Leviathan

Part 2. Commonwealth
Thomas Hobbes

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the
omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reported,
between [brackets], in normal-sized type.
Hobbes wrote Leviathan in Latin and in English; it is not always clear which parts were done first in English
and which in Latin. The present text is based on the English version, but sometimes the Latin seems better and is
followed instead. Edwin Curley’s fine edition of the English work (Hackett, 1994) has provided all the information
used here regarding the Latin version, the main lines of the translations from it, and other information given here
between square brackets.—Biblical references are given at the end.
First launched: August 2007

Contents
Chapter 17. The causes, creation, and definition of a commonwealth 77

Chapter 18. The rights of sovereigns by institution 80

Chapter 19. Kinds of commonwealth by institution, and succession to the sovereign power 85

Chapter 20. Paternal dominion and despotic dominion 92

Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes

Chapter 21. The liberty of subjects 96

Chapter 22. Systems—subject, political, and private 103

Chapter 23. The public ministers of sovereign power 109

Chapter 24. The nutrition and procreation of a commonwealth 111

Chapter 25. Advice 115

Chapter 26. Civil laws 119

Chapter 27. Crimes, excuses, and extenuations 131

Chapter 28. Punishments and rewards 140

Chapter 29. Things that weaken or tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth 144

Chapter 30. The office of the sovereign representative 150

Chapter 31. The kingdom of God by nature 160

Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 17: Causes, creation, definition

Part 2. Commonwealth

Chapter 17. The causes, creation, and definition of a commonwealth

Men naturally love liberty, and dominion over others; the greater spoils someone gained by robbery, the greater
so what is the final cause or end or design they have in was his honour. The only constraints on robbery came from
mind when they introduce the restraint upon themselves the laws of honour, which enjoined robbers to abstain from
under which we see them live in commonwealths? It is cruelty and to let their victims keep their lives and their farm
the prospect of their own preservation and, through that, implements. These days cities and kingdoms (which are
of a more contented life; i.e. of getting themselves out of only greater families) do what small families used to do back
the miserable condition of war which (as I have shown) then: for their own security they enlarge their dominions,
necessarily flows from the natural passions of men when on the basis of claims that they are in danger and in fear of
there is no visible power to keep them in awe and tie them invasion, or that assistance might be given to invaders ·by
by fear of punishment to keep their covenants and to obey the country they are attacking·. They try as hard as they
the laws of nature set down in my chapters 14 and 15. can to subdue or weaken their neighbours, by open force
and secret manoeuvres; and if they have no other means for
For the laws of nature—enjoining justice, fairness, mod- their own security, they do this justly, and are honoured for
esty, mercy, and (in short) treating others as we want them to it in later years.
treat us—are in themselves contrary to our natural passions,
unless some power frightens us into observing them. In Nor can the joining together of a small number of men
the absence of such a power, our natural passions carry us give them this security ·that everyone seeks·; because when
to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants the numbers are small, a small addition on the one side or
without the sword are merely words, with no strength to the other makes the advantage of strength so great that it
secure a man at all. Every man has obeyed the laws of suffices to carry the victory, and so it gives encouragement
nature when he has wanted to, which is when he could do for an invasion. How many must we be, to be secure? That
it safely; but if there is no power set up, or none that is depends not on any particular number, but on comparison
strong enough for our security, ·no-one can safely abide with the enemy we fear. We have enough if the enemy doesn’t
by the laws; and in that case· every man will and lawfully outnumber us by so much that that would settle the outcome
may rely on his own strength and skill to protect himself of a war between us, which would encourage the enemy to
against all other men. In all places where men have lived start one.
in small families ·with no larger organized groupings·, the And however great the number, if their actions are di-
trade of robber was so far from being regarded as against rected according to their individual wants and beliefs, they
the law of nature that ·it was outright honoured, so that· can’t expect their actions to defend or protect them against

77
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 17: Causes, creation, definition

a common enemy or against injuries from one another.

For being drawn in different directions by their ·differing· (1) Men continually compete with one another for honour
opinions concerning how best to use their strength, they and dignity, which ants and bees do not; and that leads men,
hinder rather than help one another, and by quarrelling but not those other animals, to envy and hatred and finally
among themselves they reduce their strength to nothing. war.
When that happens they are easily subdued by a very few (2) Among those ·lower· creatures, the common good ·of
men who agree together; and when there’s no common enemy all· is the same as the private ·good of each·; and being
they make war on each other for their particular interests. naturally inclined to their private ·benefit·, in procuring that
For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to agree in they also procure the common benefit. But a man’s biggest
the observation of justice and other laws of nature, without pleasure in his own goods comes from their being greater
a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well than those of others!
suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there would (3) Bees and ants etc. don’t have the use of reason (as
not be—and would not need to be—any civil government or man does), and so they don’t see—and don’t think they
commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without see—any fault in how their common business is organized;
subjection. whereas very many men think themselves wiser than the
For the security that men desire to last throughout their rest, and better equipped to govern the public. These men
lifetimes, it’s not enough that they be governed and directed struggle to reform and innovate, one in this way and another
by one judgment for a limited time—e.g. for one battle, or in that, thereby bringing the commonwealth into distraction
one war. For ·in that case·, even if they obtain a victory and civil war.
through their unanimous efforts against a foreign enemy, (4) These creatures, though they have some use of voice
yet afterwards—when they have no common enemy, or when in making known to one another their desires and other
some of them regard as an enemy someone whom the others affections, don’t have that skill with words through which
regard as a friend—the difference of their interests makes it some men •represent good things to others in the guise of
certain that they will fall apart and once more come to be at evil, and evil in the guise of good, and •misrepresent how
war amongst themselves. great various goods and evils are. These activities enable
It’s true that certain living creatures, such as bees and their practitioners to make men discontented, and to disturb
ants, live sociably with one another (which is why Aristotle their peace, whenever they feel like doing so.
counts them among the ‘political’ creatures [Greek politike (5) Creatures that lack reason don’t have the notion of
= ‘social’]), although •each of them is steered only by its being insulted or wronged as distinct from being physically
particular judgments and appetites, and •they don’t have damaged; so as long as they are at ease ·physically· they
speech through which one might indicate to another what are not offended with their fellows; whereas man is most
it thinks expedient for the common benefit. You may want troublesome when he is most at ease, for that is when he
to know why mankind can’t do the same. My answer to that loves to show his wisdom and to control the actions of those
·has six parts·. who govern the commonwealth.

78
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 17: Causes, creation, definition

so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, in

(6) The agreement of these creatures is natural, whereas Latin CIVITAS. This is the method of creation of that great
men’s agreement is by covenant only, which is artificial; so LEVIATHAN , or rather (to speak more reverently) of that mortal
it’s no wonder if something besides the covenant is needed god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace
to make their agreement constant and lasting, namely a and defence. For by this authority that has been given to
common power to keep them in awe and direct their actions •‘this man’ by every individual man in the commonwealth,
to the common benefit. •he has conferred on him the use of so much power and
The •only way to establish a common power that can strength that people’s fear of it enables him to harmonize
defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries and control the wills of them all, to the end of peace at home
of one another, and thereby make them secure enough to and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. •He is the
be able to nourish themselves and live contentedly through essence of the commonwealth, which can be defined thus:
their own labours and the fruits of the earth, is •to confer A commonwealth is one person of whose acts a great
all their power and strength on one man, or one assembly multitude of people have made themselves the au-
of men, so as to turn all their wills by a majority vote into a thors (each of them an author), doing this by mutual
single will. That is to say: •to appoint one man or assembly covenants with one another, so that the common-
of men to bear their person; and everyone •to own and wealth may use the strength and means of them all,
acknowledge himself to be the author of every act that he as he shall think appropriate, for their peace and
who bears their person performs or causes to be performed common defence.
in matters concerning the common peace and safety, and all He who carries this person is called SOVEREIGN, and said to
of them •to submit their wills to his will, and their judgments have ‘sovereign power’, and all the others are his SUBJECTS.
to his judgment. [Hobbes explains the key concepts of that sentence Sovereign power can be attained in two ways. One is by
early in Chapter 16.] This is more than ·mere· agreement or natural force, as when a man •makes his children submit
harmony; it is a real unity of them all. They are unified in themselves and their children to his government, by being
that they constitute one single person, created through a able to destroy them if they refuse, or •subdues his enemies
covenant of every man with every ·other· man, as though to his will by war, sparing their lives on condition that
each man were to say to each of the others: they submit their wills to his government. The other is
I authorize and give up my right of governing myself when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some
to this man, or to this assembly of men, on condition one man or assembly of men, doing this voluntarily in the
that you surrender to him your right of governing confidence that this man or assembly will protect them
yourself, and authorize all his actions in the same against all others. This latter, may be called a political
way. commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution, and the
[Rather than ‘you’ and ‘your’, Hobbes here uses ‘thou’ and ‘thy’—the former a commonwealth by acquisition. I shall speak first of
second-person singular, rare in Leviathan—emphasizing the one-on-one a commonwealth by institution, ·turning to commonwealth
nature of the covenant.] When this is done, the multitude by acquisition in chapter 20·.

79
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 18: Rights of sovereigns by institution

Chapter 18. The rights of sovereigns by institution

A commonwealth is said to be ‘instituted’ when a mul- it to some other man or other assembly of men; for •they
titude of men agree and covenant—each one with each are bound, each of them to each of the others, to own and
other—that be the proclaimed author of everything that their existing
When some man or assembly of men is chosen by sovereign does and judges fit to be done; so that any one man
majority vote to present the person of them all (i.e. to dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made
be their representative), each of them will authorize all to that man, which is injustice [from the semi-colon to the end,
the actions and judgments of that man or assembly of those words are Hobbes’s]. And •they have also—every man of
men as though they were his own, doing this for the them—given the sovereignty to him who bears their person;
purpose of living peacefully among themselves and so if they depose him they take from him something that is
being protected against other men. This binds those his, and that again is injustice. Furthermore, if anyone who
who did not vote for this representative, as well as tries to depose his sovereign is killed or punished for this
those who did. For unless the votes are all understood by the sovereign, he is an author of his own punishment,
to be included in the majority of votes, they have come because the covenant makes him an author of everything
together in vain, and contrary to the end that each his sovereign does; and since it is injustice for a man to do
proposed for himself, namely the peace and protection anything for which he may be punished by his own authority,
of them all. his attempt to depose his sovereign is unjust for that reason
From the form of the institution are derived all the power also.
and all the rights of the one having supreme power, as well Some men have claimed to base their disobedience to
as the duties of all the citizens. ·I shall discuss these rights, their sovereign on a new covenant that they have made
powers, and duties under twelve headings·. not with men but with God; and this also is unjust, for
First, because the people make a covenant, it is to be un- there’s no covenant with God except through the mediation
derstood they aren’t obliged by any previous covenant to do of somebody who represents God’s person, and the only one
anything conflicting with this new one. Consequently those who does that is God’s lieutenant, who has the sovereignty
who have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby under God. But this claim of a covenant with God is so
bound by a covenant to own the actions and judgments of obviously a lie, even in the claimant’s own consciences, that
one sovereign, cannot lawfully get together to make a new it is the act of a disposition that is not only unjust but also
covenant to be obedient to someone else, in any respect vile and unmanly.
at all, without their sovereign’s permission. So those who Secondly, what gives the sovereign a right to bear the
are subject to a monarch can’t without his leave •throw person of all his subjects is •a covenant that they make
off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited with one another, and not •a covenant between him and any
multitude, or •transfer their person from him who now bears of them; there can’t be a breach of covenant on his part;

