[ G.R. No. 251693.

September 28, 2020 ]

JODY C. SALAS, EX REL PERSON DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY (PDL)
RODOLFO C. SALAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, BRANCH 32, JCINSP. LLOYD GONZAGA, WARDEN OF THE
MANILA CITY JAIL ANNEX, AND ALL THOSE TAKING ORDERS,
INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FROM HIM, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:
This resolves the petition[1] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, filed by petitioner Jody C. Salas (petitioner) on behalf of his father, Rodolfo C. Salas (Rodolfo) who
was arrested on charges of 15 counts of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-1581) and 14-
306533 to 14-306546, pending with Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

Antecedents

The 1992
conviction of
Rodolfo for the
crime of rebellion

By virtue of an Amended Information dated October 24, 1986, Rodolfo, along with other members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines - New People's Army (CPP-NPA), was indicted for the crime of rebellion. The
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until the present time, in
the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the
New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other subordinate
organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are
the aforementioned accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms through [sic] the country against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines tor the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat
of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's
territory or part of it;

That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed
organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged
themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and
other acts in pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as:

1. Conducting armed raid, sorties and ambushes against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as
against innocent civilians in such places as Larap, Camarines None; Subic, Zambales; Dinalupihan, Bataan; and
Tondo, Manila;

2. Undertaking the so-called 'Operation Agaw Armas' all over the country, including the Metro Manila area, as a
consequence of which, victims are mercilessly killed simply for the purpose of obtaining possession of their
firearms;

3. Infiltrating and, by falsehood and deception, manipulating legitimate organizations to work for the success of
the rebellion;

4. Negotiating with foreign sources/suppliers for the supply of arms to the New People's Army as amply exposed
by the arrival in Isabela in July 1972 of the vessel 'M/V KARAGATAN' from foreign shores, fully loaded with arms;

That despite the advent of a new regime occasioned by the February 1986 revolution, the aforenamed
organizations, through the leadership of the accused who, in open contempt of the new government's policy of
reconciliation and, in a determined effort to overthrow the government and to install a new social and political
order in our society, persisted and continued in their depredations against the forces of the government and
innocent civilians causing death and destruction, which include, among others, the following:

1. Simultaneous raid/attack on the INP Station and Kadiwa Center at Atimonan, Quezon and the INP Station at
Plaridel, Quezon on March 16, 1986;
2. Raid/attack on the Pagsanjan, Laguna INP Station on April 12, 1986;

3. Ambuscade of troopers at Brgy. Matacon, Polangui, Albay on April 18, 1986;

4. Ambuscade of troopers at Brgy. Aquiquican, Gattaran, Cagayan on April 24, 1986 resulting in the death of Col.
Sudiacal, PA and newsmen Willie Vicoy and Pete Mabazza;

5. Ambuscade of troopers at Villa Principe, Gumaca, Quezon on June 30, 1986;

6. Ambuscade of troopers at Vintar, Ilocos Norte on July 20, 1986;

7. Ambuscade of troopers at Brgy. Cinco, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte on August 24, 1986;

8. Liquidation of Capt. Cecilia Palada and companion at Gate I, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City on September 10,
1986;

9. Kidnapping and liquidation of Col. Rex Baquiran at Brgy. Arnacian, Pinukpuk, Kalinga-Apayao on September
13, 1986;

10. Ambuscade of troopers at Maria Aurora, Aurora Province on September 14, 1986 resulting in the death of Lt.
Col. Constancio Lasatan and others;

11. Raid/attack on PC Detachment at San Francisco, Kalian, San Pablo City on September 17, 1986;

12. Ambuscade of troopers at Balagtas, Bulacan on September 24, 1986 resulting in the death of Lt. Col. Angel
Lansang.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-48926, was raffled to Branch 12 of the RTC of Manila, which was
presided by Judge Procoro J. Donato.

It bears noting that the foregoing charge involves rebellion as defined and penalized by Articles 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1834, [3] which prescribed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. In the course. of the trial, Rodolfo - who was already in detention at the time of the
filing of the Information and did not obtain provisional liberty through bail - entered into a plea bargaining
agreement with the prosecution. Rodolfo pleaded guilty to rebellion under Executive Order No. 187, [4] which
repealed P.D. No. 1834 and reinstated the lesser penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor. The said agreement was embodied in Rodolfo and the prosecution's Joint Manifestation and
Motion (After Plea Bargaining)[5] dated May 9, 1991.

Thus, in its May 10, 1991 Decision, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction against Rodolfo, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, RODOLFO SALAS alias
Commander Bilog/Henry, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of REBELLION, as defined in Article 134
and penalized under Article 135, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 187, and as charged
in the Amended Information, and, accordingly, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay one-third (1/3) of the
costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused (who appears to have been arrested on September 29, 1985 but
brought under the jurisdiction of this Court on October 2, 1986) shall be credited with the full time during which he
underwent preventive imprisonment provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof x x x.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Rodolfo served the foregoing sentence in full and was released in 1992.

The filing of
charges for
multiple counts of
murder against
Rodolfo and his
subsequent arrest
and incarceration
On August 26, 2006, a mass grave with at least 67 skeletal remains [7] was discovered by the 43rd Infantry of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Mt. Sapang Dako, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. It is believed that the said
remains belong to victims of the CPP-NPA's "Operation Venereal Disease" which spanned from 1982 until 1992.
Among these remains, 15 were identified by forensic experts and their relatives.

Following the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the case in I.S. No. 06-116, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte issued a Resolution[8] dated February 16, 2007 recommending the filing of murder charges
against Rodolfo and 37 other leaders of the CPP-NPA. Accordingly, on February 20, 2007, Rodolfo and his co-
accused were formally indicted for 15 counts of murder in an Information, [9] the accusatory portion of which
states:
That on or about the months of May and June 1985, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at Sitio Mt.
Sapang Dako, Brgy. Kaulisihan, in the Municipality of Inopacan, Province of Leyte, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being members of the Central, Regional, and
Provincial Committees, Arresting, Investigating and/or Execution Teams/Groups of the CPP-NPA, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, employing treachery, evident premeditation, and taking
advantage of their superior strength, did then and their willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct, torture, strike
and hit with blunt instruments, stab with the use of bladed weapon such as "kutsilyo" and shoot with different
kinds and caliber of unlicensed firearms, 1). Juanita Aviola, 2). Concepcion Aragon, 3). Gregorio Eras, 4).
Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5). Restituto Ejoc, 6). Rolando Vasquez, 7). Junior Miyapis, 8). Crispin Dalmacio, 9).
Zacarias Casil, 10). Pablo Daniel, 11). Romeo Tayabas, 12). Domingo Napoles, 13). Ciriaco Daniel, 14). Crispin
Prado, and 15). Ereberto Prado, which the accused provided themselves for the purpose thereby inflicting upon
them, injuries, gunshot and stab wounds which caused the instantaneous death of 1). Juanita Aviola, 2).
Concepcion Aragon, 3). Gregorio Eras, 4). Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5). Restituto Ejoc, 6). Rolando Vasquez, 7).
Junior Miyapis, 8). Crispin Dalmacio, 9). Zacarias Casil, 10). Pablo Daniel, 11). Romeo Tayabas, 12). Domingo
apoles, 13). Ciriaco Daniel, 14). Crispin Prado, and 15). Ereberto Prado, buried them in a mass grave at Sitio Mr.
Sapang Dako, Brgy. Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte, which was only discovered and unearthed on August 26, 2006,
to the damage and prejudice of their respective heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
In an Order[11] dated June 12, 2008, the venue of the trial of the case was transferred from Branch 18 of the RTC
of Hilongos, Leyte to the RTC of Manila. The case was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-
1581) and 14-306533 to 14-306546 before Branch 32 of the RTC of Manila, which is currently presided by
respondent Judge Thelma BunyiMedina (Judge Bunyi-Medina). Thereafter, on August 28, 2019, Judge Bunyi-
Medina issued a Warrant of Arrest[12] against all of the accused in the said case.

On February 18, 2020, at around 5:30 a.m., more or less, Rodolfo was arrested by law enforcement authorities at
his residence in Angeles City, Pampanga. As attested by a Certificate of Detention [13] dated February 19, 2020,
he was detained at the Philippine National Police detention facility at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga.
By virtue of a Commitment Order[14] dated February 20, 2020, Rodolfo was then transferred to the Manila City Jail
Annex in Taguig City of which respondent JCinsp. Lloyd Gonzaga (JCinsp. Gonzaga) is the Warden.

Hence, the present recourse which petitioner filed on behalf of Rodolfo on March 2, 2020. On even date, this
Court rendered a Resolution[15] ordering that the writ of habeas corpus be issued in favor of Rodolfo.

In his verified Return of the Writ,[16] JCInsp. Gonzaga, through the Office of the Solicitor General, informed this
Court that on March 2, 2020, Rodolfo was ordered to be transferred to the Manila City Jail in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

On March 12, 2020, oral arguments were conducted, with the person of Rodolfo being presented before this
Court. We then resolved Rodolfo's application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, as well as his alternative prayer for bail. Thus:
In a similar case pending in the Regional Trial Court, bail was granted to Saturnino Ocampo in G.R. No. 176830.

Acting on these prayers and without prejudice to the final resolution in this case, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY petitioner, application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction for lack of merit;

2. GRANT petitioner's alternative application for bail; and

3. ORDER the provisional release of RODOLFO C. SALAS in Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-1581)
and 14-306533 to 14-306546, upon posting of a cash bond of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In view of the parties' submission of their memoranda amplifying the arguments in support of their respective
postures, the case is now ripe for resolution.
 Issues
1. Whether or not the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus lies as the proper remedy for
Rodolfo; and

2. Whether or not jeopardy attaches, considering the prior conviction of Rodolfo for the crime of rebellion the
penalty for which he had already fully served.
Arguments

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner excoriates the filing of the murder charges against his father. He contends that habeas corpus is the
proper remedy to redress the State's violation of Rodolfo's constitutional rights to due process and against double
jeopardy. Rodolfo was never notified of the preliminary investigation in the murder case. Likewise, the 1991 plea
bargaining agreement that Rodolfo entered into with the prosecution and approved by the trial court expressly
states:
(2-e) That both accused will be covered by the mantle of protection of the HERNANDEZ-ENRILE political offense
doctrine against being charged and prosecuted for any common crime allegedly committed in furtherance of
rebellion or surversion [sic]; x x x[18]
Rodolfo having already served his sentence for rebellion and having duly repaid his debt to society, he can no
longer be charged with murder because the said crime is deemed absorbed in rebellion - a principle that had long
been settled by the Court in People v. Hernandez[19] and Ponce-Enrile v. Judge Salazar.[20] Thus, Rodolfo's
criminal prosecution for multiple counts of murder gravely infringes his constitutional right against double
jeopardy.

Furthermore, there is no plain and speedy remedy to address Rodolfo's predicament other than habeas corpus.
To pursue other remedies before the trial court would amount to additional time for Rodolfo to languish in jail.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents claim that Rodolfo's arrest and subsequent detention were effected through a lawful process which
enjoys the presumption of regularity. The petition violates the principle of hierarchy of courts for bypassing the
remedies that are readily available before the RTC.

