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Fortinash: Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing, 5th Edition
Chapter 08: Culture, Ethnicity, and Spirituality

Test Bank

MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. To include a cultural focus in patient care planning, which belief about faith will the
nurse incorporate? Faith is a:
a. Belief of body and mind
b. Manner of expressing spirituality
c. Use of spiritual resources without empiric proof
d. Search for the sacred, transcendent, or universal

ANS: C
Faith is the ability to draw on spiritual resources without having physical and empiric proof.
Body and mind refer to psychosomatic concepts. A manner of expressing spirituality refers
to religion. A search for the sacred, transcendent, or universal refers to spirituality.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Comprehension REF: Page 151

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment (Learning and Teaching)
MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

2. A culturally diverse patient refuses to participate in a group because of the presence of a

person who “can put spells on.” The nurse recognizes a priority need to explore this
patient’s:
a. Economic status
b. Home environment
c. Health-illness beliefs
d. Educational background

ANS: C
Culture influences beliefs about health and illness, including causes of illness. What the
nurse might label as delusional might be a culturally determined belief about illness
causation. The other assessments do not relate to the situation as directly.
DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 143
TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

3. An Asian-American patient diagnosed with depression explains to the nurse that eating
two specific foods will restore the balance of hot and cold and she will be cured. The
nurse should:
a. Explain that foods cannot cure mental disorders.
b. Arrange for the patient to talk with the dietitian.
c. Change the subject to focus on medication compliance.
d. Accept that cultural beliefs about illness die slowly.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-2

ANS: B
Culturally determined beliefs about health and illness should be respected. If there are no
contraindications to the patient eating the foods mentioned, the nurse should facilitate
obtaining them. Attempt to explain the flaw in the patient’s belief is an attempt to negate
culturally determined beliefs. Changing the subject does not address patient concerns.
Assuming that the belief is inflexible suggests the patient’s beliefs have no merit.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 160

TOP: Nursing Process: Implementation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

4. When working with a patient newly emigrated from Asia who has been assessed as
having xenophobia, the nurse could anticipate making the assessment that the individual:
a. Resists sharing food with others
b. Would be reluctant to ride an elevator
c. Is unlikely to talk with nonfamily members
d. Fears the consequences of going out of doors

ANS: C
Xenophobia is defined as a morbid fear of strangers. The xenophobic individual would not
necessarily resist sharing food (fear of germs), riding in elevators (fear of closed spaces), or
going out of doors (fear of open spaces).

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 146

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

5. The nurse plans to use pamphlets to teach a newly immigrated Vietnamese patient about
diabetes mellitus. Before initiating this education, the priority information for the nurse
to obtain is the patient’s:
a. Ability to read and understand English
b. Readiness and ability to learn this material
c. Previous knowledge and interest in the subject
d. Willingness to participate and follow instructions

ANS: A
Pamphlets are useful only if the patient can read and understand the language in which the
material is written. The other options are secondary to this priority concern.
DIF: Cognitive Level: Analysis REF: Pages 147-148
TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

6. A nurse is planning to incorporate a culturally sensitive focus in her nursing care. Which
of these underlying principles concerning cultural heritage will be included?
a. A group is formed from among individuals who share similar ancestral origins.
b. A condition of belonging to a group is that all members share a unique heritage.
c. Learned patterns of behavior and thinking are shared by members of a cultural
group.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-3

d. The classification of humans into cultural groups is generally based on physical

characteristics.

ANS: C
Cultural heritage is learned patterns of behavior and thinking shared by a particular group
that is transmitted over time to other members. Ancestral origins, a similar heritage, and
physical characteristics may be shared traits but alone do not constitute cultural heritage.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Comprehension REF: Page 143

TOP: Nursing Process: Teaching and Learning
MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

7. A patient diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia is describing religiously-based

delusions that other patients find offensive. Which nursing intervention will the nurse
implement to provide a therapeutic milieu?
a. Engaging the delusional patient in prayer in order to redirect the problematic
behavior
b. Explaining to the delusional patient that such talk is offensive to some of the
milieu and will not be allowed
c. Asking for the pastoral counselor to visit the unit and talk with both the delusional
patient as well as the rest of the milieu
d. Removing the delusional patient from the milieu when staff is unable to
successfully refocus the conversation to a non-religious topic

ANS: C
Occasionally, individuals with serious mental disorders experience delusions that are
spiritual or religious in nature. Certified pastoral counselors are skilled with regard to
counseling patients and consulting with staff about these problems, and they assist the health
care team in ways that address the particular concerns of individual patients. Challenging or
debating the truth of a person’s delusions is not therapeutic, and spiritual delusions are no
exception. Engaging in spiritual or religious practice with individuals on a psychiatric unit is
also inappropriate. Removing the patient from the milieu is seldom therapeutic and done only
to maximize milieu safety.
DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 152
TOP: Nursing Process: Implementation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

8. A patient confides to the nurse that she feels guilty about the poor relationship she had
with her mother-in-law, who is now deceased. The patient tells the nurse that she is sure
God will punish her for this and that she needs to confess her sins to someone. Which of
the following is the best response by the nurse?
a. “Would you like to speak to the chaplain when he comes later today? In the
meantime, we could talk about your relationship with your mother-in-law.”
b. “It sounds as if you need to talk about this. Let’s sit down in a private area. I’d like
to know more about your relationship with your mother-in-law.”
c. “We all have trouble with our in-laws occasionally. God doesn't punish us for
that.”

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-4

d. “What’s done is done. We need to focus on your positive qualities.”

ANS: A
The patient has identified a specific spiritual problem that a chaplain would be equipped to
handle, so a referral is appropriate. The nurse, in the meantime, is equipped to discuss
relationship issues. Offering to talk about the relationship without addressing the patient’s
expressed spiritual needs is not therapeutic. Suggesting that the patient’s relationship issues
are not uncommon minimizes the patient’s feelings. Attempting to refocus the patient
dismisses the patient’s needs.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 152

TOP: Nursing Process: Implementation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

9. A patient is dealing with the loss of a spouse. Which response shows an understanding of
the role spirituality plays in the management of grief?
a. “He’s in a better place; my faith tells me that is true.”
b. “I find that my faith is stronger now that I’m alone.”
c. “I’m told that a sense of spiritual connection will help me go on with life.”
d. “My faith helps me deal and gives me renewed hope; I rely on it to help me heal.”

ANS: D
Spirituality allows one to cope with these feelings by providing a sense of hope and meaning
to experiences that would otherwise be crippling. Spirituality is often a key component in the
healing process, and it is an integral part of the patient’s treatment plan. The remaining
options do not as directly deal with the patient’s personal loss and the progression to healing.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 151 TOP: Nursing Process:
Evaluation
MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

10. The nurse identifies a patient as being in spiritual distress. Which patient statement
supports this nursing diagnosis?
a. “I’ve never felt so alone before in my entire life.”
b. “I don’t know if I could get through this without faith in God.”
c. “I’ve always relied on my faith in God but now I feel I’ve been abandoned.”
d. “Why do bad things happen to good people? I’ve always been a good person.”