80
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 18: Rights of sovereigns by institution

and consequently none of his subjects can be freed from assembly of men that has the sovereignty, whose
subjection by a claim that the sovereign has forfeited ·his actions all the subjects take responsibility for, and are
right to govern by breaking his covenant with his subject(s)·. performed by the strength of them all, united in their
It is obvious that the sovereign makes no covenant with his sovereign.
subjects on the way to becoming sovereign. ·To see why When an assembly of men is made sovereign, nobody imag-
this is true, suppose that it isn’t, and for ease of exposition ines this to have happened through any such covenant;
suppose that you are one of the subjects·. In that case for no man is so stupid as to say, for example, that the
the sovereign must either •make a covenant with the whole people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold
multitude as the other party, or •make a separate covenant the sovereignty on such and such conditions, the non-
with each man, ·including one with you·. But it can’t be performance of which would entitle the Romans to depose the
•with the whole as one party, because at this point they Roman people! Why don’t men see that the basic principles of
are not one person; and if he •makes as many separate a monarchy are the same as those of a popular government?
covenants as there are men, those covenants become void ·They are led away from seeing this by· the ambition of people
after he becomes sovereign. Why? Because any act ·of the who are kinder to the •government of an assembly than to
sovereign’s· that you (for example) can claim to be a breach •that of a monarchy, because they •can hope to participate
·of your covenant with him· is an act of yours and of everyone in the former, but •despair of enjoying the latter.
else’s, because it was done ·by the sovereign, and thus was Thirdly, because the majority have by consenting voices
done· in the person, and by the right, of every individual declared a sovereign, someone who dissented must now
subject including you. go along with the others, i.e. be contented to accept all
Besides, if one or more of the subjects claims a breach the actions the sovereign shall do; and if he doesn’t, he
of the covenant made by the sovereign in his becoming may justly be destroyed by the others. For if he voluntarily
sovereign, and one or more other subjects contend that there entered into the congregation of those who came together
was no such breach (or indeed if only the sovereign himself ·to consider instituting a sovereign·, he thereby sufficiently
contends this), there’s no judge to decide the controversy, so declared his willingness to accept what the majority should
it returns to the sword again, and every man regains the right decide on (and therefore tacitly covenanted to do so); so if
of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the he then refuses to accept it, or protests against any of their
design they had in the institution ·of the commonwealth·. . . . decrees, he is acting contrary to his ·tacit· covenant, and
The opinion that any monarch receives his power by therefore unjustly. Furthermore: whether or not he enters
covenant—i.e. on some condition—comes from a failure to into the congregation, and whether or not his consent is
grasp this easy truth: asked, he must either •submit to the majority’s decrees or
Because covenants are merely words and breath, they •be left in the condition of war he was in before, in which he
have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect can without injustice be destroyed by any man at all.
any man, except whatever force comes from the public
sword—i.e. from the untied hands of that man or

81
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 18: Rights of sovereigns by institution

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution

·of the commonwealth· the author of all the actions and Sixthly, it is for the sovereignty [= ‘the man or assembly of
judgments of the sovereign, it follows that nothing the men to whom the sovereignty has been given’] to be the judge
sovereign does can wrong any of his subjects, nor ought •of what opinions and doctrines are threats to peace
any of them to accuse him of injustice. For someone who and what ones tend to support it;
acts by the authority of someone else can’t in acting wrong and consequently
the person by whose authority he acts; but according to •of which men are to be trusted to speak to multitudes
this institution of a commonwealth, every individual man of people, on what occasions, and how far they should
is an author of everything the sovereign does; so someone be allowed to go;
who complains of being wronged by his sovereign complains and
about something of which he himself is an author; so •of who shall examine the doctrines of all books before
he oughtn’t to accuse anyone but himself—and indeed he they are published.
oughtn’t even to accuse himself of wronging himself, because For the actions of men come from their opinions, and the
to wrong one’s self is impossible. [Throughout this paragraph up way to govern men’s actions in the interests of peace and
to this point, ‘wrong’ replaces Hobbes’s ‘injury’.] It’s true that those harmony is to govern their opinions. When we are consid-
who have sovereign power may commit iniquity [= ‘do wicked ering doctrines, nothing ought to be taken account of but
things’], but not injustice or injury in the proper meaning of truth; but this doesn’t conflict with regulating doctrines on
that term. grounds having to do with peace. For a doctrine that is
Fifthly, following from the preceding point: no man who harmful to peace can’t be true, any more than peace and
has sovereign power can justly be put to death or punished harmony can be against the law of nature. It’s true that in
in any other way by his subjects. For seeing that every a commonwealth where the negligence or incompetence of
subject is an author of the actions of his sovereign, ·if he governors and teachers has allowed false doctrines to become
punishes the sovereign· he punishes someone else for actions generally believed, the contrary truths may be generally
committed by himself. found to be offensive. But even the most sudden and rough
And because the goal of this institution is the peace and bustling in of a new truth never breaks the peace, but only
defence of them all, and whoever has a right to the goal sometimes awakens the war. ·I said ‘awakens’ the war, not
has a right to the means to it, the man or assembly that ‘starts’ it·. For men who are so slackly governed that they
has the sovereignty has the right to be judge both of the dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are at
means to peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and war already; their state is not peace, but only a cessation
disturbances of peace and defence; and to do whatever he of arms through mutual fear, and they live continually on
thinks is needed, both beforehand •for preserving of peace the fringe of a battlefield, so to speak. So he who has the
and security by prevention of discord at home and hostility sovereign power must be the judge—or establish others as
from abroad, and •for the recovery of peace and security after judges—of opinions and doctrines, this being necessary for
they have been lost. And therefore, peace and the avoidance of discord and civil war.

82
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 18: Rights of sovereigns by institution

Seventhly, the sovereignty has the whole power of pre- it’s the instituted sovereign who has that command. Indeed,
scribing the rules that let every man know what goods he may having command of the military is enough to make someone
enjoy, and what actions he may perform, without being trou- sovereign, without his being instituted as such in any other
bled by any of his fellow-subjects; and this is what men call way. So whoever is appointed as general of an army, it’s
‘property’ [Hobbes writes ‘propriety’]. Before the establishment always the sovereign power who is its supreme commander.
of sovereign power (as I have already shown), all men had a Tenthly, it is for the sovereignty to choose all counsellors,
right to all things, a state of affairs which necessarily causes ministers, magistrates, and officers, in both peace and war.
war; and therefore this ·system of· property, being necessary For seeing that the sovereign is charged with ·achieving· the
for peace and dependent on sovereign power, is one of the goal of the common peace and defence, he is understood to
things done by sovereign power in the interests of public have the power to use whatever means he thinks most fit for
peace. These rules of property (or meum and tuum [Latin for this purpose.
‘mine’ and ‘yours’]) and of good, bad, lawful, and unlawful in the Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed [= ‘entrusted’] the
actions of subjects, are the civil laws, i.e. the laws of each power of rewarding with riches or honour, and of punishing
individual commonwealth. . . . with corporal punishment or fines or public disgrace, every
Eighthly, the sovereignty alone has the right of judging, subject •according to the law the sovereign has already made;
i.e. of hearing and deciding any controversies that may or if no ·relevant· law has been made, •according to his
arise concerning law (civil or natural) or concerning fact. (the sovereign’s) judgment about what will conduce most to
For if controversies are not decided, •one subject has no encouraging men to serve the commonwealth, or to deterring
protection against being wronged by another, •the laws them from doing disservice to it.
concerning meum and tuum have no effect, and •every man Lastly, because of •how highly men are naturally apt to
retains—because of the natural and inevitable desire for value themselves, •what respect they want from others, and
his own preservation—the right to protect himself by his •how little they value other men—all of which continually
own private strength, which is the condition of war, and is gives rise to resentful envy, quarrels, side-taking, and even-
contrary to the purpose for which every commonwealth is tually war, in which they destroy one another and lessen
instituted. their strength against a common enemy—it’s necessary •to
Ninthly, the sovereignty alone has the right to make war have laws of honour, and a public rate [= ‘price-list’] stating the
and peace with other nations, and commonwealths, i.e. the values of men who have deserved well of the commonwealth
right •to judge when war is for the public good, •to decide or may yet do so, and •to put into someone’s hands the power
what size of ·military· forces are to be assembled for that to put those laws in execution. But I have already shown
purpose and armed and paid for, and •to tax the subjects that not only the whole military power of the commonwealth,
to get money to defray the expenses of those forces. For the but also the judging of all controversies, is assigned to the
power by which the people are to be defended consists in sovereignty. So it’s the sovereign whose role it is to give titles
their armies, and the strength of an army consists in the of honour, and to appoint what order of place and dignity
union of the soldiers’ strengths under one command; and each man shall hold, and what signs of respect they shall

83
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 18: Rights of sovereigns by institution

give to one another in public or private meetings. it won’t continue beyond that unless the common people
These are the rights that make the essence of sovereignty, come to be better taught than they have been until now!).
and are the marks by which one can tell what man or And because these rights are essential and inseparable,
assembly of men has the sovereign power. For these ·rights it necessarily follows that in whatever words any of them
and powers· can’t be shared and can’t be separated from seem to be granted to someone other than the sovereign, the
one another. The sovereign may transfer to someone else the grant is void unless the sovereign power itself is explicitly
power to coin money, to dispose of the estate and persons of renounced ·at the same time·, and the title ‘sovereign’ is no
infant heirs, to have certain advantages in markets, or any longer given by the grantees to him who grants the rights
other prerogative that is governed by particular laws, while in question; for when he has granted as much as he can,
still retaining the power to protect his subjects. But •if he if we grant back ·or he retains· the sovereignty ·itself·, all
transfers the military it’s no use his retaining the power of the rights he has supposedly granted to someone else are
judging, because he will have no way of enforcing the laws; restored to him, because they are inseparably attached to
or •if he gives away the power of raising money, the military the sovereignty.
is useless; •or if he gives away the control of doctrines, men This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably
will be frightened into rebellion by the fear of spirits. So if assigned to the sovereignty, there is little basis for the
we consider any one of the rights I have discussed, we shall opinion of those who say of sovereign kings that though
immediately see that ·it is necessary, because· the holding they have •greater power than every one of their subjects,
of all the others ·without that one· will have no effect on the they have •less power than all their subjects together. For if
conservation of peace and justice, the purpose for which all by ‘all together’ they don’t mean the collective body as one
commonwealths are instituted. This division ·of powers that person, then ‘all together’ and ‘every one’ mean the same, and
ought not to be divided· was the topic when it was said that what these people say is absurd. But if by ‘all together’ they
a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand (Mark 3:24); for a understand them as one person (which person the sovereign
division into opposite armies can never happen unless this bears), then the power of ‘all together’ is the same as the
division ·of powers· happens first. If a majority of people in sovereign’s power, and so again what they say is absurd.
England hadn’t come to think that these powers were divided They could see its absurdity well enough when the sovereign
between the king, the Lords, and the House of Commons, is an assembly of ·all· the people, but they don’t see it when
the people would never have been divided and fallen into the sovereign is a monarch; yet the power of sovereignty is
this civil war—first over disagreements in politics, and then the same, whoever has it.
over disagreements about freedom of religion—a war that Just as the •power of the sovereign ought to be greater
has so instructed men in this matter of sovereign rights that than that of any or all the subjects, so should the sovereign’s
most people in England do now see that these rights are •honour. For the sovereignty is the fountain of honour.
inseparable. This will be generally acknowledged when peace The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are created
next returns, and it will continue to be acknowledged for as by him. Just as servants in the presence of their master are
long as people remember their miseries ·in the war· (though equal, and without any honour at all, so are subjects in the

