1. TOCAO V.

COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The case involves a petition for review of a decision af rmed by the Court of Appeals,
concerning a dispute between Nenita A. Anay and William T. Belo and Marjorie Tocao. Anay,
after meeting Belo through her prior job, joined a venture to import kitchen cookwares. Belo
agreed to nance the venture, with Anay leading marketing. They decided not to include Belo's
name in documents related to their transactions with a manufacturer, using Anay's name
instead. An oral agreement detailed Anay's entitlements, including a percentage of pro ts and
sales, though not reduced to writing due to Belo's assurances.

The venture, operating as Geminesse Enterprise, succeeded under Anay's efforts. However,
con icts arose when Anay was excluded from the company by Tocao, despite prior
acknowledgments of her role and performance. Anay sought unpaid commissions, an audit of
the company's nances, and damages through a court case.

The trial court ruled in favor of Anay, recognizing an oral partnership agreement, ordering an
account of the partnership's affairs, and awarding damages. The Court of Appeals upheld this
decision but reduced the damages awarded.

Belo and Tocao appealed to the Supreme Court, disputing the existence of a partnership. They
argued that Geminesse Enterprise existed before the alleged partnership and questioned the
lack of a written memorandum regarding the partnership's terms.

The trial court found indications of a partnership based on shared intentions, a common fund,
joint interest in pro ts, and testimony from a witness. Belo's actions, such as attending meetings
and issuing a memo granting commissions, were seen as indicative of his involvement as a
partner, despite the absence of written evidence. The Court concluded that the lack of a written
agreement did not negate the existence of a partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of partnership is well grounded by facts.

HELD:
The court a rmed that for a partnership to be legally recognized, it requires: a) two or
more individuals contributing money, property, or industry to a joint fund, and b) an intention to
share pro ts among themselves. The form of the partnership isn't crucial; an oral contract is as
valid as a written one, except when real rights or immovable property are involved. Lack of
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission doesn't nullify a partnership as long
as the requisites of a partnership are met.
The petitioners acknowledged the expertise of the private respondent in the cookware
distribution business, af rming her signi cant role in the partnership's success. Despite denials
of nancial involvement by one petitioner, evidence suggested active participation in business
matters, including authorizing payments. Another partner admitted personal nancing and
shared business ventures with the other petitioner.
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 Despite receiving a share of pro ts, the private respondent's role was argued not to be that of
an employee. She had managerial involvement, contributed to staff selection, and received
commissions, differing from an employer-employee relationship.

The court highlighted that in a partnership, partners must share pro ts and losses except for the
industrial partner, who isn't liable for losses. Even though the business was registered as a sole
proprietorship, its name was used practically for various business activities, including cookware
distribution.

The claim for unaccounted stocks of Geminesse Enterprise by the petitioners strengthened the
argument for a partnership between them. Even after the private respondent's exclusion from
the partnership, she continued to receive commissions, showcasing the partnership's ongoing
existence.

The unilateral exclusion of the private respondent by one partner was deemed unjusti ed
dissolution, causing potential liability for damages. Despite attempts to dissolve the partnership,
it continued until the winding up of its affairs, evident in the unresolved claims for stocks
entrusted to the private respondent.

2. FABIAN V. DESIERTO
FACTS:
The case involves Teresita Fabian, a major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation, and Nestor Agustin, a district engineer. Agustin
allegedly abused his position by engaging in an intimate relationship with Fabian and using his
in uence to bene t PROMAT in securing government contracts. However, when Fabian
attempted to end the relationship, Agustin resorted to harassment and intimidation. Fabian
led a complaint against Agustin, seeking his dismissal for various misconducts related to their
relationship and Agustin's abuse of power.
Initially, a Graft Investigator found Agustin guilty of grave misconduct, recommending his
dismissal. The Ombudsman later modi ed the decision, nding Agustin guilty of misconduct and
imposing a one-year suspension without pay. After Agustin's appeal and the Ombudsman's
discovery of a con ict of interest involving Agustin's counsel, the case was transferred to Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero. Guerrero ultimately overturned the previous decision and cleared
Agustin of the administrative charges.

Petitioner argues that section 27 of RA 670 provides that administraive decisions of the
Of ce of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court. However, under section 7 of
the Rule III of the Administrative Order No.7 (Rules of Procedure of the Of ce of the
Ombudsman, when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the
decision of the Ombudsman is nal and unappealable. Petitioner submits that the ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict the right to appeal allowed by RA 6770.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 is valid insofar as the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions in administrative cases led before the O ce of the
Ombudsman.

HELD: No.
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 Under section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, no law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution
without its advice and consent. In the deliberations for the procedure of Appeal from the O ce
of the Ombudsman to the SC, the senate was aware of the provisions of section 30 Article VI.
Senator Edgardo Angara, a co-author of S.B. No. 543, acknowledged that the provision would
broaden the Court's jurisdiction. Notably, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights did not
consult the Court about this matter. Thus, it was held by the Court tat Section 27 of RA 670
should be struck down as unconstitutional and in line wit the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-jdicial agencies in the 1997 revised rules of civil procedure, appeals from
the decisions of the O ce of the Ombudsman should be taken to the Court of Appeals ( under
Rule 43).

