Chinese Studies in History

ISSN: 0009-4633 (Print) 1558-0407 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mcsh20

Absorbing the “Four Borderlands” into “China”:

Chinese Academic Discussions of “China” in the
First Half of the Twentieth Century

Ge Zhaoguang

To cite this article: Ge Zhaoguang (2015) Absorbing the “Four Borderlands” into “China”:
Chinese Academic Discussions of “China” in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, Chinese
Studies in History, 48:4, 331-365, DOI: 10.1080/00094633.2015.1063932

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 Chinese Studies in History, 48(4), 2015, 331–365
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0009-4633 print/ISSN: 1558-0407 online
DOI: 10.1080/00094633.2015.1063932

GE ZHAOGUANG
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Absorbing the “Four Borderlands” into

“China”: Chinese Academic Discussions
of “China” in the First Half of the
Twentieth Century

Abstract: As a historical study, this article attempts to

objectively describe the state of modern China, its territories,
and its peoples, and the process by which they came into being,
focusing on how Chinese academic circles participated in recon-
structing the historical narrative on “China” and the “Chinese
people” in the 1920s and 1930s. It narrates a historical process:
how mainstream Chinese academic circles participated in the
movement to reconstruct “China” and the “Chinese people”
after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, particularly in the 1920s
and 1930s, under the impetus of the historical, political, and
social context of modern China. To a certain extent, their
efforts to absorb the “four borderlands” into “China” may have
hastened the rise of modern China, with its unique territories
and peoples.

Translation © 2015 Taylor & Francis, Inc. from the Chinese text “Na ‘siyi’
ru ‘zhonghua’.” Translated by Carissa Fletcher.
Ge Zhaoguang is a professor at the National Institute for Advanced
Humanistic Studies at Fudan University.

331
 332 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

I. Introduction: How Early Modern China Became a

“State”

In 1958, the American scholar Joseph R. Levenson produced

an absolutist appraisal of China’s shift from tradition to early
modernity in Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, stating:
“In large part the intellectual history of modern China has been
the process of making kuo-chia of t’ien-hsia.”1 This was later
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condensed into the formula “from ‘all under heaven’ to ‘all

nations’” demonstrating how China was compelled to shift from
the traditional concepts of “all under heaven” and the tributary
system toward the new international order of modern world
powers, and from Confucian cultural ideals toward the univer-
sal norms of the modern West.2 The tide of “East meets West”
was undoubtedly the most important factor behind this sea
change. From the cultural influence of the late Ming mission-
aries to the opening of the gates to the “gunships” of the late
Qing, modern Western political institutions, science, tech-
nology, and cultural ideas gradually effected an enormous
transformation of China (including its self-identity).3
However, the changes effected by the “(Western) impact—
(Chinese) response” are only one aspect of modern China’s
transformation: after all, China was an immense traditional
empire, historically destined to become a modern state, and
was unlike any other state (including its neighbor Japan). I
believe that the greatest difference between China and other
nations in its transformation from a traditional empire to a
modern state was not simply the shift “from ‘all under heaven’
to ‘all nations,‘” but also its efforts to “absorb the four border-
lands into China.” In other words, the efforts to gradually
absorb various peripheral peoples into one “Chinese people,”
on the foundation of the territories and peoples of the Qing
Dynasty, ultimately forming one immense (multi-)ethnic modern
“empire” or “state.”
We cannot understand today’s “China” without examining
the intersections of these two historical processes.4 In this paper,
I wish to explain how early modern China was compelled on
the one hand to shift “from ‘all under heaven’ to ‘all nations’”
 SUMMER 2015 333

and made efforts on the other hand to “absorb the four

borderlands into China.” This historical process is closely
related to the following factors:
First, the ideal of “unification” and the concept of “China”
stemming from the traditional Chinese intellectual world
undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the Chinese politicians
and intellectuals reconstructing “China.”
Second, and more importantly, the great Qing Empire’s
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territorial expansion was a key catalyst for many later problems.

The closely succeeding Republic of China and People’s Republic
of China inherited the peoples, territories, and religions of the
Qing Empire; thus any discussion of “Chinese” territories,
peoples, and identity must recognize its roots in the history of
the Qing Dynasty.
Third, the international context had a significant impact on
the identity of “Chinese” peoples and territories, though Japan
is in fact more important here than the West: the pressure from
Japan beginning in 1894 formed the essential backdrop to
China’s territorial, ethnic, and self-identification problems.
This paper focuses on the perspective of history, particularly
academic history, exploring how modern Chinese academic
circles, from historians and archaeologists to anthropologists
and linguists, sought to “absorb the four borderlands into
China” concurrently with the shift “from ‘all under heaven’ to
‘all nations’” during the late Qing and into the Republic,
establishing discourses on “China” (or the “Chinese people”).

II. “Republic of the Five Ethnicities” and “Expelling

the Tatars”: Divergent Reconstructions of “China”
in the Late Qing

The following historical examples may be familiar to the reader,

but are useful in illustrating how “China” was reconstructed in
the late Qing and early Republic.5
After experiencing the Opium Wars, the chaos of the Taiping
Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese Naval War of 1894, the
Hundred Days Reform (1898), and the Boxer Rebellion, the
 334 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

Qing Empire was tottering by the early twentieth century,

dismembered by the Western powers and Japan, and regarded
as illegitimate by domestic revolutionaries. Beginning in 1901,
figures such as Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 repeatedly emphasized
that China should have been ruled by the children of the Yan
Emperor and the Yellow Emperor, but instead the “Eastern
barbarians” (Manchurians) “invaded the heartland, stealing
the throne, and exerting a baneful influence on China.”6 Zhang
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believed that the Manchus and the Chinese were not of the same
race: “Their language, politics, religion, diet, and dwellings all
differ from the homeland.”7 He therefore regarded the fall of
the Ming Dynasty as the conquering of China.8 This was a
popular idea at the time: contemporary revolutionaries used
Han nationalism as a mobilizing force to overthrow the Qing
Dynasty, as preached in Revolutionary Army (革命军 Geming
jun) by Zou Rong 邹容, and Alarm Bell (警世钟 Jingshi zhong)
by Chen Tianhua 陈天华.9
This concept of Chinese versus barbarians gradually took form
beginning in the Song Dynasty. Unlike the Tang Dynasty, which
sought an “infinitely grand” and vast empire where “Chinese and
barbarians were as one,” the Song believed that there was no need
for Chinese and barbarians to interact, seeing the Tang empire as
“worshipping falseness while suffering real maladies.”10 Exclud-
ing the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the Manchu Qing Dynasty,
a policy of essentially shrinking China into a Han kingdom was
upheld from the Song Dynasty to the Ming; this concept evolved
into Han nationalism in the late Qing. Given global trends, the
revolutionaries who incited anti-Qing sentiment through Han
nationalism believed that “today is the era of nationalism.”11
The establishment of the new Republic of China meant expelling
the foreign race: as Zhang Taiyan argued in An Explanation of
the Republic of China, that was why it was called “China,” as
opposed to the “four borderlands” (Manchuria, Tibet, Mongolia,
and the Tarim Basin), which were not to be included in the
Republic of China.12 The post-revolutionary reconstruction
of the “Chinese people” accorded with the Song and Ming
interpretation: a Han nation-state, whose territories reverted
approximately to the 15 provinces of the Ming Dynasty.
 SUMMER 2015 335

However, loyalists and conservatives promoted another line

of thinking. Also in 1901, Liang Qichao 梁启超 published A
Discussion of Chinese History (中国史叙论 Zhongguo shi xulun),
arguing that the Miao, Tibetan, Mongolian, Hun, and Tungusic
ethnicities were the same as the Han race, and should all be
included in “Chinese history” as well as in “China.” To forestall
doubts in his readers regarding a single multiethnic state, he
pointed out that ethnicities constantly diverged and merged
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throughout history, and even the Han race was not singular.
Liang asked rhetorically: Although the Han claim to be the
children of the Yellow Emperor, “could we really stem from
one ancestor?”13 In fact, Liang Qichao did not disapprove of
nationalism, but he did not imitate Zhang Taiyan in using
nationalism as a mobilizing force in an internal ethnic revol-
ution, instead regarding it as an organic concept of external
resistance against foreign imperialism.14 In 1903, Jiang Zhiyou
蒋智由 (a.k.a. Guanyun 观云) published “Historical Impressions
of the People of China in Antiquity” in Issue No. 31 of the
Xinmin congbao (New Citizen), which cited Japanese theories
arguing that the Miao people were the earliest inhabitants of
China, while the Han were a non-native race that arrived later.
In reality, Jiang Zhiyou did not completely support the “Miao
first, Han later” theory, but, first, he agreed with the evolution-
ary concept of history as “survival of the fittest”; second, he
suggested that one should not cling to the traditional concept
of a Han China; and third, he urged the Chinese to remember
the “martial” spirit of the ancient Han race, to sweep away the
nation’s humiliation.15 In 1905, Jiang Zhiyou also published
“On the Chinese Race,” supporting Terrien de Lacouperie’s
theory of the Western origin of the Chinese race. On the one
hand, he used the “Western origin” theory to undermine the
Han Chinese bias; on the other hand, he used the idea to encour-
age the Han Chinese to regain their grand ambitions and spirit of
tolerance.16 In the same year, Liang Qichao published “Observa-
tions on the Historical Chinese People,” emphasizing that the
Han ethnicity commonly referred to as the “Chinese people”
was not a consanguineous, singular people, but rather an
amalgam of many peoples: “The Chinese people of today did
 336 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

not originate from a single ethnicity, but in fact were formed

through the assimilation of many ethnicities.”17 According to
Liang Qichao’s vision of “China,” although China originally
comprised 18 provinces, its protectorates should also be
included, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, the Tarim Basin, and
Tibet: “China is naturally a great unified state, with a unified
race, unified language, unified literature, and unified religion.”18
In the early twentieth century, the revolutionary and con-
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servative lines of thinking clashed fiercely. It is highly significant

