ISSUE I: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF PREESHA WITH SUNIL IS LIABLE TO

BE ANNULLED?

[¶1] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the annulment of the marriage
between Preesha and Sunil is legally untenable and contrary to the principles of matrimonial
law, procedural fairness, and natural justice. The sanctity of marriage, described by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar as “a foundation upon
which the entire structure of society rests”, cannot be dismantled lightly, particularly when
based on questionable allegations of concealment and marital discord. The same can be
validated in Three-fold manner:

[1.1] NON-DISCLOSURE OF BIPOLAR DISORDER DOES NOT AMOUNT TO

FRAUD UNDER MATRIMONIAL LAW

[¶2] It is humbly submitted that mere non-disclosure of a medical condition does not
automatically vitiate marital consent unless it fundamentally affects the spouse's ability to
participate in the marital relationship. In Anurag Anand v. Sunita Anand, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court clarified that “a spouse is not obligated to disclose every aspect of their
health unless it renders cohabitation impossible or constitutes a threat to the other party.”

[¶3] Bipolar disorder, while a recognized mental health condition, is manageable through
treatment and does not inherently render a person unfit for marriage. In Alka v. Abhinav, the
Court emphasized that the law focuses on functional capability, not diagnosis itself. Preesha,
despite her condition, successfully supported Sunil in both family and business affairs,
reflecting her ability to fulfill marital obligations.

[¶4] Furthermore, Sunil cohabited with Preesha for three years after marriage, during which
he had sufficient opportunity to observe her behavior. This negates any argument that Preesha
fraudulently induced the marriage. Fraud, as held in Smt. Anima Roy v. Prabir Kumar Roy,
must strike at the very root of consent — a high bar not met in this case.

[¶5] It is further submitted that annulment is a discretionary relief, subject to the principle of
condonation. As held in Dastane v. Dastane, a spouse who condones a defect by voluntary
cohabitation forfeits the right to seek annulment on that ground. Sunil’s conscious decision to
continue marital life after knowing Preesha’s health history constitutes clear condonation.
[¶6] Preesha, like every citizen, is protected under Article 21, which guarantees her right to
privacy and dignity, including the right not to be stigmatized due to her health condition.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India recognized the
right to be let alone, particularly concerning intimate personal matters like health and
relationships. Sunil’s reliance on her medical history, after years of cohabitation, is an abuse
of matrimonial remedies.

[1.2] MARITAL DISCORD AND ALLEGED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE DO NOT

CONSTITUTE LEGAL CRUELTY WARRANTING ANNULMENT

[¶7] It is humbly submitted that allegations of marital discord and isolated incidents of
physical altercations do not meet the stringent threshold for legal cruelty under matrimonial
laws. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, the Court held that, ‘cruelty sufficient for annulment
must make cohabitation impossible and strike at the very core of marital harmony’.

[¶8] Preesha’s occasional emotional outbursts were the result of Sunil’s growing neglect and
emotional abandonment, stemming from his excessive focus on business interests. Marriage,
as described in Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur, is a relationship requiring mutual adjustment,
where both partners shoulder responsibility for marital strain. Singling out Preesha and
labeling her emotionally unstable is deeply unfair and legally unsustainable.

[¶9] The principle of proportionality, embedded in Article 21, further bars granting
annulment for minor domestic tensions. As the Supreme Court recognized in Modern Dental
College v. State of MP, every legal remedy must maintain proportionality between the
alleged wrong and the relief sought. Seeking annulment over routine marital disputes —
particularly after years of voluntary cohabitation — is excessive, vindictive, and
disproportionate.

[¶10] Furthermore, marital discord arising out of cultural differences, personality clashes, or
communication gaps does not qualify as cruelty. In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey,
the Supreme Court clarified that mere incompatibility is not cruelty unless it renders life
intolerable. Sunil’s allegations, even if true, are minor irritations at best and not grounds for
dissolving a marriage.
[1.3] ANNULMENT VIOLATES PREESHA’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO
DIGNITY, REPUTATION, AND MARITAL STATUS

[¶8] It is humbly submitted that marriage, apart from being a social institution, confers legal
status and social dignity upon both spouses. Arbitrarily annulling a marriage tarnishes the
reputation and dignity of the affected spouse, infringing Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the
Constitution.

