Mind Association
Challenges to German Idealism: Schelling, Fichte and Kant by Kyriaki Goudeli
Review by: Peter Thielke
Mind, New Series, Vol. 113, No. 451 (Jul., 2004), pp. 548-552
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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548 BookReviews
'anAristotelian-Leibnizian metaphysical aesthetic. . . thatthe bestof allpossi-
ble worldswouldbe ... one with the maximalamountof diversity... pro-
duced[maximally] parsimoniously' (p. 80). Geussdoesnot explainor develop
thisdoctrine,or mentionanyreasonsone mighthaveforholdingit. Insteadhe
setsit aside,contentto assertthat'[i]t is now extremelyunfashionable to ...
drawpoliticalconsequencesfromthis kind of metaphysicalview' (p. 80).
Thereis no roomin philosophical discussion,andparticularly in an introduc-
torytext,forthissortof argumentbyappealto fashion.
In fact,thereappearsto be an underlyingpragmatisminfectingGeuss's
book.FollowingNietzsche,he writesthatphilosophers have'tendedto extract
... truthfrom[its]everydayinstrumental context,absolutize[it] ... andset it
up as an objectof aspiration... an unconditional end ... to be pursuedforits
own sake'(p. 60). And he maintainsthat truth,and also 'rationality', have
'value'onlyin so faras theyare'embeddedin contextsof instrumental action'.
So maybeit shouldnot surpriseto seehimuserhetoricinsteadof soundargu-
ment,or to findhimconflatingwhatis trueor rightwithwhat'wethink'is so
(pp.41and42).In anycase,regarding thevalueof truthandreason,he canbe
easilyrefuted.Onepersonwhofinds value in thequestfortruthsolelyin order
to understand suffices,as is madeevidentby the crassnessof askingher:'why
pursue'understanding whenit is so 'disconnected' fromconsequential utility
(p. 60)?
In spiteof thesecriticisms(someof whichmerelymanifestour diverging
views)I recommendGeuss'sbookto thoseinterestedin politicaltheory.It can
serveas an introductionto the subject,albeita somewhattendentiousone,
andit is an interestingstatementof the truththatin politicalandmoraldis-
cussion,unlessone blendshistoryandculturalsensitivitywithargumentand
analysis,one is boundto failto understand.
Universityof Virginia JORGE SECADA
CabellHall 512
PO Box 400780
Charlottesville,VA22904-4780
USA
Challengesto GermanIdealism:Schellin$ Fichteand Kant,byKyr-
iakiGoudeli.Houndmills,UK:Palgrave,
2002. Pp. Xii + 218.H/bt4s.oo.
In a climateof renewedinterestin GermanIdealism,FriedrichSchellinghas
beensomethingof the odd manout. As KyriakiGoudeliarguesin Challenges
forwhilethe 'IdentityPhiloso-
to GermanIdealism,thisneglectis unjustified,
phy'of his earlyworksremainsunconvincing, laterworkdevelopsa
Schelling's
powerfulandnovel'logogrific'conceptionof philosophy.Goudelipeelsaway
the mythologicalveneerof theselaterworksto revealwhatsheseesas Schell-
ing'sfundamentalchallengeto KantianandFichteanIdealisms.Muchof the
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BookReviews 549
aimof Challengesto GermanIdealismis to rescueSchellingbothfromHegel's
famouslampooningof his systemas 'thenightin whichallcowsareblack',and
fromHeidegger's readingof Schellingasa thinkertrappedbytheearlyIdentity
Philosophy. Thisis aninteresting
andprovocative thesis,andalthoughit is not
clearthatthelaterSchellingposesa truechallengeto Idealism,Goudeli'swork
shouldhelpboth in rehabilitating Schelling'sreputation,andin presentinga
Schellingianalternative to the morefamiliarKantian,FichteanandHegelian
positions.