Moreover, the political offense doctrine is inapplicable unless and until Rodolfo is able to prove that the acts of
murder were committed in furtherance of a political end. Such must be raised as a defense during trial and
evidence in support thereof duly presented before the court a quo. This is a factual issue that lies beyond the
province of habeas corpus.

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the petition.

The writ of
habeas corpus is
not the proper
remedy to obtain
the release of
persons detained
by virtue of a
judicial process

The writ of habeas corpus, the "most celebrated writ in the English law",[21] is a procedural device for subjecting
executive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny. [22] It is the great and efficacious writ, in all
manner of illegal confinement[23] which serves as a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.[24] Habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy[25] which, when properly issued, supersedes all
other writs.[26] It is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action.[27]

Habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights.[28] It is "a proceeding against some person who
has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the
court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary." [29] Habeas corpus does
not compensate for past wrongful incarceration, nor does it punish the State for imposing it. Instead, it is a
challenge to unlawful custody, and when the writ issues it prevents further illegal custody. [30] Thus, in Fay v. Noia:
[31]

x x x Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the
growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious
remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be
shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. x
xx
In this jurisdiction, habeas corpus is acknowledged as "a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." [32] Its primary
purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[33] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances
under which a person is detained.[34] Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. [35]

In Villavicencio v. Lukban,[36] this Court, speaking through Justice Malcolm, decreed:

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.[37]
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this Court or any of its
members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of
its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.[38] The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its
jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has been
restrained is a complete nullity. The concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or
holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or
process in question.[39]

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court had occasion to exhaustively discuss the nature of the writ
of habeas corpus, to wit:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Ru1es
of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in
character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and
secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court's function. It
cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider
questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting
to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions
of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of
human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under
legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief
by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose
of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be
inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief,
but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before
the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be
resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if
the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does not issue
as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper
formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made
but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the
legality of the restraint under which a person is held.[41]
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is apparent that the writ of habeas corpus is not without its limits. For all its
broad, latitudinarian even, scope, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus application is considerably narrowed,
where the detention complained of may be traced to judicial action. [42] In Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[43] this
Court defined judicial process in the following manner:
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of
law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses,
and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in
a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. [44]
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.[45] This is bolstered by Rule 102, Section 4:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Accordingly, there have been instances when habeas corpus was denied on the ground that the persons seeking
relief were detained by virtue of a lawful process.

In IBP v. Hon. Enrile,[46] three lawyers were arrested after a Preventive Detention Action was issued against them
by President Marcos, thereby prompting the filing of a habeas corpus petition before this Court. While the petition
was being heard, an Information for rebellion was filed against the said lawyers, and a Warrant of Arrest was
ordered issued by the RTC. We dismissed the petition on the ground of mootness because their detention was
placed under the auspices of a judicial process. Thus:
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of
an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial
order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.[47]
Similarly, in Velasco v. CA,[48] a warrant of arrest was issued against Lawrence Larkins (Larkins), in a case for
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, by Judge Manuel Padolina (Judge Padolina) of Branch 162 of the
RTC of Pasig City. Pending the enforcement of the said warrant, a complaint-affidavit for rape was filed against
Larkins before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Thereafter, agents of the NBI arrested Larkins and
detained him at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.

Larkins posted bail in his B.P. Blg. 22 case, which resulted in Judge Padolina issuing an order recalling the
warrant and arrest and directing his release. The NBI, however, refused to release him. Thereafter, an
Information for rape was filed against Larkins before Branch 71 of the RTC of Antipolo City, presided by Judge
Felix S. Caballes. Larkins filed a motion for bail, alleging that his warrantless arrest at the hands of the NBI was
illegal, to no avail. Thus, he filed a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with the CA, which the appellate court
granted.

On review, We ruled that Larkins was not entitled to habeas corpus because the illegality of his warrantless
arrest was cured by the filing of an Information against him:
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of
the detained person. x x x

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the
instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows; "Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with ... an offense in the Philippines."

xxxx

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not
prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint
against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.[49]
Furthermore, in Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan, et al.,[50] Anita Mangila (Mangila) was arrested following the
issuance of a warrant of arrest by Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Puerto Princesa City for seven counts of syndicated estafa. Assailing the regularity of the warrant of arrest,
Mangila sought relief before the CA by filing a petition for habeas corpus which was, however, denied because it
is not the proper remedy therefor. We affirmed the ruling of the CA, thus:
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a
warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued
the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila's petition
for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by
Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

xxxx

With Mangila's arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the
writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas
corpus.[51]
In the present case, it was clearly averred by petitioner that an Information for 15 filing of criminal charges which
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-1581) and 14-306533 to 14-306546 before Branch
32 of the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, Judge Bunyi-Medina issued a Warrant of Arrest by virtue of which Rodolfo
was arrested at his home in Angeles-City, Pampanga. Likewise, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC
directing Rodolfo's detention at the Manila City Jail. These issuances are hallmarks of judicial process. The
restraint on Rodolfo's liberty was lawful from the very beginning. It cannot be inquired into through habeas
corpus.

It bears repetition to state at this juncture that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to
issue the same.[52] Rodolfo is, therefore, not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

At any rate, this Court had already granted petitioner's alternative prayer for bail in favor of Rodolfo, upon the
posting of a bond with the RTC. Jurisprudence holds that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached
to his release which precludes freedom of action.[53] Apart from the bail bond requirement, no restriction to
Rodolfo's freedom of action was attached to the grant of his provisional liberty. Indeed, if the respondents are no
longer detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should
be dismissed.[54]

And even if this Court were to consider the merits of the instant petition, it is premature to declare that Rodolfo
was deprived of his right to due process during the preliminary investigation of the murder case, or that his
indictment for multiple counts of murder is a political offense which is deemed included in his previous conviction
for rebellion and is therefore violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Habeas corpus is
not the proper
remedy to
question the
regularity of a
preliminary
investigation; the
right to such
investigation is
statutory at best
and not
constitutional

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the [RTC] has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. [55] The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. [56] Consequently, it is not subject
to the same due process requirements that must be present during trial. [57] In Lozada v. Hernandez, etc., et al.:[58]
It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereon but is
merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime had been committed and
whether there is probably cause to believe the accused guilty thereof (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209; People vs.
Badilla, 48 Phil., 716). The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At
most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). And rights conferred upon accused persons to
participate in preliminary investigation concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such
rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law". (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy,
18 Phil., 122).[59]
It is therefore clear that because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein
depend on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights they believe they are
entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase "due process of law." [60] Once the information is filed in
court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the
accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. [61] It is established that the issue of
whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of
fact, determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information. [62]

Verily, these matters lie squarely within the ambit of the RTC, in consonance with the principle of hierarchy of
courts which dictates that direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law,
notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. [63] The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts[64] and, as discussed earlier, habeas corpus is a summary remedy[65] the purpose of which is
merely to inquire if the individual seeking such relief is "illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed
under some form of illegal restraint."[66]

It is too early to
make a
pronouncement
on the existence of
double jeopardy
as against
Rodolfo

Then, too, it would be improper for this Court to order the dismissal of the murder charges against Rodolfo on the
pretext that the same are already deemed absorbed in his prior conviction for rebellion and, resultantly, place him
in double jeopardy.

The political nature or motive behind a crime is not presumed. Neither is it readily accepted as an uncontroverted
fact upon the mere assertion of an accused. In People v. Gempes:[67]
x x x Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with their knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative
defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through
witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement. x x x [68]
In Ocampo v. Judge Abando, et al.,[69] which involves the prosecution of the same Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163
(formerly H-1581) and 14-306533 to 14-306546, this Court declared that the defense that a crime was committed
in furtherance of a political end must be raised and proven before the trial court. Thus:
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as 'common' offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple
rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the
institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
public prosecutor.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court
to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen from
the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.

We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense,
since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for
this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions. [70]
Certainly, the determination as to whether the killings of the 15 individuals whose remains were unearthed at
Inopacan, Leyte, were motivated by a political end is a question that must be seasonably raised and proven by
Rodolfo as a defense before the trial court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which
tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts) [71] that
Rodolfo may adduce to discharge his burden of proof.

A Final Note

This Court is not unmindful of Rodolfo's perceived persecution for a crime which he believes he has already paid
for. We cannot, however, disregard the desire of society and, more importantly, the families of the 15 victims who
were summarily executed and unceremoniously discarded in a mass grave in Inopacan, Leyte, to obtain justice
for these abhorrent acts some 35 years ago.

In the same vein, We cannot countenance petitioner's assertion that the remedies before the RTC - such as the
filing of a motion to quash the complaint or information under Rule 117, Section 3, or filing a motion for
reinvestigation - do not offer sufficient and adequate relief, or that Judge Bunyi-Medina will not be able to resolve
Rodolfo's motions, should he file the same, with dispatch. This Court will never be at the forefront of casting
doubts and aspersions on the performance of our judges. We maintain our faith that the officers of the court are
tirelessly working in ensuring "the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice."[72]

For indeed, as Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, "The are of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards
justice."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Leonen, (Chairperson), J., concur with separate opinion.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-30.
[2]
Id. at 32-35.
[3]
INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR THE CRIME OF REBELLION, SEDITION, AND RELATED CRIMES,
AND AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 AND 147 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND ADDING SECTION 142-B THERETO.
[4]
REPEALING PRESIDENTIAL DECREES NOS. 38, 942. 970, 1735, 1834, 1974, AND 1996 AND ARTICLES
142-A AND 142-B of the REVISED PENAL CODE AND RESTORING ARTICLES 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141,
143, 144, 146, 147, 177, 178, AND 179 TO FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AS THEY EXISTED BEFORE SAID
AMENDATORY DECREES.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 43-46.
[6]
Id. at 41-42.
[7]
"Mass grave with 67 skeletal remains discovered in Leyte," September 3, 2006 (visited on July 22, 2020).
[8]
Rollo, pp. 47 53.
[9]
Id. at 120-123.
[10]
Id. at 121-122.
[11]
Id. at 130.
[12]
Id. at 131.
[13]
Id. at 132.
[14]
Id. at 54.
[15]
Id. at 55-56.
[16]
Id. at 76-97.
[17]
Id. at 202.
[18]
Id. at 45.
[19]
99 Phil. 515 (1956).
[20]
264 Phil. 593 (1990).
[21]
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) citing 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129.
[22]
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
[23]
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
[24]
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
[25]
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
[26]
Perky v. Browne, 105 Fla. 631 (Fla. 1932).
[27]
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
[28]
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
[29]
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
[30]
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
[31]
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
[32]
Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362, 367-368 (1971).
[33]
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo v. Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex,
et al., 757 Phil. 630, 644 (2015).
[34]
Go v. Dimagiba, 499 Phil. 445, 456 (2005).
[35]
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 15.
[36]
39 Phil. 778 (1919).
[37]
Id. at 790-791.
[38]
Salibo v. Warden, Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, supra.
[39]
Abellana v. Hon. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019.
[40]
492 Phil. 410 (2005).
[41]
Id. at 42!-423.
[42]
Ventura v. People, G.R. No. L-46576, November 6, 1978.
[43]
302 Phil. 273 (1994).
[44]
Id. at 285-286.
[45]
Barredo v. Hon. Vinarao, 555 Phil. 823, 828 (207).
[46]
223 Phil. 561 (1985).
[47]
Id. at 576.
[48]
315 Phil. 757 (1995).
[49]
Id. at 768-773.
[50]
714 Phil. 204 (2013).
[51]
Id. at 211-212.
[52]
Atty. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 444 Phil. 499, 551 (2003).
[53]
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Hon. Liwag, 256 Phil. 771, 775 (1989).
[54]
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Eufrania E. Veluz v. Villanueva, et al., 567 Phil. 63, 68-69
(2008).
[55]
Sen. Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 751 Phil. 821, 894 (2015).
[56]
Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, et al., 707 Phil. 172, 184 (2013).
[57]
Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 810 Phil. 106, 119 (2017).
[58]
92 Phil. 1051 (1953).
[59]
Id. at 1053.
[60]
P/Insp. Artillero v. Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, et al., 686 Phil. 1055, 1072 (2012).
[61]
Sec. De Lima, et al. v. Reyes, 776 Phil. 623, 649 (2016).
[62]
Sen. De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al., 819 Phil. 616, 691 (2017).
[63]
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
[64]
Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172, 177-178 (2017).
[65]
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40 at 421-422.
[66]
Abellana v. Hon. Paredes, supra note 39.
[67]
83 Phil. 267 (1949).
[68]
Id.
[69]
726 Phil. 441 (2014).
[70]
Id. at 466-468.
[71]
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 769 (2013).
[72]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 275 Phil. 894, 898 (1991).