Anent the issue of the transfer of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making
power in disciplinary actions, it is deemed a procedural matter. This transfer doesn't impact the
right to appeal, which remains intact; rather, it alters the procedure for lodging and deciding
appeals. The rationale behind this is that no litigant possesses an absolute entitlement to a
speci c remedy, as these remedies can be substituted without violating vested rights,
especially concerning procedural rules linked to remedies. Additionally, the shift in appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals doesn't constitute the creation of a new right of appeal;
instead, it falls within the procedural powers of the Supreme Court. Moreover, this transfer
doesn't undermine vested rights since the parties still retain a remedy and have access to a
competent tribunal to address their concerns.

3. IN RE APPOINTMENTS: MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND PLACIDO B. VALLARTA

FACTS:
The Chief Justice brought forth appointments made by the President for two judgeships
to the Regional Trial Court. The matter was referred to the Court En Banc due to a
constitutional issue arising from these appointments. The issue stemmed from discussions at a
Judicial and Bar Council meeting regarding the constitutionality of appointments to the Court
of Appeals during the period leading up to the presidential elections. The debate centered on
con icting constitutional provisions: one restricting appointments two months before the
presidential elections, and another mandating the lling of vacancies in the Supreme Court
within 90 days of occurrence. Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, referencing
records from the Constitutional Commission, asserted that the election ban didn't apply to
Court of Appeals appointments. This view, accepted without substantial deliberation or
research by other JBC members, was submitted to the President along with the Council's
nominations for Court of Appeals vacancies.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appointments of the two judges signed by the President are
valid

HELD: No.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the rst prohibition relating
to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or in uencing the
election. While the lling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there
is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
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 during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public
policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.

In light of the questions raised with regard to the constitutionality of the appointments,
attention was drawn to Sec 15 Article VII of the Constitution which prohibits the president/
acting president from making appointments two months immediately before the next elections.
On the other hand, section 4 of Article VII states that any vacancy in the supreme court shall be
lled up within 90 days.

In the letter by CJ addressed to the president, he explained that the direct prohibition of
section 4 implies no speci cation of which appointments are proscribed, thus should be
construed to apply to al appointments of any kind and nature. As the exception makes
reference to only to executive positions, it would seem that judicial postitions are covered by
the general rule.

Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution targets two types of appointments: those
made for buying votes and those for partisan motives, including "midnight" appointments. The
latter refers to rushed appointments made near the end of an outgoing president's term, aiming
to limit the incoming administration's choices. However, the Aytona v. Castillo case established
exceptions, acknowledging that well-considered appointments to important positions after a
new president's proclamation are acceptable if made with deliberate action and spaced
reasonably.
Section 15, Article VII restricts the president's appointment power more extensively than
Aytona's ruling. While Aytona allowed spaced and deliberate appointments, the constitutional
provision only permits temporary executive appointments when public service or safety is at risk
during the speci ed ban period.

In con icts between the time frames for lling court vacancies and the president's appointment
restrictions, the court leans toward upholding appointment restrictions to prevent vote-buying,
emphasizing that temporary vacancies can tolerate the ban period. The argument favoring
Articles VIII's Sections 4 (1) and 9 doesn't prevail over Article VII, as the Constitution should be
considered as a uni ed document.

Though rare, scenarios might demand urgent appointments during the ban period, such as
ensuring a quorum in the Supreme Court or resolving evenly divided critical issues. However,
such cases fall outside the purview of Sections 15 of Article VII and Articles VIII's Sections 4 (1)
and 9.

4. FORTICH V. CORON
Facts

This case involves a dispute over the conversion of a 144-hectare land in Sumilao, Bukidnon
from agricultural to industrial/institutional use. The petitioners, NQSR Management and
Development Corporation and Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association (BAIDA), led
an application for land use conversion with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in 1993.
However, the DAR Secretary denied the application and ordered the distribution of the land to
quali ed landless farmers. The petitioners led a motion for reconsideration, which was also
denied.
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 The Bukidnon Governor and Sumilao Mayor requested the President to suspend the DAR
Secretary's order and con rm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao
converting the land. The Executive Secretary reversed the DAR Secretary's order and upheld
the power of local government units to convert agricultural land into industrial areas. The DAR
Secretary led a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. A second motion for
reconsideration was led, and during its pendency, the President constituted a Presidential
Fact-Finding Task Force to review the land use of the property. The task force recommended
the allocation of 100 hectares to farmer bene ciaries and 44 hectares for an industrial and
commercial zone.

Issue

The main issue raised in this case is whether the "win-win" Resolution issued by the Of ce of
the President, which modi ed a previous decision that had already become nal and executory,
is void or not.

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the "win-win" Resolution is void because it violated procedural
rules and disregarded the principle of nality of administrative determinations. Procedural rules
should be respected and followed to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
While there may be instances where the rules can be relaxed, this should only be done in
proper cases and under justi able circumstances. In this case, the Of ce of the President acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in modifying a nal and executory
decision.