Thetaskof rehabilitation beginswitha lengthyanalysisandcritiqueof both
KantandFichte.ThecentralclaimmadeagainstKantconcernsthe 'severely
limitedcharacter of thenotionof experience providedbytranscendental logic'
(p. 3). Goudeliarguesthatby focusingonlyon the formalelementsof experi-
ence,Kant'ssystemfailsto accountfor both the deductionof the categories
andthenotionof thetranscendental unityof apperception. Moreover,accord-
ing to Goudeli,Kantcannotexplainhowthe a prioricategoriescanmediatea
posterioricontent.The only waythis wouldbe possibleis if contentwere
'alreadyinwardlydeterminedby the understanding' (p. 36),but thisviolates
the cognitivedualismthatcharacterizes Kant'sposition.Kantfacesthe prob-
lem thatthe givencontentof experiencemustbe both 'formallytransparent
andimpenetrably opaque'(p.38).In an analysisof reflective
judgementin the
Critiqueof Judgement,Goudelifocuseson howthis problemmightbe solved
by an appealto the feelingof pleasurethatKantclaimsattendsthe freeplayof
the understandingand imaginationin an aestheticjudgement.But such a
strategyrunscounterto theclaimsof the firstCritique,fornowintuitionhasa
kindof priorityoverconcepts:the rigidregimentation of contentgiveswayto
a 'cognitionthatmightbe attainedby meansof bothfeelingandreflection-
beyondcategoricalsynthesis by meansof a playfulinteractionwith the
world'(p.50).
Thediscussionof Kantis followedby a shortertreatmentof Fichte'sIdeal-
ism,whichGoudeliarguesfailsto extricateitselffromthe reflectivemodelof
cognitionit soughtto avoid.Byplacingthe activityof the Absolute-Iat the
foundationof his system,Fichteneversucceedsin deducingthe natureof the
worldthatstandsopposedto theI. Toavoidthedualismsthathe seesplaguing
Kant'ssystem,Fichtemustendorsea viewof the worldthateitherconfronts
theI-which seemstoo realist or thatis theresultof the I'sownself-limita-
tion whichseemstoo solipsistic(p. 81).Bybeginningwith the Absolute-I,
Goudeliplausiblyargues,Fichteis neverableto movebeyondit.
ThecriticismslevelledagainstKantandFichtearepowerful,but theyalso
arenot new,andherethe lackof muchhistoricalcontextis somewhatdisap-
pointing.JustthesequestionsaboutKant'ssystemwereraisedin variousforms
in the 1790S, andit wouldbe helpfulto geta senseof howSchelling's criticisms
of KantandFichtedevelopedin responseto theseattacks.Asit stands,it is not
clearwhetherthe criticismsaretakento be generalproblemsfor Kantand
Fichte,or distinctivelySchellingianworries.Moreover, whilemanyof theearly
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550 BookReviews
criticismsof Kantweredirectedat the problemof the relationbetweencogni-
tivefaculties,anequallyimportantsetof objectionsfocusedon theproblemof
noumena,andclearlytheissueof thethingin itselfpartlymotivatedtheemer-
genceof AbsoluteIdealism.Ofthisproblem,verylittleis said.
Thesecondhalfof the bookturnsto Schelling,andheresomeinteresting
newgroundis broken.GoudeliarguesthatSchelling's development represents
a moveawayfroma 'philosophical monotheism'to the 'polytheismof imagi-
nation'(p. 94).Thisemergesonlyin Schelling's later,andlesserknown,works,
whichpresentwhatGoudelicallsthe 'logogrific' expressionof theworld:liter-
ally,the 'logicof a riddle',or a recognitionof the ineluctableriddlesandpara-
doxes that characterizeexperience.AlthoughSchellingcoined the term
'logogrif',little attentionhas been paid to its role in his laterworks,and
Goudeli'sdiscussionis an interestingandilluminatingtreatmentof the sub-
ject.