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J:

I concur with the opinion of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan. I add the following to
his well-written piece.
First, in general, habeas corpus is indeed not the proper remedy to inquire into the illegal detention of a person
under judicial process. However, there are extraordinary circumstances where it may be the only viable remedy.

For instance, in In re: Salibo v. Warden,[1] habeas corpus was allowed, despite the issuance of judicial process,
because the deprivation of liberty was due to mistaken identity. In that case, Datukan Malang Salibo was
arrested by virtue of a warrant against a "Butukan S. Malang," one of the many accused allegedly involved in the
Maguindanao massacre. Considering that Datukan Malang Salibo sufficiently proved that he was not the
"Butukan S. Malang" named in the arrest warrant, this Court held that Datukan Malang Salibo was being illegally
deprived of liberty.

In allowing the release of Datukan Malang Salibo, this Court pronounced:

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. ...

....

[I]nstead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.

At any time before a plea is entered, the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court[.]

....

In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits
the facts alleged in the information." "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."

"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]." If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial
court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment." If after amendment, the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or information.

....

However, ... [p]etitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore,
correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant....

....

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name
and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was
also not an escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

....

Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash,
the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan
S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.

A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S.
Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.

Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport, his identification card from the Office on Muslim
Affairs, his Tax Identification Number card, and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation all bearing
his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents
showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."

Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when the
Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification from Saudi Arabian
Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on
November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December
20, 2009.[2] (Citations omitted)
Second, I reiterate my concurrence in Ocampo v. Judge Abando[3] regarding the non-applicability of
the Hernandez doctrine. Ocampo, like the present case, involves the prosecution of the leaders of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines that
allegedly implemented "Operation Venereal Disease." There, this Court held that the Hernandez doctrine[4]-a
doctrine stating that a common crime committed in furtherance of rebellion is absorbed in the rebellion charge-is
not a ground for the dismissal of the charges for the common crime, at least at the prosecutor level.

In Ocampo, I added the following points to call for a more nuanced interpretation of what constitutes rebellion, so
as to prevent violations of human rights carried out under the pretext of armed conflict:
We survey the evolution of the political offense doctrine to provide better context.

As early as 1903, this court distinguished common crimes from crimes committed in furtherance of a political
objective. In United States v. Lardizabal, the accused, Commanding Officer of Filipino insurgents, ordered the
execution of an American prisoner before retreating from the enemy. We said in this case that the accused's act
falls under the Amnesty Proclamation of 1902, thus:
... [the execution] was not an isolated act such as a "political offense committed during the insurrection pursuant
to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities," but was a measure which, whether necessary
or not, was inherent in the military operations for the preservation of the troops commanded by him and of which
he was the supreme officer on that island. It was an act which, while from the standpoint of military law
might be regarded as one of cruelty, was at the same time one depending absolutely upon the discretion
of an officer in charge of a command for securing the safety of the troops under his control and
constitutes no other offense than that of sedition, within which term the war itself is included by the
letter and spirit of the proclamation.
In United States v. Pacheco, two men selling English dictionaries within the Dagupan area were abruptly
abducted and killed by the accused and his men. Witnesses testified that it was presumed by the accused that
the salesmen were American spies because the dictionaries being sold were written in English. This court
observed:
It does not appear from the record that the aggressors were impelled to kill the deceased by any motive other
than that the latter were suspected of being spies and, therefore, traitors to the revolutionary party to which the
defendants belonged. From the foregoing statement of facts, it may therefore be said that the two murders
prosecuted herein were of a political character and the result of internal political hatreds between Filipinos,
the defendants having been insurgents opposed to the constituted government.

The case has to do with two crimes for which, under the penal law, the severest punishment has always been
inflicted. However, considering the circumstances under which these crimes were committed and the fact that the
sovereign power in these Islands, in view of the extraordinary and radical disturbance which, during the period
following the year 1896, prevailed in and convulsed this country, and prompted by the dictates of humanity
and public policy, has deemed it advisable to blot out even the shadow of a certain class of offenses,
decreeing full pardon and amnesty to their authors - an act of elevated statesmanship and timely generosity,
more political than judicial in its nature, intended to mitigate the severity of the law - it is incumbent upon us, in
deciding this case, to conform our judgment to the requirements and conditions of the decree so promulgated.
Then in the landmark case of People v. Hernandez, this court defined the term, political offense:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If
a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof." then said offense
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
This court in Hernandez first clarified whether common crimes such as murder, arson, and other similar crimes
are to be complexed with the main crimes in the Revised Penal Code. Thus:
... national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code covering complex crimes provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The Hernandez ruling was then affirmed by this court in subsequent cases, such as Enrile v. Salazar. It is worthy
to note, however, that in "affirming" the doctrine in Hernandez, this court in Enrile said:
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality
that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less
impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom
nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as
against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause - and the Court is no exception - that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort
at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise
the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the
need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
However, other cases declined to rule that all other crimes charged m the Information are absorbed under
alleged political offenses. In Misolas v. Panga, this court ruled:
Neither would the doctrines enunciated by the Court in Hernandez and Geronimo, [sic] and People v.
Rodriguez [107 Phil. 659] save the day for petitioner.

In Hernandez, the accused were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery
while in Geronimo, the information was for the complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery and kidnapping.
In those two cases[,] the Court held that aforestated common crimes cannot be complexed with rebellion as
these crimes constituted the means of committing the crime of rebellion. These common crimes constituted the
acts of "engaging in war" and "committing serious violence" which are essential elements of the crime of rebellion
[See Arts. 134-135, Revised Penal Code] and, hence, are deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Consequently, the accused can be held liable only for the single crime of rebellion.

On the other hand, in Rodriguez, the Court ruled that since the accused had already been charged with rebellion,
he can no longer be charged for illegal possession of firearms for the same act of unauthorized possession of
firearm on which the charge of rebellion was based, as said act constituted the very means for the commission of
rebellion. Thus, the illegal possession of the firearm was deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

However, in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., this court held that:
... The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both
where the indictment alleges that the former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter.
Surely, whether people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion, or not, the deaths or injuries of the
victims are no less real, and the grief of the victims' families no less poignant.

Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what acts or omissions other than those
set out in the Revised Penal Code or other existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes
and what penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at
some prior time the act or omission was but an element or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have
been connected with another crime.
The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases cited is against attempts to complex rebellion with the
so called "common" crimes committed in furtherance, or in the course, thereof; this, on the authority alone of the
first sentence of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio of said cases is that Article 48
cannot be invoked as the basis for charging and prosecuting the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., for
the purpose of obtaining imposition of the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum period (in
accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not - indeed they could not and were never meant to -
proscribe the legislative authority from validly enacting statutes that would define and punish, as
offenses sui generis crimes which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may be viewed as a complex of
rebellion with other offenses. There is no constitutional prohibition against this, and the Court never said
there was. What the Court stated in said cases about rebellion "absorbing" common crimes committed in its
course or furtherance must be viewed in light of the fact that at the time they were decided, there were no penal
provisions defining and punishing, as specific offenses, crimes like murder, etc. committed in the course or as
part of a rebellion. This is no longer true, as far as the present case is concerned, and there being no question
that PD 1866 was a valid exercise of the former President's legislative powers.
It is not our intention to wipe out the history of and the policy behind the political offense doctrine. What this
separate opinion seeks to accomplish is to qualify the conditions for the application of the doctrine and remove
any blanket application whenever political objectives are alleged. The remnants of armed conflict continue.
Sooner or later, with a victor that emerges or even with the success of peace negotiations with insurgent groups,
some form of transitional justice may need to reckon with different types of crimes committed on the occasion of
these armed uprisings. Certainly, crimes that run afoul the basic human dignity of persons must not be tolerated.
This is in line with the recent developments in national and international law. [5] (Citations omitted, emphasis in the
original)
It bears repeating here what I had said before in Ocampo:
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot negate himself or herself. Torture and
summary execution of enemies or allies are never acts of courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those
who gave their lives so that others may live justly and enjoy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.

Torture and summary execution - in any context - are shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply
been transformed into desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because of these
acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel. [6]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus.

