Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich Speech
Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich Speech
Thank you, very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!
I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled
politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.
This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in
roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to
say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly
polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me.
After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my
speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.
Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating
to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming
poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.
This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security
for one is security for all”. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the
Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all
countries everywhere is in danger.”
These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference – global crises,
global responsibility – exemplifies this. Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and
economically divided, and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured
global security. This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the
margins of the international community’s and the world’s agenda. And, just like any war, the
Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological
stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.
The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either. The
history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world
supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history?
However, what is a unipolar world? However, one might embellish this term, at the end of the
day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one
centre of decision-making. It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the
end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the
sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.
And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy
is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority. Incidentally,
Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who
teach us do not want to learn themselves.
I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.
And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in
today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is
even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no
moral foundations for modern civilisation. Along with this, what is happening in today’s world
– and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into
international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.
And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any
problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension.
Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr
Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more
are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in
international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As
a result, we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these
conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.
We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And
independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal
system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its
national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational
policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?
In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according
to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate. And of course,
this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this
– no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will
protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.
The force’s dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats – though they were also well-known before –
have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character. I am
convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the
architecture of global security. And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance
between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the
international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly – changes in light of the dynamic
development in a whole number of countries and regions.
Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in
purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the
United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia,
India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap
will only increase in the future.
There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic
growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.
In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need
for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and
the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty
in the judicial systems of certain states.
However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries
that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily
participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of
fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians!
But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various
internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question
that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood
your question (addressing Mr Lieberman), then of course it is a serious one! Can we be
indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well:
of course not.
But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly, we do. It is sufficient to look at
recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we
witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime – a peaceful transformation! And what
a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start
bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat
of mutual destruction, we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values
and for the law?
I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as
a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not
understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was
inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision
is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points
of view. Or I didn’t hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the
decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the
UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really
react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international
law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a
dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary
to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and
application of its norms. And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily
go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.
Dear ladies and gentlemen! The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations
is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue. Russia supports the renewal of
dialogue on this important question. It is important to conserve the international legal
framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of
reducing nuclear weapons. Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our
nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700–2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December
2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners
will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred
superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister
declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one
might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this
declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.
Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies.
The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones. In connection with this I
would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on
destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have
a universal character.
Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working
on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the
United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems. It is
obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security. At the same
time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons.
Needless to say, it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer
space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy – it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American
partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.
In Russia’s opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences
for the international community and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era.
And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of
weapons in outer space. Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an
agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will
be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let’s work on this together.
Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but
disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I
deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do. Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight
thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called
problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even
foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American
territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in
Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.
And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the
elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this
document, including the Russian Federation. NATO countries openly declared that they will
not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain
number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from
Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule.
We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There
are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and
protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this
issue with Mr Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.
But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline
American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its
frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do
not react to these actions at all.
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation
of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom
is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made
after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even
remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like
to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He
said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German
territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees?
The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But
we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice –
one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy,
freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.
And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us – these walls may be
virtual, but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible
that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of
politicians, to dissemble and dismantle these new walls?
Dear ladies and gentlemen! We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-
proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to
manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want
to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also
understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons. This
creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme
acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution
for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising
crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are
going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment
of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but
also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries
that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through
direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA
supervision.
The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity
with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally
interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities,
that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready
for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends. In general, we
should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli
whereby it would not be in states’ interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel
cycle, but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their
energy capabilities.
In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail.
Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly – she mentioned, touched on this
theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and transparent
conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of
being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail. We are open to
cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to
different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia – and please think about this
figure – up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to
find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic
sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.
I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad.
The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and
stability of the Russian economy. Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to
uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly. For that reason, more and more
opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are
objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia’s OECD sovereign credit rating
improved, and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would
like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.
Furthermore. As you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages.
I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free
trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to
the Russian market.
And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many
talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one
hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world’s poorest countries –
and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest — and many here also know this
– linked with the development of that same donor country’s companies. And on the other hand,
developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries’
access to high-tech products. And let’s say things as they are – one hand distributes charitable
help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits
thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of
radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens in, shall we
say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at
large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.
It is obvious that the world’s leading countries should see this threat. And that they should
therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that
would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.
Dear ladies and gentlemen, speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not
to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all – I shall emphasise this – all
aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations
between these spheres. What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly
destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to
promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being
accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with
the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called
non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally
independent, but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.
According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to
assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is
an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of
other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should
live and develop. It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of
democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence,
politically and economically unstable. We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks
and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.
Dear ladies and gentlemen! In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often –
and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to
the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs. In connection
with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to
do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has
practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.
We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how
the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential.
And of course, we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom
we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure
security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.
Thank you for your attention.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2008 by the First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey B.
Ivanov
Dear colleagues,
Russia has invariably favoured strengthening the UN role in maintaining peace, international
security and stability, working out strategies to counter modern challenges and threats
affecting all states without exception. Our priority remains to ensure integrity, viability and
effectiveness of the international legal basis, regulating the issues of disarmament and non -
proliferation.
The major international agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CNDN), treaties on the
prohibition of chemical and biological weapons presume the need for universalization and
attaining through joint effort their unconditional implementation. We stress the fundamental
importance to guarantee openness of the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation
mechanisms to ensure participation, on equal footing, of the countries showing interest and
capability to make a meaningful contribution to the process.
The START I treaty, which has played a historic role in nuclear missile disarmament, is due
to expire on December the 5th, 2009. It is time we move further. In 2005, we invited the US
to conclude a new arrangement to replace it. We believe that it should be legally binding and
provide for further reductions and limitations both of strategic delivery vehicles
(intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers) and their warheads. It is crucial to make a good use of the tested-by-time
experience of START I treaty while drafting a new arrangement including, in particular, the
ban to deploy strategic offensive arms outside national territories.
However, our commitment to continue this process in a positive manner should not be
translated as refusal from certain major approaches. First and foremost, this concerns
uploading capability problem. Our point of departure is that any deviation in this sense from
basic principles of START Treaty leads to the emergence of uploading capability, which in
fact provides means for quick acquiring decisive military superiority in the area of strategic
offensive arms. We expect a constructive response of the new US Administration in this
matter and generally to our proposals. This will allow to arrive in the foreseeable future at
an arrangement which will mark a new substantial step forward along the road to missile and
nuclear disarmament.
Our principle attitude to the issues of anti-missile defence development remains very much
the same. We are confident that the creation and deployment of missile defences of various
types affect directly regional and international security. If one does it unilaterally without
due respect of the interests of strategic stability of other parties involved as, for instance, is
in the case with fielding of the US missile defence European site, the situation cannot but
result in increased tension.
