VERDICTUM.

IN

2024 INSC 343

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.3484-3488 of 2024)

Shivani Tyagi Appellant(s)

Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. Respondent(s)

ORDER

Leave granted.

1. In these quintuplet appeals the victim of an acid

attack assails the suspension of sentence of life

imprisonment of the convicted persons, the private

respondents and their consequential enlargement on

bail.

2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the self-

same appellant-victim in the captioned appeal, learned

counsel appearing for the common first respondent-

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State of Uttar Pradesh and learned counsel appearing

for the private respondents.

3. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for

short the “Cr.PC”) deals with the suspension of

execution of sentence pending the appeal against

conviction and release of appellant(s) on bail. The said

provision mandates for recording of reasons in writing

leading to the conclusion that the convicts are entitled

to get suspension of sentence and consequential

release on bail. The said requirement thus indicates the

legislative intention that the appellate Court invoking

the power under Section 389, Cr. PC, should assess the

matter objectively and that such assessment should

reflect in the order.

4. We will briefly refer to some of the relevant

decisions dealing with Section 389, Cr. PC. In the case

of short-term imprisonment for conviction of an offence,

suspension of sentence is the normal rule and its

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rejection is the exception. (See the decision in

Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of

Gujarat1). However, we are of the considered view that

the position should be vice-versa in the case of

conviction for serious offences when invocation of

power under Section 389 is invited. This Court, in the

decision in Kishori Lal v. Rupa & Ors.2, held in

paragraphs 4 and 5 thus:-

“4. Section 389 of the Code deals with

suspension of execution of sentence pending the
appeal and release of the appellant on bail.
There is a distinction between bail and
suspension of sentence. One of the essential
ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for
the appellate Court to record reasons in writing
for ordering suspension of execution of the
sentence or order appealed against. If he is in
confinement, the said Court can direct that he be
released on bail or on his own bond. The
requirement of recording reasons in writing

1
(1999) 4 SCC 421
2
(2004) 7 SCC 638

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 VERDICTUM.IN

clearly indicates that there has to be careful

consideration of the relevant aspects and the
order directing suspension of sentence and grant
of bail should not be passed as a matter of
routine.
5. The appellate Court is duty-bound to
objectively assess the matter and to record
reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants
suspension of execution of sentence and grant of
bail. In the instant case, the only factor which
seems to have weighed with the High Court
for directing suspension of sentence and
grant of bail is the absence of allegation of
misuse of liberty during the earlier period
when the accused-respondents were on
bail.”

5. In the decision in Anwari Begum v. Sher

Mohammad & Anr.3 this Court in paragraphs 7 and 8

held thus:-

“7. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court’s

order shows complete non-application of mind.
Though a detailed examination of the evidence

3
(2005) 7 SCC 326

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 VERDICTUM.IN

and elaborate documentation of the merits of the

case is to be avoided by the Court while passing
orders on bail applications, yet a Court dealing
with the bail application should be satisfied as to
whether there is a prima facie case, but
exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is
not necessary. The Court dealing with the
application for bail is required to exercise its
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a
matter of course.

8. There is a need to indicate in the order

reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was
being granted, particularly where an accused
was charged of having committed a serious
offence. It is necessary for the Courts dealing
with application for bail to consider among other
circumstances, the following factors also before
granting bail, they are:
1. The nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment in case of conviction and the
nature of supporting evidence;
2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with
the witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant;
3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in

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 VERDICTUM.IN

support of the charge.

Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from
non-application of mind as was noted by this
Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598, Puran v. Rambilas
(2001) 6 SCC 338 and in Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528.”

6. After referring to the aforesaid paragraphs in the

decisions in Kishori Las’s case (supra) and Anwari

Begum’s case (supra), this Court in the decision in

Khilari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.4 interfered with

an order suspending the sentence and granting bail for

non-application of mind and non-consideration of the

relevant aspects.

7. Applying the principles and parameters for

invocation of the power under Section 389. Cr. PC,

revealed from the decisions, as above, we will have to

consider the sustainability of the challenge against the

impugned orders by the appellant victim. In that

4
(2009) 4 SCC 23

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 VERDICTUM.IN

regard a succinct narration of the facts involved in the

case, strictly confining to the requirement for

consideration of these appeals, is required. The private

respondents in the appeals, five in numbers, were

convicted finding guilty of offences, including under

Sections 307/149 and 326A/149, IPC. The appellant-

victim was then aged about 31 years and, in the

incident, she suffered attack with sulfuric acid and her

body was burnt 30 to 40 percent. PW-6, Dr. Uttam Jain

with Ext.A5, would reveal that she suffered deep burn

on the face, chest and both hands and injuries on her

were grievous in nature.

