Case 2:11-cv-08395-R -MAN Document 61
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MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP RONALD L. OLSON (State Bar No. 44597) [email protected] JOHN W. SPIEGEL (State Bar No. 78935) [email protected] JOHN M. RAPPAPORT (State Bar No. 254459) [email protected] 355 South Grand Avenue, Thirty-Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702 PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP BRAD S. KARP (Pro Hac Vice) [email protected] THEODORE V. WELLS, JR. [email protected] BRUCE BIRENBOIM [email protected] BETH A. WILKINSON [email protected] LYNN B. BAYARD [email protected] 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 Telephone: (212) 373-3000 Facsimile: (212) 757-3990 Attorneys for Defendants NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and NFL PROPERTIES LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DAVE PEAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al, Defendants. CASE NO. CV 11-08395 R(MANx) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO REMAND Date: Time: Judge: December 5, 2011 10:00 AM Hon. Manuel L. Real
Notice of related cases: No. CV 11-08394 R (MANx) No. CV 11-08396 R (MANx)
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Plaintiffs motion to remand this action to state court came on for hearing on December 5, 2011, the Honorable Manuel L. Real presiding. After consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, and all other matters presented to the Court, the Court DENIES plaintiffs motion for the reasons that follow. Generally, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a defendant cannot remove state-law claims to federal court even if the defendant has a defense based on federal law. Milne Emps. Assn v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the Supreme Court has concluded that the preemptive force of some statutes is so strong that they completely preempt an area of state law. In such cases, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. Franchise Tax Board v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). The Supreme Court has held that federal law exclusively governs suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In addition, section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act preempts state law claims that are substantially dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the terms of a CBA. Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). Here, the Court finds the decision in Stringer v. National Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2007), to be persuasive and concludes that plaintiffs second cause of action, for negligence against the defendant National Football League (NFL), is preempted. Its resolution is inextricably intertwined with and substantially dependent upon an analysis of certain CBA provisions imposing duties on the clubs with respect to the medical care and treatment of NFL players. The CBA provisions that relate to the duties of team physicians are implicated. The CBA places primary responsibility for identifying such physical
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conditions on the team physicians. Stringer, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 910. Plaintiffs complaint alleges a [f]ailure to ensure accurate diagnosis and recording of concussive brain injury so the condition can be treated in an adequate and timely manner. (Compl. 379.) The physician provisions of the CBA must be taken into account in determining the degree of care owed by the NFL and how it relates to the NFLs alleged failure to establish guidelines or policies to protect the mental health and safety of its players. The Court reaches a similar conclusion when examining the CBA provisions relating to the teams athletic trainers. Having concluded that at least one of plaintiffs claims is preempted by section 301, it is unnecessary at this stage of the proceedings to determine whether plaintiffs other claims are also preempted. That determination is better left for the motion-to-dismiss stage. As long as at least one federal claim is present, this Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. Thus, defendants removal of this action was proper and, therefore, plaintiffs motion to remand is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 8, 2011 THE HONORABLE MANUEL L. REAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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