[1]
757 Phil. 630 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[2]
Id. at 648-658.
[3]
726 Phil. 441 (2014) [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
[4]
Also called the "political offense doctrine."
[5]
Id. at 473-478.
[6]
Id. at 496-497.
 [ G.R. No. 246209, September 03, 2019 ]

MONICO A. ABOGADO, ROBERTO M. ASIADO, LARRY HUGO, ANGELO SADANG,

NONELON BALBONTIN, SALITO LAGROSA, ARZEL BELIDAN, RONALD GRANDIA, TROY
LAGROSA, RONEL BADILLA, ARCHIE GARCIANO, REGIDOR ASIADO, ELY LOPEZ,
EXPEDITO MAGDAYAO, RENY MAGBANUA, ROMULO CANA, JR., ROGELIO HINGPIT,
JONEL HUGO, ROBERT VALDEZ, RIZEN GALVAN, RICARDO NATURAL, SANNY
BELIDAN, ROWEL P. EJONA, FELIX ULZON, RAFFY M. ASIADO, PRIMO M. ASIADO,
ADRIAN P. ABAYAN, RANDY DACUMOS, DANILO BELONO, ROMEO MALAGUIT, DENNIS
BANIA, JASON VILLAMOR, GARY CASTILLOS, ALBERTO SONIO, DOLIE DUSONG, BJ
PIRING AND JING MALINAO (COLLECTIVELY KNOWN AS THE "KALAYAAN PALAWAN
FARMERS AND FISHERFOLK ASSOCIATION"), NILO LABRADOR, W1LFREDO
LABANDELO AND ROLANDO LABANDELO, AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY HON. ROY A. CIMATU, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY HON. EMMANUEL PIÑOL, BUREAU OF
FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES, REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL DIRECTOR HON.
EDUARDO B. GONGONA, PHILIPPINE NAVY, REPRESENTED BY FLAG OFFICER IN
COMMAND HON. VADM ROBERT EMPEDRAD, PN, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
REPRESENTED BY COMMANDANT HON. ADMIRAL ELSON E. HERMOGINO, PCG,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, REPRESENTED BY CHIEF HON. PDG. OSCAR
ALBAYALDE, PNP MARITIME GROUP, REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR HON. PCSUPT
RODELIO B. JOCSON, AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY
HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Cases involving the public interest which seek to protect the marginalized and oppressed
deserve more attention from their lawyers as compared with any other case. Those who have the
least deserve to have more in law.

Before this Court is an Omnibus Motion with Manifestation1 and Compliance with
Motion2 requesting, among others, the withdrawal of a Petition seeking writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

On April 16, 2019, a Petition3 was filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Monico A.
Abogado, Roberto M. Asiado, Larry Hugo, Angelo Sadang, Nonelon Balbontin, Salito Lagrosa,
Arzel Belidan, Ronald Grandia, Troy Lagrosa, Ronel Badilla, Archie Garciano, Regidor Asiado,
Ely Lopez, Expedito Magdayao, Reny Magbanua, Romulo Cana, Jr., Rogelio Hingpit, Jonel
Hugo, Robert Valdez, Rizen Galvan, Ricardo Natural, Sanny Belidan, Rowel P. Ejona, Felix
Ulzon, Raffy M. Asiado, Primo M. Asiado, Adrian P. Abayan, Randy Dacumos, Danilo Belono,
Romeo Malaguit, Dennis Bania, Jason Villamor, Gary Castillos, Alberto Sonio, Dolie Dusong, BJ
Piring, and Jing Malinao,4 all members of the Kalayaan Palawan Farmers and Fisherfolk
Association, along with Nilo Labrador, Wilfredo Labandelo, and Rolando Labandelo, who were
residents of Sitio Kinabuksan, Cawag, Zambales.

They sought the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC, or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, over Panatag Shoal (Scarborough
Shoal), Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef), and Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal), located
within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.
Petitioners relied on the Permanent Court of Arbitration's findings in its July 12, 2016 Arbitral
Award5 that Chinese fisherfolk and China's construction of artificial lands have caused severe
environmental damage to the marine environment of these areas. They alleged that their
"constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology"6 was being threatened and was being
violated due to the "omissions, failure, and/or refusal of Respondents to enforce Philippine laws
in Panatag Shoal, Ayungin Shoal, and Panganiban Reef."7

Respondents in this case include the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
represented by Secretary Roy A. Cimatu, the Department of Agriculture, represented by
Secretary Emmanuel Piñol, the Bureau Of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, represented by
National Director Eduardo B. Gongona, the Philippine Navy, represented by Flag Officer In
Command Robert Empedrad, the Philippine Coast Guard, represented by Admiral Elson E.
Hermogino, the Philippine National Police, represented by Chief Oscar Albayalde, the Philippine
National Police Maritime Group, represented by Director Rodelio B. Jocson, and the Department
Of Justice, represented by Secretary Menardo I. Guevarra.

On May 3, 2019, this Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan and ordered respondents to file a verified
return within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt of notice.8

On May 24, 2019, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Verified
Return with Comment.9 They argued that the Petition suffered from fatal procedural infirmities,
which should have warranted its dismissal. They alleged that the Petition failed to state a cause
of action since petitioners merely relied on the 2016 Arbitral Award as evidence and failed to
attach the required judicial affidavits of witnesses.10

Respondents likewise made several factual allegations to substantiate their argument that they
complied with environmental laws and regulations in the protection and preservation of Panatag
Shoal (Scarborough Shoal), Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef), and Ayungin Shoal (Second
Thomas Shoal).11 They submitted that since the case involved the conduct of foreign relations,
the remedies sought by petitioners were diplomatic and political in nature, and hence
"transcend[ed] mere enforcement of environmental laws."12

On June 4, 2019, this Court issued a Resolution13 setting the case for oral
arguments.14 Preliminary conference was held on June 18, 2019. On the same day, this Court
issued the Advisory15 for oral arguments. Parties were informed to submit their written copies of
opening statements, tables of authorities, copies of any document to be presented, and all slide
presentations no later than July 1, 2019.16

On July 2, 2019, this Court issued a Resolution17 informing the parties that Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio voluntarily inhibited from the case.

The first round of oral arguments was held on July 2, 2019. Petitioners' counsel Atty. Andre C.
Palacios and collaborating counsel Atty. Jose Manuel I. Diokno presented their opening
statements and were interpellated by this Court En Banc.18

On July 9, 2019, the oral arguments resumed, with Solicitor General Jose C. Calida (Solicitor
General Calida) about to present respondents' arguments. However, before presenting his
opening statement, he orally manifested that he be allowed to submit as additional compliance a
Manifestation and Motion,19 along with its attached documents, to be admitted as part of the
case records.20

The documents attached to the Manifestation and Motion were affidavits21 executed by 19 of the
40 fisherfolk-petitioners before respondent Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources,
requesting that their signatures be withdrawn from the Petition, which they claimed they did not
read and was not explained to them before signing. They stated that they had been misinformed
about the nature of the Petition filed before this Court. Thinking that the respondents would be
the foreign nationals who caused the environmental damage, they said that they were surprised
to hear that the case was instead filed against the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
and the Philippine Navy, whom they considered allies.

In particular, the affidavits read:

[Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioners Monico Abogado and Roberto Asiado, May 29, 2019

1. Kami ay minsang kinausap ni Atty[.] Ann Fatima Chavez patungkol sa pag proteksyon sa lugar
naming sa Pag-Asa laban sa mga dayuhan gaya ng mga intsik at Vietnamese na gumagamit ng
cyanide at dinamita sa kanilang pangingisda;

2. May inilatag syang dokumento sa amin kung paano mapangalagaan ang kalikasan sa aming
lugar at para sa aming ikabubuti bilang mangingisda. Ipinaliwanag pa sa amin kung ano ang
mga nakasaad sa dokumento na ang layunin lamang ay ang pangalagaan ang karagatan na
buong nasasakupan ng Kalayaan, at para rin sa kapakanan naming mga mangingisda;

....

6. Walang nabanggit sa amin na kakasuhan ang ano mang ahensya ditto (sic) dahil kung
nagkaganon, talagang di kami pipirma. Nagulat na lang kami nang malaman namin na tila
ginagamit ang asosasyon namin sa Kalayaan upang kasuhan pala ang mismong mga ahensya
na ito na syang katuwang namin doon;

7. Pagkatapos ng pag-uusap na iyon, ipinabatid naming sa aming mga kasamahan na may

pipirmahan sila at suportahan namin ito dahil ang buong akala naman namin baka may
donasyon o benepisyo para sa aming mga mangingisda at kasamahang magsasaka;

8. Ang buod ng salaysay na ito ay upang ilahad ang katotohanan na iba ang paliwanag sa amin
ni Atty. Chavez sa lumalabas ngayon na reklamo "daw" na mula sa amin. Ito po ay mariin
naming pinapasinungalingan. Di po katanggap-tanggap sa amin na mismong navy at coast
guard na siyang katuwang namin sa Pag-Asa ay kakasuhan namin ngayon. Wala kaming alam
dito at di naming suportado and inihaing petisyon laban sa mga ahensyang ito;

9. Wala kaming kopya na nakuha dahil buong tiwala kami dun sa aming napag-usapan para sa
aming benepisyo at kapakanan. Muli, walang nabanggit na pagsasampa ng reklamo laban sa
katuwang naming mga ahensyang ito. Parang niloko po kami sa lagay na 'to e. Maganda ang
samahan naming ng navy pero tila sinisira kami sa isa't isa.22 (Emphasis supplied)

[Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioner Monico Abogado, June 27, 2019

8. Nagtungo ulit ako ng Navy sa sumunod na araw at doon ko na lang nalaman na pati pala ang
mga ibang ahensiya ng gobyerno, kasali na ang BFAR, ay kinasuhan din pala gamit ang aming
asosasyon bilang petitioner. At masakit sa loob ko na may isinama pang ibang pangalan na hindi
naman myembro ng aming asosasyon tulad nina, NILO LABRADOR, WILFREDO LABANDELO
at ROLANDO LABANDELO na hindi namin ka-myembro, at di namin kilala. Kami ay 37 lang na
miyembro ng aming asosasyon at hindi sila kasali. Para sa akin, isang malaking panlilinlang ito
at panggagamit lamang sa aming asosasyon. Kaming mga maliliit ang naiipit dito. Ngayong araw
ko lang nalaman na ang nasabing tatlong mangingisda pala ay kasama naming napangalanan
bilang petitioner pala at hindi pinapalabas bilang myembro ng aming asosasyon;

9. Pinapatunayan ko po na wala akong kinalaman sa petisyon na sinasabi nila laban sa mga

ahensiya ng gobyerno. Wala akong nababasa na petisyon laban sa Navy, BFAR at ibang
ahensiya. Wala akong pinipirmahan na petisyon laban sa mga ahensiya. Na sa pagkakatanda ko
ay may nabanggit lamang si Atty. Chavez sa akin dati na petisyon laban sa mga dayuhang
nangingisda sa Kalayaan ngunit ang petisyon na sinasabi niya ay hindi ko din nakita at
pinirmahan.

....

