reading
of hadith on the basis of which gender-just interpretations of the same can
be developed. The contextualist interpretation of hadith for Kodir entails a
critical reading of the hadith by means of ijtihad of the text (matn) of the
hadith conceived of as a linguistic text that functions within a certain cultural
environment. If approached as such, Kodir (2013, 176) forms the view that
the meanings of hadith can yield a number of different interpretations, some
of which are commensurable with gender-just interpretations/meanings.
Adopting this contextualist approach, Kodir (2007, 1–25; cf. 2013) argues
that the proper interpretation of hadith is obtained by evaluating them with
respect to the original socio-political contexts in which they were embedded
and by inquiring into the circumstance behind the emergence of hadith, a
classical hadith science known as ‘ilm asbab al-wurud. This is especially so
in relation to hadith pertaining to gender issues. In this context, Kodir (2007)
states:

The hadith regarding relations between men and women are windows
into a particular socio-cultural reality. These texts must therefore be
understood to be based on the logic of the historical role they played in
furthering justice and the general welfare of specific communities.
(25)

Kodir also makes use of the hermeneutical principle of corroborative induc-

tion (istiqra’) to hadith interpretation as a pre-requisite for their proper inter-
pretation. In this context, Kodir (2007, xx–xxi) laments the lack of such an
approach in traditional scholarship by stating that “in essence, certain hadith
and indeed, specific decisions by the Prophet have been typically selectively
invoked as authoritative references instead of being examined comprehen-
sively and in totality.”
Kodir is therefore of the opinion that Qur’an-hadith texts are to be inter-
preted and applied according to the broader transformative spirit that char-
acterizes the Qur’an and the hadith as a whole by resorting to a thematic and
holistic approach to the interpretation of hadith.16
Kodir also applies teleological hermeneutics to hadith texts, arguing that
hadith pertaining to gender issues should be read in accordance with their
underlying objectives which take form in certain ethico-religious values such
as justice, equality, and mercy, understood and conceptualized in ethically
objectivist terms. In this context, Kodir asserts that in respect to gender
issues, references to the hadith must be approached from the perspective of
being aware of the crucial values the Prophet Muhammad’s message entailed,
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 189
including the oneness of Allah, the equality of all human beings (rich or poor,
men or women), justice, and mercy (Kodir, 2007, xxi). The principles of
justice and equality in particular play a prominent role in this type of reason-
ing and interpreting of hadith (Kodir, 2013, 171). Kodir (2007) laments that
this approach to interpretation of hadith is lacking today, as evident from
the following quote:

Contemporary interpretations of many [of these] hadith continue to

engender inequality and unfairness in the relationship between men and
women. This inequality, moreover, violates the most fundamental prin-
ciples of the Qur’an and the hadith.
(23)

Kodir therefore calls for a new ‘interpretive paradigm’ of the hadith that
seeks to establish are in accordance with the contemporary conceptualiza-
tions of gender justice, as this is in accordance with the most fundamental
values and teachings of Islam, the most important of which are tawhid and
the overarching message brought to us by the Prophet Muhammad based on
justice, equality, and mercy (Kodir, 2007, xix).

Adis Duderija
Finally, Duderija has developed a systematic hermeneutic of Sunna that is
conceptually, hermeneutically, and epistemologically independent of the con-
cept of a sound hadith and hermeneutically linked to that of Qur’anic herme-
neutics. Duderija argues that it is within the confines of this Qur’an-Sunna
hermeneutic that the function and normative value of hadith in Islamic
thought is to be assessed. In this respect, Duderija (2007; 2009) outlines his
methodology as follows:

a acknowledge the hermeneutically symbiotic and interdependent rela-

tionship between Qur’an and Sunnah that existed during the early
formative period of Islamic thought;
b take into account the conceptually and hermeneutically independent
relationship between Sunna and Hadith and, by implication, that of
Qur’an and Sunna that was evident during the early formative period
of Islamic thought;
c recognize that the classical formulation of usul ul fiqh theory did not
make the distinction in a.) and b.), engendering a largely hadith-centred
Qur’ano-Sunnaic usul ul fiqh theory.
d acknowledge that, in the final analysis, contemporary debates on the
assessment and evaluation of the function and the significance of the
hadith body of knowledge in Islamic thought are not to remain solely
within the theoretico-epistemological framework of the classical ulum
ul hadith sciences under the purview of the classically trained
190 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics
muhadithun (or the western Muslim and non-Muslim scholars operat-
ing within the same), but that these scholarly discourses need to be
closely linked to the questions relating to the development of Qur’anic
(or more precisely Qur’ano-Sunnaic) hermeneutic models (i.e. usul ul
fiqh sciences). In this context, the most fruitful assessment and evalu-
ation of the value and the significance of each hadith will not solely
be conceptualized a priori in terms of its authenticity/reliability or its
epistemological value, but by how its message/text fits into an overall
broader hierarchically structured Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutic model. So
the crucial question or questions, in this context, is/are not just whether
or not a particular hadith has an impeccable isnad or if is it a mutawatir
hadith, but what are the delineating features and underlying method-
ological and epistemological assumptions governing the interpretational
processes of a certain scholar pertaining to conceptualization and
interpretation of the nature and scope of the Qur’anic and Sunnahic
bodies of knowledge who uses this particular hadith in order to argue
a particular point of view and where does, according to his/her her-
meneutic, hadith fit into it.

Duderija has employed this understating of Qur’an-Sunna-hadith dynamics

to argue that the patriarchal interpretations of the hadith (and the Qur’an)
are not in accordance with the concept of Sunna as the concept was under-
stood during much of the formative period of Islam (Duderija, 2013).

Conclusion
A number of progressive Muslim scholars have developed very systematic
and sophisticated non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna/hadith hermeneutical mod-
els which affirm gender-just interpretations of Islam and counter the preva-
lent patriarchal alternatives. These non-patriarchal Qur’an-Sunna
hermeneutical models are characterized by rationalist, contextualist-driven,
and holistic hermeneutics which privilege a purposive and values-based
approach to the Islamic tradition, as embodied in certain values considered
to form the very core and spirit of Islam such as justice, fairness, and mercy
whose meanings are neither premised on nor confined to their pre-modern
conceptualizations.

Notes
1 In this context, she again acknowledges her intellectual debt to F. Rahman’s
double movement theory. See chapter six.
2 Amina Wadud coined the term ‘the tawhidic paradigm’ in Wadud (2006, 24).
3 Defined as “father-rule and/or a politics of male privilege based in theories of
sexual differentiation” (Barlas 2002, 93).
4 See chapter six.
5 Which in Abu Zayd’s view is an important element in the Qurʾanic ethic.
 Non-patriarchal Islamic hermeneutics 191
6 Which Abu Zayd translates as “responsible for” females.
7 http://en.kadivar.com/
8 In this context, he states as follows:
“All commandments regarding criminal law and penal code, civil law (includ-
ing family rules and non-criminal personal law), international affairs, and basic
law, some of which are rooted in the Qurʾān and the Sunna (tradition), are con-
sidered to be in the realm of the fiqh of human interactions. All these command-
ments were absolutely wise, just, moral and reasonable at the time they were
issued, or they would not have been issued by the Legislator. Not a single one of
these commandments was considered oppressive, violent, immoral or unreason-
able in the common usage of reasonable people of the Age of Revelation. These
commandments were legislated to achieve justice and advocate human communi-
ties’ worldly interests. On the other hand, one may not deny that human issues,
particularly in the spheres of the social and human communities’ common usage
(‘urf) have been severely transformed and that many things which were consid-
ered just, moral, reasonable and normal in centuries past would be considered
oppressive, immoral, abnormal, and contrary to the way of reasonable people
(sīra-yi uqalā).” Kadivar (2011, 478–479).
9 That is, that ethical value terms mean only what is approved or disapproved,
commanded, or forbidden by God. In terms of Islamic legal theory, this would
translate into a view that all ethico-moral and legal rules must ultimately be
derived from prescriptions enunciated by God.
10 See chapters two and three in this study.
11 He is the Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the
UCLA School of Law. He is also the Chair of the Islamic Studies Interdepartmen-
tal Program at UCLA. https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/
khaled-m-abou-el-fadl/
12 Cf. chapter six and the work of Abdullah Saeed.
13 See chapter six.
14 For more on epistemology-based criticism of hadith in general by El Fadl, see
chapter two.
15 Shaikh (2004, 100) defines this method in simple terms as a “theory or method
for interpretation which is sensitive to and critical of sexism”. Elsewhere she
(2012, 26) describes her feminist hermeneutics as a combination of “hermeneutic
of suspicion that critically analyzes patriarchal biases in the texts and destabilizes
accepted interpretations of ‘truth’ ”.
16 He has employed a similar approach to hadith interpretation in his more recent
work (Kodir, 2013).
Conclusion
The future of progressive Islam