ANS: C
Spiritual distress is a nursing diagnosis that is defined as a disruption in the value and belief
systems that pervades the person’s state of being and that transcends the physical and
psychosocial self. Feeling abandoned when one has always relied on faith is an indication of
spiritual distress. Feeling alone and questioning why something has occurred is not
necessarily spirit based, and not an indication of spiritual distress. Questioning one’s ability
to manage an emotion without one’s faith is a testimony to the faith, not an expression of
despair.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-5

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Pages 151-152

TOP: Nursing Process: Evaluation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

11. Assessment of interpersonal relationships of Asian and Asian-American patients is

dependent on the nurse’s understanding that the culture of these patients is identified as
high context and will therefore value:
a. Privacy; family is not routinely included in health discussions
b. Their right to make independent decisions about their care
c. Sharing their opinions and wishes with healthcare team
d. Their role and place in their family structure

ANS: D
Asian and Asian-American patients have been socialized into high-context cultures in which
there is collective identity, group decision making, emotional dependence, deference to those
of higher status and age, and use of indirect language to communicate. The remaining
options are characteristic of low-context cultures.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 149

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

12. Which communication behavior would be considered uncharacteristic for a patient from
a high-context culture?
a. Little direct eye contact
b. Use of global messages
c. Use of nonverbal symbolization
d. Arguing points with the physician

ANS: D
Arguing to get a point across is more characteristic of the communication of a person from a
low-context culture. A person from a high-context culture would not be expected to dispute a
person with authority. The person from a high-context culture would be expected to use
global communication and nonverbal symbolization but to make little direct eye contact.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 149

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

13. An Asian-American patient is referred to the mental health clinic. He has many somatic
complaints for which no physical basis has been found. The patient tells the nurse that he
does not believe this clinic can help him. Based on knowledge of the beliefs common to
this culture, what can the nurse hypothesize about the patient?
a. Because of the cultural stigma attached to mental illness, he may be expressing
psychological distress via somatic symptoms.
b. Acculturation has occurred because feelings of hopelessness are alien to his native
culture.
c. Suicide is not a present danger because suicidal impulses are rarely associated with
feelings of helplessness among Asian-American patients.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-6

d. The patient has rejected both family care and traditional healing methods in favor
of health care practices of the new culture.

ANS: A
The following facts are known about beliefs commonly held by members of this culture:
there is a stigma attached to mental illness; mental illness is often described in somatic terms;
members of this culture come into treatment late and often have feelings of hopelessness
upon entry into the system; families tend to care for their members with mental illness; and
traditional healing has usually been tried and failed before the patient attempts to access the
mental health system.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 156

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

14. The nurse determines which patient is at the greatest risk for a spiritual crisis?
a. A patient, whose religion opposes the use of blood products, has a severely
bleeding ulcer
b. A single parent who must decide to terminate life support for a terminally ill child
c. A newlywed whose spouse has died in an automobile accident caused by a drunk
driver
d. A patient who denies the need for spiritual support when given the diagnosis of
terminal cancer

ANS: A
A spiritual crisis may occur when religious or spiritual beliefs conflict with a necessary
procedure or a treatment protocol, such as permitting a blood transfusion. Although the
remaining options all present with a serious emotional situation, there is no evidence to
support that the patient’s beliefs are being challenged.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 151

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

15. The nurse believes that a patient is exhibiting internal locus of control related to spiritual
development. Which patient statement supports this conclusion?
a. “Praying gives me tremendous comfort.”
b. “I pray because my church says that prayer is the way to God”
c. “I will ask that my fellow church members pray for me to get better.”
d. “My mother prayed daily and she was such a good and kind person.”

ANS: A
During development, one’s sense of faith, meaning moral values, and judgment moves from
an external locus of control to an internal locus of control. An example of such internal
control is the expressed feeling of comfort derived from prayer. The remaining options
reflect external locus of control since each is an expression of how beliefs about prayer are
provided by others; church doctrine and the faith of others.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-7

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Pages 153-154

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

16. A novice nurse has identified impaired verbal communication for an older Asian patient
who recently immigrated to the United States based on the patient’s reluctance to
maintain eye contact and engage in a conversation with staff. In order to assure that the
diagnosis is appropriate, the nurse manage asks:
a. “Have you asked the patient why communication is difficult for them?”
b. “Could you be misdiagnosing common shyness for a communication issue?”
c. “Have you noticed the patient communicating differently with family when they
visit?”
d. “Do you think the patient’s cultural traditions have a part to play in their
communication behaviors?”

ANS: D
Misunderstanding occurs when the nurse fails to take into account culture-specific
interaction patterns. Silence, infrequent eye contact, shame, fear, and language barriers all
affect a patient’s ability to interact. In light of the patient’s cultural diversity, the other
options are less likely to be pertinent.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 149 | Page 163

TOP: Nursing Process: Diagnosis MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

17. As a nurse assesses culture factors with patients, the subculture that poses the greatest
risk to a patient’s mental health is:
a. Poverty
b. Female gender
c. Advanced age
d. Cultural ethnicity

ANS: A
Many people in poverty suffer discrimination and stigma which places them at risk for
depression and other anxiety-related illnesses. The other subcultures do not present with the
same or greater degree of risk.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 144

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

MULTIPLE RESPONSE

1. The nurse is addressing the possibility that a family of newly emigrated Hispanics may
experience cultural shock. Which statements are truisms concerning this cultural
adaptation issue? Select all that apply.
a. Most primitive cultures embrace the lifestyle of the industrialized ones.
b. It may take generations for family members to become acculturated.
c. The most resistant to adaptation are children and young adults.

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-8

d. Typical responses include fear and distrust of strangers.

e. Family members are at high risk for anxiety disorder.

ANS: B, E
Many immigrants experience culture shock, a sudden or violent disturbance of emotions that
involves a sense of anxiety, fear, and distrust. Children and young adults usually adapt to
their new surroundings more quickly. It takes approximately three generations or longer for
members of a minority group to integrate into the dominant cultural environment.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 143

TOP: Nursing Process: Assessment MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

2. A nurse works in a mental health clinic serving many Southeast Asian individuals.
Which statements by the nurse would validate a striving toward cultural competence?
Select all that apply.
a. “It’s a challenge to plan treatment that is culturally congruent.”
b. “My dream is to be accepted by the Southeast Asian patients I care for.”
c. “There is so much to learn about the Southeast Asians and their problems.”
d. “Psychiatric care tends to be similar for those of Southeast Asian cultures.”
e. “I always try to be sensitive to the uniqueness of my culturally diverse patients.”

ANS: A, B, C, E
Culturally competent health care requires the development of interpersonal skills,
communication skills, and awareness and sensitivity to the uniqueness of individuals. It is
also an ongoing process, because each new encounter presents the opportunity to gain
additional knowledge and skills. Psychiatric care should be tailored to the individual and not
to cultural stereotypes.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 147 TOP: Nursing Process:
Evaluation
MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

3. A patient’s cultural background is identified as being sociologically low context. Which

nursing interventions would be appropriate for such a patient? Select all that apply.
a. Asking the patient to contribute suggestions to include in the care plan
b. Providing the patient with privacy during visits with their religious leaders
c. Instructing the patient on how to select foods within their prescribed diet plan
d. Waiting to provide medication education until family members are visiting
e. Facilitating the family in assuming responsibility for the patient’s physical needs

ANS: A, B, C

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-9

Behaviors and communication styles of cultural societies referred to as low context

(individualistic) are those in which people care for themselves. Low-context societies
emphasize thinking and values that are centered on the individual: autonomy, individual
initiative, the right to privacy, and emotional independence. Facilitating family in assuming
responsibility for the patient’s physical and educational needs is not compatible with the
characteristic needs of the low-context society.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Pages 148-149

TOP: Nursing Process: Implementation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

4. Guidelines for communicating with a patient whose ability to speak and understand
English is questionable include (select all that apply):
a. Use interpreters whenever possible.
b. Allow sufficient time for patient to formulate response.
c. Recruit a family member as an interpreter whenever possible.
d. Use nonverbal communication whenever it is considered appropriate.
e. Maintain eye contract if such interaction is accepted by the patient’s culture.