The potential US missile defence European site is not just a dozen of anti-ballistic missiles
and a radar. It is a part of the US strategic infrastructure aimed at deterring Russia’s nu clear
missile potential. Of course, implementation of transparency and confidence-building
measures proposed by Russia with regard to the US missile defence European site might
certainly mitigate some of our concerns. However, such measures are not to be considered
as an alternative to our response. The Sochi Declaration of the Russian and US Presidents
clearly states that Russia is opposed to the deployment of the US missile defence European
site.
Now a few words about Treaty between the US and the USSR on the elimination of their
intermediate range and shorter-range missiles [Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty] (INF).
Generally, the situation here looks, indeed, alarming. During 20 years after signing of the
Soviet – American INF Treaty many countries (North Korea, China, Pakistan, India, Iran,
Israel) have acquired such delivery vehicles. And, by the way, all of them are situated near
our borders. That is exactly the reason why the US and Russia have come forward with a
joint initiative to ascribe INF multinational nature.
As far as nuclear non-proliferation is concerned, our main priority remains to increase the
efficiency of the NPT. The next NPT Review Conference will take place as soon as next
year. It will become an important landmark in our joint efforts aimed at strengthening the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. We hope that the year 2010 Conference will be marked
with constructive and productive work.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important instrument for
strengthening the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms
limitation. Russia has ratified the CTBT in year 2000 and has been consistently promoting
its early entry into force. Observance of the nuclear tests’ moratorium, however important it
might be, is no substitute for legal obligations under the CTBT. We therefore urge all
countries whose participation is vital for this Treaty’s entry into force to sign and/or ratify it
as soon as possible.
Monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is yet another
important way of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We view the
Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement as an effective tool to enhance
potential of the Agency in this respect. We expect that all countries, which have not yet
joined the Protocol, especially those involved in significant nuclear activities or possessing
large stocks of nuclear material, will accede to it at the earliest possible stage.
Nowadays, there is a growing interest in peaceful nuclear energy as a dependable means to
ensure national energy security. In our view, international cooperation in what concerns the
nuclear fuel cycle should be promoted aiming at providing a cost-effective and feasible
alternative to creating all its elements on the national level. Russia has proposed multilateral
cooperation in developing the global infrastructure of the nuclear energy sector and in
establishing international centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services. We have already
contributed to the implementation of this initiative by setting up of the International Uranium
Enrichment Centre on the basis of the processing facilities in Angarsk. The project has
already been joined by Kazakhstan, with Armenia and Ukraine finalizing entry formalities.
One of the challenges both to the international non-proliferation regime and to the
international security as a whole is the threat of nuclear terrorism. Consequently, we regard
the Russian-American Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism launched in
2006 by the Presidents of Russian Federation and the United States as a major contribution
to the global security. The Initiative is already being implemented and is growing in scale.
The number of states participating in the Initiative has reached 75. We consider it to be a
good example of how we can cooperate in the modern world in addressing new challenges
and threats. On the other hand, the long-lasting reluctance of NATO to bring the 1990 Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in line with the new realities and expansion
of the Alliance - despite certain countries’ security interests, has forced Russia to suspend
the Treaty.
At the same time, Russia has proposed a distinct program to restore viability of the European
control regime over conventional armaments. Our proposal still applies. We are prepared to
continue and intensify the dialogue. And if one believes that the existing control regimes are
inadequate (which, indeed, seems to be the case), we should reinforce them. Russia is ready.
Until now, our partners’ point of departure was that Russia could be persuaded to make
concessions in exchange for the promise to consider its “anxieties” at a later stage. As
President Medvedev has recently stated, “national security cannot depend just on promises”.
In other words, our partners’ approach is based on a false assumption and does not leave
many chances for this problem’s early solution. Meanwhile, time factor and some of NATO
countries’ own decisions are working against CFE itself.
Missile proliferation problem remains the source of our serious concern, which has only
multiplied in the absence of control arrangements similar to those of WMD – namely related
to WMD delivery vehicles. The situation with small- and medium range missiles’
proliferation – as I have already mentioned – is an obvious demonstration of the fact. Russia
favours complex approach to addressing this problem. Our strategic objective is to have a
global missile non-proliferation regime based on a legally binding agreement elaborated, in
particular, along the lines of the Russian initiative to set up a global missile and missile
technology non-proliferation control system. Under auspices of the UN Security Council,
we cooperate in the implementation of the Council's resolutions 1540 and 1810 on non -
proliferation.
And finally, we participate in multilateral export control activities, including Wassenaar
arrangements for control of conventional armaments and dual use goods and technologies,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
We are convinced that results of cooperation for the non-proliferation purposes could be
better if Russia participated in the Australian Group.
Ladies and gentlemen,
no doubt, WMD non-proliferation regime should be strengthened through international
cooperation and leaders here should be naturally USA and Russia. Moscow is ready to work
closely with the new Obama Administration.
Before I leave this podium may I take the opportunity and suggest that politicians improve
their economic thinking in the situation of the global financial and economic crises when the
world just cannot afford speeding up expenditure on arms race. And very finally: should we
keep the trend when the market conditions improve?
Thank you for your attention.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2010 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
The dramatic changes in the world over the past twenty years could not but influence the
international agenda. We are now faced with the question of its transformation and change. The
obvious improvement in the atmosphere in Euro-Atlantic politics, where the demand for
confrontational approaches has fallen seriously, also prompts this.
But it is difficult to call normal the situation where the politico-military realities in the Euro-
Atlantic area are far behind the contemporary economic, technological, trade, investment and
other processes of globalization and interdependence, which occur in the world today.
Over the past twenty years European security has been seriously weakened across all
parameters. This applies to the arms control regime and lingering conflicts and attempts to turn
the "frozen conflicts" into "hot" ones and the atrophy of the OSCE. The remarks that "all is
normal, nothing needs to be changed" do not convince us. I hope our point of view will be
listened to.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization a real
opportunity emerged to make the OSCE a full-fledged organization providing equal security
for all states of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, this opportunity was missed, because the
choice was made in favour of the policy of NATO expansion, which meant not only preserving
the lines that separated Europe during the Cold War into zones with different levels of security,
but also moving those lines eastward. The role of the OSCE was, in fact, reduced to servicing
this policy by means of supervision over humanitarian issues in the post-Soviet space.
As a result, a European architecture that would bring together all states of the Euro-Atlantic
space without exception in one organization based on coherent, legally binding principles and
with the appropriate tools to ensure them in practice did not materialize. The amorphousness of
the OSCE led to its isolation from the needs of real life in many areas.
The main thing is that neither in the OSCE nor in any other framework was there realized the
lofty and noble principle enunciated in the 90s at the highest level, the principle of indivisibility
of security across the Euro-Atlantic space, according to which no state can be secured at
another's expense.
This principle is declared in the OSCE, NATO and the Russia-NATO Council (RNC) alike.
But whereas in the North Atlantic Alliance the indivisibility of security is an obligatory, legally
confirmed norm, in the OSCE and RNC it is limited to a genre of political declarations, without
any legal or practical embodiment. That the principle of indivisibility of security in the OSCE
does not work doesn't take long to prove. Let's recall the bombing of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1999, when a group of OSCE countries, bound by this political declaration,
committed aggression against another OSCE country, which was also covered by this principle.