As a world-embracing tradition, it [Islam] inspires and sustains a public

theology based on concern for others. It continues to motivate moral con-
duct through its normatively founded emphasis on equality in creation,
thereby establishing norms for the universal human cultural heritage. As a
significant force in shaping the presuppositions of universal world civiliza-
tion and as a cultural tradition that has shaped and adjusted its own moral
understandings in different social and political environments, this Islam
seeks guidance from its own history. Consequently, it can critically evalu-
ate its own heritage in regard to the rights of religious minorities and the
place of women in society, being guided by its own experience in history
and general progress in moral reflection. This genre of Islam seeks to avoid
raising historical contingencies to the status of authoritatively normative
models and accepts the role of time and place in interpretive relativism as
part of general progress toward relevant appropriation of Islamic beliefs
and practices.
(Sachedina, 2008, 155)

The rather lengthy epigraph/quote given above aptly summarizes most of the
arguments this book has been concerned with. The imperative of adopting
a creative and critical approach to knowledge by means of epistemological
and methodological openness; the possibility of epistemological, moral, and
ethical progress; the imperative of the gender justice and non-patriarchal
interpretations of Islam as examples of rediscovering the ethical in Islamic
law; the utmost concern for the rights of all, especially those on the margins
and the vulnerable, and a willingness to defend and resist their usurpation
by means of embodying the exemplar of Prophetic ethical practice; and non-
monopolization of religious truth and a contextualist approach to the nor-
mative fountainheads grounded in a concept of God rooted in justice,
goodness, mercy, and beauty.
The future of progressive Islam, in my assessment, will be intimately linked
to finding ways of remaining true to these imperatives and walking the walk,
not just talking the talk. Indeed, Mandaville (2003, 34), in my view, correctly
argues that the future success of progressive Islam will not so much depend
 Conclusion 193
on “promoting an ever-proliferating roster of innovative hermeneuticians –
but rather in gaining an understanding of how the general tendencies of this
reformist impulse circulate in the daily practice of Muslim masses at the
grassroots level”.
Progressive Muslims firmly believe that the Islamic tradition (turath), if
approached and conceptualized in harmony with these imperatives, has the
necessary intellectual resources to turn them into a tangible and concrete
reality. This process, of course, will be long and arduous, but the journey
and the desired destination, I am convinced, will be very worthwhile. In this
context, the following words of El Fadl (2015) are as comforting as they are
instructive:

I want to emphasize that I do believe that in the age of epistemic anxiety

and disorientation, the Islamic tradition can play a critical role in anchor-
ing and rooting contemporary Muslims. The role of the Islamic tradition
goes well beyond functioning as a temperate instrument of preservation
and restoration. The Islamic tradition can serve as a catalyst for hope
and moral progress, and it can play a dynamic role in treating the social
ailments that afflict the collective Muslim psyche. But of course, this all
depends on the meaning or kind of Islamicates (or Islamiyyat) that are
understood and pursued by contemporary Muslims.
(474)

Embedding the imperatives directly into a particular vision of the normative

Islamic weltanschauung is absolutely crucial for progressive Islam and those
Muslims who adhere to it because it reflects their confidence in the resilience
and resourcefulness of the turath and its ability to find constructive and
meaningful answers to the manifold contemporary and future challenges
(progressive) Muslims will encounter. Moreover, since the imperatives of
progressive Islam are premised on the idea of a uniquely Muslim contribu-
tion to broader universal discourses, grafting these imperatives self-
consciously in the turath will, hopefully, lead to the recognition of the Islamic
tradition as an important and constructive contributor to these very
discourses.
Finally, Mandaville (2003, 34) aptly notes that “progressive Islam is
indeed alive and well (and, more importantly, growing) in the wider Muslim
world” and that many of the progressive Muslim scholars whose scholarship
embodies the imperatives of progressive Islam (as, for example, described in
this book) “are representative – rather than exclusively generative – of ideas
that already permeate Muslim communities”. Although this book focused
on the ideas developed by a handful of the main theoretician and representa-
tives of progressive Islam, progressive Islam and its imperatives are embodied
by many (progressive) Muslims throughout the world to whom, incidentally,
this book is dedicated with much hope for a better future for all Muslims
and non-Muslims alike.
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Index

