Technical Perspectives

Industrial
transformer
fires
Gary Howe EngTech FIFireE, President of the Norfolk and Suffolk branch of the Institution of Fire
Engineers, explores the impact of fires associated with industrial transformers, and how primary fire
risks fall on the oil itself which is used both as an insulator and coolant.

Abstract transformers that supply electrical power. A transformer

Transformers subject to an outage due to fire can be operates on the principle of a changing magnetic field
highly destructive creating very long periods of business moving across a conductor inducing a voltage in that
interruption preventing sites from undertaking their core conductor. The primary windings of a transformer are
activities. supplied with an alternating current which provides the
changing magnetic field that induces voltage in the
Tank rupture due to over pressurisation is a common “secondary” windings. The ratio of the number of turns
cause of oil filled transformer fires. Tank rupture will between the primary and secondary windings is reflected
release substantial quantities of oil, with a resulting oil in the ratio between the primary (input) voltage and the
mist explosion and a long-burning, high heat release, oil secondary (output) voltage. The ratio of the primary and
pool fire. Fire protection and proper construction features secondary voltages equals the ratio of the primary and
are critical to limiting the extent of damage to adjacent secondary turns.
structures and equipment in the event of a transformer fire
(FM Global, 2024) Transformers may be either oil filled or dry (cast resin).
Generally dry transformers have a smaller capacity
The purpose of this article is to arm the reader with the than oil filled units due to the different cooling capacity
knowledge to competently assess the fire risks associated of the design. Dry transformers are air cooled, simpler in
with transformers alongside the appropriate selection design, requiring less maintenance. For this reason, they
of physical barriers, spatial separation, automatic fire are popular in some industries below a certain voltage
detection, fixed fire protection alongside implementation of / power level. However, it is important to be aware that
appropriate inspection, test and maintenance regimes. dry transformers are not risk free, they require good
cooling, regular cleaning and periodic inspection, test and
What is a transformer? maintenance. It should also be remembered that their
Electrical power is the lifeblood of industry. The heart insulation is covered with a thermoplastic coating and so it
of the electrical delivery system are the oil filled power may burn and overheats if the transformer develops a fault.

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 29

Technical Perspectives

What causes transformer fires?

The electrical windings and the magnetic core in a
transformer are subject to a number of different forces
during operation:

♦ Expansion and contraction due to thermal cycling.

♦ Vibration.
♦ Local heating due to magnetic flux.
♦ Impact forces due to through-fault current.
♦ Excessive heating due to overloading or inadequate
cooling.

Common challenges of transformers

The author commonly finds the following global challenges
with transformers:

Inspection, test and maintenance (ITM)

♦ Ageing fleet of transformers requiring an increased ITM
programme.
♦ Absence of testing for corrosive sulphur. Industry
transformer failures attributed to the presence of corrosive
sulphur compounds in the oil results in copper sulphide
deposits within the insulating paper.
♦ Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) contamination checks.

Fixed fire protection

♦ The form of fixed fire protection installed is not the ♦ Gaseous fixed fire protection systems for indoor
transformers with an absence of periodic room
best choice for the intended objective. For example,
integrity testing.
alternatives to conventional deluge or sprinkler
protection have been installed e.g., water mist ♦ Business critical MCC rooms being located directly
above transformers.
with unsubstantiated claims of ‘equivalency’ with
conventional sprinkler protection.
♦ Unrecognised implication of high air flow velocities (e.g., Automatic fire detection
wind speed where for example water mist has been ♦ The selection and efficacy of automatic fire detection
selected as the preferred form of fixed fire protection). capability is misunderstood or never properly investigated.
♦ Fixed fire protection installed is the correct choice but
poorly implemented. Fire walls.
♦ Design code is not properly understood and not ♦ Gaps in walls – bus duct transition.
correctly applied. ♦ Fire walls not extending above the height of the
♦ System design never verified against intended conservator tank.
application.
♦ Incorrectly spaced frangible bulb sprinkler heads installed Compound
in contravention to the appropriate code of practice ♦ Bund integrity compromised.
e.g. NFPA 13. ♦ Rock filled pit clogged.
♦ Absence of periodic functional and discharge testing
(inspector test facility) for fixed fire protection systems to Radiant heat transfer and projectiles.
verify their operational readiness. ♦ A lack of appreciation of the implication of radiant heat
♦ Manual systems, which bring the inherent risk of human flux from a large pool fire impacting on nearby plant,
error or delay. equipment, and adjacent buildings.
♦ Inadequate water supplies e.g. fire hydrants for fire & ♦ Absence of mitigation measures e.g. fire wall to control
rescue services to achieve final extinguishment. burning projectiles impacting adjacent steel work, cables

30 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 and enclosed equipment in electrical cabinets. The
likelihood of projectiles during the loss event should be
“Whilst mineral oil is a highly
considered feasible that in the event of a catastrophic
loss event projectiles from the transformer will impact the effective coolant and dielectric
adjacent areas. insulating fluid in transformers, its
♦ Deficiency of structural strength of blast wall surrounding
transformer to contain any deflagration (blast) event.
main drawback is the flashpoint
and fire point of the oil itself.”
Exposure
♦ Transformers being located very close proximity to
business critical plant and equipment.