Everyone also remembers the tragedy of August 2008 in Transcaucasia, where a member
country of the OSCE which is bound by various commitments in the sphere of non-use of force
used this force, including against peacekeepers of another member country of the OSCE, in
violation not only of the Helsinki Final Act, but also of the concrete peacekeeping agreement
devoted to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, which excludes use of force.
The absence of clear-cut rules in the OSCE led to the fact that the information of the OSCE
observers in South Ossetia about the preparations of the Georgian leadership for a military
attack was not reported to the OSCE Permanent Council. It is still unclear how this could
happen. But that this resulted from the lack of clear-cut rules there is no need to prove.
Incidentally, the RNC also failed by refusing to convene on Russia's request for an
extraordinary meeting at the height of hostilities. Both Kosovo and South Ossetia are
manifestations of the systemic weakness of the OSCE.
But I also want to say about another thing. In historical development there has come a time
when serious changes are occurring, and we have to choose between past and future. That, by
and large, is the question now. It is important not to miss this unique moment. I am sure we are
able to rise above historical complexes and "look beyond the horizon."
By and large, it is necessary to analyse the "family affairs" in Europe, and reassess a lot of
things, though not in terms of the euphoria and triumphalism of the early 90s, but on the basis
of sober analysis of the real consequences of what has occurred in the past twenty years. On
whether we can jointly draw the right lessons the geopolitical weight of Europe depends, as
well as of all European civilization, of which both the US and Russia are an integral part. One
chief lesson must be an honest acknowledgement that there is a problem with the concept of
indivisibility of security and that it will have to be tackled so it does not interfere with taking
up specific, important tasks for us all, which are more than enough. Having solved the
indivisibility of security problem once and for all in full measure, we can focus on a positive
agenda and pressing matters based on coinciding interests and will create a solid foundation for
joint action by the US, EU and Russia in international affairs. I would like to note the
importance of precisely such a trilateral interaction. Bilateral strategic dialogues are insufficient
and cannot replace the trilateral cooperation.
Many understand the unhealthy nature of the current situation. Hence the real interest in the
idea put forward by President Medvedev in June 2008 of concluding a European Security
Treaty. A solid thinking process has since been launched both at intergovernmental (OSCE,
RNC, the Russia-EU interaction) and at various political science venues. Were it not for this
initiative, there would be no shake-up in the OSCE.
Our NATO and EU partners tell us that the Russian Draft Treaty should be discussed only in
the OSCE, as this organization is the "custodian" of the adopted by us all comprehensive
approach to security, for which we have always consistently advocated. I will note, however,
that prior to our initiative, most OSCE member states had not thought about it. Until recently,
and even now, the lion's share of OSCE programs does not reflect the comprehensive approach
and is devoted to the humanitarian sphere to the detriment of the other baskets. We have
repeatedly drawn attention to these distortions, which must be removed.
Speaking about the human dimension, we must not forget that there is also the Council of
Europe, where an array of European conventions has been produced that in contrast to the
political documents of the OSCE are legally binding and thus constitute a single, common legal
humanitarian space of the continent. Incidentally, these conventions are open to all those
wishing. Why in the context of the Corfu Process, as one of the solutions to humanitarian issues,
not appeal to all OSCE members to join these conventions? This will benefit all.
The Council of Europe has fundamental legal documents – the Statute, the European
Convention on Human Rights. There is the "executive authority" in the person of the Committee
of Ministers. There are the Court, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the
Parliamentary Assembly. In other words, it is in the realm of "soft security" that a pan-European
structure has long been established and works quite well, ensuring compliance with the
commitments in the field of human rights and freedoms. Above all, there are mechanisms in
this structure to ensure compliance with these obligations. In the sphere of "hard security" there
is no organization which on the same legally binding principles would provide a single politico-
military space in Europe.
We all need an OSCE which actually enhances security and cooperation on the continent on an
equal basis in all dimensions, bringing "added value" in terms of its real comparative
advantages. Russia wants to see the OSCE a strong and effective organization, based on
international law.
Therefore, we actively backed the Greek OSCE Chairmanship in its initiative to launch the
Corfu Process, which demonstrated awareness of the need to revive in full the Helsinki
Decalogue and a truly all-round approach to security. Continued dialogue will help, we hope,
to develop ways to enhance, comprehensively, the capacity of the OSCE, to remove the serious
distortions in its activities and to convert it into a full-fledged international organization.
Of course, the comprehensive approach should not be quietly substituted by artificial linkage
tactics. After all, if someone refuses to discuss "hard security" until he is satisfied with the
human rights situation, then someone else can take a similar stand, but with opposite sign, not
wishing to speak on humanitarian subjects without prior agreement on politico-military or
economic issues. And then we all will find ourselves at an impasse.
We ought to proceed from the equivalence of all dimensions of security, each of which is
essential and should be considered with a view to achieving the best possible arrangements, but
not on the principle of the lowest common denominator.
In this case, we are actively in favour of reaffirming, including as part of the Corfu Process of
course, all the fundamental documents of the OSCE in all areas and of reviewing the progress
on all previously adopted commitments. We are particularly interested in a commitment to
ensure freedom of movement in the OSCE space. For some reason, everyone is now trying to
avoid it, although for our people, people across Europe it is a key issue.
It is encouraging that the agreed Corfu Process agenda highlights the need to increase the
effectiveness of the Organization, which implies a serious discussion of the questions of its
reform. The Corfu Process should primarily result in the creation of a legal foundation of the
OSCE on which to build agreement on matters of substance.
In putting forward the initiative on European security, we wanted to include in the Draft Treaty
all major aspects of politico-military issues: arms control and confidence-building measures
and conflict resolution and response to contemporary threats and challenges. But, after listening
to our colleagues, we agreed to include them in the Corfu Process. All practical issues connected
with politico-military security are already included in the Corfu Process agenda. On many of
them there are Russian initiatives, including those advanced jointly with other OSCE members.
And in the Draft Treaty we have left no practical things, but only one principle – the principle
of the indivisibility of security. This is a kind of test. If we continue to believe in what our
leaders declared and subscribed to in the 90s, why cannot we make the same things legally
binding. If, however, this principle is no longer supported, we want to hear why. But if it is
supported, let's take this decision and confirm that we were all sincere when we in the 90s said
that none of our countries would secure themselves at others' expense. That's actually all. The
idea is extremely simple, minimally necessary to advance along the path of confidence building
measures, and absolutely not contradictory. Therefore, when we hear people say that they find
the idea interesting but that they need to understand what Russia wants, then we answer that we
do not hide anything. We honestly say that we want to confirm in a legally binding form what
was already declared.
Today in the Euro-Atlantic area we see a qualitatively new moment coming forth: a kind of
convergence of national interests, which objectively creates the conditions for solving on a de-
ideologized basis the fundamental task of strengthening the position of European civilization
in a globalizing, polycentric and increasingly competitive world. By overcoming the bloc-based
Cold War approaches in the European architecture, and the derivative fears they arouse with
regard to "spheres of influence," we will provide the new quality of mutual trust that Europe so
desperately needs in contemporary conditions.
