SALES || 11.14.

24 || Case Digests 1

#1 DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by
FANESA vs. CA, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died
PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did not
PAULMITAN and ANITO PAULMITAN yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every
inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
FACTS: Agatona Sagario Paulmitan left the two (2) ff parcels of land distant ones."
located in Negros Occidental:
1. Lot No. 757 (1,946 sqm) Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to
2. Lot No. 1091 (69,080 sqm) inherit from Agatona, their mother.

Agatona married Ciriaco Paulmitan (also deceased), and had two When Agatona died, the estate was unpartitioned. Therefore,
(2) children -- Pascual and Donato. Donato and Pascual were co-owners of the estate pursuant to Art.
1078 of the NCC.
Donato is one of the petitioners, together with his daughter,
Juliana Fanesa and her husband, Rodolfo. When Pascual died intestate, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property.
Meanwhile, the private respondents are the children of Donato's
sibling, Pascual, Agatona's other son. Thus, when Donato sold Lot No. 1091 to Juliana, he was only a co-
owner with respondent and as such, he could only sell that portion
The titles to the two lots were still in Agatona's name. which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship and filed it
before RD Negros Occidental, extrajudicially adjudicating unto The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half
himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their
surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. Thus, a new title was issued in father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer
his name. but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property
and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is
As regards Lot. No. 1091, Donato executed a DOAS in favor of his partitioned.
daughter.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
The land was sold at public auction due to non-payment taxes. and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
However, Juliana was able to redeem the property. therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
Private respondents (children of Pascual) then filed a complaint to involved.
partition the properties plus defenses before CFI Negros
Occidental, against petitioners. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
With respect to Lot No. 757, trial court dismissed the complaint on him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
the ground of prescription (complaint was filed more than 11
years after a new title was issued to Donato) Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
For Lot No. 1091, a judgment was issued in favor of respondents other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
on the ground that they are Agatona's respondents, hence, they
are entitled one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale Thus, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
by Donato to Juliana did not prejudice their rights. Moreover, the his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
repurchase by Juliana did not vest in her exclusive ownership over without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
the entire land but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred,
the amount paid to redeem the property. thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

A partition of the land was ordered and ordered petitioners to pay Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner
private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P.
share in the fruits of the land. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land
but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question
with the respondents, her first cousins.
ISSUE: WON Juliana is the rightful owner of Lot No. 1091 by virtue
of the sale made in her favor by her father, Donato? (and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court
redemption from Provincial of Negros Occidental after it was of Appeals AFFIRMED.
forfeited for non-payment of taxes)?
SO ORDERED.
RULING: No, the Court has held that Juliana only a co-owner of
Lot No. 1091 by virtue of the sale made in her favor by her father, #2 MINDANAO ACADEMY, INC., MAURICIO O. BAS, ERLINDA D.
Donato. DIAZ, accompanied by her husband ANTOLINDIAZ, ESTER AIDA D.
BAS, accompanied by her husband MAURICIO O. BAS,
When Agatona died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and ROSALINDA D. BELLEZA, accompanied by her husband
Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article APOLINARIO BELLEZA, LUZ MINDA D. DAJAO, accompanied by
777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are her husband ELIGIO C. DAJAO, ADELAIDA D. NUESA,
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent," the accompanied by her husband WILSON NUESA, PEDRO N.A
right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over BUTON, SY PAOCO, JOSEFA DIGNUM, and PERFECTO VELASQUEZ
 SALES || 11.14.24 || Case Digests 2

