1

ISM Code

A. Introduction

1. More than 90% of international trade by weight moves by sea transport. The
function of the fleet of merchant ship is to provide spatial links in the world
economy. In the present rapid changing business environment, a ship operation
has become extremely dynamic.

2. This paradigm shift had brought the era of sub standard shipping at least to the
shores of a maritime state that resulted large number of wrecks and created
potential pollution threat to the Indian waters.

3. There is diverse fleet of tankers, chemical carriers, gas carriers, bulk carriers,
containers and other types of trading and non trading vessels engaged in marine
activities in the Maritime Zones of member states of IMO including India.

4. A list of casualty occurring in 20 th and 21st century certainly open up the eyes of
not only the marine community but also others sections of human society being
affected by it.

I. 20th Century major Shipping Casualties from ISM aspect are:

o International Tonnage
 M.V. Titanic, Flag UK, in 1912, on its maiden voyage - resulted in
loss of 1500 lives & led to the creation of SOLAS, 1914- Elements of
ISM Code affected could have been 3, 5,6, 7, 8 & 9 etc.
 M. T Torrey Cannon, Liberia , built in 1959 in March 1967 this
resulted in Major oil pollution off UK coast which led to adoption of
1969, CLC, High Seas Intervention, 1969 and MARPOL 1973/78-
causes reported to be Navigational error and Steering gear design-
Elements of ISM Code affected could have been 1.2.3, 5 , 7 &
8 etc
 M.V Herald of Free Enterprise, Kingstown, Saint Vincent, built in
1980 & sank in March 1987 off Belgium port led to adoption of ISM
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Code- Elements of ISM Code affected could have been 3, 4,5, 6,

7 &8 etc
 M.T Exxon Valdez, Flag USA, built in 1986 and grounded in 1989
led to Major oil pollution off Alaska & led to Double Hull design, main
causes reported to be , Fatigue and in operational navigational
equipment etc – Affected elements of ISM are 6.1,7 & 10 etc. A
feature film has been made by HBO named Dead Ahead etc;
 M.T Erica, Flag Malta, age 24 years, sank in 1999 off French Coast,
poor maintenance and management were the causes –ISM Code
Elements affected could be 1.2.3, 3 and 10 etc . It also led to
strengthening of Safety Net
 M.T Prestige Flag Bahamas, age 26 years , sank, in Nov 2002
with 77000 t of cargo off Northern Spain, caused major pollution .No
specific reasons noted except sub standards maintenance &
operations – Elements of ISM Code affected could be 1.2.3 & 10
etc. It raised issue of POR.
 M.V Estonia, POR- Estonia, built in 1979/80 sank in 28.9.1994 off
Finland with reportedly 892 PX – causes poor cargo stowage and high
speed or sabotage theory floated –Element of ISM Code affected
could have been 1.2.3 & 7 etc. It raised issue of inadequate
passenger ship safety
 M.T Sea Empress, Flag Liberia ,3 year old grounded in UK waters &
in Feb 1997 spilled 72,000 tons of oil off Wales, Causes pilot
error( junior ), miscalculation of tide, cost cutting & inadequate tug
power, No discussion etc- Element of ISM affected could be 1.2.3,
7 & 8 etc, it raised an issue of port preparedness and Master
role during pilotage;
o National Tonnage
 M.V Nitya Ram, Flag India, in 1985 over 25 year age with total loss of
about 18 crew, sank in Bay of Bengal main causes substandard
maintenance and operations – Elements of ISM Code affected
could have been 1.2.3, 3, 8 & 10 etc
 M.V Nitya Nanak , Flag India in 1985 over 25 year age with total loss
of about 17 crew , sank in Bay of Bengal , main causes substandard
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maintenance and operations – Elements of ISM Code affected

could have been 1.2.3, 3, 8 & 10 etc
 M.V Arcadia Pride, Flag India, 1997, 23 year old sank with about 10
person –main causes cargo of granular sulphur shifting- Elements of
ISM Code affected could be 7 & 8 etc

B. ISM Code & Amendments

5. The Code’s origins go back to the late 1980’s & early 1990’s on account of the
following reasons inter-alia

 Public outcry for major oil pollution from the ships;

 concern about poor management standards in shipping; &
 concern for inadequate competence standards of seafarers