that, less than a decade later, although the fervent Han national-
ism of the revolutionary faction aided to a certain extent in the
overthrow of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, anyone who took office
was subject to charges of “ceding territory” and “splitting the
country.” The revolutionaries could not solely rely on military
strength to transform the state regime, so they were forced to
compromise. Therefore, the reconstruction of the state and
people of the new Republic of China continued to adhere to con-
servative strategies. The “Imperial Edict of Abdication” promul-
gated by the Qing Emperor in 1911 appealed for the preservation
of the state as a “Republic of the Five Ethnicities,” “still combin-
ing the complete territories of the Manchu, Han, Mongolian,
Tungusic, and Tibetan ethnicities in a great Republic of China.”
When the Republic of China was established in January 1912,
Sun Yat-sen became the provisional president. He announced
his acceptance of the “Republic of the Five Ethnicities” as part
of his Plans for National Reconstruction. In his inaugural
speech, Sun promised to unify China’s territories, “combining
the lands of the Han, Manchu, Mongolians, Tungusic tribes
and Tibetans into one state,” as the position of the revolutionary
faction shifted from “exclusionary” to “inclusionary.”19
It seemed that this debate had finally come to a close.
But why had this situation emerged? Here we must refer to
the pressure and influence of Japan.
Japan defeated China in the 1894 Naval War, and the Treaty
of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895, carving out Taiwan and
other Chinese territories. This incited the greatest intellectual
upheaval in China in several thousand years, forcing the country
to shift from “change within its traditions” to “change outside its
 SUMMER 2015 337

traditions.” However, in Japan, this victory sparked many debates

over whether China was to be “preserved” or “partitioned.”
Yukio Ozaki’s “Matters Concerning China” (支那处分案) and Ariga
Nagao’s “Policy on the Preservation of China” (支那保全策) were
particularly provoking to China.20 During the 100 Days Reform
of 1898, Zhixin bao (The Reformer China) No. 55 (June 6, 1898),
translated the article “Theory on the Preservation of China”
from Japan’s Sino-Foreign Discourses. Following the failure
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of the 100 Days Reform, Yadong shibao (East Asia Times) No.
4 (November 15, 1898), translated “Policy on the Partitioning
of China” (瓜分中国策) from Japanese Current Events (日本时事
报), describing the severe problems that China faced. One year
later, on January 31, 1899, Yadong shibao No. 5, published Ariga
Nagao’s “Theory on the Preservation of China” (支那保全论),
translated by the “Flying Daoist”: this article had formerly
appeared in Japan’s Diplomatic Review (外交时报 Gaiko jiho),
and launched straightaway into the topic of whether China
should be “preserved” or “partitioned.”
This was a popular topic in Japanese political and academic
circles after 1895: at that time, Japan was imagined on the
one hand as Asia’s rescuer, having expanding Japan’s space
through its annexation of Korea, extending into neighboring
Manchuria and Mongolia; on the other hand, Japan attempted
to confine China within the Han territories south of the Great
Wall, transforming it into a Han state. The East Asia Society
and the Common Culture Society, supported at that time by
Konoe Atsumaro, explained Japan’s dominance of Asia through
the theory of “cultural survival of the fittest,” and discussed the
interdependent relationship of China and Japan based on the
theory of “common culture, common race.”21 This gave rise to
the idea that Japan should serve as the “leader of an alliance”
to rescue East Asia, as well as the idea that China should aban-
don the four borderlands. As a Japanese scholar has said, this
tendency “formed under the stimulus of the outbreak of the
Qing-Japanese war and in the context of the increasing interest
of [Japanese] citizens in the Asian mainland; it also formed in
the context of Japan’s rapid rise as a modern state in two decades
under the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s increasing self-awareness as
 338 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

an Asian race, and its advocacy of the unique Japanese culture in

the face of Western culture.”22 This caused Japan to regard
Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and even the Tarim Basin and
Tibet as “quasi national territory.”23
Ariga Nagao, who advocated the “preservation of China,”
believed that, if China was to be preserved, “then there must
be two policies: the first is independent preservation, and the
second is dependent preservation.” However, under the circum-
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stances, it was impossible for China to preserve itself: due to the

depredations of the great powers and China’s long-standing pov-
erty and weakness, it did not have the strength to resist. Yet in
the case of dependent preservation, what power should it rely
on? Ariga proposed two schemes: the first was termed “singular
aid,” meaning that China would rely solely on one certain power;
the second was termed “plural aid,” meaning that “two or
three powerful states would establish an alliance to support its
predicament.”24 In contrast, Yukio Ozaki’s “Matters Concern-
ing China” advocated complete annexation of China, “as the
Yuan did the Song, as the Qing did the Ming, and as the British
did India.” Yukio believed that the Chinese people, “apart from
the imperial court, are not aware they have a state … if the people
have no sense of statehood, though its military forces be great,
the state shall perish.” Therefore, it was best that China be
partitioned as soon as possible.25 In fact, both “preservation”
and “partitioning” involved the dismemberment of the great
multiethnic empire of China.
Matters were different in China. Although politicians (such as
Sun Yat-sen) had once had thoughts of abandoning Manchuria,
none could bear the responsibility of “severing the borders and
splitting the land,” causing “loss of sovereignty and national
humiliation.” Therefore, the political leaders of the Republic of
China, from Sun Yat-sen to Yuan Shikai 袁世凯, had no choice
but to uphold a vast, multiethnic state; and although scholars
had at one point identified with the European theory of the
“nation-state,” the traditional idea of a “great unified” empire
was still profoundly influential, and by inertia, academic circles
continued to employ the traditional concepts of “China” and
“Chinese.” Japan’s imperialist political intentions arguably
 SUMMER 2015 339

provoked Chinese scholars to rehash their debates over people

and state, and reconstruct their position on the preservation of
China.
From the Republican uprising to the May Fourth Movement,
the concept of the “Chinese people” gained broad recognition
amidst domestic turmoil and foreign incursions.26 By the 1920s
and 1930s, at the promptings of new crises, a trend arose empha-
sizing the idea that “the Chinese people are an integral whole,” in
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an attempt to academically and ideologically “absorb the four

borderlands into China.”

III. “The Chinese People Are an Integral Whole”: The New

Chinese Academic Trend of the 1920s and 1930s

In the 1920s, China’s two most important academic trends—how

to define “China” and establish “identity”—harbored inherent
discrepancies.
The first academic trend critiqued the assumptions of Lacoup-
erie’s theory of the “Western origin of Chinese civilization,”
which filtered in from Japan in the late nineteenth century (as
well as the accompanying theory that the “Miao race preceded
the Han race as the original inhabitants of China).27 This trend
also rectified the archaeological theory proposed by Johan
Gunnar Anderson that the Yangshao (Painted Pottery) culture
originated in the West. Lacouperie’s “Western origin” theory
was fairly popular in the late Qing, while Anderson’s archaeo-
logical excavations of the early 1920s and his An Early Chinese
Culture (published in 1923 in an abridged translation by Yuan
Fuli 袁复礼) seemingly confirmed the “Western origin” theory
by suggesting a West-to-East spread of the Painted Pottery
culture, based on a comparison of Yangshao and Central Asia.
However, the “Western origin” theory challenged the uniqueness
and autonomy of Chinese civilization, prompting Chinese
scholars such as Fu Sinian 傅斯年, Li Ji 李济, and He Bingsong
何炳松 in ceaseless attempts to prove the native origins and
plural nature of Chinese civilization based on historical records
and archaeological excavations. The purpose of these highly
 340 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

nationalist historical and archaeological trends was clearly to

rebuild China’s historical identity.
The second major academic trend involved the “Doubting
Antiquity School.” In the 1920s, figures such as Gu Jiegang
顾颉刚 promoted a reexamination of the history of the Three
Dynasties, the classics, and mythology. It was fundamentally
a modern reform of traditional historiography and paleography:
classical texts on early history were reexamined with a suspicious
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eye on the basis of scientific, objective, and neutral modern

standards, in an effort to expel legends (or myths) from history.
The veracity of the Yellow Emperor and other figures who had
once symbolized the Chinese people, as well as that of China’s
once-sacred classics, was sharply challenged. In 1923, Gu Jiegang
proposed that the guiding principle of the Doubting Antiquity
School be “the repudiation of false history,” which included:
1) “Destroying the concept of the single origin of ethnicities,”
2) “Destroying the concept of perpetual territorial unity,”
3) “Destroying the concept of the humanization of ancient
history,” and 4) “Destroying the concept that the age of anti-
quity was a golden world.”28 For this reason, Dai Jitao 戴季陶
and other figures declared that this movement “rocked the
foundations of the nation.” The concept of a “single origin of
ethnicities” signified that the Chinese ethnicities had a common
ancestor, while “perpetual territorial unity” symbolized the static
status quo of China’s territories since antiquity; the legendary
figures of ancient history symbolized a common origin of
different ethnicities, while the concept of antiquity as a golden
era implied that civilization should return to traditions. These
symbols were a form of identity and a cohesive force, and any
aspersions cast upon them undermined the foundations of
China’s historical roots and identity.
In the early 1920s, these two academic trends, which appeared
to be diametrically opposed in terms of their deeper ideological
import, temporarily coexisted without great conflict. Yet at the
turn of the decade, ethnic and national crises led to subtle
changes in the positions of these two academic trends, or that
is, of the scholars situated within them. Let us review the threats
China faced at this time: back in 1921, Gong Debai 龚德柏 had
 SUMMER 2015 341

translated Naniwa Kawashima’s On the Annexation of China (并

吞中国书), which incited an intense reaction among Chinese
students studying abroad in Japan.29 The “Tanaka Memorial”
was released in 1927: despite its questionable authenticity, it
was rapidly translated and published in China, giving rise to
extreme indignation among the Chinese people.30 By 1928,
Chinese public opinion was increasingly affected by Japan’s
invasion plans and actual movements, following the translation
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or introduction of Hosono Shigekatsu’s “On the Japanese

Annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia” (日本吞并满蒙伦),
Tsurumi Yusuke’s “View on China in Turmoil” (观动乱的中国),
Nozawa Gennojo’s “The Current State of Manchuria” (满洲现
状), Tada Hayao’s “Japan’s Fundamental Concepts on China”
(日本对华之基础观念), as well as studies by Shiratori Kurakichi,
Risaburo Asano, Inaba Kunzan, Satou Yoshio, Yanai Wataru,
and other figures on the historical geography of Manchuria
and Mongolia; journals and newspapers released a constant
stream of information about studies by Japanese scholars and
students on Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.31 People were
shocked by Japan’s frequent studies of Manchuria and
Mongolia, excavations of northeast cultural relics, and discus-
sions of the Manchuria problem. Manchuria was seized follow-
ing the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, and the state
of Manchukuo was established in 1932; the Turkish Islamic
Republic of East Turkestan was founded in 1933, followed by
the appearance of the so-called “North China Autonomy Move-
ment” in 1935. The annexation and partitioning of its national
territories triggered an unprecedented crisis in China, spurring
Chinese scholars to redirect their efforts toward the study of
the “four border ethnicities” (or “borderlands”), to refute
Japanese arguments on the relationship between China and
Manchuria, Mongolia, the Tarim Basin and Tibet on historical,
geographical, and ethnic grounds.32 In 1932, Hua Qiyun 华企云
published China’s first work on the borderlands, The Border-
lands of China (中国的边疆 Zhongguo de bianjiang); in 1933, Fu
Sinian and his colleagues published Historical Survey of the
Northeast (东北史纲 Dongbei shigang); in 1934, Gu Jiegang and
his colleague Tan Qixiang 谭其骧 founded the semimonthly
 342 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

journal Yugong (Tribute of Yu). As Gu stated, in an era of peace,

scholars might as well “learn for learning’s sake”; but when “the
nation’s strength is in decline, and the land is in peril,” one must
“strive for pragmatism in one’s studies.”33 Against this political,
ideological, and academic backdrop, on December 15, 1935, Fu
Sinian published “The Chinese people are an integral whole” in
No. 181 of Duli pinglun (Independent Review). In this paper,
Fu stated that the unification of China in the Qin and Han
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dynasties only came about due to the “rigid political restrictions”

of the Shang and Zhou and the “deep impression left by the idea
of grand unity” in the spring and autumn and Warring States
periods. “We Chinese people, as the saying goes, write one type
of characters, adhere to the same culture, and practice the same
ethics, like one family.”34

IV. “Native” or “Pluralistic”: Chinese Academic Studies

of the Chinese People and Chinese Culture Prior to
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937)

Let us examine the new changes to the Chinese academic world

prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937.
Academia Sinica was founded in 1928. According to its
cofounder Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 the purpose of the school and
its promotion of humanities research was to find roots for
China’s identity.35 Under the leadership of Fu Sinian, the Insti-
tute of History and Philology represented a powerful academic
force in the contemporary mainstream. Although Fu Sinian
leaned toward Han ethnocentrism, in that era, he generally
supported a view of history involving the absorption and Sinici-
zation of the four borderlands. After the institute’s founding in
1928, he consciously advocated two areas of academic research:
first, the history and language of the four borderlands on the
periphery of the Han regions; and second, the historical traces
of the various ethnicities living within China’s borders.
This academic trend was motivated in part by competition
with European Orientalism, and in part by the recognition of
the various peoples and regions constituting “China”; it was
 SUMMER 2015 343

not nationalistic, in the strict sense. Seeking a native origin for

Chinese civilization, combing through the independent threads
of Chinese history, observing the current circumstances of the
Chinese peoples, and surveying the customs of peripheral
regions, all from a “scientific” academic standpoint: these were
the self-conscious pursuits of the contemporary Chinese
academic world. However, as Fu Sinian stated in “The Work
Objectives of the Institute of History and Philology,” the
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academic trends of the 1920s and 1930s—which led to a wave

of new understanding for non-Han Chinese peoples, including
economics, politics, and life in the Chinese borderlands, as well
as non-Mandarin dialects and ethnic languages—developed,
after all, under the stimulus of Western and Japanese academia.36
Therefore, these trends were in part a form of scholarly “compe-
tition” against Japan and the West, and in part undoubtedly a
form of resistance against the political aspirations represented
by Western and Japanese discourses on the borderlands and
peoples of “China.” In this era, academics and politics were
inextricably intertwined.

1. History

In this era, many subjects were common to archaeology, anthro-

pology, and history: key themes included demonstrating the
pluralistic historical formation of the ancient Chinese race and
civilization, as well as the historical origins of the various
ethnicities within modern China. As stated previously, the
influence of the Doubting Antiquity School meant the Chinese
race and civilization could no longer remain entrenched in the
theories of a “single origin of ethnicities” and “perpetual terri-
torial unity”; after much scholarly debate, people also gradually
abandoned the theory of the “Western origin” of the Chinese
race and civilization. Yet what cultural blocs conjoined to form
ancient China? Can these cultural blocs be regarded as China?
Some scholars offered bold analyses after combing through the
historical texts. In 1927, Xu Zhongshu 徐中舒 published “Conjec-
tures on the Shang and Zhou Ethnicities on the Basis of Ancient
 344 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

Works” in the first issue of Guoxue luncong (Anthology of Essays

on National Studies) produced by the Tsinghua Academy. Xu
refuted the traditional theory of the “single origin of the Three
Dynasty,” arguing that the Shang and Zhou belonged to differ-
ent ethnicities. In the same year, Meng Wentong 蒙文通 published
A Thorough Examination of Ancient History (古史甄微 Gushi
zhenwei), arguing that the ancient peoples of China could be
divided into three branches situated on the Jianghan Plain, the
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coastal mountains of modern-day Shandong, and the Yellow

River Basin. In 1933, Fu Sinian proposed in Theory of the East-
ern Yi and the Western Xia (夷夏东西说 Yi Xia Dongxi shuo) that
ancient China was formed through the gradual fusion of the
Eastern Yi and the Western Xia: Fu emphasized in Chapter 5,
“Contextual Summary,” that his aim was to explain “the general
pattern of East-West confrontation in the progression from tribe
to kingdom (and later empire)” in ancient China.37
The applications of this concept were not limited to the history
of China’s ancient origins: it was in fact pervasive throughout
ethnohistorical writings. The 1930s produced a prolific number
of works on Chinese ethnohistory: in 1930, Miao Fenglin 缪凤
林 published “Introduction to Chinese Ethnohistory” in Vol. 2,
Nos. 3–4 of Shixue zazhi (Journal of History); this was followed
by three separate works entitled Chinese Ethnohistory (中国民族史
Zhongguo minzushi), written respectively by Wang Tongling
王桐龄 (1934), Lü Simian 吕思勉 (1934), and Song Wenbing 宋文
炳 (1935). These ethnohistorical works may have differed to some
extent, but they all defended the indigenous nature and pluralism
of the “Chinese people,” attempting to narrate the history of the
various peoples of China as the process of one hundred rivers
flowing into the sea. In the example of the 1934 work, Wang
Tongling divides the “yellow race” into three southern branches
(the Miao, Han, and Tibetan peoples) and three northern
branches (the Manchu, Mongolian, and Tungusic peoples)
according to directions of migration. According to Ma Rong’s
马戎 review, Wang’s “classification of the Chinese people as ‘three
southern branches’ and ‘three northern branches’ was essentially
interlinked with the overall framework of the “Republic of the
Five Ethnicities” that people often spoke of in the early years
 SUMMER 2015 345

of the Republic, just adding the southern ‘Miao ethnicity.’”

Other ethnohistorical works were generally similar, in that they
were inseparable from the basic classification of China as “five
ethnicities” or “six ethnicities”; the implication was “the absorp-
tion of the four borderlands into China,” truly transforming
China into a great state as a “Republic of Five Ethnicities.”38
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2. Archaeology

Seemingly from its first establishment, archaeology in China

assumed the heavy burden of seeking the origins of Chinese
civilization and drawing the boundaries of the Chinese people.
Take the case of Li Ji 李济, honored as the “father of Chinese
archaeology”: Li studied anthropology at Harvard University,
and his primary interest was explaining the composition and
origins of the Chinese. The title of his 1923 doctoral dissertation
at Harvard was “The Formation of Chinese People.” He argued
that the Chinese people were divided into five main branches:
the children of the Yellow Emperor (Han), the Tungusic tribes,
the Tibeto-Burman language family, the Muong-Khmer family,
and the Dan language family; as well as three subbranches: the
Huns, the Mongolians, and the pygmies. The modern Chinese
race primarily originated from Tungusic encroachment on Han
territories, gradually forming the modern “Chinese people.”39
Although scholars have noted that Li Ji’s views were “undoubt-
edly the response of an early twentieth-century Chinese intellec-
tual to the destiny of the nation and the global situation, being
both ideological and intellectual,”40 to be fair, Li Ji’s studies of
the 1920s were primarily informed by intellectual motivations,
most likely the refutation of the “Western origin theory.”
He sought the physical and linguistic roots of the “Chinese
people” without demonstrating a particularly strong sense of
nationalism.41
However, archaeological research was persistently clouded by
the demands of nationalistic camps. As Zhang Guangzhi 张光直
noted, the primary characteristic of Chinese archaeology in the
1950s was nationalism.42 The incipient archaeology of this era,
 346 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

whether exploring the prehistoric Stone Age or excavating

Shang Dynasty ruins, always based its understanding or
interpretation of archaeological findings on the need to answer
a question (primarily the theories of the native origin of Chinese
civilization, or the pluralistic fusion of the Chinese people).
When He Bingsong published “New Myths on the Origin of
the Chinese People” in 1929 to refute the Western origin theory,
his hopes rested on archaeological excavations.43 Archaeologi-
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cal findings were closely watched: unearthed relics were used

to refute Western and Japanese archaeologists and prove: first,
that the Chinese race and civilization had independent origins;
second, that the Chinese race and civilization were truly
an assimilated blend of diverse elements; and third, that the
various peoples of China could be written as one history and
one state.
In this atmosphere, the 1929 discovery of the Peking Man’s
skull at Zhoukoudian near Beijing was an important symbol;
the discovery of the Longshan Black Pottery Culture at Cheng-
ziya was another important event; while the publication of the
first Anyang archaeological report in a way both proclaimed
the establishment of Chinese archaeology and reconstructed
the indigenous genealogy of the Chinese race and civilization.
These archaeological achievements coincided with the historical
surmises made by figures such as Xu Zhongshu (1927), Meng
Wentong (1933), and Fu Sinian (1933) regarding the cultural
zone of early China (namely, the interactions between the East-
ern Yi and the Western Xia), sketching a general outline of the
history of early China. The newly minted Chinese archaeology
arguably arose not in response to archaeological problems,
but rather historical, or even nationalistic historical questions.
The string of archaeological discoveries at Zhoukoudian,
Yangshou, Longshan, and Anyang opportunely provided
context for the Chinese race and civilization, as well as ironclad
evidence to refute the Western origin theory. Thus, Fu Sinian
could proclaim in the preface to his work Chengziya (城子崖
Chengziya) that the most important events of Chinese history
were “completely Han”: “The more questions arise, the more
we reinforce the framework of Chinese historical knowledge.”44
 SUMMER 2015 347