ANS: A, B, D, E
Interpreters are preferred to translators since they are trained to decode the message behind
the patient’s verbal response. The patient needs time to formulate their responses especially
if they are attempting to speak in English. Nonverbal communication is a good source of
information when effectively interpreted. Eye contact when accepted by the patient’s culture
encourages interaction and allows for interpretation of nonverbal communication. Family
members should not be used if other options are available since they are not always objective
in their translations.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 150 TOP: Nursing Process:
Planning
MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

5. A patient experiencing depression over the loss of a loved one shares that, “I’m not a
religious person but I need something to help me cope with this.” The nurse shows an
understanding to the need for an outlet for the expression of emotions when (select all
that apply):
a. Asking, “Does dancing make you feel good?”
b. Encouraging the patient to talk about the feelings
c. Offering to arrange for a consult with the music therapist
d. Asking, “Can you think of ways to express your emotions in a healthy way?”
e. Suggesting the patient draw a picture of what it feels like to experience such a loss

ANS: A, C, E

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Test Bank 8-10

Religious practices are often beneficial for patients, but for those who do not have a formal
religion, other spiritual interventions are useful. Group therapies that encourage patients to
extend themselves and to find meaning in life are helpful. In addition, several other creative
forms of expression such as art, music, and dance therapy often address patients’ spiritual
needs. Although the other options are not inappropriate, they do not provide interventions but
rather reflect assessment questions.

DIF: Cognitive Level: Application REF: Page 152

TOP: Nursing Process: Implementation MSC: NCLEX: Psychosocial Integrity

Copyright © 2012, 2007 Mosby, Inc., an affiliate of Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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different place from that which it occupies in our scheme: but in
fact, he uses the term for a different science; he applies it to the
classification not of simple minerals, but of rocks, which is a science
auxiliary to geology, and which has sometimes been called Petralogy.
What we have termed Mineralogy, M. Ampère unites with Chemistry.
"It belongs," he says[244], "to Chemistry, and not to Mineralogy, to
inquire how many atoms of silicium and of oxygen compose silica; to
tell us that its primitive form is a rhombohedron of certain angles,
that it is called quartz, &c.; leaving, on one hand, to Molecular
Geometry the task of explaining the different secondary forms which
may result from the primitive form; and on the other hand, leaving
to Mineralogy the office of describing the different varieties of
quartz, and the rocks in which they occur, according as the quartz is
crystallized, transparent, coloured, amorphous, solid, or in sand."
But we may remark, that by adopting this arrangement, we separate
from Mineralogy almost all the knowledge, and absolutely all the
general knowledge, which books professing to treat of that science
have usually contained. The consideration of Mineralogical
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curious and instructive, is forced into the domain of Chemistry,
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a rigorous transition from the sciences of classification to those
which consider the mathematical properties of bodies; and
connecting the external characters and the internal constitution of
bodies by means of a system of important general truths. I conceive,
therefore, that our disposition of this science, and our mode of
applying the name, are far more convenient than those of M.
Ampère.
9. We have seen the reaction against the pure sensational doctrines
operating very powerfully in England and in France. But it was in
Germany that these doctrines were most decidedly rejected; and
systems in extreme opposition to these put forth with confidence,
and received with applause. Of the authors who gave this impulse to
opinions in that country, Kant was the first, and by far the most
important. I have in the History of Ideas (b. iii. c. 3), endeavoured to
explain how he was aroused, by the skepticism of Hume, to examine
wherein the fallacy lay which appeared to invalidate all reasonings
from effect to cause; and how this inquiry terminated in a conviction
that the foundations of our reasonings on this and similar points
were to be sought in the mind, and not in the phenomena;—in the
subject, and not in the object. The revolution in the customary mode
of contemplating human knowledge which Kant's opinions involved,
was most complete. He himself, with no small justice, compares[245]
it with the change produced by Copernicus's theory of the solar
system. "Hitherto," he says, "men have assumed that all our
knowledge must be regulated by the objects of it; yet all attempts to
make out anything concerning objects à priori by means of our
conceptions," (as for instance their geometrical properties) "must,
on this foundation, be unavailing. Let us then try whether we cannot
make out something more in the problems of metaphysics, by
assuming that objects must be regulated by our knowledge, since
this agrees better with that supposition, which we are prompted to
make, that we can know something of them à priori. This thought is
like that of Copernicus, who, when he found that nothing was to be
made of the phenomena of the heavens so long as everything was
supposed to turn about the spectator, tried whether the matter
might not be better explained if he made the spectator turn, and left
the stars at rest. We may make the same essay in metaphysics, as
to what concerns our intuitive knowledge respecting objects. If our
apprehension of objects must be regulated by the properties of the
objects, I cannot comprehend how we can possibly know anything
about them à priori. But if the object, as apprehended by us, be
regulated by the constitution of our faculties of apprehension, I can
readily conceive this possibility." From this he infers that our
experience must be regulated by our conceptions.
10. This view of the nature of knowledge soon superseded entirely
the doctrines of the Sensational School among the metaphysicians of
Germany. These philosophers did not gradually modify and reject the
dogmas of Locke and Condillac, as was done in England and
France[246]; nor did they endeavour to ascertain the extent of the
empire of Ideas by a careful survey of its several provinces, as we
have been doing in this series of works. The German metaphysicians
saw at once that Ideas and Things, the Subjective and the Objective
elements of our knowledge, were, by Kant's system, brought into
opposition and correlation, as equally real and equally indispensable.
Seeing this, they rushed at once to the highest and most difficult
problem of philosophy,—to determine what this correlation is;—to
discover how Ideas and Things are at the same time opposite and
identical;—how the world, while it is distinct from and independent
of us, is yet, as an object of our knowledge, governed by the
conditions of our thoughts. The attempts to solve this problem,
taken in the widest sense, including the forms which it assumes in
Morals, Politics, the Arts, and Religion, as well as in the Material
Sciences, have, since that time, occupied the most profound
speculators of Germany; and have given rise to a number of
systems, which, rapidly succeeding each other, have, each in its day,
been looked upon as a complete solution of the problem. To trace
the characters of these various systems, does not belong to the
business of the present chapter: my task is ended when I have
shown, as I have now done, how the progress of thought in the
philosophical world, followed from the earliest up to the present
time, has led to that recognition of the co-existence and joint
necessity of the two opposite elements of our knowledge; and when
I have pointed out processes adapted to the extension of our
knowledge, which a true view of its nature has suggested or may
suggest.
The latter portion of this task occupies the Third Book of the Novum
Organon Renovatum. With regard to the recent succession of
German systems of philosophy, I shall add something in a
subsequent chapter: and I shall also venture to trace further than I
have yet done, the bearing of the philosophy of science upon the
theological view of the universe and the moral and religious
condition of man.
 CHAPTER XXI.
Further Advance of the Sensational School.
M. Auguste Comte.

I
shallnow take the liberty of noticing the views published by a
contemporary writer; not that it forms part of my design to offer
any criticism upon the writings of all those who have treated of
those subjects on which we are now employed; but because we can
more distinctly in this manner point out the contrasts and ultimate
tendencies of the several systems of opinion which have come under
our survey: and since from among these systems we have
endeavoured to extract and secure the portion of truth which
remains in each, and to reject the rest, we are led to point out the
errors on which our attention is thus fixed, in recent as well as older
writers.
M. Auguste Comte published in 1830 the first, and in 1835 the
second volume of his Cours de Philosophie Positive; of which the aim
is not much different from that of the present work, since as he
states (p. viii.) such a title as the Philosophy of the Sciences would
describe a part of his object, and would be inappropriate only by
excluding that portion (not yet published) which refers to
speculations concerning social relations.
1. M. Comte on Three States of Science.—By employing the term
Philosophie Positive, he wishes to distinguish the philosophy involved
in the present state of our sciences from the previous forms of
human knowledge. For according to him, each branch of knowledge
passes, in the course of man's history, through three different states;
it is first theological, then metaphysical, then positive. By the latter
term he implies a state which includes nothing but general
representations of facts;—phenomena arranged according to
relations of succession and resemblance. This "positive philosophy"
rejects all inquiry after causes, which inquiry he holds to be void of
sense[247] and inaccessible. All such conceptions belong to the
"metaphysical" state of science which deals with abstract forces, real
entities, and the like. Still more completely does he reject, as
altogether antiquated and absurd, the "theological" view of
phenomena. Indeed he conceives[248] that any one's own
consciousness of what passes within himself is sufficient to convince
him of the truth of the law of the three phases through which
knowledge must pass. "Does not each of us," he says, "in
contemplating his own history, recollect that he has been
successively a theologian in his infancy, a metaphysician in his youth,
and a physicist in his ripe age? This may easily be verified for all
men who are up to the level of their time."
It is plain from such statements, and from the whole course of his
work, that M. Comte holds, in their most rigorous form, the doctrines
to which the speculations of Locke and his successors led; and which
tended, as we have seen, to the exclusion of all ideas except those
of number and resemblance. As M. Comte refuses to admit into his
philosophy the fundamental idea of Cause, he of course excludes
most of the other ideas, which are, as we endeavoured to show, the
foundations of science; such as the ideas of Media by which
secondary qualities are made known to us; the ideas of Chemical
Attraction, of Polar Forces, and the like. He would reduce all science
to the mere expression of laws of phenomena, expressed in formulæ
of space, time, and number; and would condemn as unmeaning, and
as belonging to an obsolete state of science, all endeavours to
determine the causes of phenomena, or even to refer them to any of
the other ideas just mentioned.

