\\ ri yi I ling which is able to be and not-be has a cause; for

si«!civil in itself it is indifferent to either, so that something

else must exist which determines it to one."
- St. Thomas Aquinas

PRINCIPLE OF
SUFFICIENT
REASON
Saint Thomas
Aquinas and the
Principle of Sufficient
Reason

Scott M. Sullivan Ph.D.

Saint Thomas Aquinas and the
Principle of Sufficient Reason

Scott M. Sullivan Ph.D.

Copyright © 2015 by Scott M. Sullivan

www.ScottMSullivan.com

Classical'! heist Press, 2015.

Printed In the United Stales of America

List of Abbreviations

De Ente De Ente et Essentia

De Pot. Quaestiones Disputate de Potentia Dei
De Ver. Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate
In Sent. Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
In Post. Ana. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle
In Meta. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle
In Phys. Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle
Exp.lib. Per. Commentary on the On Interpretation of Aristotle
S.C.G Summa Contra Gentiles
S.T. Summa Theologiae
Comp. Theol. Compendium Theologiae seu Brevis Compilatio
Theologiae
De Spiritualibus Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis

The volume and page numbers, as well as paragraph numbers (in some
cases) which follow the citations of these texts, are from the editions list-
ed in the bibliography. The Leonine edition citation is also listed where
available.
Table of Contents
CHAPTER I:
Introduction 7
CHAPTER II:
Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason 47
CHAPTER III:
The Principle Stated and Its Meaning 63
CHAPTER IV:
Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild
Principle of Sufficient Reason 101
CHAPTER V:
Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know Them 133
CHAPTER VI:
The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the
Principle of Sufficient Reason 161
CHAPTER VII:
Causal Principles and Conclusions 187
CHAPTER VIII:
Replies to Objections 215
CHAPTER IX:
Conclusion . . . < 239
 "Leibniz, in his writings, spread out such an abundance of seminal
thoughts that there is hardly another philosopher who can be
compared with him in this respect. A portion of these ideas were
worked out even in his own day, and with his collaboration; another
portion were forgotten but were later rediscovered and further
developed. This justifies the expectation that in his works there is
still a great deal that now appears dead and buried but that will
eventually enjoy its resurrection."1
- Gottlob Frege
(<
The principle of sufficient reason had been formulated long before
Leibnitz.'*2
- Reginald Garrigou Lagrange

1 Gottlob Frege, ed. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach, Nachgelassene Schriften

(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Vcrlag, 1969), 9.
2 Reginald (Jarrlgou Lagrange, ir, Patrick Cummins, Reality, A Syt\tlml$ af'lhomlstic
'thought (SI Louis: H. Herder Hooks, I WO), 34.
CHAPTER I:
Introduction
T
hat things do not come into being from nothing is a metaphysical
intuition that we all use and rely upon nearly every moment of
our lives. Common experience tells us all that things just do not
pop into existence out of nothing. It takes work and effort to make things
happen. Buildings are made by builders, diseases are the result of germs,
headaches come from sinus pressure, plane crashes occur when there is
some major malfunction, bumps occur in the middle of the night because
of the wind blowing a shutter, an alley cat knocking over a trash can, or a
burglar attempting a break-in.
In a well-known passage, Aristotle once described the philosophical
enterprise as a search for causes and explanations in hopes to satisfy a
natural human desire to know.3 Philosophy begins in wonder, wanting to
know an answer to some question, "Why?" We can see the truth behind
I he Aristotle s description evinced throughout the history of philoso-
phy. The pre-Socratics sought an explanation as to the ultimate "stuff" of
which everything is made. Socrates used the elenchos in efforts to arrive
al an "account" or logos of some concept under discussion. Plato posited

3 "Wisdom 1M knowledge ahoul ccrluln causes and principles." Aristotle, Meta 1982al,
7/ic Complete Work$ qf Arlitotl? vol, //, ctl. Jonathan Barnes, Ir. W.D. Ross (Princeton:
Princeton Unlveully Pmi. I MM), IM V
SI, 'lltomas Aquiim* and tin* /V/< 7/>/r ofSuJIicit'iil Reason

the existence of abstract objects to ground the continuity of knowledge.

Aristotle hlmsell poshed the existence of form, matter, and privation as
principles thai must exist in order to give an account of physical change.
'Ihe medieval scholastics made arguments that moved from observed acts,
to a power I hat is able to do those acts, to a nature that serves as a principle
behind I hose powers... And so the story goes.
A similar motivation and procedure could be said for the various sci-
ences. It is easy to arrive at clear examples. Forensic scientists, arson in-
vestigators, plane crash investigators, cancer research, nutritional experts,
etc., are part of our everyday common experience. They seek to provide us
with reasons or causes as to why the person died, why the building caught
fire, why the plane crashed, what causes cancer, what made me overweight,
etc. After all, it is supposed, it has to be something.
The common denominator is some sort of intellectual movement,
moving from the directly experienced to the not-so-directly experi-
enced. Discovery then, in both philosophical and scientific arenas, can
be described as dynamic, moving from what is better known, most obvi-
ous, or directly observed to positing the existence of something relative-
ly lesser known and unobserved.
But on what basis are these queries made? Either this process is based
on some principle (def. "that from which anything proceeds") or it is not.
Since, as Aristotle admitted, a principle-less inference would fall victim to
an infinite regress and thus is impossible, we can reasonably ask just what
is the philosophical underpinning or operative principle behind such
movements in reason? Why do we ask why? On what basis do we suppose,
or even presuppose, that there are indeed explanations, reasons, or causes
really out there that will satisfy our investigations?
The underlying operative formula in the above examples is that there
has to be some reason [R] that explains some event [E]. But, is it just a mere
assumption or human wishful thinking that the universe will "cooperate"
with our subjective thirst for these explanations? Some philosophers, as
we will see, have argued just that point. If they are right, then a tremen-
dously large portion of philosophical and scientific inquiry about how the
world operates and what is "real" has proceeded from an irrational basis,
rendering any conclusion based on such irrationality equally irrational.
If, however, it could be shown that such a principle is grounded in rea-
son and can be reasonably defended, then these "rails" upon which philos-
 Introduction

ophy and science operate would of course be vindicated, and any conclu-
sions based on it, justified as well.
So what exactly is this principle? In our unreflective, intuitional, ev-
eryday speech, it goes something like "Things do not just happen out of
the blue/ something has to make them happen!" In ancient and medi-
eval times, the principle about which we are concerned was sometimes
implicit, and other times explicit, albeit with various formulations, such
as; "Nothing gives what it does not have," "There cannot be more in the
effect than what was contained in the cause," "Whatever begins to exist
must have a cause," or more frequently, ex nihilo nihil fit - "Out of noth-
ing, nothing comes."
In this work, I will propose that the principle of sufficient reason is the
grand formulation of these intuitions and scholastic dictums, and thus is
I he principle that lies behind all of our casual inferences. Leibniz explicitly
coined this term, yet he claimed not to discover any new principle, rather
only to encapsulate all the implicit formulations used in the history of
philosophy. The principle of sufficient reason is commonly formulated as
such: "Every being has the sufficient reason for its existence (i.e., the ade-
quate ground or basis in existence) either in itself or in another."4 Stated
negatively, "Out of nothing, nothing comes" (being neither comes from
nor can be determined by sheer nothing).5 The principle of sufficient rea-
son, then, is simply an attempt to conveniently summarize, in one ba-
sic formula, the common intuitions of everyday life and what other greal
philosophers have either presupposed or loosely articulated in these more
specialized formulas of the "principle of causality,"
Leibniz once said that without the principle of sufficient reason, very
I i 11 le in philosophy and science could be demonstrated. In a similar vein,
I he contemporary Thomistic philosopher, Norris Clarke, has called the
principle of sufficient reason the dynamic principle of metaphysics, since
II is in virtue of this very principle that enables the mind to pass from
one being to another in order to make sense out of it: "All advance in

'I Some of Leibniz's formulations of the principle of sufficient reason ("Nothing takes
place without sufficient reason/' "Nothing exists without there being a greater reason for
It In exist than for it not to exist," "Nothing happens without a reason why it should be so
ml her than otherwise," or simply, nihil est sine ratione) are perhaps the most familiar.
5 'Ihose propositions may appear to differ; however, I will explain the relationship be-
tween lhe principle of sufficient reason and various causal and ex nihilo principles in
Chapter III.
St. 'Ihomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

thought to infer the existence of some new being from what we already
know depends upon this principled
Although having different formulations, it is fair to say that some for-
mulation of the principle of sufficient reason has enjoyed widespread ac-
ceptance throughout the history of Western philosophy. Yet "nothing is
so true that it cannot be denied [at least] orally."7 The principle has its
share of deniers; most notably Nicholas of Autrecourt in the 14th century,
David Hume in the 18th century, and many philosophers in our age, such
as J. L. Mackie8 and William Rowe.9 In fact, today the common tendency
in academia seems to regard the principle with suspicion, and very often
the phrase "principle of sufficient reason" is loaded with contempt and
derogatory implications. Most contemporary literature is not very favor-
able to the principle, and bashing the principle as "rationalist" seems to
be a sort of current philosophical fad. Indeed, Quentin Smith is correct
in saying, "The Principle of Sufficient Reason has very few contemporary
defenders of any of its versions.. ,"10 The anti-principle of sufficient reason
mentality enjoys such an extensive ascendancy that one can casually dis-
miss the principle with little more than a verbal wave of the hand.11

Usage of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

in Philosophy and Science
In spite of the current academic mentality opposing the principle, we
should consider three important aspects of our rational lives that not

6 William Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphys-
ics (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 21. Emphasis mine.
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, In Post. Ana., 1. 19.
8 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
9 William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975).
10 Quentin Smith, "A Defense of a Principle of Sufficient Reason," Metaphilosophy, Vol.
26(1-2), January/April 1995,97.
11 For example, we could consider Ginger Lee's 2006 Ph.D. dissertation, David Hume
and The Principle of Sufficient Reason (Marquette University, 2006) which rejects the
principle for apparently no reason other than an uncritical acceptance of Hume's critique
of causality coupled with an assertion about the truth of Schopenhauer's transcendental
epistemology. It declares, "The transcendental position shares with Hume a total lack of
confidence in our ability to access what is out there'", 189. Such cavalier rejections are
commonplace. Rarely are arguments for the principle laken Inlo conuldtfrullon, mid co-
gent arguments offered against it are of equal rarity.

10
 Introduction

only presuppose the principle, but also, more importantly, simply could
not survive without it. The first is the common sense intuition shared by
nearly all of us that things do not just happen for no reason. As we men-
tioned, the "out of nothing, nothing comes" principle is very commonly
presupposed in daily inferences, and numerous examples are available
from just a brief reflection. From the sound of a dog barking, we infer a
real dog is the source of that sound; from certain tracks formed in the
mud, we intuit that some animal is responsible for those shapes; from
the sip of coffee, we ascertain that the taste we experience is the result of
that action, and so on. It should be obvious how at least some versions of
the principle of sufficient reason are involved in such everyday examples.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how daily life could function normally with-
out such a presupposition.
What is perhaps less apparent, or at least what seems to escape many
academics, is the frequency with which this principle has been employed
in both philosophy and science. Science and philosophy too to a great ex-
lent require such a principle. Why? That a certain state of affairs can be
explained (that is, reasons given for why it is so) is a fundamental assump-
l ion of nearly any investigation: philosophical, scientific, or everyday com-
mon sense. What we might call a "sufficient reason presumption" is that
reality is intelligible; hence, there is a reason or explanation why things
are the way they are, and so with enough reflection and/or investigation
we can, at least in principle, discover that reason. It seems patently clear
I hat without such a presumption, it is futile to begin any investigation,
therefore making the principle of sufficient reason an imperative starting
point for practically all philosophy and science. Without understanding
how critical such a notion is, one will not grasp the radically foundational
and ubiquitous nature of the principle of sufficient reason. Let us look at a
few examples to clarify this point.

Hie Assumption of Intelligibility in Science

Why, one might ask, is the principle of sufficient reason needed for sci-
ence? The answer is simple - science needs the principle of sufficient reason
because science seeks explanations of phenomena. Science seeks answers
as to why things happen, and as Aristotle once said, when we ask "why" of
something, wc arc asking lor a cause. rIhat statement may appear naive to
those educated In cummt philosophies of science. Yet if we put the phi-

11
•S7. 'Ihomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

losophers of science aside and look at the scientists themselves, common

experience tells us they have no problem searching for the causes of things.
The typical "in the trenches" researcher has never read Kuhn, has never
even heard Humean event causation, and would not know anything about
explaining things only by a "mathematical representation." To be sure, the
ordinary scientist has no problem saying things like "smoking has been
'linked' (read: known to cause) to cancer," "Being overweight makes one
prone' (again: likely to cause) to heart disease," and so on. By putting
aside deeper philosophical disputes that occur only in sanitized academic
environments, it certainly seems true that scientists today quite frequent-
ly seek causal explanations, and if those scientists were not antecedently
convinced that everything that happens has a cause, they would never be-
gin their research in the first place.12
Indeed, it was the question, "Why do people really get sick?" that led
seekers to the germ theory of disease. It was the difficulty over the quan-
dary, "How can we stop infection?" that led Louis Pasteur to the discovery
of antibiotics. When one researcher wanted to know how to stop viruses,
that line of inquiry led to the development of vaccines. Clearly it was the
problem, "What causes the human body to follow a certain set of instruc-
tions in its development versus some other path?" that led a certain group
of researchers to the conclusion that human genes made up of DNA are
the responsible entities.
This assumption that phenomena in the world can be explained is
not limited to the directly observable either. After all, what is a magnetic
field? A magnetic field consists of "lines of force" surrounding a magnet
or charged particle. Do we ever see these "lines of force?" No. Then how
do we know they exist? Because we see two magnets interact with one
another, and these fields must exist since something must be causing this

121 am reminded of a citation by Maritain taken from Georges Urbain regarding what
scientists might think of philosophical idealism. "There is perhaps not a single chemist
who confuses the reality of barium sulfate with the idea he has formed of it. I was once
curious enough to put the question to some of them. Ihey all found it rather queer. From
the startled looks they gave me I could see they all thought me mad to ask such a ques-
tion." Jacques Maritain, The Degrees ojKnowledge, tr. Gerald B. Phelan (South Bend, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 52, n.38I. This observation correlates my own
experience that philosophers ought not to assume that most scientists gel deeply Involved
in philosophy of science. In the same way, I find thai few malhemflllclumi have bothered
asking themselves aboul ihe ontologlcnl SUUUN of number*,
 Introduction

reaction between the two magnets. Iron filings may represent the fields,
but of course the iron filings themselves are not the magnetic fields. What
is a "black hole?" It is a place where ordinary gravity has become so ex-
treme that it overwhelms all other forces in the universe, including light.
But if we cannot see them, how do we know they exist? Scientists infer
their existence by the observed instances of extreme gravitational pulls
confined to a particular area. The black holes are not directly observable.
They are known to exist through their effects. We may also ask, "How did
the universe originate?" Many scientists believe that it happened about
13.7 billion years ago with a massive explosion called the Big Bang. Of
course, no one has directly witnessed the emergence of the universe, but
scientists make the inference nevertheless because they observe a certain
effect (like the expansion rate of the universe), and reason that there must
be a reason for the phenomena, thus something must be the reason why it
is happening at all. Nobody has ever seen the Big Bang that initialized our
universe, but scientists quite reasonably infer that it existed based upon
the effects we see today.
Nor is this presumption of intelligibility confined merely to the un-
disputed success stories. How did human beings arrive on Earth? Many
"old-school" Darwinian biologists tell us that it is the result of a slow,
constant, and consistent series of chance genetic mutation acted upon by
natural selection. But "punk eek" (punctuated equilibrium) evolution-
ists challenge this gradualism. This explanation is not sufficient, they
say, since the evidence from the fossil record does not bear out Darwin's
theory of gradual change. The fossil record shows more sporadic jumps,
hence the process must have occurred in spurts, with periods of little
change ("stasis") and then massive change, leveling out again to a period
of very little change. But again, still other evolutionists challenge both
of these positions. Both the Darwinian evolutionist's explanation and
I he punk eek explanation lack explanatory scope since they do not suffi-
ciently account for the origin of life in the first place. This third group of
panspermia evolutionists holds that life must come from life, and so we
should seek our ancestry in the realm of outer space, being open to the
idea that alien life forms "seeded" the earth with life millions of years
ago. The point here IN that regardless of whichever interpretation has
more merit, it is still assumed by all parlies that something must explain
the arrival of human brings on our planet.

13
St. 'Ilionms Aquinas mul the I'riciple of Sufficient Reason

In all of ihese cases, there are questions about the world - the scientist
asks why something is the case, what makes something happen, etc., and
there are reasons "out there" to be found. The world (at least in itself) is an
understandable and explainable place. There are reasons why these things
occur. If one group gives an explanation that is inadequate in some way
(say, for example, it lacks explanatory scope), another group will point out
the inadequacy in the theory. There may indeed be debate over whether or
not a thesis is adequate, but never once is the scientific mind content with
statements like "One's eye color does not come from anything," "Nothing is
responsible for diseases," "Nothing is causing this extreme gravitational at-
traction," "The human species came from absolutely nothing," and so on. In
all of these cases, reason passes from an observable instance of something to
infer the existence of something else that is not directly observable in order
to explain, ground, and make sense of the first. Without this assumption
that the world is intelligible in this way, science could do very little. A cha-
otic world in which diseases, the human species, not to mention car deal-
erships and supermarkets can just pop into existence out of nowhere, is not
the world in which we live nor the world that science investigates. Ex nihilo
nihil fit is therefore an important scientific principle.13

The Assumption of Intelligibility in Philosophy

"When I was young Cebes, I had an extraordinary passion for that
branch of learning which is called natural science. I thought it
would be marvelous to know the causes for which each thing comes
and ceases and continues to be"14
- Plato
If there is something that philosophy "does," it is at least a disciplined
attempt to understand and explain things. Whether the questions are

13 Nagel writes, "Science is driven by the assumption that the world is intelligible....
It seems to me that one cannot really understand the scientific world view unless one
assumes that the intelligibility of the world...This assumption is a form of the principle
of sufficient reason— that everything about the world can at some level be understood,
and that if many things, even the most universal, initially seem arbitrary, that is because
there are further things we do not know, which explain why they are not arbitrary after
all." Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception
of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford University Press, 2012) 17.
14 Plato, Phaedo, 96a. taken from Plato: The Collected Dialo^um, ir. Hugh Tivdennick
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961),7H