The main question: Will the pan-European space be a truly, in legal terms, single space? Or
will it be divided into "spheres of influence" and areas in which different standards are applied
in terms of military and political security, humanitarian obligations, access to markets and
modern technology and so on? It's a hugely important issue, a kind of test of the members of
the Euro-Atlantic "family" for maturity, for their ability to adequately perceive what is
happening in the world.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2011 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
I would like to express my words of gratitude to the organizers of the Munich Conference,
which in recent years has been included in the category of leading discussion “platforms” on
topical issues of international security. In Russia, with constant attention are related to its work
- on October 20 last year, the participants of the second (Moscow) retreat of the Munich
conference activists were received by the President of Russia Dmitry A. Medvedev.
In 2010, the leaders of the Euro-Atlantic states managed to significantly improve the
atmosphere in European affairs. Security relations are radically transformed, with less and less
manifestations of confrontation and more elements of cooperation. Spheres of interests
coincide. There has been a real advancement towards our common goal - ensuring stability and
prosperity in Europe, where everyone will equally feel protected, where everyone’s security
will be guaranteed, regardless of participation in military-political alliances. Much of what we
spoke at last year’s Munich Conference is embodied in practical foreign policy actions.
To a large extent, this is the result of a broad discussion on the problem of reforming the
architecture of the continent, which began in response to the initiative of President Dmitry
Medvedev to conclude a Treaty on Euro-Atlantic Security.
We are satisfied that the invitation made by Dmitry A. Medvedev to an open dialogue - and
this, in fact, is the essence of our initiative - was accepted. Our partners responded by putting
forward a whole range of their own ideas about the future of European security, on the whole
consonant with our initiative. In particular, French President N. Sarkozy proposed a new format
of interaction between the European Union and its neighbours, including Russia, Ukraine, and
Turkey. In June last year in Meseberg, German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed, and
President Dmitry Medvedev supported the creation of the Russia-EU Committee on Foreign
and Security Policy, which would translate Moscow-Brussels cooperation in the international
arena into a new quality - from simple discussion to develop joint solutions, including in the
field of crisis management.
Another sign of change - we already talked about this today - US Secretary of State H. Clinton
will literally exchange the instruments of ratification of the START Treaty in an hour, which
was also born thanks to an understanding of the counterproductive unilateral approaches to
security. The principles of equality, parity, equal and indivisible security laid down in the
Treaty create a solid foundation for modern Russian-American cooperation in various
fields. The Treaty that will enter into force from that day will have a beneficial effect on
international stability.
Encouraging signals were given by the recent summit of the Russia-NATO Council (NRC) in
Lisbon. I will highlight the adoption of the Joint Review of Common Security Challenges. With
his approval, the logic of negative interdependence, based on the confrontation of power
potentials, on threats and counter-threats, is overcome, an ascent to the logic of positive
interdependence begins. Since there are common security challenges, it means that we have
common interests and tasks, which means that we all recognize the indivisibility of security in
the Euro-Atlantic space. The goal in Lisbon is to bring the relations of CPH members to the
level of strategic partnership. The main thing is that it does not remain on paper.
The OSCE summit, held on December 1-2, 2010 in Astana, which continued the tradition of an
open and equal political dialogue between the heads of state and international organizations,
confirmed the growing demand for cooperation in Euro-Atlantic. In addition to the final
Summit Declaration, Russia, together with the majority of other OSCE participants, was ready
to adopt a detailed action plan. Unfortunately, this did not succeed: the plan became a hostage
of one-sided ideologized approaches in the spirit of a zero-sum game.
Nevertheless, as the OSCE summit showed, there are quite good prospects for the
modernization of the Vienna Document on confidence-building measures, and there have been
shifts in the process of overcoming the impasse on the issue of control over conventional
weapons in Europe. If you hear each other’s legitimate concerns, you can succeed.
It is in our common interest to cope with the long-standing conflicts that are still a source of
suspicion and discord. To do this, we will have to abandon double standards, objectively
approach each situation, fully take into account the positions of all parties.
In general, we are satisfied that the Russian initiative on the European Security Treaty helps to
formulate a weighty program of action, the implementation of which will contribute to the
creation of a truly Greater Europe. In essence, this is the final elimination of the legacy of the
“cold war” - in the minds, in politics, in affairs. It is important to take advantage of the “window
of opportunity” that has opened and to establish such cooperation in countering new threats that
would be resistant to all sorts of ideological prejudices, once and for all would eliminate the
danger of dividing lines - now in areas of common interest.
The key project from this point of view is a joint EuroPRO project. At the NRC summit in
Lisbon, we agreed to analyse the possibilities of its creation. President Dmitry A. Medvedev
proposed our vision of this project on the principles of equality, connecting the potentials of
Russia and NATO countries, without creating any problems for each other, based on mutual
consideration of interests and the need to collectively counter common challenges in the field
of missile proliferation.
Collaboration begins. We expect that it will be conducted honestly, taking into account the task
set to enter a strategic partnership. If the dialogue with Russia will be used to divert attention
from the US-NATO missile defence, then we risk missing a unique chance.
I think everyone understands that the agreement to discuss in the NRC ways of establishing
cooperation in the field of missile defence does not in any way mean Russia's prior consent to
join the NATO program being developed without its participation. The “take it or leave it”
scheme does not work here.
Unfortunately, for the time being it turns out that NATO, in its internal elaborations on the topic
of missile defence, is going to go a step, or even two ahead of what we are going to do in the
NRC in this area. In any case, the decisions of the NATO Lisbon Summit are aimed at this. Still,
I hope that we will not again be trying to confront the fait accompli. Otherwise, we will not
avoid new complications.
For everyone, Russia's position should be self-evident in favour of maintaining strategic parity
in the context of solving the ABM problem. Professionals are well aware that the
implementation of the third and fourth stages of the American “phased adaptive approach”
(namely, it is the basis of the discussed NATO missile defence) will mean reaching a strategic
level directly affecting the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent forces. If our concerns
are not taken into account, if joint equal work does not work out, then, willy-nilly, we will have
to compensate for the resulting imbalance. Such a scenario, unfortunately, is fraught with a
return to the logic of the past, which the Russian leadership has openly warned about more than
once. Failure would seriously reduce cooperation opportunities not only in countering missile
risks, and across the entire spectrum of threats to our common security. I emphasize that this
would not be our choice.
Joint defence against common threats is the highest, essentially allied, form of security
cooperation. Therefore, our ability to create a joint European missile defence system with the
participation of Russia and NATO will be a test of the sincerity of declarations of readiness for
partnership, for a radical transformation of the strategic context of relations, for creating in
practice an indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
The key point: everything we do in the NRC, including cooperation on missile defence, should
not “designate enemies”, damage global strategic stability, giving rise to new dividing lines -
now between the NRC and the rest of the world. This would undermine the urgently needed
efforts to build inter-civilization harmony.
