Demanda Por Libra
Demanda Por Libra
Defendants.
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. PARTIES..............................................................................................................................5
A. Plaintiff ....................................................................................................................5
B. Defendants ...............................................................................................................5
C. One-Sided Liquidity Pools are inherently Unfair and Deviate from Standard
Decentralized Finance Protocols ...............................................................21
D. The Defendants Supplied the Infrastructure for the One-Sided Liquidity Pools and
Used These Pools to Disadvantage Retail Buyers and Maximize
Defendant’s Profits ....................................................................................22
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to1 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 2 of 48
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This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to2 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 3 of 48
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Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys, allege the following upon information and belief,
except as to allegations concerning Plaintiff, which are alleged upon personal knowledge.
Plaintiff’s information and belief are based upon, among other things, their counsel’s
investigation, which includes, without limitation, review and analysis of press releases, news
articles, websites, state corporate filings, and other publicly available information concerning the
Defendants and the cryptocurrency known as the $LIBRA token (“$LIBRA” or “$LIBRA
Token”).
1. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated against Defendants Kelsier Ventures, Meteora, and KIP Protocol arising from the
startups, and educational projects. These promotional efforts leveraged the high-profile
two-sided liquidity (token paired with stable assets such as USDC or SOL), Defendants
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to1 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 4 of 48
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employed a single-sided liquidity model. This structure artificially inflated the initial
price of the $LIBRA Token, creating an illusion of market stability and value where none
truly existed.
artificially controlled the token’s price and manipulated market dynamics. Defendants
strategically withheld approximately 85% of the token’s total supply at launch, directly
specifically USDC and SOL, from retail purchasers once trading commenced. Within
hours, Defendants’ insiders rapidly siphoned approximately $107 million from the
liquidity pools, causing an immediate 94% collapse in the token’s market valuation.
7. These deceptive tactics were coupled with a failure to disclose critical material
facts to purchasers. Defendants failed to inform potential purchasers about the true
liquidity structures, insider control of token supply, and deliberate mechanisms that
8. Plaintiff and the Class suffered substantial financial losses due to Defendants’
deceptive and fraudulent conduct. Plaintiff brings this action seeking compensatory and
to prevent further fraudulent token offerings, and the appointment of a receiver to protect
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to2 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 5 of 48
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9. This action seeks to redress the substantial economic harm caused by Defendants’
manipulative scheme and hold them accountable for their unjust enrichment at the
10. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to
Article VI, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution and Judiciary Law § 140-b,
which grant the Supreme Court general original jurisdiction in law and equity.
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Meteora pursuant to CPLR §
301, as Meteora maintains its principal place of business within the State of New York.
Meteora’s core management team, including its co-founder and former Chief Executive
Officer, Ben Chow, conducts significant business activities from New York City. Chow
publicly identifies himself as a founder “in New York,” reflecting the centralized and
12. Additionally, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Meteora under CPLR §
302(a)(1), as Meteora transacts business within the state, and the claims herein arise from
those transactions. Meteora’s decentralized finance (the “DeFi”) platform, particularly its
proprietary Dynamic Liquidity Market Maker (the “DLMM”) infrastructure, which was
essential to managing the liquidity and market-making functions critical to the launch and
subsequent sales of the $LIBRA Token, was coordinated and managed from Meteora’s
management headquartered in New York. The technical and strategic decisions related to
liquidity provision, token sales mechanics, and market-making operations at issue in this
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to3 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 6 of 48
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case were fundamentally controlled and executed by Meteora personnel operating within
13. The infrastructure and technological tools employed by Meteora to facilitate the
$LIBRA Token launch, including the critical liquidity management and insider access
features enabling token pricing and subsequent investor losses, were directly operated
and supervised from New York. Meteora’s New York-based operations thus created and
14. Moreover, the financial instruments utilized during the $LIBRA launch, including
financial activities tied directly to New York’s financial markets. These operations affirm
business within New York, creating sufficient minimum contacts to anticipate litigation in
this jurisdiction.
15. Venue is proper in New York County pursuant to CPLR § 503(a), as a substantial
part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims occurred within this county.