14. Wala akong anumang hawak na kopya ng petisyon laban sa mga dayuhang mangingisda at
wala din akong hawak na kopya ng petisyon laban sa mga ahensiya ng gobyerno. Muli, walang
nabanggit sa akin na pagsasampa ng reklamo laban sa katuwang naming mga ahensyang ito.
Parang niloko yung asosasyon namin. Maganda ang samahan namin sa Navy at iba pang
ahensiya pero tila sinisira kami sa isa't isa;

15. Na ngayong araw ko lang nakita ang buong kopya ng sinasabing petisyon. Nagulat ako na
may nakita akong katulad ng aking pirma duon sa baba ng "verification" ng parte ng petisyon.
Muli, wala akong natatandaan na may pinirmahan akong ganun at wala din akong nababasang
ganung papel[.]23 (Emphasis supplied)

[Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioner Roberto Asiado, June 27, 2019

4. May inilatag siyang dokumento sa akin kung paano mapangangalagaan ang kalikasan sa
aming lugar at para sa aming ikabubuti bilang mga mangingisda. Ang sabi ni Atty. Ann Fatima
Chavez akin (sic) ay dokumentong ito ay isang petisyon laban sa mga dayuhan, sa kanilang
illegal na pangingisda at paninira sa ating karagatan. Ipinaliwanag pa sa akin kung ano ang mga
nakasaad sa dokumento na ang layunin lamang ay ang pangalagaan ang karagatan na buong
nasasakupan ng Pag-Asa, Kalayaan, Palawan, at para rin sa kapakanan naming mga
mangingisda;

5. Pinasadahan kong binasa ang dokumento na ito pero dahil maganda naman ang
pagkapaliwanag at mahaba-haba siyang basahin at dahil malaki ang tiwala ko kay Atty. Ann
Fatima Chavez, pumayag ako na pumirma dito kahit na di ko nabasa ang nilalaman ng petisyon;

6. Dito ako pansamantalang nakabase sa Puerto Princesa, Palawan, at dahil ako ang president
ng aming asosasyon, ako ang siyang kinausap patungkol sa sinasabing layunin na
maprotektahan ang kapakanan naming mga mangingisda sa Pag-Asa, Kalayaan, Palawan;

7. Ako mismo ang naghatid ng napirmahang petisyon na galing sa Pag-Asa, Kalayaan, Palawan
sa law office nina Atty. Chavez sa may gasoline station sa Malvar, Puerto Princesa, Palawan.
Matapos noon, di na kami nagkita pa ni Atty. Chavez;

....

11. Wala akong nakuhang kopya ng petisyon dahil buo ang tiwala ko kay Atty. Chavez. Muli,
walang nabanggit na pagsasampa ng reklamo laban sa mga ahensyang ito. Parang niloko po
kami ni Atty. Chavez sa lagay na ito. Maganda ang samahan naming ng BFAR, Philippine Navy
at Philippine Coast guard pero tila sinisira kami laban sa isa't isa[.]24 (Emphasis supplied)

[Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioner Arzel Belidan, June 27, 2019

2. Noong mga February 2018, nasa opisina ako ng asosasyon namin dito sa Puerto Princesa.
Pinatawag ako para utusang magpadala ng isang envelope papuntang Brgy. Pag-asa, Kalayaan,
Palawan;

3. Ang envelope na aking ipinadala ay naka seal ng masking tape, at naka address ito sa
pangalan ni Nonelon Balbontin, myembro ng aming asosasyon na naka base sa Brgy. Pag-asa,
Kalayaan, Palawan noon;
4. Hindi ko nakita ang loob ng envelope. Hindi ko rin po binuksan ang envelope na iyon. Wala
akong alam sa nilalaman na dokumento ng envelope na iyon, at kung ano na ang nangyari duon
pagkatapos kong naipadala ito;

5. Ngayon, nagulat nalang po ako na may petisyon daw kaming inihain laban sa mga ahensya
ng gobyerno, at ang pangalan ko ay nakasali sa mga nag rereklamo. Ako din ay nabigla ng may
pirma ako sa nasabing petition. Sa katunayan wala akong pinipirmahan napetsyon laban sa mga
ahensya ng gobyerno kagaya ng BFAR, Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard at iba pa;

6. Wala naman po akong reklamo sa mga nasabing ahensya ng gobyerno dahil ang mga ito ang
tumutulong at kaagapay at katuwang namin sa Brgy. Pag-Asa, Kalayaan, Palawan;

7. Marami pong naitulong ang BFAR, Philippine Navy at Philippine Coast Guard sa amin;

8. Ang buod ng salaysay na ito ay upang ilahad ang katotohanan na hindi ako pumirma sa
nasabing reklamo laban sa mga ahensyang ito. Di po katanggap-tanggap sa akin na mismong
BFAR, Philippine Navy at Philippine Coast Guard na siyang katuwang namin sa Pag-Asa ay
kakasuhan namin ngayon. Wala kaming alam dito at di namin suportado ang inihaing petisyon
laban sa mga ahensyang ito[.]25 (Emphasis supplied)

[Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioner Angelo Sadang, July 4, 2019

2. Na ako ay nautusang mag pa-ikot ng dalawang pahina ng papel para pirmahan ng mga
kasama ko sa asosasyon;

3. Ang pagkakaalam ko po ang papel na iyon ay para sa mga benepisyo ng ibibigay ng gobyerno
para sa amin. Wala akong kaalaman na ang papel na iyon ay kaso pala laban sa gobyerno; at

4. Noong nakaraang linggo ko lang nalaman sa president naming (sic) na meron palang isang
petisyon laban sa mga ahensiya ng gobyerno na kami daw ang nagsampa. Pinapatunayan ko po
na wala akong kinalaman sa petisyon at wala akong pinipirmahan na petisyon laban sa mga
ahensiya[.]26 (Emphasis supplied)

[Handwritten letter of petitioner Randy Dacumos, July 4, 2019

Ako[,] RANDY DACUMOS[,] resid[e]nte ng Bgy. Pag-Asa, Mun. of Kalayaan Member ng

Samahan ng Fisher Fo[l]ks[.] Ako po ay nagulat ng (sic) malaman kong nadawit [ang aming]
pangalan sa isinampa[ng] kaso[.] Gusto ko pong malaman nin[y]o na wala akong pin[i]rmahang
papel [na] kinakas[u]han ang ibang [ahensya] ng go[by]erno.27

[Handwritten letter of petitioner Larry Hugo, July 4, 2019

Ako po si Larry Hugo nagmula po ako sa bayan ng Kalayaan. Ako yong Vice Prest. (sic) ng
Samahan ng mga [illegible] na mangingisda ng Kalayaan[.] Hindi po totoo na kami po ay
pumirma doon sa sinasabing [illegible] kas[u]han ang B[F]AR, NAVY[.] Inos[e]nt[e] po kami sa
naturang problema[.] Nagamit lamang po ang aming Samahan para sa kanilang mga masamang
plano kung ano man yon!28

[Handwritten letter of petitioner Romulo Caña, Jr., July 4, 2019

Ako po si Romulo C. Caña, Jr. taga Barangay Pag-asa Kalayaan Palawan[.] Wala po akong
alam sa pirmahan nagulat nalang po ako na nadamay ang pangalan ko sa kaso. Ang alam
kolang (sic) ay may ipamimigay sila sa amin [b]ilang tulong po sa amin. Wala talaga po akong
alam diyan.29
[Handwritten letter of petitioner Danilo Belono, July 4, 2019

Ako si Danilo Belono.

May asawa at anak[.] Naninirahan sa Pag-Asa, Kalayaan, Palawan[.] Isa po ak[o]ng member sa
Fish[er] Fo[lk.] Hindi po alam na ganon ang ma[n]gyayari[.] Hindi po kami nag pirma laban sa
ibang samahan na t[u]m[u]t[u]long sa amin (sic) tulad po na BFAR at mga su[n]dalo[.]30

[Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioners Regidor Asiado and Richard Galvan, July 5,
2019 and Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioners Dennis Bania, Felix Ulzon, Jing
Malinao, Ronald Grandia, Expedito Magdayao, Robert Valdez, Raffy M. Asiado, Primo M.
Asiado, Adrian P. Abayan, and Romeo M. Malaguit, July 5, 2019

2. Na nalaman na lang namin mula sa mga kasamahan namin sa asosasyon na meron palang
isang petisyon laban sa mga ahensiya ng gobyerno na kami daw ang nagsampa. Pinapatunayan
po naming (sic) na wala kaming kinalaman sa petisyon;

3. Na hindi po naming (sic) kayang kasuhan ang mga ahensiya ng gobyerno dahil sila ang
tumutulong sa aming mga mangingisda;

4. Walang nabang[g]it sa amin na kakasuhan ang ano mang ahensya ng gobyerno ng ating
bansa dahil kung nag kaganoon, talagang di kami pipirma. Nagulat na lang kami nang malaman
namin na tila ginagamit ang asosasyon namin sa Kalayaan upang kasuhan pala ang mismong
mga ahensya na ito na syang katuwang namin sa Kalayaan[.]31 (Emphasis supplied)

[Sinumpaang Salayasay of petitioners Wilfredo M. Labandelo and Nilo P. Labrador, July 5, 2019

5. Noong Abril 2019, kami (Wilfredo Labandelo, Nilo Labrador) ay pinapatawag ng IBP sa
kanilang tanggapan sa Maynila kung saan may pinakita sa aming Petition. Kung anuman ang
nilalaman ng Petition na ito ay hindi namin nalaman noong pagkakataong iyon sapagkat di kami
binigyan ng pagkakataon para mabasa ang nilalalman nito.

6. Sinubukan rin naming manghingi ng kopya ng nasabing Petition sa IBP at pinangakuan na

bibigyan nito subalit hanggang ngayon wala pa rin nakakarating sa amin. Sa dahilang ito,
pinapatunayan namin na hanggang sa araw na ito ay hindi pa rin namin alam ang buong
nilalaman ng Petition na ito.

7. Nalaman nalang namin sa news na aming napanood sa telebisyon at sa Rappler na ang

Petition na aming pinirmahan pala ay tungkol sa mga nangyayaring problema sa West Philippine
Sea.

8. Pinapatunayan namin na wala kaming kinalaman sa naturang Petition na laban sa anumang

ahensiya ng gobyerno sapagkat ito ay magkaiba sa kasalukuyang problema na inilapit namin sa
IBP gaya ng pagpapasara ng paaralan, at ang pagpapaalis sa mga naninirahan sa Sitio
Kinabukasan.

9. Lumapit po kami sa IBP na walang intensyong magreklamo o mag-file ng Petition laban sa

mga ahensiya ng gobyerno gaya ng BFAR, DENR, DA, Philippine Coast Guard, at iba pa. Wala
rin po nabanggit sa amin sa kahit anumang pagkakataon na magsasampa kami kasama ng IBP
ng anumang kaso sa mga nasabing ahensiya.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners' counsels objected to Solicitor General Calida's Manifestation and Motion, arguing
that it was unethical for respondent Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to have
conferred with petitioners without their counsels' knowledge.33
In view of this development, the parties were required to move in the premises and submit their
respective compliances by 4:30 p.m. on July 12, 2019.34

On July 12, 2019, petitioners' counsels filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Confer with Clients
and Obtain Special Authority.35 Citing Rule 138, Section 2336 of the Rules of Court, they
requested a 10-day extension, or until July 22, 2019, to confer with their clients before
proceeding with any action that would result in the termination of the case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, filed a Compliance (Re: Order to Move in
the Premises).37 It opposed the Motion for Extension of Time, saying that the pleading "will not
cure the infirmity that the Petition was initiated by counsel without the full knowledge and
understanding of the fisherfolk-petitioners."38 As such, it requested that the case be immediately
dismissed.39

On July 16, 2019, this Court issued a Resolution40 granting the Motion for Extension of Time
until 12:00 noon of July 19, 2019 and noting the Compliance. It also reminded counsels for all
parties to observe the rule on subjudice and refrain from making statements about the case to
the media or on social media.41

At 4:18 p.m. on July 19, 2019, petitioners' counsels filed an Omnibus Motion with
Manifestation.42 They informed this Court that they met with six (6) of the fisherfolk-petitioners,
who signified that they no longer wished to pursue the case. They also signed a handwritten
letter, which read:

Mga Ginoo,

Una po sa lahat ay nais naming magpasalamat sa inyong panahong ginugol sa pakikipagpulong

sa amin.