Ratio

The Court emphasized the importance of procedural rules in facilitating the resolution of cases
and ensuring a speedy administration of justice. The nal and executory character of
administrative determinations should not be disturbed, unless there are justi able reasons and
causes to do so. In this case, the respondents failed to show a justi able reason for a relaxation
of the rules. The Court also declared that the "win-win" resolution was issued in excess of
jurisdiction and in violation of the principle of nality to administrative determinations.

The Court further ruled that the power of local government units to reclassify lands is not subject
to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. This issue had already been settled in a
previous case, where the Court held that local government units do not need the approval of the
DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

5. PEOPLE V. REDULOSA

FACTS:
Appellant Romeo Redulosa and Roselo Carton were accused of kidnapping for ransom
with murder. The RTC rendered judgment nding appellant Redulosa and Carton guilty of te
charge with the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the use of a motor vehicle. Both
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 were sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim’s heirs in the amount of 50,000
and to pay 100,000 by way of moral and exemplary damages. The case was then brought
before the SC for automatic review.
On March 22 1995, appellant sent a letter an “urgent motion to withdraw appeal”. The
solicitor general found no valid reason to interpose objection to the appelant’s motion.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appellant can withdraw his appeal after being sentenced to death
by the trial court that was rendered before the 1987 constitution took efects which porhibits the
imposition of death penalty.

HELD:
After due deliberation the Court resolved to grant appellant's motion to withdraw his
appeal. To begin with the death penalty imposed on appellant was automatically reduced to
reclusion perpetua in view of Art. III, Sec 19 (1) of the Constitution which took e ect on
February 2, 1987. While this case was brought to this Court for automatic review as required by
Rule 122, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the case has ceased to be in this Court by virtue of
such Rule. As a matter of fact appellant had to le a notice of appeal on August 20, 1990,
otherwise he would be taken as having given his assent to his conviction on the basis of the
reduced sentence and his case would be remanded to the trial court for execution of its
decision as modi ed with respect to the penalty which is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed one, so does he
have a right — subject to the approval of this Court — to terminate the appeal by withdrawing
it. 1 Both the appellant's counsel and the Solicitor General urge approval of appellant's motion.
Nor is this right of appellant to withdraw his appeal a ected by the enactment of R.A. No. 7659
which took e ect on December 31, 1993, 2 providing for the reimposition of the death penalty
in cases of heinous crimes including the one for which appellant was sentenced to death
(kidnapping for ransom with murder). The new law does not apply to crimes committed prior to
its e ectivity,

6. REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
In 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, and Jose Y.
Campos formed HMHMI as a holding company for shares in various corporations. After the
death of Hans M. Menzi in 1984, Montecillo took charge as the executor of Menzi's estate and
president of HMHMI. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a
sequestration order in 1987 against HMHMI's assets. The estate of Hans M. Menzi,
representing HMHMI, contested this order, arguing that it lacked legal basis. Legal battles
ensued, with the Sandiganbayan ultimately lifting the sequestration order in 1998, stating that
there was insuf cient evidence for its issuance. The petitioner then led a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied, leading to the current petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in adopting its resolutions
lifting the writs of sequestration.

HELD: No.
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan decisions is limited to
questions of law, not facts. A question of law concerns the application of law to speci c facts,
while a question of facts involves doubts about the truth of the facts presented. The Supreme
Court does not reexamine evidence or act as a fact- nder. Instead, it focuses on legal
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 interpretations. Additionally, the Sandiganbayan has the authority to decide on all matters in an
ill-gotten case, including the validity of sequestration orders issued by the PCGG.
The Court agrees with respondents that the Sandiganbayan holds full authority to
decide on all aspects of the ill-gotten case, including the validity of the PCGG-issued
sequestration writs. The evidence presented indicates that Hans M. Menzi primarily owned the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation, with exceptions such as shares sold to U.S. Automotive
corporation in 1985, converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the public. There's
no substantial evidence showing that Ferdinand E. Marcos or his associates acquired Menzi's
Bulletin shares subject to sequestration. Therefore, the questioned Sandiganbayan resolutions
cannot be voided based on the current evidence.

7. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition regarding appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI). First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. obtained approval to
modify its BOI certi cate, which Mariwasa opposed by ling a motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, Mariwasa appealed to the Court of Appeals based on Supreme Court Circular
No. 1-91.
The Court of Appeals temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision, which
expired without a preliminary injunction. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. moved to dismiss the
petition and lift the restraining order, asserting that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over
BOI Case No. 92-005, exclusively vested in the Supreme Court by Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.

The Court of Appeals denied the motion, prompting First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. to le a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. They argued that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal, stating that the appellate
jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court by statute could not be altered by Circular No. 1-91.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. contended that the procedures outlined in Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91 for appeals to the Court of Appeals contradicted Article 82 of E.O.
226, which mandates direct appeals to the Supreme Court from BOI decisions or orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court Circular 1-91 repealed or superseded Article 82 of
EO 226 thus appeals from decisions of the BOI are to be led at the Court of Appeals.