Of course, there are still a number of areas where confidence and predictability are required. In
this regard, I would note that NATO’s hypertrophied emphasis on “collective defence” against
the background of speculations about certain “threats from the East” does not, of course, please
us. He will constantly generate "search for the enemy", inflate tensions. We noticed that the
section on “classic threats” was written out in the new Strategic Concept of NATO from
conservative, ideologically motivated positions. But we hope that the decisions taken in the
NRC will prevail.
It should be obvious to everyone that there are no states in the Euro-Atlantic that have reasons,
plans or intentions to threaten NATO members. With this objective reality, it would be
necessary to harmonize the mechanisms for implementing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
including the process of military planning of the alliance in its doctrinal and material
aspects. There is no need to camouflage the obvious: the alliance, like Russia, needs partners,
including, if not above all, in ensuring security from the trans-border threats of terrorism, drug
trafficking, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery from outside the Euro-
Atlantic. We are ready for such cooperation on the basis of the principles of international law
enshrined in the UN Charter at the initiative of the great powers, which today play a leading
role on the world stage.
In the Euro-Atlantic region, for sure, there will still be those who, for one reason or another,
are not comfortable with reducing the demand for conflict, who are afraid to take a decisive
step from the past to the future and still sometimes try to turn world politics backwards. Much
remains to be done to irrevocably overcome the accumulated historical clichés, phobias and
suspicions. So that the principle of the indivisibility of security proclaimed in our joint political
declarations can be translated into practical joint projects.
We are ready for the most serious collective work in this most important area of Euro-Atlantic
and global politics. The time has come to make a choice between common strategic interests
and short-term conjuncture of political expediency.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2012 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
Dear Chairman,
Dear ladies and gentlemen,
It is a pleasure for me to attend the Munich conference again, which has firmly consolidated
itself as most authoritative site for open conceptual discussion of European and international
politics problems.
It is impossible to overlook the symbolism of the date of today's meeting. 70 years ago, one of
the most difficult, bloody, and crucial battles of World War II – the battle of Stalingrad – was
over. Hundreds of thousands of my compatriots who gave their lives for this victory on the
banks of Volga were not only defending the Motherland, but also fighting for the attainment of
universal peace, just as all our allies were doing.
The diplomacy efforts were also aimed at the purpose of not permitting the tragedy of world
war to repeat. They resulted in the creation of the United Nations Organization. However, soon
afterwards the "cold war" drew the dividing lines in Europe, putting off the opportunities for
building a system of collective security, which is embodied in the UN Charter, for a long time.
I speak of this not to provoke another search for the guilty ones. Stirring up the past is not for
credible politicians. As the Russian president Vladimir Putin stressed in December letter to the
Federal Assembly, Russia is only going ahead, only into the future. That's why the meaning of
our participation in Munich conference we see above all in trying to find a joint approach to
building a security community based on authentic strategic partnership. That is the very aim
that was put by the leaders of Euro-Atlantic countries in 2010 at OSCE summits in Astana and
Russia-NATO Council in Lisbon.
Certainly, it would be a mistake to state that nothing is done at all for achieving this noble aim.
Russia and USA concluded the START, many-sided cooperation in combating terrorism,
narcobusiness, piracy, threats from Afghanistan, is developing. The rejection of "cold war" era
psychology is officially proclaimed. Russia and NATO members declared that they are not
seeing each other as enemies.
However, we are not here to shower praises and compliments upon each other, but to understand
the ways that need to be coordinated for the successful solving of the remaining problems.
With this in view, we all have to admit that not in word but indeed we are still nowhere near
the truly collective Euro-Atlantic architecture, which would be based on solid international
legal foundation. Still present is a tendency of building relations on military-political affairs in
Europe not on the base of principles proclaimed in OSCE and NRC, but by advancing NATO-
centric security structure as a single option.
We consider such a narrow-bloc approach to be of no avail and difficult to conceive with the
help of objective, rational considerations; it is hardly applicable to building politics in today's
global world, when we share the threats. It is time to take a broad and comprehensive look at
the whole complex of relations in Euro-Atlantics and try to define the identity of approaches
and the remaining discrepancies between us, including with regard to conflict situations in other
parts of the world that influence our mutual security.
When looking at today's most restless region – Near East, North Africa, Sahel zone – it is hard
to get rid of the feeling of some kind of a curved space. Many questions arise in connection
with approaches applied by some of our partners in the conditions of the "Arab Spring" process.
Does the support of speeches for the change of regimes allow justifying terrorist methods? Are
you able to make war in one conflict situation against those whom you support in another
conflict situation? How to make sure that the weaponry you illegally supplied to a zone of
conflict is not directed against yourself? Who among the rulers is legitimate, and who is not?
When is it acceptable to cooperate with authoritarian regimes (both civil and not that much
civil), and when is it allowed to support their violent overthrow? In what cases is it needed to
acknowledge the forces that came to power as a result of a democratic election, and in what
cases – to refuse contacting them? What are the criteria and standards determining all this?
It is important to seek joint honest answers to these questions, especially as Euro-Atlantic
countries have much more common points than disagreements in respect of ultimate goals of
the efforts on resolution of crises. In the Near and Middle East, North Africa and African
continent, as well as in other regions, we all want the stability to be secured, conditions for
sustainable development to be created, the people of the states located there to be able to
advance towards democracy and prosperity, human rights and uninterrupted supply of
hydrocarbons, as well as another essential resources, to be guaranteed.
If these are our common aims, then we would probably be able to agree on transparent and clear
"rules" which should be followed by all external players in their practical actions. Agree that
we all will be supporting the democratic reforms in states undergoing transformations and not
imposing an outside value scale but acknowledging the variety of development models. Agree
that we shall be supporting the peaceful settlement of the inner state conflicts and stopping of
violence by creating conditions for an inclusive dialogue with involvement of all national
political groups. Agree that we shall refrain from outside interference, especially by force,
without a clear mandate from the UN Security Council and from arbitrary application of
unilateral sanctions. That we will consistently and firmly fight extremism and terrorism in all
forms, will demand observation of rights for ethnic and confessional minorities. I'm sure that if
all of the "Action Group" meeting participants in Geneva on 30 June 2012 together honestly
fulfilled jointly formulated approaches, then today's tragic and horrible situation Syria may not
even be. But for this it is necessary to honestly fulfil what has been agreed upon and not to
extract or add anything. For that purpose, we have been suggesting for a long time to hold a
new meeting of the "Action Group". We hope that Lakhdar Brakhimi who is present here will
try to advance this initiative in his work.
On the whole, in respect of the "Arab Spring" processes, it's high time to withdraw from
simplified schemes and slogans, to weigh the situation and its development scenarios from
responsible positions. Understanding this makes its way. I'll particularly mention the recent
article of Volfgang Ishinger in "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" where very interesting ideas
that have something in common with our situation assessment are stated.
If we are interested in joint actions for the benefit of all, then we need to see the world as it is.
To accept that forceful operations (no need to look far for examples) lead to chaos strengthening
in international relations and can cause waves of instability that no "stability island" will shelter
from. History continues to gain speed and ahead there are many crossroads where it will be
again necessary to choose between unilateral geopolitical aims and partnership, between zero
sum games and joint efforts to find answers to today's challenges.
