1 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

ORIN SNYDER (pro hac vice)

2 [email protected]
200 Park Avenue
3 New York, New York 10166
Telephone: 212.351.4000
4 Facsimile: 212.351.4035

5 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

ILISSA SAMPLIN, SBN 314018
6 [email protected]
DANIEL NOWICKI, SBN 304716
7 [email protected]
333 South Grand Avenue
8 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
Telephone: 213.229.7000
9 Facsimile: 213.229.7520

10 Attorneys for Defendant Range Media Partners, LLC

11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

12 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

13 CREATIVE ARTISTS AGENCY, LLC, CASE NO. 24SMCV04697

14 Plaintiff, UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

15 v. RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC’S

NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION
16 RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC, a limited TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO AND
liability company and DOES 1-50, MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S
17 COMPLAINT
Defendants.
18 ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE
MARK A. YOUNG IN DEPARTMENT M
19
HEARING:
20 Date: August 5, 2025
Time: 8:30 a.m.
21 Dept.: M
Judge: Hon. Mark A. Young
22 RES ID: 225680025342

23 Complaint Filed: October 1, 2024

Trial Date: None Set
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Crutcher LLP RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 5, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this

3 matter may be heard, in Department M, of the above-captioned Court, located at 1725 Main Street,

4 Santa Monica, California 90401, Defendant Range Media Partners, LLC, by and through its counsel of

5 record, does and will generally demur to plaintiff’s Complaint and all causes of action alleged therein,

6 and, if the Court does not sustain the demurrer as to the entirety of the first cause of action, moves in

7 the alternative to strike the first cause of action.

8 More specifically, as set forth fully in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and

9 Authorities, plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of California business and professions code section

10 17200, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contractual relations,

11 and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage are each subject to demurrer under Code

12 of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), because the claims are either preempted, filed in the

13 wrong tribunal, or defective as a matter of law because CAA lacks standing to bring the claim.

14 In the alternative, if the Court does not sustain Range’s demurrer as to the entirety of the first

15 cause of action for violation of California business and professions code section 17200, Range moves

16 to strike the remainder of the cause of action as legally deficient and not drawn in conformity with the

17 laws of this state. Specifically, Range moves to strike paragraphs 103 through 118 of the Complaint

18 in their entirety, on the grounds that the contents sought to be stricken constitute “irrelevant” or

19 “improper matter” and are “not drawn in or filed in conformity with the laws of this state,” pursuant to

20 Code of Civil Procedure 436, subdivisions (a) & (b).

21 Counsel for Range met and conferred with counsel for plaintiff about the substantive defects in

22 the Complaint on January 21, 2025, and the parties were unable to reach agreement. (See Samplin

23 Declaration, filed herewith.)

24 This Demurrer and Motion to Strike is based on this Notice, the accompanying Demurrers, the

25 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all records and pleadings on file with the Court

26 in this matter, all further evidence, briefing, and argument that may be presented at or before the hearing

27 on the Demurrer and Motion to Strike, and such other matters as the Court may properly consider.

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 1
DATED: January 27, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
2
By: /s/ Orin Snyder
3
Orin Snyder
4 Ilissa Samplin
Daniel Nowicki
5
Counsel for Defendant Range Media
6 Partners, LLC
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 1 RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC DEMURRERS TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

2 DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

3 (VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 17200)

4 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), Range demurs to plaintiff’s first

5 cause of action on the ground that plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

6 against Range under the governing law. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,

7 subdivision (a), Range also demurs to plaintiff’s first cause of action on the ground that the Court has

8 no jurisdiction over the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Pursuant to Code of

9 Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (b), Range also demurs to plaintiff’s first cause of action

10 on the ground that the person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

11 DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

12 (AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES)
13 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), Range demurs to plaintiff’s second
14 cause of action on the ground that plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
15 against Range under the governing law.
16
DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
17
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS)
18
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), Range demurs to plaintiff’s third
19
cause of action on the ground that plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
20
against Range under the governing law.
21
DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
22
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE)
23
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), Range demurs to plaintiff’s fourth
24
cause of action on the ground that plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
25
against Range under the governing law. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
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subdivision (a), Range also demurs to plaintiff’s first cause of action on the ground that the Court has
27
no jurisdiction over the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
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 1 PRAYER

2 Wherefore, Range prays:

3 1. That plaintiff takes nothing by reason of the Complaint;

4 2. That Range’s Demurrer to the Complaint and the specific causes of action set forth
5 therein be sustained;
6 3. That plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend; and
7 4. For any other further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
8