HELD: Yes.
To address inconsistencies and confusion in appellate procedures, the Supreme Court,
utilizing its constitutional authority to establish rules of practice, issued Circular 1-91. Despite
being a circular, it carries the force and effect of law, as established in legal precedent like the
Inciong v. de Guia case where a court circular was considered as having legal force.

B.P. 129 notably aims for a standardized appeal process from quasi-judicial agencies,
bene ting both the legal practitioners and the judiciary. Equally signi cant is the goal of easing
the Supreme Court's caseload, allowing more focus on substantial national concerns and
fundamental rights rather than individual cases with transient implications. This aligns with Dean
Vicente G. Sinco's perspective, emphasizing the Court's role in addressing signi cant national
issues and governmental authority affecting fundamental rights over cases limited to individual
rights and obligations.
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 The debate over where and how appeals from decisions of the BOI should be lodged
mainly revolves around procedural aspects rather than the substantive right to appeal provided
by E.O. 226. Circular 1-91 altered the avenue for appeals from the BOI's decisions, shifting it to
the Court of Appeals within a fteen-day period from notice. This change didn't impede the
actual right to appeal.

Despite the BOI not being explicitly listed in the agencies covered by Circular 1-91, the
language used implies the inclusion of other quasi-judicial bodies not speci cally mentioned.
Moreover, the BOI doesn't fall within the exclusions outlined in Section 2 of the circular. Just as
in the DBP v. CA case, where the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over the Court of Tax Appeals
was upheld based on the comprehensive scope of B.P. 129, the BOI shouldn't be excluded from
Circular 1-91, an implementation of the same law.

Essentially, Circular 1-91 replaced or overrode Article 82 of E.O. 226 in terms of how
appeals from BOI decisions are handled. Instead of directly ling appeals with the Supreme
Court, these appeals must now go through the Court of Appeals.

8. RE: REQUEST OF ACCUSED THROUGH COUNSEL FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL

DIVISION TO TRY PLUNDER CASE AM NO. 02-1-07-SC

Facts:
This case involves a request made by the defense counsel in the plunder case against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and his co-accused. The defense requested the creation of a
special division to try the case due to concerns about the composition of the regular Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan, which was originally assigned to hear the case. The defense
cited the retirement of one justice and the inde nite leave of absence of another, leaving only
one permanent member in the division. The Special Prosecution Panel opposed the request,
arguing that changes in membership in any division are inevitable and that the Third Division
should continue hearing the case. The Oversight Committee of the Supreme Court received the
Sandiganbayan's resolution recommending the creation of a special division.

Issue:
Whether or the Supreme Court has the authority to create a special division in the
Sandiganbayan to try the plunder case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
his co-accused.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it has the power to create a special division in the
Sandiganbayan under Section 5, paragraph 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court
deemed it necessary to create a special division in the interest of justice and the speedy
disposition of the case. The special division would be composed of Acting Presiding Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario as Chairman, and Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro as members. The special division would hear, try, and decide
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the plunder case and all related cases led against Estrada and his co-accused until they are
resolved.

9. IN RE OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILS.

Facts:

This case involves the integration of the Bar of the Philippines. The Commission on Bar
Integration was created to determine the advisability of integrating the Bar in the country. The
Commission conducted a national poll and received overwhelming support for Bar integration,
with 96.45% of lawyers voting in favor. Additionally, 80 local Bar associations and lawyers'
groups expressed unquali ed endorsement and support for Bar integration. The integration of
the Bar is seen as a means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to ful ll its public responsibilities effectively.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether the integration of the Bar of the Philippines should be
ordained at this time.

Ruling:

The Court, after a thorough study of the arguments and factual data presented, ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines. The Court nds that Bar integration is constitutional and
legally unobjectionable. It is seen as an imperative means to improve the legal profession and
the administration of justice. The Court's decision is based on the overwhelming support for Bar
integration from lawyers nationwide and the bene ts observed in other jurisdictions where Bar
integration has been implemented.

Ratio:

The Court's decision is based on the following reasons:

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 1. Bar integration has yielded numerous bene ts in other jurisdictions, including improved
discipline among lawyers, greater in uence and ascendancy of the Bar, better
participation of individual lawyers in Bar activities, enhanced Bar facilities and services,
elimination of unauthorized practice, avoidance of costly membership campaigns,
establishment of an of cial status for the Bar, a more cohesive profession, and better
discharge of the Bar's obligations and responsibilities.
2. The potential negative consequences of Bar integration, such as government
dominance, weakened local Bar associations, cliquism, and intrusion of politics, have not
materialized in other jurisdictions where Bar integration has been implemented.
3. The overwhelming support for Bar integration from Filipino lawyers, as evidenced by the
national poll and resolutions from local Bar associations and lawyers' groups, indicates a
nationwide demand for integration.
4. Bar integration is seen as a means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to ful ll its public
responsibilities effectively.