2. M. Comte rejects the Search of Causes.—In a previous work[249] I

have shown, I trust decisively, that it is the genuine office of science
to inquire into the causes as well as the laws of phenomena;—that
such an inquiry cannot be avoided; and that it has been the source
of almost all the science we possess. I need not here repeat the
arguments there urged; but I may make a remark or two upon M.
Comte's hypothesis, that all science is first "metaphysical" and then
"positive;" since it is in virtue of this hypothesis that he rejects the
investigation of causes, as worthy only of the infancy of science. All
discussions concerning ideas, M. Comte would condemn as
"metaphysical," and would consider as mere preludes to positive
philosophy. Now I venture to assert, on the contrary, that
discussions concerning ideas, and real discoveries, have in every
science gone hand in hand. There is no science in which the
pretended order of things can be pointed out. There is no science in
which the discoveries of the laws of phenomena, when once begun,
have been carried on independently of discussions concerning ideas.
There is no science in which the expression of the laws of
phenomena can at this time dispense with ideas which have
acquired their place in science in virtue of metaphysical
considerations. There is no science in which the most active
disquisitions concerning ideas did not come after, not before, the
first discovery of laws of phenomena. In Astronomy, the discovery of
the phenomenal laws of the epicyclical motions of the heavens led to
assumptions of the metaphysical principle of equable circular
motions: Kepler's discoveries would never have been made but for
his metaphysical notions. These discoveries of the laws of
phenomena did not lead immediately to Newton's theory, because a
century of metaphysical discussions was requisite as a preparation.
Newton then discovered, not merely a law of phenomena, but a
cause; and therefore he was the greatest of discoverers. The same
is the case in Optics; the ancients possessed some share of our
knowledge of facts; but meddled little with the metaphysical
reasonings of the subject. In modern times when men began to
inquire into the nature of light, they soon extended their knowledge
of its laws. When this series of discoveries had come to a pause, a
new series of brilliant discoveries of laws of phenomena went on,
inseparably connected with a new series of views of the nature and
cause of light. In like manner, the most modern discoveries in
chemistry involve indispensably the idea of polar forces. The
metaphysics (in M. Comte's sense) of each subject advances in a
parallel line with the knowledge of physical laws. The Explication of
Conceptions must go on, as we have already shown, at the same
rate as the Colligation of Facts.