Abou El Fadl, Khaled: on the concept Fish, Stanley 2, 6

of episteme of reasonableness 48–9; fitna: women as sources of 150–1, 167
on concept of human rights in Islam
112–16; on (Qur’an’s) epistemology gender-justice: definition of 148–9
46–8; view on ahl-al hadith, ulum ul gender oppositionality 149–50
hadith and sunna 46 Gutiérrez, Gustavo 75–7, 86, 96
Abu Hamid Al Ghazali 28–30
Abu Ishaq Al Shatibi 20 Hanafi, Hasan: as proponent of Islamic
ahl al-hadith 33, 46 liberation theology 91–4
Akhtar, Shabbir: as proponent of
Islamic liberation theology 94–7 Islamic feminism 158–63
Al-Jabiri, Muhammad: on concept of Islamic humanism 12, 163
human rights in Islam 100–6 Islamic modernism 23–5, 39–40
Amin, Samir 77–8 Islamic postmodernism 40
asala (authenticity) 16, 38 Islamic traditionalism 38–9
ittiba’ 38
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 12, 21
Benhabib Seyla 12 Juergensmeyer, Mark 31
bida’a 38
Kamali, Hashim: maqasid al shari’a
critical traditionalism 27–8 driven Qur’an-Sunna hermeneutics
138–45
Dabashi, Hamid 78–9 Kant, Emmanuel 3, 64–5
De Sousa Santos, Boaventura 14, 100, 120 Koselleck, Reinhart 14
dogmatic traditionalism 22–3
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba: critique of neo-
Elliot, T.S. 14–15 traditional gender cosmology 152–5;
Engineer, Ali Ashgar: as proponent of views on Islamic feminism 160–2;
Islamic liberation theology 80–4 work with Musawa 163–5
epistemological cosmopolitanism 7 Moosa, Ebrahim: on concept of human
Esack, Farid: as proponent of Islamic rights in Islam 112–19; on critical
liberation theology 84–90; work with traditionalism/progressive Islam
Positive Muslims 165–6 10–30
Eshkevari, Hassan, Y.: alternative Musawah 163–4
gender model for gender relations Mu’tazila 33, 50, 153
156–8; critique of neo-traditional
gender cosmology 155–6 non-patriarchal Qur’anic hermeneutics:
ethical voluntarism 123 definition of 169; in thought of Adis
ethic of pluralism 56–7 Duderija 182–4; in thought of Amina
206 Index
Wadud 170–2; in thought of Asma Saeed, Abdullah: model for contextualist
Barlas 173–5; in thought of Mohsen reading of the Qur’an 126–38
Kadivar 177–82; in thought of Nasr salafi see salafism
Hamid Abu Zayd 175–7 salafism 35–8, 184
non-patriarchal sunna/hadith salaf ul salih see salafism
hermeneutics 184; in thought of salvation of non-Muslim Other 57–9
Adis Duderija 189–90; in thought of secular/secularization/secularity 5, 19,
Faqihuddin Abdolkodir 188–9; in 103, 111, 162
thought of Khaled Abou El Fadl Sharur, Muhammad: approach to
184–7; in thought of Sa’diyya epistemology 41–4; concept of sunna
Shaikh 187 44–5; critique of salafism/salafi
worldview
Positive Muslims: theology of social hermeneutics 1, 2, 148, 163, 165
compassion 165–6 Soroush, Abdolkarim: criticism of
Prado, Abdenur 77 traditional Islamic epistemology 51;
as proponent of critical realism 50–1;
Ramadan, Tariq: philosophy of on religious pluralism 60–7; theory
pluralism 67–71; theory of dual of expansion and contraction of
nature of revelation 71–2 knowledge 52–3
religio perennialis 70
Rousseau, Jacque 102 taqlid 37–8, 144
text fundamentalism 20–1, 25
Sachedina, Adulaziz: on concept of traditional Islamic epistemology/ies
human rights in Islam 106–12 32–5