14 ._.__
 Introduction

about ethics, the mind/body problem, or the nature of God, just where
would the search for wisdom be without a starting principle that things
like these need explaining? Philosophers seek answers and are not typi-
cally satisfied with primitive inexplicable notions. The notion that states
of affairs just do not come into being for no reason and that the universe
is therefore intelligible gives us a sort philosophical "right" to ask "why"
certain things are the way they are. Such a starting point is a critical fac-
tor to the wonder that is specific to philosophy. Without such a principle,
philosophy would not get very far at all.
Before we look at some historical examples, let me clarify a point.
As I briefly mentioned, this assumption of intelligibility, which I am
calling the principle of sufficient reason, comes in many shapes and
sizes. It frequently appears under different formulations, and often is
not explicitly stated at all. It may appear from time to time in what I
will call its logical form, and at other times, in its ontological form.
The point being is that when one goes looking for a principle that pos-
IIs reality as intelligible and require reasons, he ought not to look for
any single formulation of the principle in the history of philosophy.
One needs to be open to different ways of saying (or assuming) the
same thing. So while Leibniz's full-blown statement of the principle
will hardly appear as something used by other thinkers, nevertheless
some version of it is always present in philosophical reasoning. Conse-
quently, the history of philosophy is full of examples that make use of
interpretations of the principle of sufficient reason.
The listing here does not, in any way, claim to be exhaustive of all the
I hinkers who have used the principle. Rather, it is simply a concise attempt
lo show, by only a handful of examples, just how radically important, wide-
spread, and foundational the principle has been in philosophy.
Parmenides' argument against change and multiplicity is a good place to
slart.15 Parmenides argues for the impossibility of change and multiplicity
based on his hard disjunction of being and not-being. Things cannot come
anew from being, nor can they be distinguished from one another by being
(since whatever is already has "being"), nor can things come from or be dis-
tinguished by nothing Hrgo, change and multiplicity of being is impossible.
Parmenides then wunlu us lo conclude that since change and multiplicity
cannot be accounted lor, mich notions should be rejected. But why does
15 Aristotle, 'th$ Phytic** IVinl ivibio,

15
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

change and multiplicity need an explanation? In other words, why is it that

change cannot come into being from nothing? Parmenides does not say.16
Socrates was concerned with asking definitional questions because he
wants to construct an episteme for ethics. For example, "What is virtue?"
Virtue can be explained, and the elenchos is worthwhile because it will
help us "give an account" of virtue. A successful definition or "account" of
virtue provide all of the necessary and sufficient conditions that apply to
it (neither too broad, narrow, nor circular), and it must, pace the Sophists,
be objective, viz., the definition needs to reflect realities that are able to
be discovered and not merely determined by taking a poll or appealing to
convention. As we all know, Socrates thinks knowledge fits these criteria.17
Virtue is reducible to knowledge. To know the good is to do it. There is no
such thing as a wise man who chooses wrong, and so "akratic" behavior
(akrasia) is impossible. For Socrates, virtue can be explained. It is not the
case that virtue and wisdom mutually imply each other, but rather, virtue
is identifiable with wisdom - it is just wisdom by another name.
Socrates is, of course, presupposing here that moral character can be ac-
counted for and explained. The whole basis of his reasoning presumes that
good behavior does not just happen "out of the blue" without any reason
whatsoever. On the contrary, Socrates thinks there are real reasons that
bring about or cause good character. The presence of good moral character
has a sufficient reason for its existence; knowledge explains why it is there. If
Socrates were open to the possibility of anything (virtue included) coming
into being from nothing, his argument would be desperately crippled.
Plato wanted to defend certain knowledge (episteme) as something over
and above the mere belief held by common men. Belief is fallible, but the
true knowledge of the philosopher must be something incorrigible. But
if the philosopher has this certain knowledge, what is its object? Certain
knowledge cannot be sufficiently accounted for by appealing to sensible
particulars. The mutable nature of sensible objects renders them ontologi-
cally unfit to be the objects of episteme. Something else then must be pos-

16 Jonathan Barnes argues that Parmenides* use of the idea that all happenings must
have an explanation, and that explanation must be sufficient for what they explain, is
an application of the principle of sufficient reason. "The phrase husteron e prosthen is
sometimes translated 'later rather than sooner,' or at one time rather than at another/
Thus, Parmenides is applying the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Jonathan Barnes, The
Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1989), 187.
17 l'or example, we see this view discussed throughout PIIUO'N Mem).
 Introduction

Hod. Plato thinks that the feature of incorrigibility (on the epistemic side)
must be matched or explained by certain features on the metaphysical
side. If the knowledge is necessary and unchanging, so too must be the
objects of that knowledge. The existence of incorrigible knowledge needs
to be explained by the existence of unchanging, eternal, abstract objects.18
'1 hus, from the epistemological fact about certain knowledge, Plato makes
metaphysical inferences. The Forms are the ontological conclusions that are
inferred to exist based upon certain epistemological premises. It is not that
Plato claims that we can see or experience these Forms with our senses;
ml her, Plato thinks that abstract objects must exist because they are the
only sorts of things that can account for episteme. Plato wants to say that the
l;nrms (if we may use the Aristotelian terminology) are at least the material
i atises of our knowledge, even if something else, such as illumination by the
I;orm of the Good, may serve as some sort of efficient cause as well.19
But one might wonder why one should bother with claiming the exis-
tence of unseen abstract objects. Why is it that certain knowledge cannot
jus! exist as an uncaused "brute fact," with no explanation at all? Why
not just say that episteme has no cause or explanation? The only answer
seems to be that Plato just implicitly rules this option out. Out of nothing,
nothing comes - not even episteme. Episteme needs to be explained and
accounted for, and the Forms, although not a sufficient condition, are at
least a necessary condition for its existence.
Aristotle thought the very nature of philosophical inquiry was to know
the principles of things, and so defends the idea of causes as explanations.
Wisdom, he says, not only deals with the causes and principles of things,
lull wisdom actually is a causal understanding of the world.20 That things in
t he world can be explained in terms of their causes is taken for granted, and
I his notion serves as the whole basis of the philosophical enterprise. That

IK "If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are
IIK'NC sclf-existent ideas unperceived by sense and apprehended only by the mind." Plato,
ihmicus, 51d. Translation taken from Plato Collected Dialogues tr. Benjamin Jowett, 1178.
I y Not to mention other indications that the Forms serve as some sort of formal/efficient
i niisc: 'Tor I cannot help thinking that if there be anything beautiful other than absolute
hnuity, that can only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty - and this I
Nhould say of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?... I leave all that, which
IN only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured
In my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of
bcHiiiy In whatever way or manner obtained." Plato, Phaedo: lOOb-e. op. cit.
20 ArlNtolle, Metaphysial I VH2«I.

17
St, Ihomtis Aquinas ami the Priciplc of Sufficient Reason

we can and need to explain things in terms of causes and principles enables
Aristotle to frequently make existential inferences from things directly per-
ceived to what must exist to ground those observances. Take motion, for
example. How is it that motion occurs? What must reality be like in order
for there to be motion at all? The Megarics took the position that there is
only actuality; anything that is not actuality is nothingness. But Aristotle
says this view does away with movement and becoming. Since movement
and becoming are obvious facts about the world around us, there must be
more to reality than what the Megarics say. The Megaric dichotomy is false,
and Aristotle goes between its horns by saying there is a third alternative.
There is more to being that simple actuality, another level of being he calls
"potency/' Potency is a level of being that is real but not actual, it is an abil-
ity to be act but which is not act.21
We see here a lucid example of reason moving from the observed to the
unobserved. Aristotle moves from directly observable motion to inferring
the existence of a non-observable level of being called potency. But why
does he posit the existence of this unobservable "potency?" Why say such
a thing exists in any way at all? What is the methodology or reasoning
process behind this inference? There seems to be no other option except
for holding that if a given set of alternatives cannot suffice in explaining X,
another thing must be added until X is sufficiently accounted for and ex-
plained (because X must be explained). But this "adding of entities" meth-
od is really nothing other than presupposing that something cannot come
from nothing. Since what we have cannot suffice for an explanation (and
since "out of nothing, nothing comes," ergo nothing is not a viable option),
21 This discussion occurs in Aristotles Metaphysics, Book IX, 1047a4 ff. Jonathan
Barnes argues that Aristotle makes use of the principle of sufficient reason in the Physics
as well: "Aristotle later applied the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Physics 252a4" Jonathan
Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1989), 614. For further discus-
sion on Aristotles use of the principle of sufficient reason in the Metaphysics, Vasilis
Politis argues that "[Aristotle] is clearly working with some version of the principle of
sufficient reason." He concludes by saying that Aristotle's philosophical project, in that
it is a search for explanations or causes, must presuppose an assumption of the principle
of sufficient reason: "If we ask why Aristotle is working with such a strong principle of
sufficient reason, the answer is, evidently, because he wants to push the overall project,
i.e., the project of searching for explanations - reasons, causes - as far is it will go." Vasilis
Politis, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics (London: Rout-
ledge, 2004) 273-5. Others argue that Aristotle's need to explain motion follows motion s
characterization as an accident. See John F. X. Knasas, "Thomistic Existentialism and the
Proofo Ex Molu at Contra Gentiles I, c. 13," 'Ihe 'lhomist 59 (1995): 591-615.

18
 Introduction

another entity must be added, and so on. The idea that motion can be
just an unexplainable "brute fact," without any reason or principle behind
It, seems to be an impossible alternative for Aristotle. This is the same
methodology we also see operative in the philosophical distinctions of
form/matter and substance/accident. Things need reasons, motion needs
a reason, and the doctrine of potency helps to fill that role.22
One could also mention St. Augustine's famous argument from eternal
I ruths to an eternal mind that grounds those truths.23 In short, humans
a re all aware of ideas they have within their souls, ideas which by their
very nature are universal and necessary. But these universal and necessary
Ulcus cannot originate from us, nor can they come from the external ma-
terial world, since these are contingent beings lacking any characteristic
of universality or necessity. Ergo, there must be some necessary being or
denial mind that serves as a transcendent anchor for these truths.
But again, as we asked of Plato, why does Augustine think these truths
need an explanation or ground at all? Why is it that they cannot just be
"eternally true" without any justification or "ontological ground?" Pre-
sumably, it is because he thinks it is simply evident that things (in this
i use, necessary truths) need reasons as to why they are a certain way and
not otherwise. Something must account for these ideas; it cannot just be
"not hing." If nothing accounted for these things, these ideas would be lack-
IIIK a sufficient reason. Since contingent beings insufficiently account for
t hese truths, our minds must look elsewhere and assert the existence of a
holier being can better account for them.
'Ihe Arabic scholastics utilized an idea which in modern times has
been coined, "the principle of determination." Thinkers in this tradi-
llnn frequently invoked a need for some selecting agent to determine
the existence of one possibility over other alternatives. The principle of
determination holds that between things equally possible (to be or not to
he), some sort of determinant, cause, reason, or selecting agent (murajjih)
Is called for to bring into being one possible over the other. We see this
Idea for example in al-Ghazali:

11 As J. Maritain notes, "The principle of sufficient reason precedes the division of

l>clnn Into potency and act. To apprehend its necessity there is no need first to have rec-
ognized this distinction.** Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on
HWr/# (New York: Mentor Omcgtt. 1962), 103.
2} Sec AugUNtlnc of Hippo, P* Libftv Arbltrlw Bk II.

19
 St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

It is an axiom of reason that all that comes to be must have a cause

to bring it about. The world has come to be. Ergo, the world must
have a cause to bring it about. The proposition, "What comes to
be must have a cause" is obvious, for everything that takes place
occupies a certain span of time, yet it is conceivable that it come
about earlier or later. Its confinement to the particular time span
it actually fills demands some determinant to select the time. 24
The need of an agent-like determination to make one possibility an
actuality from among other possibilities is also used by al-Farabi. Fara-
bi makes a distinction between what a thing is: it is essence (mahiyyah)
and that it is, it is existence (huwiyyah). All things that exist, exist either
necessarily (if its essence includes existence), or possibly (its nature does
not include the notion of existence).25 This division is exhaustive. Of ev-
erything that exists, that fact of existence is either from the very essence
of the thing or it is not. Hence, anything that exists is either necessary or
possible. Everything that is a possible being, however, needs a cause to
bring it into being:
Transition from not-being to being demands an actual cause. This
cause either has its essence identical with its existence or not. If it
does, then being is uncaused. If it does not, then existence must be
from another, and that from another, and so on until we arrive at
a First Cause, whose essence differs in no way from its existence.26
For al-Farabi, there is nothing that exists that does not have existence,
and this existence can be had only essentially or through another being.
In other words, the existence of all things is accounted for, either by the
necessity of a thing's own nature, or by the causal efficacy of some other
thing. There is no being who's existence is accountable to "nothing".

24 Al-Ghazali, "The Jerusalem Tract," trans, and ed. A.L. Tibawi, The Islamic Quarterly,
9 (1965), 98 (emphasis mine), cited in William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument:
From Plato to Leibniz (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1980), 58.
25 "Everything that is belongs to one of two kinds. In the case of beings of the first
kind, existence is not involved in their essence. These are called 'of possible existence.' In
the case of being of the second kind, its essence does involve existence. These are called
'necessarily existent."' Alfarabi, Philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. F. Dieterichi (Leiden:
Brill, 1890), 90, cited in Craig, 81.
26 Alfarabi text from Robert Hammond, The Philosophy ofAlfarabi ami Its Influence on
Medieval Thought (New York: Hobsen Book Press, 1947), 20, died In Craig, H<T.

20
 Introduction

Along the same lines, Avicenna's argument for the existence of God
is interesting because it seems to anticipate the principle of sufficient
reason by posing a dichotomy that resembles later formulations of the
principle. Avicenna offers an argument from contingency to the exis-
lence of a necessary being, arguing that a series of contingent beings must
terminate into that necessary being.
Whatever has being must either have a reason for its being or have
no reason for it. If it has a reason, then it is contingent... If on the
other hand it has no reason for its being in any way whatsoever,
then it is necessary in its being. This rule being confirmed, I shall
now proceed to prove that there is in being a being which has no
reason for its being.
Such a being is either contingent or necessary. If it is necessary,
I hen the point we sought to prove is established. If, on the other
hand, it is contingent, that which is contingent cannot enter upon
being, except for some reason which sways the scales in favor of its
being and against non-being. If the reason is also contingent, then
I here is a chain of contingents linked to one another, and there is
no being at all, for this being which is the subject of our hypothesis
cannot enter into being so long as it is not proceeded by an infinite
succession of beings, which is absurd.27
I n this passage, Avicenna seems to use the word "reason" in a more restrict-
ed sense to mean "cause." Thus reformulated it reads, "Whatever has being
musl either be caused or necessary." This means that in Avicennas universe,
I lie existence of every existing being is accounted for. Whatever exists is either
i mised by another or it exists a se. There are no tertium quid sorts of beings
I hal have no reason at all, that is, an alleged being that exists neither necessar-
ily nor through a cause. This dichotomy of "whatever exists, exists either from
I he necessity of its own nature or from the causal efficacy of another being" is
what we will later call a "strong" principle of sufficient reason.
'I he Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides assumes the truthfulness of ex
iiihilo nihil fit in his own argumentation for the existence of God. Rabbi

17 Ibn Sinn, UI-RIHUIUI nl-'Amhlyrt, In Arthur J. Arbcrry, Avicenna on Theology (Lon-

don: )ohn Murrny, lWl). 25, cmplumU mine, 'I he passage is died In Craig, 88-9. In this in-
Nlrtiice, ll should be mentioned (lit*I Avlcemnt amnn lo be using "reason" as synonymous
W i t h "CMUNC."

21
,S'/f 'I llamas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Moses wants to show that the position that no things are eternal is false.
If no things were eternal, then it is possible that all things could cease to
exist, and if that, nothing would exist. But if nothing ever existed, then
nothing would exist now either: "All things therefore must come to an end,
and then nothing would ever be in existence, for there would not exist any
being to produce anything. Consequently, nothing whatever would ex-
ist."28 Whatever one might think of Maimonides' modal inference that all
possibilities must be actualized over infinite time is an entirely separate
issue from the fact that Maimonides assumes and implicitly holds to the
truth of at least some version of the principle of sufficient reason.
Let us move ahead to St. Thomas Aquinas and his well-known Quin-
que Viae. These arguments start with apparent facts about the world,
and proceed by reason into the causes of these apparent facts. Motion,
causation, contingency, degrees of perfection, and things acting for an
end all call for a more complete explanation - a prime mover, a first
cause, etc. But how would these arguments ever get off the ground with-
out presupposing that these sorts of events call for explanation in the
first place? It should be easy for us to see and agree with the words of
Gilson, "Ex nihilo nihil fit; therefore all movement presupposes a mover;
every effect presupposes a cause; every contingent being a being per se;
every series a first term; all order an orderer."29
One can make a similar observation about Aquinas' argument for the
existence and nature of the human soul. Human souls are not the kinds
of things that one can directly observe. Rather, their existence and nature
are conclusions derived from philosophical analysis. Aquinas holds that
the soul is the "first principle of life of those things which live." This prin-
ciple is not a body (for then all bodies would be alive), but the act of a body.
Human souls have the additional properties of being incorporeal and sub-

28 Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, pt. II ch. 1, 2nd ed. rev., trans. M.
Friedlander (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1928), 152.
29 Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Edward Bullough (New
York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993), 94. Norman Kretzmann concurs that Aquinas' cos-
mological proofs presuppose some version of the principle of sufficient reason: "Aquinas
shows that he assumes or considers self-evident some form of'the Principle of Sufficient
Reason [PSR], a principle that in its strongest form maintains that nothing can exist and
no fact can obtain without there being an explanation for that thing's existence or for that
fact's obtaining.'" Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas'* Natural
Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Prow, 1W7), 107,

22
 Introduction

sistent, and Aquinas claims he knows this based on observed operations

of the human intellect. The intellect s knowledge of universal natures is an
operation per se apart from the body, and whatever can act per se apart
from the body must be able to exist apart from such a body.30
Here it seems that Aquinas is using the principle labeled by later scho-
laslics as agere sequitur esse, which signifies on the ontological side that
JK lions are dependent on the nature of the thing, and thus, on the epis-
I emological side, that we can know what a thing is by what it does. From
an act of some sort, reason infers that there is an underlying nature that
accounts for that act. Applying this method to the soul, we know the
nature of the soul not by direct observance, but through the acts it per-
forms. If the soul performs acts that are per se apart from a body, then
the source of those acts must also be incorporeal, subsistent, and able
lo exist apart from the body. Whatever one may think of this particular
argument is irrelevant. The point is that the claim presupposes that acts
i a n not just be unexplained entities coming into being from nothing. If
ac Is could come into being from sheer nothing, then one could never
make a valid argument about the nature of the soul or anything else that
followed the agere sequitur principle. To be sure, if ex nihilo nihil fit is
false, then the agere sequitur principle is false as well, and to whatever
degree one doubts ex nihilo nihil fit one must also, to that same degree,
doubt the agere sequitur principle.
' I here is more. The idea that "from nothing, nothing comes to be" is
deeply imbedded and interwoven throughout the whole Thomistic fabric.
II is difficult to find an argument that does not presuppose it in some way,
and there are strong reasons to think the principle is truly metaphysical,
enjoying universal applicability. To list just a few examples: in one instance,
Aquinas defends a formulation of the principle remarkably similar to Avi-
i enna's "tipping the scale between possibilities" argument mentioned above.
Aquinas thinks that absolutely everything other than God - viz., all contin-
gent realities, need a cause for their existence, since of themselves they are
merely possible and "indifferent" to being or not being. Somethingis needed
lo overcome this indifference to being in order for such things to be at all:

M) S.T 1.75,1-3 (vol, 5, 150) I Im* Aquinas discusses principles of vital operations (vital-
h ofH'rattonis principiumii AM writ wn ihe principle of intellectual operations (principium
hUcllfctuaUs operation!*), In nlhvr wnnk IIICNC vllal and intellectual operations have a
ground In u *uul which U no! IliflNltcilly observable,