3. Anthropology45

In 1930, Ling Chunsheng 凌纯声, Shang Chengzu 商承祖, and

other members of the Institute of History and Philology
published The Hezhe Minority of the Lower Songhua River
(松花江下游的赫哲族 Songhua jiang xiayou de Hezhe zu) on the
basis of a survey of the Hezhe; in 1933, Ling Chunsheng and
Rui Yifu 芮逸夫 conducted another survey of the Miao people
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of western Hunan, publishing Report on a Survey of the Miao

Ethnicity of Western Hunan (湘西苗族调查报告 Xiangxi Miaozu
diaocha baogao). In 1934, Ling and Yi also surveyed the She
minority at Lishui, Zhejiang Province; in 1935, Ling, Yi, and
Tao Yunda 陶云达 surveyed the Yi minority of Yunnan Province;
from 1936–1937, Ling and Yi surveyed the Kawa, Lahu, Jingpo,
and Baiyi minorities of western Yunnan. Mainstream academia
clearly had rising interest in ethnic questions: in April 1934, the
Ethnology Group, which had formerly belonged to the Institute
of Social Sciences, was transferred to the Academia Sinica Insti-
tute of History and Philology: ethnic studies thus joined history,
archaeology, and anthropology in the mainstream. In 1930,
Pang Xinmin 庞新民 (of the Sun Yat-sen University Institute of
Philology and History) led the Biology Department Collections
Team of Sun Yat-sen University to study North River, and wrote
Notes on the Yaoshan of North River, Guangdong (广东北江猺山杂
记 Guangdong Beijiang Yaoshan zaiji). In the same year, Jiang
Zhefu 姜哲夫, who joined the field study at North River, also
wrote several papers on the sacrificial rites and “king worship”
of the Yao. In 1931, Pang conducted another study of the
Yaoshan of Guangxi Province, writing Notes on a Survey of
the Guangxi Yaoshan (广西猺山调查杂记 Guangxi Yaoshan diao-
cha zaji). In the 1930s, Shi Luguo 史禄国 and Yang Chengzhi
杨成志 surveyed the Luoluo of Yunnan, publishing Study of the
Southwestern Ethnicities (西南民族研究 Xinan minzu yanjiu) in
1932, which focused on the customs and culture of borderland
ethnicities.
It is notable that these highly “anthropological” surveys
displayed motivations similar to the fields of history and archae-
ology: first, to give prominence to Chinese research within
 348 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

foreign academic discourses; and second, to “absorb the four

borderlands into China” through surveys of various ethnicities.
Yang Chengzhi of Sun Yat-sen referenced the former question
as early as 1929 in a speech linking the minorities of southwest
China with the legends of the Yellow Emperor and Chiyou
appearing in ancient Chinese texts. Yang argued that the Yellow
Emperor and Chiyou were the respective progenitors of the Han
and Miao peoples, and pointed out that Chinese scholars had
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produced too few studies on those ethnic groups that gradually

migrated toward the mountainous borderlands, to the point that
foreigners called them “non-Chinese.” Yang called it a “national
shame” that China had not produced its own works.46 In 1930,
Ling Chunsheng stated in the preface to The Hezhe Minority
of the Lower Songhua River that “most of the modern Chinese
scholars studying ethnohistory are seasoned European sinolo-
gists; they do not hesitate to believe that the Tungusic tribes of
today are the Eastern barbarians of antiquity.”47 Ling pointed
out that advances in historical research had already shattered
the theory of a single origin of the ethnicities, which absorbed
all the groups of the present day as the origin of the Chinese civi-
lization and race; the Eastern barbarians (Shanghai) were one
source. His work, which formed amid the discourses of many
foreign theories, was hailed as the “founding document of scien-
tific Chinese ethnography.” Ling’s theories on the history of the
Hezhe minority were consistent with Fu Sinian’s “theory of the
Eastern Yi and the Western Xia” and echoed Fu’s Historical
Survey of the Northeast, demonstrating that the prehistoric
experiences of the Northeast and the interior were interrelated,
and thus refuting the theories of Yano Jinichi and Torii Ryuzo.48
Research on Southwest China was similar: In 1936, Fang Guoyu
published “The Bo and the Bai” in Yishi bao (World Benefit
News), refuting ideas such as French scholar Paul Pelliot’s
theory that the Thai race founded the State of Nanzhao (c.
800–900 C.E., centered in modern-day Yunnan). Fang argued
that the Thai did not found Nanzhou, implying that Yunnan
should belong to China.49
The idea of “absorbing the four borderlands” had already
manifested in Ling Chunsheng’s The Hezhe Minority of the
 SUMMER 2015 349

Lower Songhua River. One scholar notes that Ling “relied on

ancient Chinese texts to examine the Black River-Mohe of the
Sui and Tang eras and the evolutionary process they experienced
through the Jin, Ming, and Qing eras; it is clear that his method
carried a tinge of ‘nationalism,’ as many later scholars have said.
He absorbed the Hezhe minority into the genealogy of the
Chinese people, and gave this group a fixed position.”50 Ling’s
Report on a Survey of the Miao Ethnicity of Western Hunan,
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based on his 1933 survey, was motivated by Torii Ryuzo’s study

of the Miao: his writings on their origin, distribution, name, and
evolution hint at the concept of a “single origin of the Miao and
Han.”51 Ling’s assistant Shi Qigui 石启贵, himself of Miao eth-
nicity, proved in Report on a Field Survey of the Miao Ethnicity
of Western Hunan (湘西苗族实地调查报告 Xiangxi Miaozu shidi
diaocha baogao) that Ling et al. had no clear theories on the
history, geography, production, folk songs, or language of the
Miao, rather relying on the similar origins, language, name,
and customs of the Han and Miao to put forth the “Miao-Han
single origin theory.”52 In a certain sense, the conclusions reached
by these Han-Miao scholars absorbed the Miao ethnicity of the
Southwest into the overall national race. Tao Yunda’s “On the
Name, Distribution and Migration of the Naxi,” based on his
1934–36 survey of the Naxi ethnicity of Yunnan, points out that
in the Lijiang region, “the Tu ethnicity of Yunnan held the actual
power in Yunnan from the early Tang to the late Song, and the
Han were officials in name only, in the nature of the Jimi system.
When Kublai Khan of the Yuan Dynasty pacified Yunnan, the
power of the Tu gradually faded. The Yuan made the greatest
contributions to the development of Yunnan: without this burst
of force, it is questionable whether Yunnan would belong to
China today.” In other words, the power of the local Tu ethnicity
waned after the Yuan Dynasty, allowing this borderland and its
different ethnic groups to be absorbed into greater China.53 In
magnifying the sense of independence of Chinese academics
and criticizing the views of Western and Japanese scholars,
Chinese anthropologists also sought to highlight the nationalist
stance of “absorbing the four borderland barbarians into China,”
proving the existence of the “great family of the Chinese people.”
 350 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

Though the archaeological discoveries of the Peking Man, the

Longshan Black Pottery Culture, and the Anyang Shang
Dynasty ruins were great achievements, they could only illustrate
the culture of the core territories of the Shang and Zhou
Dynasties. Many historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists
of that era sought to find cultural traces of the assimilation of the
“four borderlands” into “China” in the peripheral territories
outside the Central Plains; they hoped to demonstrate that,
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although this “China” was separated into different cultural

systems in antiquity, they were interconnected, and experienced
mutual assimilation. In “Notes on Obtaining a New Oracle-Bone
Manuscript,” Fu Sinian made an interesting comment in a dis-
cussion of the “Zhurong clan,” an early people of the southern
Chu State in the Zhou Dynasty: “[They] were divided into many
clans based on different geographical locations, some mature
and some immature. The surviving Zhurong of the Central
Plains were the servants and slaves of the Yi at that time, with
many vassal states; few could flee far. The rise of the Chu State
was the rebirth of the Zhurong, not the restoration of the clans
that fled the Central Plains. The Jurchen people who twice
arrived in China were all strangers, not refugees returning to
China. Upon arrival, they all became Chinese people after some
time passed. Some non-Sinicized Jurchen still exist on the eastern
borders of modern Heilongjiang and Jilin.”54 Li Ji made a similar
statement, calling for the scholars of ancient Chinese history to
“overthrow the view of Chinese civilization as bounded by the
Great Wall, using our eyes and our legs to go north of the Great
Wall and seek materials on ancient Chinese history; there is our
oldest ancestral home.”55 Li also noted the connections between
the Chinese civilization and race and its peripheral regions. In the
paper “The Work of Reconstructing Ancient Chinese History
and its Problems,” Li argued that Chinese civilization was not
isolated: it originated “perhaps from the Black Sea, across the
grasslands of Central Asia, Dzungar in Xinjiang, and the Gobi
Desert of Mongolia, all the way to Manchuria.”56 Liang Siyong
梁思永, who had just returned from the United States to join Li
Ji’s archaeological team, also looked to Northeast China, with
the encouragement of his father Liang Qichao, to refute Western
 SUMMER 2015 351

theories on the Chinese race and civilization, and reject Japanese

efforts to confine “China” within its territory proper.57 The
Northeast was the site of frequent archaeological excavations
by Torii Ryuzo and other figures, as well as the focus of Japanese
efforts to declare these territories (Manchuria and Mongolia)
separate from “China.”
In the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese academics clashed with
Westerners and Japanese on the question of who was to inter-
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pret “China,” maintaining that the Chinese race and civilization

were of “native, independent origin”; they also made gradual
development in their efforts to “absorb the four borderlands
into China.”