10. CECILIO AREVALO BM NO. 1370

Facts:
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. led a request for exemption from payment of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues amounting to P12,035.00. He claimed that he should not be assessed
IBP dues for the years he was working in the Philippine Civil Service from 1962-1986 and when
he was working abroad from 1986-2003. He argued that the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one's profession while in government service and that he was in an inactive status
without income derived from his law practice.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. is entitled to exemption from payment of IBP dues
during the time he was inactive in the practice of law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Membership in the IBP is mandatory for all lawyers
and payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership. The Court held that there is
no rule allowing exemption from payment of membership dues. The IBP argued that Atty.
Arevalo could have informed the Secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad before he
left, which would have terminated his membership and discontinued his obligation to pay dues.
The Court also emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
subject to regulation and inquiry by the Court.

Ratio:
The integration of the Philippine Bar requires every lawyer to be a member and pay annual
dues. The payment of dues is a regulatory measure to raise funds for the objectives and
purposes of the IBP. The Court has the power to regulate the privilege of law and impose a
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reasonable fee to defray the expenses of regulating the profession. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure
to comply with these conditions may result in the loss of the privilege to practice law.

11. IN RE: EDILLION

Facts:

Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, for his refusal to pay membership fees
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors unanimously
recommended the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys due to his delinquency in
paying dues. Edillon argued that the provisions requiring him to be a member of the IBP and
pay dues violated his constitutional rights. He sought reinstatement, citing his state of health,
advanced age, and the welfare of former clients who still relied on him for counsel.

Issue:

Whether the provisions requiring membership in the IBP and payment of dues are constitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the integration of the Philippine Bar is legally unobjectionable and
within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, it is an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. The IBP Board of Governors has
the authority to recommend the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys for non-payment of dues. The penalty of disbarment imposed on Edillon for his refusal
to pay his membership dues was justi ed. However, considering the change in his attitude and
the lapse of two years since his disbarment, the Court ordered his reinstatement, provided that
he pays his dues and accepts the Court's competence to regulate the legal profession and
integrate the bar.

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 1. The integration of the Philippine Bar is legally unobjectionable and necessary to raise
the standards of the legal profession and improve the administration of justice. The
Court recognized that the integration of the Bar is an imperative means to ensure that
the legal profession ful lls its public responsibility effectively.
2. The IBP Board of Governors has the authority to recommend the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys for non-payment of dues. The
Court af rmed the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to take disciplinary action
against delinquent members, including the removal of their names from the Roll of
Attorneys.
3. The penalty of disbarment should be exercised on the preservative principle, not the
vindictive principle. The Court emphasized that the purpose of disbarment is not to
punish the lawyer but to protect the public and the administration of justice. Disbarment
should be imposed to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and not as a form of
punishment.
4. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and failure to abide by
these conditions may result in the loss of such privilege. The Court recognized that being
a member of the bar is a privilege that comes with certain obligations, including the
payment of membership dues. Failure to ful ll these obligations may result in disciplinary
action, including disbarment.
5. Reinstatement may be considered after a suf cient time has elapsed and there are
actuations showing due contrition on the part of the transgressor. The Court considered
Edillon's change in attitude and the lapse of two years since his disbarment as factors in
ordering his reinstatement. The Court recognized that reinstatement may be granted if
the transgressor shows genuine remorse and has demonstrated a change in behavior.
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 12. ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Facts:

This case involves an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplement thereto led by Leo
Echegaray, a death convict, to temporarily restrain his execution by lethal injection. The main
argument of the public respondents is that the execution of the death convict falls under the
exclusive authority of the executive branch. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to control
the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction and cannot be taken away. The
court retains jurisdiction to execute and enforce its nal judgment, even after it has become
nal. The court has the inherent and necessary power to control its processes and orders to
ensure fairness and justice. The court temporarily restrained the execution of its own decision to
allow for a check of its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress. The court's
temporary restraining order has served its purpose as it has led to the issue of whether
Congress will review capital punishment. The court granted the motion and lifted the temporary
restraining order. The court also emphasized that its jurisdiction does not depend on the
convenience of litigants. The court's power to suspend the execution of convicts does not violate
the co-equal and coordinate powers of the branches of government. The court has the authority
to control the enforcement of its decisions, while the President has the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and Congress has the power to repeal or modify laws. The court's
stay of execution does not prevent the exercise of these powers by the other branches of
government. The court also noted that nal and executory judgments can be suspended in
exceptional cases in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Some
justices also expressed their opinion that the death penalty law and the lethal injection law are
unconstitutional.