8. We may hasten to add that regarding the merits of

the appeals by the party respondents against their

conviction, we shall not be understood to have held or

made any observation as it is a matter to be considered

on its own merits in the pending appeals.

9. We have already referred to the mandate under

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 VERDICTUM.IN

Section 389 Cr.PC that the order passed invoking the

said provision should reflect the reason for coming to

the conclusion that the convicts are entitled to get

suspended their sentence and consequential release on

bail. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Hasmat5,

this Court held that in an appeal against conviction

involving serious offence like murder punishable under

Section 302, IPC the prayer for suspension of sentence

and grant of bail should be considered with reference

to the relevant factors mentioned thereunder, though

not exhaustively. On its perusal, we are of the opinion

that factors like nature of the offence held to have

committed, the manner of their commission, the gravity

of the offence, and also the desirability of releasing the

convict on bail are to be considered objectively and

such consideration should reflect in the consequential

order passed under Section 389, Cr.PC. It is also

5
(2004) 6 SCC 175

Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024 Page 8 of 14

 VERDICTUM.IN

relevant to state that the mere factum of sufferance of

incarceration for a particular period, in a case where

life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for

invocation of power under Section 389 Cr.PC without

referring to the relevant factors. We say so because

there cannot be any doubt with respect to the position

that disposal of appeals against conviction, (especially

in cases where life imprisonment is imposed for

serious offences), within a short span of time may not be

possible in view of the number of pending cases. In

such circumstances if it is said that disregarding the

other relevant factors and parameters for the exercise

of power under Section 389, Cr. PC, likelihood of delay

and incarceration for a particular period can be taken

as a ground for suspension of sentence and to enlarge a

convict on bail, then, in almost every such case,

favourable invocation of said power would become

inevitable. That certainly cannot be the legislative

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 VERDICTUM.IN

intention as can be seen from the phraseology in

Section 389 Cr.PC. Such an interpretation would also

go against public interest and social security. In such

cases giving preference over appeals where sentence

is suspended, in the matter of hearing or adopting such

other methods making an early hearing possible could

be resorted. We shall not be understood to have held

that irrespective of inordinate delay in consideration of

appeal and long incarceration undergone the power

under the said provision cannot be invoked. In short,

we are of the view that each case has to be examined on

its own merits and based on the parameters, to find out

whether the sentence imposed on the appellant(s)

concerned should be suspended during the pendency

of the appeal and the appellant(s) should be released

on bail.

10. Having observed and held as above, we are

deeply peeved on perusing the impugned judgment,

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 VERDICTUM.IN

for the same reflects only non-application of mind and

non-consideration of the relevant factors despite the

fact that the case involved an acid attack on a young

woman resulting into permanent disfiguration. In the

case on hand, a scanning of the impugned order would

reveal that what mainly weighed with the Court is the

offer made on behalf of the convicts that they would

give a payment of Rs. 25 lakhs through demand drafts,

taking into account the evidence that the victim had

incurred an amount of Rs. 21 lakhs for her treatment.

Paragraph 10 of the impugned order would reveal that

taking note of the said offer besides the period of

incarceration and also the delay likely to occur in the

consideration of appeal, sentence imposed was

suspended and the private respondents were enlarged

on bail. Paragraph 10 of the order would reveal this

position and it reads thus:-

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“10. After hearing counsel for the parties and

considering the voluntarily offer made by the
appellants, which is without prejudice to the right
of defence as well as right of the prosecution to
be decided at the time of final adjudication and
having no bearing on the merit of the case, over
and above, the amount of compensation being
paid by the District Legal Services Authority,
Meerut, the appellants have offered to pay an
amount of Rs. 25 lacs to the victim for her
medical treatment and also in view of the long
custody as well as the antecedents of the
appellants and also considering the fact that the
appeals pertain to the year 2021 and are not
likely to be listed for final argument in near
future, we deem it appropriate to grant
suspension of sentence of the appellants.”

11. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned

order is infected with non-application of mind and non-

consideration of the relevant factors required for

invocation of power under Section 389 in the light of the

settled position of law. An acid attack may completely

strip off the victim of her basic human right to live a

Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024 Page 12 of 14

 VERDICTUM.IN

decent human life owing to permanent disfiguration.

We have no hesitation to hold that in appeals involving

such serious offence(s), serious consideration of all

parameters should be made. Even a cursory glance of

the impugned order would reveal the consideration

thereunder was made ineptly. The serious nature of the

offence involved was not taken into account besides the

other relevant parameters for the exercise of power

under Section 389, Cr. PC.

12. In such circumstances, the impugned judgment

cannot be sustained. The upshot of the discussion is

that the order suspending the sentence of the private

respondents and enlarging them on bail, invite

interference. Consequently, the impugned order is set

aside and consequently the bail granted to the private

respondent in all these appeals stands cancelled.

Consequently, the appellants shall surrender before the

trial Court for the purpose of their committal to judicial

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 VERDICTUM.IN

custody. This shall be done within a period of four

days. In case of their failure to surrender as ordered,

the private respondents who are convicts shall be re-

arrested and committed to custody.

13. The Appeals are allowed as above.

………..................J.
(C.T. Ravikumar)

New Delhi;
April 05, 2024

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 VERDICTUM.IN

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1957-1961 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 3484-3488 of 2024)

SHIVANI TYAGI … Appellant (s)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & Anr. … Respondent(s)

ORDER

1. I have gone through the detailed reasons recorded by

brother C.T. Ravikumar, J. Elaborate discussion has been made on the

aspect of suspension of sentence in heinous crimes as it is a case where

the High Court had directed suspension of sentence of the respondents

in an acid attack case, which will haunt the victim throughout her life.

The disfigurement of the face of the victim, as is evident from the

photographs placed on record, could not even be seen.

2. It is a case in which after hearing the arguments raised by

the appellant and going through the paper book our conscience was

shocked. By a short order we granted the leave in the matters and

Page 1 of 18
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allowed the appeals, for the reasons to follow. The respondents were

directed to surrender before the Trial Court on or before 09.04.2024.

The same is extracted below:

“Leave granted.
Appeals are allowed. Reasons to follow.
The respondents-life convicts shall surrender on or
before 9.4.2024 before the concerned Trial Court. In case
of their failure to surrender, they shall be taken into custody
and produced before the Trial Court.”

2.1. I fully subscribe to the views expressed, but wish to add

some more reasons.

3. The main ground on which the High Court ordered

suspension of sentence of the respondents, who have been awarded

life imprisonment is that the counsel for the accused submitted that in

the evidence it had come on record that about ₹ 21 lakhs (Rupees

Twenty-One Lakhs only) have been spent on her treatment as she

suffered disfigurement of her face. It was further argued that the Trial

Court in its judgment of conviction had directed that the victim be

granted adequate compensation for her treatment under the Victim

Compensation Scheme. Then, it was collectively argued by the learned

counsel for the accused that without prejudice to their right of defence

the accused collectively and voluntarily offered to pay a sum of ₹ 25

Page 2 of 18
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lakhs (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs only) which may be given to the

victim for her medical treatment. It was objected to by the learned

counsel for the State. Taking note of the offer made by the counsel for

the private respondents, who are the convicts, the High Court accepted

the offer made by them and directed that, over and above, the amount

of compensation paid by the District Legal Services Authority to the

victim, the private respondents have offered to pay a sum of ₹ 25 lakhs

(Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only) for her treatment. The sentence

awarded to them was suspended. It was further noticed that the hearing

of appeal is likely to take some time. Relevant paragraph 10 of the

impugned order is extracted below:

“10. After hearing counsel for the parties and

considering the voluntarily offer made by the appellants,
which is without prejudice to the right of defence as well
as right of the prosecution to be decided at the time of
final adjudication and having no bearing on the merit of
the case, over and above, the amount of compensation
being paid by the District Legal Services Authority,
Meerut, the appellants have offered to pay an amount of ₹
25 lakhs to the victim for her medical treatment and also
in view of the long custody as well as the antecedents of
the appellants and also considering the fact that the
appeals pertain to the year 2021 and are not likely to be
listed for final argument in near future, we deem it

Page 3 of 18
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appropriate to grant suspension of sentence of the

appellants.”