Combustible liquids such as transformer mineral oil are

Emergency service response
classified according to their flashpoints and fire points.
♦ Lack of appreciation of the predetermined attendance
Flashpoint is the lowest temperature of the test portion,
time of fire & rescue services response to commence
corrected to a standard barometric pressure of 101,3 kPa, at
firefighting operations especially in remote geographical
which application of an ignition source causes the vapour
areas.
of the test portion to ignite and the flame to propagate
across the surface of the liquid under the specified
Selection of cooling oil
conditions of test (ISO, 2016)
Mineral oil has been commonly used for many years
for both cooling and electrical insulation purposes in
Fire point is lowest temperature of the test portion,
transformers (M&I Materials, 2016). Whilst mineral oil is a
corrected to a barometric pressure of 101,3 kPa, at which
highly effective coolant and dielectric insulating fluid in
application of a test flame causes the vapour of the test
transformers, its main drawback is the flashpoint and fire
portion to ignite and sustain burning for a minimum of 5 s
point of the oil itself.
under the specified conditions of test (ISO, 2000).

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 31

Technical Perspectives

Table 1: Comparison of flash and fire points for differing oil types.

Fluid Flashpoint ISO 2719 Fire Point ISO 2592

This International Standard describes three This International Standard specifies a procedure
procedures, A, B and C, using the Pensky-Martens for the determination of flash and fire points of
closed cup tester, for determining the flash point of petroleum products using the Cleveland open cup
combustible liquids, liquids with suspended solids, apparatus. It is applicable to petroleum products
liquids that tend to form a surface film under the having an open cup flash point above 79 °C, except
test conditions, biodiesel and other liquids in the fuel oils, which are most commonly tested by the
temperature range of 40 °C to 370 °C. closed cup procedure described in ISO 2719.

Mineral oil 150oC 170 oC

Synthetic Ester 260 oC 316 oC

Natural Ester >260 oC 350 oC

Whilst listed and approved higher flashpoint oils are available

#On load tap changers
and capable of being a replacement for traditional mineral
♦ Malfunction of mechanical switching mechanism.
oils. The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) should be
♦ High resistance contacts.
consulted to ascertain their fitness of use for each specific
♦ Overheating.
transformer before considering the switch to a higher
♦ Contamination of insulating oil.
flashpoint mineral oil.
#Bushings
Synthetic and natural ester fluids are a potential dielectric ♦ General aging.
solution. Synthetic ester is based on a natural source and is ♦ Contamination.
referred to as “synthetic organic ester” in accordance with IEC ♦ Cracking.
61099 and IEC 61203 standards. Natural esters are derived from ♦ Internal moisture.
organic sources, such as rapeseed and soybean oil.
#Core Problems

Synthetic and natural ester fluids tend to be more expensive

♦ Core insulation failure.

compared to traditional mineral oils, the removal of

♦ Open ground strap.

equipment such as fire suppression systems, or reductions in

♦ Shorted laminations

containment are potential benefits (M&I Materials, 2016)

♦ Core overheating.

#Miscellaneous
What can fail in oil filled transformers? ♦ Current transformer issues.
Oil-filled transformers can withstand a certain number ♦ Oil leakage.
of discharges if these are not too energetic. But each ♦ Oil contamination.
discharge causes degradation of the liquid and eventually
the transformer may suffer a catastrophic failure due to this
degradation. (Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 2016)
Resilience ambition
The starting point before deciding on the type of protection
and risk mitigation measures required for transformers is
#Windings to first analyse the potential risks. This will assist with the
Insulation deterioration from: identification of critical aspects to consider. Without this
there is a risk of much time and effort being spent that is
♦ Moisture. The dielectric strength of transformer oil also
poorly focused and fails to achieve the financial protection
decreases rapidly with the absorption of moisture – as
anticipated. To define the resilience ambition, goals should
little as one part water in 40,000 parts oil (25ppm) can
be established early. The following are examples of key
reduce breakdown voltage by 50 percent ambient
points to consider:
temperature (M&I Materials, 2016)
♦ Overheating. ♦ Has the business interruption time and period to full
♦ Vibration. reinstatement been fully understood and calculated?
♦ Voltage surges. ♦ Has an emergency response plan been formulated?
♦ Mechanical stress from through-faults. ♦ Is there retention on site of critical spares?

32 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 Technical Perspectives

♦ Is the realistic procurement time for a replacement Transformers protection

transformer understood?
An important step in the assessment is to understand firstly
♦ Are protection measures designed to remain viable for inspection test and maintenance (ITM) and potential control
all plant operation modes and during inspection, test and
measures for the transformer (see Table 2). The ITM controls
maintenance? For example, what happens when the fire
form an integral part of the assessment, condition if long-
detection or fire protection system is impaired?
term reliability of the transformer is a core objective.

Following the development of the resilience ambition the next

step is to think of the protection levels required.

Table 2: Areas of focus and control measures

Area of focus Control measures

Risk assessment as part of oil reconditioning programme.