v. ILDEFONSO D. YAP, ROSENDA A. DE NUQUI, and SOTERO A. ** FOR ISSUE OF MONTHLY RENT
DIONISIO, JR., The lower court correctly found that both vendors and vendee in
the sale acted in bad faith and therefore must be treated, vis-a-vis
FACTS: By deed entitled "Mutual Agreement," Rosenda A. de each other, as having acted in good faith.
Nuqui (widow of deceased Sotero Dionisio) and her son Sotero
Dionisio, Jr. sold three parcels of residential land in Oroquieta, However, upon the filing of the complaint against them Yap's good
Misamis Occidental, and another parcel in Ozamis City in favor of faith ceased and consequently the court's declaration of liability
Ildefonso D. Yap. for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. Thus, Erlinda is
entitled to recover a share of the said rents in proportion to her
The sale included buildings, laboratory equipment, books, own interests in the lands and the interest in the four co-owners
furniture, and fixtures used by Mindanao Academy in Oroquieta which she had acquired.
and Misamis Academy in Ozamis City.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
The total price for the sale was P100,700.00. possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes
place upon service of judicial summons.
** Adelaida Dionisio-Nuesa (Rosenda's daughter) is also named
therein as co-vendor, but actually did not take part either WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified by
personally or through her uncle and supposed attorney-in-fact, eliminating therefrom the award of attorney's fees ofP1,000.00 in
Restituto Abuton. favor of Erlinda D. Diaz and her husband, plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
1907, and the award of nominal and exemplary damages in Civil
However, Rosenda and her two children (Sotero and Adelaida) Case No. 1774; and making the award of attorney's fees in the sum
were not the sole owners of the properties; other co-owners of P2,000.00 payable to counsel for the account of the Mindanao
included Erlinda D. Diaz, Ester Aida D. Bas, Rosalinda D. Belleza, Academy, Inc. instead of the plaintiff stockholders. In all other
and Luz Minda D. Dajao (also Rosenda's children with Sotero Sr.) respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
The school buildings and equipment were owned by Mindanao
Academy, Inc., a corporation. #3 FELIX BUCTON AND NICANORA GABAR BUCTON vs. ZOSIMO
GABAR, JOSEFINA LLAMOSO GABAR AND CA
Despite these issues, Yap took possession of the properties by
virtue of the sale and operated the schools under the name FACTS: Herein petitioner Nicanora Gabar Bucton (wife of her co-
Harvardian Colleges. petitioner Felix Bucton) is the sister of private respondent Zosimo
Gabar, husband of his co-respondent Josefina Llamoso Gabar.
Two actions were filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental: Nicanora and her husband filed an action for specific performance
against respondent spouses praying for the latter to be compelled
1. annulment of the sale and recovery of rents and damages with to execute a deed of sale in petitioners' favor of the western half
Mindanao Academy Inc. (Rosenda's other five children and some of a 728sqm parcel of land.
stockholders of the corporation vs. Ildefonso, Rosenda, and Sotero
Jr.) Josefina bought the land from Sps. Villarin on installment basis.

2. rescission (Rosenda Nuqui, Sotero Jr. and Erlinda vs Ildefonso) Josefina entered into a verbal agreement with Nicanora that the
latter would pay one-half of the price and own said half of the
The trial court declared the sale (Mutual Agreement) null and void, land.
ordered Yap to restore the properties and pay rents, and awarded
damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Nicanora gave P1,000 to Josefina with a receipt.

Yap appealed the decision. Subsequently, she gave P400 also with a receipt.

ISSUE: WON the sale is null and void? Petitioners also gave P1,000 (loan) to the respondents which
Zosimo signed to.
RULING: Yes, the Court has held that the sale is null and void
because the sellers were not the sole owners of the properties Sps. Bucton took possession, building structures and renting out
and the prestation involved in the sale is indivisible. portions of the land.

This conclusion is premised on two grounds: (a) the contract A Deed of Sale was executed by the Villarins in favor of Josefina.
purported to sell properties of which the sellers were not the only
owners, since of the four parcels of land mentioned in the deed Petitioner sought to obtain a separate title for their portion.
their shares consisted only of 7/12, (6/12 for Rosenda Nuqui and However, respondents refused to execute a deed of conveyance,
1/12 for Sotero, Jr.), while in the buildings, laboratory equipment, citing a mortgage on the land in favor of PNB (P3,500).
books, furniture and fixtures they had no participation at all, the
owner being the Mindanao Academy, Inc.; and (b) the prestation But, petitioners did not stop insisting to obtain their separate title.
involved in the sale was indivisible, and therefore incapable of Frustrated, plaintiffs were compelled to employ a lawyer to
partial annulment, inasmuch as the buyer Yap, by his own intercede and persuade the Sps. Gabar to comply with their
admission, would not have entered into the transaction except to obligation to Sps. Bucton but still failed. Hence, the case.
acquire all of the properties purchased by him.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioners as the first P1,000 received
The return of the properties by the vendee is a necessary by Josefina was issued a receipt wherein the purpose of said
consequence of the decree of annulment. amount is for part payment of P1,500 for the sum of the one-half
of the said parcel of land. Respondent spouses were ordered the
 SALES || 11.14.24 || Case Digests 3

execution of the deed of conveyance and issuance of separate FACTS: Bugsuk Lumber Company, Inc., is corporation engaged in
titles. buying and selling lumber and any kind of business concerning
lumber at Balabak, Palawan, and has principal office at 703 San
Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision, citing prescription under Fernando, Binondo, Manila.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, as the action was filed more than
ten years after the cause of action accrued. Bugsuk Lumber Company made sales of lumber to several firms.