9 DATED: January 27, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

10 By: /s/ Orin Snyder

11 Orin Snyder
Ilissa Samplin
12 Daniel Nowicki

13 Counsel for Defendant Range Media

Partners, LLC
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 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Page
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
3
II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT........................................................................................... 6
4
A. The Complaint’s Allegations .................................................................................... 6
5
B. CAA’s Causes of Action .......................................................................................... 7
6
III. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 8
7
IV. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 9
8
A. CAA’s UCL Claim (Count 1) Fails .......................................................................... 9
9
1. CUTSA Preempts CAA’s UCL Claims Related To Confidential
10 Information .................................................................................................. 9
11 2. CAA Cannot Use The UCL To Improperly Bring TAA Claims In Court ...... 11
12 3. CAA Cannot Complain About Whether Range Contracts With The
WGA ......................................................................................................... 12
13
B. CUTSA Preempts CAA’s Aiding And Abetting And Interference With
14 Contract Claims (Counts 2 and 3) ........................................................................... 13
15 C. CAA’s IIPEA Claim (Count 4) Must Be Brought Before The Labor
Commissioner ........................................................................................................ 13
16
D. Leave To Amend Should Not Be Granted ............................................................... 14
17
V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 15
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 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
2
Cases
3
1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn., Inc. v. Appellate Div. of Superior Court (2018)
4 28 Cal. App. 5th 1146 ................................................................................................................ 8
5 Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park (2013)
220 Cal. App. 4th 495 ................................................................................................................ 9
6
Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009)
7 171 Cal. App. 4th 336 ......................................................................................4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14
8 C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984)
163 Cal.App.3d 1055 ................................................................................................................. 6
9
California Dep’t of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Ct. (2020)
10 48 Cal. App. 5th 922 .................................................................................................................. 8
11 Casterson v. Superior Court (2002)
101 Cal. App. 4th 177 ................................................................................................................ 8
12
Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999)
13 20 Cal. 4th 163 ........................................................................................................................ 12
14 ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2019)
369 F. Supp. 3d 983 ................................................................................................................... 9
15
Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Ct. (2014)
16 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395 ............................................................................................................ 14
17 Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010)
182 Cal. App. 4th 247 ............................................................................................... 5, 12, 13, 15
18
Extreme Reach, Inc. v. Spotgenie Partners, LLC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2014)
19 2014 WL 12781769 ................................................................................................................. 10
20 Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp. (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1295 ................................................................................................................ 8
21
Ivanoff v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2017)
22 9 Cal. App. 5th 719 .................................................................................................................. 15
23 K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 939 .......................................................................................................9, 10, 13
24
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003)
25 29 Cal. 4th 1134 ...................................................................................................................... 14
26 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011)
51 Cal. 4th 310 .......................................................................................................................... 4
27
Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi (2008)
28 42 Cal. 4th 974 .......................................................................................................................... 2

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 1 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011)
782 F. Supp. 2d 911 ................................................................................................................... 9
2
NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014)
3 41 F. Supp. 3d 816 .................................................................................................... 9, 11, 13, 14

4 PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995)

33 Cal. App. 4th 1680 ................................................................................................................ 8
5
Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006)
6 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256 .............................................................................................................. 8

7 Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp. (2010)

184 Cal. App. 4th 210 ................................................................................................................ 4
8
Styne v. Stevens (2001)
9 26 Cal. 4th 42 .......................................................................................................................... 12

10 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Health IQ, LLC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013)
2013 WL 12132029 ........................................................................................................... 4, 5, 9
11
Unified Grocers, Inc. v. VM Int’l, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020)
12 2020 WL 5370622 ..................................................................................................................... 9

13 Velez v. Smith (2006)

142 Cal. App. 4th 1154 .............................................................................................................. 8
14
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc. (1995)
15 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 .................................................................................................................. 2

16 William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers Guild of Am.

(C.D. Cal.) 2:19-cv-05465-AB-AFM.......................................................................................... 2
17
William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers Guild of Am. (C.D. Cal. 2020)
18 478 F. Supp. 3d 932 ................................................................................................................... 1

19 Statutes

20 Bus. & Prof. Code §16600 ............................................................................................................... 2

21 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10 (e)...................................................................................................... 8

22 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §12022........................................................................................................ 11

23 Labor Code §1700.44, subd.(c) ...................................................................................................... 11

24 Other Authorities

25 CPI, CAA-ICM Merger Delayed Amid DOJ Scrutiny, COMPETITION POLICY

INTERNATIONAL, January 17, 2022, https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/doj-
26 stop-antitrust-probe-of-creative-artists-agencys-acquisition/ ........................................................ 1

27 Isaac Chotiner, Seducing the A-List, SLATE, September 12, 2016,

https://slate.com/culture/2016/09/an-interview-with-james-andrew-miller-about-
28 powerhouse-the-untold-story-of-hollywoods-creative-artists-agency.html ................................... 1

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 1 Matt Donnelly, CAA Sells Majority Stake to Francois-Henri Pinault's Artemis,
VARIETY, September 7, 2023, https://variety.com/2023/film/news/caa-sells-
2 majority-stake-francois-henri-pinault-artemis-1235686302/ ........................................................ 1

3 Natalie Jarvey, Doesn't Anybody Want to Be an Agent Anymore?, VARIETY, March 2,

2023, https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2023/03/entertainment-industry-
4 talent-agents .............................................................................................................................. 1

5 Nellie Andreeva, CAA Gears Up For End-Of-Year Staff Cuts, DEADLINE, October 21,
2024, https://deadline.com/2024/10/caa-end-of-year-staff-cuts-agent-layoffs-
6 1236116407/ .............................................................................................................................. 1

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 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I. INTRODUCTION

3 This case involves a powerful company attempting to penalize its longtime employees for

4 leaving. Creative Artists Agency (CAA) is widely recognized as the most influential talent agency in

5 the world. 1 For years, CAA has leveraged its dominance and market power to control key aspects of

6 the entertainment industry, including which movies are produced, which TV shows are aired, and who

7 is cast in major projects. 2

8 In 2021, CAA further expanded its dominance by acquiring another major Hollywood agency,

9 ICM Partners, in a $750 million deal. 3 The acquisition faced significant delays due to antitrust scrutiny,

10 reflecting legitimate concerns that the transaction would substantially reduce options for actors and

11 artists. Despite these issues, CAA managed to push the acquisition forward. The ICM acquisition

12 contributed to CAA’s valuation reaching approximately $7 billion by 2023, when the company sold a

13 majority stake to French billionaire François-Henri Pinault. 4 Today, CAA employs over 3,000 people

14 and continues to wield considerable influence in the entertainment industry. 5

15 While consolidating its market power and dominance within the entertainment industry, CAA

16 also has been enmeshed in a number of controversies. One of the most significant challenges came

17 from the Writers Guild of America (WGA), which directly attacked CAA’s business model. In 2019,

18 the WGA argued CAA had a conflict of interest with its artist-clients, alleging CAA negotiated special

19 deals with studios to line its own pockets by securing more favorable terms for itself than for its clients

20 on entertainment projects. (See William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers Guild of Am. (C.D. Cal.