23
St, Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

"Everything that has a possibility of being and of not being, needs something
else to make it be, for, as far as it itself is concerned, it is indifferent with
regard to either alternative."31 Aquinas gives a similar argument ab<out all
composite things, whether composed of form and matter or essence and
existence. They, too, need a cause, but this time he states a different reason:
"For things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes
them to unite."32 On another occasion, Aquinas uses an act/potericy ar-
gument supporting ex nihilo nihil fit regarding the existence of the entire
universe. He says that the most effective way to prove Gods existence is
from the supposition of the eternity of the world, which being supposed, it
seems less manifest that God exists. "For if the world and movement had
a beginning, it is clear that we must suppose some cause to have produced
the world and movement, because whatever becomes anew must take its
origin from some cause of its becoming, since nothing evolves itself from
potentiality to act, or from non-being to being."33
The perceptive reader of Aquinas will also find a striking anticif ation
of Leibniz's critique of Newtonian absolute time and space. Leibniz a>gUed
that space and time could not be eternal and absolute, since there wovld be
no sufficient reason as to why God created the universe when He di{ and

31 Compendium of Theology Part. 1 Ch. 6, vol. 4. Aquinas also uses this sort of'some-
thing that determines two possibilities" argument to argue for final causality: "I cnswer
that, every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if in a number of causes ordained^o one
another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the}rst of ;
all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, %Ve in
so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act \ut an
agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not domi-
nate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently
in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined Usome
certain one, which has the nature of an end" S.T. I-II.1.2, vol.6, 9, emphasis mine.
32 "..Every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite nless
something causes them to unite" S.T. 1.3.7, (vol. 4, 47), emphasis mine. We will eplore
texts like these more thoroughly in a later chapter.
33 "Cum nihil educatse depotentia in actum vel de non esse in esse," S.C.G. 1.13, vol. 3> 33.
Similarly, "Everything which was not always manifestly has a cause whereas this is 0 t so
manifest of what always was." (Si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisseUmne
enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam.) S.T. 1.46.1 ad.6, vol. < 480,
emphasis mine. This should not be confused with Aquinas* frequent disagreemenwith
the ex nihilo nihil fit axiom of the ancient philosophers (i.e., S.T. 1.45.2 ad.l, vol.' 456
and De Pot. q. 3 a. 1) where that statement meant that a material cause musl alw*s be
presupposed. Aquinas thinks of course that God can create ex nihilo and. In such tase,
there Is an cfliclenl cause bul no material cause,

24
 Introduction

where He did. Aquinas says something remarkably similar to this idea that
space and time cannot be eternal in response to the claim that the universe
has always existed and thus could not have come into being:
Now God's duration, which is eternity, does not have parts, but is
utterly simple, without before and after... Therefore, the beginning
of the whole of creation is not to be thought of in comparison to
any diverse parts designated in some pre-existing measure... So
that there would have to be a reason in the agent why he brought
the creature into being in this designated part of that duration
rather than at some other preceding or subsequent point. Such a
reason would be required if, beside the totality of created being,
there existed some duration divisible into parts, as is the case in
particular agents, which produce their effects in time, but do not
produce time itself. God however, brought into being both the
creature and time together... Particular bodies are brought into
being not only at a definite time, but also in a definite place; and
since the time and the place in which they are involved are extrinsic
to them, there must be a reason why they are produced in this place
and time rather than in another... Outside the universe of creatures
I here is no time, time having been produced simultaneously with
I hat universe; hence we do not have to look for the reason why it
was produced now and not before...!'34
It is worthy of note that in this text Aquinas seems to recognize what
Leibniz would later; that if space and time were absolute (ie., indepen-
dent beings in their own right) and eternal, God would indeed need a
suilicient reason why He created the universe at one point in space and
I line rather than another. However, Aquinas' response (which is shared
l>y Leibniz, for that matter) is that space and time do not exist inde-
pendently of the divine choice. The divine duration that existed logically
prior to the temporal space-time duration is simple and not composed of
parts, so there is no temporal "before" the creation of the universe with-
in which God must operate. Aquinas' admission of this point suggests
his openness to extending the principle of sufficient reason beyond the
purely ontological level of ens reale to the realm of ens rationis, and even
more particularly, the ratio of choice.
More modern proponents of the principle of sufficient reason frequent-
ly use an exhaustive division In stating the principle: "Whatever exists

H IS.C.CI. //J5.A, vol, 1.1, ,MV, tmphtul* mine,

25
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

must have a sufficient reason in itself or in another," or something more

akin to the Arabic Neoplatonist s "Everything that exists must have ex-
istence essentially or non-essentially." These formulations convey the
notion that everything either exists essentially (per se) or its existence is
caused through another (per aliud), and consequently there is nothing for
whom existence is unaccounted. Likewise, Aquinas too makes these sorts
of disjunctive statements, sometimes as major premises of an argument.
For example, he does this when arguing that even the heavenly bodies
have a potency for non-being:
But even if it is granted that a celestial body is not composed of
matter and form, it still must be admitted that potency for non-
being is in it in some way. For it is necessary that each simple
subsisting substance either is its own existence or participates in
existence. A simple substance which is its own subsisting existence
cannot exist except as oney just as whiteness, if it were subsisting,
could not exist except as one. Therefore, every substance which is
after the first simple substance participates in existence?5
Even if the heavenly bodies were not composed of matter and form,
they must still "participate" in existence, since only one being can be
subsisting existence. What makes this passage noteworthy is the ma-
jor premise that "it is necessary that each simple subsisting substance
either is its own existence or participates in existence." If we may put
aside the question of whether it is a true first principle or not (more on
this later), we can say with full confidence that a) Aquinas thinks it is
true, b) he calls it "necessary" and c) it seems to be the same as modern
formulations of the principle of sufficient reason - "Whatever exists
must have a sufficient reason for its existence either essentially or in
the causal efficacy of some other being." It is simply another way of
saying the same thing.
Interestingly enough, there is at least one instance where Aquinas actu-
ally uses and affirms the literal phrase "ex nihilo nihil fit" in the course of
an argument. The context is Aquinas elaborating on Aristotle's explana-
tion on how generation can come from non-being to being and he wants
to clarify from what sort of "non-being" generation proceeds. Aquinas
lists three sorts of non-being, the first of which is "what does not exist in

35 In Mela. Bk 8 Lee 21 n.5H()f emphasis mine.

26
 Introduction

tiny way; and it is from this kind of non-being that nothing is generated,
luntuse in reality out of nothing, nothing comes"36
Aquinas then both implicitly and explicitly accepts and uses an ex ni-
hilo principle, and also has a way of stating something very much like the
principle of sufficient reason. That St. Thomas never explicitly appeals to a
"principle of sufficient reason" here or anywhere else is entirely irrelevant.
I lis argumentation either regularly presupposes it or invokes particular
loi'ins of it. (i.e., "Every changing being needs a cause"; "Every being that
lupins to exist needs a cause"; "Everything that has a possibility of being
in id of not being needs a cause"; "Every finite, composed being needs a
» mi so"; etc.).37 It may be a matter of debate in any of these examples wheth-
rr Aquinas thinks these formulations of the principle of sufficient reason
me* I rue principles in the strict sense or conclusions to an argument. It is
not our concern at this point to show one way or the other. The point at
I his juncture is that Aquinas thinks the principle is true. More will be said
Kiln* on how to categorize the proposition.
I )uns Scotus' argument for the existence of God is an attempt to prove
l hr existence of a divine Being by way of a strict Aristotelian demonstration.
A lulling for Gods "triple primacy" was Scotus' attempt at showing there is
it first in efficient causality, final causality, and perfection. During the course
nl his argumentation, Scotus explicitly appeals twice to an ex nihilo princi-
ple, viz., that something cannot be produced by nothing, for what is nothing
i mises nothing,38 and again later: "From nothing, nothing is able to be."39
Si ol us makes no attempt to defend these statements so critical to his argu-
ment, which suggests he may take them as evident axioms.40

U) "Dicitur enim non ens tripliciter. Uno modo quod nullo modo est; et ex tali non ente
nun fil generatio, quia ex nihilo nihil fit secundum naturam,y> In Meta.} lib. 12 1. 2 n. 14,
t'tnphtisis mine.
S7 ()ne could also add as Aquinas says at S.T. 1.4.2, "Whatever perfection exists in an
rlUvl must be found in the effective cause". We will see that critics of the principle, such as
Will In in Rowe, accuse Aquinas of holding to some version of the principle of sufficient rea-
mm In order for these arguments to be successful. That Aquinas does hold to a principle of
MI Hit/lent reason I certainly agree. That he does so unjustifiably, however, is another matter.
\H "Non a nihilo, quia nullius est causa illud quod nihil est" Opus Oxoniense I dist. II, q. i tr.
In Innnncs Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1987), 39.
.W "... A nullo nihil potest esse." Ibid., 44.
40 William Rowe also crlllclzcH Scotus also on what he seems to think is an unwarrant-
ed itNNcrllon oflhc principle of miflielcnl reason principle. See Rowe, The Cosmological
Argument. 50,

27
St. lliomns Atjuhhis <ind the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it
is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been
something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning;
and what had a beginning must be produced by something else.46
Benedict Spinoza was explicit about his support of the principle. He uses
a common disjunctive style formulation similar to what we saw in Avicen-
na and Aquinas. In The Ethics we read that the proposition, "Everything
which exists, exists either in itself or in something else" is his first axiom.47
Later Spinoza argues that "of everything whatsoever that exists a cause or a
reason must be assigned. .. .This reason or cause must either be contained
in the nature of the thing in question, or external to it."48 Although Spinoza
does not give this axiom a special name, we will see later that it is quite like
what I will call the strong principle of sufficient reason.
Leibniz is the first philosopher to encapsulate all of these various for-
mulations under the term "principle of sufficient reason." He claimed not
to have "discovered" this principle, but only to have recognized its funda-
mental significance. Perhaps the best summary of his view is stated in the
Monadology: "Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that
of contradiction.... And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold
that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be
a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these
reasons usually cannot be known by us."49 In the way Leibniz forms the
principle here, we can say that he holds both to an ontological formulation
of the principle of sufficient reason referring to facts "real or existing" as
well as a logical principle of sufficient reason that refers to statements. It
is the ontological formulations of the principle, however, that appear more
frequently in Leibniz's writings, such as "nothing exists without there being
a greater reason for it to exist than for it not to exist,"50 or perhaps more pop-
ularly from this famous passage from the Theodicy:

46 Ibid., 474, emphasis mine.

47 Benedict Spinoza* The Ethics (see Axiom I) in On the Improvement of the Under-
standing, The Ethics, Correspondence, tr. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications
1955), 46.
48 Ibid., 51.
49 Nicholas Rescher, cited in G. W. Leibniz's Monadology: An Edition for Students
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 31-2.
50 G, W. Leibniz, On Contingency in Philosophical Essays, tr. Roger Arlew and Daniel
Ciarber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackclt Publishing Company, 1V8S)), 2V,

30
 Introduction

Nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least

a reason determining it... .This great principle holds for all events,
and a contrary instance will never be supplied: and although
more often than not we are insufficiently acquainted with these
determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that there are such.51
11 is not as if mere humans are able to always know what the sufficient
i iMson is for something. Nonetheless, we perceive that these reasons must
lu\ TO be sure: "We know £by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing
|t an not] produce any real being.' Whence it follows with mathematical
evidence that something has existed from all eternity; since whatever 'had
\\ beginning must be produced by something else/"52
hollowing Avicenna and Aquinas, Leibniz also sees the principle of suf-
lu Icnl reason as a sort of selecting or determining factor that overcomes
I lie "indifference" to being between different possible outcomes:
'1 his sufficient reason for the existence of the universe cannot be
found in the series of contingent things, that is, in the series of
bodies and their representations in souls; for, since matter is in
i I self indifferent to motion and rest, and to one motion rather
I ban another, we cannot find in matter the reason for motion, still
less the reason for a particular motion. And although the present
motion found in matter comes from the preceding motion, and
il, in turn, comes from a preceding motion, we will not make
any progress in this way, however far back we go, for the same
question always remains.53
'I he sufficient reason is then what makes the indifference between mo-
llnn and rest to be one or the other. Like Avicenna, Leibniz too alludes to
I he analogy of a sufficient reason as being the factor that "tips the scale"
he! ween why things are the way they are versus otherwise:
In order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another
principle is required, as I have observed in my Theodicy; I mean the
principle of sufficient reason, namely, that nothing happens without

M Leibniz, Theodtcy44t Ir. li.M. I luggim! (Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1988), 147.
''2 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, Ir. Peter Remnant and Jonathan
hennell (Cambridge, New York; (:nmhrUl|(c University Press, 1981), 435.
r
i3 Leibniz, "'Ihe Principles nl'Nitlitre MIUI (iruce Based On Reason," in Philosophical
luHiyi, 210,

31
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise. And therefore

Archimedes, being desirous to proceed from mathematics to natural
philosophy, in his book De aequilibro, was obliged to make use of a
particular case of the great principle of sufficient reason. He takes
it for granted that if there is a balance in which everything is alike
on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that
balance, the whole will be at rest. That is because no reason can be
given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now by
that single principle, namely, that there ought to be a sufficient reason
why things should be so and not otherwise, one may demonstrate
the being of God and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural
theology and even, in some measure, those principles of natural
philosophy that are independent of mathematics.. .54
One can almost see an argument from analogy here. Just like a scale
that is equally balanced, with no reason (weight) to make it tip to one
side over the other, so to there must be a reason why things exist one way
and not otherwise.
In his response to Clarke, Leibniz defended the principle against the
charge of "begging the question." We cite here the relevant passage at length:
He pretended that I have been guilty of a petitio principii. But
of what principle,. I beseech you? Would to God less clear
principles had never been laid down. The principle in question
is the principle of the want of a sufficient reason for a thing to
exist, for an event to happen, for any truth's taking place. Is this
a principle that wants to be proved?.... I dare say that without
this great principle, one cannot prove the existence of God, nor
account for many other important truths Has not everybody
made use of this principle upon a thousand occasions?. . . . I
have often defied people to allege an instance against that great
principle, to bring any one uncontested example wherein it fails.
But they have never done it, nor ever will. It is certain there is
an infinite number of instances wherein it succeeds, or rather it
succeeds in all the known cases in which it has been made use
of. From whence one may reasonably judge that it will succeed
also in unknown cases, or in such cases as can only by its means

54/fc/d.,321.

32
 Introduction

become known, according to the method of experimental

philosophy which proceeds a posteriori, even if the principle
were not otherwise justified by pure reason, or a priori.55
I his is an interesting passage in that Leibniz argues that because the
principle of sufficient reason is so widely confirmed in our experience, to
arbitrarily call it into question in the case of unknown instances corn-
mils the fallacy of special pleading. The objector posits an exception to
a widely confirmed principle without justification. Everyday experience,
wllhout exception, does not provide us with a violation of the princi-
ple. l?rom this reason alone, Leibniz thinks it is reasonable to adopt a
universal rule. Leibniz also poses a challenge to any gainsayers of the
principle. Provide one uncontested example of where the principle has
billed. Since one cannot, given the widespread success of the principle,
one can at least provide an inductive case for the principle even if the
M'I f evident justification of the principle were not available. Leibniz then
nuts with a comment indicating he thinks ultimately the principle could
Uv defended by reductio ad absurdum argumentation.56
Christian Wolf was a staunch defender of defense of the principle of
Millicient reason and his defense is well known:
Nothing exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather
than does not exist. That is, if something is posited to exist,
something must also be posited that explains why the first thing
exists rather than does not exist. For either (i) nothing exists without
a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist, or
else (ii) something can exist without a sufficient reason for why it
exists rather than does not exist (§53). Let us assume that some A
exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does
not exist. (§56) Therefore nothing is to be posited that explains why
A exists. What is more, A is admitted to exist because nothing is

Vi Ibid., 346.
'»ft "To deny this great principle is to do as Epicurus did, who was reduced to deny that
nllitT great principle, namely, the principle of contradiction, which is that every intelligi-
ble enunciation must ell her be (rue or false. Chrysippus undertook to prove that principle
agalnal lipiciirua.bul I think I need not I ml late hi m.T have already said what is sufficient to
jtiMll'y mine, and I might nay nomdhlng more upon It, but perhaps it would be too abstruse
lur thin prcnent dliiput*. And I believe reasonable and Impartial men will grant me that
having forced an tulveriwry to deny that principle IN reducing him nd absurdum" Ibid.

33
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

assumed to exist: since this is absurd (§69), nothing exists without

a sufficient reason; and if something is posited to exist, something
else must be assumed that explains why that thing exists.57
This and similar passages in Wolff would later become the object of
ridicule, contempt, and objection by later thinkers, most notably Kant.
David Hume, whose famous argument against the causal principle that
"out of nothing, nothing comes" we will address later, nevertheless clarified
his view in a letter he wrote to John Stewart in February 1754. Hume wrote
that he did not think that you could prove the causal principle through in-
duction or demonstration, but he still certainly believed in it and in fact
thought that the denial of this principle was patently absurd:
But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a
Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only
maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition
proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from
another Source. That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as
Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no demonstrative
nor intuitive Proof. Woud you infer that I deny their Truth, or
even their Certainty? There are many different kinds of Certainty;
and some of them as satisfactory to the Mind, tho perhaps not so
regular, as the demonstrative kind.58
Kant's take on the particular version of the causal principle, that "Ev-
ery event has a cause" is well known and needs little discussion here. In
a rather famous passage he criticized Wolff's argument above, stating
that Wolff equivocates on the term "nothing." But this did not mean
that Kant did not accept the importance of the principle. He held the
principle to be a synthetic a priori proposition; namely, it is a necessary,
universal, and informative truth known independently from experi-
ence. Kant's questionable and perhaps disjointed epistemology, however,

57 This citation is the translation into English that appears in the end notes to Kant's
Lectures on Metaphysics, 564. Although Kant was critical of this demonstration of the
principle of sufficient reason (claiming that Wolff's argument is guilty of an equivocation
of the term 'nothing/ one meaning the opposite of something and another meaning noth-
ing as non-being), he nevertheless did seem to affirm that the principle was an innate first
principle the human mind.
58 David Hume to John Stewart, February, 1754, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y.
T. (irelg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1: 187.