M. Comte will say[250] that Newton's discovery of gravitation only

consists in exhibiting the astronomical phenomena of the universe as
one single fact under different points of view. But this fact involves
the idea of force, that is, of cause. And that this idea is not a mere
modification of the ideas of time and space, we have shown: if it
were so, how could it lead to the axiom that attraction is mutual, an
indispensable part of the Newtonian theory? M. Comte says[251] that
we do not know what attraction is, since we can only define it by
identical phrases: but this is just as true of space, or time, or
motion; and is in fact exactly the characteristic of a fundamental
idea. We do not obtain such ideas from definitions, but we possess
them not the less truly because we cannot define them.
That M. Comte's hypothesis is historically false, is obvious by such
examples as I have mentioned. Metaphysical discussions have been
essential steps in the progress of each science. If we arbitrarily
reject all these portions of scientific history as useless trifling,
belonging to the first rude attempts at knowledge, we shall not only
distort the progress of things, but pervert the plainest facts. Of this
we have an example in M. Comte's account of Kepler's mechanical
speculations. We have seen, in the History of Physical Astronomy,
that Kepler's second law, (that the planets describe areas about the
sun proportional to the times,) was proved by him, by means of
calculations founded on the observations of Tycho; but that the
mechanical reason of it was not assigned till a later period, when it
appeared as the first proposition of Newton's Principia. It is plain
from the writings of Kepler, that it was impossible for him to show
how this law resulted from the forces which were in action; since the
forces which he considered were not those tending to the centre,
which really determine the property in question, but forces exerted
by the sun in the direction of the planet's motion, without which
forces Kepler conceived that the motion could not go on. In short,
the state of mechanical science in Kepler's time was such that no
demonstration of the law could be given. The terms in which such a
demonstration must be expressed had not at that time acquired a
precise significance; and it was in virtue of many subsequent
metaphysical discussions (as M. Comte would term them) that these
terms became capable of expressing sound mechanical reasoning.
Kepler did indeed pretend to assign what he called a "physical proof"
of his law, depending upon this, that the sun's force is less at
greater distances; a condition which does not at all influence the
result. Thus Kepler's reason for his law proves nothing but the
confusion of thought in which he was involved on such subjects. Yet
M. Comte assigns to Kepler the credit of having proved this law by
sound mechanical reasoning, as well as established it as a matter of
fact[252]. "This discovery by Kepler," he adds, "is the more
remarkable, inasmuch as it occurred before the science of dynamics
had really been created by Galileo." We may remark that inasmuch
as M. Comte perceived this incongruity in the facts as he stated
them, it is the more remarkable that he did not examine them more
carefully.
3. Causes in Physics.—The condemnation of the inquiry into causes
which is conveyed in M. Comte's notion of the three stages of
Science, he again expresses more in detail, in stating[253] what he
calls his Fundamental theory of hypotheses. This "theory" is, that we
may employ hypotheses in our natural philosophy, but these
hypotheses must always be such as admit of a positive verification.
We must have no suppositions concerning the agents by which
effects are produced. All such suppositions have an anti-scientific
character, and can only impede the real progress of physics. There
can be no use in the ethers and imaginary fluids to which some
persons refer the phenomena of heat, light, electricity and
magnetism. And in agreement with this doctrine, M. Comte in his
account[254] of the Science of Optics, condemns, as utterly
unphilosophical and absurd, both the theory of emission and that of
undulation.
To this we reply, that theory of one kind or other is indispensable to
the expression of the phenomena; and that when the laws are
expressed, and apparently explained, by means of a theory, to forbid
us to inquire whether it be really true or false, is a pedantic and
capricious limitation of our knowledge, to which the intellect of man
neither can nor should submit. If any one holds the adoption of one
or other of these theories to be indifferent, let him express the laws
of phenomena of diffraction in terms of the theory of emission[255].
If any one rejects the doctrine of undulation, let him point out some
other way of connecting double refraction with polarization. And
surely no man of science will contend that the beautiful branch of
science which refers to that connexion is not a portion of our
positive knowledge.
M. Comte's contempt for the speculations of the undulationists
seems to have prevented his acquainting himself with their
reasonings, and even with the laws of phenomena on which they
have reasoned, although these form by far the most striking and
beautiful addition which Science has received in modern times. He
adduces, as an insuperable objection to the undulatory theory, a
difficulty which is fully removed by calculation in every work on the
subject:—the existence of shadow[256]. He barely mentions the
subject of diffraction, and Young's law of interferences;—speaks of
Fresnel as having applied this principle to the phenomena of
coloured rings, "on which the ingenious labours of Newton left much
to desire;" as if Fresnel's labours on this subject had been the
supplement of those of Newton: and after regretting that "this
principle of interferences has not yet been distinctly disentangled
from chemical conceptions on the nature of light," concludes his
chapter. He does not even mention the phenomena of dipolarization,
of circular and elliptical polarization, or of the optical properties of
crystals; discoveries of laws of phenomena quite as remarkable as
any which can be mentioned.
M. Comte's favourite example of physical research is Thermotics,
and especially Fourier's researches with regard to heat. It is
shown[257] in the History of Thermotics, that the general
phenomena of radiation required the assumption of a fluid to
express them; as appears in the theory of exchanges[258]. And the
explanation of the principal laws of radiation, which Fourier gives,
depends upon the conception of material molecular radiation. The
flux of caloric, of which Fourier speaks, cannot be conceived
otherwise than as implying a material flow. M. Comte apologizes[259]
for this expression, as too figurative, and says that it merely
indicates a fact. But what is the flow of a current of fluid except a
fact? And is it not evident that without such expressions, and the
ideas corresponding to them, Fourier could neither have conveyed
nor conceived his theory?
In concluding this discussion it must be recollected, that though it is
a most narrow and untenable rule to say that we will admit no
agency of ethers and fluids into philosophy; yet the reality of such
agents is only to be held in the way, and to the extent, which the
laws of phenomena indicate. It is not only allowable, but inevitable
to assume, as the vehicle of heat and light, a medium possessing
some of the properties of more familiar kinds of matter. But the idea
of such a medium, which we possess, and on which we cannot but
reason, can be fully developed only by an assiduous study of the
cases in which it is applicable. It may be, that as science advances,
all our knowledge may converge to one general and single aspect of
the universe. We abandon and reject this hope, if we refuse to admit
those ideas which must be our stepping-stones in advancing to such
a point: and we no less frustrate such an expectation, if we allow
ourselves to imagine that from our present position we can stride at
once to the summit.
4. Causes in other Sciences.—But if it is, in the sciences just
mentioned, impracticable to reduce our knowledge to laws of
phenomena alone, without referring to causes, media, and other
agencies; how much more plainly is it impossible to confine our
thoughts to phenomena, and to laws of succession and resemblance,
in other sciences, as chemistry, physiology, and geology? Who shall
forbid us, or why should we be forbidden, to inquire whether
chemical and galvanic forces are identical; whether irritability is a
peculiar vital power; whether geological causes have been uniform
or paroxysmal? To exclude such inquiries, would be to secure
ourselves from the poison of error by abstaining from the banquet of
truth:—it would be to attempt to feed our minds with the meagre
diet of space and number, because we may find too delightful a
relish in such matters as cause and end, symmetry and affinity,
organization and development.
Thus M. Comte's arrangement of the progress of science as
successively metaphysical and positive, is contrary to history in fact,
and contrary to sound philosophy in principle. Nor is there any better
foundation for his statement that theological views are to be found
only in the rude infantine condition of human knowledge, and vanish
as science advances. Even in material sciences this is not the case.
We have shown in the chapter on Final Causes, that physiologists
have been directed in their remarks by the conviction of a purpose in
every part of the structure of animals; and that this idea, which had
its rise after the first observations, has gone on constantly gaining
strength and clearness, so that it is now the basis of a large portion
of the science. We have seen, too, in the Book on the palætiological
sciences, that the researches of that class do by no means lead us to
reject an origin of the series of events, nor to suppose this origin to
be included in the series of natural laws. Science has not at all
shown any reason for denying either the creation or the purpose of
the universe.
This is true of those aspects of the universe which have become the
subjects of rigorous science: but how small a portion of the whole
do they form! Especially how minute a proportion does our
knowledge bear to our ignorance, if we admit into science, as M.
Comte advises, only the laws of phenomena! Even in the best
explored fields of science, how few such laws do we know!
Meteorology, climate, terrestrial magnetism, the colours and other
properties of bodies, the conditions of musical and articulate sound,
and a thousand other facts of physics, are not defined by any known
laws. In physiology we may readily convince ourselves how little we
know of laws, since we can hardly study one species without
discovering some unguessed property, or apply the microscope
without seeing some new structure in the best known organs. And
when we go on to social and moral and political matters, we may
well doubt whether any one single rigorous rule of phenomena has
ever been stated, although on such subjects man's ideas have been
busily and eagerly working ever since his origin. What a wanton and
baseless assumption it would be, then, to reject those suggestions of
a Governor of the universe which we derive from man's moral and
spiritual nature, and from the institutions of society, because we
fancy we see in the small field of our existing "positive knowledge" a
tendency to exclude "theological views!" Because we can explain the
motion of the stars by a general Law which seems to imply no
hyperphysical agency, and can trace a few more limited laws in other
properties of matter, we are exhorted to reject convictions irresistibly
suggested to us by our bodies and our souls, by history and
antiquities, by conscience and human law.
5. M. Comte's practical philosophy.—It is not merely as a speculative
doctrine that M. Comte urges the necessity of our thus following the
guidance of "positive philosophy." The fevered and revolutionary
condition of human society at present arises, according to him[260],
from the simultaneous employment of three kinds of philosophy
radically incompatible;—theological, metaphysical, and positive
philosophy. The remedy for the evil is to reject the two former, and
to refer everything to that positive philosophy, of which the destined
triumph cannot be doubtful. In like manner, our European
education[261], still essentially theological, metaphysical, and literary,
must be replaced by a positive education, suited to the spirit of our
epoch.
With these practical consequences of M. Comte's philosophy we are
not here concerned: but the notice of them may serve to show how
entirely the rejection of the theological view pervades his system;
and how closely this rejection is connected with the principles which
lead him also to reject the fundamental ideas of the sciences as we
have presented them.
6. M. Comte on Hypotheses.—In the detail of M. Comte's work, I do
not find any peculiar or novel remarks on the induction by which the
sciences are formed; except we may notice, as such, his permission
of hypotheses to the inquirer, already referred to. "There can only
be," he says[262], "two general modes fitted to reveal to us, in a
direct and entirely rational manner, the true law of any phenomenon;
—either the immediate analysis of this phenomenon, or its exact and
evident relation to some more extended law, previously established;
—in a word, induction, or deduction. But both these ways would
certainly be insufficient, even with regard to the simplest
phenomenon, in the eyes of any one who fully comprehends the
essential difficulties of the intimate study of nature, if we did not
often begin by anticipating the result, and making a provisory
supposition, at first essentially conjectural, even with respect to
some of the notions which constitute the final object of inquiry.
Hence the introduction, which is strictly indispensable, of hypotheses
in natural philosophy." We have already seen that the "permissio
intellectus" had been noticed as a requisite step in discovery, as long
before as the time of Bacon.
7. M. Comte's Classification of Sciences.—I do not think it necessary
to examine in detail M. Comte's views of the philosophy of the
different sciences; but it may illustrate the object of the present
work, to make a remark upon his attempt to establish a distinction
between physical and chemical science. This distinction he makes to
consist in three points[263];—that Physics considers general and
Chemistry special properties;—that Physics considers masses and
Chemistry molecules;—that in Physics the mode of arrangement of
the molecules remains constant, while in Chemistry this arrangement
is necessarily altered. M. Comte however allows that these lines of
distinction are vague and insecure; for, among many others,
magnetism, a special property, belongs to physics, and breaks down
his first criterion; and molecular attractions are a constant subject of
speculation in physics, so that the second distinction cannot be
insisted on. To which we may add that the greater portion of
chemistry does not attend at all to the arrangement of the
molecules, so that the third character is quite erroneous. The real
distinction of these branches of science is, as we have seen, the
fundamental ideas which they employ. Physics deals with relations of
space, time, and number, media, and scales of qualities, according to
intensity and other differences; while chemistry has for its subject
elements and attractions as shown in composition; and polarity,
though in different senses, belongs to both. The failure of this
attempt of M. Comte at distinguishing these provinces of science by
their objects, may be looked upon as an illustration of the
impossibility of establishing a philosophy of the sciences on any
other ground than the ideas which they involve.
We have thus traced to its extreme point, so far as the nature of
science is concerned, one of those two antagonistic opinions, of
which the struggle began in the outset of philosophy, and has
continued during the whole of her progress;—namely, the opinions
which respectively make our sensations and our ideas the origin of
our knowledge. The former, if it be consistent with itself, must
consider all knowledge of causes as impossible, since no sensation
can give us the idea of cause. And when this opinion is applied to
science, it reduces it to the mere investigation of laws of
phenomena, according to relations of space, time, and number. I
purposely abstain, as far as possible, from the consideration of the
other consequences, not strictly belonging to the physical sciences,
which were drawn from the doctrine that all our ideas are only
transformed sensations. The materialism, the atheism, the sensualist
morality, the anarchical polity, which some of the disciples of the
Sensational School erected upon the fundamental dogmas of their
sect, do not belong to our present subject, and are matters too
weighty to be treated of as mere accessories.
The above Remarks were written before I had seen the third volume
of M. Comte's work, or the subsequent volumes. But I do not find, in
anything which those volumes contain, any ground for altering what
I have written. Indeed they are occupied altogether with subjects
which do not come within the field of my present speculations.
 CHAPTER XXII.
Mr. Mill's Logic[264].