Specifically, the core business activities of Meteora related to the management, liquidity
provision, and execution of the $LIBRA Token launch were directly carried out by
management of the liquidity mechanisms employed during the token launch, occurred in
New York. These activities are directly connected to the harm suffered by Plaintiff and
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to4 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 7 of 48
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17. Additionally, given the concentration of Meteora’s personnel, documents, and key
financial infrastructure underlying the token launch—the County of New York represents
the most practical and efficient forum for resolving this litigation.
III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiff
18. Plaintiff Omar Hurlock purchased the $LIBRA Token and suffered damages as a
result. Plaintiff Omar Hurlock is a resident of New York state in the United States.
B. Defendants
in 2021, specializing in investments within the Web3 technology sector. The firm
positions itself as a catalyst for Web3 innovation, combining go-to-market expertise, in-
depth research, and targeted investments to support visionary projects at every stage—
(“AI”) applications.
Solana blockchain, designed to enhance liquidity, optimize capital efficiency, and create
yield opportunities for digital assets, including memecoins. Meteora’s core management
team, including its co-founder and former Chief Executive Officer, Benjamin Chow,
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to5 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 8 of 48
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22. Defendant Hayden Davis is, and at all times relevant to this complaint was, a
founder of Kelsier Ventures, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Kelsier Ventures.
23. Defendant Gideon Davis is, and at all times relevant to this complaint was, a
founder of Kelsier Ventures, and the Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of Kelsier
24. Defendant Thomas Davis is, and at all times relevant to this complaint was, a
founder of Kelsier Ventures, and the Chairman of Kelsier Ventures. Thomas Davis is a
25. Defendant Julian Peh is, and at all times relevant to this complaint was, a founder
of KIP Protocol, and the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of KIP Protocol. Julian Peh is
a resident of Singapore.
26. Defendant Benjamin Chow, at all times relevant to this complaint was, a founder
of Meteora, and the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Meteora. Benjamin Chow is a
manner. Each block in the chain contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a
timestamp, and transaction data, ensuring a continuous and verifiable record of activity.
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to6 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 9 of 48
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29. The decentralized nature of blockchain intends to eliminate the need for a central
transactions, supply chain management, and digital identity verification. They serve as
31. Blockchain are noted for their potential improvements to security, transparency,
and resistance to tampering, making them useful for financial and transactional
ecosystems.
32. A blockchain network consists of nodes that maintain and verify the integrity of
the ledger. Public blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, are open to anyone and
operate on a permissionless basis, meaning any participant can join the network, validate
blockchains restrict access and are often utilized by enterprises for specific business
purposes.
33. Cryptocurrencies are a type of digital assets that utilize blockchain technology to
store of value, or a unit of account. Cryptocurrencies derive their value from factors such
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to7 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 10 of 48
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35. Memecoins are a subset of cryptocurrencies that are primarily driven by social
media influencer paid or unpaid marketing, internet culture, market making, liquidity
management, and insider price management techniques rather than inherent technological
innovation or utility.
clear use cases and established ecosystems, memecoins often emerge as viral sensations,
38. Memecoins success largely depends on the articulated purpose of the token,
influencer recruitment or engagement, and continued market enthusiasm that attract new
investor participation.
39. The launch and distribution of memecoins often involve practices such as pre-
These methods are often obfuscated through sophisticated technologies and coordinated
efforts of infrastructure providers, token launch teams, and liquidity providers or so-
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to8 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 11 of 48
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43. The $LIBRA Token, a memecoin, was marketed as a means to promote financial
44. According to $LIBRA’s website, the memecoins mission was “to boost the
Argentine economy by funding small projects and local businesses, supporting those who
45. $LIBRA’s promotional website further described the memecoin stating: (1) “At
The Viva La Libertad Project, any Argentine with an idea or project can apply for
funding;” (2) “Whether you have a small business, a startup, or an educational initiative
that needs a boost, this is your opportunity;” (3) “We believe in the ability of Argentines
46. The project’s website and public statements framed $LIBRA as part of a broader
transparency and technological advancement. The website explicitly stated that $LIBRA
was intended to “strengthen the Argentine economy from the ground up by supporting
47. Like many other Solana memecoins launched utilizing the Meteora infrastructure,
and coordinated by the Kelsier Ventures team, $LIBRA utilized the likeness of influential
48. Specifically, the $LIBRA memecoin website stated that: (1) “A Token with
Purpose: $LIBRA;” (2) “As a symbol of this movement and in honor of Javier Milei’s
1 See https://www.vivalalibertadproject.com/
This is a copy of a pleading filed electronically pursuant to9 New York State court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5-b(d)(3)(i))
which, at the time of its printout from the court system's electronic website, had not yet been reviewed and
approved by the County Clerk. Because court rules (22 NYCRR §202.5[d]) authorize the County Clerk to reject
filings for various reasons, readers should be aware that documents bearing this legend may not have been
accepted for filing by the County Clerk. 12 of 48
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libertarian ideas, we are launching the $LIBRA Token, designed to strengthen the
and (3) “With this token, we aim to channel funding efficiently and in a decentralized
49. The Defendants have used this same strategy provide a veneer of legitimacy to
promote their memecoin launches, while failing disclose the presence of predatory
infrastructure techniques like one-sided liquidity pools and insider trading or sniping
whereby the launch team and related parties gain majority control of the memecoins
available supply at launch, creating an unfair advantage against everyday retail traders.
50. Taken as a whole, these statements created the clear and intended impression that
the $LIBRA memecoin possessed inherent value due to its purported use case—
51. By aligning the token’s launch with the high-profile endorsement of Argentina’s
economic potential.
53. This strategic association with influential political figures and ambitious
including the use of one-sided liquidity pools, insider trading, sniping bots, and pre-
launch token allocations—that were in fact designed to benefit insiders and infrastructure
54. In addition to the stated purpose of the $LIBRA memecoin, the launch team
55. The official $LIBRA website stated that fifty percent (50%) of the tokens would
56. That 30% of the tokens would be used as liquidity to support the tokens ongoing
57. Finally, that 20% of the token would be retained by the treasury, again to support
58. The combination of these statements was designed to create confidence in the
buyers of this token that the token price would be professionally managed, and that their
investment would indeed go towards supporting the Argentinian economy which would
59. These tokenomics were false or misleading in that, nearly 90% of the token
supply was captured by the team or insiders at launch, and used by those close to the
project to enrich themselves at the costs to both retail purchasers and the Argentine
people.
2 See https://www.vivalalibertadproject.com/
60. This pattern is similar to many of the other tokens launched by the Defendants,
whereby the Defendants gained at the cost of retail participants through misleading
marketing tactics and a failure to disclose material facts that would have raised concerns
61. As a result of these representations, purchasers were led to believe that the
$LIBRA Token was a well-structured digital asset with a clear economic purpose and
blockchain, designed to enhance liquidity, optimize capital efficiency, and create yield
token creators, cryptocurrency project teams, and market participants, enabling them to
systems. These systems permit liquidity providers (the “LPs”) to control trading
conditions, liquidity depth, and market pricing in highly customizable ways, enabling
token creators and insiders to exercise substantial influence over token launches and
66. Meteora’s proprietary DLMM, or one-sided liquidity pools, are unlike traditional
67. The DLMM allows liquidity providers to supply liquidity using only a single
asset, typically the provider’s own tokens, rather than pairs of tokens matched with stable
68. The DLMM gives Liquidity Providers, like Kelsier Ventures, the capability to
69. The Providers can set precise price ranges, liquidity depths, and fee structures,
giving them significant control over trading behavior and outcomes. This effectively
places much of the initial liquidity risk onto retail buyers and subsequent market
participants.
70. These Dynamic AMM pools not only generate revenue from swap fees but also
protocols. Such design significantly enhances returns for liquidity providers, encouraging
71. Meteora played a central and critical role in the launch and market activity
surrounding the $LIBRA Token by utilizing its specialized DeFi infrastructure built on
72. Specifically, the $Libra token team leveraged Meteora’s proprietary DLMM
infrastructure.
73. Unlike traditional decentralized exchanges, Meteora’s DLMM allowed the token
creators and project insiders to initiate liquidity through one-sided liquidity pools—
providing liquidity exclusively in $LIBRA Tokens, without pairing these tokens with
74. This enabled Defendants to launch trading with minimal or no upfront capital
investment, placing nearly all of the trading and pricing risks onto subsequent retail
purchasers.
76. Meteora designed the DLMM to disproportionately reward early purchasers who
scarcity and corresponding supply shock, rapidly inflating the $LIBRA Token’s price to a
peak valuation of approximately $4.5 billion within hours of its market debut.
78. Further exacerbating this artificial market dynamic, Meteora’s DLMM did not
merely passively host liquidity but provided tools that allowed liquidity providers—
primarily the Defendants and affiliated insiders—to dynamically manage and manipulate
liquidity conditions.
79. Insiders had the ability to discreetly withdraw stable assets (USDC and SOL),
traders.
80. These liquidity withdrawals by insiders directly contributed to the abrupt and
catastrophic price collapse of $LIBRA shortly thereafter, inflicting severe financial harm
81. Meteora’s leadership has explicitly acknowledged their direct involvement and
prior to launch, indicating an active verification process rather than a passive role as
83. Meteora was thus integrally involved in both the technology and market
management aspects of the token’s launch, directly enabling and supporting the insider
trading mechanisms that caused significant harm to the retail investor class.
84. In short, Meteora’s DLMM platform provided the technological foundation and
significantly enriching insiders while directly causing devastating financial losses to retail
purchasers.
specializing in investments within the Web3 technology sector. The firm positions itself
market launch.
3 See https://x.com/hellochow/status/1891341548115149190
86. Kelsier Ventures played a central and deliberate role in the creation and
development team, minted the entirety of the $LIBRA Token supply—one billion tokens
—via a single controlled wallet, designated as Libra Team Wallet 1. Immediately after
representing 76% of the total supply, into multiple additional wallets under their direct
87. The timing and patterns of these token transfers, occurring rapidly after minting
and mirroring identical interactions as the original deployer, indicate clear insider
introduced the tokens into the Meteora DLMM pools, specifically identified as pool
address BzzMN…Szz. This structured movement of tokens into liquidity pools allowed
Kelsier Ventures to strategically control the initial liquidity and market pricing dynamics.
88. Of the minted tokens, Kelsier Ventures initially withheld approximately 70% of
the total supply from market circulation entirely. An additional 15% was placed into the
liquidity pools, while 14.9% of the tokens were retained by Kelsier and affiliated insiders.
89. Blockchain analysis has identified multiple wallets linked directly to Kelsier
Ventures and affiliated insiders involved in the $LIBRA Token launch. Notably, LIBRA
Wallet 2 was identified as extracting approximately $4.3 million from liquidity pools
shortly after the token became available for public trading. (See EXHIBIT 2)
90. Further analysis revealed that LIBRA Wallet 3 generated profits exceeding $29
million through structured liquidity extraction techniques. As of the time of this filing,
this wallet continues to hold at least $17 million worth of funds obtained from retail
transactions employing similar tactics, contributing substantially to the total insider profit
92. The substantial insider profits were obtained through sophisticated manipulation
of liquidity pools hosted on the Meteora decentralized exchange. Rather than executing
visible sales, insiders structured liquidity placements within very narrow and
93. This strategic structuring enabled insiders to passively convert their LIBRA token
holdings into stable assets (primarily USDC and SOL) whenever retail buyers entered the
into stable assets without traditional, transparent market trades that would have revealed
94. By leveraging this liquidity mechanism, insiders successfully obscured their exit
from retail purchasers, who remained unaware that their stable asset contributions were
95. Blockchain transaction data clearly illustrate the coordinated and deliberate nature
systematic incremental withdrawals shortly after the launch, rapidly removing stable
assets from liquidity pools in amounts ranging from $1 million to as high as $7.7 million
multiple withdrawals within a short span on February 14, 2025. These individual
97. In total, insiders extracted approximately $107 million in stable assets within
hours of the $LIBRA Token’s launch. This substantial extraction of liquidity directly
precipitated a severe token price collapse of approximately 94% from its artificially
inflated peak valuation, inflicting catastrophic financial harm upon retail purchasers who
98. Insiders associated with the $LIBRA Token systematically extracted substantial
specifically identified include LIBRA Wallet 2, LIBRA Wallet 3, and LIBRA Wallet 4
99. LIBRA Wallet 2 extracted approximately $4.3 million from retail purchasers
through strategically managed liquidity positions. LIBRA Wallet 3 realized total profits
estimated at $29 million, of which at least $17 million was retained post-extraction.
101. Insiders utilized Meteora’s DLMM pools to structure their profit-taking. Instead
of openly selling tokens on the market, insiders placed liquidity within narrowly defined
price ranges, ensuring that retail purchasers’ token purchases directly converted into
102. This liquidity manipulation allowed insiders to avoid transparent market selling.
Retail investor purchases automatically provided stablecoins that insiders then withdrew
promptly, effectively capturing real monetary value without triggering observable price
103. Specific examples demonstrate the coordinated and systematic nature of these
million, $1.7 million, $2.7 million, $3.1 million, and as high as $7.7 million. (See
EXHIBIT 3)
104. Similarly, Wallet 6 conducted precise and coordinated extractions ranging from
approximately $107 million in stable assets from the liquidity pools within hours of the
LIBRA token launch. This systematic depletion directly caused a catastrophic 94%
applications.
107. KIP Protocol markets itself as providing foundational blockchain tools enabling
108. KIP Protocol’s business model revolves around providing technical infrastructure
109. The company is backed by prominent venture capital firms, including Animoca
market maker.
Protocol publicly associated itself with the $LIBRA Token launch in February 2025,
111. KIP Protocol’s association significantly enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the
$LIBRA Token, leading retail purchasers to reasonably rely upon its credibility and
technological reputation.
112. The $LIBRA official website prominently featured KIP Protocol’s branding and
statements endorsing the token, positioning it as an essential partner for the project’s
C. One-Sided Liquidity Pools are inherently Unfair and Deviate from Standard
Decentralized Finance Protocols
119. The $LIBRA memecoin launch was unfair because it utilized one-sided liquidity
pools allowing liquidity providers to supply liquidity using only a single asset.
120. In standard decentralized finance (DeFi) practices, two-sided liquidity pools are
a pair, reflecting true market conditions based on genuine supply and demand.
121. Such balanced pools inherently mitigate market manipulation by ensuring price
122. By contrast, one-sided liquidity pools artificially insulate prices from genuine
market forces, creating deceptive impressions of liquidity depth and market stability,
thereby distorting the token’s true value and misleading purchasers about its actual
market demand.
purchasers. Because insider sell-offs are disguised as liquidity adjustments rather than
explicit market transactions, retail traders are denied visibility into the actual selling
activities of insiders.
124. Unlike traditional two-sided liquidity pools, which require equal deposits of two
assets (such as $LIBRA Tokens paired with SOL or USDC), one-sided pools enable
liquidity providers, including token issuers and insiders, to contribute only their
initiate trading conditions at minimal or no upfront capital investment, shifting almost all
risk onto subsequent purchasers who provide the opposing asset when trading begins.
127. In typical markets or two-sided liquidity pools, prices openly fluctuate in response
to balanced buying and selling pressures, clearly reflecting actual market activity.
128. In stark contrast, one-sided liquidity pools enable artificial management of price
discovery.
129. Rather than appearing transparently as direct sales, insider and issuer selling
130. This caused retail purchasers to witness token price charts and trading activities
insider selling.
132. The initial liquidity pool established by the Defendants consisted exclusively of
$LIBRA Tokens without any corresponding deposit of stable assets, such as SOL or
USDC.
133. This structuring inherently benefited insiders and token launch teams by enabling
134. Instead of openly selling tokens, insiders withdraw stable assets (SOL and USDC)
135. Thus, the entire initial liquidity relied exclusively upon incoming retail purchasers
who, unaware of this structure, provided stable assets in exchange for $LIBRA Tokens
136. In the $LIBRA launch, the use of one-sided liquidity pools resulted in retail
traders seeing positive market signals rather than the realistic insider sell-offs, causing
137. Defendants leveraged this structure to discreetly monetize their token holdings,
until their exit became complete and irreversible, resulting in severe and rapid price
collapse.
138. In the $LIBRA Token’s specific instance, blockchain analysis demonstrated that
insiders used Meteora’s DLMM pools to covertly extract approximately $87.4 million in
stable assets from retail purchasers within the first few hours of token trading.
139. These profits were realized without the transparency associated with normal
market sales, effectively hiding their trades behind the mechanics of passive liquidity
provision.
140. In the $LIBRA launch, insiders were able to exploit this one-sided liquidity
141. The token creators deposited a substantial supply of $LIBRA Tokens into the one-
sided liquidity pools without corresponding stable asset collateral. They subsequently
profited substantially by allowing retail buyers to provide stable assets into the pool in
exchange for tokens, at which point insiders extracted these stable assets.
143. Once insiders had maximized their gains, they abruptly withdrew liquidity,
causing an immediate collapse in the token’s price and inflicting substantial losses upon
retail purchasers.
144. The Defendants’ deliberate failure to disclose the one-sided liquidity pool
structure was materially misleading. Purchasers should have been explicitly informed of
the use and risks associated with one-sided liquidity pools, including
145. The disproportionate extent of insiders’ token control at launch, allowing them
146. The precise mechanics and inherent risks of one-sided liquidity pools, including
147. The potential and likelihood of sudden liquidity withdrawal by insiders, resulting
148. The Defendants’ omission of these critical disclosures deprived retail purchasers
149. Defendants artificially preset the initial price of the $LIBRA Token without
determine fair pricing, the LIBRA team manually set the initial valuation at
150. At launch, the LIBRA liquidity pools contained only LIBRA tokens, with no
stablecoin assets such as SOL or USDC to provide legitimate price support. This single-
sided liquidity approach created an artificial valuation, entirely detached from genuine
supply-and-demand dynamics.
151. Approximately twenty minutes prior to publicly announcing the token launch,
Defendants minted one billion LIBRA tokens (the entire token supply) in a single insider-
controlled wallet. This action allowed insiders total control over the token distribution
(150,000,000 tokens) into Meteora’s DLMM pools, withholding the remaining 85% of
supply under insider control. This ensured insiders dominated the token’s liquidity and
153. Following the initial liquidity placement, Defendants incrementally added smaller
18,400,092; 12,244,340; and 31,575,660 tokens) were also exclusively one-sided, with no
total supply) into pools specifically designed to facilitate rapid and profitable insider
exits. This structure enabled insiders to monetize their holdings quickly, at artificially
155. Retail purchasers were misled into believing the LIBRA token’s valuation was
pricing mechanisms, these retail buyers purchased tokens at grossly inflated and
unsupported valuations.
156. Due to the absence of authentic stablecoin liquidity, retail purchasers provided
their own stable assets (SOL/USDC) when buying into LIBRA’s artificially priced pools.
Insiders quickly extracted these stable assets, rapidly depleting liquidity and directly
157. As a direct consequence, retail purchasers suffered severe and immediate financial
158. Defendants exercised total initial control over the LIBRA token supply by minting
all one billion LIBRA tokens into a single wallet (“Libra Team Wallet 1”);. This
centralized control allowed insiders to dictate token distribution from inception. (See
EXHIBIT 1)
159. Immediately after minting, Defendants retained approximately 85% of the total
LIBRA token supply under insider control. Only 15% of tokens were initially placed into
160. Shortly following the minting process, approximately 760 million LIBRA tokens
—constituting roughly 76% of the total supply—were transferred from Libra Team
Ventures and other entities closely affiliated with the Defendants. (See EXHIBIT 1)
161. Defendants strategically deposited tokens into Meteora’s DLMM pools. These
pools were structured with one-sided liquidity, consisting solely of LIBRA tokens and no
corresponding stable assets, enabling insiders to manage token liquidity without risking
availability and pricing mechanisms. The absence of stable asset liquidity allowed
dynamics.
163. Insiders strategically positioned token liquidity within DLMM pools at artificially
high price points. This positioning enabled insiders to systematically extract stable assets
164. Retail purchasers, believing in a legitimate and fair market, provided stable asset
liquidity that insiders immediately withdrew. This practice resulted in rapid profit
165. Consequently, this insider-driven liquidity extraction directly caused a sudden and
substantial collapse of the LIBRA token’s market price. The artificial price structure and
166. Defendants marketed the $LIBRA Token as a fair, transparent, and community-
driven project. Promotional statements from Argentina’s President Javier Milei, as well as
the official LIBRA website, explicitly promised that funds raised from the token sale
would directly support economic growth and entrepreneurial activity within Argentina.
167. Contrary to their public representations, Defendants artificially set the initial
valuation and market capitalization of the $LIBRA Token. Utilizing one-sided liquidity
pools, Defendants launched the token without genuine backing liquidity, intentionally
creating a deceptive appearance of robust market demand and stability. The liquidity
information regarding how raised funds would be allocated to fulfill the promised
substantiate their advertised claims of using the token proceeds to stimulate the
Argentinian economy. Purchasers thus relied upon misleading and materially incomplete
169. The token’s artificially established valuation quickly collapsed by more than 90%
once retail purchasers began purchasing $LIBRA Tokens. Defendants, including Kelsier
Ventures and affiliated insiders, systematically removed the limited stable asset liquidity
that retail purchasers deposited into the market, thereby extracting millions of dollars in
value while concealing their sales activity through manipulative liquidity pool
mechanisms.
170. Following the precipitous price collapse, Kelsier Ventures’ CEO Hayden Davis
publicly promised to repurchase more than $100 million of the extracted liquidity within
artificially inflated the token’s value, publicly disseminated materially false and
misleading claims regarding the token’s economic purpose and management, and
expense of retail purchasers. As a result, retail purchasers were misled and subsequently
suffered significant financial harm, rendering the entire $LIBRA Token launch
172. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Article 9 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) on behalf of all individuals who purchased $LIBRA
Tokens (the "Class"). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their immediate family
members, legal representatives, agents, directors, officers, heirs, successors, assigns, and
any entity in which any of the foregoing have or had a controlling interest
173. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this
time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that
there are hundreds of members in the proposed Class. For example, 1,000,000,000
$LIBRA tokens were minted by the Defendants. Upon information and belief, the
throughout the United States and the world. Joinder would be highly impracticable.
174. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff purchased the
$LIBRA Tokens, and sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct complained
of herein.
175. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has
retained counsel who are competent and experienced in securities class action litigation.
176. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among
a) Whether Defendants committed deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any
consumer goods or services within the State of New York and violated NY GBL
b) Whether Defendants knew or should have known that their statements were
d) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages as a result of the
177. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient
as a class will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their
common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication
178. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of claims by many Class
members who could not afford individually to litigate claims such as those asserted in
this Complaint. The cost to the court system of adjudication of such individualized
179. Plaintiff is unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be encountered in the
COUNT I
Violation of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350
Against all Defendants
180. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
182. New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349 prohibits deceptive acts and
practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce within the State of New
York. GBL § 350 similarly prohibits false advertising in connection with consumer goods
or services.
183. Defendants, including Meteora, Kelsier Ventures, and related entities, engaged in
unfair, deceptive, and misleading practices in connection with the marketing, launch, and
184. Defendants publicly represented that the $LIBRA Token was intended to facilitate
marketed the token through statements prominently displayed on the official $LIBRA
website, such as: “At The Viva La Libertad Project, any Argentine with an idea or project
can apply for funding,” and “We aim to channel funding efficiently and in a decentralized
any substantive details regarding token distribution, actual mechanisms for funding
186. Defendants utilized the likeness and endorsement of prominent political figures,
notably President Javier Milei, to further promote and lend legitimacy to the $LIBRA
Token. This strategy was calculated to create investor reliance and foster expectations of
substantial economic benefits associated with purchasing and holding the token.
structured the token launch using inherently unfair “one-sided liquidity pools,” which
artificially set and inflated token valuations without stable asset backing. By doing so,
Defendants concealed significant insider sales activities and obscured the true economic
value of the token, causing retail purchasers to purchase at artificially inflated prices.
188. Defendants deliberately failed to disclose essential material facts regarding their
approximately 90% of the total token supply was under their control, that token pricing
and liquidity were artificially managed through insider-dominated liquidity pools, and
purchasers.
189. Retail purchasers relied upon Defendants’ deceptive marketing claims, including
the misrepresentation that the token possessed legitimate economic value and would
$LIBRA Tokens at artificially inflated prices, unaware that Defendants had structured the
190. Defendants’ conduct constitutes a clear violation of GBL § 349, as their acts and
practices were materially deceptive, unfair, and misleading. These deceptive acts caused
while intentionally concealing the underlying risks, unfair tokenomic distribution, and
192. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of GBL §§ 349 and
350, Plaintiff and the proposed Class suffered substantial monetary damages. Plaintiff
and the Class are entitled to recover damages in an amount to be determined at trial,
including actual damages, statutory damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and
193. Defendants’ acts were willful, intentional, and egregious, justifying punitive
damages to deter similar future conduct. Plaintiff further seeks all available equitable
and fraudulent business practices, along with prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees and
costs.
194. As a result of the Defendants actions, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered
COUNT II
Negligent Misrepresentation
Against all Defendants
195. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if
196. Defendants, including Meteora, Kelsier Ventures, and their affiliated insiders, held
themselves out to the investing public as knowledgeable experts and trusted facilitators of
digital asset launches. In launching and promoting the $LIBRA Token, Defendants
undertook a duty to disclose accurate, complete, and truthful information regarding the
soundness.
197. Defendants prominently advertised the $LIBRA Token through their official
website and public statements, explicitly representing that funds raised from the token
sale would directly support economic growth and innovation in Argentina, including
specific promises such as: “At The Viva La Libertad Project, any Argentine with an idea
or project can apply for funding,” and that token proceeds would be used “efficiently and
initiatives.
198. At the time Defendants made these public statements, they knew or should have
possessed special knowledge regarding the token’s actual liquidity structure, insider-
owed purchasers a duty of care to accurately disclose these critical facts but failed to do
so.
199. Defendants’ representations regarding the value, purpose, and utility of the
$LIBRA Token were materially misleading because Defendants failed to disclose the
substantial risks arising from their use of one-sided liquidity pools and controlled float
strategies. Defendants failed to disclose that approximately 90% of the token’s total
supply was under their direct control, creating an inherently unstable market environment
designed specifically for insider financial benefit rather than legitimate market-driven
price discovery.
200. Plaintiff and the proposed class reasonably relied upon Defendants’ public
statements, promotional materials, and purported expertise when investing in the $LIBRA
Token. Had the omitted facts concerning liquidity structure, token supply, insider
holdings, and extraction strategies been disclosed, Plaintiff and other similarly situated
purchasers would not have invested or would have invested at significantly lower
valuations.
material omissions, Plaintiff and other similarly situated purchasers suffered substantial
economic harm, including but not limited to severe depreciation in the value of their
investments when insiders rapidly withdrew stable assets from the liquidity pools,
determined at trial, together with interest, attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and any
203. As a result of the Defendants actions, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered
COUNT III
Unjust Enrichment
Against All Defendants
204. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if
205. Plaintiff repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations contained
herein.
206. Defendants, including Meteora, Kelsier Ventures, and affiliated insiders, received
substantial financial benefits through their involvement in the $LIBRA Token launch,
specifically through the strategic manipulation of liquidity pools and extraction of stable
207. By employing single-sided liquidity pools and controlled float tactics within the
Meteora DLMM, Defendants unfairly profited from artificially inflated token valuations.
208. Defendants’ profits from these deceptive practices were achieved at the direct
expense of Plaintiff and the proposed class, who provided stable assets (such as USDC
and SOL) based on false representations of market stability, genuine liquidity, and token
valuation.
209. It would be unjust and inequitable for Defendants to retain the substantial
financial benefits derived from their deceptive conduct, as they knowingly structured the
purchasers.
210. Equity and good conscience require Defendants to disgorge all profits obtained
through these unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent practices. Plaintiff are entitled to
restitution of the full amount wrongfully obtained by Defendants, along with interest,
attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and such other equitable relief as the Court may deem just
and proper.
211. As a result of the Defendants actions, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class respectfully request that the Court enter
judgment in their favor and grant the following relief against Defendants Kelsier Ventures, KIP
A. Compensatory Damages
ii. Economic damages arising from the rapid price collapse directly
c. Stable assets (including SOL and USDC) siphoned from retail purchasers
making commissions, and other profits arising from the artificially inflated
e. Plaintiff further requests restitution to restore Plaintiff and the Class to the
a. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and equitable relief including, but not limited to:
D. Punitive Damages
state laws, including New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350.
b. Plaintiff requests pre and post judgment interest on all sums awarded to
c. Plaintiff requests that the Court grant such further and other relief as the
contained herein.
investing public.
c. Meteora currently holds significant revenues and assets derived from these
dissipation.
integrity.
asset marketplace.
____/s/
Max Burwick
[email protected]
BURWICK LAW, PLLC