6. A sequence of development of the ISM code is through IMO Applicable IMO

Resolutions / Circulars. An indicative list of IMO Resolutions /Circulars etc are
set out below

 IMO A 441( 11)- Control of flag state over ship owner,1979;

 IMO A. 443(11)- Decision of the Master with regard Safety & Marine
Environment, 1979;
 IMO A 466(12) Procedures for control over ships, 1981;
 IMO A 596(15) MSC to develop guidelines of safe operations, 1987;
 IMO A 647(16)-Guidelines on management for safe operations &
pollution prevention, 1989;
 IMO A 680(17) - Guidelines on management for safe operations &
pollution prevention, 1992;
 IMO A 741(18)- ISM Code for safe operations , 1993;
 IMO A772 (18)- Fatigue factor in ship management, 1993;
 IMO, 788(19)- Guidelines to implement ISM Code by Adminstartion,1995;
 IMO A 848(20) – Implementation of ISM Code,1997;
 IMO A850(20)- Human element vision , 1997;
 IMO A 880(21)- Implementation of ISM Code, 1999;
 IMO A 913(22) Revised guidelines for Administration- ISM Code, 2001;
 IMO A 947(23) Human element vision-IMO, 2003;
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 IMO A 950(23) Guidelines for Maritime Assistance Service(MAS),2003;

 IMO A 1022(26)- Revised Guidelines on implementation of ISM Code,
2009;
 IMO A 1047(27) – Guidelines on minimum safe manning, 2011
 IMO A 1071(28)- Guidelines on ISM Code,2013;
 IMO A 1072(28)- Revised guidelines for structure of an Integrated
system of Contingency plan for ship board emeergencies,2013
 MSC/Cir.884- Guidelines for safe Ocean Towing, 1998;
 MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.8, 2009- IMO guidelines for the Operational
implementation of the ISM code by Companies;
 MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.7, 2008- IMO guidance on near miss reporting;
 MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.6, 2008- Guidance on the Qualifications, training and
experience of DPA;
 MSC/Cir.1059,MEPC/Cir.401,2002, Procedure for observed ISM major non
conformities;
 MSC resolution 353(92) June 2013 – ISM amendments;
 MSC-MEPC7/Cir9,2014- ISM code for laid up ships;
 Guidance of Fatigue Mitigation and Management (i.e. MSC/Circ. 1014)
etc.).
7. A list of Industry guidelines on best practices is set out below
 Assessments and Development of SMS (ICS);
 Bridge Procedure Guide (ICS);
 Guide to helicopter/ship operations(ICS);
 Guidelines for the preparation of garbage management plans(ICS);
 Guidelines on good employment Practice(ICS);
 A guide for shipping Industry-MLC,2006 (ISF);
 On board training record books for deck cadet, engineering cadets &
ratings(ISF);
 Marine English language test for seafarers(ISF);
 Personal training and service record book(ISF);
 STCW Convention- Checklist(ISF);
 Watch keeper(IMO/ILO work hour record program) (ICS)
 Occupational Health Safety Management system (OHSAS), BS,18001
 SOHSP- Ship Board Occupational Health Programme by MPA
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 ISO,9001 standards
8. Amendments to the SOLAS, 1974 , ISM Code & Guidelines- A brief on
the Code entry in to force and the amendments are given below.

 Chapter IX of the annex to the SOLAS 1974 adopted by the 1994 SOLAS
Conference. Accepted on 1st January 1998 and
 It entered in to force on 1st July 1998.
 text was amended by resolution MSC 99(73) in December 2000 & came in to
force on 1st July 2002.
 Further amended by resolution MSC 194(80) in May 2005, & came in to force
on 1st January 2009.

9. A brief is given below;

I. SOLAS, 1974 , Chapter IX

 Regulation 1- Definitions- ISM Code, Company, Oil tanker, Chemical Tanker,

Gas Tanker, BC, HSC etc;
 Regulation 2- Application- two phases 1st phase July 1998 & 2nd phase July
2002;
 Regulation 3- Safety Management Requirements- ISM Code mandatory &
ship with DOC;
 Regulation 4- Certification- DOC & SMC only after SMS verified;
 Regulation 5-Maintenanace of conditions- maintenance as per ISM
Code( 1.4)
 Regulation 6- Verification and Control- of Company and control of ship
 MSC99(73)- 2000, minor amendment to regulation 1 definition , regulation
3 made mandatory and minor change to regulation 6; &
 MSC 194(80)-2005, minor change to regulation 1 definition