GoudelifirstexaminesSchelling's earlyattemptin the IdentityPhilosophy
to overcomedualismthroughthenotionof theAbsolute,in whichessenceand
existenceareidentical.AsSchelling's thoughtprogresses, however,theempha-
sis on the Absoluterecedes,andthe notion of freedombecomesevermore
central.Insteadof tryingto providea theoretical proofof thepossibilityof free
will, Schelling comes to realize, Goudeli argues,that freedom must be
explainedin termsof longingandwill ratherthanin anyabstractreconcilia-
tion of contingencyand necessity.In fact, as Schellingconceivesit in On
Human FreedomandTheAgesof the World,freedomis largelya matterof the
willto expressone'spotenciesin artisticcreationandimaginative activity.The
internal,freeforceswithinman,however,areconfrontedby the external,con-
strainingandcontingentpotenciesof the world.As Goudelicharacterizes it,
Schelling's insightis to recognizethatthiscontingencycannotbe explainedin
termseitherof mechanism,or as merebrutegivencontent.Rather,in contin-
gencynatureitselfis 're-enchanted', for it too expresseslonginganddesireto
fulfilits essence thisis thelogogrifof experience. In Schelling's
notionof the
contingentwe find a momentof sheerindifference,which'inheresin every
being,as an uncontrollable, unclassifiable dimensionandalsoas its possible
and interestingunpredictability... This momentis definedas free,pure,
unmitigated will'(p. 144).
Thisfreedomis largelypartof the unconscious,which'willalwaysremain
free,our constantnourishing"mother"andat the sametime our mostchal-
lenging,mockingcrueladversary' (p. 159).Fromthe riddlesanddreamsof a
logogrificaccountof freedomarisesa 'newtypeof Bildung,as manifestation of
the enigmaticwisdominfusingthe cosmicbecoming'(p. 163).As Goudeli
readshim, Schelling's turntowardsmythologyandhistory in particularin
his workThe Deities of Samothrace standsas an attemptto cometo terms
with the waysin whichthis mysteriouswisdomcan be somehowexpressed
artisticallyandmythologically.
Layingtheweightof rehabilitating Schelling's reputationon a workas cryp-
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BookReviews 551
tic as the Deities is a brave yet also dangerous choice, and despite
Goudeli'svaliantattempt,it seemsa bit strainedto placetheDeatiesat thepin-
nacleof Schelling'sthought On its surface,the workdealswith the mystery
ritesof the Cabeiri,the deitieswhoinhabittheislandof Samothrace. Schelling
examinesthe emergenceof sevendeities,eachof whichexpresses'thevarious
unities of tensions, depictingthe variousmomentsof cosmic becoming'
(pp.175-6).So)for example)Demeterappearsas the goddessof non-being)
whileZeusrepresents a kindof transcendent order.Thephilosophical mono-
theismof the Absoluteis replacedby the 'imaginativepantheism)Goudeli
identifieswithSchelling's logogrif.
Thisis a fascinating claim,but in it the answerto the largerquestionabout
howthe laterSchellingin factchallengesIdealismremainshardto see.Partof
the problemlies in the ratherattenuatedconclusion to the book: while
Goudeliraisesthe callfor a 'radicalapproachtowardsthe notion of experi-
ence' (p. 19l), the logogrific alternativeshe finds in Schelling could be
addressedin moredetail.In part)thisarisesfromthe factthatwhileSchelling
introducesthe notionof thelogogrif,it receivesrelatiarely littlediscussion,and
'is not explicitlyelaborated) (p. 3) in his works.In fairness,Challengesto Ger-
man Idealismis intendedonlyas an initialforayintothe topicof the logogrif,
but the conclusion,especiallythe verybriefre-engagementwith Kantand
Fichte,couldbe fleshedoutwithmorediscussion.
