Third World Quarterly

Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links

Author(s): Caroline Thomas
Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 159-175
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Third WorldQuarterly, Vol22, No 2, pp 159-175, 2001

Global governance, development and

human security: exploring the links

CAROLINE THOMAS

ABSTRACT This article draws attention to the convergence of the global

development and security agendas at the beginning of the new millennium. It
explores the links between global governance, developmentand human security.
It argues that material sufficiency lies at the core of human security. Hence, the
problems of poverty and deepening inequality are central concerns, and the
unfolding of these problems in the 1980s and 1990s is highlighted. During the
closing decades of the 20th century, a neoliberal vision dominated the global
developmentpolicy agenda, while these problems of inequality deepened. The
policy was developed, championedand implementedby a range of global gover-
nance institutions,working throughstate governments.The idea and the institu-
tions of global governance are examinedcritically, with a view to establishing in
whose interestglobal governance and its associated developmentpolicies may be
operating,and whetherthis is in supportof humansecurity.

Setting the scene

Poverty is the ultimate systemic threatfacing humanity.The widening gaps between
rich and poor nations ... are ... potentially socially explosive ... If the poor are left
hopeless, poverty will underminesocieties throughconfrontation,violence and civil
disorder.(Michel Camdessus,ManagingDirectorof the IMF,2000b)
In a world awash with resources,wealth and technology, global poverty is certainly
not the productof bad luck. (PeterWilkin, 2000)
Pervasive poverty and deepening inequality are distinctive features of the
contemporaryglobal social landscape. Powerful global governance institutions
are awakening to these fault lines as potential threatsto the global order.On 10
January2000 the United Nations Security Council, the most important global
body dedicated to tackling security issues, met to discuss the challenge of
HIV/AIDSin Africa. The focus of the meeting was far removed from the traditional
concerns of the Security Council, which were mainly military threatsto regional
and global order.This is indicative of a widening of the global security agenda to
encompass non-traditional matters, such as health, environment and poverty
issues.
Moreover,for the first time, a WorldBank Presidentwas invited to addressthe
Security Council. WorldBank PresidentJames Wolfensohn, in his speech to the

Caroline Thomas is at the Department of Politics at the University of Southampton, Highfield, South-
ampton S017 IBJ, UK. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/01/020159-17 ? 2001 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590120037018 159

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 CAROLINE THOMAS

meeting, remarked that 'If we want to prevent violent conflict, we need a

comprehensive,equitable,and inclusive approachto development'.Development
is moving to the centre stage of the global political agenda, largely on account of
the realisationof currentleaders of global governanceagencies that development
and security are intimately linked. HIV/AIDS, a matter that had previously been
considered within the UN system as a health issue, was evolving into a global
securityconcern.
The convergence of the development and security agendas is the concern of
this article. The focus is selected not in response to the increasedlevel of interest
of leaders of global governance institutions, but rather in recognition of the
ancient and enduring concerns of humanity.For the overwhelming majority of
people on this planet, human security is their primary concern. As Nelson
Mandelaremarkedat the dawn of the new millennium,ordinarypeople want:
the simpleopportunity to live a decentlife, to havea propershelterandfood to eat,
to be ableto carefor theirchildrenandto live withdignity,to havegoodeducation
for theircharges,theirhealthneedscaredfor andto have access to paidemploy-
ment.(Citedby Camdessus, 2000a)
Human insecurity is not some inevitable occurrence. Of course, natural catas-
trophes such as drought undermine human security, but even within a single
locality they do not undermine everyone's security equally. Rather, human
insecurity results directly from existing structuresof power that determine who
enjoys the entitlementto securityand who does not. Such structurescan be iden-
tified at several levels, ranging from the global, to the regional, the state and
finally the local level.
Our focus here is the global level. Thus we are concerned directly with the
global development agenda and the materialpolarisationwhich is unfolding in
the wake of its application.The growth of materialinequalityis evident between
states, within states, and also between privatecorporations(Thomas, 1999). This
has a direct impact on the contemporaryhuman experience of security, and on
futureprospectsfor enhancinghumansecurity.
Regarding future prospects for human security, there is a simple but hugely
importantquestion as to whetherthe mechanismsin place to tackle poverty and
to promote wider development are adequate to the task. In 1995 the UN set a
targetof a 50% reductionin the numberof people existing in absolutepoverty by
2015. This outcome is to be delivered not by any redistributivemechanism, but
rather by the application of the particular neoliberal model of development
promotedin the 1980s and 1990s by global governanceinstitutions.This model
places its faith in the market rather than the state, and focuses on export-led
growth based on free capital mobility. The model representsa significant depar-
ture from the earlierembeddedliberalismof the post-second world war period. It
is even furtherremoved from a critical alternative model of development that
places basic needs at the centre.
The neoliberal model requireshigh and sustainedgrowth to achieve the UN's
target for poverty reduction. African economies, for example, would need to
grow at an estimated7% a year on averageto reach the targetby 2015 (Amoako,
1999). Yet even if such growth is sustainedin Africa and elsewhere, can we be
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXPLORING THE LINKS

confident that it will translateinto a 50% reduction in the absolute poor? How
will the benefits and the costs be distributed?Moreover,beyond this initial goal,
can the model significantly enhance the human security of the rest of humanity?
If not, does the solution lie in reform of the existing model, or transformationof
it? These questions matter.The scope, depth and speed of the changes that have
been, and continue to be, introduced in development policy are breathtaking.
Their legitimacy is open to question, and the futures of billions will be deeply
affected by them. (These mattersare explore more fully in Thomas, 2000).