84
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

presence of their sovereign. When they are out of his sight of ungoverned men who are not subject to laws and to a
some may shine more than others, but in his presence they coercive power to hold them back from robbery and revenge.
shine no more than do the stars in the presence of the sun. Nor do they bear in mind •that the greatest burdens laid
But someone may object here that subjects are in a on subjects by sovereign governors does not come from
miserable situation because they are at the mercy of the •any pleasure or profit they can expect from damaging or
lusts and other irregular passions of him who has (or of weakening their subjects (in whose vigour consists their
them who have) such unlimited power. Commonly those own strength and glory), but from •the stubbornness of
who live under a monarch think their troubles are the fault the subjects themselves, who are unwilling to contribute
of monarchy, and those who live under the government to their own defence, and so make it necessary for their
of democracy or some other kind of sovereign assembly governors to get what they can from them ·in taxes· in time
attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth of peace, so that they may have the means to resist their
(when really the sovereign power is the same in every form of enemies, or to get an advantage over them, if an occasion for
commonwealth, as long as it is complete enough to protect this should suddenly present itself. For all men are provided
the subjects). These complainers don’t bear in mind •that the by nature with notable •microscopes (that is their passions
human condition can never be without some inconvenience and self-love) through which every little payment appears
or other, or •that the greatest trouble that can possibly come as a great grievance, but don’t have the •telescopes (namely
to the populace in any form of government is almost nothing moral and political science) that would enable them to see far
when compared with the miseries and horrible calamities off the miseries that hang over them, which can’t be avoided
that accompany a civil war, or with the dissolute condition without such payments.

Chapter 19. Kinds of commonwealth by institution, and succession

to the sovereign power

Differences amongst commonwealths come from differ- distinguished from the rest. So, clearly, there can be only
ences in the sovereign, or the person who represents ev- three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must
ery one of the multitude. The sovereignty resides either be one man or more than one; and if more than one, then it’s
in •one man, or in •an assembly of more than one; and either the assembly of all ·the multitude· or an assembling
·when it is an assembly· either •every man has right to containing only some of them. When the representative is
enter the assembly or •not everyone but only certain men •one man, the commonwealth is a MONARCHY; when it’s •an

85
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

assembly of only some of the multitude, then it is called an to the purpose for which all sovereignty is instituted.
ARISTOCRACY ; when it’s •an assembly of all that are willing So it would absurd for a monarch, having invited the
come together, it is a DEMOCRACY or popular commonwealth. people of his dominion to send him their deputies with
There can’t be any other kind of commonwealth, because the power to make known to him their advice or desires, to
sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) must think that these deputies, rather than himself, were the
be possessed •by one, •by more than one ·but less than all·, absolute representative of the people. (The absurdity is even
or •by all. more obvious if this idea is applied not to a monarch but to
Books of history and political theory contain other names a sovereign assembly.) I don’t know how this obvious truth
for governments, such as ‘tyranny’ and ‘oligarchy’. But came to be so disregarded ·in England· in recent years. In
they are not the names of other forms of government; they this country we had a monarchy in which he who had the
are names of the same forms, given by people who dislike sovereignty—in a line of descent 600 years long—was alone
them. For those who are discontented under monarchy call called ‘sovereign’, had the title ‘Majesty’ from every one of his
it ‘tyranny’, and those who are displeased with aristocracy subjects, and was unquestionably accepted by them as their
call it ‘oligarchy’; so also those who find themselves aggrieved king. Yet he was never considered as their representative,
under a democracy call it ‘anarchy’, which means lack of any that name being given—with no ·sense that this was a·
government, but I don’t think anyone believes that lack of contradiction—to the men who at his command were sent
government is any new kind of government! Nor (to continue to him by the people to bring their petitions and give him (if
the line of thought) ought they to believe that the government he permitted it) their advice. This may serve as a warning
is of one kind when they like it and of another when they for those who are the true and absolute representatives of
dislike it or are oppressed by the governors. a people, that if they want to fulfil the trust that has been
Obviously, men who are in absolute liberty may if they committed to them they had better •instruct men in the
please give authority to one man to represent them all, or give nature of the office ·of sovereign·, and •be careful how they
such authority to any assembly of men whatever; so they are permit any other general representation on any occasion
free to subject themselves to a monarch as absolutely as to whatsoever.
any other representative, if they think fit to do so. Therefore, The differences among these three kinds of common-
where a sovereign power has already been established, there wealth don’t consist in differences ·in the amount of· power,
can be no other representative of the same people (except for but in differences in how serviceable they are, how apt to
certain particular purposes that are circumscribed by the produce the peace and security of the people—the purpose
sovereign). ·If there were two unrestricted representatives·, for which they were instituted. ·I now want· to compare
that would be to establish two sovereigns, and every man monarchy with the other two, ·making six points about this
would have his person represented by two actors; if these comparison·.
opposed one another, that would divide the power that has to (1) Anyone who bears the person of the people or belongs
be indivisible if men are to live in peace, and would thereby to the assembly that bears it, also bears his own natural
pull the multitude down into the condition of war, contrary person [= ‘bears himself considered just as one human being’]. And

86
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

though he is careful in his official person to procure the besides the inconstancy of nature there is an inconstancy of
common interest, he is at least as careful to procure the numbers. Something that the assembly decided yesterday
private good of himself, his family, relatives, and friends; and may be undone today because a few members who wanted
when the public interest happens to conflict with the private, it reversed showed up, while those who would have wanted
he usually prefers the private, because men’s passions yesterday’s resolution to hold firm have stayed away because
are commonly more powerful than their reason. It follows they were too confident, or negligent, or for personal reasons.
from this that the public interest is most advanced when it (4) A monarch can’t disagree with himself out of envy or
coincides with the private interest ·of the sovereign·. Now self-interest, but an assembly can, and the disagreement
in •monarchy the private interest is the same as the public. may be so strenuous as to lead to a civil war.
The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise purely (5) In monarchy there’s this disadvantage: any subject
from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects; for may be deprived of all he possesses by the power of one
no king can be rich or glorious or secure if his subjects man (·the sovereign·), so as to enrich a favourite or flatterer.
are poor or wretched, or so much weakened by poverty [The Latin version adds: ‘Nevertheless, we do not read that this has
or dissension that they can’t maintain a war against their ever been done.’] I admit that this is a great and inevitable
enemies. In a •democracy or an •aristocracy, on the other disadvantage. But the same thing can just as well happen
hand, public prosperity often does less for the private fortune where the sovereign power is in an assembly; for their power
of someone who is corrupt or ambitious than does lying is the same, and they are as likely to be seduced into
advice, treacherous action, or civil war. accepting bad advice from orators as a monarch is from
(2) A monarch decides who will advise him, and when flatterers; and they can become one another’s flatterers,
and where; so he can hear the opinions of men who are taking turns in serving one another’s greed and ambition.
knowledgeable about the matter in question—men of any Also, a monarch has only a few favourites, and the only
rank or status—and as long in advance of the action and with others they may want to advance are their own relatives;
as much secrecy as he likes. But when a sovereign assembly whereas the favourites of an assembly are many, and the
needs advice, it can’t have advisers from outside its own relatives of the members of an assembly are much more
body; and of those who are in the assembly few are skilled in numerous than those of any monarch. Besides, any favourite
civic matters—the majority of them being orators, who give of a monarch can help his friends as well as hurt his enemies;
their opinions in speeches that are full either of pretence but orators—i.e. favourites of sovereign assemblies—have
or of inept learning, and either disrupt the commonwealth great power to hurt but little to help. For, such is man’s
or do it no good. For the flame of the passions dazzles the nature, accusing requires less eloquence than does excusing;
understanding, but never enlightens it. And there’s no place also, condemning looks more like justice than pardoning
or time at which an assembly can receive advice in secret; does.
there are too many of them for that. (6) In a monarchy the sovereignty may descend to an
(3) The resolutions of a monarch are not subject to any infant, or to one who can’t tell good from bad; which has
inconstancy except that of human nature; but in assemblies, the ·alleged· drawback that then •the use of the sovereign’s

87
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

power must be in the hands of another man, or of some child, if any contest does start up and disturb the public
assembly of men, who are to govern by the child’s right and peace, it should be attributed not to the form of monarchy
in his name, as guardians and protectors of his person and but to the subjects’ ambition and ignorance of their duty.
his authority. But to say there is a drawback in •putting On the other side, every great commonwealth whose
the use of the sovereign power into the hands of a man sovereignty is in a great assembly is, so far as concerns
or an assembly of men is to say that •all government is consultations about peace and war and the making of laws,
less satisfactory than confusion and civil war—·which is in the same condition as if the ·power of· government were
absurd·. So the only danger that can be claimed to arise ·theoretically· in a child. For just as •a child lacks the
·from a situation where the monarchy has been inherited by judgment to disagree with advice that is given him, and so
someone who isn’t yet fit to exercise its powers· has to do has to accept the advice of them (or him) to whose care
with the struggles among those who become competitors for he is committed, so also •an assembly lacks the freedom
an office bringing so much honour and profit. to disagree with the advice of the majority, whether it’s
This disadvantage does not come from the form of gov- good or bad. And just as •a child needs a guardian or
ernment we call ‘monarchy’. To see this, consider •the case protector to preserve his person and his authority, so also •in
where the previous monarch has appointed those who are to great commonwealths the sovereign assembly, in all ·times
have the care of his infant successor—doing this either by an of· great danger and trouble, needs guardians of liberty
explicit statement or ·implicitly· by not interfering with the [Hobbes gives this phrase in Latin’]. That is, they need dictators or
customarily accepted procedure for such appointments. In protectors of their authority, who amount to being temporary
that case, if the ‘competition’ disadvantage arises, it should monarchs, to whom they can for a time commit the exercise
be attributed not to the monarchy but to the ambition and of all their power; and it has more often happened that at the
injustice of the subjects; and those ·vices· are the same in all end of that time •the assembly were ·permanently· deprived
kinds of government where the people are not well instructed of their power ·by the dictator· than it has happened that
in their duty and in the rights of sovereignty. For •the case •infant kings were deprived of their power by their protectors,
where the previous monarch has made no provision at all regents, or any other guardians.
for such care ·of his infant successor·, the law of nature has I have shown that there are only three kinds of
provided this sufficient rule, that the infant sovereign shall sovereignty:
be cared for by the man who has by nature •the most to gain •monarchy, where one man has the sovereignty,
from the preservation of the infant’s authority and •the least •democracy, where the general assembly of ·all the·
to gain from the child’s dying or losing authority. For since subjects has it, and
every man by nature seeks his own benefit and promotion, •aristocracy, where it is in an assembly of certain
to put an infant under the control of people who can promote persons picked out in some way from the rest.
themselves by destroying or harming him is not guardianship Still, someone who surveys the particular commonwealths
but treachery. So once sufficient provision has been made that did or do exist in the world will perhaps find it hard
against any proper dispute about the government under a to get them into three groups, and this may incline him