Matapos po ang ating pag-uusap kahapon, isinangguni po namin ang usapin sa mga kapwa
naming kasapi at aming napagkaisahang iatras nyo na lamang ang kaso, nang sa gayon ay
maging tahimik na ang aming mga buhay.

Bilang mga kinatawan ng samahan ng Fisherfolks ng Kalayaan at upang patunayan ang

kagustuhan ng nakararami, aming inilagda ang aming mga pangalan ngayong araw na ito sa
Lungsod ng Pto. Princesa.43

Petitioners' counsels stated that the lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Palawan
Chapter were able to meet with these six (6) fisherfolk-petitioners in Puerto Princesa City as they
could not leave yet for Pag-asa Island due to engine trouble in their vessel. As for the 20 other
fisherfolk-petitioners who had signed the Petition, the lawyers were unable to meet them as they
were "on Pag-asa Island and the undersigned counsels cannot travel to meet them there; or ...
communicate with them as Philippine telephone companies have no or very weak network
coverage there."44

Petitioners' counsels also stated that despite "heavy rain, strong wind, and large waves[,]"45 the
lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Zambales Chapter exerted efforts to meet with
the three (3) fisherfolk-petitioners in Sitio Kinabuksan, Zambales. However, they were only able
to meet with petitioner Wilfredo Labandelo (Wilfredo), who informed them that his brother,
petitioner Rolando Labandelo (Rolando), had already moved to Palawan on June 22, 2019 and
that petitioner Nilo Labrador (Labrador) has since relocated to another place on July 12, 2019 but
did not leave any contact details.46 Petitioner Wilfredo also executed a handwritten letter stating:

Mga Ginoo:
Pakiurong nyo ang kaso namin Abogado vs DENR[.]47

Petitioners' counsels also informed this Court that on July 19, 2019, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors adopted resolutions requesting the Petition's
withdrawal.48 Moreover, they again objected to the Office of the Solicitor General's Manifestation
and Motion dated July 9, 2019, which they said "has caused this case to become a media
spectacle instead of being a case that presents important issues concerning the environment in
the West Philippine Sea."49 Thus, they prayed that this Court:

1. GRANT the following Petitioners' Motion to Withdraw the Petition for the following Petitioners:

1. MONICO ABOGADO

2. ROBERTO ASIADO

3. NONELON BALBONTIN

4. RANDY DACUMOS

5. ANGELO SADANG

6. RENY MAGBANUA

7. WILFREDO LABANDELO

8. THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. GRANT the undersigned counsels' Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the following
Petitioners:

1. RICARDO NATURAL

2. LARRY HUGO

3. ARZEL BELIDAN

4. RONALD GRANDIA

5. RONEL BADILLA

6. EXPEDITO MAGDAYAO

7. JONEL HUGO

8. ROBERT VALDEZ

9. SANNY BELIDAN

10. ROWL P. EJONA (sic)

11. FELIX ULZON

12. RAFFY M. ASIADO

 13. PRIMO M. ASIADO

14. ADRIAN P. ABAYAN

15. DANILO BELONO

16. ROMEO MALAGUIT

17. DENNIS BANIA

18. JING MALINAO

19. NILO LABRADOR

20. ROLANDO LABANDELO.

3. GRANT the Petitioners' Motion to Expunge from the Records Respondents' Manifestation
[and] Motion filed on 9 July 2019.

4. NOTE the above manifestations.50

In a July 30, 2019 Resolution,51 this Court deferred action on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
and required petitioners' counsels to:

(a) exert more efforts to reach their clients through means of communication they have
established when they engaged them as their clients; (b) provide adequate proof that the 20
other clients have actual knowledge of the contents of their petition; and (c) provide legal
justification that the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel may be granted while leaving most of the
petitioners without representation.52

Petitioners' counsels were given a non-extendible period of seven (7) days53 to comply with the
Resolution.

On August 14, 2019, petitioners' counsels filed a Motion to Admit Compliance with Motion.54 In
it, they explained that while they were able to send through registered mail a copy of the
Compliance to the Office of the Solicitor General on August 13, 2019, "the heavier-than-usual
traffic"55 caused their messenger to arrive a few minutes after 5:00 p.m. and fail to file, the
pleading before this Court. Hence, they prayed that the Compliance with Motion still be admitted
by this Court.

In their attached Compliance with Motion,56 petitioners' counsels explained that on August 4,
2019, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Zambales Chapter met with fisherfolk-
petitioners Rolando and Labrador, who provided them with letters stating:

Mga ginoo!

Pakiurong nyo ang kaso naming Abogado vs. DENR

Rolano M. Labandelo
Aug. 4/ 2019 (sic)

....

Mga ginoo:
Pakiurong nyo ang kaso namin Abogado vs. DENR

Nilo Labrador
Oua. 4/2019 (sic)57

Petitioners' counsels likewise stated that Atty. Josefina Ela Bueno, the former president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Zambales Chapter, executed an affidavit narrating how she and
the other officers of the Chapter met with and explained the Petition's contents to the fisherfolk-
petitioners, recounting how the latter voluntarily signed its Verification/Certification.58 "However,
due to logistical difficulties brought about by the inclement weather and the distance between
Zambales and Manila,"59 petitioners' counsels said that the affidavit could not be attached to the
pleading. Hence, they prayed for additional time to file this affidavit.60

To prove the difficulties in contacting their clients, petitioners' counsels attached a

Certification61 from the Kalayaan Municipal Administrator, who stated that there had been no
cellphone or internet service in Pag-asa Island from the third quarter of 2016 until July 27,
2019.62

Petitioners' counsels further manifested that on August 2, 2019, in Puerto Princesa City
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Palawan Chapter met with fisherfolk-petitioner
Ricardo Natural (Natural), who expressed his desire to withdraw the case.63

Petitioners' counsels likewise manifested that at around 10:00 a.m. on the same day, they were
able to videoconference with 12 of the fisherfolk-petitioners, namely, Arzel Belidan, Ronald
Grandia, Expedito Magdayao, Jonel Hugo, Robert Valdez, Felix Ulson, Raffy Asiado, Adrian
Abayan, Danilo Belono, and Jing Malinao. They did the same with two (2) other fisherfolk-
petitioners, Romeo Malaguit and Dennis Bania, at 2:00 p.m. that day. While fisherfolk-petitioner
Larry Hugo (Larry) was unable to join the video conference, he, together with the 14 fisherfolk-
petitioners, executed a letter stating their desire to join the other fisherfolk-petitioners in
withdrawing the Petition.64

Petitioners' counsels alleged that Sanny Belidan (Sanny) and Rowel Ejona (Ejona), the
remaining fisherfolk-petitioners who have yet to give their conformity to the Petition's withdrawal,
could not be contacted despite several attempts through their mobile phones.65 Leonila De
Jesus, the officer-in-charge for Pag-asa Island, also confirmed that they were not in Pag-asa
Island.66 Petitioners' counsels maintained, however, that two (2) officers of the Kalayaan
Palawan Farmers and Fisherfolk Association would execute an affidavit narrating the
circumstances of their participation and their understanding of the Petition's contents. As such,
they requested additional time to submit the affidavit.67

In sum, petitioners' counsels prayed that this Court:

1. NOTE this Compliance;

2. GRANT the undersigned counsels' motion for additional time, or until 16 August 2019
(Friday) to file the affidavit of Atty. Josefina Ela Bueno and the letter from the officers of
the Kalayaan Palawan Farmers and Fisherfolk Association; and

3. GRANT the Motion to Withdraw the Petition.68

This Court resolves to grant the Motion to Withdraw the Petition. The Petition is dismissed,
without passing upon any of the substantive issues raised. However, we take this occasion to
discuss the following points.
The nature of a writ of kalikasan is stated in Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases:69

SECTION 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Paje v. Casiño70 discusses the scope of the writ and the reliefs that may be granted under it:

The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary
remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that
transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended "to provide a stronger defense for
environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement,
implementation and legislation have fallen short" and seeks "to address the potentially
exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats."

Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary
remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but
only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to
call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to
grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.

If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court shall render judgment
granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the
petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15 of Rule 7, to wit:

Section 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or
neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting
in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person
or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
 (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that
may be granted under the writ are broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.71

Thus, a writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy that "covers environmental damages the
magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial boundaries."72 The damage must be
caused by an unlawful act or omission of a public official, public employee, or private individual or
entity. It must affect the inhabitants of at least two (2) cities or provinces.73

In civil, criminal, and administrative cases, parties are clear as to the quantum of evidence
necessary to prove their case. Civil cases require a preponderance of evidence,74 or "evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to
it[.]"75 Administrative cases require substantial evidence,76 or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise."77 Criminal cases require proof beyond
reasonable doubt,78 or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind."79 In petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, however, the quantum of evidence is
not specifically stated.

Other special civil actions such as certiorari,80 prohibition,81 and mandamus82 must be filed by
a party that is directly injured or will be injured by the act and omission complained of. However,
a petition for the writ of kalikasan may be filed on behalf of those whose right is violated. The
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases only requires that the public interest group is duly
accredited.83 Filing through representation is also allowed for other extraordinary writs such
as habeas corpus,84 amparo85 and habeas data.86

This Court explained that "the Rules [of Procedure for Environmental Cases] do[es] not define
the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in
terms of the territorial scope of such damage[.]"87 Every petition, therefore, must be examined
on a case-to-case basis. It is imperative, however, that even before a petition for its issuance can
be filed, the petition must be verified and must contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and personal
circumstances are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act
or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

(d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses,
documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence;

(e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and no such other action or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of its present status; (3) if petitioner should
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, petitioner shall
report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and
 (f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.88

Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others' behalf,
carry the burden of substantiating the writ's elements. Before private parties or public interest
groups may proceed with the case, they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the
determination of the writ's issuance.

In LNL Archipelago Minerals v. Agham Party List,89 this Court denied the petition for the
issuance of the writ filed by a party list group advocating for the protection of the environment.
This was due to the group's failure to substantiate its allegations:

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In the present case, the
allegation by Agham that two laws — the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the
Philippine Mining Act — were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham.
Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental damage were mere general
allegations.