II. International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code) (A.
741(18)) Effective as from: 1 July 1998

10. The ISM code has undergone following changes:

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 December 2000 amendments (MSC.104(73)) 1 July 2002- Clause 1

Definition a minor change

 December 2004 amendments (MSC.179(79)) 1 July 2006-minor Forms

changed

 May 2005 amendments (MSC.195(80)) 1 January 2009- Form Company ID

added

 2008 amendments (MSC.273(85)) 1 July 2010-Clause 1,Defination, Clause

5, Clause 7 ship operations, Clause 8 emergency preparedness, Clause 9, NC
reporting, Clause 10 ship maintenance, Clause 12, Documentation, Clause
13, certifications and Clause 14 interim certification

 2013 amendments (MSC. 353(92)) 1 January 2015 Clause 6.2 Resources,

12.2 Documentation

III. Amendments to Guidelines

11. The Guidelines on implementation of the International Safety Management

(ISM) Code also underwent modifications. The sequence is as follows

For the Administration

 IMO Resolution A 788(19) of 1995

 IMO Resolution A 913 (22) of 2001
 IMO Resolution A 1022(26) of 2011
 IMO Resolution A 1071(28) of 2013

For the Company

 IMO Resolution A 788(19) of 1995 &

 MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.5 of 2007

15. A summary of amendments are as follows

 Revised guidelines on the implementation of the International Safety

Management (ISM) Code by Administrations adopted by resolution A.1071
(28) in December 2013, it revokes resolution A.1022 (26) with effect from 1
July 2014.
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 Revised Guidelines for the operational Implementation of the International

Safety Management (ISM) Code by Companies - MSC MEPC.7/Circ.8-28 June
2013.
 Guidance on the qualification, training and experience necessary for
undertaking the role of the Designated person under the provisions of ISM
Code.
 Guidance on near miss reporting Annex to MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.7
 MSC-MEPC7/Cir9,2014- ISM code for laid up ships;
 Guidance of Fatigue Mitigation and Management (i.e. MSC/Circ. 1014)
etc.).

C. Understanding of the ISM Code & SMS

12. The DM process through 16 Elements of Part A and Part B of the Code
can be understood from the below framework that emphasis on the 7S’s

 Systems- Policy/Procedures and instructions Sections 2 & 7

 Structure- Organization Structure Section 3
 Shared vision- Section 1
 Staffing Section 6
 Skills Section 6
 Style – Leadership function sections 2,4 & 5
 Strategy- Decision Making sections 7 & 8

“ Quote INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CODE FOR THE SAFE OPERATION

OF SHIPSAND FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (INTERNATIONAL SAFETY
MANAGEMENT (ISM) CODE)
PART A: IMPLEMENTATION
1. GENERAL
1.1 Definitions
The following definitions apply to parts A and B of this Code.
1.1.1International Safety Management (ISM) Code means the International
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention as
adopted by the Assembly, as may be amended by the Organization.
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1.1.2 Company means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person
such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the
responsibility for operation of the ship from the ship owner and who, on assuming
such responsibility, has agreed to take over all the duties and responsibility
imposed by the Code.
1.1.3Administration means the Government of the State whose flag the ship is
entitled to fly.
1.1.4 Safety Management System means a structured and documented system
enabling Company personnel to implement effectively the Company safety and
environmental protection policy.
1.1.5Document of Compliance means a document issued to a Company which
complies with the requirements of this Code.
1.1.6 Safety Management Certificate means a document issued to a ship which
signifies that the Company and its shipboard management operate in accordance
with the approved safety management system.
1.1.7 Objective evidence means quantitative or qualitative information, records or
statements of fact pertaining of safety or to the existence and implementation of a
safety management system element, which is based on observation, measurement
or
test and which can be verified.
1.1.8 Observation means a statement of fact made during a safety management
audit and substantiated by objective evidence.
1.1.9Non-conformity means an observed situation where objective evidence
indicates the non-fulfillment of a specified requirement.
1.1.10 Major non-conformity means an identifiable deviation that poses a serious
threat to the safety of personnel or the ship or a serious risk to the environment
that requires immediate corrective action or the lack of effective and systematic
implementation of a requirement of this Code.
1.1.11Anniversary date means the day and month of each year that corresponds
to the date of expiry of the relevant document or certificate.
1.1.12Convention means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974 as amended.
1.2 Objectives
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1.2.1The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human
injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to
the marine environment, and to property.
1.2.2Safety-management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:
.1provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
.2 assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel and the environment and
establish appropriate safeguards; and
.3 continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel ashore and aboard
ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environmental
protection.
1.2.3The safety-management system should ensure:
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and
.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the
Organization,
Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are
taken into account.
1.3 Application
The requirements of this Code may be applied to all ships.
1.4 Functional requirements for a safety-management system
Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management
system (SMS) which includes the following functional requirements:
.1a safety and environmental-protection policy;
.2instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of
the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation;
.3defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst,
shore
and shipboard personnel;
.4procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of
this
Code;
.5procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
.6 procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
2.SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY
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2.1The Company should establish a safety and environmental-protection policy