34
 Introduction

forced him to apply this principle only to phenomena and not to the
Ihings in themselves that lie underneath that reality.59
Kant did not get the last word on the matter. The Leibnizian philosopher
lohann August Eberhard attacked Kant's criticism of Wolffian-Leibnizian
metaphysics and argued that anything that was true and valuable in Kants
metaphysics was already contained in Leibniz's writings. Whether or not
(his is true overall is not a matter of concern here, but there is at least one
i onlemporary Kant scholar who does recognize the importance of the prin-
i iplc of sufficient reason in Kant s philosophy and thus, his "debt to Leibniz":
Although not often mentioned by its name in the Critique of Pure
Reason, it would be hardly possible to overestimate the role that the
principle of sufficient reason plays in Kant's new transcendental logic.
That is why in acknowledging his debt to Leibniz in On a Discovery
lie mentioned this principle first. Even if not from Leibniz's point of
view, Kant thought that the principle of sufficient reason was more
important than the Monadology: it provided that backbone around
which all the pieces of Kant's new metaphysics are gathered and in
relation to which they obtained their meaning and validity.60
Schopenhauer's Ph.D. dissertation of 1813, The Fourfold Root of the Prin-
i iplc of Sufficient Reason, critically looked at the natural tendency to view the
world as understandable. Schopenhauer thought this idea pertained to four
11 liferent areas: the principle of becoming, i.e., that an effect must follow from

'V "Hence if the reader will look back at our proof of the principle of causality, he
will become aware that only for objects of possible experience were we able to prove that
principle, viz., that everything that occurs (i.e., any event) presupposes a cause; and it
|»t rsupposes this, moreover, in such a way that we were also unable to prove the principle
I nun mere concepts, but could prove it only as principle for the possibility of experience''.
Iminanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis:
I lurkelt, 1996), 299, A 189 / B 232; A 196 / B 241.
()() Predrag Cicovacki, "Kants Debt to Leibniz" in A Companion to Kant, ed. Graham Bird
((>xford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 86. Anthony Savile attributes Kant's acceptance of the princi-
I >»il of sufficient reason as an assumption of common sense: "Why should Leibniz have thought
it ny such thing? What support can he offer for it? Reflecting on these questions sixty years after
I Hhn 1/s death, Kant observed that before his own consideration of the matter it was just an
assumption of common sense. TO deny It would be to accept the seeming absurdity that some-
thing can come from nothing: ex ulhllo nllquodl Yet, even though we may suppose that to be
« brute Impossibility, reiMon require* Ihul wc should be able to say something to show why it is,
JIIMI LIS we did In the cnnc of lh» Principle of (InntmdkMlon," Anthony Savile, Routledge Philoso-
phydutdtbook to iplbnlutout th* MoiMiMany (New York: Uoulledge, 2000), 34,

35
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

a cause; the principle of being, i.e., that sensible objects belong to time and
space; the principle of knowing, viz., that conclusions follow from premis-
es; and the principle of acting, viz., that actions follow from motives. With
Schopenhauer, all versions of the principle are understood to operate within a
framework of Kantian epistemology, that is, the principle of sufficient reason,
in whatever area, was only applicable to the phenomenal sphere.61
From 1750, many scholastics adopted the phrase "principle of sufficient
reason" from Leibniz/Wolff, but without the epistemology of Kant.62 One
thinker, Benedict Stattler, went so far as to define philosophy in terms of
the principle. Philosophy is, he says, "the science of sufficient reason of
those things which are or become or are able to be or become."63 Similar to
Aristotle, who said wisdom was causal knowledge of the world, Stattler's
definition of philosophy could be said to be knowing the sufficient reasons
of the real and the possible.
Josef Wilhelm Kleutgen is another scholastic worthy of special mention.
Kleutgen was instrumental in initiating the Scholastic/Thomistic revival of
the 20th century, and because he had been so imbibed with the teachings
of St. Thomas Aquinas, he earned the nickname Thomas redivivus from his
peers. Pope Leo XIII was so enamored with his work that he called Kleutgen
the "prince of philosophers," and it has been reported that Pope Leo request-
ed that Kleutgen write the initial draft of the papal encyclical Aetrni Patris.64
61 Perhaps due to Schopenhauer's influence, later Ludwig Wittgenstein also thought
that the principle of sufficient reason was an a priori insight: "All such propositions, in-
cluding the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of continuity in nature and of least
effort in nature, etc., etc. - all these are a priori insights about the forms in which the
propositions of science can be cast." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophi-
cus (London: Routledge, 2001) 81. And again: "Laws, like the principle of sufficient reason,
etc. are about the net and not about what the net describes/' Wittgenstein, 83, 6.35.
62 See John Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, June 1959).
63 "Recte itaque Philosophiam definimus esse scientiam rationis sufficientis eorum,
quae sunt, velfiunt, aut esse,fieriquepossunt." Benedict Stattler, (1728-1797), Philosophia
methodo scientiispropria explanata (Augsburg: M. Rieger and Sons, 1769), 721-1,2. Cited
in Gurr, n. 22, 57.
64 "It is highly probable that Kleutgen was one of the authors designated by Leo XIII
to draft the encyclical Aeterni Patris, which became the magna carta of official Thomism
within the Catholic Church. Certainly during the year in which the encyclical was drafted
Kleutgen had been called back to Rome at Leo XIIIs express desire and appointed prefect
of studies at the Gregorian University of the Roman College." Gerald A. McCool, Nine-
teenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method (New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 1989), 167.

36
 Introduction

ll Is also worthy of mention that, in spite of his strongly Thomistic and Scho-
lnMlc background, Kleutgen did not hesitate to publicly credit Leibniz for
having introduced the principle of sufficient reason into philosophy. It is not
IIwtI the scholastics should be faulted for an oversight, but rather, Kleutgen
thinks Leibniz should be recognized for saying explicitly and with greater
puvision what the scholastics implicitly held under different formulations.
(KI v u I gen explicitly mentions "there is no effect without a cause," as just one
nuiinple).65 Kleutgen also points out, as I have argued above, that although
11 ir scholastics did not specifically mention this principle; nevertheless, their
whole1 Aristotelian theory of knowledge by causation depends upon it, as
wrll us the doctrine of the four causes and the unification of essence and
••Hlslcnce in God and its distinction amongst creation. What the principle
i i«ii 11 y a (firms, says Kleutgen, is that all existing being either exists by itself or
by something else, and so it is important that we do not confuse ratio with
i tiusti. 'I he principle of sufficient reason does not say that all things have a
\ iti isc, only that all things have a reason. The difference is that the concept of
httliK unlike causa, does not imply production:
A being can be a principle or a sufficient reason without being
n cause in the proper sense of the word, which supposes the
production of a thing distinct from the agent-being. If then we
understand these concepts: being and principle of sufficient
reason in the sense explained, we cannot doubt the truth of the
principle: every being has a sufficient reason.66
'lying this to the ex nihilo principle, Kleutgen says the judgment that
••vrrylhing exists by itself or by another can be expressed negatively by
flying that what is cannot exist from nothing
'I ho Suarezian thinker, Juan Jose Urraburu, who received the honor of
hrlng invited to teach philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome
I mm Pope Leo XIII, also briefly mentions and supports this principle. In
his Institutiones philosophicae quas Romae in Pontifica Universitate Gre-
Xorhma tradiderat, Urr&buru makes the distinction between the broader
principle of sufficient reason and the more restricted principle of causality,
noting an "indifference argument" similar to the one used by Avicenna,
Amilnus, and Leibniz:
ft* Jewel" Wllhclm Klculgcn, />/<• Philosophic Der Vorzett (Inssbruck: F. Rausch, 1878),
vul, 1,45V,
ftft/Wrf..474-»icU#d!n(JurrlI.M,

37
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

For if ratio be taken for the essence of a thing or to the determinant to

existence, it is clearly evident that nothing can be without a suitable
and proportionate essence, and nothing can exist unless there is
something which determines its existence; otherwise it would be
indifferent to existence and from indifference nothing follows.67
John Gurr presents a vast array of other scholastic philosophers, most of
whom accept the principle, but argues that the systematic adoption of the
principle of sufficient reason by these scholastics occurred in the latter half
of the 18th century when Leibniz and Wolff began to exercise an important
influence on Scholasticism. Gurr thinks these scholastic systems suffered as
a result, since he perceives the principle of sufficient reason as presuppos-
ing a rationalism and flourishing in an "essentialist" context (where being
is seen primarily as essence), but less valuable in systems (i.e., Thomistic)
where being is seen as the act of existence. Gurr is hostile to the principle as
commonly used for these reasons, but appears to be open to other formula-
tions "as would be acceptable to perennial Scholasticism/*68
Space does not permit a full discussion of Gurr s work here, but a few brief
remarks will help justify my approach, since the present essay itself makes
heavy use of scholastic and Thomistic style argumentation. First, Gurr is
wrong that the principle of sufficient reason is an inherently antithetical no-
tion to an authentic Thomism. One indication of this should be that the adop-
tion of the principle of sufficient reason by post-19th century Thomists is con-
siderable. In fact, the list of names of prominent Thomists who have explicitly
accepted the principle of sufficient reason include Maurice De Wulf,69

67 Juan Jose Urraburu, Institutionesphilosophicae quas Romae in Pontifica Universi-

tate Gregoriana tradiderat (Valladolid: Typis Viduae ac Filiorum, 1891, II, 1101), cited:
in Gurr, 151.
68 Ibid., 7, n. 3. Gurr's claim here that the principle of sufficient reason flourishes only
in an "essentialist'* context seems to result from only thinking of a sufficient reason in the
order of essence. However there can be, as I will argue throughout, a sufficient reason in
the order of existence as well and it is this latter notion that is very congenial to an exis-
tential Thomist metaphysic.
69 The Thomist philosopher Maurice De Wulf held that all change and causality was "de-
manded by the principle of sufficient reason - an absolute principle to which all that is must
be obedient, under penalty of not being at all. To deny this sort of preexlstcnce Is equivalent to
denying change from one state to another, the evolution of reality," M mi rice ilc Wulf, Philoso-
phy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uulwnlly Prnw. ll>22), 200.

38
 Introduction

|olm Rickaby,70 H. Gardeil,71 Reginald Garrigou Lagrange,72 Fredrick

70 "To compile a catalogue of all the truths which are self-evident, and cannot be re-
ihit fil to components simpler than themselves, would be a tedious work, and not helpful
In present purposes. If, however, we are called upon to emphasize any beyond the three
limit Umed primaries, it will be the Principle of Sufficient Reason, so often violated by
pure empiricists, and yet so vital to all philosophy" John Rickaby, The First Principles of
Knowledge (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1919), 175.
/I "If being is intelligible, there must be a ground for its intelligibility. This ground
It precisely its 'sufficient reason/ that which both determines being to be and renders
II Intelligible. Every being, accordingly, is intelligible because for every being there is a
*»nllulent reason, something that adequately accounts for what it is or has." H.D, Gardeil
* M\ Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: IV. Metaphysics, tr. John Otto
IM Louis, MO: Herder Book Co., 1967), 140.
II I he principle of sufficient reason is the immediate basis of the proofs for the existence
nl (mil, By the appeal to the impossible it resolves itself into the principle of identity. In this
HI'IINI*. II Is an analytic principle....The principle of sufficient reason may be expressed by the
Inllowlng formula: "liverything which is, has a sufficient reason for existing," or "Every be-
ing hiiN a sufficient reanon",...'! HIH principle Is self-evident, and though it cannot be directly
iltMnoiiNt ruled, ll can be Indirectly dcmonM ruled by the indirect method of proof known as
UHIUCIIO ud ttbuurdum," (tarrlgnu Lagrange, Ucglnuld God: His Existence and His Nature I,
tr, I Join Bcdc Roue (Si Loull, MOi llmlrr Book Co., 1V34), 181.

39
 St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Copleston,73 Joseph Gredt,74 Jacques Maritain,75 Etiene Gilson,76 Bernard

73 This judgment is based on his BBC debate with Bertrand Russell, BBC Radio Third
Programme Recording, January 28 1948.
74 Etiam principium rationis sufficientis: "Nihil est sine ratione sufficiente", estprincipium
per se notum omnibus....principium rationis sufficientis etprincipium causalitatis reducun
tur ad principium contradictionis" Iosepho Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thorn
isticae, ii (Friburgi: Herder and Company, 1937), para.749,5 151, emphasis mine.
75 "This principle has a far more general scope and significance than the principle of
causality. For the principle of sufficient reason is exemplified in cases in which the efficient
cause plays no part. For instance, man s rationality is the ground, the sufficient reason of his
risibilitas and docilitas. Similarly, the essence of the triangle is the ground of its properties;
and there is no difference of being, no real distinction between the properties of the triangle
and its essence. Again God s essence is the ground of His existence, He exists a se, He is
Himself the sufficient reason of His esse, the ground of His existence, since His essence is
precisely to exist." (Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics (New York: Sheed & Ward,
1939) 99). Also: "At a later stage we can reduce, or rather logically attach, the principle of
sufficient reason to the principle of identity, by a reductio ad absurdum. This is a reflex op-
eration which may, for example, be described compendiously as follows. The expression in
virtue of which, when we say that in virtue of which an object is, must have a meaning or be
meaningless. If it is meaningless philosophy is futile, for philosophers look for a sufficient
ground of things. If, on the other hand, it has a meaning it is evident that in virtue of the
principle of non-contradiction, it is identical with the meaning of the phrase that without
which an object is not. If, therefore, anything exists which has no sufficient reason for its
existence, that is to say which has neither in itself nor in something else, that in virtue of
which it is, this object exists and does not exist at the same time. It does not exist because
it lacks that without which it does not exist. This reductio ad absurdum proves that to deny
the principle of sufficient reason is to deny the principle of identity. But the proof is a prod-
uct of reflection. The original manifestation, spontaneous and intuitive, of the principle of
sufficient reason is as I have described it above." Ibid., 101.
76 Because of its lack of a textual basis in the writings of St. Thomas, Gilson was re-
luctant to affirm the phrase "principle of sufficient reason," yet would still write in "Les
Principes et les causes" Revue Thomiste 52:1 (1952), 47-8: "A philosopher whom St. Thom-
as could not have foreseen, Leibniz, later affirmed that there are two first principles, one
for necessary truths - the principle of contradiction - and the other for contingent truths
- the principle of sufficient reason. For Thomists, what is one to do with this second first
principle? Some suggest formulating it as follows: 'Nothing exists without sufficient rea-
son.' In that case it means this: for something to exist in the world rather than not exist,
and for it to exist in a given manner rather than in some other manner, there must be a
cause that determines whether it exists or does not exist, and exists in this way rather
than otherwise. Two reflections now suggest themselves. First of all, this principle cannot
be held to be an absolutely first principle. Indeed if nothing determines that something exist
rather than not exist, or be as it is rather than otherwise, then it is possible for that thing
both to be and not to be at the same time that which it is and something else. Since this
would be contradictory, one can say that the formula of the principle of sufficient reason
leads back to the principle of contradiction. Secondly, and for the Mttmc rcanon, ihls princi-
ple is valid for necessary irulhs nol less than for contingent truth*, 'lhun It IN not necessary

40
 Introduction

l.nncrgan,77 Norris Clarke,78 Mortimer Adler,79 Raymond Dennehey,80 and

muny others, most of whom would not for a moment consider themselves
tin "essentialist" in metaphysics or a rationalist in epistemology.81 In fact,
11 ml man exist, but if he does exist it is held to be necessary that he be endowed with reason
in ill, consequently, since God is infinitely wise, everything has been ordered by His thought,
Mini wherever there is order there is reason. This means that there are sufficient reasons for
I IIIM|<s necessary just as there are for things contingent. Hence the conclusion: 'The prin-
»Iplr of sufficient reason is true, and it is valid not only for contingent truths but also for
in-* rssary truths, so that it must be held to be their principle, but not their first principle.'"
t llnl in Desmond Fitzgerald's "Gilson and Maritain on the Principle of Sufficient Reason'
In Itiitfues Maritain and the Many Ways of Knowing, ed. Douglas A. Ollivant (Catholic Uni-
vmlly of America-Press: Washington DC, 2002), 120-127.
/'/ I.onergan affirms an common alternative formulation of the principle, namely that
llu* real is completely intelligible." Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Under-
iltUHlhig, 5th edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 672.
/H ".. .It seems to me that this general Principle of Sufficient Reason is a quite legitimate
tlrvrlopment of Thomism, with the advantage of summing up in one basic formula the prin-
• l|ilr of the intelligibility of being that is implied in all of Thomas's specialized formulas of
II w I • ri nciple of Causality." William Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary
Ihomistic Metaphysics (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 181. All
IMIVIIIICC in thought to infer the existence of some newbeing from what we already know dc-
priiils upon this principle [of sufficient reason]. The ancient and medieval thinkers, includ-
ing Si. I nomas, did not formulate the principle in these explicit terms, but simply included
II ii IUIIT the general affirmation of the intelligibility of being.. ..But many modern Thomisls
wrk nine the explicit formulation we have given above ["Every being has a sufficient reason
(MI lis existence either in itself or in another"], as do I, because of its convenience as the most
it 11 Inclusive expression of the dynamic intelligibility of being as distinct from the static
M
| liuiple [PNC], and one that all realist metaphysicians use constantly, whether they de-
it i \hv 11 in this way or not. Ibid., 20. Clarke thinks however this is distinct from a Leibnizian
junllclive version that looks forward and can deduce the existence of an effect by rational
iin ivsslly. Thomas' use, thinks Clarke, does not deduce effects from causes but traces effects
kirk In a sufficient reason or adequate cause.
'/li "What does not have a raison d'etre or a cause of its existence in itself, trembles on
llu* verge of nothingness. Only if some cause exists and operates to preserve it in existence
Ml saved from annihilation, or being reduced to nothingness." Mortimer J. Adler, How
lo Ihink About God (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980), 117-118.
HO Tor Lo affirm the existence of things and at the same time to deny that they require
•i *tifliclent reason is to do violence to reason. That which lacks a sufficient reason for its
v K hi nice cannot be: it would both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect; it
wniiUl ihcrefore be nothing at all. Thus the principle, "It is impossible for a being to be and
mil In* nl I he same time and in (he same respect" leads to the principle of sufficient reason:
"l-vrry being has the reason for lis being either in itself or in some being outside itself." And
lliU principle leads In lurn In the principle of causality: "Every being that does not have
Ihr Niilliclent reason for llu being In lUcIf U ctuised by another.'* Raymond Dennehy, "The
< )ntologlcul BUMIN of Cerllliulc/' Ih* 'Ihamttt, vol. 50, No. 1, January 1986), 131.
HI < iurr actually mttk*»lh*clttlm llwl many ofthcMc'lhomUlH of the'Ihomistic revival

41
 St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

if the Thomist Norman Kretzman is right in saying that "Every cosmolog

ical argument depends on some version of the principle of sufficient rea
son,"82 then all Thomists, whether they explicitly admit it or not, require
this principle as an essential element to their philosophical worldview
Moreover, as we will see later, an important formulation of the principle of
sufficient reason which says: "Whatever exists has a reason for its exis
tence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of
some other being," is clearly a Thomistic doctrine. One may debate about
how St. Thomas comes to know that "Whatever exists has a reason for its
existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy oj
some other being"but what is not up for debate and what one cannot deny
is that St. Thomas at least thinks that statement is true. A reason, as we will
discuss in more detail in Chapter Three, is simply that which accounts for

went to the manuals of the late 18th century Jesuit and Franciscans thinkers (whom Gurr
claims were the ones responsible for incorporating Leibnizian and Wolffian rationalism
into scholasticism) in order to get their Thomistic material - and in doing so unknowingly
drank in Leibnizian and Wolffian waters! "It was inevitable that many of the authors of the
Thomistic revival, in their lack of contact with a tradition really stemming from St. Thomas
himself, credited the rationalistic manuals of the late eighteenth century with a Thomistic
content and meaning [The revival Thomists] decided that the Wolffian manuals such as
we have examined in this chapter were reliable guides in the perennial task of Scholastic
philosophy itself... .In thus reading St. Thomas into a framework furnished by rationalism
seemed to be the hand of Aquinas, but the voice was that of Wolff, and for many years this
synthetic product received the blessing intended for the great original." Gurr, The Principle
of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 90. What makes Gurrs position more im-
plausible is that he thinks Pope Leo XIII s Aeterni Patris was an attempt to rescue Catholic
philosophy from this nineteenth century "rationalism," but does not address the fact that
Kleutgen (himself a supporter of the principle of sufficient reason, and one who explicitly
gives credit to Leibniz) is frequently credited to be the primary author of that very encyc-
lical! Finally, to compound the error, Gurr's regret over the prevalent acceptance of the
principle of sufficient reason at the time of his writing (1959) forces him to seek a villain
responsible for this mix-up, and he decides to lay the blame at the feet of the "rationalist'
Garrigou Lagrange, without, even for a moment, pointing the finger at another much more
influential champion of the principle, namely Pope Pius XII! Ibid., 158.
82 Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas s Natural Theology in
Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 80. Kretzmann himself is an-
other Thomist who subscribes to a version of the principle of sufficient reason which he
thinks, as I have said here, is fundamental not only for science but for all rational thought,
"I subscribe to PSR2 ('Every existing thing has a reason for its existence either in the ne-
cessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of some other beings') interpreting the
expression fa reason for its existence' in the sense of a reason for its presently existing. Not
only the history of science, but even a fundamentally rallonnl nlllludc lowariLs ordinary
reality, presupposes PSR2." Ibicl,t 107.