Many of these crossroads are seen already now. For instance, it is a question of the future of
Pan-European organization – OSCE. Today the disagreements within it are deepening because
of the attempts to dictate one's standards to others, transform it in sufficiently confrontational
polemic platform, escalating in this way the systemic crisis of the Organization. The uniting
projects are needed that will cement the European space and help build consensus on
fundamental security questions. "Window of opportunities" still exists: last year in December
CFM OSCE in Dublin has resolved to start the "Helsinki+40" process. We would like to hope
that by 2015, when this anniversary will be celebrated, a truly joint agenda would be
successfully made, reflecting our mutual determination to concentrate on the solution of the
common strategic goals on the basis of putting into life the principle of security indivisibility,
and not an exchange of claims.
ABM problem became an important conformity test of real business with solemn declarations
of commitment to this key principle. We are all risking to lose another real chance to build a
single Euro-Atlantic space. Russia proposes a simple and constructive way – to coordinate strict
guarantees of undirectedness of US global ABM against any OSCE member country and
develop clear military-technical criteria allowing to estimate the conformity of ABM systems
with the stated aims: neutralization of missile threats that come from outside of Euro-Atlantic
region.
It's also important to clarify the definition of NATO's mission in new conditions, not for
interfering in this process, but for making it clear for us. Advance to an authentic partnership
between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance is still slowed down by the attempts to exploit
the thesis about the Soviet threat, which is now already transforming into the thesis about the
Russian threat. Phobias are very enduring, and we see how a military planning process is built
under this thesis. Even in the conditions of deficit of financial resources an increase in military
activities is observed in the north and centre of Europe, as if in these regions the security threats
are mounting. Advancement of projects for NATO's further expansion and advancement of
bloc's military infrastructure to the East is continuing – as if there were no top-level statements
on fatality of preserving dividing lines on the continent. Speaking of this, some of our European
partners are now inventing new dividing lines, begin trying to artificially divide integration
projects into "good" and "bad", "friendly" and "alien".
Today the conception of the "clever defence" is discussed in NATO. I lay aside the question
about from whom specifically they are going to defend. More important is to realize the
objective demand for a new, modern, "clever" foreign policy aimed at the most effective use of
the emerging opportunities of cooperation instead of their inexcusable squandering. If the
leading economies of the world within the scope of "Group 20" were able to arrange joint efforts
for overcoming the global financial and economic crisis, so why it cannot be done in politics?
Last year Russia became the full member of WTO, which was created first of all for fighting
protectionism in the trade and economic relations. We are grateful to USA, EC and all who
supported this process. But if we try to analyse the situation with preserving bloc thinking, then
this thinking is probably the protectionism in the military and political sector? In that case it's
evident that it's in the direct contradiction with the today's demands which dictate the necessity
of the formation of the open systems of equal security for everyone.
Our proposals about how to make a principle of security indivisibility, repeatedly declared in
OSCE and NRC, legally binding, working in practice, are still on the "bargaining table". The
codification of the commitments not to enhance own security at the expense of others' security
approved on the highest political level would help improve military and political climate in
Euro-Atlantics and would favour closer relations between all countries and realization of the
strategic goal to create the united economical and humane space from Atlantics to Pacific
Ocean.
The aspiration for elaborating joint approaches for securing genuinely equitable architecture in
Euro-Atlantics is more and more clear not just in case of reasonable politicians, but also on the
level of civil society. We welcome the collaboration of the centres of politology in Germany,
Poland, Russia, and France on preparing recommendations regarding problems of Euro-
security, which was approved in OSCE. We want to stimulate such contacts and processes in
every possible way. We welcome this work.
No doubt that we are living at the turning point of the history, which means that the decisive
and large initiatives are needed. It is time to mutually write off the historical debts and issue
each other the "anti-recessionary" credit – the credit of trust and partnership.
In advance of the speech I was asked to comment the Russian-American relations, but deep
down, I agree with today's words of Joe Biden – a good friend and colleague of mine. We really
have a very vast and positive agenda, but in the relations between such major states the opposing
views and discrepancies, sometimes serious ones, are inevitably retained. You all know them.
We shall fundamentally consider every question in Russian-American relations as subjected to
agreement, if being guided by the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual respect for
interests. But regarding the questions where we are able to cooperate for our countries goodness
and international security, we are, no doubt, already working and will continue doing this.
I would like to finish with a reference to President Barack Obama who said during his inaugural
speech that USA will seek to resolve disagreements with other countries by peaceful means –
not as a result of naivety, but because the cooperation is the most sure remedy for eliminating
suspicions and fear. In its foreign policy Russia stably abides exactly such an approach which
is based on strict observance of principles and norms of international law. We decidedly count
on reciprocity.
Thank you for your attention.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2014 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
Mr. President,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all, I would like to congratulate the organisers of the Munich Conference on its 50th
anniversary. It has been a long time. It is important that the conference is maintaining its
reputation firmly and confidently.
Others have already mentioned anniversaries and 50 years of the Conference. The Berlin Wall,
a symbol of division of Europe, was dismantled 25 years ago, and created hope for a common
European home. We remember these talks, the inspiration many people were overtaken by. We
have not managed to make this dream come true, but nevertheless we remember some of those
important decisions here today, including the joint statement at the NATO-Russia Council
summit in Lisbon in 2010. The OSCE summit was held in the same year in Astana. Important
documents which had set the goal to create a common European, European Atlantic and
Eurasian security community were adopted at these forums. We still have this goal, nobody has
cancelled it, however it seems that we are not moving towards it very fast – many people even
say that there is movement, yet it is in the other direction.
On the eve of the recent EU-Russia summit, our colleagues from Brussels proposed putting
pending business aside and focussing on the strategic aspects of interaction of the two largest
partners in the European space. We immediately agreed, even more so that we consistently
speak in favour of sincere, straight from the mouth and omission-free discussion of the most
complicated problems with any partners, including the EU, NATO and the United States.
The Eastern Partnership programme promoted by Brussels has recently been considered the
symbol of difference in political views of Russia and the EU. From the very beginning, when
this project was started, we were for dialogue, transparency and consideration of each other's
interests in relations between Russia, the EU and all our neighbours. It is good that the European
Union has started to talk about this right now.
However, to search for mutually acceptable agreements, we need to answer some fundamental
questions, arising, in particular in connection with the situation in Ukraine and, primarily, about
the relation between the stirring of street protests which become more and more violent, and
the promotion of democratic principles. Why don't we hear condemning voices addressed to
those who have occupied and still hold administrative buildings, attack policemen, set them on
fire, use racist, anti-Semitic and Nazi slogans? Why do many prominent European politicians
actually support such actions, even though they immediately and strictly stop any deviations
from the letter of the law?