Second, Agham's allegation that there was a "mountain" [levelled] in LAMI's port site was earlier
established as false as the "mountain" was non-existent as proven by the testimonies of the
witnesses and reports made by environmental experts and persons who have been educated
and trained in their respective fields.90

This was, unfortunately, not the only time that environmental advocates have come to this Court
unprepared. In Paje,91 this Court denied a petition filed against the construction of a coal-fired
power plant in Subic Bay Industrial Park for the public interest group's failure to provide the
necessary evidence:

The records of this case painfully chronicle the embarrassingly inadequate evidence marshalled
by those that initially filed the Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan. Even with the most conscientious
perusal of the records and with the most sympathetic view for the interests of the community and
the environment, the obvious conclusion that there was not much thought or preparation in
substantiating the allegations made in the Petition cannot be hidden. Legal advocacy for the
environment deserves much more.92

The imminence or emergency of an ecological disaster should not be an excuse for litigants to do
away with their responsibility of substantiating their petitions before the courts. As with any
special civil action for extraordinary writs, parties seeking the writ of kalikasan must be ready with
the evidence required to prove their allegations by the time the petition is filed. Hasty slipshod
petitions, filed in the guise of environmental advocacy, only serve to undermine that advocacy:

Environmental advocacy is primarily motivated by care and compassion for communities and the
environment. It can rightly be a passionately held mission. It is founded on faith that the world as
it is now can be different. It implies the belief that the longer view of protecting our ecology
should never be sacrificed for short-term convenience.

However, environmental advocacy is not only about passion. It is also about responsibility. There
are communities with almost no resources and are at a disadvantage against large projects that
might impact on their livelihoods. Those that take the cudgels lead them as they assert their
ecological rights must show that they have both the professionalism and the capability to carry
their cause forward. When they file a case to protect the interests of those who they represent,
they should be able to make both allegation and proof. The dangers from an improperly
managed environmental case are as real to the communities sought to be represented as the
dangers from a project by proponents who do not consider their interests.93

Environmental advocacy requires more than passion for saving the environment. Thus:
Certainly, there is a need for leaders, organizations, and dedicated movements that amplify the
concerns of communities, groups, and identities which tend to be put in the margins of forums
dominated by larger and more politically connected commercial interests. This includes forums
that create and implement regulatory frameworks. Liberal democratic deliberations at times fail to
represent the silenced majority as it succumbs to the powerful minority.

While acknowledging this reality, we also need to be careful that the chambers of this court do
not substitute for the needed political debate on public issues or the analytical rigor required by
truths in science. We are Justices primarily. While politics and science envelope some of our
important decisions, we should not lose the humility that the Constitution itself requires of us. We
are an important part of the constitutional order: always only a part, never one that should
dominate. Our decisions have the veneer of finality. It should never, however, be disguised
superiority in any form or manner.

Political debates indeed also mature when we pronounce the nature of fundamental rights in
concrete cases. Before cases ripen — or, as in this case, when it has become moot — restraint
will be the better approach. We participate in the shaping of the content of these fundamental
rights only with the guidance of an actual case. This, among others, distinguishes the judicial
function from the purely political engagement.

....

If any, the resolution of this case implies rigor in environmental advocacy. Vigilance and passion
are the hallmarks of the public interest movement. There is no reason that the members of this
movement should not evolve the proper skills and attitudes to properly work the legal system and
understand the role of the judicial process. Environmental advocacy also requires an
understanding of science and the locating of the proper place of various norms such as the
precautionary principle. After all, representation of marginalized community voices deserves
excellent representation and responsible leadership. Filing a judicial remedy almost two years
too late and without the required scientific rigor patently required by the allegations and the
arguments misses these standards.94

A writ of kalikasan cannot and should not substitute other remedies that may be available to the
parties, whether legal, administrative, or political. Mere concern for the environment is not an
excuse to invoke this Court's jurisdiction in cases where other remedies are available:

The function of the extraordinary and equitable remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan should not supplant
other available remedies and the nature of the forums that they provide. The Writ of Kalikasan is
a highly prerogative writ that issues only when there is a showing of actual or imminent threat
and when there is such inaction on the part of the relevant administrative bodies that will make
an environmental catastrophe inevitable. It is not a remedy that is availing when there is no
actual threat or when imminence of danger is not demonstrable. The Writ of Kalikasan thus is not
an excuse to invoke judicial remedies when there still remain administrative forums to properly
address the common concern to protect and advance ecological rights. After all, we cannot
presume that only the Supreme Court can conscientiously fulfill the ecological duties required of
the entire state.95

Moreover, there are other legal remedies available:

The writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be wielded like a political tool. It is
both an extraordinary and equitable remedy which assists to prevent environmental
catastrophes. It does not replace other legal remedies similarly motivated by concern for the
environment and the community's ecological welfare. Certainly, when the petition itself alleges
that remedial and preventive remedies have occurred, the functions of the writ cease to exist. In
case of disagreement, parties need to exhaust the political and administrative arena. Only when
a concrete cause of action arises out of facts that can be proven with substantial evidence may
the proper legal action be entertained.96

A writ of continuing mandamus, on the other hand, "is a special civil action that may be availed of
'to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.'"97 Rule 8, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. — When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

The rationale for the grant of the writ was explained in Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of
Aklan:98

Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of regulation by
Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate government agencies.

Thus, a government agency's inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of
environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change the
scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives,
which may require a judicial component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an
agency's action or inaction will need to be analyzed.

This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows
for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a
legal duty.99

While Rule 2100 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides a civil procedure
for the enforcement or violation of environmental laws, Rule 8 provides a distinct remedy and
procedure for allegations of unlawful neglect in the enforcement of environmental laws or the
unlawful exclusion in the use or enjoyment of an environmental right. As with the procedure in
special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, this procedure also requires that
the petition should be sufficient in form and substance before a court can take further action.
Failure to comply may be basis for the petition's outright dismissal.101

Sufficiency in the substance of a petition for a writ of continuing mandamus requires:

... that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable
neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of
the writ, viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the
act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically
enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4)
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.102 (Citation omitted)

The writ is essentially a continuing order of the court, as it:

... "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision" and, in order to do this, "the
court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government
agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision."103

However, requiring the periodic submission of compliance reports does not mean that the court
acquires supervisory powers over administrative agencies. This interpretation would violate the
principle of the separation of powers since courts do not have the power to enforce laws, create
laws, or revise legislative actions.104 The writ should not be used to supplant executive or
legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies required are clearly political
or administrative in nature.

For this reason, every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be clear
on the guidelines sought for its implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot
merely request the writ's issuance without specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be
implemented and the period when the submission of compliance reports may cease.

II

This Court likewise takes this occasion to pass upon the prior Motion for Withdrawal as Counsels
for 20 of the fisherfolk-petitioners.

There are 41 petitioners here, consisting of 37 fishers from Palawan, three (3) fishers from
Zambales, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Of the 37 fishers from Palawan, 13 did not verify the Petition.105 Nineteen (19) of the 40
fisherfolk-petitioners from both Palawan and Zambales submitted affidavits106 to respondent
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources disowning the Petition. In summary:

Name of Whether Whether Whether Whether

petitioner petitioner signed petitioner petitioner petitioners'
the Petition submitted an requested to counsels asked
affidavit to the withdraw the to withdraw as
BFAR disowning Petition as of counsels as of
the Petition July 19, 2019 July 19, 2019

1 Monico A. Yes Yes Yes

Abogado

2 Roberto M. Yes Yes Yes

Asiado

3 Larry Hugo Yes Yes Yes

4 Angelo Sadang Yes Yes Yes

5 Nonelon Yes Yes

Balbontin

6 Salito Lagrosa No

7 Arzel Belidan Yes Yes Yes

8 Ronald Grandia Yes Yes Yes

9 Troy Lagrosa No

10 Ronel Badilla Yes Yes

11 Archie Graciano No

12 Regidor Asiado No Yes

13 Ely Lopez No

14 Expedito Yes Yes Yes

Magdayao

15 Reny Magbanua Yes Yes

16 Romulo Cana, Jr. No Yes

17 Rogelio Hingpit No

18 Jonel Hugo Yes Yes

19 Robert Valdez Yes Yes Yes

20 Rizen Galvan No Yes

21 Ricardo Natural Yes Yes

22 Sanny Belidan Yes Yes

23 Rowel P. Ejona Yes Yes

24 Felix Ulzon Yes Yes Yes

25 Raffy M. Asiado Yes Yes Yes

26 Primo M. Asiado Yes Yes Yes

27 Adrian P. Abayan Yes Yes Yes

28 Randy Dacumos Yes Yes Yes

29 Danilo Belono Yes Yes Yes

30 Romeo Malaguit Yes Yes Yes

31 Dennis Bania Yes Yes Yes

32 Jason Villamor No

33 Gary Castillos No

34 Alberto Sonio No

35 Dolie Dusong No

36 BJ Piring No

37 Jing Malinao Yes Yes Yes

38 Nilo Labrador Yes Yes Yes

39 Wilfredo Yes Yes Yes

Labandelo

40 Rolando Yes Yes

Labandelo

41 Integrated Bar of Yes Yes

 the Philippines

On July 19, 2019, petitioners' counsels requested to withdraw as counsels for 18 of the
fisherfolk-petitioners, namely, Natural, Larry, Sanny, Ejona, Arzel Belidan, Ronald Grandia,
Ronel Badilla, Expedito Magdayao, Jonel Hugo, Robert Valdez, Felix Ulzon, Raffy M. Asiado,
Primo M. Asiado, Adrian P. Abayan, Danilo Belono, Romeo Malaguit, Dennis Bania, and Jing
Malinao, on the ground that they were "on Pag-asa Island and the undersigned counsels cannot
travel to meet them there; or ... communicate with them as Philippine telephone companies have
no or very weak network coverage there."107 As for two (2) of the fisherfolk-petitioners in
Zambales, they reasoned that Labrador and Rolando have since moved away and did not leave
any contact details.108

Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on withdrawal of counsels:

RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

....

SECTION 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire.
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket
of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.

A counsel may only be allowed to withdraw from the action either with the written consent of the
client or "from a good cause." In Orcino v. Gaspar:109

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.110

Canon 22, Rule 22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the "good causes"
under which a counsel may withdraw without the written conformity of the client:

CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE
AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection

with the matter he is handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client;
 d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases.

Failure to contact the client despite diligent efforts is not considered under this Rule as a "good
cause" upon which a lawyer may withdraw from the case without first seeking the client's written
conformity. Had this Court granted the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 20 fisherfolk-petitioners
would be left without counsel to inquire if they were still pursuing the case.

Even if we were to apply liberality and consider the fisherfolk-petitioners' affidavits disowning the
Petition as their written conformity to counsels' withdrawal, the other fisherfolk-petitioners who
verified the Petition but submitted no affidavit would have been left without any representation:

1. Ronel Badilla

2. Jonel Hugo

3. Ricardo Natural

4. Sanny Belidan

5. Rowel P. Ejona

6. Rolando Labandelo

To recall, petitioners' counsels filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Confer with Clients and
Obtain Special Authority,111 citing as basis Rule 138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

SECTION 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full
amount in cash.

Counsels' filing of their Motion to Withdraw as Counsel without prior notice to the clients is a
violation of the very rule they sought to uphold. The Petition's withdrawal compromises their
clients' litigation, since the case will be dismissed without their consent and without prior notice.
In Natividad v. Natividad:112

The cause of action, the claim or demand sued upon, and the subject matter of the litigation are
all within the exclusive control of the client; and the attorney may not impair, compromise, settle,
surrender, or destroy them without his client's consent.113

Monteverde v. Court of Industrial Relations114 likewise held:

The main issue is whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations correctly dismissed the case
for unfair labor practice after it had rendered a decision dated March 21, 1968 on the motion of
Atty. Juan G. Sison, Jr., counsel of the petitioners, without inquiring into the authority of the
lawyer to ask for the dismissal of the case.