42
 Introduction

I lie existence of something. There is no being in the Thomistic universe

II in I does not have a reason for its existence; there is only God (who exists
I mm the necessity of His own nature) and everything else (which exists
heumse of the causal efficacy of something else). So not only do numerous
Ihomists hold it to be true, but it seems that even Aquinas himself holds
In 11 very strong formulation of it. Second, just because the phrase "princi-
ple of sufficient reason" came from German rationalism, that fact alone
lines not mean that rationalism is the only context in which the principle
utn function, nor does it mean that the principle does not accurately de-
|Hi I I he metaphysical situation.83 To Gurr's credit, he seems to recognize
I he important distinction between the phrase and the concept of the prin-
» Iple of sufficient reason (in his words, the notion of sufficient reason and
I he principle of sufficient reason). It seems true that the phrase "principle
ul sufficient reason" was adopted by the scholastics from German rational-
ism, but this, of course, does not mean the concept of sufficient reason was
*u adopted, nor that the principle can only function within a rationalistic
*yMem. As we have seen and I will continue to argue, the principle of suf-
li< lenl reason is a fundamental principle to all philosophy, for it belongs to
I he philosophical enterprise to explain. The only way something can be
enplained is if it is explainable. Thus, the principle of sufficient reason is
Inherently wrapped up with the human mind seeking understanding, and
I* uol traceable to any particular school of thought or geographical area.
Nor should we forget that even Pope Pius XII, a friend of Thomism and
t< holasticism to be sure, saw the importance of this issue. He remarked
lhal I he Catholic Church holds human reason in high esteem, and can
only perform its important functions well when "imbued with that sound
philosophy" acknowledged and accepted by the Church, a philosophy that
Milliards, among other things, "the unshakable metaphysical principles of
HtH'n'ient reason, causality, and finality"84 The Pope seems to be saying that
wil hotil the safeguarding of the principle of sufficient reason and other prin-
i Iples, human reason is unable to perform crucial functions. For these rea-

M s (Mher recent scholastics, such as Joseph Owens and John RX. Knasas, defend the
|»i Iin Iplc by understanding the initiated thing as acquiring some kind of accident. Since
mi luiklcnt is Ipso facto dependent, ihc need for explanation is provoked. See Joseph
< JwniN, '"Ihc Cuusal Proportion - Principle or Conclusion," The Modern Schoolman, 32
(IUW): 323-39. I'or John V, X, KmiJUtiT dlm'UNNlon of causality from the accidental, see Be-
ing ami Somt 20th Century Vwmlfti (New York: Pordhnm University Press; 2003), Ch. 6.
M4 IMUH XII, Hunuml <!*n*rli (IVflO). 2U,

43
 St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

sons, scholastics and Thomists need not shy away from using both the notion
and the actual phrase "principle of sufficient reason."85 Just as Aristotle pro-
vided the scholastics with terms such as act and potency to capture a real
ontological situation, I see no reason why Leibniz too cannot provide scho-
lastics with a basic formula and phrase that sums up all of the assumptions
about the intelligibility of the world and the more specialized formulations
of the principle of causality.
This historical overview is sufficient to help the reader grasp both the wide-
spread nature of the issue and its fundamental importance. It is immateri-
al whether the principle is implicit or explicit; it makes no difference if you
phrase it in terms of "the principle of determination" like the Arabic scholas-
tics, the ex nihilo nihilfit of Aquinas and Descartes, the a nullo nihil potest esse
of Scotus, or the principle of sufficient reason of Leibniz or Wolff. As we will
later see, all of these various formulations presuppose at least some version of
the principle of sufficient reason, and without such presuppositions, the philo-
sophical enterprise is a truly crippled and hopeless endeavor.

The Need for a Defense of the Principle of

Sufficient Reason \
The principal aim of this essay, however, is not to determine the his-]
torical pedigree of an idea. Here we are concerned with a single question; j
namely, what good reasons are therefor thinking the principle of sufficient]
reason is true? This all-important question must be handled by arguments i
and not historical surveys. Given the above, I hope it is clear that this ques-j
tion is of fundamental importance to philosophy.
Many laypeople will find this purpose silly. Our metaphysical intu-
itions tell us that of course, something cannot be caused or determined by!

85 To mention three more problems in Gurr's work: 1) Apart from "essentialist" and
"rationalist" assertions, there is little in the way of argument to support Gurr's impatience (
with the principle and there is hardly any response to arguments in favor of it. 2) He '
seems to focus on the works that explicitly contain the phrase "principle of sufficient
reason" and not the negative formulation "out of nothing nothing comes" (or some equiv-
alent). Such an oversight is considerable if it is true (as I and many others say) that the two
formulations are metaphysically equivalent. 3) Gurr does not ask important questions
about common scholastic principles and methods (like the agere sequilur principle dis-
cussed above) and how they function without covertly presuppowlng (he principle of suf-
ficient reason. Without delving into these deeper Issues, CUxrr'n work U w VCIUTI* historical
overview lacking any deep philosophical significance.
 Introduction

nothing. Almost all of our day-to-day actions presuppose that something

i it n not come to be from nothing. We hear a knock on the door and seek to
HVV who is doing the knocking. We get sick and wonder where we caught
I he disease. Everyday life is literally inundated with causal inferences. On
1111 s score, the layperson has a good point; the principle of sufficient reason
i rrlainly enjoys a tremendous amount of intuitive plausibility.
Yet a defense of the "obvious" has never been anathema in philosophy.
Aristotle devoted a significant amount of time into defending the principle
nl non-contradiction, and such an effort is not misguided. A sound philoso-
phy attempts to explain "the obvious." A defense of the principle of sufficient
teason is important because a defense of first principles is important.86
II would seem that given the foundational nature of this principle and
I he immense section of our knowledge and methodology that hangs in
I he balance, there would be much literature on this subject. This infer-
ence, however, would be sorely mistaken. As far as I can tell, while a large
majority of philosophers have made use of causal inferences (and by the
same token, have used the principle of sufficient reason as a foundation for
I hose inferences), very few have ever devoted more than a paragraph or
I wo defending that principle.87
I n my view, this topic is of such a weighty importance; it deserves a full-
length treatment. The structure of the remainder of this thesis follows the
mcler of a scholastic article. We will first cover objections to the principle.
Next, we will explain the meaning and nature of the principle, followed
hy arguments in favor of the principle of sufficient reason. Finally, we will
i lose with a reply to the objections.

86 I-or example, Aristotle thought it important to say some words in the defense of the
principle of non-contradiction (Meta IV), which is arguably the most patently true prin-
ilpleofall.
H7 'I he largest treatment of defending the principle to date is Alexander R. Pruss, The
Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
PIVNN, 2006). Anolher relatively exleiiNlve defense is Reginald Garrigou Lagrange's God:
His Existence and His Nature I, Ir, Demi Hcile Rose (St Louis, MO; Herder Book Co., 1934),
111 232, However, the topic* iltucilNNtfil there are broiuler thun strictly defending the prin-
ilplcul'ftiiflk'knl rcaion.

45
 "Perhaps it just expresses an arbitrary demand; it may be
intellectually satisfying to believe that there is objectively, an
explanation for everything together, even if we can only guess at
what the explanation might be. But we have no right assume that
the universe will comply with our intellectual preferences.1"
- J. L. Mackie

1 J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and A#ain$t the lixlttanv of God
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), H6-7,
CHAPTER II:
Arguments Against
the Principle of
Sufficient Reason
W
hen reviewing literature critical of the principle of sufficient
reason, it is important to remember the distinction between
arguments and assertions. It is one thing to support one's po-
ult Ion with evidence, logic, and good reasons. It is another thing to assume
m assert that one's position is true while neglecting to provide supportive
HI Alimentation. A great amount of contemporary material critical of the
principle of sufficient reason does the latter. Little to no attention is paid to
I he Initial intuitive plausibility and arguments that attempt to support the
I irl nciple; and apart from an occasional point about fatalism or an uncritical
i I'lorence to Hume, little or no arguments are offered against it.
I'or Innately, not all critics are guilty of such omissions. Some
philosophers have taken it upon themselves to offer sufficient reasons for
i ejecting the principle of sufficient reason. Hume's arguments against the
ittumil principle are well known and respected, I will cover this series of
arguments first, From there, wc will move on to cover a few contemporary

47
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

thinkers who are opposed to the principle. The most careful work in
recent times that attacks the principle in is William Rowe's 1975 work,
The Cosmological Argument2 This work, although primarily focused
on rebutting some of the more popular versions of the cosmological
argument for the existence of God, nevertheless is relevant to our efforts,
since Rowe attacks the cosmological arguments collectively by saying they
all boil down to presupposing the principle of sufficient reason, which in
Rowe's view, either cannot be known to be true or, in some of its stronger
formulations, is demonstrably false.

The Objections of David Hume

But let us begin with David Hume. Hume's familiar argument against
causal principles is from in Sec III of the Treatise On Human Nature. Here
I quote the relevant passages at length:
To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a
cause: It is a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to
exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for
granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded.
It is supposed to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those
maxims, which though they may be denyed with the lips, it is
impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. But if we
examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above-explained,
we shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but
on the contrary shall find, that it is of a nature quite foreign to that
species of conviction.3
Recognizing the pervasive metaphysical intuition, Hume acknowledges
that although men may verbally deny "whatever begins to exist must have
a cause," it is impossible for men to really deny it "in their hearts." By this I
take it that Hume means that regardless of what men may say, they in truth

2 William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-

versity Press, 1975).
3 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Selections
from a Treatise of Human Nature (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1921),
197. For other examples of scholars who see Hume's argument as an issue for the
principle of sufficient reason/causality, see Pruss, 31 and G. R. M. Anscombe,
'Whatever Has a Beginning of Existence Must Have a CHUM: Hume* Argument
Exposed," Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 5 (April 1974), 145-51,
 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

really do believe the proposition. Hume then begins to question the source of
I his certainty; given "the idea of knowledge above-explained" (viz., Hume's
rpistemology of the "fork"), how can one be certain of this proposition
wilhout fear of error? He then goes on to argue that our certainty of this
principle cannot come from either intuition or demonstration:
But here is an argument, which proves at once, that the foregoing
proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We
can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new
existence, or new modification of existence, without shewing at
I he same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever
begin to exist without some productive principle; and where the
latter proposition cannot be proved, we must despair of ever being
able to prove the former. Now that the latter proposition is utterly
incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by
considering that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other,
and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be
easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment,
and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea
of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore,
of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is
plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual
separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no
contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being
refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which it is
Impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause.4
I ft he principle were intuitively or demonstratively certain, the contrary
I imposition would state some impossibility. In other words, unless the
proposition "Something can begin to exist without a cause" can be shown
lu be impossible, one can never be certain of the causal proposition either.
Suppose we call the opposite of the causal proposition, "Something can
lu'l^ln to exist without a cause," the anti-causal proposition. If the causal
proposition is intuitively or demonstratively certain, then the anti-
ttuiNiil proposition must be impossible. But the problem, Hume says, is
thttl the anli-causal proposition can never be proven impossible, because
the Ideas of cause and effect are distinct, and one can imagine them

4/fiW., 19H.
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

separated without any apparent contradiction. Since one can imagine

without contradiction the separation of these ideas in the mind, the actual
separation of these realities is also possible. We can summarize Hume s
"imagination argument" as follows:
1. If the anti-causal proposition is not impossible, the causal
proposition is not certain.
2. The anti-causal proposition is not impossible.
a. Imagination argument:
a.i. Whatever is separable in the imagination
(without contradiction) is separable in reality,
a.ii. The concepts of cause and effect are distinct
and separable in the imagination (without
contradiction),
a.iii. Therefore, cause and effect are separable in reality.
3. Therefore, the causal proposition is not certain.
The main argument makes an epistemological claim to the effect that
the causal principle is not certain. Yet to support the second premise
of this epistemic argument, Hume brings forth what we can call the
"imagination argument.,> This sub-argument presupposes a metaphysical
claim that "things possible for the imagination are also possible in reality"
In other words, epistemic possibility parallels metaphysical possibility.
The claim is strong and universal; everything that is epistemically possible
is also metaphysically possible, and vice versa. If it were not, Hume s major
premise (a.i.) would be vulnerable to counter claims of incompleteness.
However, Hume does not give us a defense of this proposition, nor does he
tell us whether he thinks he knows it through intuition or demonstration.
We will address this point later.
But what about arguments given on behalf of the causal principle? Hume
mentions and tackles three of them. First he mentions that Dr. Samuel
Clarke argued that if something came to be without a cause, it would cause
itself. Hume then notes that John Locke argued that if something came to
be without a cause, "nothing" would be its cause. Finally, Hume says there
are others who claim that "every effect must have a cause" because a cause
in implied in the very notion of the idea of "effect."
Hume responds by saying all three of these arguments beg I he question
at issue. When one says something may be without a cuu«c» I hey exclude all
causes from a thing. The being itself is not its cause, "nothing" IN not Its cause;

50
 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

nil her, this alleged being has no causes at all. It is a completely uncaused being,
it nil so to assume this alleged uncaused being has a cause is to assume the
polnI under contention. Additionally, while it may be true that every effect
I ins a cause, it must be shown that everything that begins to exist is an effect:
I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in shewing
I he weakness of this argument, after what I have said of the
foregoing. They are all of them founded on the same fallacy, and
are derived from the same turn of thought. It is sufficient only to
observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them,
and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes
of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from
I he absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that
exclusion. If every thing must have a cause, it follows, that upon
I he exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or
of nothing as causes. But it is the very point in question, whether
every thing must have a cause or not; and therefore, according to
all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken for granted.5

I hey are still more frivolous, who say, that every effect must have
a cause, because it is implyed in the very idea of effect. Every effect
necessarily pre-supposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of
which cause is the correlative. But this does not prove, that every
being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because
every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be
marryed. The true state of the question is, whether every object,
which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause: and this
I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain, and
hope to have proved it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.6
11ume's main point seems to be this: since the anti-causal principle ap-
pears "plainly possible,,> and since the arguments for the causal proposi-
I Ion's necessity are fallacious, how then can one know the causal principle
lur certain? One cannot know it through the only means by which (Hume
thinks) certainty can be had: that is, it cannot be known be intuition or
ilcmonst ration. In response one may appeal to experience and observation,

JW/iM.,200.
ft/Wr/,.201.

51
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

yet it is well known what Hume thinks of induction. Induction cannot es-
tablish certainty, the gap from the individual experiences to the general
proposition is "custom," and if induction from experience is the ground
for the causal proposition, it can only be known through custom as well -
and custom supplied by the human mind is no ground for certitude.

Rowe and Other Contemporary Objectors

William Rowe s work is singular in that it summarizes very well what
I consider to be the most plausible contemporary arguments against the
principle of sufficient reason. For this reason, this thesis will focus primar-
ily on analyzing them and treating them as our primary opposition while
adding occasional considerations offered by other thinkers; such as J. L.
Mackie and James Ross. The three arguments from Rowe that we will be
considering are as follows:
1. The principle of sufficient reason rejects out of hand the possibility of
uncased beings springing into existence out of nothing.
2. The principle of sufficient reason is not a truth known by experience
or intuition.
3. The principle of sufficient reason (at least some versions) is demon-
strably false, since if true, there would be no contingency in the world.
These are the three primary arguments that Rowe and others have
offered against the principle of sufficient reason. One could say that
the first two are Humean arguments, where Hume's main argument is
separated into its epistemic and metaphysical claims respectively. However
the third is something new; an attempt to show that at least some versions
of the principle of sufficient reason are false. We might also distinguish
these three arguments another way. The first is a metaphysical claim that
uncaused beings may be possible; the second is an epistemological claim
that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be known to be necessarily
or certainly true; and the third involves a modal claim that the notion
of sufficient reason would destroy contingency in the world, frequently
meaning that if the principle of sufficient reason were true, it would
destroy the occurrence of contingent events and also, presumably, destroy
the contingency involved in free choice by rational creatures.
Rowe argues that the basic assumption behind «ny cosmological
argument for the existence of God is that it la nrvor a brut? fuel that

52
 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Nomething is changing, being produced, or being conserved in existence.

Insofar as a theist makes this assumption in an argument, Rowe thinks
Mich arguments are fallacious because they beg the very question
under consideration. As Aquinas reasons that by taking away the first
member of a causal series no other member can exist, he clearly assumes
du cording to Rowe) that all series rely on a first member, and therefore
Ai|iiinas's argument is "a textbook example of begging the question.>>7
As Rowe states:
What Aquinas' argument requires us to believe is that the
coming into existence of something cannot be a brute fact, a
fact for which there is no explanation whatsoever. . . .What I
have tried to show in this study of Aquinas's three versions of the
(;osmological Argument is that, at crucial points in each way, an
assumption is made to the effect that the fact that a thing exists,
the fact that something comes into existence, or the fact that
a certain causal activity is going on in the world are facts for
which there must be an explanation.8
Kowe sees two possible formulations of the principle of sufficient rea-
Min as "strong" and "weak."9 The strong principle of sufficient reason is
i|iiltc broad: "Whatever exists must have an explanation of its existence
ell her in the necessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of some
Ml hor being." The weak principle of sufficient reason on the other hand is
more restricted: "Whatever comes into existence must have an explana-
I It HI lor its existence."10 Rowe does not think either version is successful,
it 1111 thus he concludes that while the principle of sufficient reason may be
I mt\ it cannot be known to be such, and so every argument assuming this
principle is no more conclusive than this fragile link. We now elaborate on
hl.N I hree objections.

ilrst Objection: Uncaused Beings Springingfrom Nothing

kowe argues that the denying a new being has a cause does not mean
MI u1 falls into the conflict of saying the thing caused itself. A thing causing

/ Kowe, '[he Cosmological Argument, 32.

H IbltL 45.
v ID the next chapter, I will muily/.c ihLs distinction in more detail. Here I will simply
lay nut Howe's view UM It appear* In the text.
K) Kowe, 'Ihe Casmohgh'Hl Argument* 7X

53
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

its own existence is a contradiction to be sure, but to assume a thing needs

to cause itself, or a cause at all, is to assume what one should prove. Rowe
presses the possibility that a new being can be from "nothing," meaning
simply that all causes for it are excluded:
In the natural sense of the expression, "caused by nothing," it
is true that if something exists without a cause it is caused by
nothing - to be caused by nothing is simply not to be caused by
any thing whatever. Taken in this way, premise (1) [if something
exists without a cause, it is caused by nothing] is true. Moreover,
premise (2) [nothing cannot be the cause of something] is true
as well. For to say that nothing cannot be the cause of something
is simply to say that if something has a cause, then there must be
some thing that is its cause.11
Rowe agrees that nothing cannot positively be the cause of some-
thing, but it does not follow that there cannot be uncaused beings out of
"nothing" in a looser sense, meaning that they are not caused at all. In
other words, Rowe posits that there is a weak sense where "come from
nothing" simply means that the new being has no cause whatsoever; it
is a brute fact. Uncaused beings could spring from nothing even though
caused beings cannot. Only when there is a known contingency do we
need a cause, and the problem with the principle of sufficient reason is
that it a priori discounts the possibility of these "brute fact beings" with-
out justification.
J. L. Mackie offers a similar line of reasoning. To him, insisting on the
principle of sufficient reason is merely a "metaphysicians demand,"12 and
he agrees with Hume and Rowe that "there is no good a priori reason
why a sheer origination of things, not determined by anything, should
be unacceptable."13

11 Ibid.y 76, emphasis mine. Also: "To say, Something has been produced out of [by]
nothing is to say no more than 'Something exists which has not been produced/ If I say of
something, a stone, for example, that nothing produced it, I certainly am not saying - nor
does what I say entail - that the stone was produced. What I am saying of I he slone is that
it was not produced at all." Ibid.y 63.
12 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 92.
13 Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, 94.