V. “The Greatest Crisis of the Chinese People”: The

Shifting Mood of Chinese Academics against the
Backdrop of Japanese Aggression

As mentioned previously, Manchukuo was founded in 1932 fol-

lowing the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931; the Turkish
Islamic Republic of East Turkestan was founded in 1933; and the
“North China Autonomy Movement” arose in 1935. Chinese
academic circles were already enshrouded by a sense of great
crisis prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937.
A detailed observation reveals that the mentality of Chinese
scholars in that era underwent subtle changes, as revealed in
the idea that “national salvation overcame enlightenment”: faced
by a formidable foe, Chinese scholars chose to “save the nation.”
In the context of these efforts, a succession of discourses on
border territories and ethnicities appeared.58
Liu Yizheng’s 柳诒徵 changing ideas are illustrated in the pre-
faces he wrote for the founding issues of three academic publica-
tions. Liu was an academic leader who championed “the native
standpoint of the Chinese civilization,” and his ideas aptly reflect
the shifting concepts and emotions of contemporary academic
circles. In 1921, Liu Yizheng and his friend founded Shidi xuebao
(Journal of Historical Geography): in the preface to the first
issue, Liu emphasized that Chinese scholars should expand their
 352 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

field of knowledge, and compete with foreign academics. He

stated that scholars could not have tunnel vision, nor could they
yield to foreigners on questions of Chinese history and geogra-
phy: if such were the case, “not only could we not compete with
our contemporaries, all knowledge of the ancient peoples would
be lost.”59 In 1926, in the preface to Shixue yu dixue (History and
Geography), Liu again emphasized the importance of history
and geography, arguing that traditional Chinese scholarship
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was marred first by the eight-part essay of the imperial civil ser-
vice examination; second, by school educational materials; and
third, by commercial publications, leaving Chinese scholars
astonished by foreign learning. Liu also emphasized the impor-
tance of historical and geographical knowledge, and highlighted
the need to defend the native positions of Chinese scholarship, to
compete with Western and Japanese learning. However, in
September 1932, following the Mukden Incident, although Liu’s
preface to Guofeng banyue kan (‘Airs of the States’ Semimonthly)
still upheld his views on culture and academics, the reader can
clearly sense the deep impressions of the “fate of the nation”
and “crisis.” Liu repeats the grief-stricken interjection “Alas!”
three times, and is anxious that China will collapse like the Song
and Ming dynasties, or fall to an even more tragic fate; he
emphatically urges the public not to allow “our famed civiliza-
tion to suffer reverses like the peoples of the Northeast,” and
appeals to scholars to “focus on glorifying our personal charac-
ter and uplifting our national character” in this time of crisis.60
In the face of this immense national crisis, many scholars of
the humanities began to transform. For instance, Gu Jiegang,
a prominent figure of this era, originally did not believe that
“the eighteen provinces that China and the Han occupy were
thus unified since ancient times,” regarding this as “indeed
a misappropriation of a post-Qin and Han perspective to evalu-
ate pre-Qin and Han territories.” He repeatedly emphasized that
the idea of “perpetual unity” was a “preposterous historical
view.”61 However, only a few years later, he shifted the focus
of his historical theories from explaining the previous disunity
of China to emphasizing the legitimacy of the territories of
greater China. After establishing the journal Yugong in 1936,
 SUMMER 2015 353

Gu Jiegang collaborated with Shi Nianhai 史念海 and other

figures to write A History of the Evolution of Chinese Territories
(中国疆域沿革史 Zhongguo jiangyu yange shi). In the conclusion to
the first chapter, Gu wrote: “In the days of the ancient emperors,
the Han resided together on the Central Plains, ringed by
predatory foreign peoples; the ancients spilled their blood and
exhausted all their might, working diligently to achieve the
situation of recent times” (i.e., modern China). Gu traced the
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“ancient emperors,” stating that “territorial divisions had seem-

ingly already begun to leave their mark in the time of the ancient
emperors: since the Tribute of Yu, Chinese states of nine prefec-
tures, twelve prefectures, or the greater nine prefectures each
flourished for a time, and can all represent the ancestors’ ideal
territorial system.” Clearly, this argument diverges from the
image of the 1920s leader of the Doubting Antiquity School:
Gu not only uses the term “ancient emperors,” faintly echoing
the phrase “Han emperors” employed by Zhang Taiyan and
other figures and reinforcing the connotations of Han national-
ism; he also emphasizes the “difficulties of territorial expansion
for the ancients,” accommodating the concept of the “Republic
of the Five Ethnicities” championed by Liang Qichao and
others. Apparently Gu gradually abandoned the skeptical
position that the Chinese race did not stem from a single origin,
and that its territories should not be unified, instead shifting
toward “absorbing the four borderlands into China,” and
supporting one “China” and one “Chinese race.”
After 1930, the Chinese media was keenly aware of Japan’s
attention to Manchuria and Mongolia: in the academic sphere,
works such as Hamada Kosaku’s Archaeological Observations
on the Dawn of East Asian Civilization (自考古学上观察东亚文明的
黎明) and Ogawa Takuji’s Study of China’s Ancient Ethnicities
(中国古民族底研究) attracted the interest of Chinese scholars; in
the political sphere, the “founding” of Manchukuo and theories
on Mongolian independence, as referenced in Zong Guangchan’s
宗光彦 Japanese Colonial Theory on Manchuria and Mongolia
(日本人满蒙殖民论 Ribenren Man-Meng zhimin lun), aroused the
indignation of the entire country and spurred the transformation
of the academic world, as illustrated in the following anecdote.
 354 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

In 1933, the Japanese spoke to an assembly of the nobility of

Inner Mongolia, inciting the Mongolians to seek independence
from China. The female scholar Tan Tiwu 谭惕吾, whom
Gu Jiegang had always admired, personally traveled to Inner
Mongolia to investigate this event: in December 1933, she gave
a speech at Yenching University on “The proceedings of the
meeting at Bailingmiao and impressions on Inner Mongolia,”
revealing the relationship between the Inner Mongolia
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independence movement and Japanese schemes. Gu Jiegang

referenced this situation for several days running in his diary,
and I suspect that Tan Tiwu’s investigation and speech influ-
enced Gu’s intellectual shift to a fair degree, and perhaps even
spurred him to co-found the journal Yugong with Tan Qixiang
the next year.62

VI. “The Chinese People Are One”: from the 1939 Debate
in Yishi Bao to Chiang Kaishek’s Theory on the Chinese
People in China’s Destiny

The fall of Beiping followed on the heels of the Marco Polo

Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937: the Japanese army inexorably
marched south as the Chinese army suffered a series of defeats.
The seat of government also gradually moved south, with
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi becoming the final
bases of the Nationalist government. Research institutes,
universities and scholars slowly moved toward the southwest
as well, transforming a once peripheral borderland into the
hub of academia.
In a symbolic move, on December 19, 1938, Gu Jiegang esta-
blished “Borderland Weekly” as a supplement to Yishi bao and
wrote a foreword urging people not to forget “ethnohistory
and borderland history,” so as to “resist the aggression of
ambitious nations.”63 On January 1, 1939, in the New Year’s
issue of Yishi bao, Gu published “The Name ‘China Proper’
Must be Abandoned,” arguing that the term “China proper”
was “used as evidence by the Japanese to counterfeit and distort
history, so as to steal our national territory.”64 In February, he
 SUMMER 2015 355

wrote “The Chinese People Are One,” clearly stating that “all
people of China are of Chinese ethnicity,” and earnestly pro-
claiming that the Chinese people henceforth would no longer
be divided into any other ethnicities, be they Han, Manchurian,
Mongolian, Tungusic, Tibetan, Miao, etc. The appearance of
this essay in Yishi bao on February 13 attracted a huge response
from Chinese academic circles: it was reprinted in periodicals all
over the country, with scholars such as Zhang Weihua 张维华, Bai
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Shouyi 白寿彝, and Ma Yi 马毅 all joining in the discussion.65 Fu

Sinian, who had developed a grudge against Gu Jiegang, called
for a letter campaign urging him not to lightly discuss “such
provoking terms related to ethnicity and borderlands” in this
time of national crisis, and not to publish the “Borderland
Weekly” in Yishi bao; but Fu also expressed support for Gu’s
concept that “the Chinese people are one,” acknowledging that
Gu’s “approach is very honest, and is indeed the only stance
taken on the question of ethnicity in today’s politics.” In a letter
to Zhu Jiahua 朱家骅 and Hang Liwu 杭立武, Fu Sinian bitterly
attacked certain ethnologists for accepting imperialist science as
their authority: “This place is currently undergoing assimilation,
and along come some scholars who not only attack assimilation
in such debates, but also provoke national divisions.”66
According to Gu Jiegang, Fu Sinian disapproved of his
“Borderland Weekly” because “publishing language that over-
analyzes whether the Chinese people belong to a certain ethnicity
leads to unfortunate divisions”; Gu wrote “The Chinese People
Are One” to answer Fu Sinian and erase his doubts, and
those of other scholars;67 and the “ethnologists” mentioned by
Fu Sinian primarily referred to Wu Wenzao 吴文藻 and Fei
Xiaotong 费孝通. Wu and Fei, who had both studied in Japan
before returning to China, continued their work of identifying
ethnicities in China during the War of Resistance, and even
recognized the theory that “China proper” (or traditional China)
consisted of the 18 provinces within the Great Wall, thus incur-
ring the wrath of Fu Sinian, Gu Jiegang, and other historians.
To be fair, Wu Wenzao, Fei Xiaotong, and other anthro-
pologists and ethnologists were simply experts dedicated to the
study of ethnology: they accepted the Western definition of
 356 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