The receipt was issued on January 19, 1946. While the case was Office of the Treasurer of the City of Manila sent a demand to the
filed on February 15, 1968. 22 years and 26 days already elapsed. Company for the payment of license fees and mayor's permit, on
Therefore, the plaintiffs' action to enforce the alleged written the ground that said business firm was found to be engaged in the
contract (Exh. A or receipt of P1,000) was not brought within the sales of timber products without first securing the required
prescriptive period of ten (10)years from the time the cause of licenses and permit.
action accrued.
As Bugsuk Lumber Co., Inc. refused to pay, City Fiscal of Manila
Hence, this appeal. filed a complaint against petitioner before Municipal Court of
Manila, alleging that Bugsuk is a dealer, selling logs may it be
ISSUE: WON there was a valid sale between Josefina and wholesale or retail.
Nicanora?
Bugsuk denied the allegations and prayed for the complaint's
RULING: Yes, the Court has held that there was a valid sale dismissal.
between Josefina and Nicanora.
Municial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
When the portion of the land was sold to Nicanora, Josefina was
still not the owner of the land (it was still the Villarins'). Bugsuk appealed to CFI Manila, which rendered decision that
Bugsuk indeed sold logs to various firms in wholesale and retail
However, regardless of the fact that the seller was not the owner transactions in Manila, therefore, must pay the required licenses
at the time of sale, the Court ruled that there was a valid sale. and permits.

Sps. Gabar only became owners of the lot when a deed of sale was ISSUE: WON Bugsuk which has a principal office in Manila,
executed in their favor. receiving orders for its products and accepting in said office
payments thereto, can be considered a dealer in this City and is,
Ownership passes to the buyer by operation of law. Petitioner therefore, subject to the payment of the license tax and permit
acquired a good title even if there fees in question?
was only a verbal agreement. Therefore, Nicanora can demand the
execution of the deed of sale. RULING: NO. The Court has held that Bugsuk's principal in Manila
cannot be considered a dealer or store. Thus, it should not be
This is a case of “a seller not being the owner at the time of subject to payment of licenses and permits.
perfection, but eventually the seller was able to acquire ownership
over the thing sold. Buyer then becomes the owner, and she Bugsuk is not a dealer as what it sold was the produce of its
acquired title of it by operation of law, so she can demand the concession in Palawan. A dealer is one who buys to sell again, a
execution of the deed of sale. middleman between the producer and the consumer of the
commodity.
Pursuant to Art. 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[w]hen a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates The Court sees no reason why a producer or manufacturer selling
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, its own produce or manufactured goods should be considered a
such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee," dealer just to make it liable for the corresponding dealer's tax.
Nicanora's payments to Josefina resulted in resulted in the full
payment of the purchase price and the consequential acquisition Bugsuk maintains that the principal office in Manila is used to only
by petitioners of ownership over one-half of the lot. Petitioners received orders and payment from customers, and not for buying
therefore became owners of the one-half portion of the lot in and selling.
question by virtue of a sale which, though not evidenced by a
formal deed, was nevertheless proved by both documentary and And even if it did receive orders of its good and payments, it does
parole evidence. not make Bugsuk a store.

**Prescription Issue:** A store is any place where goods are kept for sale or sold, whether
– The Supreme Court held that the action did not prescribe, by wholesale or retail.
determining that the real basis for the petitioners’ action was not
merely the receipt (Exhibit A) but their continuous possession and Logs were produced in Palawan, not in Manila. The Manila office
ownership of the property. As the sale was consummated by only processed the orders and payments; it did not keep goods
possession, the action was imprescriptible. therein or act as a dealer or intermediary between the field office
and the customers. Thus, it is not liable for the said taxes.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals appealed from are hereby reversed, and the judgment of Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, in its appellant declared exempt from the liabilities sought to be
Civil Case No. 3004, is revived. Costs against private respondents. charged against it under the provisions of the aforementioned
ordinances, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
#4 CITY OF MANILA vs. BUGSUK LUMBER CO
 SALES || 11.14.24 || Case Digests 4