[¶9] In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the right to
privacy includes the right to autonomy in personal relationships. Preesha’s right to marital
status, identity, and reputation is protected under this umbrella. A hasty annulment based on
exaggerated claims robs her of social legitimacy and personal dignity.

[¶10] Further, the Court in Sharda v. Dharmpal recognized that marriage directly implicates
personal liberty and dignity under Article 21. To strip Preesha of her marital status without
sufficient cause is an affront to her right to life with dignity.

[¶11] It is well settled in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu that reputation is part of the
right to life under Article 21. Annulment based on alleged mental disorder or unproven
cruelty publicly stigmatises Preesha and violates her constitutional rights.

[¶12] In view of the above, it is humbly submitted that Preesha’s marriage was valid, lawful,
and worthy of judicial protection. The annulment decree was based on weak evidence,
procedural irregularity, and a narrow view of matrimonial law. As observed in Yusuf v.
Sowramma, marriage is not a fragile contract to be snapped at the first sign of trouble but a
resilient partnership built on mutual respect and understanding.

“A woman’s dignity is inseparable from her status within marriage — to strip her of that
status without fair cause is to strip her of her dignity itself.” — Justice Krishna Iyer

Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court set aside the annulment
decree, restore Preesha’s lawful marital status, and uphold her right to dignity, equality, and
reputation as guaranteed under the Constitution.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNIL AGARWAL WITH
MEENAKSHI GUPTA IS LEGALLY VALID MARRIAGE?

[¶1] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the marriage between Sunil
Agarwal and Meenakshi Gupta is legally void, as it was solemnized while an appeal against
the annulment of his first marriage with Preesha Samson was still pending. Under family law,
a second marriage entered into while a previous marriage is sub judice (under appeal) or
legally subsisting is void ab initio. This lack of validity has direct implications on
Meenakshi’s legal status of marriage.

The invalidity of this marriage can be established through a three-fold analysis.

[2.1] The Marriage Between Sunil and Meenakshi Was Contracted During the
Pendency of Preesha’s Appeal, Rendering It Void

[¶2] It is humbly submitted that Sunil Agarwal married Meenakshi Gupta on March 1, 2008,
even though Preesha Samson had filed an appeal on March 8, 2008, challenging the Family
Court’s decree annulling her marriage. A pending appeal prevents the finality of a decree, and
as a consequence, Sunil’s marital status was not yet conclusively determined when he
remarried.

[¶3] The doctrine of lis pendens, recognized under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, prevents any party from altering its legal status while a judicial dispute is ongoing.
This principle was reaffirmed in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, where the Court held that
any act affecting a disputed legal right must be suspended until judicial resolution.

[¶4] In Smt. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled that a second
marriage entered into without obtaining a legally binding divorce is void ab initio.
Furthermore, A. Subash Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh reiterated that a pending judicial
process over marital status prevents a second marriage from being legally recognized.

[¶5] Scholars like Wade & Forsyth in Administrative Law have argued that, 'legal disputes
must be resolved through a conclusive verdict before subsequent actions are undertaken’.
Sunil’s second marriage, contracted while his marital status was still contested, violates this
principle and must be declared void.
[2.2] The Second Marriage Contravenes the Prohibition of Bigamy Under Hindu Law

[¶6] It is humbly submitted that Sunil Agarwal was governed by the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 (HMA). Section 5(i) of the HMA states that for a marriage to be legally valid, neither
party should have a living spouse at the time of solemnization.

[¶7] In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that bigamy is strictly
prohibited under Hindu law, and a second marriage while the first is still legally subsisting is
void under Section 11 of the HMA.

[¶8] Furthermore, under Section 78 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, bigamy
is a criminal offense, replacing Section 494 of the IPC. It clearly states that:
"Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is
void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to a fine."

[¶9] In Yamunabai v. Anant Rao, the Supreme Court held that a second wife in a void
marriage has no legal status and is not entitled to maintenance or property rights. Similarly, in
Indira Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the Court ruled that only legally wedded wives have
enforceable marital rights under Hindu law.

[¶10] Justice Krishna Iyer, in A. Subash Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, observed that
bigamous marriages not only lack legal recognition but also undermine the foundational
principles of personal law and social justice. Upholding the validity of Sunil’s second
marriage would dilute the sanctity of Hindu marriage laws and create legal uncertainty.