Just a while ago, the President of the European Union Herman Van Rompuy stated from this
rostrum that the Ukrainian people should make their choice, and immediately added that the
future of Ukraine is in the European Union. My friend, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen also spoke about the need to give Ukraine freedom of choice. However, all of us
understand how this choice was predetermined for Ukraine at the NATO summit in 2007. Later,
common sense seemed to prevail. I will also cite the words used by the spokesperson for the
U.S. Department of State, which are engraved on my memory: "The United States hopes that a
government will be formed in Ukraine that will ensure political unity and economic prosperity
backed by the IMF and meeting the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for a European future".
If this is a confirmation of freedom of choice, then freedom of the Ukrainian people is
interpreted in rather a strange way, because the choice is in fact imposed, while Russia does not
want and will not engage in such things.
If we look at the root of this problem, it is important to understand whether our partners from
the European Union and in the West in general are ready to base their beliefs on principles of
equality, mutual respect, consideration of each other's interests in their relations with Russia
and our neighbours. Today, when the European continent is not the focus of global politics any
more, we should not divide it into spheres of influence, but decide how each and all the
countries of Europe can occupy winning positions in this highly competitive world. Will
everyone "sail" alone or would it be more reasonable to combine efforts and comparative
advantages of the European Union, Russia and other European states? Today many people on
the continent share the opinion of one of the most authoritative French politicians, Jean-Pierre
Chevènement, who thinks that Europe may become a pole in the new international system only
through the development of its partnership with Russia.
Making a speech several days ago in Brussels, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin confirmed
that Russia would like to build cooperation with the EU on the basis of large, ambitious, equal
and mutually beneficial projects and tasks. It is primarily about the combination of European
and Eurasian integration processes with the outcome of a common economic and humanitarian
space stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. There is no doubt that we can
only implement such a concept gradually, however, there is nothing unachievable here, because
both integration models are built on similar principles, they are based on WTO norms and might
effectively supplement each other. Vladimir Putin proposed studying the possibility of the
formation of a free trade zone between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union created by
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan by 2020 as a first step.
Consent in such strategic tasks would allow the removal of the problem of selecting the vector
of development of the states located between Russia and the EU. Hardly any European people
would face the "or-or" situation, if we were moving along the path of construction of a common
European home, like I have spoken about at the beginning of my speech, and which was the
object of so many fine words at the end of the 1980's – the beginning of the 1990's.
Unfortunately, the logic of maintaining and deepening dividing lines, based on the principle
"those who are not with us are against us", still prevails.
It seems to me that we have approached the moment of truth in this philosophy, therefore we
specifically welcome the decision reached at the EU-Russian summit in Brussels on the 28
January to conduct an expert, depoliticised analysis of compatibility of EU and Eurasian
integration processes.
The security area still shows a lack of strategic vision and trust. We are still unable to overcome
the phobias of the past epoch, the aspiration to see the state of affairs through the "friend-or-
foe" lens. In conditions, when military confrontation in the European continent has become
unimaginable, the renewal of talks about the threat from the East is perplexing, to say the least,
even more so that these are not just talks – military infrastructure keeps growing on the eastern
borders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there are exercises, the goal of which is not
to fight terrorism (as Russia does with its partners), they are based on Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. The situation around the plan to create the European segment of the US
ABM is a test of readiness to build an equal security system in Atlantic Europe. Anders Fogh
Rasmussen spoke about this trying to convince me that this was a defensive system. However,
I think that military men understand well that the ABM is part of the strategic arsenal of the
United States, which is an integral component of the entire strategic stability. When we add a
"nuclear-missile shield" to the "nuclear sword", the temptation to use these attack and defence
opportunities becomes rather high, depending on which leaders may come to power in the
country having such opportunities. We do not avoid dialogue, although we do not see any
changes in the position of our partners. They just offer us the option to take their word for it
that the European ABM is not aimed against Russia. Quite frequently, we have quoted the
statement by one of great Germans who said that not the intent, but rather the potential, is
important in military arts. Everybody understands what I am talking about.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned many issues related to arms control: nuclear, non-strategic
nuclear, usual nuclear arms. We met in Brussels just recently, and I asked the NATO Secretary
General all the questions I have to put to NATO and mentioned today. He did not tell me the
aspects, which he presented here. If they are interested in talking seriously, they need to do this
within the framework of direct contacts in the NATO-Russia Council and within the ambit of
our regular meetings with the NATO Secretary General, which we value greatly, rather than
through an audience.
We are convinced that the principle of indivisibility of security must become a universal law,
the obligation of each country to take into consideration and respect all the legal interests of its
neighbours in Atlantic Europe. In fact, this is a military and political implementation of the
well-known moral imperative – treat other people the way you want to be treated.
This year we celebrate 100 years since the beginning of the First World War and 75 years since
the beginning of the Second World War. It is important to avoid using these dates for
information wars (we are already seeing such attempts), but to use them to seriously think over
those internal springs of the processes, which have brought Europe and the entire world to
disaster at times in the last century. The accumulation of elements of instability and chaos in
economics and politics makes me draw a parallel with the development of events at the
beginning of the XX century and between wars not only on the European, but also on a global
scale. We need to remember where attempts to ensure personal security at the expense of the
security of others, the following of narrow egoistic interests, and the logics of national
exclusiveness, can lead us to.
I would like that the Helsinki Plus 40 OSCE discussions become a serious attempt to rethink
complicated processes in the European space, to move away from bloc schemes, to find joint
answers to common challenges. We can't fail to see that only together we can handle acute
problems of the modern time.
We view the breakthrough decisions reached in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons,
the convention of the Geneva-2, as well as developments in the Iranian issues, as collective
successes. Now it is important to maintain these positive advances and appease the situation in
the region located in the direct vicinity of Europe, by joint efforts.
By emphasising the lack of alternatives to collective actions for these issues and to achieve final
results in all these directions, I would like to respond to the question I was asked: "What can
Russia do to resolve the Syrian crisis?" Russia cannot do anything alone. It is important that all
the external players do not attempt to promote the Syrian representatives they "patronise" as
the only legal representatives of the Syrian people, but to make the Syrian parties stay in Geneva
and continue their talks rather than slam the door. We welcome the modest yet promising results
reached by the Special Envoy for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi,over the last week. We expect them
to deepen and develop at the next round of talks. Russia actively supports the initiated dialogue
which should become truly representative as soon as possible. This is an inescapable rule of
success. All those having influence on the opposition must bring the entire spectrum of Syrian
society to the negotiation table. This request is included in UNSC resolution 2118, which
approves the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 and supports the conference to bring it to
life.
The long bloody conflict in Syria has turned the country into a stronghold of extremists and
terrorists from all over the world, and nobody knows how they will use their skills, when they
return home. Their atrocities against Christians and other minorities in Middle Eastern countries
convey bad suggestions.
We are grateful to all our partners, who have demonstrated their solidarity with Russia in
connection with the recent explosions in Volgograd, which were a rough reminder of the global
nature of the terrorist threat, the need not to ease our efforts in our joint fight and counteract
radicalisation of the public mood. To that end I recall the words of Helmut Schmidt, patriarch
of German politics: "Trends of nationalism, which have appeared again everywhere, in my
country as well, are directed at the past, they do not lay a road to the future. Nationalist nostalgia
can only weaken Europe".