#5 EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP vs. SPOUSES with Cruz and the themselves delivered the books voluntarily to
LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name Cruz.
and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and CA
** As actual delivery of the books were made, Cruz acquired
FACTS: One Professor Jose Cruz placed an order via phone of 406 ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to
books from petitioner company, EDCA Publishing & Distributing the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
Corp., payable on delivery. them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of
P8,995.65. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the
petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Suspicious over Cruz's second order when the first check was not
yet cleared, EDCA later found out that Cruz was not a dean nor an #6 JOSE AZNAR vs. RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO and TEODORO SANTOS
employeE of De La Salle and that he has no more account or (intervenor)
deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had
drawn the payment check. FACTS: Sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two
metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500.
Cruz, whose real name was Tomas de la Pena, was later arrested
and stated that he sold the 120 books to the private respondents, A certain L. De Dios went to Santos' residence and informed Irineo,
Spouses Leonor and Gerardo Santos. Teodoro's son, that his uncle, Vicente Marella, is interested to buy
the car.
EDCA with the assistance of police, forced their way to the private
respondents' store and threatened Leonor with prosecution for Marella agreed to buy the car for P14,700.00 on the
buying stolen property. understanding that the price would be paid only after the car had
been registered in his name.
The books were seized without warrant, loaded in EDCA'S van and
were turned over to petitioner company. A deed of sale for the car was executed in Marella's favor and the
registration of the car in Marella's name was effected. However,
Private respondents filed for recovery of the books before the purchased price had not been paid.
Municipal Trial Court after demand of their return was rejected by
EDCA. Marella informed Irineo that he was short by P2,000 and told the
latter to go to his sister's house to get the said amount.
MTC recognized private respondent's ownership of the books. RTC
sustained lower court's decision. CA did the same. Irineo gave the registration papers and deed of sale to Marella.
The car was also gone when Irineo went to the house of Marella's
Hence, this petition. sister.

ISSUES: Irineo later found out that no L. De Dios lived there. He was also
1. WON EDCA may retrieve the books from Santos? not able to find Marella. Thus, he reported the matter to his father
2. WON EDCA had been unlawfully deprived of the books because who promptly advised the police authorities.
the checks were dishonored?
That very same day, Marella was able to sell the car in question to
RULINGS: the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00.

1. NO, EDCA may not retrieve the books as Santos was a while Aznar was attending to its registration in his name, agents of
purchaser in good faith and exercised due diligence when she the Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the same
asked for the invoice from EDCA before purchasing it from Cruz. based on Teodoro's report that the car was unlawfully taken for
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to him.
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael
Yapdiangco, the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit which
As there's no stipulation that ownership shall not pass until full seized the car in question. Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he
payment, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer prayed for its delivery to him. In the course of the litigation,
ownership to the buyer who can in turn Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to intervene by the lower
transfer it to another. Ownership of the books passed to Tomas court.
upon the delivery thereof. He had the right to transfer the same to
Santos. Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is The lower court rendered a decision awarding the disputed motor
equivalent vehicle to Teodoro as he has been unlawfully deprived of his
to title. personal property by Marella, from whom the Aznar traced his
right.
2. NO, the Court has held that EDCA had not been unlawfully
deprived of the books because the checks were dishonored as Although Aznar acquired the car in good faith and for a valuable
Santos asked for the title of ownership for the books before consideration from Marella, Teodor was entitled to its recovery on
purchasing the same. the mandate of Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Moreover, the Court ruled that there is no unlawful deprivation in ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good
this case, just because the checks were dishonored. EDCA faith is equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who lost any movable
voluntarily delivered to Cruz the books. Thus, they cannot recover or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
the books when they have been less cautious to their transaction person in possession of the same.
 SALES || 11.14.24 || Case Digests 5

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been

unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.

From this decision, Jose B. Aznar appeals.

ISSUE: WON Teodoro Santos is entitled to the possession of the car

in dispute?

RULING: YES, Teodoro Santos is entitled to the possession of the

car in dispute.

Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under
litigation because the same was never delivered to him.

For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other

property rights, the thing transferred must be delivered, inasmuch
as, according to settled jurisprudence, the tradition of the thing is
a necessary and indispensable requisite in the acquisition of said
ownership by virtue of contract.

So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is not

transferred by contract merely but by delivery. Contracts only
constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of
ownership, while delivery or tradition is the method of
accomplishing the same, the title and the method of acquiring it
being different in our law.

In the case on hand, the car in question was never delivered to the
vendee by the vendor as to complete or consummate the transfer
of ownership by virtue of the contract. It should be recalled that
while there was indeed a contract of sale between Vicente Marella
and Teodoro Santos, the former, as vendee, took possession of the
subject matter thereof by stealing the same while it was in the
custody of the latter's son.

The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil
Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the effect that if
the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of
it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or
robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in
good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article
establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability,
to wit, when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot
retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without
paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a
public sale.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed

and the decision of the lower court affirmed in full. Costs against
the appellant.