It was stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Amando C. Bugayong that nowhere in the
minutes of the hearing of July 23, 1969 does it appear that the complainants have admitted in
open court that they had authorized their counsel, Atty. Juan G. Sison, Jr., to enter into a
settlement with the FIBISCO. All that is recorded in the minutes is the request for the sending of
a notice of hearing to Atty. Juan G. Sison, Jr. both at his known address at Rm. 313 de Leon
Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila and at 745 Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila.

It is elementary that lawyers "cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash."

It is clear that the Court of Industrial Relations erred in dismissing the case on the motion of Atty.
Juan G. Sison, Jr. alone without inquiring into his authority. The Court of Industrial Relations did
not even bother to find out what kind of settlement was entered into between Atty. Juan G. Sison,
Jr. and the FIBISCO.115

Thus, in Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Company, Inc.:116

"The broad implied or apparent powers of an attorney with respect to the conduct or control of
litigation are, however, limited to matters which relate only to the procedure or remedy. The
employment of itself confers upon the attorney no implied or apparent power or authority over the
subject matter of the cause of action or defense; and, unless the attorney has expressly been
granted authority with respect thereto, the power to deal with or surrender these matters is
regarded as remaining exclusively in the client."

"The line of demarcation between the respective rights and powers of an attorney and his client
is clearly defined. The cause of action, the claim or demand sued upon, and the subject matter of
the litigation are all within the exclusive control of a client; and an attorney may not impair,
compromise, settle, surrender, or destroy them without his client's consent. But all the
proceedings in court to enforce the remedy to bring the claim, demand, cause of action, or
subject matter of the suit to hearing, trial, determination, judgment, and execution, are within the
exclusive control of the attorney."117

To prevent compromising the interests of the remaining fisherfolk-petitioners, this Court, instead
of granting the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, required counsels to exert more efforts in
contacting their clients. In Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education:118

The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of the client is immediately
effective once filed in court, however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal
with the written conformity of the client would leave the latter with no legal representation in the
case, it is an accepted practice for courts to order the deferment of the effectivity of such
withdrawal until such time that it becomes certain that service of court processes and other
papers to the party-client would not thereby be compromised — either by the due substitution of
the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express assurance of the party-client that he now
undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes and other papers. Adoption by courts of
such a practice in that particular context, while neither mandatory nor sanctioned by a specific
provision of the Rules of Court, is nevertheless justified as part of their inherent power to see to it
that the potency of judicial processes and judgment are preserved.119

Petitioners' counsels had the responsibility, right at the start of their engagement, to establish the
modality of communication with their clients. Mere difficulty in contacting the client is not a
sufficient reason for his or her counsel to abandon his or her cause, more so in this case where
counsels are rendering legal aid pro bono. Counsels should exert the same amount of
professionalism, regardless of their client's capacity to pay for their services.
Nonetheless, it would be unjust for this Court to compel the two (2) remaining fisherfolk-
petitioners, Sanny and Ejona, to continue with this case without legal counsel. Petitioners'
ℒαwρhi ৷

counsels have likewise manifested that they exerted earnest attempts to contact them on their
cellular phones but were unable to as the two were no longer in Pag-asa Island. This Court also
takes note of the six (6) fisherfolk-petitioners' handwritten letter dated July 15, 2019, in which
they manifested their representation of the other members of the fisherfolk association:

Bilang mga kinatawan ng samahan ng Fisherfolks ng Kalayaan at upang patunayan ang

kagustuhan ng nakararami, aming inilagda ang aming mga pangalan ngayong araw na ito sa
Lungsod ng Pto. Princesa.120 (Emphasis supplied)

For this reason, this Court considers the Petition withdrawn as to all fisherfolk-petitioners. The
case is considered dismissed, without passing upon any of the substantive issues raised.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw the Petition is GRANTED. The case is

considered DISMISSED, without passing upon any of the substantive issues raised.

In view of the unusual procedural developments of this case, counsels of petitioners

are STERNLY WARNED to be mindful of their duties and obligations under the Code of
Professional Responsibility and that the same or similar infractions in the future shall be dealt
with more severely by this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando,
Carandang, Lazaro Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Carpio,* J., no part.

Peralta, J., See seperate opinion.

Jardeleza, J., See Separate opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 3, 2019 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on November 28, 2019 at 3:45 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Footnotes

* No part per Resolution dated July 2, 2019.

1 Rollo, pp. 836-846

2 Id. at 875-891.

3 Id. at 3-48.

4 Only 24 of 37 association members verified the Petition (Rollo, pp. 38-40). Rowel was
sometimes spelled Rowl in the rollo.

5 In the Matter of the South Sea China Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2013-19, July 12,
2016, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-
Award.pdf (last accessed on September 2, 2019).

6 Rollo, p. 32.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 227-229.

9 Id. at 235-283.

10 Id. at 243-244.

11 Id. at 251-259.

12 Id. at 259-260.

13 Id. at 588-597.

14 Oral arguments had initially been scheduled on June 25, 2019 but was later reset to
July 2, 2019 (rollo, p. 639).

15 Rollo, pp. 621-626.

16 Id. at 624.

17 Id. at 770-A-770-E.

18 Id. at 770-B-770-C.

19 Id. at 771-777. This document was physically distributed by the Office of the Solicitor
General to the Court En Banc and to petitioners' counsels during oral arguments.

20 Id. at 808-A.

21 Id. at 778-808.

22 Id. at 803-804.

23 Id. at 792-793.

24 Id. at 796-797.
25 Id. at 800-801.

26 Id. at 786.

27 Id. at 805.

28 Id. at 806.

29 Id. at 807.

30 Id. at 808.

31 Id. at 779 and 781. The contents of both affidavits were the same.

32 Id. at 784-785.

33 Id. at 808-A-808-B.

34 Id. at 808-C.

35 Id. at 809-813.

36 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 23 provides:

SECTION 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim but the full amount in cash.

37 Rollo, pp. 814-829.

38 Id. at 816.

39 Id. at 817.

40 Id. at 830-832.

41 Id. at 831.

42 Id. at 836-846.

43 Id. at 838.

44 Id. at 839. Counsels explained that lawyers of the Palawan Chapter were able to meet
with petitioner Ricardo Natural on July 14, 2019, but he did not meet them on July 15,
2019 for the signing of the withdrawal letter.

45 Id. at 840.

46 Id. at 840-841.

47 Id. at 840.
48 Id. at 841 and 863.

49 Id. at 842.

50 Id. at 843-844.

51 Id. at 865-867.

52 Id. at 865-866.

53 Considering that this Court declared a work suspension on August 2, 2019 and early
dismissal of its employees on August 9, 2019, the last equitable day for filing would be
August 13, 2019.

54 Rollo, pp. 872-874.

55 Id. at 873.

56 Id. at 875-883.

57 Id. at 877.

58 Id.

59 Id. at 878.

60 Id. at 878 and 882.

61 Id. at 889, Compliance with Motion, Annex "F."

62 Id. at 879.

63 Id. at 879.

64 Id. at 879-880.

65 Id. at 881.

66 Id. at 879.

67 Id. at 881-882.

68 Id. at 882.

69 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, April 13, 2010.

70 752 Phil. 498 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

71 Id. at 538-540 citing RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES and

The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases issued
by the Supreme Court, pp. 78- 79 and 133.
72 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, 743 Phil. 8, 94 (2014) [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., En Banc] citing The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, p. 133.

73 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES, Rule 7, sec. 1.

74 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 1, which provides:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the

party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so
far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number.

75 Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138, 173 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division] citing 7 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
Evidence (Part II, Rules 131-134), 2-4, 542-543 (1973).

76 See Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third
Division] citing Lorena v. Encomienda, 362 Phil. 248 (1999) [J. Panganiban, Third
Division] and Cortes v. Agcaoili, 355 Phil. (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

77 Id. at 167 citing Enrique v. Court of Appeals, 299 Phil. 194 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En
Banc].

78 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 2, which provides:

SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused

is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.

79 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 2.

80 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.

81 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 2.

82 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec, 3.

83 See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES, Rule 7, sec. 1.

84 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 3.

85 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (2007), sec. 2.

86 A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC (2008), sec. 2.

87 Paje v. Casiño, 752 Phil. 498, 539 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

88 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES, Rule 7, sec. 2.

89 784 Phil. 456 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

90 Id. at 480.

91 752 Phil. 498 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

92 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casiño, 752 Phil. 498, 715
(2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

93 Id.

94 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in International Service for the

Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines),
774 Phil. 508, 721-722 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, En Banc].

95 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casiño, 752 Phil. 498, 714
(2015) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

96 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, 743 Phil. 8, 71 (2014) [Per J.

Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

97 Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, 689 Phil. 218, 271 (2012) [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] citing The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases p 45.

98 689 Phil. 218 (2012) [Per. J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

99 Id. at 271-272 citing The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, p. 76.

100 See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES, Rule 2, secs. 4

and 5. They provide:

SECTION 4. Who may file. — Any real party in interest, including the government
and juridical entities authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the
enforcement or violation of any environmental law.

SECTION 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,

including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest
to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff
may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No, 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions.

101 See Dolot v. Paje, 716 Phil. 458 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]. See also RULES OF
COURT, Rule 65 and Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 8.
102 Id. at 472.

103 Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, 689 Phil. 218, 272 (2012) [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] citing The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, p. 45.

104 See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First
Philippine Industrial Corporation, 760 Phil. 304 (2015) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

105 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

106 Id. at 778-808.

107 Id. at 839.

108 Id. at 840-841.

109 344 Phil. 792 (1997) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

110 Id. at 797-798 citing Rincoanda Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje, 263 Phil.
654 (1990) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division]; REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 138,
sec. 26(2); Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 102 1988; Pineda, Legal and Judicial
ethics, p. 266 1994; 7 C.J.S. 940; Dais v. Garduño, 49 Phil. 165, 169 (1925) [Per J.
Ostrand, En Banc]; Stork Country v. Mishel, 173 N.W. 817, 820, 6 ALR 174 (1919);
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, pp. 289-290 (1992); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL Responsibility,
Canon 22; and CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 44.

111 Rollo, pp. 809-813.

112 51 Phil. 613 (1928) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

113 Id. at 619 citing 6 C. J. pp. 643, 646-648, 76 Am. Dec. p. 259 and Holker vs.
Parker 1813, 7 Cranch, 436.

114 169 Phil. 253 (1977) [Per J. Fernandez, First Division].

115 Id. at 256-257 citing REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 23.

116 97 Phil. 100 (1955) [Per J. Labrador, First Division].

117 Id. at 104-105 citing 7 C. J. S. pp. 899-900 and 6 C. J. S., p. 643.

118 699 Phil. 419 (2012) [Per J.Perez, En Banc].

119 Id. at 436.

120 Rollo, p. 838.