Issue:

This case involves the jurisdiction of the court to restrain the execution of a petitioner who was
sentenced to death. The petitioner led a motion to set aside the execution and argued that the
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 court still had jurisdiction to address incidental matters arising from the case. The court clari ed
that the motions led by the petitioner were not incidents in the case where the death penalty
was imposed, but rather in a separate case where the constitutionality of the Lethal Injection
Law was being challenged. The court then addressed the main issues raised by the public
respondents.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the motion to temporarily restrain the
execution. The court held that it has the jurisdiction to control the execution of its decisions and
that this power cannot be taken away. The court emphasized that its jurisdiction does not
depend on the convenience of litigants and that it has the authority to suspend the execution of
convicts in exceptional cases in the higher interest of justice. The court also noted that its power
to suspend the execution does not violate the co-equal and coordinate powers of the branches
of government. The court further stated that nal and executory judgments can be suspended
when supervening events warrant it. The court lifted the temporary restraining order after it has
served its purpose in leading to the issue of whether Congress will review capital punishment.

Ratio:

The court's decision was based on its interpretation of its jurisdiction and power to control the
execution of its decisions. The court held that the power to control the execution of its decision
is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction and cannot be subject to substantial subtraction. The
court cited previous jurisprudence to support its argument that even after a judgment has
become nal, the court retains the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The court also argued
that its power to suspend the execution of convicts does not violate the co-equal and coordinate
powers of the branches of government. The court emphasized that the President has the power
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and Congress has the power to repeal or
modify laws, while the court has the authority to control the enforcement of its decisions. The
court further stated that nal and executory judgments can be suspended in exceptional cases
in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
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13. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
Facts

This case involves a petition for certiorari led by Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge
of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, against the Of ce of the Ombudsman. The
respondent in this case is Napoleon A. Abiera, an employee of the Public Attorney's Of ce. The
alleged incident occurred when the petitioner falsi ed his Certi cate of Service by certifying that
all civil and criminal cases submitted for decision within a 90-day period had been determined
and decided, when in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in several cases.
Petitioner argues that he had been granted an extension of 90 days by the Supreme Court to
decide these cases.

Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the Of ce of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain
a criminal complaint for the alleged falsi cation of a judge's certi cation submitted to the
Supreme Court, and if so, whether a referral should be made rst to the Supreme Court.

Ruling

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. The Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to
entertain the criminal complaint for the alleged falsi cation of the judge's certi cation. The
complaint should be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

Ratio
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 The Court rst addresses the issue of jurisdiction. The petitioner argues that the Ombudsman
has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance
of his of cial duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. However,
the Court disagrees and states that a judge who falsi es his certi cate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inef ciency, as well as
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the Ombudsman does
not have jurisdiction over the criminal complaint.

The Court then discusses the issue of encroachment into the Court's power of administrative
supervision. It is established that the Supreme Court has exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman's investigation in this case encroaches on
this power and violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Therefore, in the absence of any
administrative action taken by the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman should refer the matter of
petitioner's certi cates of service to the Supreme Court for determination.

The Court also clari es that the Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court to submit its
records or allow its personnel to testify on the matter. The Ombudsman should defer action on
the complaint and refer it to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

14. PEOPLE V. BARING

Facts

The case involves the conviction of Valentin Baring, Jr. for the statutory rape of his common-law
wife's seven-year-old granddaughter. Baring was sentenced to death, and this case is an
automatic review of his conviction.

Issue

The main issue raised in this case is whether there were lack of material facts supporting
Baring's conviction.

Ruling

The court found no reason to reverse the trial court's ndings and af rmed Baring's conviction.
The court also modi ed the penalty to reclusion perpetua as the element of relationship that
would qualify the penalty to death was not present.

Ratio

Baring argued that there were lack of material facts supporting his conviction, but the court
found no reason to reverse the trial court's ndings. Baring claimed that the examining physician
was not presented as a witness, there was a delay in reporting the crime, and the exact date
and time of the crime were not speci ed in the information. However, it was Baring's counsel
who waived the presentation of the physician, the delay was justi ed, and the time of the crime
is not an element in rape. Therefore, the court af rmed the conviction based on the credible
testimony of the young victim.
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The court emphasized that decisions must clearly and distinctly express the facts and law on
which they are based. It is not necessary for a decision to be a complete recital of the evidence
presented, as long as the factual and legal basis are clearly set forth. In this case, the court
found that the decision met this requirement.

The court also addressed Baring's argument that his right to confront a witness against him was
violated because the examining physician was not presented. However, the court found that
Baring's counsel had waived the presentation of the physician, so his right to confront the
witness was not violated.

The court further explained that a medical examination is not indispensable to prove the
commission of rape. The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is suf cient to convict the accused.
Delay in reporting the crime does not affect the credibility of the victim, especially considering
the young age of the victim and the relationship between the victim and the accused.

The court also rejected Baring's denial and defense of being framed-up, stating that the victim's
clear and categorical testimony pointing to Baring as the perpetrator cannot be overturned by
mere denial.