which
describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will be achieved.
2.2The Company should ensure that the policy is implemented and maintained at
all
levels of the organization both, ship-based and shore-based
3.COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
3.1If the entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is other than the
owner, the owner must report the full name and details of such entity to the
Administration.
3.2The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority and
interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to and
affecting safety and pollution prevention.
3.3The Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and shore-
based support are provided to enable the designated person or persons to carry out
their functions.
4.DESIGNATED PERSON(S)
To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the
Company and those on board, every Company, as appropriate, should designate a
person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management.
The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include
monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship
and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as
required.
5.MASTER'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
5.1The Company should clearly define and document the master's responsibility
with
regard to:
.1implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the Company;
.2motivating the crew in the observation of that policy;
.3issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner;
.4verifying that specified requirements are observed; and
.5periodically reviewing the SMS and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based
management.
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5.2The Company should ensure that the SMS operating on board the ship contains
a
clear statement emphasizing the master's authority. The Company should establish
in
the SMS that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make
decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the
Company's assistance as may be necessary.
6.RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL
6.1The Company should ensure that the master is:
.1properly qualified for command;
.2fully conversant with the Company's SMS; and
.3given the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely performed.
6.2The Company should ensure that each ship is:
.1 manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance
with national and international requirements; and
.2appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe
operation on board.*
* Refer to the Principles of minimum safe manning, adopted by the Organization
by Resolution A.1047(27)
6.3The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and
personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the
environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. Instructions which
are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and
given.
6.4The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company's SMS
have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and
guidelines.
6.5The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any
training which may be required in support of the SMS and ensure that such training
is provided for all personnel concerned.
6.6The Company should establish procedures by which the ship's personnel receive
relevant information on the SMS in a working language or languages understood
by them.
6.7The Company should ensure that the ship's personnel are able to communicate
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effectively in the execution of their duties related to the SMS.