T
he History of the Inductive Sciences was published in 1837, and
the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences in 1840. In 1843 Mr. Mill
published his System of Logic, in which he states that without
the aid derived from the facts and ideas in my volumes, the
corresponding portion of his own would most probably not have
been written, and quotes parts of what I have said with
commendation. He also, however, dissents from me on several
important and fundamental points, and argues against what I have
said thereon. I conceive that it may tend to bring into a clearer light
the doctrines which I have tried to establish, and the truth of them,
if I discuss some of the differences between us, which I shall
proceed to do[265].
Mr. Mill's work has had, for a work of its abstruse character, a
circulation so extensive, and admirers so numerous and so fervent,
that it needs no commendation of mine. But if my main concern at
present had not been with the points in which Mr. Mill differs from
me, I should have had great pleasure in pointing out passages, of
which there are many, in which Mr. Mill appears to me to have been
very happy in promoting or in expressing philosophical truth.
There is one portion of his work indeed which tends to give it an
interest of a wider kind than belongs to that merely scientific truth to
which I purposely and resolutely confined my speculations in the
works to which I have referred. Mr. Mill has introduced into his work
a direct and extensive consideration of the modes of dealing with
moral and political as well as physical questions; and I have no
doubt that this part of his book has, for many of his readers, a more
lively interest than any other. Such a comprehensive scheme seems
to give to doctrines respecting science a value and a purpose which
they cannot have, so long as they are restricted to mere material
sciences. I still retain the opinion, however, upon which I formerly
acted, that the philosophy of science is to be extracted from the
portions of science which are universally allowed to be most
certainly established, and that those are the physical sciences. I am
very far from saying, or thinking, that there is no such thing as Moral
and Political Science, or that no method can be suggested for its
promotion; but I think that by attempting at present to include the
Moral Sciences in the same formulæ with the Physical, we open far
more controversies than we close; and that in the moral as in the
physical sciences, the first step towards showing how truth is to be
discovered, is to study some portion of it which is assented to so as
to be beyond controversy.
I. What is Induction?—1. Confining myself, then, to the material
sciences, I shall proceed to offer my remarks on Induction with
especial reference to Mr. Mill's work. And in order that we may, as I
have said, proceed as intelligibly as possible, let us begin by
considering what we mean by Induction, as a mode of obtaining
truth; and let us note whether there is any difference between Mr.
Mill and me on this subject.