21 2020) 478 F. Supp. 3d 932, 936 [detailing the history of the WGA dispute].) This controversy prompted

22
1
(Natalie Jarvey, Doesn’t Anybody Want to Be an Agent Anymore?, VARIETY, March 2, 2023,
23 https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2023/03/entertainment-industry-talent-agents.)
2
(See Isaac Chotiner, Seducing the A-List, SLATE, September 12, 2016,
24 https://slate.com/culture/2016/09/an-interview-with-james-andrew-miller-about-powerhouse-the-
untold-story-of-hollywoods-creative-artists-agency.html.)
25 3
(See CPI, CAA-ICM Merger Delayed Amid DOJ Scrutiny, COMPETITION POLICY
INTERNATIONAL, January 17, 2022, https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/doj-stop-antitrust-probe-
26 of-creative-artists-agencys-acquisition/.)
4
(See Matt Donnelly, CAA Sells Majority Stake to Francois-Henri Pinault’s Artemis, VARIETY,
27 September 7, 2023, https://variety.com/2023/film/news/caa-sells-majority-stake-francois-henri-
pinault-artemis-1235686302/.)
28 5
(See ibid.; Nellie Andreeva, CAA Gears Up For End-Of-Year Staff Cuts, DEADLINE, October 21,
2024, https://deadline.com/2024/10/caa-end-of-year-staff-cuts-agent-layoffs-1236116407/.)
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 1 thousands of clients to fire their agents. (Ibid.)

2 Like any business, CAA experiences employee turnover. Some employees leave the talent

3 agency industry altogether, while others establish rival agencies, pursue executive roles in the

4 entertainment sector, or become talent managers. 6 In August 2020, following the WGA’s challenge to

5 CAA and other agencies, four CAA agents left to pursue a different path, transitioning into talent

6 management and stepping away from the agency business.

7 Talent agents, such as those employed by CAA, act as intermediaries between studios and

8 artists, focusing on negotiating numerous short-term, project-specific engagements. (See Marathon

9 Ent., Inc. v. Blasi (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 974, 983.) In contrast, talent managers perform a much broader

10 role. (Ibid.) A personal manager’s main function is to advise, counsel, direct, and coordinate with the

11 artist in developing their career. (See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc. (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th

12 246, 252.) Many of CAA’s clients also work with personal managers alongside their agents. (See

13 William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers Guild of Am. (C.D. Cal.) 2:19-cv-05465-AB-AFM,

14 Dkts. 147 ¶ 116, 151-4 ¶ 19.)

15 The four former CAA employees, eager to embark on new careers as talent managers, left CAA

16 to become some of the first employees of a new management company founded by Peter Micelli, now

17 known as Range Media Partners. Instead of supporting their entrepreneurial pursuits, CAA’s

18 leadership acted emotionally, punitively, and vindictively. On October 9, 2020, under the direction of

19 CEO and Chairman Bryan Lourd—who has ruled CAA since coming to power nearly three decades

20 ago—CAA retaliated by canceling the vested equity these employees had earned through their decades-

21 long service at the company. (See CAA Pet. to Compel Compliance with Arbitration Subpoenas,

22 LASC No. 24SMCP00411, filed Aug. 2, 2024, ¶ 16.)

23 CAA justified this draconian action by citing noncompete provisions in the employees’

24 contracts. But CAA knows full well that these provisions are illegal under California law (see Bus. &

25 Prof. Code § 16600), and also clearly do not apply because the employees had left the agency business

26 entirely and were now working as managers, a distinct role. This unlawful cancellation of equity sent

27
6
(See Jarvey, fn. 1, supra [“What happens when someone wakes up one day and realizes they don’t
28 want to be an agent anymore? If they don’t run screaming from the industry altogether, some become
executives, others producers. But many pivot to management . . . .”].)
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 1 a chilling message to both current and former employees: contractual agreements and legal protections

2 at CAA were secondary to the whims and greed of its leadership.

3 CAA’s punitive actions—driven by bruised egos and a misguided sense of betrayal—are now

4 the focus of a pending arbitration before JAMS, initiated by the former employees in 2022. In the

5 arbitration, the former CAA employees seek a ruling to recover the full value of their canceled equity.

6 CAA has counterclaimed, alleging that the employees took confidential information to Range and

7 violated noncompete agreements by joining Range, which it claims is an unlicensed talent agency

8 competing directly with CAA. A hearing before an arbitral panel is scheduled for March 2025.

9 Despite CAA’s aggressive legal tactics, the arbitration has not gone well for the agency. While

10 rulings remain confidential, CAA has reportedly faced several setbacks. With the arbitration hearing

11 approaching, CAA escalated the dispute by filing this lawsuit. In this lawsuit, CAA recycles many of

12 the same claims it made in the arbitration, including:

13 1. Allegations that the former employees stole confidential information and provided it to

14 Range.

15 2. Accusations that Range is operating as an unlicensed talent agency, in violation of

16 California’s Talent Agency Act (TAA) and the WGA’s agreements with agencies like CAA.

17 CAA’s Complaint includes four causes of action:

18 • Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL): Based on alleged theft of

19 information, TAA violations, and refusal to enter into WGA agreements.