4. As the victim may also be in shock and not interested in

receiving the amount as offered by the private respondents, the

respondents moved a Correction Application1 before the High Court.

On the aforesaid application, the High Court, while noticing that offer

made by the private respondents was not acceptable to the victim,

directed the respondents to deposit the amount with the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Meerut. The relevant part of the order dated 21.02.2024 is

reproduced hereinunder:

“Correction in the order dated 12.12.2023, is sought

to the extent that the applicants have already handed over
the demand drafts in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Meerut, as the victim has not come forward to accept the
drafts, the appellants, who are granted bail, are still
languishing in judicial custody.

It is further submitted that appellants have performed

their part of liability by depositing the demand draft before
the CJM, Meerut, thus they may be released on bail.

In paragraph No. 11 of the order dated 12.12.2023, we

modify to the extent that the appellants may be released on

1
Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 12 of 2024

Page 4 of 18
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bail, even prior to handing over the demand drafts to the

victims as ordered earlier.

Notice of the application has been sent by registered

post to Sri P.K. Rai, learned counsel for the respondent No.
2 by Sri P.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants on
04.01.2024, but none appeared on behalf of respondent No.
2. Learned AGA has no objection to the prayer made by
counsel for the appellants.

The bail order dated 12.12.2023 was passed in other

connected Criminal Appeal No. 996 of 2021, Criminal
Appeal No. 801 of 201, Criminal Appeal No. 1155 of 2021
and Criminal Appeal No. 467 of 2021.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case,

it is undisputed that the demand drafts have been handed
over to the CJM, Meerut, the appellants be released on bail
subject to furnishing of surety bond.

The appellants will tender an undertaking before the

Court that in case the victim appears subsequently and
applies for release of money and in the meantime if the
validity of the drafts have lapsed, they will revalidate the
draft and hand over the same to the Court of CJM, Meerut.

With the aforesaid observations, the order dated

12.12.2023 is modified accordingly.”

5. Detailed discussions have been made in the opinion

expressed by my brother C.T. Ravikumar, J. with reference to the

Page 5 of 18
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suspension of sentence in case of heinous offences. I would like to touch

upon the issue of offer of money to the victim for suspension of sentence

in a heinous crime of acid attack, where the victim suffered burn

injuries to the extent of 30 to 40% resulting in total disfigurement of her

face. As is evident from the record, despite spending ₹ 21 lakhs

(Rupees Twenty-One Lakhs only) on the treatment, she still has not

been cured.

6. One of the principles of sentencing in criminal law is

proportionality. If the appropriate punishment is not awarded or if,

after conviction for a heinous crime, the court directs the suspension of

the sentence without valid reasons, the very purpose for which the

criminal justice system exists will fail.

7. After passing of the order dated 12.12.2023 vide which the

High Court directed the suspension of the sentence of the private

respondents on payment of ₹ 25 lakhs (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only)

to the victim, the amount was not accepted by the victim and the

convicts could not be released from the jail. An application for

correction2 of the impugned order was filed by the private

respondents. The infirmity of the court is evident from the fact that

despite this development, the High Court went on to modify the earlier

2
Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 12 of 2024

Page 6 of 18
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order dated 12.12.2023 and noted that a Demand Draft having been

handed over to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut the private

respondents be released on bail subject to Surety Bonds. It was

recorded that, in case subsequently the victim appears in court for

release of amount and the validity of the Demand Draft lapses, the

private respondents shall get the same revalidated.

8. From the facts it can safely be noticed that there is no

question of acceptance of money by the victim as she has challenged

the order of suspension of sentence of the private respondents.

9. This court had been taking the offence of acid attacks, which

are on increase, seriously. It is even to the extent of regulating the sale

of the acid with stringent action so that the same is not easily available

to the people with perverse mind. Observations made by this court in

paragraph 13 of Parivartan Kendra vs Union of India and Others3

being appropriate is extracted below:

“13. We have come across many instances of

acid attacks across the country. These attacks have been
rampant for the simple reason that there has been no proper
implementation of the regulations or control for the supply
and distribution of acid. There have been many cases where
the victims of acid attack are made to sit at home owing to
their difficulty to work. These instances unveil that the State

3
(2016) 3 SCC 571: 2015 INSC 893

Page 7 of 18
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has failed to check the distribution of acid falling into the

wrong hands even after giving many directions by this
Court in this regard. Henceforth, stringent action be taken
against those erring persons supplying acid without proper
authorisation and also the authorities concerned be made
responsible for failure to keep a check on the distribution of
the acid.”

