[ G.R. No.

246679, September 10, 2019 ]

GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

NORBERTO B. VILLAMIN, AND SENANDRO M. JALGALADO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, C.J.:

Once the order of the Office of the Ombudsman to dismiss an elective local official is executed, the
dismissed official thereby loses title to the office even if he or she has filed a timely appeal assailing
the dismissal which would have prevented it from attaining finality. The loss of title to the office
constitutes an involuntary interruption of the official's service of his or her full term.

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari initiated under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by the
petitioner assailing the resolution promulgated on March 29, 2019 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) First Division in SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18-137 (DC) granting the private
respondents' petitions to deny due course and/or to cancel the petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy
(COC),1 and the resolution promulgated on May 9, 2019 by the Commission on
Elections En Banc denying the petitioner's verified motion for reconsideration.2

Antecedents

The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte in the 2010, 2013
and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. It is the turn of events in
respect of the petitioner's 2016-2019 term that has spawned the controversy under review.

Relevant are three administrative cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).

It appears that on January 28, 2013, one Edgardo Gonzales filed in the OMB an administrative
complaint charging the petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression or grave abuse of
authority.3 While the case was pending, the petitioner won as Governor in the 2013 elections. On
October 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the OMB found and declared him
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for one year,4 which
suspension was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).5

The petitioner timely appealed the suspension to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,6 docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 142737.

Acting on the petitioner's appeal, the CA promulgated its decision reducing the imposed penalty of
suspension from one year to six months.7 He immediately re-assumed his position after the lapse of
six months, and his re-assumption later became the subject of the third OMB case.8 Under the
resolution issued on December 1, 2016 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 142737, however, the CA restored the
one-year suspension of the petitioner.9

On November 4, 2015, several persons (namely: Milline Marie B. Dela Cruz, Mark Anthony J. Mago,
Maria Joanabelle L. Crisostomo, and Shanta V. Baraquiel) initiated the second OMB case against
the petitioner.10
In the decision dated April 18, 2016 and approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on
September 13, 2016, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and oppression/abuse
of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.11

Although the petitioner appealed to the CA,12 the DILG implemented the OMB decision on
November 8, 2016 by ordering the petitioner to vacate his position as Governor.13

On the same date, the DILG issued another memorandum addressed to then Vice Governor Jonah
Pedro G. Pimentel (Pimentel) directing him to assume as Governor of Camarines Norte.14 The
memorandum stated that there was a permanent vacancy in the office of Governor as a
consequence of the petitioner's dismissal from the service. In ordering Pimentel to assume as
Governor, the DILG cited Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, or
the Local Government Code (LGC).

On November 16, 2016, Pimentel took his oath of office as Governor of Camarines Norte,15 and
thereupon assumed office and exercised the functions of Governor.16

On December 12, 2016, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the DILG from
implementing or continuously implementing the decision of the OMB.17 Thus, the petitioner was
able to re-assume his post as Governor.18

The third OMB case, as noted above, concerned the petitioner's re-assumption of the office of
Governor after the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first OMB case to suspension
for six months. The complainant thereat initiated another complaint on the basis that the petitioner
had violated the first OMB decision by re-assuming office without having fully served his
suspension.19

On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct, and ordering his dismissal from the service.20

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.21

To implement the decision of the OMB, the DILG issued the Memorandum dated March 14, 2018
ordering Pimentel to assume as Governor,22 this time citing Section 46 of LGC as legal basis
therefor.

On March 15, 2018, Pimentel again took his oath of office as Governor, and assumed office and
exercised the functions of Governor.23

On September 26, 2018, the CA ruled on the petitioner's appeal by modifying the penalty of
dismissal to six months suspension.24

On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the implementation of the decision
of the CA, and the reinstatement of the petitioner as Governor if he had already served the six-
month suspension.25

On October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of Camarines Norte.26

In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019 elections.27 This prompted respondents Norberto B.
Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to file their separate petitions (respectively docketed as SPA
No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18-137 (DC)) with the COMELEC praying for the denial of due course
to and/or for the cancellation of the petitioner's COC,28 which petitions were consolidated and
predicated on the application of the three-term limit rule.

In its March 29, 2019 resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the petitions and ordered the
cancellation of the petitioner's COC.29 The COMELEC First Division concluded that the petitioner
had fully served three consecutive terms considering that his suspension and dismissals from the
service were not interruptions of his term because he had not thereby lost title to the office; that the
OMB's decisions ordering his dismissals were not yet final; and that there had been no permanent
vacancy and no succession in accordance with Section 44 of the LGC.

The COMELEC First Division disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions are hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Respondent EDGARDO A. TALLADO is CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

It is notable that the COMELEC First Division was not unanimous. Commissioner Al A. Parreño
dissented and voted to deny the petitions, opining that the dismissals from the service had effectively
interrupted the petitioner's 2016-2019 term, and that the petitioner had thereby involuntarily lost title
to the office.30

In the resolution promulgated on May 9, 2019,31 the COMELEC En Banc, with Commissioner
Parreño maintaining his dissent, denied the petitioner's verified motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

(En Banc) AFFIRMS the Resolution dated 29 March 2019 of the Commission (First Division)
and RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent Edgardo A. Tallado.

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC En Banc declared that the petitioner's dismissal from the service had been
temporary inasmuch as he had appealed the OMB decisions; that the DILG's implementation of the
dismissals, the petitioner's removal from office, and the Vice-Governor's assumption as Governor did
not affect the temporariness of the vacancy in the office of the Governor; that the petitioner had later
on re-assumed his post as Governor; and that the DILG's implementation of the ruling on the third
OMB case, on the basis of Section 46 of the LGC, had corrected its earlier erroneous reliance on
Section 44 of the LGC in implementing the ruling in the second OMB case. The
COMELEC En Banc took the view that it was Section 46 of the LGC that was applicable inasmuch
as there was only a temporary vacancy.

Undeterrred, the petitioner lodged the petition for certiorari with the Court

On May 10, 2019, the Court issued a status quo ante order requiring the parties to observe
the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the COMELEC En Banc resolution.32 In the
resolution of June 4, 2019, the Court En Banc confirmed the status quo ante order.33
The petitioner eventually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Governor of
Camarines Norte in the May 13, 2019 elections. On May 16, 2019, the petitioner was proclaimed as
the duly elected Governor of Camarines Norte.34

Issues

The petitioner contends that his third term as Governor of Camarines Norte was involuntarily
interrupted when the Ombudsman's dismissal orders were implemented, thereby preventing the
application of the three-term limit rule. According to him, it is immaterial that the CA subsequently
modified the Ombudsman's decisions to reduce the penalty because the modification did not change
the fact that he had involuntarily ceased to hold his title when the DILG ordered him to vacate his
office on November 8, 2016 and again on March 14, 2018 pursuant to the decisions. He thereby lost
his title to the office, and the continuity of his service as Governor was involuntarily interrupted.35

The petitioner argues that contrary to the findings of the COMELEC, his removal from office caused
a permanent vacancy that necessitated the appointment of Pimentel as his successor, and that even
the DILG itself had recognized the existence of the permanent vacancy and consequently ordered
Pimentel to succeed him pursuant to Section 44 of the LGC.36

After directing the respondents to file their comment,37 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment,38 averring therein that the COMELEC had
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding and holding
that the petitioner was ineligible to run for Governor in the May 2019 elections under the three-term
limit rule.39

The OSG, as tribune of the people, submits that the implementation of the Ombudsman's decisions
on the petitioner's removal from office must be considered as term interruption because he thereby
ceased to exercise the functions and prerogatives of the office; and that he must be deemed not to
have fully served his third term as Governor considering that he involuntarily lost his title to the
office.40

To support its submission, the OSG cites Lonzanida v. COMELEC (Lonzanida)41 wherein this Court
has held that an elective official could not be deemed to have served the full term if he was ordered
to vacate his post before the expiration of the term; that the petitioner's third term as Governor was
validly interrupted twice when he complied with the DILG's memoranda ordering him to vacate his
post; and that the petitioner's loss of title to the office was manifested by the fact that Pimentel took
his oath of office as Governor, and discharged all the functions and responsibilities thereof.42

On its part, the COMELEC contends that the three-term limit rule must be strictly construed in order
to avoid attempts to circumvent and evade the application of the same;43 that under Section 7, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB's Rules), the petitioner's
exoneration from the charge of grave misconduct rendered the "dismissal" nothing more than a mere
preventive suspension,44 which was not the term interruption that effectively precluded the
application of the three-term limit rule;45 that the dismissal and its resultant legal effects must not be
recognized in view of the reduction of the penalty from dismissal to suspension;46 that because the
petitioner's position as Governor was never permanently vacant, he was able to re-assume the office
and functions of Governor, thus warranting the conclusion that the vacancy was only temporary.47

In his comment,48 respondent Villamin claims that because the two OMB decisions suspending
and/or removing the petitioner did not become final despite their immediate execution, the petitioner
never lost his title even if he could no longer exercise the powers and authority attached to the
position;49 that while the petitioner's suspension resulted to a vacancy in the office of the Governor,
the vacancy was only temporary; that Pimentel only held the office of Governor in an acting capacity,
with the full title being still held by the petitioner.50 On his part, respondent Jalgalado adopted
Villamin's comment.51

The petitioner specifies the following issues for the Court's consideration and resolution, to wit:

I.

WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS
OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION[,] WHICH CANCELLED PETITIONER'S CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY[.]

II.

WHETHER THERE WAS LOSS OF TITLE TO PETITIONER'S OFFICE DURING HIS THIRD TERM
WHICH CONSTITUTED AN INVOLUNTARY TERM INTERRUPTION[,] WHICH PREVENTS THE
APPLICATION OF THE THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE, THEREBY MAKING HIM ELIGIBLE TO RUN
FOR THE POSITION OF GOVERNOR OF CAMARINES NORTE IN THE FORTHCOMING MAY 13,
2019 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS[.]

III.

WHETHER PETITIONER'S TWICE REMOVAL (sic) FROM OFFICE DURING HIS THIRD TERM
CREATED A PERMANENT VACANCY IN THE GUBERNATORIAL POST[.]

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

I.
The three-term limit rule

Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution embodies the three-term limit rule, viz.:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

To implement the Constitutional provision, Section 43(b) of the LGC states:

xxxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.

xxxx
For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two conditions
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to
the same local government post; and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.52

In Abundo v. COMELEC (Abundo),53 the Court, upon reviewing the applicable jurisprudence on
consecutiveness of terms, summarized the rules for the determination of involuntary interruptions to
an elective local official's term thusly:

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of

terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz.:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under
the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of
any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd
term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not,
by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years
or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said
official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute
an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite
the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

Based on the foregoing, there is an involuntary interruption in the term of an elective local official
when there is a break in the term as a result of the official's loss of title to the office.

II.
The petitioner was dismissed
from office, and lost his title thereto
Nonetheless, there is no definitive ruling yet on whether or not an elective local official's dismissal
from the service pursuant to the executory decision of the OMB may be considered as an effective
interruption in the official's term.

The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is present inasmuch as the petitioner
was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, specifically in the 2010,
2013 and 2016 elections. But the second requisite was not satisfied because his intervening
dismissals from the service truly prevented him from fully serving the third consecutive term.

In ruling that the petitioner had fully served three consecutive terms as Governor and was, therefore,
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, the COMELEC
cited Aldovino v. COMELEC (Aldovino)54 under which the three-term limit rule must be read in the
context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of
the powers of the elective position.55

The COMELEC explained that despite clearly mandating the dismissal of the petitioner, the OMB's
decisions of dismissal against him did not deprive him of his title to the office because the dismissals
were not yet final by virtue of their being timely appealed; that, consequently, there was no vacancy
in the office of Governor and the petitioner's service of the penalty could only be considered as
preventive suspension; and that following Aldovino, the preventive suspension could not be
considered as an interruption of the petitioner's term.

We cannot subscribe to the COMELEC's explanation.

Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full continuity
of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service. In this
regard, Aldovino is instructive, as follows:

From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strint
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability
or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or
at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the function of his office for a reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holder's term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. Of course, the "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really
lost.56

The COMELEC relies on the OMB's Rules to support its view that the execution of the orders of
dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy.
A review reveals that the OMB's Rules did not justify the COMELEC's reliance.

The OMB's Rules, promulgated in Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003, stated in Section 7 of its Rule III as follows:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order
of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.

Section 10 of Rule III of the OMB's Rules also stated:

Section 10. Penalties. — (a) For administrative charges under Executive Order No. 292 or such
other executive orders, laws or rules under which the respondent is charged, the penalties provided
thereat shall be imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman; (b) in administrative proceedings
conducted under these Rules, the Office of the Ombudsman may impose the penalty of reprimand,
suspension without pay for a minimum period of one (1) month up to a maximum period of one (1)
year, demotion, dismissal from the service, or a fine equivalent to his salary for one (1) month up to
one (1) year, or from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both, at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances
that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or
charge.

The penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

Based on the foregoing, the OMB's Rules mandated that decisions handed down in administrative
cases should be immediately executory despite being timely appealed. Thus, it was clear that what
were to be executed were the decisions of the Ombudsman without consideration as to their finality.

That the second paragraph of Section 7 of Rule III of the OMB's Rules, supra, characterizes the
penalty of suspension or dismissal meanwhile enforced as a preventive suspension should the
public officer later win his or her appeal of the OMB's decision is absurd and illogical as to the
penalty of dismissal. The characterization also lacks legal and factual support. In his case, the
petitioner was twice fully divested of his powers and responsibilities as Governor by the DILG
immediately transferring the discharge of the office of Governor and the exercise of the functions
and powers thereof to another person, Vice Governor Pimentel. The latter forthwith took his oath of
office as Governor and unconditionally assumed and discharged such office. Without doubt, the
execution of the OMB's dismissals in that manner resulted in the petitioner's loss of title to the office
of Governor.

Neither did the non-finality of the decisions render any less the petitioner's loss of his title to the
office. It would be unwarranted to differentiate the dismissals enforced against him from the
dismissal based on and pursuant to a decision that was already final. Both dismissals would produce
the same effect – the ouster of the official from his title to the office.

Indeed, even the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) imposes
this effect of dismissal as the "permanent separation" of the guilty civil servant from his or her title to
the office by explicitly providing in its Section 56(a), viz.:

Section 56. Duration and Effect of Administrative Penalties. — The following rules shall govern the
imposition of administrative penalties:

a. The penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the
service, without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.57

xxxx

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing the dismissal of the petitioner included
no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In fact, the
decisions did not state any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents
and purposes of the law in the periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In
that status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense.

The length of time of the involuntary interruption of the term of office was also immaterial. The Court
adopts with approval the following excerpt from the dissent of COMELEC Commissioner Parreño,
which dealt with such issue, viz.:

It matters not that the duration of such loss of title to office appears to be brief and short. In fact,
in Aldovino, it was held that the elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of
time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur, thus:

From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.
The elective official must have involuntarily
left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.58 (Bold and
underscoring emphases are part of the original text)

Verily, the COMELEC failed to recognize the true effect of the executed decisions of dismissal
because it strained its reading of the OMB's Rules, and ignored the relevant law and jurisprudence in
so doing. Thus, it gravely erred.

III.
Petitioner's dismissals resulted
in permanent vacancy

The COMELEC opined that the DILG's reliance on Section 4459 of the LGC in respect of the second
OMB case was erroneous because the order of succession therein applied pertained to a permanent
vacancy despite the lack of such permanent vacancy in view of the OMB's dismissal of the petitioner
being still not final; that Section 4660 of the LGC, which provided for succession in cases of a
temporary vacancy, was applicable to the petitioner's case; and that the DILG corrected itself by now
citing Section 46 of the LGC when it implemented the second dismissal decision issued in relation to
the third OMB case.

We find that contrary to the opinion of the COMELEC, the DILG did not err in citing Section 44 of the
LGC as its legal basis when it implemented the dismissal of the petitioner under the second OMB
case.

To start with, the DILG executed against the petitioner two decisions of dismissal handed down in
two different and separate cases. As such, the COMELEC had neither factual nor legal basis to
conflate the DILG's actions in the two OMB cases for the reason that its action on the second OMB
case could not be prejudiced by its action on the third OMB case.

Secondly, the DILG's opinion on what provision of the LGC properly applied was far from binding or
controlling. It was even irrelevant. We ought to observe that the DILG, as the mere implementor of
ℒαwρhi৷

the decisions, had no legal competence to interpret or to render its opinion on the succession
ensuing from the dismissals. As the implementing body, the DILG was acting in a ministerial
capacity, and, as such, was absolutely bereft of the discretion to determine what provision of the
LGC specifically governed. Instead, the DILG was duty-bound to execute the directives of the OMB's
decisions exactly as they were written in the decisions. Otherwise, the DILG could literally supplant
the prerogative of the OMB itself to decide the administrative cases of the petitioner.

Thirdly, inasmuch as Section 46 of the LGC textually applied to succession where the local chief
executive was "temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as,
but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office," the provision was
certainly not the proper basis for the COMELEC to characterize as temporary the vacancy in the
office of Governor ensuing from the petitioner's dismissal. As earlier explained, the vacancy was not
temporary because the petitioner was fully divested of his title to the office of Governor in both
instances of his dismissal.

Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises whenever an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, or refuses to assume office, or fails to qualify, or dies, or is removed from office,
or voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office. In contrast, Section 46 of the LGC enumerates as resulting in a temporary vacancy in the
office of the local chief executive leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office.
Although Section 46 of the LGC specifically states that the causes of a temporary vacancy are not
limited to such circumstances, what is evident is that the enumeration therein share something in
common, which is that there is a definite term to be re-assumed. However, the petitioner's
dismissals, even if still not final, were not akin to the instances enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC
because the loss of his title to the office denied to him the expectancy to re-assume his term.

Lastly, Section 44 of the LGC includes removal from office as one of the instances triggering a
permanent vacancy. Such permanent vacancy was precisely the outcome that the OMB directed in
its decisions. Consequently, when the petitioner was ousted in the period from November 8, 2016 to
December 30, 2016, in the first instance of dismissal, and in the period from March 14, 2018 to
September 26, 2018, in the second instance of dismissal, the permanent vacancy in the office of
Governor ensued.
 IV.
Developments in the appeals did not
change the fact that the petitioner was dismissed

The COMELEC considered developments in the petitioner's appeals in holding that the DILG's
execution of the decisions did not result into the loss of title to the office. This holding was grounded
on two matters, namely: (1) the non-finality of the decisions under the OMB's Rules; and (2) the fact
that the petitioner was able to re-assume his seat as Governor.

The holding of the COMELEC was unjustified because it thereby disregarded the fact that the DILG
had fully implemented the decisions of dismissal. The full implementation immediately carried legal
repercussions that no developments in relation to the petitioner's appeals could change or undo.
Among others, the petitioner effectively lost his title to the office by the DILG's act of directing
Pimentel to take his oath of office as Governor, and by the latter then assuming and discharging the
office and functions of such office.

The provision of the OMB's Rules allowing the petitioner to re-assume on the basis of the interim
being considered as a period of preventive suspension after his appeals resulted in the imposition of
lesser penalties did not alter the reality that he had actually been ousted from office. In other words,
there was still an interruption of the term of office. As aptly put in Latasa v. COMELEC,61 the
interruption, to be considered as interruption of the term, "contemplates a rest period during which
the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority
over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."62 Conformably
with said ruling, the period during which the petitioner was not serving as Governor should be
considered as a rest period or break in his service because he had then ceased to exercise power or
authority over the people of the province. Indeed, it was Pimentel who then held title to the office and
exercised the functions thereof. As such, the petitioner did not fully serve his entire third term even if
his re-assumption to office subsequently occurred.

V.
Conclusion

The DILG's execution of the OMB decisions for the petitioner's dismissal clearly constituted loss of
the petitioner's title to the office. The dismissals were involuntary interruptions in the petitioner's
2016-2019 term. As such, he cannot be considered to have fully served a third successive term of
office.

In fine, the petitioner was not disqualified from seeking the same elective post during the 2019
elections. The COMELEC thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation of the
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2019 elections.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolution issued on March 29, 2019 by the Commission on Elections First Division and the
resolution issued on May 9, 2019 by the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA No. 18-041 (DC)
and SPA No. 18-137 (DC); DISMISSES the consolidated petitions in SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA
No. 18-137 (DC) for the cancellation of petitioner Edgardo A. Tallado's Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Provincial Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2019 Local Elections; DECLARES this
decision immediately executory; and ORDERS respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M.
Jalgalado to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier,
Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), I join the dissenting J. Jardeleza.

Leonen, J., I join dissent of J. Jardeleza.

Jardeleza, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion.

Caguioa, J., I join dissent of J. Jardeleza.

Hernando, J., on official business.

Carandang, J., I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
December 11, 2019 at 10:45 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 56-63.

2 Id. at 51-55.

3 Id. at 10.

4 Id. at 125.

5 Id. at 57.

6 Id. at 577-594.

7 Id.
8 Id. at 58.

9 Id. at 58, 145.

10 Id. at 131-141.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 232-237.

13 Id. at 215.

14 Id. at 216.

15 Id. at 382.

16 Id. at 384-397.

17 Id. at 398-403.

18 Id. at 58.

19 Id. at 58, 238-245.

20 Id. at 243-244.

21 Id. at 142-160.

22 Id. at 413.

23 Id. at 414-452.

24 Id. at 483-501.

25 Id. at 505.

26 Id. at 507.

27 Id. at 19, 112.

28 Id. at 56-63.

29 Id. at 56-63.

30 Id. at 69-73.

31 Id. at 51-55.

32 Id. at 940-942.
33 Id. at 985-A.

34 Id. at 992-1000.

35 Id. at 27.

36 Id. at 32.

37 Id. at 940-942.

38 Id. at 1059-1080.

39 Id. at 1076.

40 Id. at 1076.

41 G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602.

42 Rollo, p. 1074.

43 Id. at 1139.

44 Id. at 1143.

45 Id. at 1145.

46 Id. at 1148.

47 Id. at 1152.

48 Id. at 952-966.

49 Id. at 955.

50 Id. at 956.

51 Id. at 1001-1004.

52 Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602, 611.

53 G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013 688 SCRA 149.

54 G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234.

55 Id.

56 Id. at 259-260.
57 Section 51 (a) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the
predecessor of the 2017 RRACCS, similarly provided:

Section 51. Duration and effect of administrative penalties. — The following rules
shall govern the imposition of administrative penalties:

a. The penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent
from the service, without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

xxxx

58 Supra note 30, at 73.

59 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-

Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor,
or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor,
mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be
filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein.

xxxx

60 Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. — (a) When
the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to
perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence,
travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers
and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the
power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period
of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.

xxxx

61 G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.

62 Id. at p. 614.