20 • Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Claiming Range encouraged former

21 employees to misappropriate CAA’s confidential information.

22 • Tortious Interference with Confidentiality Agreements: Alleging Range interfered with

23 CAA’s contractual relationships with its employees.

24 • Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage: Claiming Range acted as

25 agents unlawfully, poaching clients while violating the TAA.

26 Together with filing the Complaint, CAA launched a public relations campaign, promoting its

27 lawsuit in Hollywood trade publications to damage Range’s reputation and gain perceived leverage.

28 But no amount of press spin can change the fact that the lawsuit is baseless and should be dismissed

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 1 immediately.

2 This case is not a close call. CAA has not explained why it waited until late 2024 to file this

3 case if, as it alleges, Range stole confidential information and competed unlawfully four years ago, in

4 2020. Nor has it explained why it did not file suit two years ago when it raised these allegations in

5 arbitration. CAA’s lawsuit appears to be a continuation of its retaliatory tactics and should be dismissed

6 or struck without leave to replead. As set forth below, the claims are either preempted, filed in the

7 wrong tribunal, or defective as a matter of law because CAA lacks standing to bring the claim. Each

8 of CAA’s claims fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed or struck without leave to replead.

9 CAA’s UCL claim (Count 1) fails as a matter of law for multiple reasons. CAA’s UCL claim

10 is based on allegations that Range (1) took CAA’s confidential information, (2) acted unlawfully by

11 violating the TAA, and (3) acquired an unfair advantage over CAA by not agreeing to a talent agency

12 contract with the WGA (as CAA has done). (Compl. ¶¶ 109–15.) None of these allegations can support

13 a UCL claim because the claim is either preempted by California’s Uniform Trade Secret Act

14 (CUTSA), the claim is brought before the wrong tribunal, or CAA lacks standing to assert it.

15 Preemption. CUTSA preempts “all claims premised on the wrongful taking and use of

16 confidential business and proprietary information, even if that information does not meet the statutory

17 definition of a trade secret.” (Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Health IQ, LLC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013)

18 2013 WL 12132029, at *5 [citing Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp. (2010) 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 236,

19 disapproved of on other grounds, Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 310].) To the

20 extent CAA alleges Range violated the UCL by taking CAA’s confidential information, that claim is

21 preempted by CUTSA.

22 Wrong Tribunal. It is well-settled in California that a private party cannot bring a cause of

23 action in court alleging a violation of the TAA. The California Labor Commissioner has exclusive

24 jurisdiction over any claim alleging a violation of the TAA. “[T]he Commissioner has the exclusive

25 original jurisdiction in the first instance to decide if a controversy arises under the Act,” and “[p]ersons

26 . . . seeking affirmative relief under the TAA may not invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court until

27 after the Commissioner has issued a ruling.” (Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th

28 336, 365.) To the extent CAA alleges that Range violated the UCL by violating the TAA, its claim

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 1 should be dismissed because it was brought in an improper forum. 7

2 No Standing. CAA cannot bring a UCL claim predicated on the allegation that Range must

3 agree to a particular contract with a third party (the WGA). “Absent a legal provision to the contrary,

4 a private party generally may choose to do or not to do business with whomever it pleases.” (Drum v.

5 San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 247, 254.) CAA does not identify any “legal

6 provision” requiring Range to enter a contract with the WGA, so its claim that Range has violated the

7 UCL by failing to enter a talent agency agreement with the WGA fails.

8 The aiding abetting claim (Count 2) and interference with contract claim (Count 3) are

9 preempted by CUTSA. CAA’s aiding and abetting and interference with contract claims are premised

10 on allegations that Range caused CAA employees to breach their fiduciary and contractual duties to

11 CAA by stealing confidential information. (See Compl. ¶¶ 122–23, 130–32.) Because these claims

12 are “premised on the wrongful taking and use of confidential business and proprietary information,”

13 they are preempted by CUTSA and should be dismissed. (Teva, 2013 WL 12132029, at p. *5; Silvaco,

14 184 Cal. App. 4th at p. 239, fn. 22.)

15 The intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (IIPEA) claim (Count 4)

16 was brought in the wrong forum. CAA’s IIPEA claim is based on the allegation that Range violated

17 the TAA by holding itself out as a management company, rather than registering as a talent agency,

18 and that this alleged TAA violation allowed Range to entice CAA’s clients to work with Range.

19 (Compl. ¶ 138.) Because this claim is based on alleged violations of the TAA, the dispute “must be

20 heard by the Commissioner, and all remedies before the Commissioner must be exhausted before the

21 parties can proceed to the superior court.” (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 365.) The claim should be

22 dismissed in its entirety.

23 The fundamental lack of merit of each claim not only warrants dismissal, but confirms that

24

25 7
This does not mean CAA is entitled to any relief from the Labor Commissioner. CAA has no standing
to bring a TAA complaint against an alleged competitor or against an alleged unlicensed talent agent.
26 The Commissioner’s regulations clearly state that the only parties that can seek relief under the TAA
are artists seeking to void their contracts with their agents, or agents seeking to collect fees from their
27 clients. (See infra, fn 8.) In addition, any claim that CAA might bring under the TAA is time-barred
by the TAA’s one-year statute of limitations, given that CAA alleges Range violated the TAA in 2020
28 and 2021. (See infra, fn 8.) Nevertheless, these are issues for the Commissioner to resolve, not this
Court.
Gibson, Dunn & 5
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RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 CAA’s true motive behind this vexatious lawsuit is to further retaliate against the four former CAA

2 employees for exercising their right to leave the company and change their careers. This case should

3 be dismissed with prejudice.