It is hard to overestimate the significance of the intercultural, interreligious, intercivilisational
dialogue in the formation of a stable and democratic global management system backed by
international law and the central role of the UN.
"The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation... it
must be a peace which rests on the cooperative efforts of the whole world." These words by
Franklin Delano Roosevelt are engraved on the memorial in Fairbanks (Alaska) honouring the
Russian and US pilots who flew aircraft as part of the Lend-Lease program during World War
II. I don't think that there is any need to wait for such large-scale turbulences to set up a truly
collective world to reinforce European and international security.
To end, I should respond to item 6 which is the ideas proposed by Frank-Walter Steinmeier in
his speech, having asked (probably me) what do Russia and Europe share and asked to present
our vision of this issue to the public. We share a lot with Europe – I can mention only a few
moments. Firstly, we share the UN Charter, which proclaimed the principles of sovereign
equality, non-interference indomestic affairs, settlement of all disputes in a peaceful way,
inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of force. Secondly, we share the Helsinki Final Act
and many other documents adopted at high level in the OSCE. They set out the principles all
the Atlantic European states should be guided by, including the principle of indivisibility of
security and freedom of movement, as well as the principle of "closed doors", the President of
the Council of Europe was talking about, which cannot be found in OSCE documents or
documents of other bodies.
We also share many conventions of the Council of Europe, including the European Convention
on Human Rights. We hope that the European Union joins this convention following its
member-states. Of course, we share the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which is a kind of canon in the human rights area and clearly states the code of conduct of states
in different situations, including the one Ukraine is facing now. This document clearly states
that any protest moods in the context of freedom of expression cannot breach the law. Riots,
violent actions serve a sufficient reason to restrict such freedoms. We should not forget about
this. We all know well how they restrict disorders in various European cities, including the
United Kingdom, France and Germany. A state should be strong to be democratic.
Thank you for your kind attention.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2015 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been addressing many international issues lately. I’m sure
that there are professionals here and that they are aware of our stance, all the more so as Russian
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev spoke this morning. I won’t repeat myself. I would only like
to add a few points.
In the past few years, each February in Munich, we have expressed the fact that European
security, like the global situation in general, is developing in an unsatisfactory manner. We
discuss steps that could improve the situation, but no fundamental changes ever happen.
Of course, we manage to accomplish certain things - that’s true. But often agreements are not
carried out due to some of the participants' attempt to revise them retroactively to gain unilateral
advantage to the detriment of the seemingly achieved balance of interests.
Yesterday marked one year since the adoption of the Package of Measures for the
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, a document approved by UN Security Council
resolution. However, the implementation of the key political provisions has not even started -
mainly due to the Ukrainian authorities' unwillingness to honestly make this effort and their
eagerness to find pretexts to avoid the commitments they entered. It is positive that the US and
Europe seem to have come to realise that such behaviour is unacceptable, as John Kerry's
speech indicated, even given all his specific political correctness in line with the tendency for
Russophobia in certain countries.
Another urgent issue is the long-running crisis in Syria. Here, cooperation has resulted in
creating the International Syria Support Group and adopting UN Security Council Resolution
2254 that approves key parameters for settling the issues through negotiation between the
government and the full spectrum of opposition, including the demand that the Syrians should
be able to decide the nation's future themselves. However, in violation of this resolution, part
of the opposition is presenting ultimatums and conditions for the negotiation process - well,
they certainly know who to learn from - and are attempting to create discord within the
International Syria Support Group.
One cannot fail to see the degradation in the Middle East and North Africa over the past five
years, which began with the start of the so-called Arab Spring and has led to Europe's migrant
crisis and carries the threat that the terrorists could seize vast areas of the Middle East, North
Africa and other regions. Unprecedented terrorist aggression has been seen in Europe, the
United States, and the countries that are our allies under the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation in Asia - all this presents a serious threat to international security. Unfortunately,
despite certain success in the fight against ISIS, the al-Nusra Front, and the like, we have failed
so far to create a truly efficient anti-terrorist front, substantially due to certain countries'
inability to put aside nonentity matters and intentions to use the situation for changing political
regimes and implementing other geopolitical ambitions. I hope that the results of the
International Syria Support Group's meeting on February 11 in Munich will help change this
attitude. A true union of the leading nations against international terrorism is also necessary to
prevent the collapse of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan, whose territories, along with
Syrian territory, is being infiltrated by ISIS, who are using the lack of an efficient unified
international strategy to their advantage.
Recently the situation on the Korean Peninsula has abruptly become more tense due to the
irresponsible and absolutely unacceptable actions by North Korea. But here again, there is still
a tendency to take unilateral steps to punish Pyongyang, in circumvention of the UN Security
Council, and to boost foreign military presence in the region to the detriment of mutual efforts
to de-escalate the situation through existing negotiation mechanisms.
I think it is obvious to everyone that the baffling complexity of entwined conflicts and expanded
conflict areas require a coherent mutual approach. However, joint efforts are being hindered by
artificial restrictions, much like NATO and the EU's refusing full cooperation with Russia,
creating the image of an enemy, and arms deployment to harden the dividing lines in Europe
that the West had promised to eliminate. It appears that old instincts die hard. Today, the level
of interaction between Euro-Atlantic organisations and Russia in certain spheres is even lower
than during the Cold War period, not to mention the returning shibboleths of an ideological
confrontation, whose conceptual basis ceased to exist a quarter of a century ago. Mixing the
propaganda with real politics to the detriment of the prospects for solving key international
issues has become a sign of our times.
Attempts to overcome this abnormal situation are being undertaken - for instance, by creating
the “Group of Wise Men” under the Helsinki +40 process, However, consensus was never
achieved as the group's report (as well as the report prepared for the current conference) turned
out to be NATO-centric and the Western countries are presented in the documents as the
"keepers" of the international system’s stability, which they apparently want to keep
unshakable. But this won’t happen. In any case, a reform of the world order should be
negotiated, because such NATO-centric egotism, which reflects political near-sightedness, does
much damage to seeking solutions to real, not invented, threats.
At the same time - and this was mentioned earlier today - last year's events again proved that
when one's idea of exceptionalism is put aside, the world's top nations - the US, the EU, China,
Russia, as well as other leading countries - can manage to achieve breakthrough results. I’m
talking about the Iranian nuclear programme settlement and Syria's chemical demilitarisation.
It is certain that this method can be successfully applied to the other azimuths of global politics,
including the settlement of the situation in the Middle East and, primarily, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. But to apply such collective approaches and such efficient methods, you need to get
used to working as a team and not make decisions for everyone and then punish those who do
not agree with such a dictate.
I believe that the Munich Conference platform can be used for a serious discussion on ways to
return to the culture of dialogue and not threats, and the art of compromise and not ultimatums.
I am convinced that the professionals present here have enough experience, wisdom and skill
to help make diplomacy the priority, the position that it should take during this period of
developing a system for stable and lasting global governance - if we are interested not in
swimming with the tide to the waterfall but in overcoming negative international trends and
satisfying the expectations related to our cooperative efforts.
A speech delivered at the MSC 2017 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov