SECURITY STUDIES

EXAM TOPICS 2022/2023

1. Defining the concept of security in the traditional sense (5 components)

Elements of the traditional understanding of security:
1. Relates to the MILITARY DIMENSION (military threats and responses)
2. Security is national/state security (STATE-CENTRISM)
3. Security is about the SURVIVAL of the state
4. Distinction between OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE SECURITY (threats and
fears)
5. Both the STATE AND SECURITY HAVE POSITIVE NORMATIVE CONNOTATIONS
(they are „good” things). The state is the provider of security. More security is
better than less.
after the end of the Cold War: this traditional definition seems too narrow.
Response from the Copenhagen School of Security: widening and deepening
the traditional concept (1990s onwards)

2. New security threats after the Cold War, the role of globalization
New security threats (term originates in the post-Cold War years): terrorism,
cyberwar, pandemics, economic instability.

3. In what sense is the international system in crisis?

RELATIVE DECLINE OF US HEGEMONY
Shifting foci of US hegemony: • Loss of trust in institutions (NATO, UN)* • Unilateral moves,
Realpolitik • Abandonment of policing, stabilizing function (public goods) • Loss of legitimacy •
(*War in Ukraine&NATO)
Changes in the global economy • Rise of China: revisionist or status quo power? • Engine of
global economy shifting towards Asia • Crisis of institutions in the wake of the financial crisis,
protectivist policies • Instabilities of the global (liberal) economic order, crises affect Western
powers more than competitors
Crisis of values in the liberal global order • Populist wave, decreasing number of democracies
(reversed trend) • Nationalism vs. Globalism, nationalism as a pushback • Weakening appeal of
the Western democratic model • Weakening of supranational (Western) institutions like the EU

4. Security as a preventive concept, security vs warfighting

Security is a concept about preventing conflicts, not fighting them. Security Studies is not the
science of how to fight wars, it is rather the study of the causes that underlie military conflicts.
(E.g. neorealism and war: wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them under anarchy.
distinction between Security Studies and Defence Studies (warfighting)
Security Studies: focus on conflict, policy, and IR. Developing empirical knowledge addressing
policy issues.

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Defence Studies: research on questions related to defence, security, strategy, and history,
developing intellectual skills necessary to succeed in a complex and demanding operating
environment.

5. The role of pivotal events in security studies

Pivotal events provoke debates in the concept of security. Pivotal events force theoretical
reflection: is the current state of the discipline sufficient to explain and understand new, pivotal
events?
Reactive social science: internal, academic debates and changes in the external context (world
politics) propel the evolution of IR and Security Studies  Pivotal events: the two world wars,
Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, CMC, 1989, 911 etc.  Emergence of new questions for Security Studies
in the wake of pivotal events:  1973 oil crisis  energy security  Chernobyl disaster (1986) 
manmade environmental disasters  Balkan wars of the 1990s  ethnic conflict  Rwandan
genocide  humanitarian intervention  9/11  terrorism  „rise of China”  great power conflict,
new geopolitics  2014 invasion of Crimea, 2022 Russia’s War on Ukraine  ’hybrid’ war  2015
„migration crisis”  migration and security

6. Threats vs. Fears

“security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”
security is a negative concept, the absence of threats.

7. Object vs. subject of security

threats (objective security) vs. the fear of states (subjective security).
Whose security? (what is the OBJECT of security?)
What from? (what is the SUBJECT of security?)

8. New Security Threats

new security threats (terrorism, climate change, economic instability) → Traditional war is
ineffective against them.

9. Defining widening and deepening (Copenhagen School)

Widening (sectors) & Deepening (non-state security)
Widening = introducing multiple security sectors
Sectors are about the subject of security: who/what is threatening? In what way?
Sectors are almost always interconnected.

Deepening = security should not just be about the state (national security).
deepening is about the object of security: whose security are we talking about? Who/what is
under threat?
Deepening and widening are usually combined.

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10. Sectors of security
Five sectors: 1. Military 2. Political 3. Societal 4. Economic 5. Environmental
Military and political sum up the traditional definition.

11. Levels of analysis in security studies

Deepening relies on IR’s levels of analysis.
• Global security (e.g. climate change, pandemics)
• Regional (e.g. Middle East, East Asia, Europe)
• State (across all five sectors)
• Individual (see human security)

PPT 2 - THE COLD WAR AND THE „NEW WORLD ORDER”

12. Globalization and security

Globalization’s challenge against the traditional definition of security (national security)  State
centrism and narrow military focus are insufficient to understand current challenges 
International relations are not just about competition among states  The domestic and the
international can no longer be separated clearly  New types of security challenges require
complex policy answers.
global politics is the political life of an emergent global society, where the local and the global are
ever closely intertwined. globalization refers to social, economic and political processes turning
political so that what happens on one side of the globe deeply affects people and communities
in the farthest parts of the world.

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13. Main elements of détente
Detente: period went there was a relaxation of tension between East and West;
Soviet-American detente lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1970s and was characterized by
negotiations and nuclear arms control agreements. In 1972 President Richard Nixon travelled
to Moscow and met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. They agreed the SALT 1 treaty
which limited the number of ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles) each could have and introduced a
temporary ban on ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). SALT 1 was successful in the
short term, in slowing down the arms race.
- Detente in Europe had its origins in the Ostpolitik of the German Socialist Chancellor, Willy
Brandt, and resulted in agreements that recognized the peculiar status of Berlin and the
sovereignty of East Germany.
- Soviet-American detente had its roots in mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear
crises, and in the economic and military incentives in avoiding an unconstrained arms race.
Both Washington and Moscow also looked towards Beijing when making their bilateral
calculations.
- In the West, detente was associated with the political leadership of President Richard Nixon
and his adviser Henry Kissinger.
- Both sides supported friendly regimes and movements, and subverted adversaries. All this
came as political upheavals were taking place in the Third World
- Soviet support for revolutionary movements in the Third World reflected Moscow's self-
confidence as a 'superpower' and its analysis that the Third World was turning towards
socialism.
- Ideological competition ensued with the West and with China. In America this was viewed as
evidence of duplicity. Some claimed that Moscow's support for revolutionary forces in
Ethiopia in 1975 killed detente. Others cited the Soviet role in Angola in 1978. Furthermore,
the perception that Moscow was using arms control agreements to gain military advantage
was linked to Soviet behaviour in the Third World.
- Critics claimed the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process enabled the Soviets to
deploy multiple independently targetable warheads on their large intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), threatening key American forces.
- December 1979 marked a point of transition in East-West affairs. NATO agreed to deploy
land-based Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe if negotiations with the Soviets did not
reduce what NATO saw as a serious imbalance. Later in the month, Soviet armed forces
intervened in Afghanistan to support their revolutionary allies.
• 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) starts détente
• 1960s: US involvement in Vietnam, 1964 Tonkin Resolution
• rapprochement, détente
• „Nixon goes to China”, tripolar conflict
• Willy Brandt and German Ostpolitik
• Cold War pragmatism, ideological struggle takes the backseat
• Arms limitation:1968 NPT, 1972 SALT I,1972 ABM, 1979 SALT II treaties
• 1968 Prague Spring (Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia), Brezhnev doctrine
• 1973 Oil Crisis

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• 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan effectively ends détente.

14. Establishment of US hegemony in the West, defining hegemony

Hegemony: a system regulated by a dominant leader, or political (and/or economic) domination
of a region, usually by a superpower. In realist theory, the influence a great power is able to
establish on other states in the system, extent of influence ranges from leadership to dominance.
It is also power, and control exercised by a leading state over other states.
Post-Cold War: collapse of the Soviet empire, unipolarity, unipolar peacekeeping, dominance of
liberal capitalism, increased national and regional dominance, diversity of security issue.
Hegemony allows the ideas and ideologies of the ruling stratum to become widely dispersed, and
widely accepted, throughout society.
The degree to which a state can successfully produce and reproduce its hegemony is an
indication of the extent of its power. The success of the USA in gaining worldwide acceptance for
neo-liberalism suggests just how dominant the current hegemon has become.

15. Elements of US hegemony, hegemony vs. empire—what is the difference?

American hegemony in the West (1945-), and globally (1989/91-)  Pax
Americana
• Hegemony is not rule by coercion → „empire by invitation”
• The hegemon provides common goods: security, stability, economic
development and arbitration in disputes
• US security guarantees(NATO + other alliance treaties)
• Stabilization of the economic order (Bretton Woods, World Bank, IMF,
WTO)  Foundation of the United Nations
• The current global order is the product of American interests and
values but is maintained with the consent of subordinate states.

16. Defining the unipolar moment – US foreign and security policy in the 1990s
Unipolarity: a distribution of power internationally in which there is clearly only one dominant
power or 'pole'. Some analysts argue that the international system became unipolar in the 1 990s
since there was no longer any rival to American power.
Unipolarity and global hegemony, the US as the sole „hiperpower”
Reliance on the institutional system (mostly UN), self-constraint
Bill Clinton’s presidency: humanitarian intervention, expansion of NATO
Liberal world order, „the end of history” (Fukuyama

17. Elements of US power projection

The exercise of military/political/cultural power unfolds above territorial states, and/or against
territorial states. This is a fundamental challenge to the Westphalian system.

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18. Defining the security dilemma
It is a spiral of insecurity, in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question
will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states. 'when the military preparations of
one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those
preparations are for "defensive" purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or
whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage). one state's
quest for security is often another state's source of insecurity. States find it difficult to trust one
another and are often suspicious of other states' intentions. Thus the military preparations of
one state are likely to be matched by those of neighbouring states.

19. Adverse outcomes of the security dilemma

What the perennial collapsing of the balance of power demonstrates is that states are at best
able to mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma but are not able to escape it.
The reason for this terminal condition is the absence of trust in international relations.
Historically, realists have illustrated the lack of trust among states by reference to the parable of
the 'stag hunt'.

20. Defining the democratic peace (modern variant), policy relevance of the concept (Iraq)
Democratic peace theory claims that democracies do not fight each other, but lately the number
of democracies is in decline. This centres on the argument that democratic states tend not to
fight other democratic states. Democracy, therefore, is seen as a major source of peace.
Support for this view can be seen in the Western pol icy of promoting democracy in Eastern and
Central Europe following the end of the cold war and opening up the possibility of these states
joining the European Union.
Iraq, Iran, North Korea = neither can be directly linked to 9/11 attacks. Democracy export listed
as one of US aims, overthrow of oppressive regimes (Bush doctrine).
Iraq quickly becomes the primary target. Replacing oppressive dictatorships is reason enough to
intervene.
- Iraq as a symbol: the US showing resolve to its potential enemies.
- End of the Iraq war: instability, weak government
- Rise of ISIS → Democracy export discredited

21. Defining security communities

A security community is a group of people which has become "integrated". By integration we
mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assu re ... dependable expectations of
"peaceful change" among its population. By a "sense of community" we mean a belief ... that
common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of"peaceful change".( Karl
Deutsch)
A security community (like NATO) is a rather different social structure, composed of shared
knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war

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22. 9/11’s importance, US reactions to the attack
- Al-Qaeda as the main target of retaliation →War on Terror
- Osama Bin Laden becomes public enemy number one.
- Strengthening national security
- Creation of the Department of Homeland Security (2002)
- Intelligence review
- P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act, October 26, 2001: wide range of emergency powers to the state, e.g.
detaining suspects w/o a court order, surveillance, phone tapping
- Expansion of security service budgets commences militarization of police.
- Everyday security: strengthening airport security.
- Opening the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre in 2002 (Cuba)
- Harsher immigration laws (Islamophobia)

23. Defining the war on terror, defining the “axis of evil”

War on terror: an umbrella term coined by the Bush administration which refers to the various
military, political, and legal actions taken by the USA and its allies after the attacks on 11
September 2001 to curb the spread of terrorism in general but Islamic-inspired terrorism in
particular.
Bush announces the war on terror on September 20, 2001. The 9/1 1 attacks on the USA and the
'war on terror' have revived the traditional state-centric approach to national security at the
expense of civil liberties and human security, although the Obama administration has modified
important elements of its predecessor's strategic approach to terrorism and promised greater
respect for civil l liberties and international conventions.

The Axis of Evil: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Inclusion of N Korea→ terrorism not about Islam
- Territorial logic naturalizes the use of the military for fighting terrorism.
- Iraq, Iran, North Korea → neither can be directily linked to 9/11 attacks

24. Elements of the war on terror

- The US will fight terrorists and those states that aid and/or harbour them worldwide scope.
- US reserves the right to act unilaterally.
- US reserves the right to preemptive war (“imminent threats” become “emerging threats”),
problem of prevention.
- Replacing oppressive dictatorships is reason enough to intervene (Iraq war) → contradicts
UN doctrine on interventions.
- No possibility for neutrality "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
- The war will not end until global terror is eradicated. (lack of operational political goal),
envisions permanent war
- Terrorism identified on a territorial basis (Westphalian logic) and the response in military
terms.
- Building a wide international coalition (called “Coalition of the Willing”)

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- THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE WAR ON TERROR COMPLETELY UNDO BUSH SENIOR’S
LEGACY, I.E. THE NEW WORLD ORDER

25. Justifications for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

Afghanistan: 9/11
- Islamist terrorist group Al-Quaeda identified as perpetrator (never officially took blame)

Iraq: Problematic justification (3 elements):

1. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program -> On 20 March 2003, US-led coalition forces
invaded Iraq with the proclaimed objective of locating and disarming suspected Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction
2. Links to Al Quaeda
3. Oppressive regime
Preemption vs. prevention key legal issue

26. Consequences of the war on terror

- The US becomes involved in two counterinsurgency wars, both highly unpopular
(Afghanistan is the longest war in US history)  US loses considerable prestige, superpower
status questioned.
- Terrorism high on the security agenda (esp. in the US  End of the Iraq war: instability, weak
government → rise of ISIS
- Democracy export discredited.
- Iraq war creates the wrong precedents (preemptive vs preventive war)
- Surveillance state grows exponentially due to general paranoia epitomized by the
P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act.
- Qualitative changes in the nature of warfare.

27. Definition of war (quantitative+qualitative)

Simple definition: war is the application of violence for political goals that remains under political
control. It is the continuation of politics by other means. War is “an act of violence intended to
compel our opponents to fulfil our will” (Clausewitz).
War is therefore not aimless, unorganized violence
But where is the numerical threshold?  Singer & Small (COW project): a war is any violent
conflict with at least 1,000 killed combatants per year. (battle-related deaths)  controversial, but
most popular definition

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28. Explanations for why interstate war is disappearing.
- Traditional war is ineffective against most new security threats (terrorism, climate change,
economic instability)
- Liberalism talks about increasing economic interdependence (globalization) as a constraint
on war.
- Moral development = claims that violence is disappearing globally, human nature is evolving
beyond its violent tendencies. The rise of the modern nation state (monopoly on violence),
cosmopolitanism (e.g. high literacy rate, free media), trade, feminism, rationalism (Pinker)
- Realists argue that mutual nuclear deterrence makes war unlikely between nuclear states.
- Democratic peace theory claims that democracies do not fight each other, but lately the
number of democracies is in decline.

29. How does globalization change warfare? (four trends)

1. RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs (technological revolution)
- 1991 Gulf War, extreme US technological superiority
- battlefield becomes battle-space: ground, air, sea, space + cyberspace
- Cyberization of weapons and communication systems = challenges and opportunities.
- drones

2. Postmodern war (media, privatized violence)

- Outsourcing logistics, training, intelligence
- The state’s monopoly over violence weakens
- The costs of warfare are decreasing (including casualties)
- Lack of oversight, lack of accountability
- Conflict makes profit → contractors interested in upholding conflicts

3. „New wars” (self-sustaining identity conflicts)

- ’New wars’: a mutual enterprise where parties to the war all gain politically and
economically from war.
- Economically self-sustaining conflicts, financed by outside support, by pillaging, smuggling
and other means which all depend on violence.
- Mostly in failed states,
- Often identity-based (not ideology-based),
- Ethnic cleansing, mass rape, genocide as a consequence
- Anomaly or new normal?
- Stabile conflict economies emerge.
- Conflict as business
- The average length of conflicts is 7 years.

4. Post-Westphalian wars (transnationality)

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- Some conflicts unfold in a transnational environment.
- „Intrastate conflict” is a misnomer.
- Global development aid policy as well as interventionism as conflict management tools
- Regional conflict complexes (e.g. Dem. Rep. Of Congo)
- Open conflict economies which are sustained by global black markets (oil, diamonds, rare
minerals

PPT 4: ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

30. Liberal and realist interpretations on the longevity of US hegemony

Liberalism on the longevity of unipolarity
- American hegemony literature (Ikenberry, Nye): the US realizes the importance of the
institutional system it created and exercises restraint to legitimize its hegemonic position.
Emerging powers have a vested interest in maintaining institutions, thereby, US hegemony.
- Institutions: new rising powers want to enjoy the benefits of pre-exiting institutions, and
therefore will be socialized within a Western world view
- Liberal values: liberal values are spreading because of economic interdependence and strong
global civil society. There superiority will soon be unquestioned (Fukuyama)

Neorealism: the US is currently too powerful for potential challengers (preponderance of power,
e.g. Wohlforth), meaning the military dimension: the US has 45% of global military spending, has
technological superiority, has 800+ bases worldwide, has unmatched projection capabilities
(bases+carrier groups) rising powers will bandwagon (i.e. follow the US), rather than balance
(i.e. challenge the US)

31. Pillars of US hegemony

The US-led order had three pillars: first, the unrivalled extent and many dimensions of US power;
second, the Western-dominated institutions and multilateral organizations originally created in
the wake of the Second World War-the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) (the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 1995), and the World Bank and I
nternational Monetary Fund; and third, the dense network of alliances and close bilateral
relationships across the Atlantic and Pacific

32. Elements that contribute to the longevity of US hegemony

„Empire by invitation”, washington consensus
Three elements of hegemony:
1) The US’s power (military, economic, cultural)
2) Institutions dominated by the West (GATT, World Bank, IMF)
3) Bi- and multilateral alliance system in the Atlantic and Pacific

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Dominance maintained through: globalization + „western values” (democracy, human rights, rule
of law, capitalism) + conscious US foreign policy strategy
Europe’s power is a positive externality (side-effect) of US hegemony

33. Dangers of hegemony

Normative reactionism: reshaping the international system along American values, e.g.
humanitarian intervention, democracy export
Realism: rise of rivals and the balance of power unavoidable (leads to conflicts)
Realist hegemony literature: „imperial overstretch” (military failures, economic collapse or the
erosion of public support for global presence)

34. How is the West “in decline”?

- Transformation of the global economy, new players
- US image problems due to the war on terror, loss of legitimacy
- Global financial crisis, eurozone crisis
- Internal political instability limit’s ability to act

35. Defining regionalism regional security complexes

Regionalization („new regionalism”) is a general trend after the Cold War, with emergent regional
hegemons.
• Asia  China
• South Asia  Indonesia
• South America  Brazil
• Africa  Nigeria, South Africa

36. Short introduction of the BRICS –why and how are they important?
„Rising powers”. Activism in the G20 and the WTO: dissatisfaction with globalization, which they
see as the means of forcefully spreading a neoliberal Western model. Original prognosis
(reductionist economics reasoning): India and China will be the main producers in the global
economy, Russia and Brazil will be the main providers of raw materials. They will be aided in ther
role by their large domestic markets, their access to regional markets, and their large labor pool
(population).
The 'BRICs' is an acronym that refers to the emerging countries Brazil, China, India, and Russia
combined. These four countries as the key emerging market economies. The relative size and
share of the BRICs in the world economy would rise exponentially. And in less than forty years
the BRIC's economies together could be larger than the G7. China and India will arise as the
world's principal suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will
become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. What the countries also have in
common is that they all have an enormous potential consumer market, complemented by access
to regional markets and to a large labour force. Comprise the four largest economies outside the
OECD (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). → is a

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unique forum where the governments of 37 democracies with market-based economies
collaborate to develop policy standards to promote sustainable economic growth.

they hold around 50 per cent of the total global foreign exchange reserves. They have reduced or
eliminated any residual dependence on foreign aid and in the cases of China, India, and Brazil
have themselves become major aid donors. China eclipsing the US as Brazil's major trading
partner and Sino-Indian trade approaching US$60 billion a year. South-South trade rose from
being marginal as late as the early 1990s and now accounts for 17.5 per cent of global
merchandise exports.
The BRICs were important not just because of their recent and current rapid development, but
because of the predicted changes that were going to transform the global economy and change
the balance of global economic power

37. BRICS membership (new members added!)

Brazil, Russia, India, China (4 largest non-OECD economies) + South Africa (largest economy in
Africa)
In 2023, BRICS membership was expanded with the admission of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates

Brazil
• GDP: $2,132 billion
• GDP By Country Per Capita: $10,510
• Annual GDP Growth Rate: 0.9%
The Brazilian economy exhibits a breadth of sectors, encompassing agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, and services. Notably, it is a prominent global hub for agricultural production and
exportation. Several factors, including commodity prices, domestic consumption, and the
advancement of infrastructure, shape the growth of Brazil's economy.

India
• GDP: $3,730 billion
• GDP By Country Per Capita (Nominal): $2,610
• Annual GDP Growth Rate: 5.9%
India is ranked 5th in world's GDP rankings in 2024. India's economy boasts diversity and swift
growth, fuelled by key sectors such as information technology, services, agriculture, and
manufacturing. The nation capitalises on its broad domestic market, a youthful and
technologically adept labour force, and an expanding middle class.

China
• GDP: $17,786 billion
• GDP By Country Per Capita: $12,540
• Annual GDP Growth Rate: 5.2%

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China has witnessed a notable upsurge in its economic progress, moving from the fourth rank in
1960 to the second rank in 2023. The Chinese economy predominantly hinges upon
manufacturing, exports, and investment. It proudly possesses an extensive workforce, robust
governmental backing, infrastructural advancements, and an expeditiously expanding consumer
market.

38. Interpretations of the rise of China

The theoretical literature contains a number of competing hypotheses, both optimistic and
pessimistic, about China's rise. Power-based offensive realists are most pessimistic, while
defensive realists are somewhat more optimistic, as are those who emphasize economic
interdependence and the constraining influence of international institutions. Those who focus on
ideas believe that China's rise depends on how Chinese goals and identity evolve, and they think
that what China wants may be more important than how powerful it becomes.
On the one hand, policymakers, business executives and the popular press have marvelled at
China's successes and scrambled to participate in the tremendous economic opportunities that
have arisen in the past few decades. seven consecutive US presidents have encouraged China's
integration into the global system.
On the other hand, there is increasing concern chat the arrival of a new superpower may
challenge the US politically and perhaps even lead to military conflict. 'much uncertainty
surrounds China's future course, in particular in the area of its expanding military power and
how that power might be used'.
both optimistic and pessimistic expectations regarding China's rise.
Scholars who emphasize material power - both military and economic - have long predicted that
other states would fear China and balance against it. Offensive realism, with its emphasis on
balance-of-power politics and the maxin1ization of power, has had the most consistently
pessimistic expectations for East Asia. because states can never be sure about the intentions or
even the capabilities of other states, they must constantly guard their own interests, which
usually requires military power. International Relations theorists have traditionally associated the
rise and fall of great powers with war and instability.
even if states do not fear China today, they worry about how China will act tomorrow, when it
may be even more powerful than it is today. Should we want China to get rich or not? For
realists, the answer should be no since a rich China would overturn any balance of power.'
Yet in contrast to offensive realists, other realists are more sanguine about the potential threat
that China may pose. These 'defensive realists' tend to argue that both nuclear weapons and
geography militate against an inevitable showdown between China and the US.
Liberals, with their focus on economic interdependence and the constraining effect of
international institutions and the potential pacifying effect of democratic states, tend to see
China's rapid and deep economic integration with the rest of the world as a positive aspect to its
rise. multiple economic relations between two states as creating ties that increase the benefit�
of stable relations between the two sides and decreasing the benefit of going to war. China and
other states have much to gain from stable relations and much to lose from conflict.

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Two other strands of liberalism hold that global and domestic institutions can mitigate conflict
and promote cooperation. The more China becomes involved with international institutions, the
more it both adjusts its own grand strategy to accommodate the needs of other countries, and
also sends signals about its intentions and willingness to work with the broader international
community.
many scholars argue that democracies are less prone to fight each other than authoritarian
regin1es, and thus if China does become a democracy, they would expect it to be less
destabilizing than if it remains an authoritarian regime run by the Communist Party.
Some liberal arguments: some argue that China's increased economic interdependence with the
world will constrain its behaviour are sceptical that this by itself can solve the security fears of
East Asian states.

39. China and security

US alliance system in the region, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, Russia v. China, South China Sea,
Belt and Road Initiative. Nuclear weapons in particular are seen to stabilize deterrence among
great powers, in what has become known as the 'nuclear peace' (Waltz 1990). Geography also
plays a role, since there is an ocean between the US and China, and because China is a
continental power, while the US a maritime power, this may mitigate the influence of the
security dilemma.

- How the Communist Party evolves, and whether it even survives, will be a key element
determining how China's foreign policy develops. However, a key lesson that the Chinese
leadership has learned over the past century is the importance of Westphalian norn1s,
chief among them, sovereignty (Carlson 2005). This has combined with a traditional
Chinese concern with territorial integrity.
- How Chinese nationalism and national identity develop will have a key impact on China's
behaviour in the future. China's outlook on the world could be cooperative or
competitive.
- For East Asia, East Asian states have moved to increase their economic, diplomatic and
even military relations with China. Taiwan is the only East Asian state that fears the
Chinese use of force.
- South Korea and China share similar interests in dealing with the North Korean nuclear
issue, and both countries vociferously dispute Japanese territorial claims.
- Japan remains the most sceptical East Asian country regarding China. Japan will not
lightly cede economic leadership to China, and it also remains unsure of Chinese
motives. Nevertheless, even Japan has not yet embarked on a course of outright
containment policy towards China, and economic relations between the countries
continue to deepen.
- Europe and Russia have also grown closer to China. European states have generally
welcomed China's economic emergence and attempted to incorporate China into a wide-
ranging set of international institutions chat give China a stake in the status quo
(Shambaugh 2005).

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 - As for Russia, its relations with China are more stable now than they were during the
height of the Cold War. Both countti.es are actively engaged in organizations such as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization; they have institutionalized an annual bilateral
security dialogue; and have even engaged in occasional joint military exercises.

40. Key security issues in the US-China relationship

defensive realists' tend to argue that both nuclear weapons and geography militate against an
inevitable showdown between China and the US.
Close examination reveals that China is unlikely to replace the US as the largest, most
technologically advanced and militarily dominant country in the world within the foreseeable
future. In terms of per capita income, China remains a third-world country. Technologically, China
is a developing counny, and although it is rapidly increasing its technological and scientific
prowess. Socially, China faces problems with rising nationalism, the impact of a one-child policy
and minority resentment in some provinces.
China's military moves have also provoked scepticism, and the US military tends to be more
suspicious of Chinese motives than is the US business sector. Despite these concerns, the US
itself still views China as more an opportunity than a threat, and official US policy is to encourage
China to become a 'responsible stakeholder' in international affairs.

41. Russia in the 1990s

The 1 990s in Russia were a time of upheaval and decline. chaotic 1 990s and instability, which
many Russians have since come to associate with the concept of democracy itself. Russia's
political and economic decline after the fall of the Soviet Union was stark. The Soviet command
economy was dismantled almost immediately. they created a new class of oligarchs whose reach
extended from business into politics. Oligarchic capitalism bred corruption on a massive scale.
mounting unemployment, high inflation, and pervasive gangland violence. the early 1990s,
inflation - unleashed by the freeing of prices and exacerbated by the Central Bank's decision to
print more money - reached over 2,400 per cent per year. The impression of decline such
economic difficulties conveyed was made worse by Russia's geopolitical retreat. With the end of
the Cold War, Russia lost the empire it had controlled within the Soviet Union, as well as the
informal empire of the Warsaw Pact and the international Communist bloc. Russia lost all its
territories.
Powerful economic actors, including state-owned companies like gas monopoly Gazprom, also
operated largely independently of Kremlin control. Gazprom placed its own people in important
positions in the upper reaches of the Russian government, including the long-serving prime
minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin.

42. Russian foreign policy under Putin, before and after 2007
The beginning of Russia's global resurgence largely coincided with the start of Vladimir Putin's
first term in the Kremlin. restoration of political stability and an increasingly assertive, self-
confident foreign policy. One of Putin's major initiatives was to reassert Kremlin authority over
both regional elites and powerful economic actors. This process, which Putin tenned 'restoring

15
the power vertical', led to the appointment of powerful presidential envoys to seven newly
created 'super-regions' as early as 2000.
Kremlin's centralization strategy was the installation of Putin loyalists (many of them siloviki,
figures with backgrounds in the security services) in important positions throughout both the
administrative apparatus of the state and on the boards of major companies.
Apart from the centralization of power, Russia's revival has had much to do with events beyond
the Kremlin's control. The most obvious reason for Russia's revival as a major power was the
dramatic increase in world energy prices, which allowed it to recover from the collapse that
followed the 1998 financial crisis. Russia is the world's second-largest oil producer, after Saudi
Arabia, and the largest producer of natural gas. Thanks to the resulting influx of wealth, Moscow
had paid off its debts to the IMF and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors by 2003.
Not only do oil and gas help to fill the Russian treasury, but Moscow's control of the
infrastructure to move energy from Russia and Central Asia to Europe and, in the future, East
Asia gives it significant influence over both producers and consumers through its ability to
manipulate prices and supplies.
Russia's vision of the global order emphasizes the interaction of sovereign states as the basis for
International Relations. For this reason, Moscow has consistently opposed what it sees as
interference in other states' internal affairs, whether in Sudan, Bunna or elsewhere. Moscow
strongly supports the role of the UN Security Council (where it holds a veto) as a forum for Great
Power decision making, in contrast to the unilateral approach that it accuses Washington of
favouring.
Russia's revival has in particular complicated its relationship with the major Western powers. The
tone of relations between Moscow and Washington slipped to a post-Cold War low during
Putin's second term as president.
Putin declared in 2001 that Russia would be a partner to the US in the unfolding 'war on terror'
The Kremlin thus came to see pro-democracy movements as a kind of stalking horse for the
expansion of Western influence. Consequently, Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet bloc
has focused on preserving the post-Soviet status quo, where secular, largely Russian-speaking
elites continue to dominate business and politics - as well as stopping or slowing the drift of
former Soviet republics into Westerndominated institutions like NATO.
In resisting the West's perceived attempts to dictate the functioning of the post-Cold War world
unilaterally, Russia has also increasingly sought backing from China, both bilaterally and through
institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Yet using China as a counterweight to the West remains problematic. China's economy is much
more dynamic than Russia's, and many Russians fear being relegated to the status of junior
partner. despite the rhetoric of partnership, Russo-Chinese competition is increasing, particularly
over energy resources in Central Asia. While Moscow needs good relations with Beijing, most
Russian statesmen recognize that relations with the West will continue to be the central
consideration for Russian foreign policy.
The Western powers should push hard to complete negotiations on Russia's ascension to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), which would aid Russia's integration into the world economy
and provide a forum for resolving trade disputes.

16
Europe in particular needs to work harder to address the complications stemming from its
dependence on Russia for oil and gas supplies. Russia's alleged energy imperialism. The EU and
its member states need to work on building an integrated gas market for the entire continent to
limit the opportunities to play individual consumers off against one another.
While Putin often spoke of the danger to Russia from the West's hard military power, Medvedev
listed global financial instability, terrorism, crime and corruption as the greatest threats to
Russian national security.
Putin remains onstage as prime minister and the siloviki still lurk behind him; indeed, it was
Putin, not Medvedev, who seemed in command during the opening stages of Russia's war with
Georgia in mid-2008.

Vladimir Putin has been ruling Russia since 1999. In that time, he’s shaped the country into an
authoritarian and militaristic society. Today, as president of Russia, he’s challenging the US-led
Western world order by propping up dictators, tampering with elections, and invading his
neighbours.
In 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin as his prime minister. With Yeltsin’s popularity in free fall, Putin
became the face of a new Russian nationalism. He crushed the Chechen rebellion, flattening the
capital city of Grozny and killing an estimated 80,000 people, and appeared on television nightly
preaching his vision of a strong, internationally respected Russia. His popularity jumped from 2
percent to 45 percent in a matter of weeks. On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin resigned and made
Putin the interim president.
He quickly began to remake the Russian state, enriching the oligarchs who supported him and
crushing those who didn’t. In 2008, Putin invaded Georgia.
Putin has also tightened his grip on his own country. With the continued support of criminal
organizations, oligarchs, and the Russian security services, Putin has been able to stifle Russia’s
free press while gutting its civil institutions and eliminating any semblance of political opposition.
Putin’s rise to power
Ending the war in Checnya
Centralization
Cracking down on oligarchs, creates his own client system
„managed democracy”
Foreign policy adventurism, nationalism
Economy still hevily reliant on oil and gas sector

43. Russia’s war on Ukraine (2014, 2022)

As on the question of NATO expansion, Russia's revival has been felt most directly by its
neighbours in the former Soviet Union, which Moscow continues to view as its own sphere of
influence. Russian attention to the region increased dramatically as a result of political upheaval
in several post-Soviet states, above all the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Orange
Revolution, along with similar 'coloured revolutions' in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and serious
unrest that shook the government in Uzbekistan, demonstrated that the rule of post-Soviet

17
strongmen faced a crisis of legitimacy. Russian elites feared that similar discontent could
threaten their own rule.
Feb 2014: annexation of Crimea (Sevastopol harbor’s strategic importance), violation of the 1993
Budapest Memorandum
 Minsk Protocol (Dec 2014), Minsk II (Feb 2015)
 Kerch Strait bridge built (2016-2018)
 „hybrid war” (heavily debated concept), Russian backed palamilitaries control Donbas region
(Luhansk+donetsk) in SE Ukraine

PPT 8: TERRORISM
44. Common elements of terrorism concepts
The UN Assembly on terrorism: „Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” (UN Assembly,
1994)
Lacks a common, accepted definition. For instance, nationalistic terrorism evokes the cliché: one
person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.
Common elements:
- Political goals and motivation;
- Violence or threat of violence;
- Aimed psychological impact beyond casualties;
- Usually targets the civilian population;

45. How did globalization change terrorism?

Historically, terrorism has mostly been a localized phenomenon
1968: the birth of transnational terrorism
Commercial flights are more affordable (mobility & hijackings)
Television offers wider reach, symbolic attacks
Extremist groups realize political and/or ideological proximity
Increasing number of victims, growing sophistication, suicide
attacks
Failed states and terrorism (Libya, Iraq, Syria)

46. Taxonomies of terrorism

State vs. nonstate
Domestic vs international
Within nonstate, motivations differ:
ethno-nationalist
ideological (right-wing, leftist)

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 religious-political
single issue (e.g. environmentalists, attacks on abortion clinics)
state-sponsored
narcoterrorism
corrigible vs incorrigible terrorism: can the group’s political goals form the basis of
negotiations?

47. The state and terror

RainbowWarrior 1985. (France)
Lockerbie 21 December, 1988. (Libya)
Latin American death squads during the Cold War
STATE TERRORISM: RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACK ON MAJOR UKRAININAN CITIES, 10 OCT. 2022
- Revenge (Crimean bridge attack on Putin’s birthday) as political goal
- Indiscriminate attack targeting civilian centers
- Aim is to achieve psychological effect

48. Identifying and introducing a terrorist group from the following categories:
ethnonationalist, political-left, political-right, Islamist

POLITICAL ISLAM: THE FACE OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

Extreme rightwing terrorism and radical islamist
terrorism – most visible forms
Perceived persecution and oppression of Muslims by the
morally bankrupt West; political Islam as a form of
resistance against globalization
Sunni (e.g. Al-Qaeda) and Shia (e.g. Hezbollah) terrorism,
Muslim-Muslim tensions
Increasing Islamophobia in the non-Muslim world

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49. Comparing old and new terrorism
Old terrorism: negotiable and limited goals (mostly nationalism and independence), local
ambitions. Methods discriminate want to send message, killing is tactical, public support
important.
New terrorism: non-negotiable, abstract, and unrealistic goals (mostly driven by religious zeal),
global ambitions. Methods nondiscriminate: killing is strategic, killing for killing’s sake. Do not
pursue legitimacy.

50. Criticisms of the Old vs. New terrorism distinction

Distinction contested; empirical counterexamples abound. Alternative views: 1) difference only in
scale, not quality; 2) historical cycles of terrorism (multiple forms coexist)

51. Isis and terror attacks in Europe

ISIS yet again considered as the harbinger of a new chapter.
ISIS/ISIL/DAESH:ORIGIN
Origin: Russian invasion of Afghanistan (1979), Abu Musab AlZarqawi founds the precursor of ISIS
- 2001: Zarqawi flees to Iraq after the US invades Afghanistan
- 2003: Iraq War, Al-Qaeda severely weakened in the region, allies itself with Zarqawi →
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) formed
- 2006; Americans assassinate Zarqawi in an air strike, AQI collapses
- 2011: US leaves Iraq
- 2011: Arab Spring, Syrian civil war.
- Iraq: remnants of AQI rebranded as Islamic State in Irak (ISI), led by Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi.
- 2014: Summer. Assad lets ISIS grow → attack on Northern Iraq from Syria, Iraqi army
flees. A third of Iraq’s territory under ISIS control
- Political goal: creating a new „caliphate”.
- Late 2014: attack on Kurdish territories in Syria (first defeats), public beheading of US
reporter James Foley
o → US attention, air strikes and loss of territory

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52. Novelty of Al Queda and ISIS
Al Qaeda:
Sunni militant islamist group, Cold War roots
Salafist jihadism (Sunni revivalism), pan-Islamism, Wahhabism
„franchise” system: centralized planning and decentralized.
execution
Recruitment in Western states
Attacks: 1992 Yemen; 1993 WTC; 1998 Nairobi US embassy;
2000 USS Cole; 2001. 09. 11.; 2002 Tunisia, Bali; 2003 Riyadh,
Casablanca, Istanbul; 2004 Madrid; 2005 Bali; 2008 Pakistan
May 2011: Bin Laden assassinated by the US, Ayman al-Zawahiri
becomes new leader(emir)
Support to insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere

53. What are failed states (with examples), and how do they relate to terrorism?
Failed states: Libya, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire,
Zimbabwe; countries where the government has lost control of significant parts of the national
territory and lacks the resources to re-impose control. They are unable to maintain central order
within the state, or to produce at least minimal conditions of social welfare and economic
subsistence.
State failures, and the resulting diminished legitimacy of developing states, are not 'objective'
conditions but the products of Northern policies.
Failed state: this is a state that has collapsed and cannot provide for its citizens without
substantial external support and where the government of the state has ceased to exist inside
the territorial borders of the state.

54. Dark side of counterterrorism

Trade-off between security and civil rights
PATRIOT Act 2001 (renewed three times), USA Freedom Act 2015 (in effect until 2019)
Hungarian constitutional amendment bill of 2016 (rejected in parliament): „terror emergency
situation”
Limiting civil rights and bypassing international law, e.g. the US’ use of torture in the War on
Terror
Exaggerated terrorist threat as political manipulation
Rise of the surveillance state  Conflation of Islam, migration and terrorism  Militarization of
police
(counter)terrorism and control. E.g. China & Uyghurs

55. Defining security theater

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Definition: security theater refers to a set of security measures that are meant to provide the
feeling of increased security, without truly counteracting threats. Security theater is not aimed at
the potential attacker, but at the public.
- Reactive airport security measures, e.g. shoes off
- Easily recognizable police and military personel in the streets, armed to the teeth
- Warning signs, e.g. CCTV surveillance
- Uniformed security guards asking for identification at building entrance
- Color-coded terrorism threat scale
- Unarmed civil servants dressing in uniforms resembling police uniforms

PPT 6: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND PROLIFERATION

Theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation

- what nuclear proliferation really is? This question has emerged because several cases
have not followed the superpower pattern of developing massive arsenals.
o nuclear opacity, a policy pursued by Israel. Israel has not signed the NPT, but has
also never confirmed that it possesses a nuclear arsenal, nor has it conducted a
full, overt nuclear test. 'nuclear ambiguity' -or, more colloquially, 'the bomb in
the basement' approach.
o latent nuclear capacity, which describes a country that possesses the
infrastructure, material, and technical capabilities to quickly assemble a nuclear
weapon, but has never done so. Japan, for example, is sometimes described as
being 'five minutes from a nuclear weapon', since it has enough fissile material,
technical ability, and knowledge to assemble a nuclear weapon on short notice if
it chose to do so.
- Motivations:
o this is the only context in which nuclear weapons have ever been used: against
Japan in 1945. During the cold war, however, nuclear weapons were seen as
useful largely for strategic reasons, in particular for their ability to deter one's
adversaries from engaging in military provocation or conventional attack.

- nuclear weapons states have regularly shared materials, technology, and knowledge.
Sometimes they share peaceful nuclear technology because they hope that providing
this assistance will help them achieve certain foreign policy goals, even though this
assistance is dual use in nature, and countries receiving peaceful nuclear assistance are
more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Countries will even knowingly share sensitive
technology related to nuclear weapons if they believe that doing so will help constrain a
more powerful enemy.

- Effects on the world

o Although countries that have nuclear weapons are involved more often in low-
level conflicts, their disputes are less likely to escalate to major war, and they are

22
 more likely to get the outcomes they want in a crisis involving non-nuclear
opponents.
o there are significant risks to the spread of nuclear weapons in terms of
international peace and stability.
o stability-instability paradox. This occurs when nuclear-armed countries feel safe
from large-scale retaliatory attack because they have nuclear weapons, and so
they feel free to engage in low-scale provocations against other countries. This
means that countries with nuclear weapons are more likely to be involved in
lowlevel conflicts, but less likely to be involved in big ones, because the fact that
they have nuclear weapons keeps anyone from threatening them with national
disintegration or any other scenario that would require the use of nuclear
weapons to defend the integrity of the state.
- Proliferation optimism and proliferation pessimism: the Waltz-Sagan debate
o Waltz argues that gradual nuclearization will contribute to stability, since 'new
nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have
experienced’ and show simi lar caution.
o Sagan more may be worse. 'Professional military organizations-because of
common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests-display organizational
behaviours that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or
accidental war'. The risk of nuclear accidents and of conflict between nuclear
armed states makes the spread of nuclear weapons undesirable.

- Nuclear Posture: term that describes what a state does with its nuclear weapons after
developing them. Nuclear posture includes the actual nuclear capabilities of a state; the
employment doctrine governing how these capabilities will be used, when, and against
whom; and the command and control procedures governing the management and use of
these capabilities.
o some postures work better than others for deterrence. The three types are:
o Catalytic: This nuclear posture, used by Israel, is designed to catalyse outside
assistance from a third party in the event of a severe crisis. The state does not
have survivable weapons, and their capabilities are not transparent. This posture
is relatively less successful in deterring conflict against either a nuclear armed or
non-nuclear opponent.
o Assured retaliation: Assured retaliation is the posture adopted by China and
India. It seeks to deter nuclear attack by guaranteeing retaliation through the use
of survivable weapons deployed in a transparent way. This posture has mixed
effects on conflict depending on whether the attack is low- or high-intensity and
whether the attacker is nuclear or non-nuclear.
o Asymmetric escalation: This posture, used by France and Pakistan, is intended to
deter conventional attack by threatening an attacker with rapid escalation to a
nuclear counterattack. Nuclear weapons are therefore deployed for possible first
use against that attacker. Asymmetric escalation is the most successful posture in

23
 terms of deterring conflict, but raises the most concerns about accidental use
and command and control, so it comes with steep trade-offs.
- The 'Global Zero' movement was also bolstered by US President Barack Obama's speech
in Prague in 2009, in which he called for a world free of nuclear weapons. While many
agree that a nuclear weaponfree world is a laudable end goal, the question is how to get
there; no state wants to relinquish nuclear weapons before others do.

56. Defining deterrence and its variants (by punishment, by denial)

Deterrence: the goal is not to wage war, but to avoid it. Deterrence assigns unacceptable costs to
aggression so that the enemy does not dare to attack (assumes the enemy is rational).
deterrence as 'the threat that leaves something to chance'-the idea that if there was even a
small risk that conventional attack would cause an opponent to escalate to nuclear conflict in
response, that risk would deter the conventional attack.
- Deterrence by punishment (targeting enemy cities and industry, the ability to inflict
unacceptable losses on the enemy is what deters) → counter city/countervalue strategy:
threatening enemy cities. „Do not attack me because I will ‚punish’ you for it, i.e. will
destroy your population.” → requires fewer, but well-hidden/defended weapons, e.g. on
submarines.
- Deterrence by denial (targeting enemy „warfighting capability”, the ability to fight and
win a war act as a deterrent) → counterforce strategy: threatening the enemy’s nuclear
arms in a first or second strike. „Do not attack me because I will be able continue to fight
and win a nuclear war) → requires a lot of weapons (second strike deterrence)
Persisting problem of deterrence: credibility towards the enemy (direct or general deterrence)
and towards allies (extended deterrence or ‚nuclear umbrella”)

To deter the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies used two different nuclear targeting
strategies. In a counterforce strategy, American nuclear weapons targeted the Soviet Union's
nuclear and conventional military assets. In a countervalue strategy, the assets threatened with
nuclear retaliation were targets of industrial or social value, typically cities with large
populations.
The United States also developed what was known as extended deterrence-the threat of nuclear
response in order to deter an attack on one of its allies. If an attack on an American ally led the
US to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the opponent's home territory, that opponent
might itself retaliate by using nuclear weapons against American soil.

existential deterrence: suggested that possession of a single nuclear warhead was enough to
deter conflict, because the credibility of severe punishment for a provocation was enough to
deter adversaries from being provocative.

Nuclear deterrence: concept that involves using nuclear weapons to prevent opponents from
taking undesirable actions. Deterrence in general seeks to use the threat of punishment to

24
convince an opponent not to do something; nuclear deterrence operates on the belief that if
there is even a small chance that one state taking an action will cause an opponent to respond
with nuclear weapons, the state considering that action will be deterred from doing so.
Deterrence is generally viewed as an attempt to defend the status quo, whereas compellence
refers to the use of threats of punishment to convince an adversary to change the status quo.

57. Defining the nuclear paradox

Nuclear paradox: I expect my adversary to act rationally (i.e. not attack me), but still expect my
adversary to believe that I am irrational enough to launch a nuclear strike even if both of us
would be destroyed in a nuclear war. (see the ‚chicken game’ in game theory)
Paradoxically, the same reason given for acquiring nuclear weapons is also the most common
reason advanced for not using them: that states have been deterred from using nuclear weapons
by the threat of nuclear retaliation from adversaries

nuclear deterrence-the question of 'how nuclear weapons could be used to prevent an opponent
from taking an undesirable action.

58. Defining mutually assured destruction

MAD (mutually assured destruction): nuclear war can be averted with second strike deterrence.
The system is most stable when both sides are vulnerable, so the threat of annihilation is mutual.
MAD seemingly stabilized the Cold War.

59. Horizontal and vertical proliferation

horizontal (state nuclear programs/ the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries) and vertical
(exchange of technology across states/ (when nuclear weapons states increase the size of their
nuclear arsenals).
Counter-proliferation: describes efforts to obstruct, slow, or roll back the programmes of states
that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons, as well as to deter and defend against the actual use
of nuclear weapons.

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60. Multi-and bilateral agreements on nuclear arms limitation
Multi- and bilateral agreements
A) about nuclear proliferation:
a. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968/70: five states-the US, Britain, the Soviet Union,
France, and China-were recognized as having the right to possess nuclear weapons.
All other states agreed to forego the development of nuclear arsenals in exchange
for an agreement by the five nuclear weapons states to move towards the
elimination of their arsenals, and in exchange for non-nuclear weapons states
obtaining access to peaceful nuclear technology.
B) quantitative and qualitative arms limitation
a. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - SALT I 1972: In 1972, the United States and the
Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which tried to
prevent an arms race by limiting the number of missiles and ballistic missile defences
(BMD) that could be deployed. The Treaty had a major weakness, however, in that it
did not sufficiently address qualitative rather than quantitative improvements to the
two superpowers' nuclear arsenals.
b. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - SALT II 1979 (Never ratified in the US, still followed):
Some of these agreements were addressed at the SALT II negotiations in 1979, which
was tacitly honoured by both sides despite the suspension of the Treaty's ratification
following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.
c. Anti-Ballistic Missile - ABM treaty 1972 (GW Bush withdraws in 2001)
d. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces - INF Treaty 1987 (Formally suspended by Trump
in 2019): An Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement in 1987 further limited the
deployment of mid-range nuclear-armed missiles.
e. In 1991, the two sides signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which went
beyond merely limiting the number of warheads and delivery vehicles and agreed to

26
 reduce them. START II was signed in 1993, and, most significantly, banned the use of
MIRVs on ICBMs.
f. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty), also signed in
2002, the two countries agreed to reduce their stockpiles of operationally deployed
weapons still further.
C) nuclear weapon free zones
a. Tlaleloco Treaty1967 (South America&Caribbean)
b. Rarotonga Treaty 1985 (Southeast Pacific): US never ratified
c. Pelindaba Treaty 1996 (Africa)
d. Treaty of Bangkok 1997 (Southeast Asia)

D) on nuclear testing
a. Partial/Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaties – PTBT/LTBT 1962: atmosphere, space,
underwater testing banned;
b. Outer Space Treaty 1967;
c. Seabed Arms Control Treaty 1971;
d. Threshold Test Ban Treaty 1974 (Prohibits higher than 150 kt for underground
testing.)
e. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996: US signed but not ratified. Bans
all nuclear testing, peaceful and otherwise. Strong detection and verification
mechanism (CTBTO).: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
would ban nuclear weapons testing entirely. To enter into force, however, the CTBT
requires signature and ratification by forty-four states, including all five recognized
nuclear weapons states as well as nuclear powers not recognized as such by the NPT.
Critics of the CTBT focus on concerns over whether the Treaty is effectively verifiable,
as well as whether a commitment not to test would constrain the national security
interests of existing nuclear powers who might want to maintain the right to test in
order to continue to advance the sophistication of their nuclear weapons
programmes. There is no sign today that the CTBT will ever enter into force, and
countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have tested nuclear weapons since the
Treaty was opened for signature.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is in charge of monitoring and ensuring that
countries that have signed the NPT do not divert fissile material from their nuclear power plants
to build nuclear weapons.

61. Main elements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT is based on a central bargain: the N PT non-nuclearweapon states agree never to
acquire nuclear weapons and the N PT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the
ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Today, 190 states have signed the NPT.
The first problem is that the NPT is not universal. Israel, India, and Pakistan never signed the
Treaty; North Korea signed but withdrew in 2003.

27
Second, the NPT has weak provisions for enforcement, as evidenced by the on-going debates
over how to address the North Korean and Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Third, critics of the NPT charge that it is fundamentally unfair. By freezing the nuclear status quo,
they argue, it privileges the nuclear status of the five nuclear weapons states recognized in the
Treaty over other countries and does not put enough pressure on the five nuclear weapons
states to actually dismantle their nuclear arsenals.
United States Ambassador Thomas Graham, whose long diplomatic career focused on arms
control and non-proliferation, has described the NPT as a 'bargain' based on three pillars: non-
proliferation, eventual disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Unlike the CWC and the BTWC, its sole purpose is not disarmament. It’s role is to safeguard and
promote the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, while promoting the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons. Its safeguards, focused primarily on monitoring the storage,
transfer and use of fissile materials, are implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which was established in 1957.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Signed: 1968. Effective: 1970

Conserves the club of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) by January 1st 1968. These are
the de jure nuclear states (US, USSR, UK, France, PRC – UNSC permanent 5!).
Blocks proliferation of nuclear weapons in exchange of peaceful technologies
Article VI: nuclear weapons states will disarm in the long run (no deadline)
Non-members with nuclear weapons (de facto nuclear states): Izrael,
Pakistan, India (rationale: unfair, de jure states ignore Article VI)
Former members: North Korea (withdrew in 2003)
Non-member Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS): South Sudan
Main institution: International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna)

Distinguishes between Nuclear-Weapons States (NWS) & Non-nuclear-Weapons States

(NNWS)
- Non-nuclear weapon states: refers to a state that is party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, meaning it does not possess nuclear weapons.
Article I: NWS agree not to help NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
Article II: NNWS permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons
Article IV: NNWS have an inalienable right to to research, develop, and use nuclear energy
for non-weapons purposes. It also supports the "fullest possible exchange" of such
nuclearrelated information and technology between NWS and NNWS.
Article VI: Article VI commits states-parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.”
Article VII: allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones (see before)

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 - Nuclear weapons-free zone: these are agreements which establish specific environments
or geographic regions as nuclear weapons-free, although there may be varying
requirements between zones.
All parties submit to monitoring by the IAEA

62. Differentiating between de jure and de facto nuclear powers

63. Nuclear hedging (Japan strategy)

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster occurred when a tsunami struck the Fukushima I nuclear
power plant on the coast of the island of Honshu. It was the largest nuclear disaster since
Chernobyl in 1 986.
Latent nuclear capacity: term that describes a country that possesses all the necessary
capabilities to construct a nuclear weapon, but which has not done so.

Hedging, itself a range, is the most extreme version of a nuclear weapon pursuit: a determination
to reach the capacity to indigenously produce nuclear weapons in a realistic timeframe (weeks to
a few years) alongside an important measure of restraint in how far to proceed along this path.

64. What are the main problems of the NPT regime?

Latency/nuclear hedging (dual use technology), weak provisions for monitoring and
enforcement, Unjustness (Article VI) vs. Deterrence, Not universal (key nuclear states non-
signatories)

65. Three basic models for why states build nuclear weapons (Sagan)
As the gap between states that have the capability to acquire nuclear weapons and states that
have actually acquired them has widened, however, scholars have examined a range of other
potential motivations for nuclear weapons development.
Security model: nuclear weapons are a defence mainly against nuclear weapons. States build
nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats.
Domestic politics model: bureaucratic interests fuel programs. States may pursue nuclear
weapons because doing so confers a domestic political advantage on leaders, or because it

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serves the interests of powerful bureaucracies and military organizations. They may also pursue
nuclear weapons because political leaders and ruling coalition’s opt for inward-looking political
and economic platforms rather than pursuing growth through integration in the global economy.
Norms model: nuclear weapons as normative symbols of modernity and identity. States build
nuclear weapons because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides
an important normative symbol of a state's modernity or identity

66. Defining the nuclear taboo (Tannenwald)

Nuclear taboo: the idea that a specific international norm has gradually become accepted by the
international community that the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable in warfare.
There is a strong taboo against using nuclear weapons in a first strike. Using nuclear weapons in a
first strike is a barbaric act, a crime against humanity. The taboo clearly separates nuclear
weapons from conventional weapons (weapon of mass destruction –WMD). Strong role of non-
nuclear states and international civilian movements.
Problems: 1) the taboo only affects use, not proliferation, 2) it is not codified, 3) it implicitly
legitimizes conventional weapons
Only China and India have a declared no first use policy!

Buzan and Herring define a taboo as 'a strategic cultural prohibition against the use of nuclear
weapons ... an assumption that nuclear weapons should not be used rather than a conscious
cost-benefit calculation' (Buzan and Herring 1998: 165). Nina Tannenwald (2007) argues that it is
this taboo that has prevented the United States from employing nuclear weapons.

67. Defining rogue states, rogue states and nuclear stability

Rogue states → Def.: authoritarian states that violate human rights, support terrorism and seek
weapons of mass destruction, thereby threatening international peace.
Main threats: regional conflicts, nuclear domino (hedging, latency) and support of nuclear
terrorism.
Difficulties: Closed societies, lack of transparency, Military targets not always known, Secondary
proliferation, Considerable conventional forces limit intervention

68. Short introduction of the Iran nuclear deal framework

Iran and nuclear weapons
IAEA 2005: Iran does not fulfil its obligations under the NPT
6 UN resolutions, sanctions
Threat of (nuclear) conflict with Israel
Iran nuclear deal framework July 2015, Trump unilaterally withdrew in May 2018

Much of the international concern about Iran's nuclear programme, for example, is centred on
the belief that Iran is leveraging fissile material created in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear energy
programme to endow itself with a latent nuclear weapons capability.

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I ran remains a formal member of the N PT, but its nuclear energy programme is the subject of
international contention. I ran's nuclear energy programme began under the US Atoms for Peace
programme in the 1 950s, and its first nuclear power plant, constructed at Bushehr with Russian
assistance, became operational in 201 1. In 2003, the IAEA reported that I ran had failed to
declare enrichment activities as required under the IAEA's safeguards agreements, which led the
UN Security Council to demand that I ran stop its enrichment activity. Negotiations with the
United Kingdom, Germany, and France (the EU-3) produced temporary suspension, but no
resolution; I ran has argued that it needs enrichment to achieve energy security, and cited its
right to nuclear energy under the N PT. In November 201 1, the IAEA reported that I ran had
conducted research and experiments aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability. This
report heightened concern that I ran's strategy is to use nuclear energy facilities to achieve a
latent nuclear capacity, from which it can then quickly 'break out' to become a fully-fledged
nuclear weapons state. The stand-off has resulted in heavy sanctions against I ran, though the
degree of participation in these sanctions has varied country by country.

69. Defining the nuclear domino; its relevance vis-à-vis North Korea
North Korean tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and in 2017
Destabilizing effect, „nuclear domino” (Japan, South Korea; see hedging)
Low probability of military solution
Easing tensions under Trump (in rhetorics), but ongoing weapons program
Potential new test in 2022
North Korea withdrew from membership in the N PT in 2003, and is currently believed to possess
approximately six to eight nuclear weapons.

PPT 7: Military Interventions

70. Norms of military intervention (Finnemore)
Norms about who can intervene, for what reason and how all limit and enable state behaviour.
These norms are subject to change. What is legal and what is legitimate is embedded in the
sociopolitical and historical context. Three forms of military intervention:
1. Intervention to collect debt (disappeared)
2. Humanitarian intervention
3. Intervention for the protection of international order and peace (most common)

71. Defining humanitarian intervention

„The threat of use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) to prevent or end
widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its
own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.” (Sean
D. Murphy). A ‘forcible military intervention in humanitarian crises’ in failed states to secure aid;
or against murderous states to stop atrocities  is this an exception from the rules of the use of
force (violence)?

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72. Defining the UN dilemma regarding humanitarian interventions
Are human rights universal, and if so, can they overrule the norm of sovereignty? This tension is
embedded in the UN. This is what is commonly referred to as the UN dilemma. Not just a legal,
but also a moral debate.
In practice the UN plays key role in managing humanitarian intervention on a “case by case”
basis. The UN was created to guard the territorial integrity, political independence and
sovereignty of its member states. But the UN, according to its charter, is also meant to protect
„we the peoples of the United Nations”. In-built contradiction: peace and stability vs. protection
of human dignity and human rights.

73. The role of the UNSC in regulating interventions; division within the Council vis-à-vis
humanitarian interventions
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Division: UK, USA and France vs China and Russia
logrolling problem (trading of favors); veto problem; posturing problem; coordination problem
For humanitarian reasons, with the explicit ban on influencing armed conflicts.

74. Humanitarian intervention vs. peacekeeping

The term 'peacekeeping' is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition.
Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six
and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes
peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as
authorized under Chapter VII.
Difference:
- Peacekeeping requires consent by the target state.
- Humanitarian intervention does not.
- Peacekeeping missions are limited in number, size and scope.
o 1948-1978: 13 missions - 1978-1988: none

75. Arguments for and against humanitarian interventions

Restrictionists (anti-HI): intervention violates the cardinal norm of international relation –
principle of sovereignty; Protecting sovereignty is more important for peace and stability; invoke
Article 2 of UN Charter (principle of non-intervention)
Counter-restrictionists (pro-HI): we should give priority to protection of human rights; there is
legal right of unilateral and collective humanitarian intervention; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) and many other resolutions cited.

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Arguments against:
1. Humanitarian intervention (HI) as no clear legal basis
2. Primary motive of HI is hardly humanitarian (realist argument). HI-based rhetoric
should always be suspicious
3. States should not risk the lives of their soldiers on humanitarian grounds (morality
cannot be the foundation for states’ foreign policy)
4. Legitimization of HI will lead to the abuse of intervention. HI will be the tools of
intervention for strong countries
5. States apply HI selectively: Northern Iraq (1993), Kosovo (1999), Somalia (1992) BUT
not in North Korea; Rwanda, East Timor, Sudan, Myanmar,Yemen and many more
6. Rule-consequentialism: int’l society will be better off if we can uphold the principle of
sovereignty instead of allowing HI in the absence of consensus.
7. Good intentions do not necessarily result in good results (see Libya 2011) 8. No
consensus on what principles should govern a doctrine of HI

76. The role of the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre in the R2P process

77. Defining the responsibility to protect (R2P): pillars and responsibilities

The responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP) – a United Nations initiative established in 2005. It
consists of an emerging norm, or set of principles, based on the idea that sovereignty is not a
right, but a responsibility. In the international community R2P is a norm, not a law.
According to R2P, Sovereignty should no longer be defined as a safeguard for states, preventing
other states to intervene if necessary. The new definition of sovereignty links sovereignty with
the responsibility to protect citizens. It is the states’ duty to protect their inhabitants from mass
atrocity crimes.
When a state is unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens from harm, its “responsibilities”
are transferred to international society.
R2P’S THREE PILLARS:
8. A state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities („mass
atrocity crimes”: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing);
9. The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfil its primary
responsibility;
10. If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have
failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through
coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the
last resort.

R2P’S THREE RESPONSIBILITES:

1. The responsibility to prevent: address root causes of crises, like civil wars, that threaten the
security of the population.
2. The responsibility to react: respond with appropriate measures (e.g. sanctions, military
means) to situations in #1.

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3. The responsibility to rebuild: full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation.

Prevention enjoys absolute primacy. Intervention is only possible once all other means have
been exhausted.

78. The problem of legitimacy and legality of humanitarian interventions through the
example of the 1999 Kosovo intervention

79. How does R2P challenge the traditional understanding of security?

R2P CHALLENGE TO TRADICIONAL SECURITY
- Human security and the individual as the object of security
- Critique of state-centrism through the logic of humanitarian intervention
- Role of UN and other international organizations. E.g. International Criminal Court
- Intersubjectivity of international norms

PPT 5: ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Why are alliances formed?
Balancing and bandwagoning: For neorealists, alliances are tools for balancing where states are
unable to establish equilibrium by relying on their own means. Therefore, states use alliances as
an instrument to maintain or improve their relative power position globally or regionally.
Neorealists believe that states decide to form or to join alliances based on exogenous, not
endogenous motivations, because '[a]lliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or
something' (Liska 1962: 12). Alliances therefore can be regarded as a particular outcome of a
conflict. By building alliances, states try to maximize their capabilities to counterbalance the
overwhelming power of another individual state or group of states.
Waltz: including perceptual and behavioural variables in the body of neorealist theory, he argues
that states do not aim to counterbalance power per se, but the power of actors they perceive as
threatening. seeking to establish equilibrium is only one option available to states. He concludes,
states are inclined to balance rather than to bandwagon, since bandwagoning always involves an
unequal exchange where one state (the weaker one) accepts a subordinate role.
neorealist perspective, alliances are a form of 'regression' in conflict regulation behaviour,
because an alliance does not abolish the constraining effects emanating from the anarchical
structure of the international system on state behaviour, but merely modifies them.

Cooperation as reward: While neoliberal institutionalists do not deny that states are acting and
interacting under conditions of system-wide anarchy, they do not attribute the same effects of
anarchy to state behaviour that realists/neorealist do. States engage in alliances because, as self-
interested actors, they anticipate a mutually rewarding exchange among the members of an
alliance. As long as the costs for the creation of alliances do not outweigh the perceived benefits
from cooperation, states are eager to cooperate. From a neoliberal institutionalist viewpoint,
alliances provide reciprocity, make members accountable for their actions, and contribute to the
creation and maintenance of cooperative security strategies.

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To summarize: from an institutionalist perspective, alliances offer their member states many
advantages, which guarantee that alliances persist beyond the conditions in which they were
created.

The domestic factor: liberals share the belief that states engage in alliances when there is a
convergence of national preferences created by domestic coalitions. The creation of NATO was
not dependent on a real or perceived threat, or even a constructed one.

Common identity and ideas, values, and norms: Constructivists believe that NATO was not
created as an effort to counterbalance the Soviet material threat. Rather, NATO represents the
institutionalized form of common ideas and worldviews about the coming international order
after the Second World War shared by the founding states of the alliance. NATO is an alliance of
identity that is not threat-based, but reflects a relationship between states based on a common
understanding of their shared traits.

80. What is collective security?

Security is easier to achieve in groups than as individuals. Simple logic of collective security: you
protect me, I protect you.
Pooling of resources to achieve a common goal. Mutual defence: one state in trouble, the other
helps, and vice versa.
NATO – history’s most powerful military alliance.
Coalition (wars or crises) vs. Alliance (peacetime)
League of Nations and collective security: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the
whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to
safeguard the peace of nations.” (Article 11)

81. Alliances: who benefits and how?

Coalition (wars or crises) vs. Alliance (peacetime)
Alliances a subset of alignments (states harmonizing policies to achieve mutual security goals)
formal alliances codify/strengthen/create alignments. a 'formal or informal relationship of
security cooperation between at least two sovereign states'. their structure can correspond to
one of two ideal types - hierarchical or egalitarian. The former type is characterized by significant
imbalances of capabilities between alliance members, whilst in the latter type, power is
distributed more or less evenly among most members.
Hierarchically structured alliances can be further differentiated into hegemonic and imperial
alliances. This distinction refers to the way the strongest power in the alliance exerts its
leadership. If the strong state leads with the consent of the smaller powers, their relationship is
considered a hegemonic one.
How do alliances form? Why do states join them? Why do strong states bear the costs of
defending weak ones?

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Standard balance of power theory (Realism):
- Weak states: protection from strong states
- Strong states (great powers): countering other strong states
- Both are forms of external balancing.
- Balance of interest’s theory: Balancing for self-preservation (see survival), but band
wagoning also for self-extension → states can join alliances not for fears but for
opportunities for gains from alliance (Schweller)
- What could these benefits be for the stronger state?
Alliances and polarity: Waltz → alliance patterns unstable under multipolarity (e.g. buck-
passing). Alliances can both strengthen and threaten strategic (system) stability (see collective
security incl. aggressive actions)

How do weak states benefit? → Three options for weak states under threat: 1) capitulation (see
vandwagoning); 2) armed neutrality; 3) joining an alliance.
- Capitulation (surrendering sovereignty) and self-defence (armed neutrality) costly, and
the latter promises a lower chance at victory than an alliance.
- Joining an alliance against a threat might increase chances of getting drawn into a war
(mutual defence), BUT the chances that any member gets attacked decrease: the larger
an alliance, the more powerful  the less likely it is that it gets attacked.
- The more states join an alliance, the more non-members are motivated to join (for them
the likelihood of becoming a target increases with growth of alliance), see
Finland+Sweden

How do strong states benefit? → Security guarantees between allies often unequal (e.g. US-
Japan Pact; US-Canada) → how do you make it more even for the strong state?
- Historical strategies: extracting value through control
- Annexation for „protection”  Vassal states (weak states cannot leave)
- Tribute: Economic or Military
- Political subordination (e.g. control over foreign policy)
- Other (e.g. access to sea, bases, trade monopolies)

The internal security dilemma

- In an alliance, as in the international system in general, the absence of a supranational
authority leads to a situation where many of the steps pursued by states to bolster their
security have the effect – often unintended - of making other states less secure. Since
alliance members can never be certain of other alliance members' future or present
intentions, they embark on policies vis-a-vis their alliance partners aimed at enhancing
security.
o The first is the risk of entrapment: Entrapment refers to a situation where an
alliance member (A) faces the choice of supporting another alliance member (B)
as a result of treaty obligations, although A has no particular interest in
supporting B, or staying out of a conflict. Country A fears involvement in a

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 conflict that does not involve its vital interests. However, if A, despite its
commitments, stays out of the conflict, it may risk defection by its ally.
o The second risk is the fear of abandonment: Abandonment characterizes a
situation from the perception of state A, which has a particular interest in a
conflict with a non-alliance member but cannot be sure of the active support of
other allies.

DETERRENCE
- Deterrence is both a theory in International Relations and a strategy of conflict
management. It can be defined as an attempt to influence other actors' assessment of
their interests. It seeks to prevent an undesired behaviour by convincing the party who
may be contemplating such an action that its cost will exceed any possible gain.
- Deterrence presupposes that decisions are made in response to some kind of rational
cost-benefit calculus, that this calculus can be successfully manipulated from the outside,
and that the best way to do so is to increase the cost side of the ledger.
o Scholars and policymakers became interested in deterrence following the
development of the atom bomb. The first wave of theorists wrote from the late
1940s through the mid-1960s.
o General deterrence is based on the existing power relationship and attempts to
prevent an adversary from seriously considering any kind of military challenge
because of its expected adverse consequences. Immediate deterrence is specific;
it attempts to forestall an anticipated challenge to a well-defined and publicized
commitment. Immediate deterrence is practised when general deterrence is
thought to be failing.
- End of the Cold War: The debate about deterrence has also extended beyond conflict
management to conflict resolution. Supporters of former US president Ronald Reagan,
and conservatives more generally, credit Reagan's arms build-up and the Strategic
Defence Initiative (Star Wars) with ending the Cold War. They are alleged to have brought
the Soviet Union to its senses and provided strong incentives for it to seek an
accommodation with the US (Matlock 1 99 5). According to this thinking, Gorbachev and
his advisors became convinced that they could not compete with the US and ought to
negotiate the best deal they could before Soviet power declined even further. Western
liberals, former Soviet policymakers and many scholars attribute the end of the Cold War
to 'New Thinking' and the political transformation it brought about within the Soviet
leadership. Gorbachev, they contend, considered the Cold War dangerous and a waste of
resources and sought to end it to bring the Soviet back into Europe, facilitate political
reform at home and free resources for domestic development.

82. Why is the US’ alliance system special?

Contemporary US alliance system does not conform to the annexation or vassal states logics!
- Consensual alliance; control over US action
- Massive power discrepancy
- Lack of burden sharing

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- Porous alliance (non-exclusivity)
- US position and prosperity in the world order built on allies  seeks more inclusive alliances
with states.
- Benefits:
• Power projection (bases+fleet support)
• Burden sharing (US military is expensive + there is no draft)  first line of defence for US’
expeditionary force.
• Rapid reaction capabilities
• Counterproliferation (preventing the rise of new nuclear powers)
• Intelligence (free to duplicate, scales well)
• Arms industry cooperation (buying and co-developing weapons systems) → Defence industry
integration and standardization; specialization
• Spillover
• Economic benefits, e.g. making sanctions work.