Periodic oil sampling/analysis.

Annual 3rd party inspection

Oil
Trending of oil analysis.

Oil leaks monitored daily.

Oil level checks daily.

Local resistance Power and discharge checks.

Heating Handheld monitoring.
Online monitoring.

Housekeeping Regular physical inspections.

Flood Flood and natural catastrophes assessments.

Buckholz protection Trip testing undertaken as part of ITM.

Outage programme Full inspection as part of planned outage.

Power Networks Tripping signals tested and verified by Power Network Company.

Thermography Planned periodic thermography.

Arc protection Internal – Oil Analysis and Partial Discharge Testing.

Electrical Site earthing. Lighting protection. Earthing resistor for each transformer is checked as part of outage
programme.

Ingress protection Incoming protection.

Surge protection Switchgear MMC surge protection.

Overload Seperate distribution panels. Trips tested as part of ITM programme.

Short circuits Arc flashing protection within windings.

Cooling fans Inspection, test and maintenance for underside fans.

Critical spares Partial critical spares held on site.

Pressure Mechanical pressure relief.

Bunding 110% bunding for enclosure.

Gravel Gravel does not conduct electricity, which reduces the risk of electrical conduction in the event of
a current leak or equipment damage & in the event of an oil leak from the transformer, gravel helps
drain the oil towards the designated collection basin and acts as a fire-resistant layer.

Security 2.2m high palisade fence.

Access procedure.
Locked compound.
CCTV for general area.
Terrorism risk assessment.

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 33

Technical Perspectives

Outdoor oil-insulated transformers

Outdoor oil-insulated transformers should be separated from
adjacent structures and from each other by either:

♦ Firewalls,
♦ Spatial separation,
♦ Or other approved means for the purpose of limiting the
damage and potential spread of fire from a transformer
failure (National Fire Protection Association, 2020).

Determination of the type of physical separation to be used

between transformers, control equipment, and building
structures should be based on a detailed analysis of the
following points:

♦ Insurance requirements of the construction or operational

insurer.
♦ Type and quantity of oil in the transformer.
♦ Size of a postulated oil spill (surface area and depth).
♦ Type of construction of adjacent structures.
♦ Type and number of exposed equipment and buildings,
including high line structures, motor control center (MCC)
equipment, breakers, other transformers, and so forth.
Refer to loss lesson case studies.
♦ Power rating of the transformer.
♦ Objective of the fire protection system provided.
♦ Efficacy of the automatic fire detection systems provided.
♦ Type of electrical protective relaying provided.
♦ Availability of replacement transformers (with realistic
lead times of anything up to 18-24 months this is a
highly important consideration to mitigate the business
interruption risk)
♦ The existence of fast depressurization systems. Table 3: NFPA 850. (National Fire Protection Association, 2020)
♦ Anticipated radiant heat flux from a pool fire at the
Transformer Oil Capacity Minimum (line of Sight)
transformer causing damage to adjacent steel work, Separation without Firewall
cables and enclosed equipment in electrical cabinets.
♦ Structural stability of a fire wall to contain blast pressure. Gal L Ft M

<500 <1893 5 1.5

Once analysis of the aforementioned points have been
considered they can then form the decision-making process 500-5000 1893-18.925 25 7.6
within the Fire Protection Design Basis Document.
>5000 >18,925 50 15

Fire walls.
♦ Where a firewall is required and provided, there are two Separation can be achieved from adjacent structures by a
potential options when seeking guidance for fire walls and 2-hour-rated firewall or by spatial separation in accordance
separation distances which is dependent on type and with Table 3. Where a firewall is provided between structures
quantity of oil. and a transformer, it should extend vertically and horizontally
♦ NFPA 850 Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for above the height of the conservator tank. A minimum height
Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current of 1m is recommended. Whilst the minimum height above
Converter Stations (National Fire Protection Association, the conservator tank is stated as 0.3048m in NFPA 850, it is
2020) recommended that a safety margin is added to this of 0.7m to
♦ IEC BS EN IEC 61936-1:2021. allow for adverse wind conditions.

34 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 Technical Perspectives

Table 4: BS EN IEC 61936-1:2021 – TC Power installations exceeding

1 kV AC and 1,5 kV DC - A
(British Standards Institute, 2021)

Transformer Oil Capacity Minimum (line of Sight) Separation without Firewall

Transformer type Liquid volume Clearance to other Clearance to other

transformers or building transformers or building
surface of non-combustible surface of combustible
material. material.

Oil insulated transformers L M m

1000 ≤ …<2000 3 7.5

2000≤ …< 20,000 5 10

20,000≤ …< 45,000 10 20

≥45,000 15 30

Less flammable liquid 1000 ≤ …≤38,000 1.5 7.5

insulated transformers
(K) without enhance >38,000 4.5 15
protection.