4 II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

5 This summary assumes the “material facts alleged in the complaint are treated as true for the

6 purpose of ruling on the demurrer.” (C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d

7 1055, 1062.) But “contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint” are

8 not accepted as true. (Ibid.)

9 A. The Complaint’s Allegations

10 CAA, a California-licensed talent agency founded in 1975, describes itself as “one of the

11 world’s leading talent agencies.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) CAA alleges that Peter Micelli, a former CAA agent,

12 left CAA in 2018 and founded Range in 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.) CAA alleges that in August 2020, four

13 CAA agents—Jack Whigham, David Bugliari, Michael Cooper, and Mick Sullivan (the “Four Former

14 CAA Employees”)—left CAA and joined Micelli at Range. (Id. ¶ 2.) While Range describes itself as

15 a “management company,” CAA alleges that Range is actually a “talent agency” that directly competes

16 with CAA. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.) CAA alleges that in October 2020 it canceled the equity that the four

17 departed agents held in CAA, because they “harm[ed] CAA” by joining Range. (Ibid.)

18 According to the Complaint, the Four Former CAA Employees took information from CAA

19 during their departure, which they used to recruit agents and talent to Range. (See id. ¶¶ 67–91.) CAA

20 alleges that the Four Former CAA Employees and other CAA employees are subject to contractual

21 confidentiality restrictions, which purportedly prohibit sharing any “information that provides CAA

22 with a competitive advantage and value” (which the Complaint calls “Confidential Information”). (Id.

23 ¶¶ 26, 29.) According to CAA, the Four Former CAA Employees breached these obligations by

24 “send[ing] large amounts of Confidential Information” to their personal email accounts, and also

25 “secretly encouraged their CAA assistants” to “take CAA’s Confidential Information in violation of

26 their contractual obligations.” (Id. ¶¶ 69–72.) The Complaint alleges that the Four Former CAA

27 Employees took CAA’s Confidential Information “to attempt to lure clients away from CAA,” and also

28 used “confidential CAA client and business information … to attempt to ‘cherry pick’ away certain

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RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 CAA agents that would most benefit Range’s intended business.” (Id. ¶¶ 84–85, 90–91.) The

2 Complaint does not identify a single client that Range recruited using CAA Confidential Information,

3 and does not identify any CAA agent who was recruited using CAA Confidential Information.

4 CAA also alleges that Range “is violating the law every time it procures work for an artist”

5 because it is not a licensed talent agency under the TAA. (Id. ¶¶ 92–95.) According to the Complaint,

6 the TAA requires anyone who procures work for an artist to be licensed as a talent agent by the

7 California Labor Commissioner. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41.) CAA alleges that Range “procure[s] work for talent

8 without a license in violation of the TAA.” (Id. ¶ 95.)

9 CAA also alleges that Range has gained an unfair advantage over CAA by not agreeing to the

10 same contract with the WGA to which CAA agreed. CAA alleges that around the time Range was

11 launched in 2020, the WGA was pushing CAA and other talent agencies to refrain from “packaging”

12 deals, where an agency would present a group (or “package”) of artists to a studio for a project, and the

13 studio would pay the agency’s fees. (Id. ¶¶ 97, 99.) According to the Complaint, CAA abandoned this

14 practice by agreeing to contracts with the WGA that prohibited CAA from engaging in packaging. (Id.

15 ¶¶ 97, 102, 111.) CAA alleges that Range has not agreed to any such contract with the WGA, and, as

16 a result, Range has obtained an “unfair” advantage over CAA because it can “provide its clients with

17 deal structures that talent agencies, including CAA, cannot lawfully offer to clients.” (Id. ¶ 102.)

18 B. CAA’s Causes of Action

19 CAA brings four causes of action based on these allegations. First, CAA brings a claim under

20 the UCL, alleging that Range violated the UCL by: (1) the Four Former CAA Employees “violat[ing]

21 their duty of loyalty and confidentiality obligations” when they purportedly used “Confidential

22 Information” to solicit talent agents or clients (id. ¶¶ 109, 113), (2) acting as unlicensed talent agents

23 in violation of the TAA (id. ¶¶ 110, 115), and (3) not entering a contract with WGA that is similar to

24 the contract CAA has agreed to with the WGA (id. ¶ 111, see also id. ¶ 97). Second, CAA asserts a

25 claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Range caused CAA’s employees

26 to breach “their fiduciary duties” to CAA “by taking and utilizing CAA’s Confidential Information.”

27 (Id. ¶ 122.) Third, CAA brings an interference with contract claim, based on the allegation that Range

28 caused CAA employees “to breach their Confidentiality Agreements” with CAA. (Id. ¶¶ 129–32.)

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AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 Fourth, CAA asserts a claim for interference with prospective economic advantage, alleging that Range

2 “interfered with CAA’s existing business relationships by encouraging CAA’s clients to leave CAA

3 and violating the TAA.” (Id. ¶ 138.)

4 III. LEGAL STANDARD

5 A defendant “may object, by demurrer . . . to [a] pleading” on the ground that it “does not state

6 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10 (e).) “[A] demurrer

7 must be sustained when the assumed facts show lack of a valid claim” (Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp. (2011)

8 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1301), or when the “complaint … ‘disclose[s] some defense or bar to

9 recovery.’” (California Dep’t of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Ct. (2020) 48 Cal. App. 5th 922, 929

10 [quoting Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 177, 183].)

11 A motion to strike may function similarly to a demurrer, in that “when a substantive defect is

12 clear from the face of the complaint, such as . . . a purported claim of right which is legally invalid, a

13 defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by filing a motion to strike.” (PH II, Inc. v.