The court addressed Baring's argument that the information was defective because it did not
specify the exact date and time of the crime. The court explained that failure to specify the exact
date or time does not make the information defective, as long as all the essential elements of
the crime are stated. The precise time of the crime is not an essential element of rape.
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15. KOMATSU INDUSTRIES V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts

The case involves a dispute between Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc. (Komatsu) and the Court
of Appeals, Philippine National Bank (PNB), Santiago Land Development Corporation, and
Maximo Contreras. Komatsu obtained a loan from the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC) and executed a real estate mortgage on its property in Pasong Tamo as
security. Komatsu also obtained a letter of credit from PNB and executed an Amendment of
Mortgage Deed covering the same property. After full payment of Komatsu's account with NIDC
and the credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage,
releasing the mortgage. However, PNB immediately demanded the return of the title and the
mortgage was reannotated and foreclosed under Act 3135, later sold to an intervenor.

Issue

The main issue raised in this case is whether the foreclosure proceeding conducted by PNB is
valid.

Ruling

The court ruled in favor of PNB, stating that the foreclosure proceeding conducted by PNB is
valid.

Ratio

The court found that there is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits a mortgagor
from mortgaging the same property for a separate and distinct debt in favor of another creditor.
The court emphasized that the mortgage is indivisible in nature and that foreclosure of the entire
property is necessary. The court also held that the Deed of Release executed by NIDC does not
release the mortgage in favor of PNB.

16. IN RE: GONZALES

Facts:

An anonymous letter-complaint was sent to Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, the Tanodbayan/

Special Prosecutor, regarding charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr.
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The letter requested Mr. Gonzalez to take action on the matter. In
addition, Mr. Cuenco sent a telegram to Mr. Gonzalez, referring to pleadings he led with the
Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135. Mr. Cuenco encouraged Mr. Gonzalez to le a
responsive pleading with the Supreme Court en banc to comply with the petition of the
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue raised in this case is whether a public of cer who is required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar and can only be removed from of ce through impeachment can be charged
with disbarment or any offense that carries the penalty of removal from of ce during their
incumbency.

Ruling:

The court ruled that a public of cer who is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar and
can only be removed from of ce through impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment or
any offense that carries the penalty of removal from of ce during their incumbency. The court
also emphasized that this rule applies to members of the Supreme Court.
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Ratio:

The court based its ruling on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation
of powers. The court recognized that the rule is important to protect the members of the
Supreme Court from unfounded charges that may be brought against them by unsuccessful
litigants or other parties seeking to affect the exercise of judicial authority. The court stated that
a member of the Supreme Court must rst be removed from of ce through impeachment before
they can be held accountable for any wrong or misbehavior through criminal or administrative
proceedings. This rule ensures that the members of the Supreme Court can perform their duties
without fear of being unjustly removed from of ce.

17. DE VERA V. DAMES

Facts:

The complainant, Reynaldo V. de Vera, Jr., wrote a letter to various government of cials
reporting alleged questionable activities conducted by Mrs. Emma C. Avellana, the principal of
CNNS. The letter detailed observations made by the complainant and other teachers regarding
a secret excavation conducted by Mrs. Avellana and her relatives, including the presence of
cars constantly parked near the diggings, the use of culverts, and the involvement of Fiscal
Villafuerte. The complainant requested an immediate investigation into the matter.

As a result of the letter, the complainant was charged with and convicted of libel by the
respondent judge. The judge ruled that the imputations made in the letter were defamatory and
malicious, and therefore constituted libel.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether the letter written by the complainant can be considered
libelous and whether the complainant acted with malice in writing and distributing the letter.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and acquitted the complainant. The
court held that the letter was not defamatory and did not dishonor or discredit the reputation of
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 the private complainants. The court also found that the complainant had good intentions and
justi able motives in writing and sending the letter.

Ratio:

The court reasoned that for an imputation to be considered libelous, it must be defamatory and
malicious. In this case, the court found that the letter did not contain defamatory imputations that
would dishonor or discredit the private complainants. The court also emphasized that malice is
not presumed in this case since the letter was not defamatory. The court further stated that the
complainant had good intentions and justi able motives in writing and sending the letter, as it
was done in the performance of his moral and legal duty as the president of the School's
Association.

18. DE GUZMAN V. JUDGE SISON

Facts

This case involves a complaint led by Hilario De Guzman, Jr., the winning mayoralty candidate
for San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections, against Judge Deodoro J. Sison of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City. De Guzman alleges irregularities in the
adjudication of the election protest led by his rival, Rolando E. Columbres, which was assigned
to Judge Sison's court.

De Guzman's complaint was initially sent to the Of ce of the Chief Justice and was
subsequently forwarded to the Of ce of the Court Administrator (OCA). The OCA required
Judge Sison to comment on the allegations. In his comment, Judge Sison argued that the
complaint lacked a cause of action and that his judgment in the election protest was supported
by evidence and lawful. He also pointed out that De Guzman had already appealed the decision
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

De Guzman then led a formal complaint against Judge Sison, attaching relevant documents in
support of his allegations. He also submitted a copy of the decision of the COMELEC's 2nd
Division, which reversed Judge Sison's ruling in the election protest. The case was
subsequently referred to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation and recommendation.
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In her report, Justice Buzon summarized the facts of the case. De Guzman was proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, but Columbres led an election protest
against him. The case was assigned to Judge Sison's court, and after conducting the necessary
proceedings, Judge Sison rendered a decision in favor of Columbres. De Guzman appealed the
decision to the COMELEC, which reversed Judge Sison's ruling and declared De Guzman as
the rightful winner of the mayoralty elections.