54
 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Second Objection: The Principle of Sufficient Reason is

not a Necessary Truth Known by Intuition or Experience
A proponent of the principle of sufficient reason may take the tack of say-
ing that the principle is a necessary truth that would, in a priori fashion, rule
out the possibility of brute fact beings. But could the principle of sufficient
reason be an intuitive and necessary truth? Rowe does not think so, because
he argues that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be analytically nec-
essary. In other words, it is not a logical truth, and does not, by definition,
reduce to a logical truth. Moreover, since the denial of the principle of suf-
ficient reason is at least conceivable, the principle cannot be synthetically
necessary either. We look at each of these arguments in turn.

Ihe Principle of Sufficient Reason as an Analytic

Necessity
Rowe thinks analytic truths need to meet three criteria: 1) they must
i educe to a logical truth, 2) they must be necessary, and 3) they must be
known a priori As for the first, Rowe cites Quine as support for the no-
I Ion of logical truth. A logically true sentence is one that both is true and
only logical words ("is," "not," "and," or," "if," etc.) occur essentially in a
icnlence. Terms that are essential in a sentence are irreplaceable in the
*ense that if replaced, the truth-value of the sentence changes. All of the
olher "non-logical" words occur "vacuously."14 An analytic truth must fit
I his mold. It must be an a priori proposition that even when it does not
express a logical truth, the proposition is nevertheless reducible by means
JII a definition to one that does express a logical truth. Thus, "All brothers
\\\v male," although as stated is not logically true (because "brothers," a
non-logical word, is used essentially in the sentence, and if replaced by
"humans," the truth-value would change), is analytically true because by
defining "brother" as "male sibling," the sentence reduces to "all male sib-
lings are male"- where now only the logical words occur essentially. Sec-
ondly, as far as the necessity required, Rowe thinks the necessity involved

M "A word occurs essentially in a sentence provided that its replacement in every one of
Hum eurrences by some other word will change the truth-value of the sentence. Thus 'lions'
In ihe I rue statement, "I here nre lions In Africa' occurs essentially since its replacement by
Ihe word 'tigers' yields ihe falnc Ntitlcnient, "Ihere are tigers in Africa.' A word occurs vacu-
ously In k\ sentenceJual In cuw ll due* not occur essentially." IbicU 78. Rowe does not explain
how A proposition cun ha both lru», and yet the non logical words still remain "vacuous."

55
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

in analytic truths is the logical or conceptual impossibility (i.e., "a round

square") of its denial. In other words, for a proposition P to be necessarily
true means that it is logically impossible that not-P be true. Rowe thinks
every analytically true proposition must be necessary in this sense. Fi-
nally, Rowe's third criterion is straightforward; that every analytic truth
should be a priori, known immediately by reflection without having to
appeal to empirical evidence.
With these three criteria of analytic truth in hand, Rowe argues that
the principle of sufficient reason does not qualify as such. The problem
is that the principle of sufficient reason does not definitionally reduce to
a logical truth, indicating that the principle is not analytically necessary:
Clearly, the principle [the principle of sufficient reason] is not
logically true. Nor, it would seem, does the mere notion of the
existence of a thing definitionally contain the notion of a thing
being caused. Kant argued, correctly I think, that although the
proposition "Every effect has a cause" is analytically true, "Every
event has a cause" is not. The idea of an event, of something
happening - a leaf falling, a chair collapsing - does not seem to
contain the idea of something causing that event. If this is so, then
PSR is not analytically true.15

The Principle of Sufficient Reason as a Synthetic

Necessity
But then Rowe considers another form of necessity. Suppose we con-
sider the proposition, "Whatever is red is colored." A definition of "red"
or "colored" will not reduce to a sentence expressing logical truth, but it is
certainly impossible that something be red and not colored. Accordingly,
Rowe considers this proposition as perhaps synthetically necessary. In this
case, we can abandon the first criterion requiring logical truth and ask
if the principle of sufficient reason can be synthetically necessary like the
statement "Whatever is red is colored." But Rowe says no again, because
unlike "whatever is red is colored," it is possible to conceive of something
not having a sufficient reason. So even if we rid ourselves of requiring that
necessary truths reduce to logical truths, we still get stuck on thai second
criterion, that the principle s denial is conceivable:

15/WA83.

56
 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

The difficulty with the view that the principle [PSR], in either its
strong or weak form, is necessary is that we do seem able to conceive
of things existing, or even things coming into existence, without
having to conceive of those things as having an explanation or
cause. Unlike the proposition "Some red things are colored," it
does seem conceptually possible that something exists that has no
cause or explanation of its existence.16
Here Rowe again brings up Hume's conceivability criterion. The diffi-
i'lilty with the principle being necessary is that a counterexample seems
possible. The contrary state of affairs referred to by the anti-causal propo-
sition seems possible. There does not seem to be any contradiction in say-
ing that something can come into being without a cause. As with Hume,
It is precisely that the contrary state of affairs can be conceived without
contradiction that should prevent thoughtful people from affirming the
principle of sufficient reason as necessarily true. Thus, Rowe concludes,
since the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically true nor is it
it synthetic necessary truth, any argument that uses the principle of suf-
lu ic*nt reason as a premise cannot be a proof of the existence of God. An
iirgument is only as strong as its premises. If the principle of sufficient
i ntson is inconclusive, so too is the argument that utilizes it:
l!or unless there is a way of knowing the principle to be true other
Ih an those we have explored, it follows that we do not know the
principle to be true. But if we do not know if one of the essential
premises of an argument is true, then we do not know that it is a
good argument for its conclusion.17
). I*. Mackie makes the same claim. There is no good reason to think
I ho principle is a principle known independently from further experi-
oiu o, UI see no plausibility in the claim that the principle of sufficient
lOiison is known a priori to be true."18 It seems then that these argu-
inonls are stating that if the principle of sufficient reason is an a priori
pi Inciple, (and there are serious disagreements about just what "apriori"
moinis), I hen the anti-causal proposition should assert a contradiction.
I ho contradiction in the anti-causal proposition should be apparent, and

lft/Wr/,85.
I7/W04.
IH Mtwklc, 7/icf Mimvh <)/ 7/IWIW, 84*5.

57
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

since it is not, one should not affirm the principle of sufficient reason as
necessary "a priori" either.

Third Objection: The "Essential" Principle of Sufficient

Reason is Demonstrably False
Rowe has an additional argument for those who hold to an "essential"
version of the principle of sufficient reason; that is, a version that says the
principle of sufficient reason is needed not only for the fact of things com-
ing into existence, but also the mode or manner of existing. In other words,
this broader version of the principle of sufficient reason accounts not only
for the fact of Xs existence, but also for any fact about X. Rowe holds that
such a principle of sufficient reason is incompatible with contingent states
of affairs. In other words, if there are contingent events, then Rowe thinks
there must be some events for which there is no reason whatsoever.19 To
summarize his reductio:
1. If there is a sufficient reason for contingent state of affairs, that suffi-
cient reason itself is either contingent or necessary.
2. Not contingent because a contingency cannot fully explain another
contingent state of affairs.
3. Not necessary because it cannot be that the existence of a contingent
state of affairs is a necessary matter.
Therefore, there cannot be a sufficient reason for a contingent state of
affairs.
That there are contingent states of affairs, Rowe thinks, is clearly a con-
tingent matter. After all, it is only contingent that there are contingent
beings, there is a possible world in which centaurs and not horses exist,
so the existence of a world containing horses cannot be necessary. If one
were to say God caused this contingent states of affairs, Rowe then asks if
the state of affairs signified by "God caused there to be contingent states of
affairs" is itself a necessary or contingent state of affairs. If God s causation
itself is contingent, it cannot be the cause of the contingent states. Appar-
ently Rowe means by this that a contingent reason alone, by definition,
cannot be the sole explanation for other contingent states. The answer we
seek cannot be another set of contingent affairs. Thus, the answer must be

19 Rowe, The Casmologlcal Argument, 100 - 5.

 Arguments Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason

I hat God's causing contingent states is necessary. But that would mean it
Is necessary that there are contingent states of affairs, and Rowe finds this
altogether unworkable:
But if the existence of God is necessary, and God's causing there
to be contingent states of affairs is also necessary, it follows that
it is necessary that there are contingent states of affairs. But as we
noted at the outset, it is contingent, not necessary, that there are
contingent states of affairs. Hence... there can be no explanation
of the fact that there are contingent states of affairs. Consequently,
since PSR implies that there is an explanation of the fact that
there are contingent states of affairs, PSR is false.20
Rowe concludes that no contingent state of affairs can be the suffi-
i lent reason of another set of contingent states of affairs. Neither can it
be necessary that there are contingent states of affairs. Thus, Rowe thinks
i onlingent states of affairs cannot be explained by either contingency or
necessity, and consequently contingent states of affairs cannot have a suf-
ficient reason for their existence.21
We should mention that this is a common contemporary argument
itKiiinst the principle of sufficient reason. It does not stem from Hume,
nl 111 many contemporary philosophers in addition to Rowe (such as James
Uoss, for example22) find it to be a persuasive case against the principle of
mi llicient reason.

A Fourth "Hedged" Argument:

Ihc Principle of Sufficient Reason May Be True But
Limited in Scope
'I his is a common objection that frequently comes up in philosophical
ilelmles over the existence of God, and both Antony Flew (before his con-
version to philosophical theism) and Bertrand Russell have verbally made
I his argument in that context. In the printed realm, J. L. Mackie makes the

wlhitU 101.
,' I Rowe sees the "existential" version of the principle of sufficient reason (sim-
ply accounting for a thing's existence) as avoiding this problem. A principle of
ntilliclcnl reason could be used simply to account for the existence of the thing
IMII m>( ihe mode. See/&/(/„ 112 13
;;. lames F. Rosa, PhlfaiOphh'ttl 'Ihvology (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1969), 295-304,
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

same point. Mackie objects that we can indeed do science operating on a

limited notion of the principle of sufficient reason, but the application of
the principle cannot be applied outside the world as a whole:
Even if we have some innate tendency to look for and expect
such symmetries and continuities and regularities, this does
not give us an a priori guarantee that such can always be found.
In so far as our reliance on such principles is epistemically
justified, it is so a posteriori.... And in any case these principles
of causation, symmetry, and so on refer to how the world works;
we are extrapolating far beyond their so far fruitful use when we
postulate a principle of sufficient reason and apply it to the world
as a whole.23
Two things are worth noting here. First, Mackie recognizes the innate
human tendency to expect reasons for things, but points out this expecta-
tion does not give us an "a priori guarantee" that there will always be such.
Intuitive plausibility and expectation do not equal metaphysical necessity.
Second, he claims the epistemic justification of these principles is from
experience, a posteriori; and so we push anything we learn from such ex-
perience too far when we "extrapolate" that principle and apply it to an
area from which it was not derived.
Even if within the world, everything seemed to have a sufficient reason,
that is, a cause in accordance with some regularity, with like causes pro-
ducing like effects, this would give us little ground for expecting the world
as a whole, or its basic causal laws themselves, to have a sufficient reason
of a different sort."24
Mackie correctly thinks that the principle of sufficient reason claims
more than just "every physical occurrence has a physical cause." The latter
can be satisfied by physical necessity. The principle of sufficient reason,
however, is a metaphysical principle, claiming that things, even the whole
body of contingent things, call for a reason with metaphysical necessi-
ty. Mackie sees no justification for this more transcendent claim. "Out of
nothing, nothing comes" may be a reasonable position, Mackie thinks, but
only if we limit it to the natural four-dimensional space-time universe.
Thus, the only sufficient reasons for a things existence then are physi-

23 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 85.

24 Ibid, 85.

60
 Arguments Against the Principle ofSuJI'tclcnt Reason

cal: "We have no good ground for an a priori certainty that there could
not have been a sheer unexplained beginning of things... .[but insofar as
I his is improbable], we should infer that it must have had some physical
antecedents."25

Summary
In my research of positions critical of the principle of sufficient rea-
son, these arguments, while conceivably not the only arguments one could
muster against the principle, are nevertheless the most credible and fa-
miliar. As we have seen, Hume's first argument was both epistemological
and metaphysical in nature, arguing that the causal proposition cannot
be known to be certainly true because the anti-causal proposition cannot
be shown to be impossible: since the separability of cause from the begin-
ning of existence is possible for the imagination, the actual separation of
I hose two entities is also possible. Hume's second point is that the three
examples he mentions of arguing on behalf of the principle beg the ques-
I ion at issue. Rowe makes two neo-Humean arguments by separating the
claims in Hume's first argument. First, Rowe makes a metaphysical claim
l hat uncaused beings springing into being seems possible, and therefore
I he principle of sufficient reason is not a necessary metaphysical principle.
Secondly, Rowe makes an epistemological claim that since the principle
of sufficient reason cannot be known either through analytic or synthetic
necessity, we do not know the principle to be certainly true. Thirdly, Rowe
(and others) claims that a stronger principle of sufficient reason (one that
a i counts for not only the existence of things, but also their mode or man-
ner of existing) is demonstrably false, since if it were true, there could be
no contingent states of affairs. Finally Mackie seems to admit the princi-
ple to some limited degree in a physical context, but sees no warrant for
a Mi rming it as a true metaphysical principle that transcends all particular
scopes of being. The conclusion to all of these efforts is, of course, to per-
suade us to agree that "there is no sufficient reason to regard the principle
of sufficient reason to be valid."26

if) Ibid, 94.

2h lbld9 203.

61
 Russell: So it all turns on this question of sufficient reason, and I
must say you haven t defined "sufficient reason" in a way that I can
understand. What do you mean by sufficient reason? You do not
mean cause?
Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of sufficient reason.
Only contingent being can have a cause. God is His own sufficient
reason; and He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in the
full sense, I mean an explanation adequate for the existence ofsome
particular being.
Russell: But when is an explanation adequate? Suppose I am about
to make a flame with a match. You may say that the adequate
explanation of that is that I rub it on the box.
Copleston: Well, for practical pur poses-but theoretically, that is only
a partial explanation. An adequate explanation must ultimately be
a total explanation, to which nothingfurther can be added.
Russell: Then I can only say thatyoure lookingfor something which
cannot begot, and which one ought not to expect to get.
Copleston: To say that one has not found it is one thing; to say that
one should not look for it seems to me rather dogmatic.
Russell: Well, I do not know. I mean, the explanation of one thing
is another thing which makes the other thing dependent on yet
another, and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entirely
to do what you want, and that we cannot do.
Copleston: But are you going to say that we cannot, or we should
not even raise the question of the existence of the whole of this sorry
scheme of things - of the whole universe?
Russell: Yes, I do not think there's any meaning in it at all. I think
the word "universe" is a handy word in some connections, but I do
not think it stands for anything that has a meaning.1

1 Transcript of Fr. Frederick Copleston v. Bertrand Russell in their fnnuniN lcMH BBC
Radio debate on the existence of God (broadcast in 1948 on the 'Ihird Program ul the Brit-
ish Broadcasting Corporation. 'I his debate was published In "HunHinlUl"fliuireprinted In
Bertrand KUNMCII, Why I Am Not a Christian (London: Gcorg* AlUll * UnWlll* IWV/),
CHAPTER III:
The Principle Stated
and Its Meaning
T he purpose of this chapter is to clarify, as precisely as possible, what
exactly is meant by the phrase, "principle of sufficient reason." This
effort at elucidation will follow the following order. First, we will de-
line our key terms, namely "principle," "sufficient," and, most importantly,
"reason." We will then examine the various formulations and meaning of
I he principle, in order to clarify that this work will focus on what I will call
I he metaphysical formulation of the principle, most commonly expressed as,
"Whatever exists must have a reason for its existence either in itself or from
another." Next, I will put this statement in its "proper logical form" that is
lo say, I will highlight and make explicit its cognitive aspects and show that
t lie principle, as commonly stated, is actually an implicit compound propo-
sil ion consisting of what I will call a "principal part" and a "source portion."
When analyzed this way, I will show that the principal part of the principle
of sufficient reason is equivalent to the Thomistic doctrine of the act of esse,
and should be regarded as necessarily true. The second "source portion" of
I lie principle is, I will claim, an exhaustive division of the possible options
Ihal could serve an ihc IOCUN or "home" for this reason for existence, that

63
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

is to say, the source portion is a complete disjunction of all the ways a

being could possess a reason for its existence. We will then look at several
clarifications of the principle to see such things as; the difference between
a cause and a reason; that to affirm the principle of sufficient reason does
not commit one to the claim that we can always know the reasons for
things; that a "reason" does not necessarily mean a "motive" of the will;
and three important distinctions regarding the scope of the principle. Fi-
nally, we will briefly examine the question of "brute facts" by considering
its different meanings and in what sense our formulation of the principle
of sufficient reason prevents us from acknowledging such a notion.

Meaning of the Terms "Principle" "Sufficient" and

"Reason"
Let us begin our discussion with defining some key terms, namely the
concepts of "principle," "sufficient," and "reason" in this order. To start off,
I take it for granted that the reader is at least casually familiar with the
terms "principle" and "sufficient." They are used quite frequently, and, as
far as I can tell, there is little to no disagreement about these concepts in
discussing the principle of sufficient reason. Nevertheless, for the sake of
completeness, a brief discussion about them is called for here.
The term "principle" is actually quite broad. A principle is a beginning
of sorts, and classically understood as "that from which anything proceeds."
In the Aristotelian tradition, this term has both logical and ontological
connotations. Aristotle wanted to know the causes and "principles" (arche)
of things, and such knowledge is what constitutes wisdom.2 Arche for Ar-
istotle meant the source or root of a thing, but there are starting points in
both knowledge as well as being. Regarding knowledge, logical principles are
"starting points." A typical example is the principle of non-contradiction
[PNC], commonly referred to as the ultimate "first principle" from which all
other knowledge proceeds. Whether or not the PNC actually is the ultimate
first principle has been frequently debated, even among scholastics, but the
point here is that knowledge needs principles or starting points to avoid the
skepticism that results from an infinite regress.
Ontological principles, on the other hand, are the fundamental causes or
constituents in things. For example, anyone who has taken an uiulcrgrad-

2Arl8lollc. Meftf., SW2A5.