7.SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, , including
checklist as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the
personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various tasks should be
defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
8.EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
8.1The Company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations, and
establish procedures to respond to them.
8.2The Company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare
for
emergency actions.
8.3The SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the Company's organization
can respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency situations involving
its ships.
9.REPORTS AND ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS AND
HAZARDOUS OCCURRENCES
9.1The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents
and
hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analyzed with
the
objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.
9.2The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective
action, including measures intended to prevent recurrence.
10.MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT
10.1The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is
maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations
and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company.
10.2In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:
.1inspections are held at appropriate intervals;
.2any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;
.3appropriate corrective action is taken; and
.4records of these activities are maintained.
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10.3The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden
operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The SMS should
provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment
or
systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by
arrangements
and equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.
10.4The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in 10.3
should be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance routine.
11.DOCUMENTATION
11.1The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all
documents and data which are relevant to the SMS
11.2The Company should ensure that:
.1valid documents are available at all relevant locations;
.2changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and
.3obsolete documents are promptly removed.
11.3The documents used to describe and implement the SMS may be referred to
as the Safety Management Manual. Documentation should be kept in a form that
the Company considers most effective. Each ship should carry onboard all
documentation relevant to that ship.
12.COMPANY VERIFICATION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION
12.1The Company should carry out internal safety Audits on board and ashore at
intervals not exceeding twelve months to verify whether safety and pollution-
prevention activities comply with the SMS. In exceptional circumstances, this
interval may be exceeded by not more than three months.
12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking
delegated
ISM-related tasks are acting in conformity with the Company’s responsibilities under
the Code.
12.3The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in
accordance with procedures established by the Company
12.4The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in accordance
with documented procedures.
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12.5 Personnel carrying out audits should be independent of the areas being
audited
unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the Company.
12.6The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the attention of all
personnel having responsibility in the area involved.
12.7The management personnel responsible for the are involved should take
timely
corrective action on deficiencies found.
PART B –CERTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
13CERTIFICATION AND PERIODICAL VERIFICATION
13.1The ship should be operated by a Company which has been issued with a
Document of Compliance or with an Interim Document of Compliance in accordance
with paragraph 14.1, relevant to that ship.
13.2The Document of Compliance should be issued by the Administration, by an
organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the
Administration, by another Contracting Government to the Convention to any
Company complying with the requirements of this Code for a period specified by the
Administration which should not exceed five years. Such a document should be
accepted as evidence that the Company is capable of complying with the
requirements of this Code.
13.3The Document of Compliance is only valid for the ship types explicitly indicate
d in the document. Such indication should be based on the types of ships on which
the initial verification was based. Other ship types should only be added after
verification of the Company’s capability to comply with the requirements of this
Code applicable to such ship types. In this context, ship types are those referred to
in regulation IX/1 of the Convention.
13.4The validity of a Document of Compliance should be subject to annual
verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the
Administration or, at the request of the Administration by another Contracting
Government within three months before or after the anniversary date.
13.5The Document of Compliance should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at
its request, by the Contracting Government which issued the document, when the
annual verification required in paragraph 13.4 is not requested or if there is
evidence of major non-conformities with this Code.
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13.5.1All associated Safety Management Certificates and/or Interim Safety

Management Certificates should also be withdrawn if the Document of Compliance
is withdrawn.
13.6A copy of the Document of Compliance should be placed on board in order that
the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for verification by the
Administration or by an organization recognized by the Administration or for the
purposes of the control referred to in regulation IX/6.2 of the Convention. The copy
of the document is not required to be authenticated or certified.
13.7The Safety Management Certificate should be issued to a ship for a period
which should not exceed five years by the Administration or an organization
recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by
another Contracting Government. The Safety Management Certificate should be
issued after verifying that the Company and its shipboard management operate in
accordance with the approved safety management system. Such a certificate
should be accepted as evidence that the ship is complying with the requirements of
this Code.
13.8The validity of the Safety Management Certificate should be subject to at least
one intermediate verification by the Administration or an organization recognized
by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another
Contracting Government. If only one intermediate verification is to be carried out
and the period of validity of the Safety Management Certificate is five years, it
should take place between the second and third anniversary date of the Safety
Management Certificate.
13.9In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.5.1, the Safety Management
Certificate should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at the request of the
Administration, by the Contracting Government which has issued it when the
intermediate verification required in paragraph 13.8 is not requested or if there is
evidence of major non-conformities with this Code.
13.10Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs 13.2 and 13.7, when the
renewal verification is completed within three months before the expiry date of the
existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate, the new
Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management Certificate should be valid
from the date of completion of the renewal verification for a period not exceeding
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five years from the date of expiry of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety
Management Certificate.
13.11When the renewal verification is completed more than three months before
the
expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management
Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management
Certificate should be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification
for a period not exceeding five years from the date of completion the renewal
verification.
13.12When the renewal verification is completed after the expiry date of the
existing
Safety Management Certificate, the new Safety Management Certificate should be
valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification to a date not exceeding
five years from the date of expiry of the existing Safety Management Certificate.
13.13If a renewal verification has been completed and a new Safety Management
Certificate cannot be issued or placed on board the ship before the expiry date of
the existing certificate, the Administration or organization recognized by the
Administration may endorse the existing certificate and such a certificate should be
accepted as valid for a further period which should not exceed five months from the
expiry date.
13.14If a ship at the time when a Safety Management Certificate expires is not in a
port in which it is to be verified, the Administration may extend the period of
validity
of the Safety Management Certificate but this extension should be granted only for
the purpose of allowing the ship to complete its voyage to the port in which it is to
be verified, and then only in cases where it appears proper and reasonable to do so.
No Safety Management Certificate should be extended for a period of longer than
three months, and the ship to which an extension is granted should not, on its
arrival in the port in which it is to be verified, be entitled by virtue of such extension
to leave that port without having a new Safety Management Certificate. When the
renewal verification is completed, the new Safety Management Certificate should be
valid to a date not exceeding five years from the expiry date of the existing Safety
Management Certificate before the extension was granted.
14INTERIM CERTIFICATION
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14.1An Interim Document of Compliance may be issued to facilitate initial

implementation of this Code when:
.1a Company is newly established; or
.2new ship types are to be added to an existing Document of Compliance, following
verification that the Company has a safety management system that meets the
objectives of paragraph 1.2.3 of this Code, provided the Company demonstrates
plans to implement a safety management system meeting the full requirements of
this Code within the period of validity of the Interim Document of Compliance. Such
an Interim Document of Compliance should be issued for a period not exceeding 12
months by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the
Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting
Government. A copy of the Interim Document of Compliance should be placed on
board in order that the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for
verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the
Administration or for the purposes of the control referred to in regulation IX/6.2 of
the Convention. The copy of the document is not required to be authenticated or
certified.
14.2An Interim Safety Management Certificate may be issued:
.1to new ships on delivery;
.2when a Company takes on responsibility for the operation of a ship which is new
to the Company; or
.3when a ship changes flag.
Such an Interim Safety Management Certificate should be issued for a period not
exceeding 6 months by the Administration or an organization recognized by the
Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting
Government.
14.3An Administration or, at the request of the Administration, another Contracting
Government may, in special cases, extend the validity of an Interim Safety
Management Certificate for a further period which should not exceed 6 months from
the date of expiry.
14.4An Interim Safety Management Certificate may be issued following verification
that:
.1the Document of Compliance, or the Interim Document of Compliance, is relevant
to the ship concerned;
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.2the safety management system provided by the Company for the ship concerned
includes key elements of this Code and has been assessed during the audit for
issuance of the Document of Compliance or demonstrated for issuance of the
Interim Document of Compliance;
.3the Company has planned the internal audit of the ship within three months;
.4the master and officers are familiar with the safety management system and the
planned arrangements for its implementation;
.5instructions, which have been identified as being essential, are provided prior to
sailing; and
.6relevant information on the safety management system has been given in a
working language or languages understood by the ship’s personnel.
15 VERIFICATION
15.1All verifications required by the provisions of this Code should be carried out in
accordance with procedures acceptable to the Administration, taking into account
the guidelines developed by the Organization*.
*: Refer to the Revised Guidelines on implementation of the International
Safety
Management (ISM) Code by Administrations adopted by the Organization
by resolutionA.1071 (28)
16FORMS OF CERTIFICATES
16.1The Document of Compliance, the Safety Management Certificate, the Interim
Document of Compliance and the Interim Safety Management Certificate should be
drawn up in a form corresponding to the models given in the appendix to this Code.
If
the language used is neither English nor French, the text should include a
translation into one of these languages.
16.2In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.3 the ship types indicated on
the
Document of Compliance and the Interim Document of Compliance may be
endorsed to reflect any limitations in the operations of the ships described in the
safety managing system. Unquote”

D. Case Studies -Marine casualties

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13 . A couple of cases each relating to various ship operations are discussed

below. An attempt can be made to analysis from ISM Code SMS aspect. Basically
shipping casualties fall in to 5 categories

 Ship related incidents

 Cargo related incidents
 People related incidents
 Environmental pollution related incidents
 Commercial Related Incidents
Case No 1.
Very serious casualty: serious injury and damage to ship/equipment
What happened?
The n° 1 crane of the 1997 built, about 200m long 28,000gt bulk carrier
collapsed from its foundation, while the vessel was discharging steel scrap in
port. The estimated weight of the load lifted by the crane was 20 tonnes,
including the grab. The crane body suddenly collapsed onto the deck
portside, damaging portside main deck railing and the crane house. The
ship's crew was not injured, but the crane operator was badly injured.
Why did it happen?
Due to improper/inadequate maintenance of the crane over an unspecified
period of time, the accumulated old grease was not "washed out"prior to the
lubrication. Due to this, and possibly influenced by the heavy grab duty,
excessive wear of the outer ring of the slewing bearing occurred. The result
was a violent separation of the slewing bearing under a heavy load operation.
The manufacturer's "washing procedure "was not followed by the crew.
What can we learn?
There is a need to have a properly implemented and effective preventive
maintenance plan.
The importance of having in the vessel's ISM manual a specific procedure for
all crew members involved in maintenance operations of cranes regarding
the manufacturer's maintenance plan.
Crane operators, preferably crew members, must be competent to safely
perform their duties.
All companies must implement a system of training of the operators.
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Also, port personnel should include properly certified individuals.