Less flammable liquid Clearance to building surface or adjacent transformers

insulated transformers (K)
with enhanced protection. Horizontal (m) Vertical (m)

0.9 1.5

Dry type transformers Fire behaviour class Clearance to building surface or adjacent transformers

Horizontal (m) Vertical (m)

F0 1.5 3.0

F1 None None

Fire Wall case study

At a site in the Netherlands in 2017 a fire occurred in a arrives to commence firefighting operations. Furthermore,
mineral oil transformer. The benefit of a correctly designed in order to achieve final extinguishment adequate water
and suitably constructed fire wall for the protection of supplies will need to be available and therefore the
transformers is visually demonstrated by figure 1 on the next adequacy of fire hydrants and/or availability of nearby
page. A fire occurred in a transformer adjacent and due to the open water sources should be assessed and verified as fit
effectiveness of the fire wall surrounding the transformer the for purpose.
transformer in figure 1 was totally unaffected by the fire.
Automatic fire detection
Emergency services The appropriate form of fire detection is extremely critical for
early detection of transformer fires. Automatic fire detection
Challenges
should be designed and installed in accordance with
Emergency service intervention may be delayed because
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code (National
of geographical location which impacts on the time to
Fire Protection Association, 2022). End users are faced
mobilise on site firefighters and additional support from
with a multitude of options when choosing automatic fire
off‑site emergency services. Fires occurring without
detection, the correct selection is critical and should only be
automatic fixed fire protection can be expected to be in the
undertaken by a competent person.
fully developed phase by the time the emergency service

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 35

Technical Perspectives

Figure 1: Source: G.Howe. An example of an adequately designed Figure 2: Source: G.Howe. An example of an adequately designed fire
three-sided fire wall for a transformer located in the Netherlands. wall for a transformer located in South America. Note the height of the
Note the height of the wall above the height of the conservator tank. wall above the height of the conservator tank.

Heat detection. Frangible bulb sprinklers

The key challenge with automatic heat detection is to The use of frangible glass bulb sprinklers located above the
verify via manufacturers data sheet the response time transformer can have a dual purpose. Firstly, as a ‘pilot’ line
index (RTI) of the specific heat detection device to verify its and trigger mechanism for deluge fire protection systems
suitability. The response time index (m½ s½) is a measure and secondly as a means of sending a ‘fire’ signal to the site
of pure thermal sensitivity, which indicates how fast the fire alarm system to alert first responders. A critical aspect to
means of detection can absorb heat from its surroundings consider is the achievement of ‘thermal communication’ with
sufficient to cause activation. For example, a heat detector the frangible bulb in other words the energy emitted from the
with a high RTI will take longer to activate than heat fire needs to be in direct contact with the sprinkler head itself.
detector with a low RTI. It is critical to consider the following points:

♦ Height of the frangible bulbs above the transformers.

The efficacy of heat detection will depend on the
♦ Temperature rating of the frangible bulbs in use.
manufacturers listing and approval and variables
♦ Spacing of the sprinkler heads on the pilot line.
including (wind, height above transformer, ambient
♦ Anticipated wind speed.
temperature amongst others) all of which should be
carefully considered. The challenge with heat detection is
If these points are considered, then the efficacy of the fire
the relatively show response time index (RTI) in other words
protection system is more likely to be assured.
the fire will be in the growth phase before this form of
detection will activate. This is an aspect to be mindful of.

Infra-red flame detectors

Triple infra-red (IR) flame detectors are a highly reliable
form of automatic detection for the detection of incipient
transformer fires providing both high performance capability
coupled with a high false alarm immunity. IR flame detectors
do need to have a clear line of sight between the IR detector
and the fire; it is important that this is periodically verified as
the effectiveness of the flame detector may be compromised
if obstructions are not carefully considered. The reluctance to
use IR flame detectors is in the authors experience primarily
down to cost. Figure 3: Source: G.Howe. Example of fire wall containing fire spread.