14 Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1682-82.) “If a complaint fails to state facts sufficient

15 to constitute a cause of action as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, it is not drawn in

16 conformity with the laws of this state, and the defendant may take advantage of the pleading defect by

17 moving to strike and dismiss the complaint.” (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1161,

18 quotations omitted). As with a demurrer, a court considering a motion to strike evaluates “the face of

19 the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice.” (Ibid.)

20 The chief distinction between a demurrer and motion to strike is that a demurrer is used to attack

21 entire causes of action, while a motion to strike may be used to strike particular allegations that form

22 a part of a cause of action. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1281

23 [“Where a whole cause of action is the proper subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain

24 a demurrer to the cause of action rather than grant a motion to strike.”]; 1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn.,

25 Inc. v. Appellate Div. of Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 1146, 1157 [“[M]otions to strike are

26 a way of attacking particular allegations within a pleading”].) Here, Range demurs to each cause of

27 action in its entirety, and moves to strike only in the alternative. If the Court does not dismiss part of

28 a cause of action, it should strike the rest of that cause of action as legally deficient.

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 1 IV. ARGUMENT

2 A. CAA’s UCL Claim (Count 1) Fails

3 1. CUTSA Preempts CAA’s UCL Claims Related To Confidential Information

4 In support of its UCL claim, CAA first alleges that Range violated the UCL by taking—or

5 causing others to take—CAA’s “Confidential Information.” (Compl. ¶¶ 109, 112–114.) This claim

6 for the misappropriation of “Confidential Information” is preempted by CUTSA. CUTSA is a

7 “comprehensive” trade secret protection statute that bars plaintiffs from bringing claims based on the

8 alleged taking of information that is not a trade secret—like the “Confidential Information” at issue

9 here. (NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014) 41 F. Supp. 3d 816, 839–40 [quoting K.C.

10 Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 954–58].)

11 CUTSA preemption applies to any claim based on misappropriation of information. “The

12 CUTSA ‘serves to preempt all claims premised on the wrongful taking and use of confidential business

13 and proprietary information, even if that information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade

14 secret.’” (Unified Grocers, Inc. v. VM Int’l, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) 2020 WL 5370622, at *5

15 [quoting ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2019) 369 F. Supp. 3d 983, 989].) “In

16 general, the acquisition, disclosure or transfer of information that does not fit [C]UTSA’s definition of

17 a trade secret does not give rise to any liability, even when that liability is couched in terms of a separate

18 tort or statutory violation.” (Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 495, 506.)

19 CUTSA preemption applies to a particular claim if that claim is “premised on the wrongful

20 taking and use of confidential business and proprietary information.” (Teva, 2013 WL 12132029, at

21 *5; Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 987 [same].) This is “a factual

22 inquiry, one that examines the conduct alleged in the claim.” (NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc.

23 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 41 F. Supp. 3d 816, 839 [quoting K.C. Multimedia, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 958].)

24 Because the preemption inquiry focuses on the “conduct alleged in the claim,” it is properly undertaken

25 at the pleading stage. (See, e.g., K.C. Multimedia, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 958-59 [analyzing preemption

26 by evaluating complaint’s allegations]; NetApp, 41 F. Supp. 3d at p. 839 [dismissing claims based on

27 preemption at pleading stage].)

28 It is well-settled that CUTSA preempts the type of claims CAA brings here—for violation of

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 1 the UCL, aiding and abetting, and tortious interference—when those claims are based on the alleged

2 theft of confidential information. “Courts agree that the [C]UTSA displaces various common law

3 claims, including claims for tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective

4 economic advantage, and unfair competition” (Extreme Reach, Inc. v. Spotgenie Partners, LLC (C.D.

5 Cal. Apr. 14, 2014) 2014 WL 12781769, at *4 [collecting cases]), as well as claims that a defendant

6 “aided and abetted” another party’s breach of duty (K.C. Multimedia, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 960).

7 The UCL claim is based, in part, on the misappropriation of allegedly proprietary

8 information. CAA’s UCL claim is premised, in part, on the allegedly wrongful taking of business

9 information, and the claim is thus partially preempted (and to the extent it is not preempted, it fails as

10 a matter of law for other reasons, as discussed below, see infra pp. 11–13).

11 In support of its UCL claim, CAA alleges in paragraph 109 of its Complaint that the Four

12 Former CAA Employees, acting on Range’s behalf, engaged in a laundry-list of bad acts that involve

13 the purported theft of confidential information: “(1) attended CAA meetings in order to gather

14 information for Range to use for competitive purposes, (2) induced and attempted to induce the

15 Solicited Employees and other CAA employees to breach their agreements and to use and disclose

16 Confidential Information and divert CAA’s clients to Range, (3) induced the Solicited Employees to

17 violate their duties of loyalty to CAA, (4) utilized CAA’s Confidential Information to solicit successful

18 talent agents to leave CAA and join Range, and (5) used and disclosed CAA’s Confidential

19 Information to divert CAA’s clients to Range.” (Compl. ¶ 109 [emphasis added].) The only allegation

20 in this list that does not expressly mention the alleged misappropriation of information is the assertion

21 that Range “induced the Solicited Employees [i.e., the Four Former CAA Employees’ assistants] to

22 violate their duties of loyalty to CAA.” (Ibid.) But the Complaint, particularly Counts 2 and 3, makes

23 clear that the allegation that the “Solicited Employees” violated their duties to CAA is in fact based on

24 the alleged misappropriation of information—the only factual allegations in the Complaint about the

25 “Solicited Employees” all relate to those individuals allegedly stealing CAA’s “Confidential

26 Information” (or purportedly being told to do so by the Four Former CAA Employees). (See id. ¶¶ 9,

27 70, 72–74, 78–79, 84.)