Case No 2
GROUNDING
Serious casualty: grounding caused by the failure to alter course
when required
What happened?
The about 37,000gt container ship ran aground early in the morning in May.
The ship was travelling in a south-easterly direction at the southern limit of
the traffic separation scheme at the time. The officer on watch, the chief
mate, took over the watch at 0400 and subsequently did not carry out two
course alterations required to keep the ship in the scheme. By the time the
chief mate realized that the speed of the ship was dropping, it was too late to
take effective corrective action and the ship grounded.
Why did it happen?
The chief mate was distracted from his watch-keeping duties because he was
reading e-mails. These e-mails were of a disturbing personal nature and he
was so absorbed by their content that he did not hear the VHF calls from VTS
warning him that his ship was leaving the TSS and running into danger. He
was alone on the bridge at the time of the grounding, having earlier
dismissed the bridge lookout so that he could clean the accommodation.
Consequently there was no other crew member there to warn him of the
dangers ahead or of the VHF calls. The chief mate had a pre-existing medical
condition which contributed to his state of mind at the time but no one on the
ship was aware of it.
What can we learn?
The importance of maintaining situational awareness while keeping a
navigational watch.
The dangers of using bridge equipment, especially computers, for non-work
related issues.
The importance of maintaining a look-out on the bridge.
Case No 3
GROUNDING
Serious casualty: grounding caused by lack of effective bridge team
management
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What happened?
The about 15,000 gt passenger vessel was leaving port. Within 7 minutes she
grounded briefly. She was refloated within 3 minutes and continued on her
voyage. At the time of the incident the vessel was under the influence of a
strong ebb tide and fresh water outflow. The vessel was equipped with a bow
thruster and twin controllable pitch propellers and a single rudder. No tugs
were used. The master controlled the engines and bow thruster to move the
vessel off the berth and under a pre-determined agreement the pilot took
control of the vessel once it was off the berth. The passenger vessel narrowly
avoided a collision with a berthed vessel and gained speed and steerage.
However, due to an apparent miscommunication resulting from a foreign
language being spoken on the bridge, the vessel grounded.
Why did it happen?
The lack of effective Bridge Team Management was a causal factor in the
grounding. This is evidenced from the fact that the handling characteristics of
the vessel were not discussed by the pilot and master during the pre-
departure information exchange. These included the poor handling at low
speed and the practice onboard to use the engines independently during
pilotages. The use of a foreign language resulted in miscommunication and
misunderstandings on the bridge.
What can we learn?
Where there are strong tidal streams during both flooding and ebbing, Port
Authorities must inform Pilots and Masters of the situation and these items
should be discussed by the Bridge Management Team.
Passage Plans must be followed.
Contingency Planning must be done, especially on vessels with poor
handling
characteristics at low speeds.
Where the pilot and master do not both share a common mother tongue,
then communications on the bridge must be carried out in English.
Safety considerations should be paramount in the decision to use harbour
tugs. Commercial conditions should come after safety.
Master and pilot information exchange must ensure a safe passage.
Case No 4
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COLLISION
Serious casualty: engine control failure leading to collision with quay
and moored vessel
What happened?
When the about 8,000gt container ship passed in a canal, the mate was
about to switch the CPP from centre control to the bridge wing. To do that he
had to press one button on a set out of five. The mate by mistake pressed the
button for back up control instead of the button for response change. The
CPP then turned to full astern and the ship collided with the quay and a
moored ship (which started to drift) before the ship was under control again.
Why did it happen?
Since the press buttons looked the same (same design and colour, placed
close to each other) it was possible to mix the buttons up without realizing
that until it was too late. Also, a short circuit on bridge wing due to moisture
made the electrical system fail, causing the CPP to go astern. Confusion
delayed the correct action to regain control.
What can we learn?
It is important to know the technical systems very well if you use them.
When the time comes and you need to take correct action, it is too late to
learn.
Sometimes, the systems are not very well designed for operators and there
might be reason to consider if it is possible for the crew to make
arrangements to prevent unintentional use.
Electrical systems need good maintenance to work appropriately.
Case No. 5
GROUNDING
Serious casualty: grounding caused by lack of effective bridge team
management
What happened?
The vessel was under way on a scheduled crossing in severe weather. During
this crossing the vessel was informed that the port of destination would be
temporarily closed due to severe weather conditions and seas. Under the
instructions of the Master the vessel proceeded to an area of safe open water
and commenced "slow steaming" while waiting for the port to reopen.The
23