[¶16] In light of the foregoing arguments, it is humbly submitted that:

1. The marriage between Sunil Agarwal and Meenakshi Gupta was void ab initio, as it
was solemnized while Preesha’s appeal was pending.

2. Meenakshi Gupta cannot be recognized as Sunil Agarwal’s lawful wife.

[¶17] This Hon’ble Court is therefore urged to:

 Declare the marriage between Sunil Agarwal and Meenakshi Gupta void under
Section 5(i) and Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  Deny any legal recognition to Meenakshi’s status as a wife and her claims over
Sunil’s estate.

Thus, recognizing Meenakshi’s claims would not only violate statutory provisions but also
undermine the rule of law, fairness, and judicial integrity.
ISSUE III: WHETHER PREESHA IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HER
PROPORTIONATE SHARE FROM THE INHERITED PROPERTY OF SUNIL?

“A woman’s right to matrimonial property is not a gift of charity — it is a constitutional

guarantee flowing from her human dignity.” — Justice Indu Malhotra

[¶1] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Preesha, being the legally wedded
spouse of Sunil under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, retains her lawful status as his widow.
As such, she is entitled to inherit her lawful share in the property inherited and self-acquired
by Sunil during his lifetime. Preesha’s right to succession is not diminished either by the
disputed annulment decree or by Sunil’s void remarriage to Meenakshi, both of which are
legally infirm and incapable of extinguishing her rightful claims. Her entitlement can be
established on the following three-fold basis:

[3.1] PREESHA REMAINS THE LEGAL WIDOW OF SUNIL UNDER THE SPECIAL
MARRIAGE ACT AND THE INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT

[¶2] It is humbly submitted that Sunil and Preesha’s marriage was solemnized under the
Special Marriage Act, 1954, which governs both the marital relationship and succession
rights upon the death of either spouse. Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act explicitly
provides that, for succession purposes, parties married under this Act shall be governed by the
Indian Succession Act, 1925, unless both parties belong to the same religion.

[¶3] Since Sunil was Hindu and Preesha was Christian, their succession rights will be
governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925, not by the Hindu Succession Act. Under
Section 33 of the Indian Succession Act, a surviving spouse is entitled to a preferential and
proportionate share in the estate of the deceased, alongside the legal heirs (in this case,
Sunil’s children).

[¶4] Since Preesha’s appeal against the annulment decree is pending, her marital status
remains intact until the appeal is finally decided. As held in K.K. Velusamy v. N.
Palanisamy, pendency of appeal prevents finality of trial court decrees. This is further
reinforced by the doctrine of lis pendens, codified under Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act, which applies analogously to matrimonial disputes affecting property rights, as
recognized in Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi.
[¶5] Thus, Preesha’s position as Sunil’s legal widow is firmly preserved. As such, she is
entitled to inherit her lawful share in Sunil’s estate, both ancestral and self-acquired.

[3.2] SUNIL’S ALLEGED WILL IN FAVOUR OF MEENAKSHI CANNOT

EXTINGUISH THE STATUTORY RIGHTS OF THE LEGAL SPOUSE

[¶6] It is humbly submitted that Sunil’s alleged Will executed in favour of Meenakshi in
January 2014 is legally ineffective to disinherit Preesha entirely. Under Section 33 of the
Indian Succession Act, a surviving spouse’s statutory right to a share of the estate cannot be
completely defeated by testamentary disposition unless the testator expressly disclaims the
spouse’s legal status — something Sunil could not have done while the marriage was legally
subsisting.

[¶7] In Navneet Lal v. Gokul, the Supreme Court held that a Will must be interpreted
harmoniously with statutory succession rights, especially of a spouse whose rights flow not
merely from the Will but from matrimonial law and personal law protections. Preesha’s
entitlement flows directly from her lawful marital status, making her a necessary heir under
the Indian Succession Act.

[¶8] Further, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, being a secular code governing Preesha and
Sunil’s marriage, provides no mechanism for unilateral disinheritance of a legally wedded
spouse. Sunil’s attempt to replace Preesha with Meenakshi, whose marriage is legally void,
violates public policy and defeats the purpose of the Act, which protects the legal standing of
inter-faith spouses. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India
emphasized that matrimonial rights must align with constitutional values of equality and
dignity, which are grossly violated if Preesha is discarded without due process of law.