28 None of the conduct alleged in paragraph 109 is actionable, because it is preempted by CUTSA

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 1 as a matter of law. Under CUTSA, CAA cannot base its UCL claim on “conduct” involving the “theft

2 of secret information.” (NetApp, 41 F. Supp. 3d at pp. 839–40.) CAA cannot rely on the allegations

3 in paragraph 109—or any other allegations in the Complaint relating to “Confidential Information”—

4 to support its UCL claim.

5 2. CAA Cannot Use The UCL To Improperly Bring TAA Claims In Court

6 CAA also alleges that Range has violated the UCL by operating as an unlicensed talent agency

7 in violation of the TAA. (Compl. ¶¶ 110, 115.) This claim is frivolous. It is well-settled that a claim

8 based on an alleged violation of the TAA must be presented to the California Labor Commissioner, not

9 a court. 8 Because CAA does not allege that it first brought this claim before the Commissioner—or

10 even that it could—the UCL claim should be dismissed.

11 If any party wishes to make a claim under the TAA, they must file a complaint with the Labor

12 Commissioner—not a court—and she must rule on whether the controversy arises under the Act.

13 “[T]he Commissioner has the exclusive original jurisdiction in the first instance to decide if a

14 controversy arises under the Act.” (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 365.) The “Labor Commissioner

15 is given exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies colorably arising under the TAA.” (Id. at p.

16 360). Anyone “seeking affirmative relief under the TAA may not invoke the jurisdiction of the

17 Superior Court until after the Commissioner has issued a ruling.” (Id. at p. 365.) The Labor

18 Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction is extremely broad, and includes the sole right to determine

19 whether the TAA is implicated by the dispute at all: “The Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction to

20 determine his [or her] jurisdiction over issues colorably arising under the Talent Agencies Act thus

21 empowers him [or her] alone to decide, in the first instance, whether the facts do bring the case within

22
8
Of course, this does not mean CAA is entitled to any relief from the Labor Commissioner, or that it
23 even has standing to bring a TAA claim. The Labor Commissioner’s regulations specify that the only
cognizable disputes under the TAA are disputes between artists and their agents, not between an
24 agency and its alleged competitor. (See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 12022 [specifying that complaints
under the TAA are intended to address a “controversy between [an] artist and talent agency”].) No
25 artist has filed any TAA complaint against Range, and nothing in the TAA suggests that CAA can bring
a TAA claim against Range on behalf of talent. Even setting aside whether CAA has any standing to
26 invoke the TAA against its alleged competitors, the purported violations of the TAA it complains of
occurred well over a year before the Complaint was filed (see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 94, 101 [alleging CAA
27 violated the TAA in or before “2021” and “2022”])—so any claim based on those alleged violations is
time-barred under the TAA’s one-year limitations period. (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 360 [citing
28 Labor Code section 1700.44, subdivision (c)].) While these issues preclude CAA’s entitlement to any
relief, they are issues for the Labor Commissioner to resolve.
Gibson, Dunn & 11
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RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 the Act.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 42, 56 fn. 6.)

2 Parties cannot try to circumvent the TAA’s procedural requirements and bring a TAA claim in

3 court by alleging that a violation of the TAA supports a UCL claim: “Unlike other statutes that might

4 be used as the basis for a UCL cause of action, the TAA mandates that cases colorably arising under

5 the TAA must first be filed with the Commissioner within the one-year statute of limitation period.”

6 (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 365.) “This is a procedural predicate-filing requirement that cannot be

7 circumvented by recasting a TAA cause of action as a UCL cause of action.” (Ibid.)

8 Therefore, to the extent CAA’s UCL claim is based on the allegation that Range violated the

9 TAA, the claim must be brought before the Labor Commissioner, not this Court. (See ibid.) And CAA

10 does not allege that it has sought relief before the Commissioner or obtained a ruling from the

11 Commissioner allowing it to pursue a claim here. CAA’s UCL claim must be dismissed to the extent

12 it is based on a purported violation of the TAA.

13 3. CAA Cannot Complain About Whether Range Contracts With The WGA

14 Aside from alleging Range has taken CAA’s confidential information and violated the TAA,

15 the only other allegation underlying the UCL claim is that Range has not entered a collective bargaining

16 agreement with the WGA as a talent agency, and thus is not subject to the same contractual restrictions

17 to which CAA is subject (since CAA has entered into such an agreement with the WGA). (See Compl.

18 ¶¶ 42, 111.) CAA claims that Range’s failure to enter into a contract with the WGA that would restrict

19 Range in the same manner as the talent agencies is an “unfair” practice under the UCL. (Id. ¶ 111.)

20 CAA cannot bring a UCL claim predicated on the allegation that Range must agree to a

21 particular contract with a third party (such as the WGA). “[A] business practice is ‘unfair’” under the

22 UCL “only if it ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of

23 one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or

24 otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’” (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn.

25 (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 247, 254 [quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.

26 (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187].) “[U]nless there is an exception, the right to refuse to deal remains

27 sacrosanct and the mere refusal to deal does not violate the spirit or policy of antitrust law,” and thus

28 does not violate the UCL. (Ibid. [quotations omitted].) Therefore, “[a]bsent a legal provision to the

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RANGE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
 1 contrary, a private party generally may choose to do or not to do business with whomever it pleases.”

2 (Ibid.)