"For the purposes of the present inquiry," Mr. Mill says (i. 347[266]),
"Induction may be defined the operation of discovering and forming
general propositions:" meaning, as appears by the context, the
discovery of them from particular facts. He elsewhere (i. 370) terms
it "generalization from experience:" and again he speaks of it with
greater precision as the inference of a more general proposition from
less general ones.
2. Now to these definitions and descriptions I assent as far as they
go; though, as I shall have to remark, they appear to me to leave
unnoticed a feature which is very important, and which occurs in all
cases of Induction, so far as we are concerned with it. Science, then,
consists of general propositions, inferred from particular facts, or
from less general propositions, by Induction; and it is our object to
discern the nature and laws of Induction in this sense. That the
propositions are general, or are more general than the facts from
which they are inferred, is an indispensable part of the notion of
Induction, and is essential to any discussion of the process, as the
mode of arriving at Science, that is, at a body of general truths.
3. I am obliged therefore to dissent from Mr. Mill when he includes,
in his notion of Induction, the process by which we arrive at
individual facts from other facts of the same order of particularity.
Such inference is, at any rate, not Induction alone; if it be Induction
at all, it is Induction applied to an example.
For instance, it is a general law, obtained by Induction from
particular facts, that a body falling vertically downwards from rest,
describes spaces proportional to the squares of the times. But that a
particular body will fall through 16 feet in one second and 64 feet in
two seconds, is not an induction simply, it is a result obtained by
applying the inductive law to a particular case.
But further, such a process is often not induction at all. That a ball
striking another ball directly will communicate to it as much
momentum as the striking ball itself loses, is a law established by
induction: but if, from habit or practical skill, I make one billiard-ball
strike another, so as to produce the velocity which I wish, without
knowing or thinking of the general law, the term Induction cannot
then be rightly applied. If I know the law and act upon it, I have in
my mind both the general induction and its particular application.
But if I act by the ordinary billiard-player's skill, without thinking of
momentum or law, there is no Induction in the case.
4. This distinction becomes of importance, in reference to Mr. Mill's
doctrine, because he has extended his use of the term Induction,
not only to the cases in which the general induction is consciously
applied to a particular instance; but to the cases in which the
particular instance is dealt with by means of experience, in that rude
sense in which experience can be asserted of brutes; and in which,
of course, we can in no way imagine that the law is possessed or
understood, as a general proposition. He has thus, as I conceive,
overlooked the broad and essential difference between speculative
knowledge and practical action; and has introduced cases which are
quite foreign to the idea of science, alongside with cases from which
we may hope to obtain some views of the nature of science and the
processes by which it must be formed.
5. Thus (ii. 232) he says, "This inference of one particular fact from
another is a case of induction. It is of this sort of induction that
brutes are capable." And to the same purpose he had previously said
(i. 251), "He [the burnt child who shuns the fire] is not generalizing:
he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same way also,
brutes reason ... not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads
the fire."
6. This confusion, (for such it seems to me,) of knowledge with
practical tendencies, is expressed more in detail in other places.
Thus he says (i. 118), "I cannot dig the ground unless I have an idea
of the ground and of a spade, and of all the other things I am
operating upon."
7. This appears to me to be a use of words which can only tend to
confuse our idea of knowledge by obliterating all that is distinctive in
human knowledge. It seems to me quite false to say that I cannot
dig the ground, unless I have an idea of the ground and of my
spade. Are we to say that we cannot walk the ground, unless we
have an idea of the ground, and of our feet, and of our shoes, and
of the muscles of our legs? Are we to say that a mole cannot dig the
ground, unless he has an idea of the ground and of the snout and
paws with which he digs it? Are we to say that a pholas cannot
perforate a rock, unless he have an idea of the rock, and of the acid
with which he corrodes it?
8. This appears to me, as I have said, to be a line of speculation
which can lead to nothing but confusion. The knowledge concerning
which I wish to inquire is human knowledge. And in order that I may
have any chance of success in the inquiry, I find it necessary to
single out that kind of knowledge which is especially and distinctively
human. Hence, I pass by, in this part of my investigation, all the
knowledge, if it is to be so called, which man has in no other way
than brutes have it;—all that merely shows itself in action. For
though action may be modified by habit, and habit by experience, in
animals as well as in men, such experience, so long as it retains that
merely practical form, is no part of the materials of science.
Knowledge in a general form, is alone knowledge for that purpose;
and to that, therefore, I must confine my attention; at least till I
have made some progress in ascertaining its nature and laws, and
am thus prepared to compare such knowledge,—human knowledge
properly so called,—with mere animal tendencies to action; or even
with practical skill which does not include, as for the most part
practical skill does not include, speculative knowledge.
9. And thus, I accept Mr. Mill's definition of Induction only in its first
and largest form; and reject, as useless and mischievous for our
purposes, his extension of the term to the practical influence which
experience of one fact exercises upon a creature dealing with similar
facts. Such influence cannot be resolved into ideas and induction,
without, as I conceive, making all our subsequent investigation
vague and heterogeneous, indefinite and inconclusive. If we must
speak of animals as learning from experience, we may at least
abstain from applying to them terms which imply that they learn, in
the same way in which men learn astronomy from the stars, and
chemistry from the effects of mixture and heat. And the same may
be said of the language which is to be used concerning what men
learn, when their learning merely shows itself in action, and does
not exist as a general thought. Induction must not be applied to
such cases. Induction must be confined to cases where we have in
our minds general propositions, in order that the sciences, which are
our most instructive examples of the process we have to consider,
may be, in any definite and proper sense, Inductive Sciences.
10. Perhaps some persons may be inclined to say that this difference
of opinion, as to the extent of meaning which is to be given to the
term Induction, is a question merely of words; a matter of definition
only. This is a mode in which men in our time often seem inclined to
dispose of philosophical questions; thus evading the task of forming
an opinion upon such questions, while they retain the air of looking
at the subject from a more comprehensive point of view. But as I
have elsewhere said, such questions of definition are never
questions of definition merely. A proposition is always implied along
with the definition; and the truth of the proposition depends upon
the settlement of the definition. This is the case in the present
instance. We are speaking of Induction, and we mean that kind of
Induction by which the sciences now existing among men have been
constructed. On this account it is, that we cannot include, in the
meaning of the term, mere practical tendencies or practical habits;
for science is not constructed of these. No accumulation of these
would make up any of the acknowledged sciences. The elements of
such sciences are something of a kind different from practical habits.
The elements of such sciences are principles which we know; truths
which can be contemplated as being true. Practical habits, practical
skill, instincts and the like, appear in action, and in action only. Such
endowments or acquirements show themselves when the occasion
for action arrives, and then, show themselves in the act; without
being put, or being capable of being put, in the form of truths
contemplated by the intellect. But the elements and materials of
Science are necessary truths contemplated by the intellect. It is by
consisting of such elements and such materials, that Science is
Science. Hence a use of the term Induction which requires us to
obliterate this distinction, must make it impossible for us to arrive at
any consistent and intelligible view of the nature of Science, and of
the mental process by which Sciences come into being. We must, for
the purpose which Mr. Mill and I have in common, retain his larger
and more philosophical definition of Induction,—that it is the
inference of a more general proposition from less general ones.
11. Perhaps, again, some persons may say, that practical skill and
practical experience lead to science, and may therefore be included
in the term Induction, which describes the formation of science. But
to this we reply, that these things lead to science as occasions only,
and do not form part of science; and that science begins then only
when we look at the facts in a general point of view. This distinction
is essential to the philosophy of science. The rope-dancer may, by
his performances, suggest, to himself or to others, properties of the
center of gravity; but this is so, because man has a tendency to
speculate and to think of general truths, as well as a tendency to
dance on a rope on special occasions, and to acquire skill in such
dancing by practice. The rope-dancer does not dance by Induction,
any more than the dancing dog does. To apply the terms Science
and Induction to such cases, carries us into the regions of metaphor;
as when we call birds of passage "wise meteorologists," or the bee
"a natural chemist, who turns the flower-dust into honey." This is
very well in poetry: but for our purposes we must avoid recognizing
these cases as really belonging to the sciences of meteorology and
chemistry,—as really cases of Induction. Induction for us is general
propositions, contemplated as such, derived from particulars.
Science may result from experience and observation by Induction;
but Induction is not therefore the same thing as experience and
observation. Induction is experience or observation consciously
looked at in a general form. This consciousness and generality are
necessary parts of that knowledge which is science. And accordingly,
on the other hand, science cannot result from mere Instinct, as
distinguished from Reason; because Instinct by its nature is not
conscious and general, but operates blindly and unconsciously in
particular cases, the actor not seeing or thinking of the rule which he
obeys.
12. A little further on I shall endeavour to show that not only a
general thought, but a general word or phrase is a requisite element
in Induction. This doctrine, of course, still more decidedly excludes
the case of animals, and of mere practical knowledge in man. A
burnt child dreads the fire; but reason must be unfolded, before the
child learns to understand the words "fire will hurt you." The burnt
dog never thus learns to understand words. And this difference
points to an entirely different state of thought in the two cases: or
rather, to a difference between a state of rational thought on the one
hand, and of mere practical instinct on the other.
13. Besides this difference of speculative thought and practical
instinct which thus are, as appears to me, confounded in Mr. Mill's
philosophy, in such a way as tends to destroy all coherent views of
human knowledge, there is another set of cases to which Mr. Mill
applies the term Induction, and to which it appears to me to be
altogether inapplicable. He employs it to describe the mode in which
superstitious men, in ignorant ages, were led to the opinion that
striking natural events presaged or accompanied calamities. Thus he