88
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

to think there are other forms, arising from mixtures of relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war; indeed,
these three. For example, (1) elective kingdoms, where he is obliged by the law of nature to take care of this. So he
kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for was, as soon as he was elected, an absolute sovereign.
a time, or (2) kingdoms in which the king has limited power, (2) The king whose power is limited is not superior to
though most writers apply the label ‘monarchy’ to these whoever has the power to limit it, and he who is not superior
governments. Likewise (3) if a democratic (or aristocratic) ·to someone· is not supreme, which is to say that he is not
commonwealth subdues an enemy’s country and governs it sovereign. So the sovereignty always was in the assembly
through an appointed governor, executive officer, or other that had the right to limit him, which implies that the govern-
legal authority, this may perhaps seem at first sight to be a ment is not monarchy but either democracy or aristocracy;
democratic (or aristocratic) government. But this is all wrong. as in ancient Sparta, where the kings had the privilege of
For (1) elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the leading their armies but the sovereignty was possessed by
sovereign; (2) limited kings are not sovereigns but ministers the Ephori [= ‘magistrates with authority over the king’s conduct’].
of those who have the sovereign power; and (3) provinces that Thirdly, although the Roman people governed the land of
are in subjection to a democracy (or aristocracy) of another Judea (for example) through a governor, that didn’t make
commonwealth are themselves governed not democratically Judea •a democracy, because they weren’t governed by any
(or aristocratically) but monarchically. ·I shall discuss these assembly into which each of them had a right to enter; nor
three cases at more length, giving them a paragraph each·. was it •an aristocracy, because they weren’t governed by any
(1) Concerning an elective king whose power is limited •to assembly that a man could be selected to belong to. Rather,
his life as it is in many parts of Christendom at this day, or ·it was •a monarchy·. They were governed by one person:
•to certain years or months like the dictator’s power among in relation to the people of Rome this ‘one person’ was an
the Romans: if he has the right to appoint his successor, he is assembly of ·all· the people, i.e. a democracy, but in relation
no longer an elective king but an hereditary one. But if he has to the people of Judea, who had no right at to participate
no power to designate his successor, then either •some other in the government, it was a monarchy. Where the people
known man or assembly can designate a successor after his are governed by an assembly chosen by themselves out of
death or •the commonwealth dies and dissolves with him and their own number, the government is called a democracy or
returns to the condition of war. •If it’s known what people an aristocracy; but when they are governed by an assembly
have the power to award the sovereignty after his death, it’s that they didn’t choose, it is a monarchy—not of one man
also known that the sovereignty was in them while he was over another man, but of one people over another people.
alive; for nobody has the right to give something that he The matter of all these forms of government consists in
doesn’t have the right to possess and to keep to himself if he monarchs and assemblies; these die, so the matter is mortal.
sees fit. But •if there’s no-one who can give the sovereignty So it is necessary for the preservation of peace of men that
after the decease of him who was first elected, then that steps be taken not only for ·the creation of· an artificial man
king has the power to establish his own successor, so as to but also for ·that ‘man’ to have· an artificial eternity of life.
keep those who had trusted him with the government from Without that, •men who are governed by an assembly would

89
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

return into the condition of war in every generation, and successor ·to a king who has died·, and ·in cases where
•those who are governed by one man would return to it as it was clearly the role of the king to do this·, it is often not
soon as their governor dies. This artificial eternity is what obvious •whom he has appointed. For both these cases
men call ‘the right of succession’. require thinking that is more precise than men in general
In any perfect form of government it is the present are accustomed to. As to the question of •who shall appoint
sovereign who has the right to decide how the succession will the successor of a monarch, the central point is this: either
go. For if the right were possessed by •any other particular he who now possesses the sovereign power has the right
man or non-sovereign assembly, it would be in a subject to decide the succession or else that right reverts to the
person; so the sovereign could take it to himself at his dissolved multitude ·which is thereby threatened with sliding
pleasure, which means that the right belonged to him all into war·. (I am saying this about a monarch who possesses
along. And if this right belonged to •no particular man, sovereign authority, so that the right of succession is the
and was left to a new choice ·after the death of the present right of inheritance; not about elective kings and princes,
sovereign·, then the commonwealth would be dissolved, and who don’t own the sovereign power but merely have the use
the right ·to decide the succession· would belong to whoever of it). For the death of him who possesses the sovereign
could get it, which is contrary to the intention of those who power leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all, i.e.
instituted the commonwealth ·in the first place, which they without any representative in whom they can be united and
did· for their perpetual and not just their temporary security. be capable of acting; so they can’t ·act in any way at all,
In a democracy, the whole assembly can’t die unless which implies that they can’t· elect any new monarch. ·In
the multitude that are to be governed die. So in that form this state of affairs·, every man has an equal right to submit
of government questions about the right of ·deciding the· himself to whomever he thinks best able to protect him, or
succession don’t arise. (if he can) to protect himself by his own sword; which is a
In an aristocracy, when any member of the assembly return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every
dies the choice of someone else to take his place is for man against every man, contrary to the purpose for which
the assembly to make, because it’s the sovereign to whom monarchy was first instituted. This makes it obvious that
belongs the ·right of· choosing of all counsellors and officers. the institution of monarchy always leaves the choice of the
For what the representative does as actor is done by every successor to the judgment and will of the present possessor
one of the subjects as author. The sovereign assembly may of sovereignty.
give power to others to choose new members to make up Sometimes a question arises about who it is whom the
their numbers, but it’s still by their authority that the choice monarch has designated to the succession and inheritance
is made, and by their authority that the choice may be of his power; it is to be answered on the basis of his explicit
cancelled if the public good requires it. words and testament, or by other sufficient wordless signs.
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession By explicit words or testament when it is declared by
occurs in monarchy. The difficulty arises from the fact him in his lifetime, orally or in writing, as the first emperors
that it isn’t immediately obvious •who is to appoint the of Rome declared who were to be their heirs. (·That is an

90
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 19: Commonwealth by institution, succession

appropriate word·, for ‘heir’ is not restricted to the children a successor close to him in blood rather than one who is
or nearest relatives of a man; it applies to anyone at all whom more remote; because it’s always presumed that closeness of
he says—somehow—he wants to succeed him in his estate.) kinship goes with closeness of affection, and it’s evident that
So if a monarch explicitly declares that such-and-such a man the greatness of a man’s nearest kindred reflect the most
is to be his heir, doing this either orally or in writing, then honour on him.
that man acquires the right of being monarch immediately But if it is lawful for a monarch to settle the succession
after the decease of his predecessor. on someone by words of contract or testament, men may
But in the absence of testament and explicit words, perhaps object that there’s a great disadvantage in this: for
other natural signs of the sovereign’s wishes should be he may sell or give his right of governing to a foreigner; and
followed. One of these is custom. Where it is customary this may lead to the oppression of his subjects, because
for the monarch to be succeeded by •his next of kin, with people who are foreigners to one another (i.e. men who don’t
no conditions on that, the next of kin does have the right customarily live under the same government or speak the
to the succession, for if the previous monarch had wanted same language) commonly undervalue one another. This is
something different he could easily have declared this in his indeed a great disadvantage; but ·if there’s oppression in
lifetime. Likewise, where the custom is that the succession such a case·, it may come not from the mere fact that the gov-
goes to •the male who is next of the kin, the right of suc- ernment is foreign but rather from the unskilfulness of the
cession in that case does go to the male next of kin, for the governors, their ignorance of the true rules of politics. That
same reason. Similarly if the custom were to advance •the is why the Romans, when they had subdued many nations
female ·next of kin·. For if a man could by a word modify an and wanted to make their government of them digestible,
existing custom, ·yet doesn’t do so·, that is a natural sign usually removed that grievance (·of oppression entirely by
that he wants the custom to stand unchanged. foreigners·) as much as they thought it necessary to do so,
What if neither custom nor the monarch’s testament has by giving sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to
been provided? Then it should be understood •first that the principal men of conquered nations not only the privileges
monarch wanted the government to remain monarchical, of Romans but also the title ‘Roman’, and admitted many
because he approved that government in himself. •Secondly of them to the senate and to official positions, even in the
that ·he wanted· a child of his own—male or female—to be Roman city. That is what our most wise King James aimed
preferred before any other; because men are presumed to at in trying to unite his two realms of England and Scotland.
be naturally more inclined to advance their own children Had he succeeded in this, it would probably have prevented
than those of other men (and of their own, a male rather the civil wars that make both those kingdoms miserable
than a female, because men, are naturally fitter than women now. So it’s not an offence against the people for a monarch
for actions of labour and danger). •Thirdly, if he has no to make a foreigner his successor, though disadvantages
descendants, ·that he wanted to be succeeded by· a brother sometimes come from that, through the fault either of the
rather than a stranger—and, generalizing from that—to have rulers or of their citizens. . . .

91
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 20: Paternal and despotic dominion

Chapter 20. Paternal dominion and despotic dominion

A commonwealth by acquisition is one where the supreme judge of the times and occasions for war and
sovereign power is acquired by force; and it is acquired by peace; it is for him to choose magistrates, counsellors,
force when men (either singly or jointly by majority of voices) commanders, and all other officers and ministers, and
are led by their fear of death or imprisonment to authorize to determine all rewards and punishments, honours,
all the actions of the man or assembly that has their lives and rankings.
and liberty in his power. The reasons for this ·in sovereignty by acquisition· are
This kind of dominion or sovereignty differs from the ones I adduced in chapter 18 for the same rights and
sovereignty by institution only in this: men who choose consequences of sovereignty by institution.
their sovereign do it for fear of •one another, not fear of Dominion is acquired two ways, by generation and by
the man whom they institute; but in this case ·of dominion conquest. [Hobbes has previously used ‘generation’ to mean ‘bringing
by acquisition· they are afraid of •the very person whom into being’; and this text has replaced this by ‘creation’—e.g. in ‘creation
they institute ·as sovereign·. In both cases they act out of of a commonwealth’. In the present context ‘generation’ means, more
fear—a fact that should be noted by those who hold that any The
narrowly, ‘animal reproduction’—begetting and giving birth to.]
covenant is void if it comes from fear of death or violence. If right of dominion by generation is what the parent has over
they were right, no man in any kind of commonwealth could his children, and is called PATERNAL. It doesn’t come from
be obliged to obedience! It’s true that when a commonwealth •the ·mere fact of· generation, as though the parent had
has been instituted or acquired, promises coming from fear dominion over his child simply because he begot him. Rather,
of death or violence are not covenants, and don’t oblige, if it comes from •the child’s consent, either explicitly stated
the thing promised is contrary to the laws; but that’s not or indicated by other sufficient signs. As for ·the idea that·
because the promise is made out of fear, but because he who generation alone is enough for dominion: God has given to
promises has no right ·to do the thing he has promised to man a ·woman, as· helper, and there are always two who
do·. . . . are equally parents; so the dominion over the child, ·if it
But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the came from generation alone·, would belong equally to both
same in both ·instituted and acquired sovereignty·: ·parents·, and the child would subject to both equally, which
The monarch’s power can’t without his consent be is impossible, for no man can obey two masters. And whereas
transferred to someone else; he can’t forfeit it; he some—·such as Aristotle and Aquinas·—have ascribed the
can’t be accused by any of his subjects of having dominion to the man only, because the male sex is the more
wronged them; he can’t be punished by them; he is excellent one, they have miscalculated. For there is not
the judge of what is necessary for peace, and the judge always enough difference of strength or prudence between
of ·what· doctrines ·maybe published·; he is the sole men and women for the right to be determined without war.
legislator, supreme arbitrator of controversies, and In commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil

92
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 20: Paternal and despotic dominion

law; and usually though not always the judgment goes in father’s power; and if the father is a subject of the mother
favour of the father, because most commonwealths have (as when a sovereign queen marries one of her subjects), the
been set up by the fathers of families, not the mothers. But child is subject to the mother, because the father also is
the present question concerns the state of mere nature, her subject. [Curley points out that Hobbes lived under three Stuart
where we can’t assume laws of matrimony or laws for the kings descended from the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots to one of
upbringing of children, but only the law of nature and the her subjects.] If a man and a woman who are monarchs of
natural fondness of the sexes for one another and for their two different kingdoms have a child, and make a contract
children. In this raw condition of nature, either the parents concerning who shall have dominion of him, the right of
settle the dominion over the child jointly, by contract, or dominion goes where the contract puts it. If they don’t make
they don’t settle it at all. If they do, the right goes where the a contract, the dominion follows the dominion of the place of
contract says it goes. We find in history that the Amazons the child’s residence. For the sovereign of each country has
contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries—to dominion over all that live in it.
whom they went to have children—that the male children He who has dominion over a child has dominion also over
should be sent back ·to their fathers·, but the female ones the child’s children and over their children’s children. For he
would remain with themselves; so that ·in their case· the that has dominion over the person of a man has dominion
dominion of the females was in the mother. over all that is his; without that, dominion would be just a
If there’s no contract, the mother has dominion. For in title with no effect.
the condition of mere nature where there are no matrimonial The right of succession to paternal dominion, proceeds in
laws it can’t be known who is the father, unless the mother the same way as the right of succession to monarchy, about
tells; so the right of dominion over the child depends on her which I have already said enough in chapter 19.
will—·i.e. on her choice not to say who the father is·—and Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is what
consequently it is hers. Also, the infant is at first in the some writers call DESPOTIC—from despotes [Greek], meaning
power of the mother, so that she can either nourish it or ‘lord’ or ‘master’—and is the dominion of a master over
expose it [= leave it out in the open, to die unless rescued by strangers]. his servant. This dominion is acquired by the victor when
If she nourishes it, it owes its life to the mother and is the vanquished, seeking to avoid being killed on the spot,
therefore obliged to obey her rather than anyone else, and covenants either in explicit words or by other sufficient
consequently the dominion over it is hers. But if she exposes signs of his will that as long as •his life and •the liberty
the child and someone else finds and nourishes it, the of his body are allowed to him, the victor will have the use
dominion is in that person. For the child ought to obey of •them at his pleasure. After such a covenant is made,
the man who has preserved it, because preservation of life the vanquished person is a SERVANT—not before. The word
is the purpose for which one human becomes subject to ‘servant’. . . .does not mean ‘captive’, ·a status that doesn’t
another, so that every man is supposed to promise obedience involve any covenant·. A captive is someone who is kept in
to him who has it is in his power to save him or destroy him. prison or in fetters until the owner of the man who captured
If the mother is a subject of the father, the child is in the him, or who bought him from someone who captured him,

93
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 20: Paternal and despotic dominion

has decided what to do with him. Such men (commonly The master of the servant is master also of everything
called ‘slaves’) have no obligation at all, but may justly break the servant has, and may demand the use of it—that it, the
their bonds or smash the prison, and kill their master or use of the servant’s goods, of his labour, of his servants,
carry him away as a captive. ·A servant’s situation is nothing and of his children—as often as he thinks fit. For what
like this. A servant is· someone who, having been captured, enables the servant to stay alive rather than being killed by
has bodily liberty allowed to him and is trusted by his master his master is the covenant of obedience through which he
on the strength of his promise not to run away or do violence owns and authorizes everything the master does. [Hobbes
to his master. expresses this by saying of the servant that ‘he holdeth his life of his
So it’s not the victory that gives the victor a right of And if he refuses to serve,
master, by the covenant of obedience’.]
dominion over the vanquished, but the covenant ·between and his master kills or imprisons or otherwise punishes him
them·. What puts the vanquished man under an obligation is for his disobedience, the servant is himself the author of this
not •his being conquered—i.e. defeated and either captured action, and can’t accuse his master of wronging him.
or put to flight—but •his coming in and submitting to the Summing up: the rights and consequences of both pater-
victor ·and making with him the covenant I have described·. nal and despotic dominion are the very same as those of a
And the mere fact that the vanquished man surrenders sovereign by institution, and for the same reasons—which
(without being promised his life) does not oblige the victor to I have set out in chapter 18. Suppose then that a man
spare him: when the vanquished man yields himself to the is monarch of two nations, having sovereignty •in one by
victor’s discretion, that obliges the victor for only as long as institution of the assembled people, and •in the other by
he in his own discretion thinks fit. [In this context, ‘discretion’ = conquest—i.e. by the submission of each individual person,
‘freedom to act or decide as one thinks fit’.] to avoid death or imprisonment. To demand more from the
What men do in asking for quarter (as it is now conquered nation than from the one with a commonwealth
called). . . .is to evade the present fury of the victor by sub- by institution, simply because the former was conquered,
mission, and to offer ransom or service in exchange for is an act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty. For
their life. So someone who receives quarter hasn’t been the sovereign is absolute over both nations alike; or else
given his life; ·the status of his life· is merely deferred until there’s no sovereignty at all and every man may lawfully
further deliberation ·by the victor·; for in asking for quarter protect himself, if he can, with his own sword—which is the
he wasn’t •yielding on condition of ·being allowed his· life, condition of war.
but merely •yielding to ·the victor’s· discretion. When the From this it appears that a great family, if it isn’t part
victor has entrusted him with his bodily liberty, then his of some commonwealth, is in itself a little monarchy in
life is something he keeps on certain conditions and his which there are rights of sovereignty, the sovereign being the
service is something he owes; then, but not before. For master or father. This holds, whether the family consist of
slaves who work in prisons or in chains ·don’t owe their a man and his children, of a man and his servants, or of
service; they· serve not out of duty but to avoid the cruelty a man and his children and servants together. [In Hobbes’s
of their task-masters. time, ‘family’ could mean something broader, like ‘household’.] But a

94
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 20: Paternal and despotic dominion

family isn’t properly a commonwealth unless it has enough be without disadvantages, but the only big disadvantages
power—through its numbers or its situation—to avoid being that occur in any commonwealth come from the subject’s
subdued without the risk of starting a war. For when a disobedience and breaking of the covenants from which the
number of men are plainly too weak to mount a united commonwealth gets its existence. Anyway, someone who
defence by themselves, each of them may, in time of danger, thinks that sovereign power is too great and seeks to lessen
use his own reason to save his life either by flight or by it will have to subject himself to a power that can limit it—i.e.
submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; just as a to a still greater power!
squad of soldiers, when a whole army takes them by surprise, The greatest objection is an argument from practice [=
may throw down their arms and ask for quarter or run away ‘people’s actual behaviour’]. It is asked: where and when have
rather than being put to the sword. subjects actually acknowledged such power? But I ask in
That brings me to the end of what I have to say about turn: where and when has there been a commonwealth
sovereign rights, on the basis of theorizing and deduction where the power was not absolute and yet there was no
concerning the nature, needs, and designs of men when sedition and civil war? In nations whose commonwealths
they establish commonwealths and put themselves under have been long-lived, and not destroyed except by foreign
monarchs or assemblies which they entrust with enough war, the subjects never did dispute over the sovereign power.
power for their protection. But anyway an argument from the practice of men who
Let us now consider what the scripture teaches in the •haven’t sifted to the bottom and with exact reason weighed
same point. [What follows is about two pages of argument the causes and nature of commonwealths, and who •suffer
aiming to show that Hobbes’s view of sovereignty is sup- daily the miseries that come from ignorance of these mat-
ported by the Bible. The present text omits that material.] ters, is invalid. Even if throughout the world men laid the
So that it appears plainly to my understanding, both from foundations of their houses on sand, it wouldn’t follow that
reason and scripture, that the sovereign power is as great that’s what they ought to do. The making and maintaining
as men can possibly be imagined to make it—whether it is of commonwealths isn’t a mere matter of practice [= ‘practical
placed in one man (as in monarchy) or in one assembly of know-how’], like tennis; it is a science, with definite and
men (as in democratic and aristocratic commonwealths). And infallible rules, like arithmetic and geometry; poor men don’t
though men may fancy many evil consequences from such have the leisure to discover these rules, and men who have
unlimited power, the consequences of not having it—namely, had the leisure have up until now not had the curiosity ·to
perpetual war of every man against his neighbour—are search for them· or the method to discover them.
much worse. The condition of men in this life will never

95
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

Chapter 21. The liberty of subjects

The ·equivalent· terms LIBER TY and FREEDOM, properly not obliged by any law to speak otherwise than he did. •The
understood, signify the absence of opposition, i.e. absence use of the phrase ‘free will’ attributes liberty not to a man’s
of external impediments to motion. These terms may be will, desire, or inclination, but to the man himself, whose
applied to unthinking and inanimate creatures just as much liberty consists in his meeting no obstacle to his doing what
as to thinking ones. For when something—anything—is tied he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.
down or hemmed in so that it can move only within a certain •Liberty is consistent with •fear: when a man throws his
space, this space being determined by the opposition of some goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he does it
external body, we say it doesn’t have ‘liberty’ to go further. very willingly, and can refuse to do it if he so desires; so it is
So when •any living creature is imprisoned or restrained by the action of someone who is free. Sometimes a man pays a
walls or chains, or when •water that would otherwise spread debt only out of fear of imprisonment; but because nobody
itself into a larger space is held back by banks or containers, prevented him from keeping the money, paying it was the
we are accustomed to say that it’s ‘not at liberty’ to move in action of a man at liberty. Quite generally, all the things that
the way that it would without those external impediments. men do in commonwealths out of fear of the law are actions
But when the impediment to motion lies in the constitution which the doers were free to omit ·and so they were actions
of the thing itself—as when a stone lies still, or a man is freely performed·.
held to his bed by sickness—what we say it lacks is not the •Liberty is consistent with •necessity: water has not only
‘liberty’ to move but rather the ‘power’ to move. the liberty but the necessity of flowing down the channel. The
And according to this proper and generally accepted same holds for the actions that men voluntarily do: because
meaning of the word ·’free’·, a FREEMAN is someone who isn’t they come from their will, they come from liberty, and yet
hindered from doing anything he wants to do that he has the they also come from necessity, because
strength and wit for. But when the words ‘free’ and ‘liberty’ every act of man’s will and every desire and inclination
are applied to anything other than bodies they are misused; comes from some cause, which comes from another
for if something isn’t the sort of thing that can move, it’s cause, ·and so on backwards· in a continual chain
not the sort of thing that can be impeded. ·I shall give four whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all
examples of such misuses·. •When it is said that ‘the path is causes.
free’, liberty is attributed not to the path but to those who So that to someone who could see the connection of ·all·
walk along it. •When we say ‘the gift is free’, we don’t mean to those causes, the necessity of all men’s voluntary actions
attribute liberty to the gift; we are attributing it to the giver, would seem obvious. And therefore God, who sees and
who was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. •When arranges everything, sees that a man’s liberty in doing what
we ·say that people· ‘speak freely’, we are attributing liberty he wills is accompanied by the necessity of doing ·exactly·
not to the voice or pronunciation but to the man, who was what God wills—no more and no less. For though men may