36 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 Technical Perspectives

Fixed fire protection ♦ Transformer protection shall provide complete water spray
impingement on all exposed exterior surfaces.
A holistic approach should be taken in order to deal with
challenges posed by transformer fires. Conventional sprinkler ♦ Where there is insufficient space to install water spray
nozzles underneath transformers such that the water
protection or water spray fixed fire protection are historically
spray cannot directly impinge upon the bottom surfaces, it
the two forms of fixed fire protection with provenance for
shall be permitted to protect the surfaces underneath the
this application.
transformer by horizontal projection or by nozzles directed
to cool the area below the transformer projections.
Water is the most suitable and effective medium for
suppressing transformer fires due to the following attributes: ♦ The water shall be applied at a net rate not less than 0.25
gpm/ft2 [10.2 (L/min)/m2] of projected area of rectangular
♦ Heat energy absorption by large water droplets. prism envelope for the transformer and its appurtenances,
♦ Coarser sprays which penetrate the fire plume in order to and not less than 0.15 gpm/ft2 [6.1 (L/min)/m2] on the
reach the base of the fire. expected nonabsorbent ground surface area of exposure.
♦ Large water droplets penetrate flow of smoke and survive (National Fire Protection Association, 2022)
transport through hot gases.
♦ Effective surface cooling. NFPA 850
NFPA 850: Recommended Practice for Electric Generating
The following key principles should be considered: Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations
(National Fire Protection Association, 2020)
♦ Particular care should be exercised in locating sprinkler
heads or nozzles so that they are in a position to provide ♦ Fire protection water spray systems provided for
good coverage and impingement on all exposed surfaces. transformer-rectifier sets should be designed for a density
♦ Transformer obstructions should be considered. Consider of 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10.2 mm/min) over the exposed surface of
obstructions which may shield water spray pattens. the transformer-rectifier set. Automatic sprinkler systems
♦ The worst-case hydraulic demand should be calculated. should be designed for a density of 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10.2
mm/min) over 500 ft2 (325 m2). (National Fire Protection
These aspects need to be considered by a competent person. Association, 2020)
Where applicable, recognised and robust fire protection
standards should be applied. The following additional criteria NFPA 750 Water mist
should also be considered for long term dependability and Sprinkler systems and water mist systems can inadvertently
robustness of the system: be considered as equivalent; however, this is not the case as
they perform very different roles. It’s common for promotors
♦ Power supply connections to firefighting pumps – consider
of water mist to state that water mist has equivalency with
the need for duplicate supplies - primary and secondary
sprinkler systems.
for increased robustness.
♦ Whistle in principle relying on a single firefighting pump
The design concept for sprinkler systems is historically based
might be acceptable, if impaired the firefighting system
upon a design density in mm/min over a specified area for
is then out of service. The use of duplicate pumps is best
each hazard category whereas water mist is much more
practice for long term reliability.
challenging, as water mist is different, as it requires the fire to
♦ Extended water supply duration for prolonged firefighting
drive the extinguishing process.
operations.
♦ Permanently fitted flow meter or test header facility for
There is no concept of a ‘safety factor’ which have been
pump set(s) to verify pump plate performance annually.
historically built into sprinklers systems over a long period of
time. The problem of designing a water mist system is mostly
Codes of practice
a mist transport problem. To be effective for the application of
NFPA 15 Water spray fixed systems transformers, the water mist needs:
Water spray fixed fire protection are to be designed and
installed in accordance with NFPA15: Standard for Water Spray ♦ Sufficient kinetic energy to overcome the turbulent
gases moving upwards and overcome vigorous
fixed Systems for Fire Protection (National Fire Protection
windspeed as transformers are typically located
Association, 2022)
externally.

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 37

Technical Perspectives

♦ Sufficient airborne suspension for an adequate period of

time to avoid reignition.
“Good standards of fixed fire
♦ Optimal surface area of water that is available for heat
energy absorption and evaporation. protection, inspection test and
♦ Optimum droplet size and characteristics to enable maintenance and housekeeping
effective heat transfer. Smaller droplets which remain
airborne provide radiant heat attenuation, in other
are the key factors in the mitigation
words shielding of radiation in order to reduce the rate of the risks of a transformer fire.”
at which fire spread to unignited fuel surfaces.

Where water mist has been evaluated as the most

appropriate solution by a competent person for
supply stipulations and periodic test facilities to enable
protection of a transformer, it is essential that the
functional testing to take place, all of which should be
system uses approved and accredited components
considered before the system is accepted.
and equipment listed by a recognised and suitable
testing laboratory. This should be based upon a globally
Best practice
recognised standard or code of practice, augmented
Good standards of fixed fire protection, inspection test and
by an independent and robust test protocol installed by
maintenance and housekeeping are the key factors in the
trained personnel in accordance with the manufacturer’s
mitigation of the risks of a transformer fire. For example,
design and installation manual.
consider:

Similar to other fixed fire protection systems additional ♦ Oil used to be a listed fire-retardant fluid. The use of higher
operational criteria may be required to satisfy the flashpoint fire-retardant fluids is beneficial if compatible
requirements of AHJ’s to provide additional resilience with operating specifications.
performance measures for water mist systems such as ♦ When calculating water supply durations from
integrity of power supply connections, increased water hydrant networks a minimum 120 min duration is
recommended to facilitate prolonged firefighting and final
extinguishment efforts.
♦ Provide fire hydrants in accordance with NFPA 291
Recommended Practice for Water Flow Testing and
Marking of Hydrants (National Fire Protection Association,
2022). Fire hydrants should be clearly identified on the
emergency plans. Ensure the hydrant network is subject to
periodic inspection, test and maintenance (ITM) including
flow testing. Results of flow tests which should record
pressure (psi) and flow (usgpm) obtained. Verification of
available pressure and flow rates is advisable, this should
be undertaken annually.
♦ Creation of a fire emergency plan in accordance with
NFPA 1660 Standard for Emergency, Continuity and Crisis
Management: Preparedness, Response and Recovery
(National Fire Protection Association, 2024)
♦ Liaison with site emergency teams to ensure they
are aware of access and facilities on site. This allows
preparation and planning for any incident.
♦ Ensure there is clear unobstructed access and suitable
hard standing areas for emergency service vehicles to
access the transformer for firefighting.
♦ Provide electrical grounding of the transformer in order to
prevent static electricity.
♦ Provide on-line monitoring of critical parameters.