“ethnicity,” and hoped to identify China’s ethnicities based

on physical, linguistic, and cultural considerations. Their under-
standing of “ethnicity” and the “state” clearly differed from the
historians’ understanding of “ethnicity” and the “state.” For
instance, Fei Xiaotong argued in his response to Gu Jiegang’s
essay that ethnicity and the state are separate: a state established
in a political sense primarily serves to guarantee the equality of
all, while a national identity need not obliterate the physical,
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linguistic, and cultural differences between different ethnicities;

thus one China could embrace the differences of the Manchus,
Han, Mongolians, Tungusic tribes, Tibetans, and Miao.68
However, the ethnologists perhaps did not realize that historians
would regard such “ethnic identification” as “provoking
national divisions,” and did not understand the intellectual
trends on the state, ethnicity and border territories among aca-
demic circles during the War of Resistance. Thus, Fei Xiaotong
was quickly silenced after two rounds of debate. As he recalled
many years after, “Later I understood that Mr. Gu’s anxious
patriotic zeal was directed at the contemporary establishment
of ‘Manchukuo’ in Northeast China under Japanese imperia-
lism, as well as the incitement of divisions in Inner Mongolia;
therefore he was filled with righteous indignation, forcefully
opposing the aggressive behavior of using ‘ethnicity’ to divide
our country. I completely support his political position, though
I do not agree with him that acknowledging that the Manchus
and Mongolians are ethnicities would mean ‘getting caught in
your own web’ or ‘giving away a weapon,’ becoming a cause
for imperialism to split our country. Or believing that, if we
simply do not acknowledge these ‘ethnicities,’ we can avoid
letting the wolf in the door. An excuse is not a cause, and laying
down one’s sword does not mean that someone else cannot start
a knife fight. But dragging politics into such a debate was not
beneficial to the contemporary situation, so I did not write
another article continuing the debate.”69
Fei Xiaotong’s silence is symbolic of the trend to obliterate
the “Republic of the Five Ethnicities” and emphasize the
“Chinese people.” This had gradually become a consensus
among Chinese academic circles during the War of Resistance.
 SUMMER 2015 357

It is clear that the debates and controversies stemming from

academic circles and the pressure of public opinion influenced
political parties and the government: the Nationalist government
established various committees on southwest China, and both
the Nationalist and Communist parties issued statements
on the Miao and Yi of the southwest; the State Education Com-
mittee on History and Geography and the State Education Com-
mittee on Border Territories of the Ministry of Education
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specifically confirmed their “position on ethnicity” and “histori-

cal statements” in their teaching materials. This idea was unan-
imously supported among political and academic circles: as Fu
Sinian stated, “the Three People’s Principles, China’s historical
geography, the historical geography of the borderlands, and the
relationship between China and its neighbor states should be
compiled into a primer, and translated into all of the above lan-
guage groups [viz., Tibeto-Burmese languages, Dan languages,
Miao-Yao languages, Yue languages, and Pu languages].”70 Gu
Jiegang and Ma Yi also stated that historical teaching materials
should be rewritten, to “create a new historical narrative,” and
“repudiate the fragmented disorder of academia caused by the
contamination of imperialism since the late Qing.”71

VII. Epilogue: “Large and Small Branches of the Same

Lineage”: Constructing a Great State “Absorbing
the Four Borderlands into China”

In a time of crisis for the Chinese people, mainstream academia

reverted completely to Liang Qichao’s earlier ideas on defining
the state and ethnicity by culture, in sum: 1) the Chinese people,
including the Han, were composed of many historically assimi-
lated ethnicities; 2) the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan,
Tungusic, and Miao ethnic groups were all part of the Chinese
people; 3) “ethnicity” differed from “race,” in that it was
primarily determined by culture rather than consanguinity or
physical characteristics; and 4) China was a Chinese nation-state,
and unity among “those of the same roots” must be maintained
in this time of crisis. The most important voice in this era was the
 358 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

1942 work China’s Destiny (中国之命运 Zhongguo zhi mingyun)

by Chiang Kaishek. In Chapter 1, “The Growth and Develop-
ment of the Chinese People,” Chiang describes the ethnic groups
within China’s borders as “large and small branches of the same
lineage,” particularly noting that China can be traced back in
history for three thousand years. In terms of territory, China
encompassed the Yellow River, Yangtze River, Heilongjiang
River, and the Pearl River; in terms of ethnicities, China
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incorporated the Khitan, Jurchen, Mongolians, and Manchus,

who were all assimilated into the Chinese people, “fused into an
integral whole, with no trace of differences.” Thus, Chiang stated:
In terms of the history of the people’s growth, we Chinese
people are a fusion of many clans.72
To the academics of this era, filled with nationalist sentiment,
this was a grand strategy to achieve the “absorption of the four
borderlands into China.” Although this era featured many
different voices, this key idea became a resounding theme.73

Notes
1. Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 103. (Translator’s
note: kuo-chia (guojia)—“state”; t’ien-hsia (tianxia)—“all under heaven.”)
2. See Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China’s Entrance into the Family of
Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
3. The theories proposed by the likes of John K. Fairbank and Joseph
R. Levenson in the 1950s have been sharply criticized in recent decades.
The criticism is valid, but I wish to add that, despite the problems of
the modernist “impact–response” model, it could still have great historical
interpretive power with a few revisions.
4. These two historical processes help us understand how modern
China can resemble both a modern state and a traditional empire; its
separation from its neighbors; the “triple threat” of modern Western
trends, internal ethnic differences, and regional identity; or why Chinese
academics seek to understand China’s modern transformation, while
emphasizing the “pluralism” of the state, and simultaneously being wedded
to arguments of “Sinicization” or “acculturation.”
5. See “The Modern Discourses on the History of the Miao” (1–7)
(苗族史の近代) by Japanese scholar Yoshikai Masato, published in The
Annual Report on Cultural Science (北海道大学文学部研究纪要) (Hokkaido
University), Nos. 124–34 (2008–11), particularly Parts 1–3. For my review
 SUMMER 2015 359

of these works, “Zai lishi, zhengzhi yu guojia zhijian de minzushi”

(Ethnic history between histories, politics, and states), see Nanfang zhoumo
(Southern Weekly), 9-7-2012.
6. “Tao Manzhou xi” (A call to arms against the Manchus), Zhang
Taiyan quanji (Complete works of Zhang Taiyan), Shanghai renmin
chubanshe, 1985: Volume 4, Part 2: Taiyan wenlu chubian (First collection
of Taiyan’s literary works), p. 190.
7. “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu” (A refutation of Kang Youwei’s
work on revolution), Zhang Taiyan Quanji: Volume 4, Part 2: Taiyan
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wenlu chubian, p. 173.

8. “Zhongxia wangguo erbai sishi er nian jinianhui shu” (On the
242nd anniversary of the fall of China), Zhang Taiyan quanji: Volume 4,
Part 2: Taiyan wenlu chubian, p. 188.
9. Zou Rong, Geming jun (Zhonghua shuju, 1971), 1: “Sweep away a
thousand years of autocracy, cast off a thousand years of slavishness.
Execute the five million members of the beastly Manchu race, and wash
clean 260 years of barbaric cruelty and humiliation.” Chen Tianhua,
Jueming shu (Suicide note), 1905; see Zhang Dan, Wang Renzhi, eds.,
Xinhai geming qian shinian shilun xuanji (Selected works of public opinion
in the decade prior to the 1911 Revolution), vol. 2, p. 153.
10. Fan Zuyu, Tangjian (Tang mirror), facsimile, (Shanghai guji
chubanshe, 1981), vol. 6.
11. Zhang Taiyan, “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu”, Zhang Taiyan
Quanji: vol. 4, Part 2, Taiyan wenlu chubian, p. 174. In Zhonghua Minguo
jie (An explanation of the Republic of China), Zhang stated that he was
not a nationalist, but he used nationalism as a means to an end. Zhang
Taiyan Quanji: Volume 4, Part 1: Bielu (Other Records), p. 256.
12. Zhang Taiyan, Zhonghua Minguo jie, ibid., p. 252: “The name
China differs from the four borderlands for this reason.”
13. Liang Qichao, Zhongguo shi xulun, Chapter 5: “Renzhong”
(Human Races), in Yinbing shi heji (Collections from the Ice-Water
Studio), facsimile (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), “Wenji” (Literary collections),
No. 6, pp. 5-7.
14. Liang Qichao, Guojia sixiang bianqian yitong lun (A discussion of
changes and similarities in national thought), in Yinbing shi heji, “Wenji,”
No. 6, pp. 20–21.
15. Guanyun (Jiang Zhiyou), “Zhongguo shang gujiu minzu zhi
shiying,” Xinmin congbao, No. 31, “Lishi” (History), pp. 1–13.
16. Guanyun (Jiang Zhiyou), “Zhongguo renzhong kao” (I), Xinmin
congbao, No. 35; “Zhongguo renzhong kao” (II), Xinmin congbao, No. 37.
17. New Citizen of China (Liang Qichao), “Lishi shang Zhongguo
minzu zhi guancha.” By this point, his views on the classification of
the Chinese people differed somewhat from “Zhongguo shi xulun.” See
Xinmin congbao, No. 56 (February 15, 1905), No. 57 (March 1, 1905).
18. Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo dili dashi lun” (On China’s geographical
trends), in Yinbing shi heji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju facsimile), vol. 2,
“Wenji,” No. 10, pp. 77–78.
 360 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