96
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

do many things contrary to the divine laws, i.e. many things no power to protect them unless a sword in the hands of
of which God is not the author, nevertheless they have no some man or ·assembly of· men causes the laws to be obeyed.
passion, will, or appetite whose first and full cause is not So the liberty of a subject lies only in the things that the
from God’s will. If God’s will did not assure the necessity sovereign passes over in regulating their conduct: such as
of man’s will and (therefore) of everything that depends on the liberty •to buy and sell and otherwise contract with one
man’s will, the liberty of men would conflict with and impede another, •to choose their own home and diet and trade, •to
the omnipotence and liberty of God. educate their children as they think fit, and the like.
And that’s enough for present purposes about natural But we’re not to infer that the subjects’ having such
liberty, which is the only liberty properly so-called. liberty abolishes or limits the sovereign power over life and
But just as men have pursued peace and their own death. For I have already shown ·in chapter 18· that he who
survival by making an •artificial man, which we call a com- has the supreme power, i.e. the commonwealth, can’t wrong
monwealth, so also they have made •artificial chains, called his citizens, even though he can by his wickedness do wrong
civil laws, which they have by mutual covenants fastened to God.
at one end to the lips of the man or assembly to whom they So it can and often does happen in commonwealths that
have given the sovereign power, and at the other end to their a subject is put to death by the command of the sovereign
own ears. These bonds are in themselves weak, but they can power, without either of them having wronged the other, as
be made to hold not by the difficulty but by the danger of when Jephtha caused his daughter to be sacrificed. [As a
breaking them. way of thanking God for his victory over the Ammonites, Jephtha vowed
The liberty of subjects—my next topic—is to be under- that ‘whoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to greet me. . . .I
stood purely in relation to these bonds. In no commonwealth will offer up for a burnt offering. . . .And behold his daughter came out to
in the world are there stated rules that regulate all the greet him. . . .Her father did with her according to his vow.’ Judges 11:
actions and words of men; indeed there couldn’t be such In cases like this, the person who dies was free
31, 34, 39.]
rules. From this it follows necessarily that in all kinds of to perform the action for which he ·or she· is nevertheless
actions on which the laws are silent men have the liberty put to death—without being wronged. And the same holds
of doing what their own reasons suggest as most profitable true when a sovereign prince puts to death an innocent
to themselves. For •if we take ‘liberty’ in its proper sense subject, as David did to Uriah ·because he fancied Uriah’s
of ‘bodily liberty’—i.e. freedom from chains and prison—it wife·. For although the action is against the law of nature,
would be very absurd for men to clamour, as they do, for the as being contrary to equity, it was not a wronging of Uriah
liberty that they so obviously enjoy. And •if we take ‘liberty’ but of God. Not •of Uriah, because Uriah himself had ·in
to be exemption from ·all· laws, it is no less absurd for a covenanting to be a subject· given David the right to do
man to demand liberty, as some do, when that liberty would what he pleased; but •of God, because David was God’s
·involve the absence of all laws, and would thus· enable all subject, and was prohibited from all wickedness by the law
other men to be masters of his life. Yet this absurdity is of nature. David himself evidently confirmed this distinction,
what some people demand, not realizing that the laws have when he repented of his action and said to God ‘To thee

97
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

only have I sinned’ [2 Samuel 11, Psalm 4:51]. Similarly, when against their surrounding neighbours. The Athenians and
the Athenian people sent a citizen into exile by ostracism, Romans were free, i.e. they were free commonwealths. It
it did not accuse him of a crime, but exiled whomever a wasn’t that individual men had the liberty to resist their
majority of citizens wished to exile—not because he had own representative, but that their representative had the
violated the laws but because he seemed so powerful that liberty to resist or invade other people. The word LIBER TAS
he could violate them and get away with it. Therefore, they is written in large letters on the turrets of the city of Lucca
banished from the commonwealth Aristedes, to whom they at this day, but this doesn’t imply that individual men there
had previously given the name ‘the Just’. They likewise have more liberty, or more immunity from service to the
banished Hyperbolus, a scurrilous jester whom nobody commonwealth, than men do in Constantinople. Whether a
feared, because they wanted to; perhaps they did it as a commonwealth is monarchic or democratic, the freedom is
joke, but this wasn’t unjust, because they banished him by still the same.
the right of the commonwealth. But it is easy for men to be deceived by the glittering
The liberty that is so frequently mentioned and honoured word ‘liberty’ and (lacking skill in making distinctions) to
in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and think they have as a private inheritance and birthright
Romans, and in the writings and discourse of those who something that is really the right only of the public, ·the
have taken from that source all they know about politics, is commonwealth·. And when the same mistake is supported
the liberty not of particular men but of the commonwealth. by the authority of men who are renowned for their writings
If each individual man had that liberty, there would be no on this subject, it’s no wonder that it leads to sedition and
civil laws and no commonwealth at all; and the effects would change of government. In these western parts of the world
be the same ·for individuals· as it is for states. Among we are made to receive our opinions about the institution and
•masterless men there is perpetual war of every man against rights of commonwealths from Aristotle, Cicero, and other
his neighbour— Greeks and Romans. These writers didn’t derive the rights of
no inheritance to transmit to the son or to expect from commonwealths from the principles of nature; instead, they
the father, wrote them into their books out of the practice of their own
no ownership of goods or lands, commonwealths, which were democratic, as grammarians
no security describe the rules of language out of the practice of the
—just a full and absolute liberty for every individual man. time, or the rules of poetry out of the poems of Homer and
Similarly with •states and commonwealths that don’t depend Virgil. The Athenians were taught (to keep them from wanting
on one another: every commonwealth (not every man) has an to change their government) that they were freemen, and
absolute liberty to do what it judges to be most conducive to that all who lived under a monarchy were slaves; so that’s
its benefit (that is, what is so judged by the man or assembly what Aristotle says in his Politics (6:2): ‘In a democracy,
that represents it). But along with their freedom they live liberty is to be supposed; for it is commonly held that no
in a condition of perpetual war, and at the edges of battle- man is free in any other ·form of· government.’ Similarly,
grounds, with their frontiers armed and cannons planted Cicero, and other writers have based their theory of civil

98
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

government on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught First, therefore, seeing that sovereignty by institution
to hate monarchy—first by •those who, having deposed their comes about through a covenant of everyone to everyone,
sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome, and that sovereignty by acquisition comes about through
and afterwards by •their successors. And from reading these a covenant of the vanquished to the victor or of the child
Greek and Latin authors, men from their childhood have to the parent, it is obvious that every subject has liberty in
acquired a habit (under the false slogan of ‘liberty’) of respect of anything the right to which cannot be transferred
favouring uproars, lawlessly controlling the actions by covenant. I showed in chapter 14 that covenants not to
of their sovereigns, and then controlling those con- defend one’s own body are void. Therefore, If the sovereign
trollers; commands a man to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to
with so much blood being spilt that I think I can truly say resist those who assault him, or to abstain from the use of
that the price these western lands have paid for learning the food, air, medicine, or anything else that he needs in order
Greek and Latin tongues is the highest that anyone has ever to live, that man has the liberty to disobey, even if he has
paid for anything. been justly condemned ·to death·.
We come now to details concerning the true liberty of a If a man is interrogated by the sovereign, or by someone
subject, i.e. what the things are that a subject may without acting on his behalf, concerning a crime the man has com-
injustice refuse to do when commanded to do them by the mitted, he isn’t bound (unless promised a pardon) to confess
sovereign. To grasp the answer to this, we must consider it, because as I showed in chapter 14 no man can be obliged
•what rights we relinquish when we make a commonwealth, by covenant to accuse himself.
or (the same thing) •what liberty we deny ourselves by Again, the subject’s consent to sovereign power is con-
owning all the actions—all without exception—of the man tained in the words ‘I authorize or take upon me all his
or assembly we make our sovereign. For our •obligation ·to actions’, and these contain no restriction at all of his own
obey· and our •liberty ·not to obey· both reside in our act of former natural liberty. For by allowing him to kill me I am
submission; so the extent of •each must be inferred from the not bound to kill myself when he orders me to do so. It is
act of submission, because no man has any obligation that one thing to say ‘Kill me, or my fellow, if you please’ and
doesn’t arise from some act of his own, for all men are by another thing to say ‘I will kill myself, or my fellow’. So it
nature free. Such inferences must rely either on •the explicit follows that no man is bound •by the words themselves to
words ‘I authorize all his actions’ or on •his intention in kill either himself or any other man; so the obligation that
submitting himself to the sovereign’s power (which intention a man may sometimes have to do something dangerous or
is to be understood from the purpose for which he submits). dishonourable when ordered to by the sovereign, depends
So the obligation and the liberty of the subject are to be not on •the words of our submission but on •the intention
derived either from •those words or others equivalent to them, ·with which we submit·, and that is to be inferred from the
or else from •the purpose of the institution of sovereignty, purpose of the submission. Therefore: when our refusal to
which is the peace of the subjects among themselves and obey frustrates the purpose for which the sovereignty was
their defence against a common enemy. ordained, then there’s no liberty to refuse; otherwise there