10. In Suresh Chandra Jana vs State of West Bengal and

Others4, while rejecting the acquittal of an accused as ordered by the

High Court in an acid attack case, this Court observed that the acid

attack has transformed itself to a gender-based violence, which causes

immense psychological trauma resulting in hurdle in overall

development of the victim. Paragraph 30 thereof is extracted below:

“30. At the outset, certain aspects on the acid attack

need to be observed. Usually vitriolage or acid attack has
transformed itself as a gender based violence. Acid attacks
not only cause damage to the physical appearance of its
victims but also cause immense psychological trauma
thereby becoming a hurdle in their overall development.
Although we have acknowledged the seriousness of the acid
attack when we amended our laws in 2013 [ The Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013).] , yet the number
of acid attacks are on the rise. Moreover, this Court has
been passing various orders to restrict the availability of

4
(2017) 16 SCC 466 : 2017 INSC 1296

Page 8 of 18
 VERDICTUM.IN

corrosive substance in the market which is an effort to nip

this social evil in the bud. [Parivartan Kendra v. Union of
India, (2016) 3 SCC 571 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 143] It must be
recognised that having stringent laws and enforcement
agencies may not be sufficient unless deep-rooted gender
bias is removed from the society.”

11. In another case reported as State of Himachal Pradesh

and Another vs Vijay Kumar alias Pappu and Another5 regarding

acid attack on a young girl of 19 years, in which this Court observed in

paragraph 13 thereof, that the victim had suffered 16% burn injuries

and that such a victim cannot be compensated by grant of any

compensation. Paragraph 13 is thereof extracted below:

“13. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that in the present

case the victim had suffered an uncivilised and heartless
crime committed by the respondents and there is no room
for leniency which can be conceived. A crime of this nature
does not deserve any kind of clemency. This Court cannot
be oblivious of the situation that the victim must have
suffered an emotional distress which cannot be
compensated either by sentencing the accused or by grant
of any compensation.”

5
(2019) 5 SCC 373 : 2019 INSC 377

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12. The circumstances under which a bail granted by the court

below can be cancelled, having been summarised by this Court in

Deepak Yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another6. Relevant

paragraphs 31 to 35 are extracted below:

“C. Cancellation of bail

31. This Court has reiterated in several instances
that bail once granted, should not be cancelled in a
mechanical manner without considering whether any
supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his
freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial.
Having said that, in case of cancellation of bail, very cogent
and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an
order directing cancellation of bail (which was already
granted).

32. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dolat

Ram v. State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] laid down the
grounds for cancellation of bail which are:
(i) interference or attempt to interfere with the due
course of administration of justice;
(ii) evasion or attempt to evade the due course of
justice;
(iii) abuse of the concession granted to the accused in
any manner;

6
(2022) 8 SCC 559 : 2022 INSC 610

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(iv) possibility of the accused absconding;

(v) likelihood of/actual misuse of bail;
(vi) likelihood of the accused tampering with the
evidence or threatening witnesses.

33. It is no doubt true that cancellation of bail cannot

be limited to the occurrence of supervening circumstances.
This Court certainly has the inherent powers and discretion
to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence of
supervening circumstances. Following are the illustrative
circumstances where the bail can be cancelled:

33.1. Where the court granting bail takes into account

irrelevant material of substantial nature and not trivial
nature while ignoring relevant material on record.

33.2. Where the court granting bail overlooks the

influential position of the accused in comparison to the
victim of abuse or the witnesses especially when there is
prima facie misuse of position and power over the victim.

33.3. Where the past criminal record and conduct of

the accused is completely ignored while granting bail.

33.4. Where bail has been granted on untenable

grounds.

33.5. Where serious discrepancies are found in the

order granting bail thereby causing prejudice to justice.

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33.6. Where the grant of bail was not appropriate in

the first place given the very serious nature of the charges
against the accused which disentitles him for bail and thus
cannot be justified.

33.7. When the order granting bail is apparently

whimsical, capricious and perverse in the facts of the given
case.

34. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru

Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] , the accused was granted bail by the High Court. In an
appeal against the order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] of the High Court, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court examined the precedents on the
principles that guide grant of bail and observed as under :
(SCC p. 513, para 12)
“12. … It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail
after it is granted because the accused has
misconducted himself or of some supervening
circumstances warranting such cancellation have
occurred is in a different compartment altogether
than an order granting bail which is unjustified,
illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors
which should have been taken into consideration
while dealing with the application for bail have not
been taken note of or it is founded on irrelevant
considerations, indisputably the superior court can
set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case

Page 12 of 18
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belongs to a different category and is in a separate

realm. While dealing with a case of second nature,
the court does not dwell upon the violation of
conditions by the accused or the supervening
circumstances that have happened subsequently. It,
on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the
soundness of the order passed by the court.”

35. This Court in Mahipal [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar,

(2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] held that : (SCC
p. 126, para 17)
“17. Where a court considering an application for
bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate
court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail.
An appellate court is thus required to consider
whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-
application of mind or is not borne out from a prima
facie view of the evidence on record. It is thus
necessary for this Court to assess whether, on the
basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a prima
facie or reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had committed the crime, also taking into
account the seriousness of the crime and the severity
of the punishment.”

13. The impugned order passed by the High Court is perused.

Specifically the order dated 21.02.2024 passed in the Correction

Application. The order does not suggest that there was any

Page 13 of 18
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consideration of the parameters laid down by this court for grant of bail

or suspension of sentence. Instead, the High Court had noticed and

directed that the convicts have offered to pay compensation to the

victim for grant of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to

accept, was directed to be deposited in the court. It was in a way kind

of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to the victim for which there

is no acceptability in our criminal justice system.

14. This Court in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab and Another7

while dealing with an issue regarding quashing of criminal

proceedings on the ground of settlement between the offender and

victim, observed that even if settlement or payment of compensation is

pleaded in a heinous crime, still the same should not be quashed as the

crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and in general

the well-being of the society. It is not safe to leave the crime-doer on

the plea of settlement with victim. Relevant paragraph 58 thereof is

extracted below:

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal

proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been settled
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be

7
(2012) 10 SCC 303 : 2012 INSC 419

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an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that

the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace
is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that
seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the
society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably
or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain
crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In respect of serious
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences
of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain
offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear
civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly
relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the
wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them amicably,
irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may within the
framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that

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on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood

of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of
justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and
no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”

15. In the State of Jharkhand vs. Md. Sufiyan8, the Jharkhand

High Court directed the accused to deposit certain amount in court, as

ad interim compensation to be paid to the victim as a condition for grant

of anticipatory bail. It was a case for various crimes committed under

IPC, POCSO Act and I.T. Act. The aforesaid direction of the High Court

was deprecated by this Court. It was opined that the willingness of the

accused to pay compensation to the victim cannot be a reason for grant

of anticipatory bail. Para 6, thereof is extracted below:

“6. The factors on which anticipatory bail could be

granted are very well crystallized in a catena of judgments

of this Court. Leave aside the discussion of such factors, not

even a whisper as to on what grounds anticipatory bail was

being allowed were considered by the High Court. Merely

because the accused is willing to pay some amount as an

8
SLP (Crl) No. 1960 of 2022 decided on 16.01.2024

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interim compensation cannot be a ground for grant of

anticipatory bail.”

16. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Sahab Alam

alias Guddu vs. State of Jharkhand and another9. Paras 2 and 8

thereof are extracted below:

“2. We have a batch of petitions before us, arising

from different nature of offences from dowry to Section 420
IPC to Section 376, IPC and POCSO Act. The common aspect
in all these cases is that one particular learned Judge of the
High Court has granted bail on condition on deposit of
substantive sums of money without consideration of the
requirements of bail dependent on the nature of offences. It
is trite to say that bail cannot per se be granted if a person
can afford to deposit the money or his capacity to pay. That
is what seems to have happened. Since there is no proper
consideration, it is also difficult for us to analyse what
weighed with the learned Judge while granting bail and it is
certainly not the jurisdiction of this Court to be first or a
second court of bail.

8. We also clarify that in view of our judgment in

Dharmesh v. State of Gujarat (2021) 7 SCC 198 there is no

9
2022 SCC Online SC 1874

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question of victim compensation, as there cannot be such a

criteria at the stage of grant of bail.”

……………….……………..J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)

New Delhi
April 5, 2024.

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