19. There have been many studies on this topic: see Yang Tianshi,
“Cong ‘pai Man geming’ dao ‘lian Man geming’” (From the anti-Manchu
revolution to the Manchu alliance revolution), in Yang Tianshi, ed.,
Minguo zhanggu (Stories of the Republic) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian
chubanshe, 1993), p. 20; Huang Xingtao, “Xiandai ‘Zhonghua minzu’
guannian de lishi kaocha—lianlun Xinhai geming yu Zhonghua minzu
rentong zhi guanxi” (Historical observations on the modern concept of
the ‘Chinese people’: a discussion of the relationship between the 1911
Revolution and the identity of the Chinese people), Zhejiang shehui kexue
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(Zhejiang Social Sciences) no. 1 (2002); and Zhang Yong, “Cong ‘shiba
xingqi’ dao ‘wuse qi’—Xinhai geming shiqi cong Hanzu guojia dao wuzu
gongtong jianguo moshi de zhuanbian” (From the ‘18 banners’ to the
‘five-colored flag’: the shift from the Han state to the model of joint
national reconstruction by the five races in the era of the 1911 Revolution),
Beijing daxue xuebao (Journal of Peking University) no. 2 (2002). See also
Zhou Jinghong, “Cong Hanzu minzu zhuyi dao Zhonghua minzu zhuyi:
Qingmo Minchu Guomindang jiqi qianshen zuzhi de bianjiang minzu
guan zhuanxing” (From Han nationalism to Chinese nationalism: the
changing concept of border peoples in the Nationalist Party and its prede-
cessors in the late Qing and early Republic), Minzu yanjiu (Ethno-National
Studies) no. 4 (2006); and Sun Hongnian, “Xinhai geming qianhou zhibian
linian jiqi yanbian” (The concept of border governance around the time of
the 1911 Revolution and its evolution), Minzu yanjiu no. 5 (2011).
20. These two articles, similar in content, were translated and reprinted
many times, and closely followed by many in China. The former was
referenced in the speech “Zhina miewang lun” (Theory on the destruction
of China), Qingyi bao (Qingyi News) Nos. 75–76 (November 2, 1901), and
the volume “Bingtun Zhongguo ce” (Strategy for the annexation of
China” (translated by Wang Jianshan, Kaiming shudian, 1903). The latter
was published in full several times, as in Waijia bao (Foreign Affairs
Magazine), No. 29 (November 14, 1902) and Jingshi wenchao (Trends in
Statecraft), No. 4 (August 8, 1903).
21. See Masatoshi Sakeda, A study of early modern Japan and the
Strong Foreign-Policy Movement (近代日本にぉける对外硬运动の研究)
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978), p. 113; and Junji Banno,
“The Japanese Alliance and ‘Leaving Asia for Europe’: two aspects of
the Asian import-export theory in the mid-Meiji period,” (东洋盟主论と
脱亚入欧论—明治中期アジア进出论の二类型) in Early modern Japan’s
attitude toward foreign relations (近代日本の对外态度), ed. Seizaburo Sato
et al. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974), p. 39.
22. Namio Egami, Lineage of Japanese Studies (1) (东洋学の系谱[1]), p. 3.
23. In the paper “The development of the Meiji era from the perspective
of Japanese history” (1913), Kuwabara Jitsuzo evoked Japan’s rise with
headings such as “The Annexation of Korea,” “East Asian Hegemony,”
“World-Class State,” “Cultural Exportation,” and “The Awakening of
Asians,” conveying a sort of universal excitement among contemporary
Japanese academic circles. See Kuwabara Jitsuzo, “The development
 SUMMER 2015 361

of the Meiji era from the perspective of Japanese history” (东洋史上より观

たる明治时代の发展), Collected Works of Kuwabara Jitsuzo (桑原骘藏全
集) vol. 1, pp. 551–63.
24. Ariga Nagao, “Theory on the Preservation of China,” (translated
from Japan’s Diplomatic Review); see “Lun Zhongguo” (On China), vol. 5,
Qingyi bao quanbian (Complete collection of Qingyi News), (compiled
and printed by the Yokohama Citizen Society), p. 7.
25. Yukio Ozaki, “On the Fate of China” (论支那之运命), “Matters
Concerning China,” Part 2; in “Lun Zhongguo,” vol. 5, Qingyi bao
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quanbian, pp. 92–93.

26. In the early Republic, the term “Chinese people” was widely
utilized, demonstrating broad acceptance of the absorption of the “four
borderlands” (border ethnicities) into China. See Chen Liankai,
“Zhongguo—Huayi—Fanhan—Zhonghua—Zhonghuaminzu: yige neizai
lianxi fazhan bei renting de guocheng” (China—Chinese-barbarians—
Han-foreign—Chinese—Chinese people: an internally developing process
of identification), in Shi, ed., Zhonghua minzu yanjiu chutan (A preliminary
study of the Chinese people), Zhishi chubanshe, 1994.
27. Lacouperie’s Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation
(London, 1894) and The Languages of China before the Chinese (London,
1887), transmitted by means of Japan, provoked sharp debates in the
Chinese academic world and influenced many scholars, including Zhang
Taiyan, Liu Shipei, Liang Qichao, and Jiang Zhiyou.
28. Gu Jiegang, “Yu Liu Huer xiansheng shu” (Letter to Mr. Liu Huer),
originally in Dushu zazhi (Reading Magazine), no. 11 (July 1, 1923); see
Gushi bian (The Doubting Antiquity School), vol. 1, reprinted by Shanghai
guji chubanshe, 1982, pp. 96–102.
29. Naniwa Kawashima, Gong Debai trans., “Qing kan Woren bingtun
Zhongguo shu” (Please read the Japanese ‘On the annexation of China’),
Liuri xuesheng jibao (Quarterly Journal of the Students in Japan) vol. 1,
no. 1 (March 15, 1921).
30. One of the earlier publications appeared in July 1927: “Jingxin
dongpo zhi Riben man-meng jiji zhengce—Tianzhong Yiyi shang rihuang
zouzhe” (Hair-raising Japanese Manchuria-Mongolia action plan: Tanaka
Giichi’s memorial to the Japanese emperor) by the Party Platform
Research Association of Suzhou Middle School; many versions of the
Tanaka Memorial were published between 1927 and 1931.
31. A flood of Japanese surveys and studies of Manchurians, Mongo-
lians, the Tungusic tribes, Tibetans, and the Miao appeared in Chinese
newspapers beginning in 1920, as a warning for the ambition that informed
them. See “Riren tumou Man-Meng zhi yanjiu re” (The Japanese plot a
research craze on Manchuria and Mongolia), Chenbao (Morning Report),
November 18, 1920; “Ri dui hua wenhuaju zuzhi Man-Meng tanxiandui”
(Japan’s Chinese Cultural Bureau organizes Manchuria-Mongolia
expedition), Shenbao (Shanghai News), August 30, 1926; “Niaoju longcang
fu Menggu diaocha renlei kaoguxue” (Torii Ryuzo goes to Mongolia to
survey anthropological archaeology), Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily
 362 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

News), May 30, 1928; “Riben xuesheng kaocha Man-Meng” (Japanese stu-
dents study Manchuria and Mongolia), Yishi bao (World Benefit News),
August 15, 1928; and “Kuitan Man-Meng, Riren shicha dongshengzhe
heduo” (Spying on Manchuria and Mongolia: how many Japanese are
watching the eastern provinces), Yishi bao, October 19, 1928.
32. As stated in Yugong xuehui yanjiu bianjiang jihua shu (Plans of the
‘Tribute of Yu’ Society for research on the borderlands): “Powerful neigh-
bors wreak destruction, and the nation is in extreme peril. Thus we must
gather as one beneath the banner of nationalism. Enemies nibble at our
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territories, and the land suffers; there is a successive trend of historical

and geographical studies of the borderlands. Gather all the people of
Manchuria, Mongolia, the Tarim Basin, and Tibet.”.
33. Gu Jiegang, Yugong xuehui yanjiu bianjiang jihua shu.
34. Fu Sinian quanji (Complete works of Fu Sinian), ed. Ouyang
Zhesheng (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), vol. 4, pp. 125–27.
35. Ding Wenjiang, “Zhongyang yanjiuyuan de shiming” (The mission
of Academia Sinica): “It is not easy to unify China, and the biggest reason
is that we do not have a common faith: the foundations for this sort of
faith must be constructed upon our understanding of ourselves. History
and archaeology research the past of our people, while linguistics,
ethnology, and other social disciplines research the present of our people;
we cannot understand ourselves until we have clearly studied both the past
and present of our people.” In Dongfang zazhi (Oriental Magazine),
Shanghai, vol. 32, no. 2 (January 16, 1935).
36. Fu Sinian, “Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo gongzuo zhi zhiqu,” Zhongyang
yanjiu yuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan (Bulletin of the Institute of History
and Philology, Academia Sinica) vol. 1, no. 1 (October 1928).
37. Fu Sinian, Yi Xia dongxi shuo, Fu Sinian quanji, vol. 3, p. 226. See
also: Xu Zhongshu, “Cong gushu zhong tuice zhi Yin Zhou minzu,”
Gouxue conglun vol. 1, no. 1 (June 1937); Meng Wentong, Gushi zhenwei
(Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933).
38. Ma Rong, “Du Wang Tongling Zhongguo minzushi” (Reading
Wang Tongling’s Chinese Ethnohistory), Beijing daxue xuebao (Journal
of Peking University) no. 3 (2002):125–35. Thanks to Ma Rong for
providing his revised edition.
39. Li Ji (Li Chi), “The Formation of Chinese People,” 1923. In
Chinese: “Zhongguo minzu de xingcheng,” Li Ji wenji (Collected works
of Li Ji), Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 51–249; see
p. 221 for the above.
40. Wang Daohuan, “Shiyusuo de tizhi renlei xuejia” (Physical
anthropologists of the Institute of History and Philology), In Xin xueshu
zhilu, ed. Du Zhengsheng (A new academic path) vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia
Sinica, 2003), 181.
41. See Zha Xiaoying, “Zhengdang de lishi guan—lun Li Ji de kaoguxue
yanjiu yu minzu zhuyi” (Current historical viewpoints—on nationalism
and the archaeological research of Li Ji), Kaogu (Archaeology) no. 6
(2012):82–92. Zha Xiaoying notes that Li Ji’s “sense of human history
 SUMMER 2015 363

was at least as strong as his nationalistic sentiments: he would state that a

certain cultural element was native-born, while emphasizing many external
factors.”
42. For Zhang Guangzhi’s comment, see “Ershi shiji houban de
Zhongguo kaoguxue” (Chinese archaeology in the latter half of the 20th
century), Kaoguxue zhuanti liujiang (Six lectures on special topics in
archaeology), Sanlian shudian, 2010 edition.
43. He Bingsong, “Zhonghua minzu qiyuan zhi xin shenhua,” Dongfang
zazhi, vol. 26, no. 2 (1929).
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44. Fu Sinian, “Preface: Chengziya,” Fu Sinian quanji vol. 3, 235–36.