99
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

is. [The abrupt switch from third-person to first-person is Hobbes’s.] man is as entitled to do as the innocent. There was indeed
Upon this ground, a man who is commanded as a soldier injustice in their first breach of duty; ·but· their bearing of
to fight against the enemy—even if his sovereign has the arms subsequent to it, although it is to maintain what they
right to punish his refusal with death—may in many cases have ·unjustly· done, isn’t a further unjust act. And if it is
refuse without injustice. An example is when he substitutes only to defend their own persons it’s not unjust at all. But an
a sufficient soldier in his place; for in this case he doesn’t offer of pardon takes the plea of self-defence away from those
desert the service of the commonwealth. And allowance to whom it is made, and renders unlawful their perseverance
should be made for natural timidity not only of women in helping or defending one another.
(from whom no such dangerous duty is expected) but also All other liberties depend on the silence of the law. A
of men of feminine courage. When armies fight, there’s subject is at liberty to do A or not do A, as he pleases, if
a running away on one side or on both; but when what the sovereign hasn’t prescribed any rule regarding actions
leads the soldiers to run is not treachery but fear, they are of that kind. This kind of liberty, therefore, is greater at
thought to act dishonourably but not unjustly. By the same some places or times than at others, depending on what the
reasoning, avoiding battle is cowardice but not injustice. sovereign ·at each time and place· thinks most appropriate.
But someone who enrols himself as a soldier, or accepts For example, there was a time when in England a man might
an advance on his pay, can no longer plead the excuse of by force go onto his own land and dispossess anyone who
a timorous nature; he is obliged not only to go into battle had wrongfully taken it over; but in later years that liberty
but also not to run from it without his captain’s permission. of forcible entry was taken away by a law made (by the king)
And when the defence of the commonwealth requires the in parliament. Another example: in some places in the world
simultaneous help of all citizens, each person who can either men are free to have many wives; in other places they have
bear arms or contribute something, however little, to victory, no such liberty.
is obliged to undertake military service; because otherwise it If a subject has a controversy with his sovereign concern-
was pointless for them to institute commonwealth—one that ing
they haven’t the purpose or courage to preserve. debt, or right of possession of lands or goods, or
No man has liberty to resist the sword of the common- any service required from the subject, or any penalty,
wealth in defence of another man, whether he is guilty or whether corporal or monetary,
innocent, because such a liberty would detract from the on the basis of an already existing law, he has the same
sovereign’s means for protecting us, and would therefore liberty to sue ·the sovereign· for his right that he would
be destructive of the very essence of government. But if a to sue another subject, doing this before judges who are
great many men have all together already unjustly resisted appointed by the sovereign. For the sovereign bases his
the sovereign power or committed some capital crime for demands on the force of an existing law and not on his
which each expects death, do they have the liberty to join power ·as sovereign·, and so he ·implicitly· declares that he
together and assist and defend one another? Certainly they is demanding •only what that law says to be required ·from
have; for they are only defending their lives, which the guilty the subject·. So the suit isn’t contrary to the will of the

100
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

sovereign, and consequently the subject is free to demand endeavour to maintain it. In the intention of those who
that his case be heard and judgment given according to that make it, sovereignty is immortal; but in its own nature it is
law. But if the sovereign demands or takes anything •on the not only •subject to violent death by foreign war, but also
basis of his claim to power, there is no basis for legal action; •contains within it from the moment of its birth many seeds
for in such a case what the sovereign does by virtue of his of a natural mortality, through internal discord arising from
power is done by the authority of every subject; so someone the ignorance and passions of men.
who brought a legal action against the sovereign would be If a subject is taken prisoner in war, or his person or his
bringing it against himself. means of life come under the control of the enemy, and if
If a monarch or sovereign assembly grants a liberty to he has his life and bodily liberty given to him on condition
some or all of his subjects, where the result of this would that he becomes a subject of the victor, he has liberty to
be that he is no longer able to provide for their safety, the accept this condition; and then he is the subject of the victor,
grant is void unless he explicitly renounces the sovereignty because he had no other way to preserve himself. . . . But if a
or transfers it to someone else. ·An explicit renunciation or man is held in prison or chains, or is ·somehow· not trusted
transfer is required, because· if he wanted to renounce or with the liberty of his body, he can’t be understood to be
transfer he could easily have done so in plain language; so if bound by covenant to submit; and so he may escape by any
he didn’t, it’s to be understood that that isn’t what he wanted, means whatsoever, if he can.
and that the grant ·of liberty· came from ·his· ignorance of If a monarch relinquishes the sovereignty, both for him-
how that liberty would conflict with the sovereign power. In self and for his heirs, his subjects return to the unconditional
such a case, therefore, ·the grant of liberty is void, and· the liberty of nature. That is because, although nature declares
sovereignty is still retained, and consequently so are all the who are his sons and who are his next of kin, it is (as I said
powers that are necessary for the exercise of sovereignty—the in chapter 19) for him to decide who shall be his heir. So if he
power of war and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers decides not to have an heir, then ·his action of relinquishing
and councillors, of raising money, and all the rest listed in his sovereignty creates a situation where· no-one is sovereign
chapter 18. and no-one is a subject. The case is the same if he dies
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood without known relatives and without declaring who is to be
to last as long as he has the power to protect them, and no his heir. For in that case no heir can be known, and so no
longer. For the right that men have by nature to protect subjection is due.
themselves when no-one else can protect them can’t be A subject who is banished by the sovereign is not a
relinquished by any covenant. The sovereignty is the soul subject during the banishment. Someone who is sent
of the commonwealth, and once it has departed from the with a message or given leave to travel is still a subject,
body the limbs no longer get their motion from it. The but what makes him so is a contract between sovereigns,
purpose of obedience is protection; and wherever a man sees not his covenant of subjection. For whoever enters into
·the prospect of· protection, whether in his own sword or someone else’s dominion is subject to all its laws, unless he
someone else’s, nature directs his obedience to it and his has a privilege ·of exemption from them· through friendly

101
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 21: Liberty of subjects

agreements between the sovereigns, or by special licence. his subjects are obliged to obey the magistrates whom he
If a monarch who is subdued by war makes himself previously appointed, governing not in their name but in his.
subject to the victor, his subjects are released from their For since his right remains, the question is only about his
former obligation ·to him· and become obliged ·instead· to administration, i.e. about ·which· magistrates and officers
the victor. But if he is held prisoner, or ·in some other way· ·are to act for him in his absence·; and if he doesn’t have a
doesn’t have the liberty of his own body, he isn’t understood way of naming them he is assumed to approve the ones he
to have given away the right of sovereignty, and therefore himself had previously appointed.

102
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

Chapter 22. Systems—subject, political, and private

Having spoken of the creation, form, and power of a purpose.) But when the intention is •evil, or (if the number
commonwealth, I now reach the topic of a commonwealth’s of people is large) •unknown, they are unlawful. [The word
parts. I start with systems, which resemble the homogeneous ‘concourse’ occurs several times in this chapter. A ‘concourse of people’
parts of a natural body, its muscles. By ‘SYSTEM’ I mean can be just a crowd, a coming together of many people; but Hobbes here
any number of men joined in one interest or one business. uses it to mean ‘many people acting in the same way or towards the
Some systems are regular, some irregular. The regular ones same end’.] In bodies politic the power of the representative is
are those where one man or assembly of men is constituted always limited, and what sets its limits is the sovereign power.
as representative of the whole number. All the others are For unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. And in every
irregular. commonwealth the sovereign is the absolute representative
Some regular systems are absolute and independent, sub- of all the subjects, so no-one else can represent any part of
ject to nobody but their own representative; they are all them except within whatever limits the sovereign sets. ·He
commonwealths, which I have already dealt with in chapters had better set some limits!· To permit a body politic of sub-
17–21. All the other regular systems are dependent ·or jects to have an absolute—·i.e. unlimited·—representative
subordinate·, i.e. subordinate to some sovereign power to would be, to all intents and purposes, to abandon the
which every one is subject as is also their representative. government of that part of the commonwealth and to divide
Of systems that are subordinate ·or dependent· some the dominion; and this would be contrary to their peace and
are political and some private. •Political systems—otherwise defence. The sovereign can’t be understood to do that by
called ‘bodies politic’ and ‘persons in law’—are ones that any grant he makes that doesn’t plainly and explicitly free
are made by authority from the sovereign power of the com- them from their subjection. ·It must be done explicitly to
monwealth. •Private systems are ones that are constituted be effective·; for consequences of his words are not signs of
by subjects amongst themselves (or by authority from a his will when other consequences are signs of the contrary.
foreigner; for an authority derived from power within one Rather they are signs of error and miscalculation, to which
commonwealth is, within the dominion of another common- all mankind is too prone.
wealth, not public but private). How the power that is given to the representative of a
Some private systems are lawful, some unlawful. Lawful body politic is limited can be learned from two things. One
systems are those that are allowed by the commonwealth; is their writ or letters [see next paragraph] from the sovereign;
all other are unlawful. Irregular systems—those that consist the other is the law of the commonwealth.
only in the concourse of people, with no representative—are When a •commonwealth is first established, nothing
lawful if they aren’t forbidden by the commonwealth or made needs to be written down, because in that case the power
with an evil purpose. (Examples would be the gathering of the representative has no bounds except what are laid
of people at markets or shows, or for any other harmless down by the unwritten law of nature. But in •subordinate

103
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

bodies so many different limitations are needed—concerning it’s a crime the assembly may be punished so far as it can be
their businesses, times, and places—that they can’t be punished: •by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which
remembered unless they are written down, and can’t be is for such artificial and fictitious bodies is tantamount to
observed unless their written versions are letters patent [= capital punishment), or •by a monetary fine (if the assembly
‘an open document issued by a monarch or government to authorize an has property in which none of the innocent members has
that can be read to the people, and that
action or confer a right’] shares). For nature has exempted all bodies politic from
are attested to by carrying the seal of the sovereign or some bodily penalties (·you can’t flog or imprison a body politic·).
other permanent sign of his authority. But those who didn’t give their vote are innocent because the
[The linking of this paragraph with the next is Hobbes’s.] Such assembly can’t represent any man in things unwarranted by
limitations are not always easy to describe in writing, per- their letters, and consequently ·the innocent minority· are
haps sometimes not even possible, so the ordinary laws not involved in the majority’s votes.
of the commonwealth as a whole must settle what the [There follows a page discussing rights and entitlements
representative may lawfully do in all cases where the official when a one-man representative of a body politic borrows
letters are silent. And therefore. . . money, or is fined. That material is omitted from the present
. . . In a body politic whose representative is one man, if he text.]
does something in his official capacity that isn’t warranted The variety of bodies politic is almost infinite; for they
in his letters ·patent· or by the laws, it is his own act and are distinguished not only by •the different concerns for
not the act of the body or of any member of it except himself; which they are constituted (an indescribable variety of them),
because outside the limits set by his letters or the laws he but also •differences in their scope, coming from differences
represents no man’s person except his own. But what he in times, places, and numbers of members. As to their
does in accordance with his letters patent and the laws is the concerns: some are ordained for government. First on the
act of everyone; for everyone is an author of the sovereign’s list, as involving the largest political entity smaller than a
act, because he is unrestrictedly their representative, and the commonwealth, is the government of a province, which may
act of someone who conforms to the letters of the sovereign be committed [= ‘entrusted’] to an assembly of men, with all
is itself an act of the sovereign, and therefore every member its resolutions being decided by majority vote; and then
of the body is an author of it. this assembly is a body politic, and their power is limited
But if the representative is an assembly, anything the by commission [= ‘by the terms in which their governing role was
assembly does that isn’t warranted by their letters patent committed to them’]. When someone transfers the responsibility
or by the laws is an act of the assembly, or of the body for some business of his to another person, to manage it for
politic ·which it represents·; and it is the act of everyone him and under his authority, that responsibility is what is
by whose vote the decree was made, but not the act of signified by the word ‘province’. [That’s a meaning that ‘province’
any man who voted against it or of any man who was did have in Hobbes’s day.] So when in one commonwealth •there
absent (unless he voted for it by proxy). It is an act of are different regions that have different laws or are geographi-
the assembly because it was voted for by a majority, and if cally far apart, and •the administration of the government ·of