38 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 Technical Perspectives

♦ Critical spares for conveyors should be kept on site This case study highlights the importance of spatial
including those recommended by the original equipment separation of transformers from business-critical
manufacturer (OEM). infrastructure and the economic costs associated
with a major transformer outage. Refer to NFPA 850
On site evaluation process Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric
When evaluating transformers, a competent person should Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current
consider the following areas as part of their site assessment: Converter Stations (National Fire Protection Association,

♦ Has the fire protection system been designed in 2020) for guidance on fire wall separation.

accordance with appropriate and recognised standards

or codes of practice?
Case study 2 – 90 MVA, 10.5/50 kV
♦ Is the fire protection system design appropriate for the
transformer
application?
An energy from waste site (EFW) with an integral gas
♦ Is the fire protection system periodically functionally
turbine power station in the Netherlands has a transformer
discharge tested?
containing 50,000L of mineral oil located externally
♦ Are the fire walls in adherence to NFPA 850 or IEC
adjacent the main turbine hall building on site which is clad
guidance?
with non-combustible double skin profile metal sheeting
♦ Is there a robust and reliable ITM programme in place?
to the roofline. However, a noted detrimental feature was
identified in the form of significant ventilation openings in
Case study 1 – 20MVA transformer the wall façade immediately adjacent the transformer.
On the 29th of March 2022 a severe electrical fault occurred
at a mine site in South Africa resulting in a external A further detrimental feature identified was related to the
transformer fire leading to a deflagration event, major existing fire suppression system where coverage did not
power failure and significant fire and explosion damage. extend to the conservator tank on the transformer and as
This event required the attendance of the mine surface such does not meet the requirements of NFPA 850 (National
emergency team to undertake offensive firefighting actions. Fire Protection Association, 2020).

Following a site assessment, it was assessed that should

The transformer which was not fitted with fixed fire
a catastrophic failure of the transformer occur, the
protection was located within the main fenced area of
transformer would not be adequately protected. The
the adjacent 132kV National Grid electrical compound.
adjacent building which houses the business-critical
Positioned just 5m away from the transformer was the
gas turbine, and contents, are now at an increased
main electrical substation with no suitable fire wall
risk of significant loss. In the event of a transformer fire
separation between the transformer and the substation.
the fabric, structure and contents of the buildings are
potentially likely to suffer significant damage resulting
As a result of the fire, a significant disruption occurred to
in forced shut down of the associated EFW line and
the critical core activities of the mine:
generator.
♦ All high voltage lines feeding the site tripped causing
significant disruption. As part of the assessment of risk it was important to
♦ 100% loss of the affected 20MVA transformer. further understand the anticipated height of the vertical
♦ Major and unrepairable damage to the adjacent fire plume to understand the likely fire spread emanating
substation including the windows being blown out from a transformer fire. Gunnar Heskestad (Society of Fire
by the deflagration event and significant internal fire Protection Engineers Handbook, 2016) derived a correlation
damage to the MCC room containing the electrical model for flame height of pool fires assuming markedly
switchgear and associated panels. fast reaction kinetics. The model assumed:
♦ Loss of electrical control equipment supplying the
♦ That the flame would extend to a height where the
business critical compressors which supplies the life
total flux of entrained air at lower levels is sufficient to
safety air supply to the mine shaft.
complete the combustion reactions (recognizing that
♦ Cost of repair and reinstatement estimated at
much of the air entrained below the flame tip never
£850,000.
takes part in the combustion reactions).

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 39

Technical Perspectives

♦ That the air demand from the surroundings is ∙ " = 0.039 · 0.99 = 0.03897 Kgm–2
Mass rate of burning m
proportional to the stoichiometric requirements of the
∙ " X ΔHc (Drysdale, 2011)
Q: Heat release rate (HRR) = Aſ m
pyrolysis gases.
♦ That the total entrainment rate obeys the relationship Q: Heat release rate (HRR) = 30m2 · 0.03897Kgm-2 · 0.85 ·
established by Ricou and Spalding for the local 46.44MJ/Kg
entrainment rate in jets of different density than
Q: Heat release rate (HRR) = 30m2 · 0.03897Kgm-2 · 0.85 ·
the surroundings. The following relationship for
46,440KJ/Kg
dimensionless flame height was derived for the local
entrainment rate in jets of different density than the Q: Heat release rate (HRR) = 46,149.05kW
surroundings. 2
Flame height L/D= -1.02D + 0.235·Q 5
–

2
The flame height of a liquid spill or pool fire can be Flame height L/D= -1.02 · 10.5 + 0.235 · 46,149.05 5 = 6.53m
–

calculated on the experimental correlation developed

This calculated the potential flame height as 6.53m; which
by Heskestad (Society of Fire Protection Engineers
would mean that the fire plume would penetrate the open
Handbook, 2016)
vented structure of the gas turbine hall via the vent openings.
2
L/D= -1.02D+0.235Q 5 Assumptions:
–

L= Flame length (m) Normal atmospheric & wind conditions prevail.