[3.3] PREESHA’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY IS A COMPONENT OF HER

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DIGNITY UNDER ARTICLE 21

[¶9] It is humbly submitted that Preesha’s right to inherit matrimonial property is not merely
a statutory right but also forms part of her right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the
Constitution. As the Supreme Court observed in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, dignity
is an inseparable component of the right to life, and in the context of matrimonial disputes,
this includes the right to financial security, shelter, and protection from arbitrary exclusion
from family property.
[¶10] In Vidyadhari v. Sukhrana Bai, the Supreme Court recognized that the rights of a
legally wedded spouse to succession and property must be zealously protected, especially in
cases involving attempts to replace a lawful spouse with a second claimant whose status is
questionable. Sunil’s remarriage to Meenakshi, being legally void under Section 24 of the
Special Marriage Act, cannot deprive Preesha of her constitutionally protected right to
dignity, equality, and property.

[¶11] Furthermore, the right to shelter, which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently
upheld as an essential component of Article 21 (e.g., Chameli Singh v. State of UP), directly
applies to Preesha’s claim over her matrimonial home and inherited property. To deprive her
of this right, especially after sacrificing her career to support Sunil, would amount to
economic violence and perpetuate gender injustice, which is impermissible under Article
15(3).

[¶12] In view of the above, it is humbly submitted that Preesha is fully entitled to recover her
proportionate share from Sunil’s inherited and self-acquired property, on the following
grounds:

 She is the legally wedded spouse under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and her status
remains intact pending appeal.

 Her succession rights are guaranteed under Section 33 of the Indian Succession Act,
which applies via Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act.

 Sunil’s alleged Will in favour of Meenakshi cannot override Preesha’s statutory and
constitutional rights.

 Preesha’s right to property is integrally linked to her fundamental rights to equality,

dignity, and shelter under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

[¶13] As Justice Krishna Iyer famously observed in Yusuf v. Sowramma, “Matrimony is not
a mere ceremony of shadows; it is the social assurance of equality, dignity, and security.”

Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court uphold Preesha’s entitlement
to her lawful share in Sunil’s property, reject any exclusive claim by Meenakshi, and reaffirm
the protective spirit of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER MEENAKSHI, ASHU AND RASHI ARE ENTITLED TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES FROM THE PROPERTY OF SUNIL, BEING
LEGAL HEIRS?

“Succession is not merely about property — it is about honour, dignity, and justice for those
who built their lives within the protective umbrella of lawful marriage.” — Justice Indu
Malhotra

[¶1] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the claims of Meenakshi, Ashu,
and Rashi over the estate of Sunil are fundamentally defective in law, as they stem from a
void marriage between Sunil and Meenakshi. Under well-settled principles of succession law,
rights of inheritance flow only through valid marital and filial relationships. Sunil’s marriage
to Meenakshi being void ab initio, and Ashu and Rashi being children born from such an
illegal union, their succession rights must be adjudicated strictly in accordance with the
statutory framework, without overriding the legitimate rights of Preesha, the lawful spouse.
This position can be established through the following clear arguments:

[4.1] MEENAKSHI’S STATUS AS SUNIL’S SPOUSE IS LEGALLY NON-EXISTENT

UNDER THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT

[¶2] It is humbly submitted that Meenakshi’s marriage to Sunil is void ab initio under Section
24 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, as Sunil’s first and valid marriage with Preesha was
still legally subsisting when Sunil married Meenakshi.

[¶3] As held in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, bigamy is prohibited across all statutory
frameworks, including the Special Marriage Act. Sunil, being already married to Preesha,
lacked the legal capacity to remarry Meenakshi, rendering the second marriage legally non-
existent. Therefore, Meenakshi cannot acquire the status of a "widow" under succession laws
and cannot claim spousal inheritance rights under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which
governs succession for marriages under the Special Marriage Act.

[¶4] Precedents like Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav reaffirm that
succession rights as a spouse can only flow from a valid marriage, and a void marriage
confers no legal rights whatsoever.
[4.2] CHILDREN BORN FROM A VOID MARRIAGE ARE LEGITIMATE BUT
HAVE LIMITED INHERITANCE RIGHTS

[¶5] It is humbly submitted that the status of Ashu and Rashi, the children born to Sunil and
Meenakshi, is governed by Section 26 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. This section
protects the legitimacy of children born from void marriages, ensuring they are not penalized
for the legal defects of their parents’ marriage.