45. In this period, the term “anthropology” also comprised the subject
later known as ethnology. For the history of this field, see Wang Jianmin,
Zhongguo minzuxue shi (History of Chinese ethnology), Yunnan jiaoyu
chubanshe, vol. 1 (1997). In particular, see Chapter 4, “Zhongguo min-
zuxue de chuangjian” (The establishment of Chinese ethnology), 102–22.
46. Yang Chengzhi, Cong xinan minzu shuodao duli luoluo (The
independent Luoluo in the context of the southwestern minorities),
1929, cited in Yoshikai Masato, “The Modern Discourses on the History
of the Miao” (4).
47. Ling Chunsheng, Songhua jiang xiayou de Hezhe zu (Institute of
History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1934); reprint, Shanghai wenyi
chubanshe, 1990, 1.
48. See Yano Jinichi, “Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet were not
integral parts of the original Chinese territories,” Diplomatic Review
(Gaiko jiho) no. 412, Gaiko jihosha, (1922).
49. On the question of the Bo ethnicity, the American D. C. Graham
(who once held a teaching post at Chengdu West China University) pub-
lished a short essay entitled “Ancient White Men’s Graves” in vol. 5 of
Journal of the West China Border Research Society; Rui Yifu also wrote
“Boren kao” (A study of the Bo people), Shiyusuo jikan (Bulletin of the
Institute of History and Philology), no. 23 (1951).
50. Li Jinhua, “Hewei tonggusi—cong bijiao shiye kan Shiluguo yu
Ling Chunsheng de tonggusiren lishi yanjiu” (Who are the Tungusic
tribes—a comparative view of Shirokogorov and Ling Chunsheng’s
studies of Tungusic history), Wenhua xuekan (Culture Journal) no. 1
(2012):111–15.
51. Ling Chunsheng, Rui Yifu, Xiangxi Miaozu diaocha baogao
(Reprint) (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2003), preface.
52. See Zhang Qiudong, “’Wenhua lieqi’ yu ‘zhengzhi zijue’—Ling
Chunsheng deng yu Shi Qigui de Xiangxi Miaozu yanjiu bijiao fenxi”
(‘Cultural novelty’ and ‘political awareness’—a comparative analysis of
the studies by Ling Chunsheng et al and Shi Qigui on the Miao ethnicity
of Western Hunan), Leshan shifan xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Leshan
Teachers College) vol. 25, no. 3 (2010):108–12.
53. Tao Yunda, “Guanyu Moxie zhi mingcheng fenbu yu qianyi,”
Shiyusuo jikan vol. 7, no. 1 (1936):126.
54. “Xin huo buci xieben houji,” Fu Sinian quanji vol. 3:131.
 364 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY

55. Li Ji, “Ji Xiaodun chutu zhi qingtongqi (zhongpian) houji” (Notes
on the excavation of Xiaodun bronzeware [II]), Li Ji wenji, vol. 5.
56. Li Ji, “Zhongguo shanggu shi zhi chongjian gongzuo jiqi wenti,” Li
Ji wenji vol. 1.
57. Liang Siyong, “Ang’angxi shiqian yizhi” (The prehistoric ruins of
Ang’angxi), Shiyusuo jikan vol. 4, no. 1 (1932). In this paper, which refers
to Johan G. Anderson and Torii Ryuzo, Liang refutes the Japanese view
of the Manchurian region as an independent civilization, pointing out
that the “Neolithic culture of Ang’angxi was but the eastern branch of
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the Neolithic culture of Rehe, Mongolia” (p. 44).

58. Ma Dazheng and Liu Di, Ershi shiji de Zhongguo bianjiang yanjiu
(A study of the Chinese borderlands in the 20th century) (Heilongjiang
jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998). This work lists relevant treatises published in this
era, noting that they are most concentrated in the 1930s, as “products of
the patriotic social movement of national salvation” (p. 77).
59. Liu Yizheng, “Shidi xuebao xu” (Preface to the Journal of Historical
Geography), Shidi xuebao vol. 1, no. 1, (November 1921):1.
60. As a result of Liu Yizheng’s changed thinking, Guoshi yaoyi (The
essentials of national history) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1948),
which he wrote in 1942, emphasized “proper territories, proper peoples,
and proper morality and justice.” He stated, “If the territories are improper,
we are humiliated; if the peoples are improper, we are humiliated.” See
Chen Baoyun, Xueshu yu guojia: shidi xuebao jiqi xueren qun yanjiu
(Academics and the state: a study of the Journal of History and Geography
and its group of scholars), Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2010.
61. See Gu Jiegang’s 1926 piece, “Qin Han tongyi de youlai he zhanguo
ren duiyu shijie de xiangxiang” (The origin of Qin-Han unity and how the
people of the Warring States Period imagined the world), Gu Jiegang
quanji (Collected works of Gu Jiegang), vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
2010), 33.
62. Gu Jiegang riji (Diary of Gu Jiegang), (Taipei: Lianjing chuban
gongsi, December 31, 1933). On Tan Tiwu’s importance to Gu Jiegang,
see: Yu Yingshi, Weijin de caiqing (Unspent talent).
63. Gu Jiegang, “Bianjiang zhoukan: fakanci” (Foreword to ‘Borderland
Weekly’); see “Yu Shuyuan wencun” (Literary collections of Yu Shuyuan),
Part 4, Gu Jiegang quanji, vol. 36, 319–21.
64. Gu Jiegang, “‘Zhongguo benbu’ yiming jiying fangqi,” Yishi bao,
January 1, 1939.
65. Gu Jiegang, “Zhonghua minzu shi yige,” in “Yu Shuyuan wencun,”
Part 4, Gu Jiegang quanji, vol. 36, 94–108. See also “Wo weishenme xie
‘Zhonghua minzu shi yige’” (Why I wrote “The Chinese people are
one”), ibid., 109–16. For the response to this article, see Zhou Wenjiu,
Zhang Jinpeng, “Guanyu ‘Zhonghua minzu shi yige’ xueshu lunbian de
kaocha” (A study of the academic debate over ‘The Chinese people are
one’), Minzu yanjiu, no. 3, (2007):22.
66. Fu Sinian, “Zhi Zhu Jiahua, Hang Liwu” (To Zhu Jiahua and Hang
Liwu) (July 7, 1939), in Fu Sinian yizha (Fu Sinian’s letters), vol. 2, 1012–18.
 SUMMER 2015 365

67. Gu Jiegang riji, vol. 4 (February 7, 1939), 197.

68. Fei Xiaotong, “Guanyu minzu wenti de taolun” (A discussion on
the question of ethnicity), Yishi bao, May 1, 1939.
69. Fei Xiaotong, “Gu Jiegang xiansheng bainian ji” (Hundred-year
anniversary of Mr. Gu Jiegang), Fei Xiaotong wenji (Collected works of
Fei Xiaotong), vol. 13, 26–27. It was recently argued that the theory of
the “Chinese people as a pluralistic, integrated structure” proposed by
Fei Xiaotong in his later years actually “subtly amended his unilateral
emphasis on the position of ethnicity as ‘pluralistic,’ surreptitiously absor-
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bing part of the concept advocated by Gu Jiegang, so that he championed

a more inclusive ‘pluralistic, integrated structure.’” See Zhao Xudong,
“Yiti duoyuan de zuqun guanxi lunyao” (A study of integrated, pluralistic
ethnic relationships), Shehui kexue (Social Sciences), no. 4 (2012):53.
70. See Fu Sinian yizha (February 1942), 1229.
71. Gu Jiegang, Ma Yi, “Jianyi dingzheng shanggu lishi Hanzu quzhu
miaozu juzhu Huanghe liuyu zhi chuanshuo, yi saochu guozu tuanjie zhi
zhangai an” (Proposal for the correction of the ancient historical legend
that the Han expelled the Miao residing in the Yellow River Basin,
to sweep away obstacles to national unity), R.O.C. Ministry of Education,
ed., cited in Yoshikai Masato, “The Modern Discourses on the History
of the Miao,” Part 6, Note 345, 114. The proposal was originally
presented to the 2nd Session of the Ministry of Education State Education
Committee on Border Territories in June 1941.
72. Chiang Kai-shek, Zhongguo zhi mingyun, Sanqingtuan pingjin
zhibu, 1946, 2–3.
73. It is worth noting that Chen Boda penned a response to China’s
Destiny on behalf of the Communist Party: Ping ‘Zhongguo zhi mingyun’
(Review of China’s Destiny) (Xinhua shudian, Jinchaji fendian). Chen’s
review associates Chiang’s idea of “large and small branches of the same
lineage” with fascist theories on bloodlines, on the basis that China
historically had many ethnicities who were forcibly assimilated through
brutal struggle. Chen also criticizes China’s Destiny for its “Han ethnocen-
trism, taking advantage of the small and weak ethnicities of this country.”
(Review, 4–8).