3 Here, CAA does not identify any “legal provision” that requires Range to agree to be bound by

4 a particular WGA agreement. CAA’s allegations about Range’s purported failure to contract with the

5 WGA cannot support a UCL claim. And because none of CAA’s allegations in support of its UCL

6 claim can support a claim, the claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed in its entirety.

7 B. CUTSA Preempts CAA’s Aiding And Abetting And Interference With Contract Claims

8 (Counts 2 and 3)

9 CAA’s second cause of action (for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty) and third cause

10 of action (for tortious interference with contract) also are wholly preempted by CUTSA.

11 CAA’s second and third causes of action are based entirely on the alleged theft of CAA’s

12 supposed confidential information. In support of its second cause of action, CAA alleges only that

13 Range aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duties “[b]y encouraging the Solicited Employees to take

14 and utilize CAA’s Confidential Information.” (Compl. ¶ 123.) In support of its third cause of action,

15 CAA alleges only that Range tortiously interfered with CAA’s contractual relations by “induc[ing] and

16 attempt[ing] to induce the Solicited Employees and other CAA employees to breach their

17 Confidentiality Agreements and to use and disclose Confidential Information and divert CAA’s clients

18 to Range.” (Id. ¶ 132.)

19 Because the only “conduct” alleged in support of these claims is the “theft of secret

20 information,” the claims are preempted by CUTSA and must be dismissed. (NetApp, 41 F. Supp. 3d

21 at pp. 839–40; see also K. C. Multimedia, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 960–61 [holding aiding and

22 abetting and interference with contract claims that were based on alleged theft of information were

23 preempted].)

24 C. CAA’s IIPEA Claim (Count 4) Must Be Brought Before The Labor Commissioner

25 CAA’s fourth cause of action for IIPEA is based entirely on an alleged violation of the TAA,

26 and must be dismissed because such a violation can be adjudicated only by the Labor Commissioner.

27 As previously discussed (supra pp. 11–12), the “Labor Commissioner is given exclusive

28 original jurisdiction over controversies colorably arising under the TAA.” (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th

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 1 at p. 360). Anyone “seeking affirmative relief under the TAA may not invoke the jurisdiction of the

2 Superior Court until after the Commissioner has issued a ruling.” (Id. at p. 365.)

3 Here, CAA is seeking affirmative relief under the TAA—its IIPEA claim, like its UCL claim,

4 depends on a ruling that Range has violated the TAA. In order to bring a claim for IIPEA, CAA must

5 allege and prove that (1) its economic relationships were interfered with, and (2) the interference must

6 have been “wrongful,” meaning “it must be ‘unlawful, that is, ...it is proscribed by some constitutional,

7 statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.’” (Crown Imports, LLC v.

8 Superior Ct. (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1404 [quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

9 (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1159].) Here, CAA says Range interfered with its relationships with its clients

10 by recruiting them to Range—and CAA claims this was “wrongful[]” because Range’s representation

11 of CAA’s former clients supposedly violated the TAA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 138–39.) Therefore, CAA can

12 prevail on its IIPEA claim only if it can prove Range violated the TAA, because the alleged TAA

13 violation is the only conduct that makes Range’s alleged interference “wrongful.” (Ibid.)

14 When a plaintiff’s claim depends on proving a TAA violation, the claim must be submitted to

15 the Labor Commissioner. (See Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 365 [Commissioner had sole jurisdiction

16 over plaintiff’s UCL claim, because claim depended on showing a TAA violation].) But CAA does

17 not allege it has filed any complaint before the Commissioner or somehow been given the right to

18 pursue its TAA-based claim in this Court. Because CAA’s fourth cause of action is based on its

19 allegation of a TAA violation, and because the Labor Commissioner has sole jurisdiction to determine

20 whether such a violation occurred, the fourth cause of action must be dismissed in its entirety.

21 D. Leave To Amend Should Not Be Granted

22 Nothing CAA could allege on amendment would save its claims. Even if CAA were to allege

23 more facts about Range’s purported theft of confidential information, CAA’s claims based on those

24 allegations would remain preempted by CUTSA. (See NetApp, 41 F. Supp. 3d at p. 840 [any tort claim

25 “premised on the wrongful taking of information that does not qualify as a trade secret” is preempted].)

26 Likewise, even if CAA were to allege more about the purported violations of the TAA, its claims based

27 on those allegations would continue to be barred in court by the TAA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision.

28 (Blanks, 171 Cal. App. 4th at p. 365 [any claim “seeking affirmative relief under the TAA” is subject

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 1 to Labor Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction].) Similarly, CAA cannot allege anything that would

2 allow it to sue Range for not entering a particular contract with the WGA. (Drum, 182 Cal. App. 4th

3 at p. 254.)

4 Because there are no additional facts CAA could plead to circumvent these legal bars, its claims

5 should be dismissed with prejudice. (See, e.g., Ivanoff v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th

6 719, 735 [dismissal with prejudice was appropriate when the plaintiff could “not identify any additional

7 facts she can allege” to circumvent a legal time-bar to her claims].)

8 V. CONCLUSION

9 The demurrer should be sustained as to all of plaintiff’s causes of action, without leave to

10 amend.

11

12 DATED: January 27, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

13 By: /s/ Orin Snyder
14 Orin Snyder
Ilissa Samplin
15 Daniel Nowicki
16 Counsel for Defendant Range Media
Partners, LLC
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08/05/2025 8:30 AM 1

Reservation ID: Confirmation Code:

225680025342 CR-DZXO8CIAZXS2ZWRYO

Fees
Description Fee Qty Amount

Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) 0.00 1 0.00

TOTAL $0.00

Payment
Amount: Type:
$0.00 NOFEE
Account Number: Authorization:
n/a n/a
Payment Date:
n/a

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