104
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

those regions· is committed to different people, the regions duty, in any place outside the colony itself, because it has
in question—where the sovereign is not resident but governs no jurisdiction or authority anywhere but in the colony. . . .
by commission—are called ‘provinces’. And though the assembly have a right to impose a fine on
But there are few examples of a province being governed any of their members who break laws that they make, they
by an assembly residing in the province itself. The Romans have no right to enforce such fines outside the colony. And
had the sovereignty of many provinces, but governed them what I have said here about the rights of an assembly for
always through presidents and magistrates, and not as the government of a province or a colony applies also to
they governed the city of Rome and adjacent territories, an assembly for the government of a town, a university, a
namely through assemblies. Similarly, when people were college, a church, and to any other government over the
sent from England to establish colonies in Virginia and persons of men.
Sommer-islands, though the government of them here was If any particular member of a body politic thinks he has
committed to assemblies in London, those assemblies never been wronged by the body itself, the right of dealing with
committed the government of them there to any assembly his case belongs to the sovereign and to those whom the
·of people living· there, but rather sent one governor to sovereign has appointed to be judges in such cases or has
each colony. For although every man naturally wants to appointed for this case in particular. It doesn’t belong to the
take part in government if he can be present ·where the body itself; for in this situation the whole body is his fellow
procedures of government are going on·, when men can’t subject; it would not be like that in a sovereign assembly,
be present they are inclined, also naturally, to commit the where there can be no judge at all if it is not sovereign, even
government of their common interest to a monarchic rather if that involves his being judge in his own cause.
than a democratic form of government. We see this in the In a body politic whose function is to control foreign trade,
behaviour of men with private estates who, when they are the most appropriate representative is an assembly of all the
unwilling to take the trouble of administering their own members, so that anyone who has risked his money ·on
affairs, choose to trust one servant rather than an assembly a trading venture· can if he wishes be present at all the
either of their friends or of their servants. body’s deliberations and resolutions. To see the case for this,
But whatever happens in fact, we can entertain the idea consider why men who are merchants, and can buy and sell,
of the government of a province or colony being committed export and import, their merchandise according to their own
to an assembly. The point I want to make is that if this did discretions, nevertheless bind themselves together to form
happen, •whatever debt was contracted by that assembly, or one corporation.
•whatever unlawful act was decreed, it would be the act only ·This isn’t the question of why they enter into joint
of those who assented, and not of any that dissented or were trading ventures—a question that has a straightfor-
absent for the reasons described above. And another point: ward answer·. Few merchants are in a position to
An assembly residing outside the colony that it governs can’t buy enough at home to fill a ship for export, or to
exercise any power over the persons or the possessions of buy enough abroad to ·fill a ship and· bring it home;
any member of the colony, or seize on them for debt or other so ·merchants generally· need to join together in one

105
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

society, where every man can either •share in the very profitable for a commonwealth if ·they were cut in half,
profits in proportion to his risk, or •go it alone and so to speak; that is, if· •they were bound up into one body in
sell what he exports or imports at whatever prices foreign markets ·where as a monopoly they could sell dear
he thinks fit. But this is not a body politic, because and buy cheap·, and •did not exist as a monopoly at home,
there’s no common representative to oblige them to where every man was at liberty to buy and sell at what price
any laws other than the ones that also oblige all other he could.
subjects; ·so it’s not what I was asking about·. The purpose ·of such a monopolistic body politic· is not to
·When merchants form a corporation, i.e. a body politic bring profit to the body as a whole; indeed, the body as such
of the kind I have been writing about·, their purpose in has no wealth except what is deducted from the individual
incorporating is to increase their profits in either of two ways: trading ventures to pay for building, buying, equipping and
by sole buying at home, and by sole selling abroad. So that manning the ships. Rather, the purpose is the profit of each
to allow a number of merchants to be a corporation or body individual trader. why each of them should be acquainted
politic is to give them a double monopoly, as sole buyers, with how his own possessions are being used; i.e. that each
and as sole sellers. For when a company is incorporated should belong to the assembly that has the power to order
for any particular foreign country, they alone export the such uses, and should be acquainted with their accounts.
commodities that can be sold in that country, which means So the representative of such a body must be an assembly,
that they are sole buyers at home and sole sellers abroad. . . . where every member of the body can if he wishes be present
This is profitable to the merchants because •it enables them at the consultations.
to buy at home at lower rates, and sell abroad at higher [There follows a half-page concerning rights and obliga-
rates; and ·in the other direction·, •there’s only one buyer tions when a ‘body politic of merchants’ is somehow involved
of foreign goods and only one seller of them at home, both in debts, fines, or crimes. That material is omitted here.]
which are again profitable to the merchants. These bodies made for governing men or trade are either
One part of this double monopoly is disadvantageous to •perpetual or •set up for a limited time that is set down
the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home they in writing. But there are some bodies •whose times are
can, as the only exporters, •set what price they please on the limited ·not by any written rules, but· by the nature of their
produce and manufactured products of the people; and as business. Here would be an example of that. A sovereign
the sole importers they can •set what price they please on monarch (or sovereign assembly) commands the towns and
all foreign goods that the people have need of, and both of other parts of his territory to send to him their deputies, to
these are bad from the people’s point of view. In the reverse inform him about the condition and needs of his subjects,
direction, as the sole sellers of the home-land’s goods abroad, or to advise him regarding the making of good laws, or for
and sole buyers of foreign goods over there, they raise the any other purpose. These deputies have a place and time
price of the former and lower the price of the latter, ·both· of meeting assigned to them; they come together as ordered,
to the disadvantage of the foreigner. . . . Such corporations and are at that time a body politic representing every subject
are therefore nothing but monopolies, though they would be of that dominion. . . . But ·this body politic exists· only for

106
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

such matters as are put to them by the man or assembly by business of the league is. Sometimes an irregular system
whose sovereign authority they were sent for; and when it is is ·not even a league, but· merely a concourse of people
declared that there are no more matters for them to consider whose working together to a common end is based not on
or debate, the body is dissolved. . . . any obligation they have to one another but only on their
Regular and lawful private bodies are ones that are consti- having similar wants and inclinations.
tuted without letters ·patent· or any other written authority A commonwealth is just a league of all the subjects
apart from the laws that are common to all other subjects. together. Leagues of subjects within a commonwealth are ’
And because they are united in one representative person, mutual defence, so they are for the most part unnecessary,
they are classified as ‘regular’. They include all households and savour of unlawful design; and for that reason they
in which the father or master orders the whole household, for are unlawful, and are commonly labelled as ‘factions’ or
he creates obligations for his children and his servants, as far ‘conspiracies’. ·Leagues of commonwealths· are different. A
as the law permits. That far but no further, because none of league is a connection of men by covenants; if (as in the raw
them are bound to obey him by performing actions that the condition of nature) no power is given to any one man or
law has forbidden. In all other actions, during the time they assembly to compel the members to keep their covenant, the
are under domestic government, they are subject to their league is valid only as long as there arises no good reason
fathers and masters who are their immediate sovereigns, as for distrust; and therefore •leagues between commonwealths,
it were. Before the institution of commonwealth, the father over which there is no human power established to keep
and master is absolute sovereign in his own household; the them all in awe, are not only lawful but also profitable for
only authority he loses through the institution is what is as long as they last. But •leagues between the subjects of a
taken from him by the law of the commonwealth. single commonwealth, where everyone could obtain his right
Regular but unlawful private bodies are those that unite by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary for the
themselves into one representative person without any public maintenance of peace and justice; and if their purpose is evil,
authority at all. Examples are •the corporations of beggars, or unknown to the commonwealth, they are also unlawful.
thieves and gypsies, ·formed so as· to succeed better in For it’s wrong for private men to unite their strength for an
their trade of begging and stealing, and •the corporations evil purpose; and if a league’s purpose is unknown, this
of men who unite themselves for the easier propagation of concealment is wrong and the league is dangerous to the
doctrines, and for making a party against the power of the public.
commonwealth, doing this by authority from some foreign If the sovereign power belongs to a large assembly, and
person. some members of the assembly come together without au-
Irregular systems, which are in their nature merely thority to discuss things on their own and to try to guide
leagues, become lawful or unlawful according to the law- the other members, this is a faction or unlawful conspiracy,
fulness or unlawfulness of each particular man’s purpose in because it’s a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for the
belonging to the league; and his purpose is to be understood faction’s particular purposes. But if someone (·not belonging
from ·the intersection of his private interests with· what the to the assembly·) whose private interest is to be debated

107
Leviathan 3 Thomas Hobbes 22: Systems—subject, political, and private

and judged in the assembly makes as many friends as he of men at church or at a public show. But only if they are
can ·among the members of the assembly·, there’s nothing there in usual numbers; for if their number is extraordinarily
wrong with that, because he isn’t part of the assembly. Even great, their purpose in coming together is not evident, and
if he hires such friends with money, that is all right unless consequently someone who can’t give a detailed and good
some law explicitly forbids it; for, given how men behave, account of why he is there should be judged to be aware
justice sometimes can’t be had without money, and everyone that they have an unlawful and tumultuous purpose [ = ‘a
is entitled to think his own cause to be just, until it has been seditious purpose’ or ‘a purpose tending to lead to tumult or uproar’]. It
heard and judged. may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be
In all commonwealths, if a private man maintains more delivered to a judge or magistrate, but if a thousand men
servants than are needed for •managing his estate and •any come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly, because
other lawful employment he has for them, this is faction only one or two are needed for that purpose. But in such
and is unlawful. For the man has the protection of the cases as these, there’s no set number such that the assembly
commonwealth, so he doesn’t need the defence of private is unlawful if its membership reaches that number; what
force. In some nations that are not thoroughly civilized, makes it unlawful is its having too many members for the
many families have lived in continual hostility, and have available officers to be able to suppress it and bring it to
invaded one another with private force; but it’s clear enough justice.
that either they have been wrong to do this or else they had
When an unusually large number of men assemble
no commonwealth.
against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an
Not only •factions for kindred, but also •factions for the
unlawful tumult because their accusation could have been
government of religion (such as Papists, Protestants, etc.)
delivered to the magistrate by a few men, or by just one.
and •factions of state (such as patricians and plebeians in
Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus. . . . [Hobbes
ancient Rome, and aristocrats and democrats in ancient
develops this example in detail, following Acts 19:38-40.]
Greece), are wrong, because they are contrary to the peace
and safety of the people, and because they take the sword That completes what I shall say concerning systems, and
out of the hand of the sovereign. assemblies of people. They can, as I have already said, be
A concourse of people is an irregular system whose compared to the homogeneous parts of man’s body: the
lawfulness or unlawfulness depends on its purpose, and on lawful being comparable to the muscles; the unlawful ones
how many people it contains. If the purpose is lawful, and to warts, boils, and abscesses, caused by the unnatural
obvious, the concourse is lawful—e.g. an ordinary meeting flowing together of bad bodily fluids.

108