 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

uate course in philosophy probably knows that Aristotle held to hylemor-

phisniy that is, the theory that material things consist of a composition of
form and matter. Matter is the material individuating principle of things
while the form is the principle by which a thing is said to be of a certain
kind. So "principle" in this sense refers to a reality in things. The upshot of
this discussion is that the term "principle" can refer to the starting points of
knowledge or it can refer to the ground or "starting point" in real things. It
is a term that has both logical and ontological connotations.
But of course here in our discussion when we say the "principle" of
sufficient reason we are talking primarily about a proposition, the very
statement "whatever exists must have a reason." This proposition is a
principle of knowledge in that it serves as the ground for investigation
(as I have argued in chapter 1), indeed I will argue it is a "first principle"
of sorts, but this is not to say we are only talking about logic. In the clas-
sical philosophy borne out of the Aristotelian tradition, logic is closely
connected with metaphysics. Concepts, propositions, and arguments
are intentional, in that they are about something other than themselves.
A principle like the principle of non-contradiction is indeed a proposi-
l ional starting point of knowledge (how could one know anything else
without it?), but it is a statement that also refers to reality. A statement
cannot both be true and false at the same time because the things to
which these propositions refer cannot both be and not-be at the same time
and in the same way. Logic and metaphysics are inseparable. The princi-
ple of non-contradiction is not just a statement about the logical order; it
Is a metaphysical law of being. It is with this understanding of the term
"principle" that I am concerned with here regarding the principle of suf-
licient reason. Accordingly, I hold that the principle of sufficient reason is
a statement that signifies reality, viz.; it is a law of being and not restricted
lo merely the logical order. Analogous to the principle of non-contradic-
llon, the principle of sufficient reason is a starting point of knowledge
lhal is also a metaphysical law about things. The principle of sufficient
reason, as we will see, is a proposition that signifies the real ontological
requirement that the existence of things be grounded and accounted for
hi certain ways. Details on how this existence of beings is grounded or
accounted for will be discussed below. The point we want to make here is
I hnl by "principle" wc mean a propositional starting point of knowledge
that refers to the real order.

65
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

The notion of "sufficient" is used plainly here with little to no philo-

sophical refinement. All that we mean by "sufficient" in the principle of
sufficient reason is "adequate," "satisfactory," or "enough." We can think of
sufficiency in terms of "enough of what it takes" for whatever end happens
to be required for the object under discussion.
Although the terms principle and sufficient have not been significant
points of conflict in disputes over the principle of sufficient reason, one
cannot say the same for the notion of "reason." There have indeed been
misunderstandings and outright rejections of the principle of sufficient
reason based on the ambiguity of this term alone. Because of this confu-
sion, it is appropriate to explain this notion in more detail.
Yet one must admit that the notion of a "reason" is very broad and
difficult to define. It cannot be strictly defined in terms of a genus and
specific difference. I cannot think of a genus that is higher than "reason."
This is to be expected, since I will be claiming that a reason is a necessary
property of being, and being as such in the thought of Aquinas is not con-
fined to any one genus but transcends them all. In fact, it seems to me that
Aristotle's Categories, which he believed to be the highest genera, could
themselves be considered different species of "explanation," different ways
of accounting for things and therefore different types of reasons. In any
case, we cannot give a strict essential definition of a "reason." But this is
not a severe indictment against the concept. Logicians know of several
examples of terms that do not permit of such a strict definition; i.e., being,
definition, God, true, and even the categories themselves: substance, qual-
ity, quantity, etc. are indefinable. There is nothing to say that we cannot
add "reason" to this list.
The best we can do is clarify this term ostensively by "pointing" at other
terms. What I mean by reason in a general sense is that which accounts
for something, or that which answers the question "Why?" Reasons serve as
the grounds or basis for something, and to make use of a distinction just
made above there are two main kinds of reasons, logical and ontological.
Logical reasons are that which account for the truth of a proposition; that is
to say that they are some fact or truth by which other truths are explained.
This notion of the term reason comes up in cases where we ask, "What is
the basis for that belief?" or "What good reasons or grounds arc I here for
thinking that to be so?" In such cases we are inquiring Into thill which
accounts for the truth of propositions.
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

The other sense of reason refers to ontological reasons. An ontological

reason is that which accounts for the existence of a being. For example, the
reason why the grass is green is due to sunlight, photosynthesis, chlorophyll,
etc. The reason man exists on this planet is due, some tell us, to evolutionary
forces in conjunction with the presence of certain chemical and physical laws
and arrangements. Ontological reasons are a ground for being. They provide
an account or basis for the existence of something; they explain why a thing
exists rather than not, and serve as the raison d'etre for the being of a thing,
which in most cases (but not all) would be called a cause. It is important to
note that this sense of the term "reason' means something that exists in re-
ality. This is the sense in which Aquinas says reasons (ratio) are said to be in
reality. Aquinas correlates the subjective and objective meanings of ratio, and
says that reasons are said to be in things insofar as there is something in the
thing outside the mind that corresponds to the concept in the mind.3 Hence,
when we speak of "reason" in the ontological sense, we are talking about ei-
l her real things in themselves (like the heat from the sun is a reason for life on
earth) or real principles of a thing (such as its form or essence).
We can illustrate these various senses of the term "reason" with the
following diagram:4
Reasons
{ratio - afca., grounds, principles, basis, etc.)
That which accountsfarsomething
Logical Ontologies!
Accounting for the truth of P Accountingforthe exaranceof 8
Often a truth by Whkh other truths Some reality from which a behg proceed*
are explained >« any vir&y whatsoever

Exerting a positive i irrTuvnce Not «x«rttn# a posltvo influence

,.''' \ Conditions
Conditio sine qua rton
From another Front Itself
{«Ktrlnslcalry} {IntHnsteaBy} Negative factors (Kmovetisprphitens)
Efficient,final,and That which must be realized or fulfilled
exemplar causality before something can happen or be
The effect is realty dependent on the
condition, but the condition exerts no
positive influence on It.

/ \
Simpl* su beta nc* Composite substances
Essence signifying the simple Essence signifying the composite;
, „ . . I.e., formal and material causes.
in theology, intnmsc connections
such as the relation of Persons in
the Trinity

VI he ratio "dtcitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet
i omrpttonl animae, slcttf si^niflcatum signo"In I Sent. d. 2 q. 1 a. 3. Parma ed. as found at
llu* (lorpus 'IhomUllcum wclmlte.
'1 Ports of thin dlftgrttm are limplrcd by mid Indebted to Peter Coffey, The Science of
/MX/V (London: Umgmimi, UNMM,, MIU! (In,, ISHH) 56-s>2

67
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

So to clarify, the point here is that reasons are simply that which accounts
for something and so can serve as the basis for either truth-value or being.
Whether logical or ontological, propositions and things proceed from their
"grounds" or "reasons." The truth of propositions is grounded and account-
ed for in their respective truthmaker, while the existence of say contingent
beings is grounded and accounted for by their causes and conditions. If we
focus on the ontological side of this diagram, we can make a distinction
based on whether these ontological reasons exert some positive influence
or not. Ontological principles that do not exert a positive influence on a
being, yet are still required for its existence, are conditions. Conditions are
the negative factors (removens prohibens) that account for the existence of
something and are distinct from causes precisely in that conditions do not
positively contribute anything to an effect, even though they are still neces-
sary. To see this difference between conditions and causes, we can imagine
a sunlit room. Properly speaking it is sun that is the cause of the light in the
room, because it is the thing that positively contributes the light. The win-
dow, on the other hand, is a condition of the sunlit room. Indeed the window
is a necessary condition for the sunlit room, it is a sine qua non factor that
must be realized before we can ever have a sunlit room, even though the
window itself does not positively contribute or cause the light. The light in
the room is really dependent on the condition of the window, yet the win-
dow exerts no positive influence on it. Conditions then can rightly a reason
for a things existence in that they refer to the removal of any obstacles that
would prohibit the being of a thing.
Of those reasons that exert a positive influence on something, we can
make another distinction by saying this can occur intrinsically or ex-
trinsically. Extrinsic principles that exert a positive influence on the be-
ing of another are a type of cause. Causes are the positive factors that ac-
count for being of another. In fact, a "cause" is that which has a positive
influence of any sort on the being of another, and the extrinsic causes
are what the scholastics coined the efficient, final, and exemplary cause.
There can also be causes intrinsic to a being. Material beings, that is
beings composed out of form and matter, have both formal and material
causes. The form makes the matter be of a certain sort, while the matter
reciprocally enables the form to exist in this segment of space/lime and
not some other.5
5 For example, NIT (lolfcy, Ibid.
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

These distinctions of the term reason leave the door open for the pos-
sibility of a truly simple substance; e.g., a being that is purely one and ex-
isting whose essence is identical with its existence and all other attributes
it may have. In this case we can say that such a being would have a reason,
even though it would not have a cause. There would be nothing extrinsic
to this being that would account for its existence, nor would there be any
plurality of principles intrinsic to this being (neither material nor formal)
that could serve as its cause either. No trace of any potency in this being
would mean that it is an actus purus, existing with true a seity. If such a
being existed it could not be characterized as a causa sui since, as we have
said, a cause is that which accounts in any way for the existence of another,
and we have stipulated that an actus purus would be simple and so could
not consist of any intrinsic "others".6 Yet it would still be correct to char-
acterize such a being as a ratio sui, since anything that exists a se would
account for its own existence and thus be its own reason.7
To sum up, it is hopefully more clear to the reader now what we mean by
the terms "principle," "sufficient," and "reason." Yet the defining of terms
is only the beginning of our attempt at clarification because the principle
of sufficient reasons has been formulated in different ways. For this rea-
son we must now turn to look at the various ways the principle has been
formulated to determine which formulation best suits our purpose here.

Statement of the Principle

Having thus set forth an attempt at defining the key terms, let us now
move to consider the different ways the principle of sufficient reason has
been stated. And when we do this, we see that many common formula-
1 ions of the principle of sufficient reason do no more than say the same
Ihing, albeit in diverse ways. Philosophers have stated the principle differ-
ently at various times, by saying things like: "Nothing takes place without

ft In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas also distinguishes ratio from causa when
he says that the divine will can have a ratio but that ratio is not a cause. "Quamvis autem
iiHijuu ratio divinae voluntatis assignari possit, non tamen sequitur quod voluntatis eius sit
illiquid causa "S.C.G. I, 87.
7 In ihe Thomistic view, there can be no causality without an act-potency interaction.
A being that is pure act would contain no potency at all, and although one may say its es-
sence or form is exlilcncc, at 111 I here would be no formal cause since the form in this case
would nol be u dlitlnct principle nerving as a limiting factor (a potency) that channeled
another principle (111 ixlflltfiwe) down to I hi* sort of being.
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

sufficient reason," "Nothing exists without there being a greater reason

for it to exist than for it not to exist," "Nothing happens without a reason
why it should be so rather than otherwise," or simply, nihil est sine ratione.
Perhaps the broadest and most well-known formulations come from Leib-
niz* Monadology where he tells us: "There can be no fact real or existing,
no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so
and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us"
And again: "Whatever exists or is true must have a sufficient reason why
the thing or proposition should be as it is and not otherwise."* Now Td like
lo emphasize these rather broad formulations for a moment because they
capture what we should recognize to be an important characteristic of the
principle of sufficient reason. Stated in this way, the explicit references to
both "things" and "propositions" highlight the fact that the principle of
sufficient reason has, or at least can have, both logical and metaphysical
applications. But this should not be at all surprising to us given what we
have seen above about the intentional nature of logic (at least "logic" in the
traditional sense) and its close connection with reality, not to mention our
division of the term of "reason" which showed that this term too covers
both logical and metaphysical domains (since "reason" can mean either
that which accounts for the truth ofpropositions or that which accounts for
the existence of things). So consonant with those discussions, we are not
surprised at all to see formulations of principle of sufficient reason cover-
ing both the logical and metaphysical domains.
As interesting at this might be, we are not going to dwell on the logical
version. As I have said above, our concern is with the metaphysical for-
mulation where "reason" refers to that which accounts for the existence
of things. And here the most common formulation of the principle is
perhaps as good as any; viz., "Whatever exists must have a reason for its
existence either in itself or from another" This is a widely held metaphysi-
cal formulation of the principle and will work fine for our purposes here.
So taking this version as our starting point, let us ask as a matter of first
importance, just what kind of proposition is this anyway? In terms of its
logical categorization, what sort of statement can we say this is? To put
the question more precisely, is there just one proposition here or is there,
at least implicitly, more than one proposition? Determining the answer to
this question is important since the rules of logic tell us there itrr different
8 Leibniz, Motuulohiiy, op, ell.. 37

70
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

truth rules for different kinds of propositions. Until we know what kind
of proposition we are dealing with, we will be at a loss for knowing how to
analyze its truth value.
Now unquestionably, the best way to answer this question is to put that
statement into what Parker and Veatch have called its proper logical form
- that is, a rephrasing of the statement to highlight its cognitive aspects by
appropriately isolating the relevant copulas and their subjects and predi-
cates.9 Yet, as soon as we do this, we can see there are actually two propo-
sitions being asserted here, meaning that this statement is actually (and we
should add, implicitly) a compound proposition because the statement as it
stands actually contains more than one claim. How do we know this? Well,
when we isolate the categorical propositions, we plainly see that there are
two factual assertions being made here. The first statement says, "What-
ever exists [is that which] must have a reason for its existence," while the
second and additional claim is that "Every reason is had either essentially
or from another/' Now patently, these are two different claims. The first
claim is that everything has a reason; the second claim is that all reasons
are found either essentially or from another. In fact, it's at least prima facie
possible that the claims could even have different truth values! It might be
the case that not everything needs a reason for its being, meaning the first
is false, but that the things that do have a reason have it from itself or from
another, meaning the second is true. Or it could be vice versa; perhaps
everything does need a reason (meaning the first is true), but the options
of essentially or from another are not exhaustive (meaning that the second
claim is false). When we look at the principle of sufficient reason in this
way, it actually consists of two separate propositions, existing side by side
and joined together by an implicit "and" conjunction.10 Thus, when we
cache this all out, again explicitly in proper logical form, we get the con-

9 See chapter 11 of Francis H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instru-
ment (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 153.
10 Scholastics commonly divided propositions into categorical and compound. One
i'un see this for example in John of St. Thomas' treatment on logic in John of St. Thomas
Outlines of Formal Logic tr. Francis C. Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1955) 55. Categorical propositions are simple and unqualified in the sense that they con-
sist of I wo conccplN united by a copula. Compound propositions, however, consist of two
whole categorical proportion* united by something other than a copula verb, like when
we Hay, t,rI he cal wan 1'ttNt ami run up w I ree." One who makes this statement is making two
liutniN: 1) about thtipwdoflh* vftl.rtiul 2) where the cat went,

71
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

junctive proposition, "Whatever exists must have a reason for its existence
and every reason for existence is possessed essentially or from another."11
Now recognizing this point is critical, because, as our traditional logic
tells us, the truth value rule for conjunctive propositions is that in orderfor a
conjunctive proposition to be true, both of its conjuncts must be true. It is as if
we had said, "Roses are red and violets are blue." In order for that statement
to be true, both conjuncts must be true. If, for example, violets are yellow,
then the entire conjunctive proposition would be false. So when we apply
that same conjunctive rule to the principle of sufficient reason we see that in
order for the whole principle of sufficient reason to be true, both of its con-
juncts, that is, both "Whatever exists must have a reason for its existence"
and "Every reason is possessed essentially or from another" need to be true.
Since we have two independent propositions, we will likely need two lines
of justification. This recognition by the way, also opens up the possibility
that the principle of sufficient reason, as a whole, is both a principle and
conclusion, if one of its conjuncts is a true first principle and the other is a
conclusion to an argument. Whether or not this is the case seems to me to
depend upon how the source portion is formulated, but we will not pursue
that question here. What is important here is to recognize that the principle
of sufficient reason is, as I have said, a conjunctive proposition consisting of
two statements united by an implicit "and" conjunction, which means that
each constituent conjunct merits our individual attention.

The Principal Part of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:

A Thomistic View
Now that we have managed to explain what sort of proposition we are
dealing with, let us look now at that first part; that is, the first conjunct of
the principle of sufficient reason: "Whatever exists must have a reason for
its existence." Now to clarify something upfront, when we ask for a reason
for existence, we are searching for that by which something is real, and
not merely that by which a thing is a certain kind of being. In other words,
we are looking for a reason in the existential order and not a reason in
the order of essence. Now this is not in any way to disparage the notion of

11 To be technical, even this latter proposition is a second compound proposition be-

cause it contains the word "or," making it a disjunctive proposition, Hut thin iliMull Is not
germane to our discussion here, 'lhal this latter proposition actually ylv«n tin nu rxhiuis-
ttve disjunct Ion will he nrgucd lor In u Inter chapter.

72
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

essence. Indeed, the notion of essence is certainly critical for the being of
the thing, and although I am inclined to agree with those who hold there
is a principle of sufficient reason in the order of essence, it is in the order of
existence that I wish to pursue this question.12 In other words, we are seek-
ing to answer Leibniz's question as to why there is something rather than
nothing. It appears to me Leibniz's question is best addressed by an exis-
tential philosophy that is centered upon the act of existing. Accordingly,
the Thomistic doctrine on the primacy of existence might give us a strong
avenue of justification for this existential principle. The principle of suf-
ficient reason is, after all, a statement about existence, and the Thomistic
move from an essential metaphysics to an existential metaphysics might
therefore give the notion of a "sufficient reason for existence" a very stable
basis for its justification.
So let us ask, is there a Thomistic answer to why there is something
rather than nothing? Does Aquinas himself have an understanding of
"that which accounts for a thing's being and thus its distinction from noth-
ing?" In the course of his own defense of the principle, Maritain says that
a sufficient reason for a thing's existence is simply "that in virtue of which
an object is"13 with "in virtue of which," meaning "that without which an
object is not."14 But is there an adequate grounding in the texts of Aqui-
nas for Maritains claim? In short, what might Aquinas say in response to
Leibniz's question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"
In response to this query, Aquinas would likely appeal at some point to
his doctrine of esse or "the act of being."15 What exactly is this doctrine of

12 Gredt for example argues there is a principle of sufficient reason in the order of
essence as well as in the order of existence. See Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristo-
tvllco-Thomisticae, ii op. cit., 151. A principle of sufficient reason in the order of essence
would he that which makes a thing be a certain kind of thing while the principle in the
order of existence would be that which makes the thing be, in an unqualified sense. This
distinction of the two orders of sufficient reason corresponds well with Aquinas' position
I lull ihcre is an act in the order of existence (what we might call "existential act") a notion
which we will cite extensively below, and a formal act, that is, an act in the order of form,
which Is a topic that is also quite important but beyond the bounds of our discussion here.
\} Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being (New York:
Mcnlor Omega, 1962), 97.
\ A Ibid, 99.
I!i "Dkendum quod esse dupllcltcr dicltur, uno modo, significat actum essendi" S. T. I,
t, 4 ail 2; vol. 4, 42, 'Ihlii i«?n»e OIVJUU* «M "an acl of being" is what we mean by esse in this
wvllon, For another philosopher who hold* thul Aquinas' doctrine of esse is an appropri-
ate rcNponNc to Ldbnln'l quiitlnn, NW )ohn I', Wlppcl, "'I nomas Aquinas on the Ultimate

73
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

esse7. Aquinas calls this esse "that by which a thing is,"16 he says the esse is
the "act of a being,"17 and "that by which something is." By way of analogy,
just as you could not have running without an act of running, Aquinas
tells us that neither could a thing exist without an act of existing.18 Making
a similar point, Aquinas says that just as motion is the act of mobile thing
insofar as it is mobile, so esse is the act of an existing thing insofar as it is a
being.19 This ''esse is the act by which something is" 20 and it is an act that
pervades everything, meaning that "this act of being is common to every-
thing that is."21 On more than one occasion, Aquinas affirms that this act
of being is universal, and is said of everything that is 22 and so whatever
exists must have esse.23 Indeed, Aquinas goes so far as to say that "it is im-
possible that some being exists which does not have esse."24 The reason is
because "Each thing exists through its own esse"25 and "Every thing exists
because it has an act of being "26 The existence of the thing then is founda-
tional for Aquinas, so much so that the act of a being is the very act that
makes a thing be, "Being is or exists insofar as it participates in this act of
being (actus essendi)"27 and this act of being in a thing is the very reason
why a thing is denominated a being in the first place!28 "Being simply is