vessel had been in the area for about four hours when, while approaching a
turn at the northern extremity there was a fire alarm and a number of
telephone calls to the bridge of a non-navigational nature. The electronic
navigation system was not being used effectively, with the consequence that
a wreck near the area was not detected. Because of the distractions, the
vessel overshot the northern limit of the safe area before the turn was
started and struck the wreck. The vessel was able to safely berth under her
own power.
Why did it happen?
The bridge team was distracted several times, including a request from a
driver of a refrigerated truck to run his engine so the truck could run its
cooling plant. The exhaust from the truck led to the activation of the fire
detection system, which then cascaded into further distractions to the bridge
team, including discussions on starting up the ventilation system so that the
truck's exhaust does not keep setting off the fire alarm. A series of telephone
calls to the bridge took place and the Master himself took another four
telephone calls to the bridge, before returning to the important aspect of
navigating the vessel.
What can we learn?
The lack of proper training in the use of the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System(ECDIS) possibly led to the wreck being undetected, and
the paper chart, which was marked with "no go"areas, was never re-assessed
or amended. All OOWs must receive training on all bridge equipment related
to vessel navigation.
The Master influenced the OOW's actions even though the OOW had officially
got the con. Therefore the OOW and the Master must communicate
effectively as a part of the bridge team. Also the bridge team was never on
standby or "red bridge" operating condition. During coastal maneuvering or
slow steaming, the bridge team must be extra vigilant and be in stand by or
red bridge condition with all distractions kept to a minimum.
No alternative passage plan had been made after the vessel deviated. Any
deviations from previous passage plans should be made in writing and
communicated to bridge team members.
Case No 6
24

GROUNDING
Serious casualty: grounding caused by lack of effective bridge team
management
What happened?
While moored at night, an about 78,000gt bulk carrier broke away from the
pier. At the time the vessel was almost fully laden and under the influence of
a strong ebb tide. Despite the use of at least seven tugs under the guidance
of a pilot and use of the vessel's main engine, it was not possible to
maneuver the vessel back to the pier and bring her alongside. Attempts to
hold the vessel in the deepest part of the port's entrance channel also failed
and the vessel grounded during the morning hours. The vessel was
subsequently refloated during the forenoon.
Why did it happen?
Neither the Port Authority nor the vessel's Master had not identified the risks
of a vessel breaking free from its berth and the potential consequences. The
effective holding capacity of the vessel's mooring winch was reduced by (a)
the number of layers of mooring line on the winch drum; and (b) poor
condition of the brakes. There is also the possibility that the brakes were not
sufficiently tightened. In addition the mooring winches were not effectively
monitored in the time leading up to the incident.
What can we learn?
Safety Management System (SMS) of vessels must address procedures for
mooring the ship, tending mooring lines and any of the associated risks. This
includes assessing the vagaries of various ports including the tide or river
current variances.
Contingency Planning is very important. Ports and vessels should develop
contingency plans or manuals and training.
Maintenance of the mooring winches, especially of items like brake drums
and linings, should be carefully carried out at regular intervals as prescribed
by the manufacturer. If there are strong eddy currents in ports, especially at
wharfs, these should be reflected in the charts and port entry documents.
Sufficient manpower on board to tend to mooring lines, especially in strong
tide areas must be considered.
There should be established means of monitoring winches when required.
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E. Conclusion

14. Four good reasons to adopt ISM Code

1. It is a Law

2. Makes your ship safer place to work

3. It clearly defines your jobs

4. It protects the Sea & Marine Environment