The human security challenge

When we think about security, we need to think beyond battalionsand borders.We
need to think about human security, about winning a different war, the fight against
poverty. (James Wolfensohn, World Bank President, addressing the UN Security
Council meeting on AIDS/HIVin Africa, 10 January2000)
The concept of human security involves a fundamental departure from an
orthodox InternationalRelations security analysis that has the state as the exclu-
sive primaryreferentobject. Instead,humanbeings and their complex social and
economic relations are given primacy with or over states. In the words of
Heinbecker,human security is about 'the ability to protect people as well as to
safeguard states' (Heinbecker, 1999: 6). In some human security formulations,
such as that of CanadianForeign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, human needs rather
than state needs are paramount.Axworthy believes this to be so in the aftermath
of the Cold War, when intrastate conflicts have become more prevalent than
interstate conflicts. These conflicts are fought with low technology, and in
contrastto the very beginning of the 20th century,most of the casualties now-
75%-are civilian (Smith, 1997: 14). Axworthy notes that women and children
are disproportionatelyoften the victims of these wars. For Axworthy, 'Human
security includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of
life, and a guaranteeof fundamentalhumanrights' (Axworthy, 1997: 184).
The concept of human security pursued here differs fundamentally from
notions of 'security of the individual', conceived in the currently fashionable
neoliberal sense. Human security is far removed from liberal notions of competi-
tive and possessive individualism(ie the extension of private power and activity,
based around property rights and choice in the market place). Rather, human
securitydescribes a condition of existence in which basic materialneeds are met,
and in which human dignity, including meaningfulparticipationin the life of the
community, can be realised. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be
pursuedby or for one groupat the expense of another.
Therefore, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in
addition the concept encompasses non-materialdimensions to form a qualitative
whole. In other words, material sufficiency is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition of human security that entails more than physical survival. For
simplicity we can refer to these different aspects in terms of a quantitative/
qualitative distinction, which broadly refers to income poverty and human
poverty.This will be furtherdiscussed below underUNDP.
The quantitativeaspect refers to materialsufficiency. In this context, Axworthy
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 CAROLINE THOMAS

remarksthat: 'At minimum,humansecurityrequiresthat basic needs are met ...'

(Axworthy, 1997: 184). Thereforethe pursuitof human security must have at its
core the satisfaction of basic material needs of all humankind. At the lowest
level, food, shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of
humanbeings.
The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human
dignity which incorporatespersonal autonomy, control over one's life and un-
hinderedparticipationin the life of the community.Emancipationfrom oppres-
sive power structures,be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is
necessary for humansecurity.Humansecurityis orientatedtowardsan active and
substantive notion of democracy, one that ensures the opportunity for all to
participatein the decisions that affect their lives. Thereforeit is engaged directly
with discussions of democracyat all levels, from the local to the global.
Human security is pursuedby the majorityof humankindas part of a collec-
tive, most commonly the household, sometimes the village or the community
defined along other criteriasuch as religion, ethnicity,gender or caste. Often it is
pursued through a combination of these. At the global level, states have the
authority and responsibility to attend to the human security needs of their
citizens. Weak state-society relations mean that states often hinder ratherthan
help the achievementof human security by all their citizens. Global governance
institutionsalso play a crucial role. They set global developmentpolicy and fix,
apply and monitor the global entitlement rules. A consideration of human
security in the contemporaryera requiresus to consider humanityembeddednot
simply within discrete sovereign states, but within a global social structure,the
capitalist world economy that has been developing since the 16th century.In a
way, the work of the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) has lent in
that direction. The concept of human security as employed in this study was
initially broughtto the forefrontof the global policy level by that particularUN
agency.

The UNDP and humansecurity

The late Dr MahbubUl Haq first drew global attentionto the concept of human
security in the UNDP's Human Development Reports. In 1994 the Human
Development Report focused explicitly on human security. The Report argued
that:
For too long, the conceptof securityhas been shapedby the potentialfor conflict
betweenstates.For too long, securityhas beenequatedwith threatsto a country's
borders.Fortoo long, nationshave soughtarmsto protecttheirsecurity.Formost
peopletoday,a feelingof insecurityarisesmorefromworriesaboutdailylife than
fromthe dreadof a cataclysmicworldevent.Job security,incomesecurity,health
security, environmentalsecurity, security from crime, these are the emerging
concernsof humansecurityall overtheworld.(uNDP, 1994:3)
By focusing on human security the 1994 Report sought to influence the UN's
1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen. During the late
1990s the UNDP's annual reports built on and refined this concept. In 1997 the
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXPLORING THE LINKS

focus was on humandevelopment,which refers not simply to the income aspects

of poverty, but to poverty as a denial of choices and opportunitiesfor living a
tolerable life (UNDP, 1997: 2). Importantlythe 1997 reportfurtherdisaggregated
what we referred to earlier as the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of
human security.It made a distinctionbetween income poverty (US$1 a day and
below) and humanpoverty (illiteracy,shortlife expectancy and so forth). Income
poverty and human poverty are often, but not always, linked; for example in the
Gulf States people may suffer human poverty without being income poor. These
two aspects tally broadly with the quantitativeand qualitativeaspects of human
securitydiscussed above.
The UNDP played a crucial agenda-settingrole at an early stage with its focus
on human security.It was noted earlierthat development and human security are
receiving more attentionnow from the key global governanceinstitutionssuch as
the IMF and World Bank, partly because poverty and inequality are increasingly
considered to be national, regional and global security threats. Indeed, there
seems to be a correlationbetween the level of entitlementto human security and
the propensityfor conflict, defined not in orthodox inter-statearms terms but in
the wider sense to include the most frequentform of warfare,intra-state.Over the
period 1990-95, 57% of countries experiencing war were ranked low on the
UNDP'S Human Development Index, while only 14% were rankedhigh, and 34%
were ranked medium. There may be a causal relationship between lack of
material entitlement, health and education, and war (figures from Smith, 1997:
48).
One explanationof this tragic outcome may be that fundamentaleconomic and
social structures allow a privileged global and national elite to control a dis-
proportionateshare of available resources. This directly affects security. In the
words of Smith:
When a privileged elite defends its too large share of too few resources, the link is
created between poverty, inequality and the abuse of human rights. The denial of
basic freedoms-to organise,to express yourself, to vote, to disagree-forces people
to choose between accepting gross injustice and securing a fairer share by violent
means. As conflict unfolds, the political leaders that emerge often find that the
easiest way of mobilising supportis on an ethnic basis. Thus do the various causes
of conflict weave in and out. War will only end if, and when, and where its causes
are removed. (1997: 15)

Smith elucidates the poverty,inequality and security link clearly. With one-sixth
of the world's populationreceiving 80% of global income, and 57% of the global
populationconsuming only 6% of global income, the concerns about poverty and
security expressed earlier by Camdessus and Wolfensohn appear legitimate
(World Bank Development News, 14 April 2000).
Yet it is importantto rememberthat the issues of poverty and inequalitymatter
to human beings in the most potent way, irrespective of whether global gover-
nance organisationscategorise them as security issues. It is also worth recalling
that the total numberof people killed during the first and second world wars is
estimated as having been about 30 million. Comparethis figure with the number
of people who currentlydie of hunger-relatedcauses each year, that is 15 million.
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 CAROLINETHOMAS

Consequentlywe can say that every two years the numberof people who die of
hunger is roughly equivalent to the number killed in 11 years of world war.
(Thomas& Reader, 1997: 109).
The fundamentalcauses at the root of hunger,poverty and inequality must be
addressed,or the achievementof humansecuritywill be impossible.

Humansecurity: lookingforward
The change in the primaryreferentobject of security from state to human being
has implicationsboth for understandingthe sources of threatsto security,and for
elucidating strategiesto increase security.Importantlythe shift in focus from the
rights, concerns and needs of states to those of humanbeings or citizens opens up
the state for critical scrutiny. State-society relations come under the spotlight.
Fundamentalquestions arise, such as those about state capacity, state legitimacy
and state collapse. Particularissues come to the fore, such as the use of child
combatantsin intra-stateconflicts, and patternsof land tenure,which may help to
keep people poor.
But the shift in focus to human security also highlights the importance of
scrutinising global processes that may affect, even jeopardise security, and the
global governance structureswhich drive them. A proper understandingof the
process of global economic integrationand of the distributionof associated costs
and benefits is crucial. Armed with this knowledge, an informeddebate can take
place on global developmentpolicy. This is alreadyhappening.We can work to
reconstructdevelopment policy in the cause of attendingto the human security
needs of all global citizens, particularlythe poorest. Too many people are dying
of hunger and disease. This is not the productof bad luck, but ratherof existing
structureswhich can be changed.

Poverty and inequality: a cause for concern

Liberal-pluralistswho have been influencedby the classical, neoclassicaland
monetaristapproachesin economies, the functionalist and post-industrialist
approachesin sociologyandthe democraticpluralistapproachesin politicalscience
adopta relativelycompliantapproachto the continuation
of widespreadandsevere
poverty.(Townsend,1993:6)
At the dawn of the 21st century,despite 50 years of official developmentpolicies
and despite huge advances in science and technology, inequalities between and
within states are growing, and almost a third of humanity continues to live in
abject poverty.Yet in the economically advancedcountries,and among a signifi-
cant strata in developing countries, there is at best complacency about these
issues. This can be attributed to the widespread influence of the neoliberal
political ideology (see below). Moreover,these serious mattershave received a
diminishingamountof attentionfrom the media in the First World.
This diminishing attention is clear in a study commissioned for the UK's
leading international aid, development and environment charities. The study
revealed a dramatic decline in the quantity and quality of coverage of the
developing world over the period 1989-99 (Stone, 2000). Commenting on the
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXPLORING THE LINKS

report,Vidal remarkthat: 'The total numberof hours of factual programmingon

developing countries has declined by 50%; ITV has dropped its coverage by
74%; BBC2 by more than a third, Channel 4 by 56%' (Vidal, 2000: 6). In
addition, the report notes that 60% of all UK TV programming about poor
countries, which house 80% of the global population, are about travel and
wildlife. On this aspect, Vidal comments: 'BBCI is increasingly obsessed with
soft wildlife and travel programmes and Channel 5 has commissioned almost
nothing from non-westernsources since it was set up' (Vidal, 2000: 6-7).
The authorof the report,Jenny Stone, argues that the lack of coverage of the
developing countries is not simply the result of a lack of interest on the part of
the public. It has much to do with other factors such as diminishing budgets,
changes in productionculture and the advent of new technologies (Vidal, 2000).
Vidal concurs with Stone that the emphasis on increasing choice in broadcasting
in the 1990s has undermined its public service value. As the main source of
informationfor the British public on the rest of the world is such broadcasting,
this is a worryingdevelopment(Stone, 2000; Vidal, 2000).
While many people in developed countriesmay remainin blissful ignorance,it
is the case that the post-cold war global landscapeis characterisedby an intensi-
fication and reconfiguration of pre-existing economic, social and political
inequalities. The demise of the communist bloc and the associated rejection of
'real existing socialism' as a mode of economic organisation have provided a
specific additionalfillip to the reconfigurationof the Third World. The Second
World, the former communist bloc, has joined the Third World ratherthan the
First World. This suggests that, post-1989, the Third World, far from dis-
appearing,is becoming global.
The dynamic of economically driven globalisation is resulting in the global
reproductionof ThirdWorldproblems.Growing inequality,risk and vulnerability
characterise not simply the state system, but an emerging global social order.
There is a North in the South,just as there is a South in the North. This is partof
an historical process underway for five centuries: the expansion of capitalism
across the globe. Technologicaldevelopments speed up the process. Individuals'
life chances and the viability of households and communities are increasingly
tied up with their respective positions in the global economy. James Gustave
Speth of the UNDP has spoken of ways in which 'An emergingglobal elite, mostly
urban-basedand inter-connectedin a variety of ways, is amassing great wealth
and power, while more than half of humanity is left out' (New YorkTimes, 15
July 1996: 55). Two-thirdsof the global populationseem to have gained little or
nothing from the economic growth that has occurredas a result of globalisation
to date. Moreover, even in the developed world, 'the lowest quartile seems to
have witnessed a trickles up rather than a trickle down' (Financial Times, 24
December 1994).
Despite significant improvements over the 1990s in global social indicators
such as adult literacy (from 64% to 76%), access to safe water (40% to 72%) and
infant mortality rates (from 76 to 58 per 1000 live births) global deprivation
continues (see Table 1) (UNDP, 1997: 22).
These indicatorsof human security have declined in the face of the promise of
the peace dividend. Expectationshave been raised that deprivationand material
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 CAROLINE THOMAS

TABLE 1
Global deprivation, 1997

Health
* HIV/AIDSinfectionsincreasedfromfewerthan15 millionin 1990 to morethan33
millionin 1997
* 880 millionpeoplelack accessto healthservices
* 2.6 billionlack accessto sanitation
* 1.5 billionwill not surviveto the age of 60

Education
* Over850 millionilliterateadults
* Over260 millionchildrenareout of schoolat the primaryandsecondarylevels

Nutrition
* 840 millionpeoplearemalnourished

Poverty
* 1.3 billionlive on less thanUS$1 perday
* 1 billioncannotmeetbasicconsumptionrequirements

Women
* 340 millionwomenarenot expectedto surviveto the age of 40
* A quarterto a half of all womenhave sufferedphysicalabuseby an intimatepartner

Children
* 160 millionchildrenaremalnourished
* 250 millionchildrenareworkingas childlabourers

Environment
* 3 millionpeoplea yeardie fromairpollution-more than80%of themindoorair
pollution
* Morethan5 milliondie perannumfromdiarrhoealdiseasescausedby water
contamination

Security
* 12 millionpeoplearerefugees

Source: AdaptedfromUNDP (1997:22).

inequalitieswould be ameliorated,as more resourcesfreed up from the armsrace

would be diverted to accelerate development. This has not happened. Global
military spending declined over the period 1987-94 at about 3.6% per annum,
yielding a cumulative dividend of US$935 billion. Yet 'there has been no clear
link between reduced military spending and enhanced spending on human
development' (UNDP, 1994: 8). What'smore, even if the hoped for peace dividend
had materialised,its impact would have been temperedby the constraintsof the
workings of the global economy. Yet the failureto deliver even on the promise of
the peace dividend represents a significant indication of the lack of genuine
commitment by agents of global power to work towards the achievement of
humansecurity.
The associated material challenges for the achievement of human security in
the new century are immense: the reductionof global poverty, the reduction of
inequality between states and between human beings; and the harnessing of
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GLOBALGOVERNANCE,DEVELOPMENT
AND HUMANSECURITY:EXPLORINGTHELINKS

scientific advancementfor the benefit of the majority of humankind.The rapid

technological advances underway have the potential to decrease or increase
existing inequalities, dependingon how they are used and which rules determine
the distributionof the benefits. These challenges require a fundamentalshift in
how we think about developmentand in the methods for its achievement.

Neoliberal development
Neoliberalism
is nota forcelike gravity,butanartificialconstruct.(George,1999)

Conceptions of development in the last two decades of the 20th century were
heavily influenced by what may be loosely termed as the 'new right backlash'.
The 1980s, and more particularlythe 1990s since the demise of communism,
have witnessed the near-universalmainstreamingof a particularbrand of liberal
ideology referred to hereafter as neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology attributes
universallegitimacy to a conception of freedom based on privatepower. It places
a premium on individual choice in the marketplace. It attacks the public realm
and associated ideas of collectivity and society. Neoliberal ideology presentsa set
of essentially local, Westernnorms as universal.
These norms have been shared and adoptedby public institutions such as the
IMF, the World Bank, other multilateral development banks, the World Trade
Organization (wTo) and the majority of governments. This has provided an
important legitimisation for the business of private lenders and transnational
corporations(TNCs), whose vision and behaviour in most cases are underpinned
by these norms. The neoliberal ideology has thus come to be promoted around
the globe as the properapproachto development.Neoliberalism supportsglobal
economic integration and presents it as the best, the most natural and the
universalpath towardseconomic growth, and thereforetowardsdevelopment,for
all humanity. Critics, on the other hand, see its expansion across the globe as
hegemonic.
Global economic integration is to be promoted through the liberalisation of
trade, investment and finance that will ensue alongside the reform of national
economies. These policy prescriptionsof a growing numberof global governance
institutions form a blueprint which has been marketed with the powerful
language of 'ThereIs No Alternative'or TINA.
The appeal of neoliberalism lies in its promises of increasing an individual's
control over or consumption of the products which capitalism is generating.
Furthermore,its proponentshave sought to legitimise it furtherby incorporation
of the language of competing ideas and values. The terminology of sustainable
development, transparencyand accountabilitythat have been incorporatedinto
the neoliberal development model exemplify this tendency. Thus, the dominant
world-view is bolsteredand lent false legitimacy.
This false legitimacy is clear given the discrepancy between its theoretical
prescriptionsand practicaloutcomes. In the wake of its practicalapplicationas a
global development policy, we have seen a deepening of existing inequalities
between and within states. Neoliberals may normatively legitimate even these
rising inequalities. Within their vision, inequality can be seen as unproblematic.
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 CAROLINETHOMAS

It may even be desirable,as it is expected to unleash entrepreneurialabilities that

will contribute to maximising global wealth creation. Ultimately, therefore,
everyone will benefit. The words of Prime Minister Thatcherare recalled here:
'It is ourjob to glory in inequality,and see thattalents and abilities are given vent
and expression for the benefit of us all' (Thatcher, 1996: 52). Therefore this
particularbrandof liberalismnot only increases global social divisions, but more
dangerously it is legitimising global inequalities of life-chance, legitimising a
situationwhere inequalitiesare greaterthanat any period in history.
We are witnessing and we are part of the process whereby the ideology of
dominantgroups, presentedas universal,is used to legitimate the marginalisation
and neutralisationof competing visions and values. This is evident across a wide
range of issues and areas, encompassing development, finance, trade, aid and
economic policy generally, as well as ecology, human rights, law and so forth.
This particularbrandof liberalismmay not, however, be as universal as is often
suggested. The global power structure favours a Western knowledge and a
Westernrepresentationof events andprocesses.
Since the process is not truly universal or comprehensive,counter-hegemonic
groups are able to continue offering alternativevisions and practices. This was
evident in the November-December 1999 Ministerial meeting of the WTO in
Seattle. High-profile street protests by civil society groups, the rejection by
developing country governmentsof the agenda of the developed countries, and
disagreement between developed countries themselves all contributed to the
collapse of the meeting. This eroded the facade of legitimacy and universality
surroundingglobal governanceinstitutionsand theirpolicies.

Global governance: in whose interest?

The debateon globalisationandits effectson the pooris legitimateandnecessary.
No-onehas a monopolyon the truth.Everyoneshouldhavea voice,particularly the
poorthemselves.(JamesWolfensohn,WorldBank DevelopmentNews, 22 February
2000)

The post-cold war period has seen the move from a bipolar world in which the
two superpowers governed separate spheres of influence, to a world in which
global governance flourishes. But with what authority,and in whose interest?
Who has a voice in global governance?ThirdWorldstates have long been distin-
guished by, among other factors, their perceptionof themselves as vulnerableto
externalfactorsbeyond their control,and in particularto decisions and policies-
primarilyeconomic-which they do not own. Do these ThirdWorldstates, which
now include the former Second World states within their ranks, perceive them-
selves as having a say in global governance?Or is someone speakingfor them?
In this section most attention is paid to the public agencies of global
governance,especially the IMF, the WorldBank and the WTO. The reason for this
focus on public agencies is simple: the are supposed to be representing the
interests of global citizens and promotingglobal public goods. (See Table 2 for
an overview of global economic governance institutions and their respective
membershipsand remits.)
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXPLORING THE LINKS

TABLE 2
Major agencies of global economic governance (with membership figures as of the
mid-1990s)

BIS Bankof InternationalSettlements.Establishedin 1930 withheadquartersin Basle. Membership

of 40 centralbanks.Monitorsmonetarypolicies andfinancialflows. The Basle Committeeon
BankingSupervision,formedthroughthe BIS in 1974,has spearheadedeffortsat multilateral
regulationof globalbanking.

G7 Groupof Seven.Establishedin 1975 as the G5 (France,Germany,Japan,UK andUSA) and

subsequentlyexpandedto includeCanadaandItaly.The G7 conductssemi-formal
collaborationon worldeconomicproblems.Governmentleadersmeetin annualG7 Summits,
while financeministersand/ortheirleadingofficialsperiodicallyhold otherconsultations.

GATT GeneralAgreementon TariffsandTrade.Establishedin 1947 with offices in Geneva.

Membershiphadreached122 stateswhenit was absorbedinto the WTOin 1995. The GATTCO-
ordinatedeight 'rounds'of multilateralnegotiationsto reducestaterestrictionson cross-border
merchandisetrade.

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund.Establishedin 1945 withheadquarters in Washington,DC.

Membershipof 182 states.The IMFoverseesshort-termcross-bordermoneyflows andforeign
exchangequestions.Since 1979 it has also formulatedstabilisationandsystemictransformation
debtor transitionsfrom
policiesfor statessufferingchronicdifficultieswith transborder
communistcentralplanning.

iosco International for SecuritiesCommissions.Establishedin 1984 with headquarters

Organisation
in Montreal.Membershipof 115 official securitiesregulatorsand(non-voting)trade
associationsfrom69 countries.The iosco developsframeworksfor transborder supervisionof
securitiesfirms.

OECD Organisationfor EconomicCooperationandDevelopment.Foundedin 1962 with headquarters

in Paris.Membershipof 29 stateswith advancedindustrialeconomies.Drawingon a staffof
600 professionaleconomists,the OECDpreparesadvisoryreportson all mannerof
macroeconomicquestions.

UNCTAD UnitedNationsConferenceon TradeandDevelopment.Establishedin 1964 with office in

Geneva.Membershipof 187 states.UNCTADmonitorsthe effects of cross-bordertradeon
macroeconomicconditions,especiallyin the South.It provideda key forumin the 1970sfor
EconomicOrder.
discussionsof a New International

WBG WorldBankGroup.A collectionof five agencies,firstestablishedin 1945, withheadoffices in

Washington,DC. The Groupprovidesprojectloansfor long-termdevelopmentin poor
countries.Likethe IMF, the WorldBankhas since 1979becomeheavilyinvolvedin structural
adjustmentprogrammesin the SouthandformerEast.

WTO The WorldTradeOrganization. Establishedin 1995 withheadquarters in Geneva.The WTOis a

permanentinstitutionto replacethe provisionalGATr. It has a wideragendaandgreaterpowers
of enforcement.

Source: Scholte(1997:431).

However, this should not be taken to suggest the lesser importanceof private
groupingsthat operatealongside states and internationalinstitutionsin the global
governance fraternity.TNCS, for example, have a powerful influence on global
economic agenda setting. They work with a range of private business interests
through fora such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the
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 CAROLINE THOMAS

annualWorldEconomic Summits(WES) at Davos. Moreover,Gill notes that:

At the heartof the globaleconomythereis an internationalisation
of authorityand
governancethatnot only involvesinternational (suchas the BIS, IMF,
organisations
andWorldBank)andtransnational firms,butalso privateconsultanciesandprivate
bond-ratingagencies ... (Gill, 1995: 418)
Sinclair (1994) and Van der Pijl (1998) develop ideas about the roles of private
bond-rating agencies and management consultancies respectively in global
governance. Indeed, Sinclair refers to these as 'private makers of global public
policy' (1994: 448).
Increasingly, business interests are co-operating not only with individual
governments but also with international organisations. This is seen in UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan's Global Compact, for example. The rise in
collaborationbetween agencies mandatedto provide public goods with private
interest-based agencies is clearly visible. For example, even international
organisationssuch as the UNDP increasinglyseek collaborationand funding from
private businesses. This closeness between the private and public spheres raises
importantissues, especially about the democraticprocess. The work of Sharon
Beder on corporate influence on environmental policy is indicative (Beder,
1997). Here, however, our focus is primarilythe contributionsand implications
of public institutionsin global governance.
Turningto public global governance,it is noteworthythat a recurrenttheme on
the liberal agenda is the presentationof a pictureof a unified global necessitating
and legitimising a common response in terms of management.Thus in the 1980s
we heard UN-inspired think-tanks talk of 'Our Common Future', 'Common
Security' and so forth. In the 1990s we heard references to a numberof global
crises, including the environment,refugees and population,each requiringglobal
management.Also in the 1990s we witnessed a series of UN-organised, partly
privately funded, global conferences. These included: the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), or Earth Summit, at Rio, 1992; the
World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, 1995; the 1995 Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development in Cairo; the 1995 World
Conference on Women in Beijing; the 1996 Human Settlements Conference in
Istanbul,and in the same year the Rome Food Summit.
The inclusive language of such conferences, and their associated declarations,
raise some importantquestions. Whose-globe are we talking about? Who is to
manage it? With what authority?In whose interest?Global managementassumes
a common understandingof a particularproblem and agreementabout how it is
to be addressed.These global conferenceshave undoubtedlyplayed an important
and positive role in raising awarenessof pressing problems, and have helped to
create the space in which debate can occur. Yet the debate has been neatly
circumscribed. These conferences have lent legitimacy to a broad neoliberal
frameworkfor understandingdevelopment, and thus they have a direct bearing
on human security.The liberal ideology espoused by powerful states and institu-
tions, and accepted by the majorityof governments,has offered a blueprintfor
global development.This model of development,with its associatedmethods and
objectives, is assumed to be in the interest of all humanity,and it is assumed to
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXPLORING THE LINKS

have unquestionableauthorityas it is presentedas common sense.

Global governance is increasingly reflected in a conscious co-ordination of
policies between the IMF, the World Bank, other regional multilateraldevelop-
ment banks, the WTO and a growing number of other arms of the UN system.
Recently it has been seen in aspects of the work of the UNDP and the United
Nations Conferenceon Tradeand Development (UNCTAD). The most recent of all
these policy co-ordinations is evident in the integration of the International
LabourOrganisation(ILO). To different degrees and in different ways, these key
institutions have been adapting their general orientation, and their respective
institutional structuresand policies, to facilitate movement towards a world in
which for capital, if not for citizens, national economic sovereignty is an
anachronism.
Influence within the public institutions of global governance directly reflects
the materialinequality of states. Only a handful of states exert meaningful influ-
ence in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank or wTo. While the Group of 7
(G7) has been transformedinto the Groupof 8 (G8) with the addition of Russia,
it is the case that G7 sets the norms and rules of global economic policy. As
Sachs points out:
The G7 countries,plus the rest of the EuropeanUnion, representa mere 14 per cent
of the world's population. Yet these countries have 56 per cent of the votes in the
IMF Executive Board ... The rest of the world is called upon to supportG7 declara-
tions, not to meet for joint problemsolving. (Sachs, 1998: 2)
Whence does it derive the authorityand legitimacy to do so? Particularlygiven
that the G7 is not very representativein terms of global population or indeed
numberof states (see Table 3). This is strikingwhen comparedwith the Groupof
77 (G77).
In this context, it is interesting to ponder for a moment the source of demo-
cratic legitimacy of the IMF and the WorldBank. As key institutionspushing the
neoliberal development model that favours the private rather than the public
sector, they are not models of democraticrepresentation.This is evident in Table
4.
The thoughts of the former Managing Director of the IMF on this matter are
interesting and revealing. Just before leaving his post, Camdessus was asked
during a videoconference with journalists in three African countries whether he

TABLE 3
Global economic governance, 1997

Title Institutional grouping Membership % world GDP % world pop

G7 Western economic powers Canada, France, Germany, 64.0 11.8

Italy, Japan, UK, USA
G77 Developing and some transition 143 members 16.9 76.0
countries (not Russian Fed
or Poland)

Source: Adapted from UNDP (1999: 109).

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 CAROLINE THOMAS

TABLE 4
Formal distribution of voting power in the IMF, 2000

Country Pop (millions) % IMF

executive vote

USA 276 17.68

UK 59 5.1
Germany 82 6.19
France 59 5.1
Japan 126 6.33
Saudi Arabia 21 3.27
Total of above 623 43.67
Other countries (c 190) 5.4 billion 56.33

Source: Compiled from IMF data, April 2000, IMF website, and UN
Population Division, Charting the Progress of Populations, 2000,
<www.undp.org/popin/wdtrends/chart/15/15.pdf>.

felt the IMF was in the hands of the big powers. His answer is quoted at length:
The IMF is in the hands of its membership.As you know each countryhas a voting
power that is in proportionto its quota, its share of IMFcapital, which is itself deter-
mined more or less by the size of the country's economy. On that basis, the United
States has 17.4 per cent of the voting power. That means that the rest of the world
has 82.6 per cent. If my countrymen, our friends, our brothers in Europe, were
united, it would be even more, something like 30 per cent of the capital of the IMF.
Nobody says that Europeis controllingthe IMF,even if it's a Europeanwho is sitting
in this chair.
No, depending on the issues, the decisions go in one direction or another.But it's
true that the developing countries,when they sit togetherand they join theirforces in
what we call here the G- 11 group, represent an extremely importantpart of our
membership.
The fact is that, in general, our decisions are not taken by a vote where a majority
imposes its solutions on a minority ... [but] ... by consensus after a long process
where people in a dialogue try to understandeach other's views and see where the
best solution lies. At the end of the day, all of them coincide in supportingthat.
(Camdessus,2000a)

The following statement, made at the end of his answer, may vindicate critics
who charge the key institutions of global governance with hegemonic behaviour:
'Frequently, the Americans suggest good solutions. After all, they are present in
many parts of the world. They are familiar with international life. But it is not
always the case ...'
Camdessus's remarks, while factually accurate, only illuminate part of this
picture. The USA is the only country in the IMF with enough votes to exercise a
unilateral veto power. The very existence of this veto is itself enough to ensure
that the USA doesn't need frequent recourse to it. The potential veto power in
itself is an effective deterrent, and can be an influential factor in effecting a
predetermined outcome in the form of a 'consensus'.
It is not surprising that many countries perceive a lack of distance between IMF
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 AND HUMANSECURITY:EXPLORINGTHELINKS
GLOBALGOVERNANCE,DEVELOPMENT

policy and US policy. The handling of the financial crises in the late 1990s in
East Asia, Russia and Brazil furthereroded the trust of developing countries in
the independence of the IMF. South Korea, for example, perceives congruence
between IMF and US policy agendas. It regardsthe USA as having taken advan-
tage of the crisis to work via the IMF to push throughits pre-existing trade and
investment agendas (Feldstein, 1998: 32). This criticism comes from a country
perceived by many to be a traditionalUS ally, which is also a member of the
Organisationof Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). IMF restruc-
turing of East Asian economies has enabled First World companies to take
advantageof bargainbasement priced East Asian companies. In 1998 European
and US companies mounted over US$30 billion in take-overs of Asian
companies-a fourfold increase on 1997 (Bello, 1999). One commentatorhas
described this as 'the greatest global asset swindle of all time' (Hahnel, 1999).
The Asian crises have also heightened awareness of the ability of a handful of
relatively new private financial actors such as hedge funds to exert massive
leverage. They can force currencydevaluationat a breathtakingpace, undermine
national economic policy, erode national development and throw literally
millions below the poverty line. Global governance does not work to restrain
these actors;indeed it often seems to supportthem.
Another important forum for global economic governance is the OECD. In
reality, this is a negotiating body for the industrialised democracies, though
membership during the 1990s extended to South Korea, the Czech Republic,
Hungary,Poland and Mexico. (Interestingly,Turkey was a founding member in
1961.) The overwhelming majorityof developing countries do not belong to the
OECD,and thereforea question arises as to its legitimacy as the negotiatingforum
for policies and agreements of global reach. The choice of the OECD as the
negotiating forum for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment comes to mind
here.
The scepticism and cynicism of developing countries and global citizens
regardingglobal governanceis understandable.From their vantage points, global
governance has all the hallmarksof being 'organised under US hegemony and
the internationalinstitutionalstructurethat conforms to the interests of, broadly
speaking, the G7 core capitalist states and their corporations' (Wilkin, 2000).
Democratic potential at all levels, from the local to the global, is diminished by
placing key decisions over policy making in the hands of ever furtherremoved
officials and institutions.It is also reducedby the influence of privateinterestson
the public process, referredto above.

Conclusion
This article has provided an overview of the relationshipbetween global gover-
nance, development and human security, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. At
the beginning of the 21st centurythe globalisationof inequality at the inter-state,
intra-stateand private company levels seems to be entrenched.This will affect
security from the human to the intra-state, inter-state, regional and ultimately
global levels. IMF and World Bank managing directorsare right to be concerned
about the link between development and security. The globalisation process is
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 CAROLINETHOMAS

resulting in highly uneven distributionof gains and, without concerted action,

inequality may deepen further,with all its attendantimplications. Alternative
pathways for the pursuit of human security must be explored. Mindful of this,
and especially of the threatthus posed to continuedglobal economic integration,
championsof neoliberalglobal developmentpolicies are in the process of articu-
lating modified developmentpolicies. So far this representsbusiness as usual, but
with slight modifications. Ultimately human security requiresdifferent develop-
mental strategies from those currently favoured by global governance institu-
tions, strategies that have redistributionat their core. It also requires a different
type of global governance,one thatbetterreflects the concerns of the majorityof
the world's states and citizens.

Note
The ideasexploredin this articlecan be foundin expandedformin Thomas(2000).

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