[¶6] However, this protection is limited to the extent of the children inheriting the property of
their biological parent (Sunil). They do not inherit through or from Meenakshi, nor can they
displace the rights of Preesha, the lawful spouse. This principle was recognized by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, where the Court held that
children born from void or voidable marriages are entitled to inherit from their biological
parent but not in competition with legally recognized heirs.

[¶7] Therefore, Ashu and Rashi are entitled to inherit only a limited share, subordinate to
Preesha’s primary and preferential share as Sunil’s legal widow. Their claim is derivative —
not independent — and must be balanced in harmony with the statutory rights of the legally
wedded spouse.

[4.3] MEENAKSHI’S CLAIM THROUGH THE WILL IS LEGALLY WEAK DUE TO

THE PENDING APPEAL AND PRINCIPLE OF SPOUSAL PROTECTION UNDER
ARTICLE 21

[¶8] It is humbly submitted that Meenakshi’s claim over Sunil’s estate is entirely dependent
on an alleged Will executed by Sunil in her favour. However, the validity and enforceability
of this Will is deeply questionable due to:

 The pendency of Preesha’s appeal challenging her annulment, which directly impacts
Sunil’s freedom to unilaterally alter spousal inheritance rights.

 The fact that Meenakshi was never a lawfully wedded spouse, meaning any
testamentary preference shown to her disregards the statutory framework of spousal
succession rights under the Indian Succession Act.

[¶9] As held in Navneet Lal v. Gokul, a Will must be interpreted in harmony with existing
legal entitlements — particularly those of a legally wedded spouse. A testator cannot, through
a Will, extinguish rights that the law itself guarantees to a spouse under the Special Marriage
Act and the Indian Succession Act.

[¶10] Further, Preesha’s right to dignity and marital security under Article 21 would be
violated if a legally void marriage is indirectly legitimized by allowing the void spouse to
benefit from succession disputes, reducing the lawful spouse to a legal nullity. The Supreme
Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India held that the right to dignity protects against
arbitrary deprivation of status, reputation, and property, all of which are implicated in
Preesha’s claim to Sunil’s estate.

[4.4] SUCCESSION RIGHTS MUST PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE LAWFUL

FAMILY UNIT — NOT ILLEGAL RELATIONSHIPS

[¶11] It is humbly submitted that Indian succession law, whether under the Indian Succession
Act, Hindu Succession Act, or any personal law, reflects a public policy preference for
protecting lawful family units. Courts have consistently refused to confer inheritance benefits
derived from illicit relationships over and above those flowing from lawfully recognized
marriages.

[¶12] In Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, the Supreme Court clarified that while
children from void marriages are legitimate, the parent in the void marriage (Meenakshi)
acquires no independent inheritance rights, and her rights cannot exceed those available to
lawful spouses. This public policy approach protects the sanctity of legally recognized family
structures and prevents the law from incentivizing unlawful second marriages.

[¶13] Therefore, Meenakshi’s claim must fail entirely, and Ashu and Rashi’s inheritance
rights must be confined to their father’s share — without any claim to the portion due to
Preesha.

[¶14] In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that:

 Meenakshi is not entitled to any share in Sunil’s estate, as her marriage is void.

 Ashu and Rashi are legitimate but their rights are limited to inheriting their biological
father’s share, without displacing Preesha’s preferential right.

 Preesha’s claim as the lawful spouse overrides all conflicting claims from parties with
no valid marital relationship with Sunil.
  Any testamentary preference shown to Meenakshi cannot override Preesha’s statutory
and constitutional rights to marital property and dignity.

[¶15] As Justice Krishna Iyer eloquently stated in Yusuf v. Sowramma, “Matrimony is not a
game of casual exits and entries; it is a socially sanctioned institution deserving the full
protection of the law.”

Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court:

 Declare that Meenakshi has no claim over Sunil’s property.

 Confine Ashu and Rashi’s inheritance to their father’s personal share.
 Direct that Preesha receives her full statutory share as the legally wedded spouse.
 Affirm the principle that lawful families deserve primary legal protection, ensuring
that bigamous or void marriages do not undermine the sanctity of lawful
relationships.