says (i. 389), "The opinion so long prevalent that a comet or any
other unusual appearance in the heavenly regions was the precursor
of calamities to mankind, or at least to those who witnessed it; the
belief in the oracles of Delphi and Dodona; the reliance on astrology,
or on the weather-prophecies in almanacs; were doubtless
inductions supposed to be grounded on experience;" and he speaks
of these insufficient inductions being extinguished by the stronger
inductions subsequently obtained by scientific inquiry. And in like
manner, he says in another place (i. 367), "Let us now compare
different predictions: the first, that eclipses will occur whenever one
planet or satellite is so situated as to cast its shadow upon another:
the second, that they will occur whenever some great calamity is
impending over mankind."
14. Now I cannot see how anything but confusion can arise from
applying the term Induction to superstitious fancies like those here
mentioned. They are not imperfect truths, but entire falsehoods. Of
that, Mr. Mill and I are agreed: how then can they exemplify the
progress towards truth? They were not collected from the facts by
seeking a law of their occurrence; but were suggested by an
imagination of the anger of superior powers shown by such
deviations from the ordinary course of nature. If we are to speak of
inductions to any purpose, they must be such inductions as
represent the facts, in some degree at least. It is not meant, I
presume, that these opinions are in any degree true: to what
purpose then are they adduced? If I were to hold that my dreams
predict or conform to the motions of the stars or of the clouds,
would this be an induction? It would be so, as much one as those
here so denominated: yet what but confusion could arise from
classing it among scientific truths? Mr. Mill himself has explained (ii.
389) the way in which such delusions as the prophecies of almanac-
makers, and the like, obtain credence; namely, by the greater effect
which the positive instances produce on ordinary minds in
comparison with the negative, when the rule has once taken
possession of their thoughts. And this being, as he says, the
recognized explanation of such cases, why should we not leave them
to their due place, and not confound and perplex the whole of our
investigation by elevating them to the rank of "inductions"? The very
condemnation of such opinions is that they are not at all inductive.
When we have made any progress in our investigation of the nature
of science, to attempt to drive us back to the wearisome discussion
of such elementary points as these, is to make progress hopeless.
II. Induction or Description?—15. In the cases hitherto noticed, Mr.
Mill extends the term Induction, as I think, too widely, and applies it
to cases to which it is not rightly applicable. I have now to notice a
case of an opposite kind, in which he does not apply it where I do,
and condemns me for using it in such a case. I had spoken of
Kepler's discovery of the Law, that the planets move round the sun
in ellipses, as an example of Induction. The separate facts of any
planet (Mars, for instance,) being in certain places at certain times,
are all included in the general proposition which Kepler discovered,
that Mars describes an ellipse of a certain form and position. This
appears to me a very simple but a very distinct example of the
operation of discovering general propositions; general, that is, with
reference to particular facts; which operation Mr. Mill, as well as
myself, says is Induction. But Mr. Mill denies this operation in this
case to be Induction at all (i. 357). I should not have been prepared
for this denial by the previous parts of Mr. Mill's book, for he had
said just before (i. 350), "such facts as the magnitudes of the bodies
of the solar system, their distances from each other, the figure of the
earth and its rotation ... are proved indirectly, by the aid of
inductions founded on other facts which we can more easily reach."
If the figure of the earth and its rotation are proved by Induction, it
seems very strange, and is to me quite incomprehensible, how the
figure of the earth's orbit and its revolution (and of course, of the
figure of Mars's orbit and his revolution in like manner,) are not also
proved by Induction. No, says Mr. Mill, Kepler, in putting together a
number of places of the planet into one figure, only performed an
act of description. "This descriptive operation," he adds (i. 359), "Mr.
Whewell, by an aptly chosen expression, has termed Colligation of
Facts." He goes on to commend my observations concerning this
process, but says that, according to the old and received meaning of
the term, it is not Induction at all.
16. Now I have already shown that Mr. Mill himself, a few pages
earlier, had applied the term Induction to cases undistinguishable
from this in any essential circumstance. And even in this case, he
allows that Kepler did really perform an act of Induction (i. 358),
"namely, in concluding that, because the observed places of Mars
were correctly represented by points in an imaginary ellipse,
therefore Mars would continue to revolve in that same ellipse; and
even in concluding that the position of the planet during the time
which had intervened between the two observations must have
coincided with the intermediate points of the curve." Of course, in
Kepler's Induction, of which I speak, I include all this; all this is
included in speaking of the orbit of Mars: a continuous line, a
periodical motion, are implied in the term orbit. I am unable to see
what would remain of Kepler's discovery, if we take from it these
conditions. It would not only not be an induction, but it would not be
a description, for it would not recognize that Mars moved in an orbit.
Are particular positions to be conceived as points in a curve, without
thinking of the intermediate positions as belonging to the same
curve? If so, there is no law at all, and the facts are not bound
together by any intelligible tie.
In another place (ii. 209) Mr. Mill returns to his distinction of
Description and Induction; but without throwing any additional light
upon it, so far as I can see.
17. The only meaning which I can discover in this attempted
distinction of Description and Induction is, that when particular facts
are bound together by their relation in space, Mr. Mill calls the
discovery of the connexion Description, but when they are
connected by other general relations, as time, cause and the like, Mr.
Mill terms the discovery of the connexion Induction. And this way of
making a distinction, would fall in with the doctrine of other parts of
Mr. Mill's book, in which he ascribes very peculiar attributes to space
and its relations, in comparison with other Ideas, (as I should call
them). But I cannot see any ground for this distinction, of connexion
according to space and other connexions of facts.
To stand upon such a distinction, appears to me to be the way to
miss the general laws of the formation of science. For example: The
ancients discovered that the planets revolved in recurring periods,
and thus connected the observations of their motions according to
the Idea of Time. Kepler discovered that they revolved in ellipses,
and thus connected the observations according to the Idea of Space.
Newton discovered that they revolved in virtue of the Sun's
attraction, and thus connected the motions according to the Idea of
Force. The first and third of these discoveries are recognized on all
hands as processes of Induction. Why is the second to be called by a
different name? or what but confusion and perplexity can arise from
refusing to class it with the other two? It is, you say, Description. But
such Description is a kind of Induction, and must be spoken of as
Induction, if we are to speak of Induction as the process by which
Science is formed: for the three steps are all, the second in the same
sense as the first and third, in co-ordination with them, steps in the
formation of astronomical science.
18. But, says Mr. Mill (i. 363), "it is a fact surely that the planet does
describe an ellipse, and a fact which we could see if we had
adequate visual organs and a suitable position." To this I should
reply: "Let it be so; and it is a fact, surely, that the planet does move
periodically: it is a fact, surely, that the planet is attracted by the
sun. Still, therefore, the asserted distinction fails to find a ground."
Perhaps Mr. Mill would remind us that the elliptical form of the orbit
is a fact which we could see if we had adequate visual organs and a
suitable position: but that force is a thing which we cannot see. But
this distinction also will not bear handling. Can we not see a tree
blown down by a storm, or a rock blown up by gunpowder? Do we
not here see force:—see it, that is, by its effects, the only way in
which we need to see it in the case of a planet, for the purposes of
our argument? Are not such operations of force, Facts which may be
the objects of sense? and is not the operation of the sun's Force a
Fact of the same kind, just as much as the elliptical form of orbit
which results from the action? If the latter be "surely a Fact," the
former is a Fact no less surely.
19. In truth, as I have repeatedly had occasion to remark, all
attempts to frame an argument by the exclusive or emphatic
appropriation of the term Fact to particular cases, are necessarily
illusory and inconclusive. There is no definite and stable distinction
between Facts and Theories; Facts and Laws; Facts and Inductions.
Inductions, Laws, Theories, which are true, are Facts. Facts involve
Inductions. It is a fact that the moon is attracted by the earth, just
as much as it is a Fact that an apple falls from a tree. That the
former fact is collected by a more distinct and conscious Induction,
does not make it the less a Fact. That the orbit of Mars is a Fact—a
true Description of the path—does not make it the less a case of
Induction.
20. There is another argument which Mr. Mill employs in order to
show that there is a difference between mere colligation which is
description, and induction in the more proper sense of the term. He
notices with commendation a remark which I had made (i. 364), that
at different stages of the progress of science the facts had been
successfully connected by means of very different conceptions, while
yet the later conceptions have not contradicted, but included, so far
as they were true, the earlier: thus the ancient Greek representation
of the motions of the planets by means of epicycles and eccentrics,
was to a certain degree of accuracy true, and is not negatived,
though superseded, by the modern representation of the planets as
describing ellipses round the sun. And he then reasons that this,
which is thus true of Descriptions, cannot be true of Inductions. He
says (i. 367), "Different descriptions therefore may be all true: but
surely not different explanations." He then notices the various
explanations of the motions of the planets—the ancient doctrine that
they are moved by an inherent virtue; the Cartesian doctrine that
they are moved by impulse and by vortices; the Newtonian doctrine
that they are governed by a central force; and he adds, "Can it be
said of these, as was said of the different descriptions, that they are
all true as far as they go? Is it not true that one only can be true in
any degree, and that the other two must be altogether false?"
21. And to this questioning, the history of science compels me to
reply very distinctly and positively, in the way which Mr. Mill appears
to think extravagant and absurd. I am obliged to say, Undoubtedly,
all these explanations may be true and consistent with each other,
and would be so if each had been followed out so as to show in
what manner it could be made consistent with the facts. And this
was, in reality, in a great measure done[267]. The doctrine that the
heavenly bodies were moved by vortices was successively modified,
so that it came to coincide in its results with the doctrine of an
inverse-quadratic centripetal force, as I have remarked in the
History[268]. When this point was reached, the vortex was merely a
machinery, well or ill devised, for producing such a centripetal force,
and therefore did not contradict the doctrine of a centripetal force.
Newton himself does not appear to have been averse to explaining
gravity by impulse. So little is it true that if the one theory be true
the other must be false. The attempt to explain gravity by the