D= Diameter (m) Calculated flame height is not applicable to the initial

deflagration event of a transformer failure.
Q = Kw

The correlation developed by Heskestad has been shown to Case study 3 – Generator step up
be quite robust for different fuels over a wide range of liquid transformer (GSUT)
pool fires only. The following calculation was undertaken An energy from waste site (EFW) with an integral gas
based on the specific characteristics of the transformer: turbine power station in Ireland was found to have a

Liquid quantity: 50,000L mineral oil. transformer containing 37,000L of mineral oil located
12.66m from nearby non-combustible radiative cooling
Area of pool fire: 30m2 towers, electrical equipment and critical infrastructure.

Combustion efficiency: 85%. The GSUT is only partially enclosed by a fire wall.

Heat of combustion: 46.44.7MJKg–1 (SFPE, 2016) The purpose of the exercise was to understand if the

∙ ∞ is an empirical constant this

Mass rate of burning m adjacent plant and equipment would be exposed to a

is asymptotic mass loss rate per unit area as the pool value of radiation intensity above a specified level which

diameter increases towards infinity - 0.039 (kg m–2 s–1) would have the potential to weaken the structural steel

(SFPE, 2016) support structure for the cooling towers.

Kβ: optical properties of the fire plume an empirical A point source estimate of radiant flux is conceptually
constant is used which is the product of the extinction the simplest representation configurational model of
absorption coefficient k and the beam-length corrector β - a radiant source used in calculating the heat flux from
1.9 –1 (SFPE, 2016) a flame to target located outside the flame. To predict

∙ " X ΔHc (Drysdale, 2011)

Heat release rate (HRR) = Aſ m the thermal radiation field of flames, it is customary to
model the flame based on the point source located at
Af: Area of fire (m2) the centre of a flame. The point source model provides

D: Diameter: Based on a transformer compound area size a simple relationship that varies as the inverse

of 10m · 3m (30m2). Diameter = 10.5m (rounded up). square of the distance, R. For an actual point source
of radiation or a spherical source of radiation, the
∙ ”: Mass rate of burning m
m ∙"=m
∙ " ∞ (1 – e–kβD) (SFPE, 2016)
distance R is simply the distance from the point or from

∙ ” = 0.039 · (1 – e–0.7·10.5)
Mass rate of burning m the centre of the sphere to the target.

40 The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51

 Technical Perspectives

The SFPE handbook (Society of Fire Protection Engineers, In the presence of wind, the flames may not remain
2016) has been used for the primary source for the vertical. Thermal radiation to the surrounding objects
calculations. Page 3451 table A.35 lists critical heat flux and will change in the presence of a significant wind. In other
thermal response parameters of a wide range of materials. words, the flame will tilt forwards to the receiving target.
The critical heat flux intensity has been assessed as 10- In additions, the calculations do not take into account
15kW/m required for the pilot ignition of electrical cabling.
2
flying projectiles.

Radiative heat flux is given by:

In summary
Radiative fraction · Qr
Transformer fires pose a significant challenge which can
Indicent radiative heat flux: q"// = 4 π radial distance2 result in major periods of business interruption.
(Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 2016)
The following are further areas of focus:
Radiative fraction: This is the fraction of the heat release
rate emitted as radiation, as a function of the pool ♦ Possible source of collateral damage / escalation to
diameter A value of 0.60 for radiative fraction was selected. adjacent plant and equipment.
♦ Often considered trouble free and easy to overlook.
Qr: : Total radiative energy measured in Watts.
♦ Failures occur suddenly and catastrophically.
Liquid quantity: 37,000L mineral oil. ♦ Potential source of liability due environmental airborne
pollution.
Area of pool fire: 40m2
♦ Often bespoke designs (limits readily available spares)
Combustion efficiency: 85%. ♦ Impact on process flow not always fully appreciated.
♦ Business interruption - protracted lead times (18 months,
Heat of combustion: 46.44.7MJ Kg–1 (SFPE, 2016)
perhaps more). Post COVID 19 and Brexit lead times for
∙ ∞ : 0.039 (kg m s ) (SFPE, 2016)
Mass rate of burning: m –2 –1 transformers continue to elongate.
♦ Business continuity plan – availability, transportation
Kβ: 1.9 m–1 (SFPE, 2016)
routes – site may be in a remote geographical location.
∙ " X ΔHc
Heat release rate (HRR) = Aſ m ♦ Needs a robust maintenance approach.
♦ Large fleet of ageing assets
Af: Area of fire (m2)
♦ Health status assessments are very established and
D: Diameter: Based on a transformer compound area size should be considered.

of 10m · 4m (40m ). Diameter = 10.5m.

2

A full assessment of the hazard posed by transformers

∙ ": Mass rate of burning m
m ∙ " = m
∙ " ∞ (1 – e–kβD)
requires a thorough understanding of the mechanisms
∙ " = 0.039 · (1 – e
Mass rate of burning m )
–0.7 · 10.5 involved. If the challenges are not fully recognised the
protection measures in place may not provide the return in
∙ " = 0.039 · 0.99 = 0.03897 Kgm–2
Mass rate of burning m
investment expected. A false sense of security may exist if
∙ " X ΔHc
Q: Heat release rate (HRR) = Aſ m the level of protection is not adequate to protect the risks.