Issue

The main issue raised in this case is whether Judge Sison exhibited gross ignorance of the law
and manifest partiality in favor of the protestant, Rolando Columbres.

Ruling

The Court found that Judge Sison indeed displayed gross ignorance of the law and manifest
partiality. It was established that Judge Sison applied outdated laws and resolutions that were
not applicable to the mayoralty elections of 1998. He ignored the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and misapplied laws that were already obsolete. This
demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the law and a misuse of judicial processes to favor
Columbres.

Furthermore, there were incidents that showed Judge Sison's bias towards Columbres.
Witnesses testi ed that they saw Judge Sison waving at the balcony of the San Jacinto
Municipal Hall during Columbres' assumption of of ce as Mayor. Another incident involved
Judge Sison being seen with Columbres at a resort, where he was reprimanded for taking a
picture. These incidents, along with other evidence, supported the charge of manifest partiality
against Judge Sison.

The Court emphasized that judges have a duty to be knowledgeable about the law and to apply
it correctly. Ignorance of the law, especially when it is elementary, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Judges should constantly keep themselves updated with legal and jurisprudential
developments. When the law is clear, judges are obligated to apply it regardless of personal
beliefs.

Ratio

The Court's decision was based on the following legal principles:

1. Judges have a duty to be knowledgeable about the law and to apply it correctly.
Ignorance of the law, especially when it is elementary, constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.

2. Judges should constantly keep themselves updated with legal and jurisprudential
developments. They should not rely on outdated laws and resolutions that are no longer
applicable.
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 3. When the law is clear, judges are obligated to apply it regardless of personal beliefs.
They should not misinterpret or misapply the law to favor a particular party.

4. Fraternizing with litigants and meeting privately with them without the presence of the
opposing party undermines public con dence in the judiciary. Judges must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial.

19. NITAFAN V. CIR

Facts

This case involves a petition led by three judges of the Regional Trial Court seeking to prohibit
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Of cer of the Supreme Court from
deducting withholding taxes from their salaries. The judges argue that such deductions
constitute a decrease in their salaries, which is prohibited by Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. The Court had previously addressed this issue administratively, reaf rming the
Chief Justice's directive to continue withholding taxes from the salaries of judges. However, the
Court has now decided to settle the legal issue raised in this case.

Issue

The main issue raised in this case is whether the deduction of withholding taxes from the
salaries of judges constitutes a decrease in their salaries, in violation of Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling

The Court dismisses the petition and upholds the authority of Congress to pass a law xing the
compensation of judges, as long as the rate is higher than the current rate or applicable only to
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 future appointees. The Court declares that the previous ruling exempting judges from income
tax is discarded.

Ratio

The Court explains that the intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
exemption from income tax for members of the Judiciary in order to ensure equality among the
three branches of government. Although this intent was not clearly set forth in the nal text of
the Constitution, the Court has authorized the deduction of withholding taxes from the salaries
of judges. The Court reiterates that the salaries of judges are subject to general income tax and
that such payment does not violate the constitutional protection against a decrease in their
salaries.

The Court compares the relevant provisions of the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions and
concludes that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to make the salaries of
judges taxable. The Court emphasizes the importance of ascertaining the intent of the framers
and the people in adopting the Constitution.

Therefore, the Court dismisses the petition and upholds the authority of Congress to pass a law
xing the compensation of judges, as long as the rate is higher than the current rate or
applicable only to future appointees. The Court declares that the previous ruling exempting
judges from income tax is discarded.

20. DIZON V. JUDGE LOPEZ

Facts:

This case involves a complaint against Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City, for violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inef ciency, and
falsi cation in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon."

In the said case, complainant Engineer Fernando S. Dizon was convicted of falsi cation of
private document. However, the promulgation of the judgment only consisted of reading the
dispositive portion of the decision, without serving a copy of the decision on the complainant.
Complainant alleges that this failure to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year
and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion constitutes a violation of the
Constitution.

Issue:

The main issue raised in this case is whether the failure of the respondent judge to furnish the
complainant a copy of the decision until almost two years after the promulgation of its
dispositive portion constitutes a violation of the Constitution.
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 Ruling:

The court ruled that the respondent judge violated Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution,
which requires lower courts to render their decisions within three months from the date of
submission. Merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not
suf cient. The judgment must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based.

Ratio:

The court explains that the delay in furnishing the complainant with a copy of the decision did
not prejudice his right to appeal or le a motion for reconsideration because his period to do so
did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment. The court cites a
previous ruling that supports this interpretation. The court also acknowledges that the judge's
record of public service is unmarred by any wrongdoing and that the delay in deciding the case
was due to factors beyond the judge's control. However, the court reprimands the judge for the
delay in furnishing the decision, as it is the judge's responsibility to ensure that the complete
decision is promulgated in a timely manner.
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