Also?it is not clearthatSchelling's increasingfocuson the unconsciouswill
requiresan endorsementof the logogrificaccountof experience.Partsof The
Agesof ltheWorld for example,addressthe waysin whichcontradictions can
be resolved,and here at least Schellingseems interestedin developinga
'rational'ratherthanlogogrificaccountof experience.Morebroadly,while
Goudelimaintainsthatreasonandlogogrifarecompatible in the logogrif
'logos ... rediscoversmeaningin its activities'(p. 1l)-the preciserelation
betweenthemremainsmurky.Canreasoneverbe satisfiedin the faceof mys-
teryandparadox? Also,if indeedSchellingultimatelyendorsesthe logogrific
accountof experience, it is not clearwhythisposesa truechallengeto Kantor
Fichte.Whileit certainlystandsasanalternativeviewof experience) it doesnot
obviouslypresenta bettersolutionto the problemsthatGoudeliidentifiesin
both Criticaland AbsoluteIdealism.Kant'ssystemmight lead to aporias
(p. 189),but giventhe characterization of the logogrif,does Schelling'sposi-
tion resolvethesetensions,insteadof justofferinga changeof attitudetoward
them?This is partof Hegelzsobjectionsto Schelling,and it wouldbolster
Goudeli'scaseto offermorediscussionof the Hegeliancritiqueof Schelling's
proJect.
We canhopethatif indeedChallerzges to GermanIdealismis thefirstpartof
a largerprojectthatsome of thesequestionswill be answeredin the sequel.
Whiletheprecisewayin whichSchellingchallengesGermanIdealismremains
uncertain,Goudeli'sbookis a provocativelookat Schelling'sturnawayfrom
the 'philosophical monotheism'of KantandFichtein favourof the (Logogrif
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552 BookReviews
andthe notionof the logogrifstandsas a fascinatingprodfor
of Experience',
renewedinterestin Schelling.
Departsnentof Philosophy PETER THIELKE
PomonaCollege
551 N. CollegeAvenue
Claremont,CA91711
USA
Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature ofSkepticalArgu-
ments and Their Role In Philosophical Inquiry, by JohnGreco.
Cambridge
Cambridge: Press,2000.
University Pp. XVi + 264.H/bt47.50.
In thisbook,JohnGrecois primarilyconcernedwithquestionsraisedbyscep-
ticism,buthe alsotakesup othertopicsin epistemology. Hehimselfadmirably
summarizes whathe is about(p. 1).First,scepticalargumentsresisteasyrefu-
tationor dismissal.Second,closeattentionto suchargumentsis philosophi-
callyfruitful,or evenmandatory. Third,sustainedengagement withscepticism
bringsinto focusthe strengthof Greco'sown accountof 'positiveepistemic
status',whichhe calls'agentreliabilism'(seep. 177).PuttingSkepticsin Their
Place proceedscarefully.Itemsaretakenup point by point, argumentsare
analysedpremissby premiss,objectionsareraisedand weighed,and then
reformulations areconsideredin viewof previousresults.I willnot attemptto
summarize thesediscussions.Instead,I willprovidea bitmoredetailaboutthe
rangeof responsesto scepticismGrecoconsiders.I'll then offersome com-
mentson his accountof how scepticalargumentswork,andon the adequacy
of agentreliabilism.
Philosophershavetried to rebutscepticismin anynumberof ways.For
example,some saythat scepticalargumentsare self-contradictory because
theirpremissesareinconsistentwith theirconclusions.Othersbelievethat
scepticismis 'pragmatically' eitherbecauseit is impossibleto give
self-refuting,
arguments for it, or becauseone can'treallyliveaccordingto whatit dictates.
Greco thinks these responsesmistake the context and purportof sceptical
arguments(pp. 61-70).Anotherfamily of viewsGrecofinds
anti-sceptical
inadequate arethosewhichdeploy 'transcendental'arguments to establishthat
the sceptic'sconclusionmustbe false(pp. 71-6). Grecoalso considers,and
rejects,the claimthatscepticalargumentsillicitlypresupposethatknowledge
requirescertaintyor a deductivistconceptionof evidence(pp.69-71, 111-12,
145-53).YetanotherpositionGrecofindswantingis the viewthatscepticism
arisesout of a Cartesian contrastbetweeninnerappearances andouterreality.
Thismetaphysicalview is supposedto enforcea foundationalistprojectin
epistemology,the failureof whichis trumpetedby the sceptic.But,it'ssaid,
scepticismcanbe vitiatedif we disavowthe epistemologyandthe underlying
metaphysics. Grecodisagrees(Ch.4; see alsopp. 121-6).Mycatalogueof the
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