Heat release rate (HRR) = 40m2 · 0.03897Kgm–2 · 0.85 ·

Additional operational criteria may be required to satisfy
46,440KJ Kg
the requirements of authorities having jurisdiction. These

Heat release rate (HRR) = 61.53kW include additional resilience measures such as three-sided
fire walls, duplicate firefighting pumps, dual power supply
Indicent radiative heat flux: (12.66m from the centre line of
connections to firefighting pumps, longer duration water
the transformer):
supply capability, flow test facilities for annual testing of
0.60 · 61,530
q"// = = 8.33kW/m 2 firefighting pumps.
4 π 160.27

The calculated radiative heat flux was assessed as being

Employing a competent persons to effectively assess the
< the 10-15kW/m2 upper limit set to affect adjacent plant
risks lies at the epicentre of the challenges associated with
and equipment and therefore no additional measures
transformer fires, alongside the appropriate selection of
were recommended. However, the calculations has been
automatic fire and fixed fire protection systems. The main
undertaken in wind free conditions.

The journal of the Institution of Fire Engineers | February 2025 Issue No 51 41

 Technical Perspectives

objective lies in mitigating the risks associated with business National Fire Protection Association, 2022. NFPA 15 Standard for Water
Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection, s.l.: NFPA.
interruption so that core processing activities are unaffected.
National Fire Protection Association, 2022. NFPA 291 Recommended
Practice for Water Flow Testing and Marking of Hydrants, s.l.: NFPA.
References
British Standards Institute, 2021. BS EN IEC 61936-1:2021 - TC. [Online] National Fire Protection Association, 2022. NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm
Available at: https://knowledge.bsigroup.com/products/power- and Signaling Code®, s.l.: NFPA.
installations-exceeding-1-kv-ac-and-1-5-kv-dc-ac?version=tracked National Fire Protection Association, 2024. NFPA 1660 Standard for
[Accessed 9 September 2024]. Emergency, Continuity, and Crisis Management: Preparedness,
Drysdale, D., 2011. In: An introduction to fire dyanmics 3rd edition. Response, and Recovery, s.l.: NFPA.
Chicester: Wiley, p. 235. National Fire Protection Associaton, 2023. NFPA 25 - Standard for the
FM Global, 2024. Transformers, s.l.: FM Global. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection
Systems, s.l.: NFPA.
FPA, 2020. Water mist its complicated. s.l., FPA.
NFPA 1620, n.d. Standard for Pre-Incident Planning. s.l.:s.n.
ISO, 2000. ISO 2592:2000(en) Determination of flash and fire points -
Cleveland open cup method. [Online] SFPE, 2016. In: M. J.Hurley, ed. Society of Fire Protection Engineers
Available at: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:2592:ed-2:v1:en Handbook. New York: Springer, p. 402.
[Accessed 14 October 2024]. SFPE, 2016. In: M. J.Hurley, ed. Society of Fire Protection Engineers
ISO, 2016. ISO 2719:2016(EN) Determination of flashpoint - Pensky- Handbook. New York: Springer, pp. 865 - table 26.21.
martens closed cup method. [Online] Society of Fire Protection Engineers Handbook, 2016. In: M. J.Hurley, ed.
Available at: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:2719:ed-4:v1:en SFPE Handbook. New York: Springer, p. 402.
[Accessed 14th October 2024].
Society of Fire Protection Engineers Handbook, 2016. In: M. J.Hurley, ed.
M&I Materials, 2016. Protecting what matters in critical power SFPE Handbook. New York: Springer, pp. 865 - table 26.21.
transmission and distribution, Manchester: M&I Materials.
Society of Fire Protection Engineers Handbook, 2016. SFPE Handbook of
National Fire Protection Association, 2020. NFPA 850 Recommended Fire Protection Engineering. In: M. J.Hurley, ed. New York: Springer, pp.
Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High 396-428.
Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations, s.l.: NFPA.
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 2016. SFPE Handbook of Fire
National Fire Protection Association, 2022. NFPA 13 Standard for the Protection, New York: Springer.
Installation of Sprinkler Systems, s.l.: NFPA.

Engineer
AM AN

Nothing says professional like letters after your name

Incorporated Engineer (IEng) professional registration Becoming registered as IEng:
not only recognises your proven commitment, skills n Demonstrates that you

and experience, but also identifies to employers are a professional

n Can improve your career
that you have the competences, expertise and work prospects and earning potential
ethics that they value. n Provides high status and
self esteem
n Gives you an internationally
Do you have the talent to apply recognised qualification
technology in a practical and creative way?
Why wait when you could
Do you see yourself working in an engineering
be one step closer to
role where on a daily basis it is your skills and becoming IEng TODAY?
know-how that ensure success? If the answer
to both is yes, then why not get your
professionalism recognised by gaining the letters
IEng after your name?

Findout
Find outmore
moreat:at: www.engc.org.uk/ieng
ife.org.uk/engineering-council

IEng-IFE-0.5-4c x4 new brand.indd 4 28/01/2025 11:50