Waltz believed that the reason why NATO still existed, even ten years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, was the fact that the US had an interest in maintaining its 'grip' (Waltz 2000: 19) on
developments in Europe. US hegemony could well explain why NATO remained one of the main
relevant political institutions in transatlantic affairs.
An argument as to why NATO survived the end of the East-West conflict that is fully in line with
the basic tenets of neoliberal institutionalism.
According to the constructivist point of view, the survival of an alliance depends on the
continuation of the underlying reason for the alliance's existence, which, as discussed above, is
not a common threat, but the perception of having a common destiny. Therefore, alliances can
survive major changes in their environment if their members still feel that they belong together
and share the same norms and values.

83. Types of neutrality, with examples

Neutrality is binary: a state is either belligerent or neutral. Law of neutrality protects neutrals
from adverse effect of the conflict + ensures non-participation and impartiality for the
belligerents (no helping either side).
Neutrality often forced, e.g. Belgium and the UK  „dependent neutrality” (guaranteed by
others), and not armed neutrality.
„Strict neutrality” (equal application) vs. „Qualified neutrality” (non-impartiality when aggression
is clear)
Models of neutrality: Switzerland (1815-), Austria (1955), Sweden (incl. Nuclear armed
neutrality), Finland (Finlandization)
Ukraine was a neutral state until 2014! (Budapest Memorandum)
Czechoslovakia was also neutral (Munich 1938)
Most European neutral states got invaded in WWII → many conclude that joining NATO is better
Internal benefits (e.g. Passports) vs. Security concerns.

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84. Interpretations on the actorness of the European Union
„Civilian power”: the EU is an actor that primarily uses its nonmilitary (civilian) instruments to
influence the world.
„Normative power”: through its mere existence (magnetism) the EU can influence what counts
as normal (acceptable) within international relations. Acting as an example, it stabilizes its
environment.
„Ethical power”: emphasizes the tension between the EU’s values and its material interests. (e.g.
helping refugees vs. border externalization)
All three (and many more) emphasize the importance of nonmilitary instruments within the EU’s
self-image. This is true both for the political and the academic communities.

85. Comparing the two EU security strategies

Before the bipolar system was finally established in 1955, enshrining the demise of an
independent European Third Force between capitalism and communism, the quest for European
security was as ambitious and bold as it was revolutionary. European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC); to protect the West against the Soviet threat; to make war between Germany and France
impossible; and to give Europe an autonomous voice in international affairs, the European
Defence Community (EDC) would have been overseen by a supranational authority, chaired by a
European defence minister, and composed of multinational military forces from France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The failure of the EDC dealt a lasting
blow to the federalists' notion that only the complete abolition of national independence could
cure the ills of the international system, while at the same time, the bottom-up approach
emphasized by neo functionalists gained ground.
Lacking both sources of military power of its own and, as many lamented, the more important
element of self-sufficiency in providing for its defence, the politics of war and peace beyond its
borders seemed to be off the EU agenda. However, the EU enlargement process of the 1 990s -
initially a policy of security projection through stabilization and association - which resulted in
the inclusion of 12 new member states in 2004 and 2007, can itself be considered a security-
policy response to the profound transformations that followed the collapse of the Soviet empire.
First, this move dispelled the dual security concerns of the majority of Central and Eastern
European states concerning Russia and Germany. Secondly, it made it possible to extend support
to the political, economic, and cultural transformation processes based on a policy of strict
conditionality.
The EU's actions are based on the same principle as its enlargement strategy: they are aimed at
establishing a ring of stability around the EU. a hegemonial strategy aiming to influence the
domestic development of the ENP countries through tailored, differentiated integration.
In sum, security through integration was the guiding principle during the Cold War years,
whereas in the 1990s, the EU relied on a policy of security projection through stabilization and
association of its Eastern neighbourhood, without questioning its basic principles or
fundamentally adapting its range of security policy instruments. At the end of the 1 990s, the
experience of failure in the Balkan wars gave rise to a determination that the EU as an

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intergovernmentally organized 'superpower' (Blair 2000) , supported by a comprehensive civilian
and military arsenal of foreign and security policy instruments, should act as a regulative force
beyond the European continent by leveraging its member states' political, economic and military
potential across multiple pillars, thus gaining the power to shape the course of events on the
global stage and fundamentally transforming the occasionally insular character of the EU in
strategic matters. Today, these three very different approaches to security policy continue to
coexist and are sometimes mutually dependent.

86. Brexit’s impact on the EU’s security

Largest military
- Strongest critic of Russia in W-Europe
- One of the largest net contributors
- Eu will lose the „special relationship”.
- EU influence decreases in former British colonies

87. Role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Oversees the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)
Dual role
- President of the Foreign Affairs Council
- ex-officio Vice-President of the European Commission
Heads the External Action Service, which:
- Represents the EU in more than 120 countries.
- Presents, explains and implements EU policies.
- Analyses partner countries
- Conducts negotiations with a fixed mandate.
- Assists the work of the High Representative, the Parliament, and the Council Presidency

88. NATO’s expansion history

12 founding members: US, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Norway, Italy,
Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, France.
1952: Greece, Turkey
1955: West Germany (BRD)
1982: Spain.
1990: Unified Germany
1999: Hungary, Poland Czech Republic.
2004: Bulgarian, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
2009: Albania, Croatia
2017: Montenegro
2020: North Macedonia

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 2023: Finland
Finland & Sweden apply in 2022

89. Collective defence in the Washington Treaty

NATO
- April 4, 1949 –Washington Treaty
- Key goal: territorial defence of Western Europe from a Soviet attack
- Article 5 (of 14): „The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

90. Trump and the crisis of NATO

NATO member states are supposed to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. Apart from the US,
only six countries do so (Estonia, Greece, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK) → recurring
tension with US elites.
Trump as president:
- Antagonizes traditional allied.
- Questions the relevance of collective defence.
- Is friendly towards Russia.
- US-Turkish antagonism over Syria
- Nationalism

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PPT 9 E 10: ENVIROLMENTAL SECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY, PANDEMICS, MIGRATION AND
CYBERSECURITY
91. Defining securitization
Securitization theory argues that 'security' is a 'speech act'. This is summed up by one writer who
argues that 'A securitizing actor by stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its
existence claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. The
issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal pol itics into the realm of emergency pol itics,
where it can be dealt with swiftly and without normal (democratic) rules and regulations of
policy making. For the content of security this means that it has no longer any given meaning but
that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security-understood in this way-is a social
construction, with the meaning of security dependent on what is done with it.'

PPT 10: MIGRATION AND CYBERSECURITY

92. Intersubjective vs. objective security

93. How is migration being securitized? (3 axes)

Migration one of the central topics for securitization theory, variance among democracies.
Securitizing migration based in basic fears of the unknown (diffuse, everpresent threat of the
Other)
Racialized discourses, see Syrian vs Ukrainian refugees in Europe.
Three axes: Economic; Hard security (terrorism); Identity

94. Regulatory problems of cybersecurity

Regulatory and technical issues:
State, private and individual actors all involved
Territorial approach outdated, globalized problem
Untraceable, unaccountable  how to deter?

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95. Inherent problems of cybersecurity
Insecurity hard to measure.
- The cyber realm is inherently international difficult to talk about national security
- The cyber realm is hard to secure
o Extreme complexity, few talent
o High global interconnectivity
o Hard to trace attacks
o Hard to distinguish legitimate use from attempts to harm
- The private sector owns most of the infrastructure
- „cybersecurity gap”: how can the private sector be persuaded to bear some of the costs of
national security?

96. Main cyber powers

USA, China, Russia, Israel, Iran.

97. China and cybersecurity

Regime security
„Great Firewall of China”, reterritorialization of online space
Cyber police, censorship
Cyber warfare?  economic espionage

PPT 9: ENVIROLMENTAL SECURITY AND PANDEMICS

98. Topics in economic security
Access to resources (quantity, sources, supply sources)
1973 oil crisis and energy dependence  Energy dependence in Europe, affects EU-Russia
relations, spills over into military and political security.
Globalization and energy security: resource rich countries (e.g. oil monarchies) and control over
resources
Globalization and security: interdependence as a national security concern (outsourcing,
strategic industries)
Securitizing the Liberal International Economic Order – LIEO → averting economic crises
Economic sanctions → synergies with other sectors (see Iran, Russia)

99. Defining the Anthropocene

Anthropocene: proposed geological epoch where the fate of the Earth’s ecosystem is primarily in
the hands of humanity.

100. What are the main issues of environmental security?

Main issues:
- Resource security

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 o Scarcity → Resource wars (oil, water, fish etc.)

- Climate change
o Extreme weather patterns
o Agriculture and climate change
o Environmental migration
o Matter of survival for some states (e.g. rising sea levels)

101. Mechanisms through which the environment impacts conflicts (e.g. Syrian civil war)
Two mechanisms for how the environment can impact conflicts
- Direct: e.g. resource wars
- Indirect: (an example): 1) agricultural output collapses due to climate change, 2) economic
decline, 3) migration, 4) erosion of legitimate institutions, 5) state failure

Syrian case
- Drought and ruined agriculture
- Internal migration to the cities, politicalsocietal tensions
- Arab Spring, civil war, refugee wave

102. Pandemics and IR

Influenza pandemics in the past two centuries: Russian Flu (1889–1890), Spanish Flu (1918–
1919), Asian Flu (1957–1958), Hong Kong Flu (1968– 1970), and Swine Flu (2009–2010) together
killed almost 60 million people
AIDS epidemic (1981-) killed 25 million
Pandemics as new security threat in the post-Cold War world
No truly global pandemic since the Spanish Flu (50million deaths)→ IR has no-real time
possibility to engage with a global pandemic

103. Globalization and COVID-19

Globalization helps pandemics to spread → threat crosses borders → territorial national security
difficult to provide on the state level → necessitates global cooperation.

104. Main security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic

Direct effect: morbidity and mortality in human populations (human security)

Indirect effect: instability
Amplifies the risk factors for radicalization in both industrialized and developing countries.
Economic uncertainty+more time spent online→Frustration+extremist online
content→radicalization

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increases global instability that violent extremist organizations benefit from and attempt to
amplify and undermine governments (e.g. Sahel region, USA)  Limits security forces’ ability to
react
Re-emergence of borders
Food security
North-South division: rich countries hoard vaccines BUT treating global South populations
essential for pandemic mitigatio

▪ Total war: total war, which involved the complete mobilization of the human, economic, and
military resources of the state in the pursuit of victory, and which recognized few if any
moral restraints in terms of who could be targeted if their destruction would bring victory
closer

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