Why Question. Why Is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?" Review
of Metaphysics 60 (2007), 723-45. Maritain also seems to connect esse with reason when
discussing the principle of sufficient reason. See Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, 99.
16 "Ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est." S. T. I, 75, 5 ad 4; vol. 5,202.
17 "Quod esse dupliciter dicitur: quandoque enim esse idem est quod actus entis." Quod.
XII, q. l a d l .
18 Nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit" Quaest. de.
Ani., q. 6.
19 "Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus
existentis, inquantum ens est.3'In I Sent, d. 19 q. 2 a.2., c.f, Alio modo dicitur esse ipse ac-
tus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus,
qui est operatio, sed actus primus." In I Sent., d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1; Parma ed., emphasis mine.
20 "Esse est actus et quo est." S.C.G.. II, 54, n. 7; vol.13, 392.
21 "Omnibus autem commune est esse" S.C.G. II, 15, n.4; vol.13, 295.
22 "Esse autem dicitur de omni quod est "S.C.G II, 15; vol.13, 295.
23 "Omne autem quod est, esse habet." De substantiis separatis, ch. 9; vol. 40, 57.
24 "Impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse."De Ver. q. 21, a. 2; vol. 22,596
25 "Unumquodque estpersuum esse." S.C.G. I, 22, n. 5; vol. 13, 68
26 "Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse." S.C.G.. I, 22, n. 9; vol. 13, 68
27 "Itapossumus dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum partIvt/nit actum es-
sendi "In. DeHeb. 1. 2
28 "Quod ens sumiturab actu essendi\ sed nomen rei exprimlt tiuttitilttlttni v*\ mentlum
entis" De Ver.t q, 1, u. Is vol. 22, 5 "tins autem rum dicit qumlMmi ltd mlum actum

74 _ _
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

that which has esse!'29 This Thomistic doctrine of the primacy of being is
said to be quite unique amongst scholastics,30 indeed esse is called "the act
of being insofar as it is a being, that is, that by which it is denominated as
an actual being in reality."31 Distinguishing things from the nothingness
of mere possibility, esse "is compared to all things as that by which they are
made actual," and this esse is "that which actuates all things." 32 This act
of being is so metaphysically important that Aquinas calls it "the act of
all acts and the perfection of all perfections."33 Since a thing cannot have
any properties prior to its own existence, "esse is the first among all acts."34
Stronger words can hardly be claimed for the act of esse. It is no exag-
geration to say that this notion is foundational to his whole metaphysical
line of thinking. Numerous other texts could be listed as well "Nothing is
more formal or simple than esse"35 Esse is also the source for intelligibility,
since "each thing is knowable to the extent that it has being."36 "Esse is the
act of that which we can say exists,"37 and "Each thing is through its own
act of being."38 This series of very strong statements about the role of esse
shows us, in the clearest of terms, that in the mind of Aquinas, esse is the

essendi", In. Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 4, a. 2, ad. 2. "Nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumltur,
non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi"De Ver. q. 1, a. 1, ad. 3; vol. 22,6 "Hoc vero nomen ens,
imponitur ab actu essendi" In. IVMeta. Led., 2, n. 6
29 "Ens simpliciter est quod habet esse" S.T. I-II.26.4; vol. 6,190.
30 "No one else in the 13th century would say that a thing is called an ens because of
lis esse" William E. Carlo, The Ultimate deducibility oj: Essence to Existence in Existential
Metaphysics. (The Hague: M. Nijhof, 1966), 12.
31 "Esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu
in rerum natura." Quod IX, 2, 3.
32 "Esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim
habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et
el lam ipsarumformarum." S.T. 1,4,1, ad. 3; vol. 4, 50
33 "Unde patet quod hoc dico esse est actualitas omnium actum, et propter hocperfectio
omnium perfectionum." De Pot. q. 7, a. 3, ad. 9., c.f. ". .. Sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur
actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quoddico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter
hoc estperfectio omnium perfectionum." De Pot. q.7, 2, ad 9.
34 "Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse." S.T. I, 76, 6; vol.5,229.
35 "Nihil enim estformalius aut simplicius quam esse." S.C.G. I, 23; vol.13, 70.
3ft "Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate."S.C.G. I,
Vl.n. 16; vol. 13,207.
37 "Quia ipsum esse non est pwprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius. Eius enim
mtus est esse de quo possumus dlcere quod sit" S.C.G II, 54, n. 3; vol.13, 392.
3H "Unumquodque #tt per tuum vssc. Quod igltur non est suum esse, non est per se
newtst-MSt"&CXS /• 22, n,5i vul, 13, <\H

75
St. 'Ihomas Aquinas and the Priilplv aJ'SuJIicicnt liaison

reason why there is something rather than nothing, since it is only by this
act of being that something can be real in the first place.
But lets push this point a little further by looking at what other con-
temporary scholars of St. Thomas take texts like these to mean. In oth-
er words, how do recent interpreters of Aquinas interpret the Thomistic
doctrine of esse7. Well, for starters, Jacques Maritain says, "To exist is to
maintain oneself and to be maintained outside nothingness; esse is an act,
a perfection,"39 and that things are "made real by the act of existing - that
is to say, placed outside the state of'simplepossibility"40 Norris Clarke says
that without this interior act of being a thing would be "indistinguishable
from nothing'*1 John R X. Knasas says that it is the "individual esse's that
make various things more than nothing"42 Joseph Owens is particularly
helpful on this score because he so frequently emphasizes the point. Ow-
ens says that since all things, whether sensible or supersensible, are said to
be in some way, that "being then, may in one way or another be attributed
to all things without exception."43 But what is this being? Owens replies,
"It is at least the characteristic that makes a thing differ from nothing"44 In
the realm of the sensible, "Being emerges as the cause that makes a thing
more than mere nothing!*45 And again, in sensible things, "Being is the

39 Jacques Maritain, Seven Lectures on Being, 93, emphasis mine.

40 Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent (New York: Image Books, 1956), 45,
emphasis mine.
41 Norris Clarke, The One and the Many, 32, emphasis mine.
42 John F. X. Knasas, The Preface To Thomistic Metaphysics: A Contribution To the
Neo-Thomist Debate On The Start Of Metaphysics (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 105, em-
phasis mine.
43 Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston, TX: Center For
Thomistic Studies, 1986), 21-2.
44 "But what is being? A tentative and to a considerable extent tautological answer
might describe it as the characteristic that makes anything be or that makes anything a be-
ing, just as whiteness makes something white. It is at least the characteristic that makes a
thing differfrom nothing Without possessing it a thing could not be thought of or spoken
of. To describe it negatively through contrast with nothing is in fact to describe it in terms
of a thing, as the word formation "no-thing" shows. Even when one thinks of and speaks
of nothingness itself, for the moment one has to endow the object "nothingness" with
being, by giving it existence in one's thought. It exists in the mind while it is being con-
sidered and discussed. While it is an object of actual consideration it enjoys cognitional
being or existence. Being, therefore, is what actually makes any object a thing, whether
in the sensible or supersensible, the real or the cognitional orders, It IN an aspect thai Is
common to all things." Ibid, 22, emphasis mine.
45 "In the realm of sensible things,,.. a thing can be undtfrNlouil mul Npnkcn about

76
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

cause that makes a thing differ from nothing"46 Because if a thing did not
exist, no other attribute of it would exist either; the act of being is also "the
primary consideration in meaning."47 Owens continues, "Without its being,
I he thing would not exist, it would be nothing. Being, therefore, may be re-
garded as a perfection that makes a thing exist and as an act that the thing is
able to enjoy/'48 "Being, then, is universally what makes a thing differentfrom
nothing. It may therefore the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfec-
tions/*49 "Being is conceived as an act or perfection that makes a thing differ
from nothing"50 This idea that the act of being is what sets a thing apartfrom
nothing is also present in Owens' earlier work, where he says, "In every case,
[existence] sets a thing apart from nothing."51 The being of the thing is "the
actuality that gives the thing existence,"52 and that this act is most prior and
most basic in a thing, it is the act of all other actualities in the thing since,
"unless the existence is presupposed, the thing would not be there at all."53
" Without existence a thing is nothing. Z*54 since "existence is what makes it a
being."55 Without this act of all acts that sets the thing apart from nothing,
II would be nothing; "Without existence, it is nothing"56
vSo in light of these texts from both Aquinas and his contemporary in-
terpreters, it should be clear to us that the Thomistic doctrine of esse would
play a critical role in how Aquinas might respond to Leibniz question
and, consequently, how he might go about formulating his own take and
)uslideation of the principle of sufficient reason. But that Aquinas would
appeal to this doctrine is one thing, whether or not such a doctrine is true

because it has being. In this way, being emerges as the cause that makes a thing more than
mere nothing. It is the cause that makes a thing something. At the deepest of levels it an-
swers I he question why." Ibid, 24, emphasis mine.
•\h I bid, 29.
•17 "Without existence, either real or cognitional, nothing else matters for a thing. Be-
lti}41 hen is the primary consideration in meaning." Ibid, 44. By "meaning," Owens means
whatever is intelligible in a thing.
>\Hlbid, 59, emphasis mine.
>\K) Ibid, 60, emphasis mine.
'>() Ibid, 61, emphasis mine.
M Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic
SI ml ION, 1985), 38, emphasis mine.
'»; Ibid, 51.
S.t Ibid, 7ft.
M Ibid, 52, emphasis mine.
M/toif.Al.
?>f> Ibid, 75, cmpluulN mine,
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

is another matter. For this reason, if we are going to invoke Aquinas' help
on this matter, we have to first see whether or not there is any justification
for this doctrine of esse.

Is This Ihomistic View True?

So now we have to face this question, is the Thomistic view on the pri-
macy of the act of being true7. It certainly requires us to take the act of
being seriously, versus say, merely the fact of being, but why should we do
that? Well, it seems to me that perhaps the strongest and clearest way to ar-
gue on behalf of this doctrine is to use the descriptions above that refer to
this act of being as an actuality that makes a being differ from nothing.57 So
we can start with this notion of distinction from nothing (or if you prefer,
distinction from mere possibility) and ask can a being really exist without
having some real actuality about it that makes it differ from nothingness
or its mere possible state? To say it another way, can the existence of a
thing, be merely some mental recognition or fact about a being without
any corresponding intrinsic reality in the thing itself?
Clearly the answer must be no. If the thing really exists and is distinct
from nothingness or mere possibility, there must be some actuality in the
being itself that makes it so. Otherwise, in reality and prior to any men-
tal consideration, it would be identical to that merely possible state. If the
thing does not have - truly have - some actuality which makes it distinct

57 Gilson himself acknowledged that the existence of the thing is not always recog-
nized by Thomists as an act, and some have accused Gilson of "theologizing" Aquinas'
metaphysics. In response to this charge, Knasas has argued "Taken in context, his [Gil-
son's] insistence upon the benefits of revelation for reason is not meant to supplant or
preclude an authentically philosophical development of the science. The philosophical
development begins with the judgmental grasp of the esses of sensible things, moves to
an apprehension of ens in the habens esse sense, and competes itself in the demonstration
of Ipsum Esse!' see John RX. Knasas "Does Gilson Theologize Thomistic Metaphysics?"
Thomistic Papers V (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1990), 17. Moreover, other
thinkers who claim for themselves the label "Thomist" (such as Peter Geach) think that
the term esse in Aquinas is to speak only of form and not some additional act of a. form.
For response to Geach and other "analytical Thomists" who hold this view, see John RX.
Knasas "Haldane's Analytical Thomism and Aquinas' Actus EssendC in Analytical Thorn-
ism (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 233-282. For the development of judgment
approach to Thomistic metaphysics see Joseph Owens, "Aquinas on Knowing Hxislence,"
The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John Catan (Albany N.Y.i Slrtlr University of
New York Press, 1980), 20-33 and John RX. KIUIHBN, Being and Sam* Wh t butitry Ihom-
ists (New York: I'ordhum University PKCNH; 2003), 173-212,

78
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

from nothing, then it is not, in reality, distinct from nothing. Hence, it

seems necessary to admit the Thomistic point that this act of distinction
from nothing or being must be a real principle possessed by things. This
point is of great metaphysical importance, because the order of being is
prior to the order of knowing and consequently it is the being of things
that first serves as the foundation of any true judgments or "facts" about
being,58 Prior to any "fact" about being there must be an "act" of being.
But in response to this an objector might retort by saying that any
property can do this. Nothingness is the absence of all properties, so it
doesn't take much to distinguish a thing from nothing. All it takes is one
insignificant property, say the color blue, to make a thing distinct from
nothing. Therefore, this act of being is not required for a beings distinc-
tion from nothing. In fact, there needn't be any act of being at all since any
old property can handle that task of making something differ from ab-
solute nothingness. Thus the Thomist doctrine superfluously posits some
weird entity of "esse" without necessity.
Yet this retort moves too fast, because it fails to consider Aquinas' point
I hat the act of being is most prior in a thing. It is the act of all other acts. Sure,
it's undeniably true that the color "blue," or any other property for that mat-
ter, makes a thing distinct from nothing, but Aquinas' point is that proper-
lies like this can do so only in a secondary or derivative sort of way. Not all
properties are created equal. Unless a thing first exists, it can't be anything
else. Once we take away the existence of the thing, there is literally nothing
else left to which we could even imagine attaching the property "blue."59

58 "Furthermore, this fact or truth about real things must be rooted in some intrinsic
property, some real act of presence within the thing itself, which grounds and justifies my
Judgment about it that 'it is, is real.' Here we pass from the mere fact of existence to the
Inner act of existence grounding it - a crucial passage in understanding which leads us
I nl o I he Thomistic vision of what it means to be, to be an actual existent." Norris Clarke,
'///«• One and the Many, 79.
!i9 'lb be precise, the initial esse that makes a thing be a substance and thus distin-
guished from mere potency is "substantial existence" {esse substantiale) while any addi-
tional accidental qualities would be esse "in a certain respect" (secundum quid): "Since
bring properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
polcntliility; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is pri-
marily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's
substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but
by tiny further actuality It Is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative be-
ing, lor lo be while do«« not lttk«? « thing mil of simply potential being; because only a thing
I lml nduully hftH being cmi rwrlv* ihU mode of being. (Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie

79
Si Ihomti* Atjuhnik tttnl thr Vrhlplc ofSujIicicnt Reason

IWNIIICN, Id us Imagine something "blue", say a blue table. Go ahead

imil ascribe all sorts of other standard predicamental properties to it. Say
It weighs one hundred pounds. Say it is six feet long, and say it's located in
a kitchen, etc. You can proceed and ascribe to it all the sorts of properties
like this you want and you will never arrive at an understanding that the
table exists! As long as you only add properties of this sort, you do not and
will not ever escape the realm of the mere possible. Only the addition of one
property does that. Add the property of "existence" and it all "comes alive."
60
All of this forces us to conclude that when it comes to existence, all other
properties must take a back seat to this act which, in the words of Aquinas,
is "the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections."61
So given this metaphysical analysis, there is no room but to affirm with
Aquinas that a thing cannot be blue unless it first is, and that the existence
of a thing is, indeed it must be, prior in being to all the rest of its proper-
ties.62 The esse of the thing then is not only a real facet of things, but it is
also a facet that is more foundational to it than anything else that can be
said about it.63 If a thing's being were not presupposed, it could not have

esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter
aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quodprimo discerniturab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc
autem est esse substantiate rei uniuscuiusque; undepersuum esse substantiate dicitur unum-
quodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid,
sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia
simpliciten cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu) S.T. 1.5.1 ad.L Emphasis added.
60 "Many metaphysicians seems to imagine that an essence cannot exist, so long as it
has not received all its determinations, that, as soon as it has received them, it is bound
either to burst into existence or, at least, to receive it. Now, a twofold error is responsible
for such an illusion. The first is not to see that to be fully completed in the order of essen-
tiality does not bring an essence one inch nearer actual existence. A completed perfected
possibility still remains a pure possibility. The second error is to forget that the essence
of a possible being necessarily includes the possible existence through which alone it can
achieve its essential determination " Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Toron-
to: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952,182.
61 "Undepatet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, etprop-
ter hoc estperfectio omnium perfectionum" De Pot. q.7,2, ad 9.
62 Of course we mean here a priority of being, not necessarily a priority of time; "...for
those things are prior in being which are not destroyed when other things are destroyed,
although when they are destroyed other things are destroyed." In Meta. VII, 1. 15.
63 Nor would it matter to say that if a certain thing exists it must have a ccrlnin proper-
ty, say for example, that if a cup of coffee exists it must have a certain tcmpernlure. Such a
claim would be irrelevant since the truth of that statement does nol convert In every cup
of coffee with a temperature exists! Something in addition to a thing1! noolblr qunlllies
must be added to set the thing apart from mere possibility,
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

any other property. Hence, the Thomistic doctrine of esse stands on excep-
tionally solid philosophical grounds.64
Now for our purposes here, establishing this doctrine is of no small
importance. For this doctrine of esse provides us with a central beachhead
from which we can launch our justification of the principle of sufficient
reason. And by no means are we the first to recognize this. Following
(iarrigou-Lagrange, this notion of distinction from nothing is possibly the
clearest and most persuasive way of understanding the principle of suffi-
cient reason.65 With this in mind, we can say that a sufficient reason for

64 Even Kant s initial speculations can help point us to this same conclusion. What is the
il illcrence between a real hundred dollars and a possible one hundred dollars? In the order of
essence alone, there is no difference at all. But Kant's criticism was based on simple apprehen-
sion or conceptualization, but conceptualization is not the only way we can know reality. After
nil, one hundred real dollars is a very big difference than one hundred possible dollars (One
hundred dollars difference!). When we make a judgment (what the scholastics call the "second
operation of the intellect") we are saying that this thing is and the addition is not a mere qual-
itiil ive addition, it is an attribution that a thing is set apart from nothingness. Existence is very
meaningful - in fact, it has the deepest meaning for anything is to exist. Without existence,
nolhing else matters for a thing, since all of its possible properties mean nothing if il does
iml In fact exist. For the Thomistic view opposing Kant, see Owens, An Elementary Christian
Metaphysics, 44. Along these same lines, Maritain argues, "The most fundamental and most
eharacteristic metaphysical thesis of Aristotelianism as re-thought by Thomas Aquinas, the
diesis of the real distinction between essence and existence in all that is not God - in other
words, the extension of the doctrine of potency and act to the relation between essence and ex-
igence, is directly connected with this intuition. This is, in truth, a thesis of extreme boldness,
lor In il potency (essence, or intelligible structure already achieved in its own line of essence)
IN completed or actuated by an act of another order which adds absolutely nothing to essence
tt.s essence, intelligible structure or quiddity, yet adds everything to it in as much as it posits it
rxtm causas or extra nihil" Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent tr. L. Galantiere and
(iernkl B. Phelan (New York: Image Books, 1958), 45. For further criticism of the "fact-under-
Mumling" of existence, see Knasas, Being and Some 20th Century Thomists, 174-182.
65 "Omne ens debet habere rationem propter quam sit potiusquam non sit. ...Si quodlibet
vns non haberet rationem essendi, rationem propter quam sitpotius quam non sit, non dis-
ih\£ueretur a nihilo, quia proprium nihil est non habere rationem essendi, cum opponatur
mil" Reginald Garrigou Lagrange, De Revelatione (Romae: Libreria Editrice Religiosa,
I *M !>), 122, A similar approach to defending the principle of sufficient reason can be found
In John Van Der Aa's Praelectionum philosophiae scholasticae brevis conspectus (end Ed.
I.onvnIn: Fonteyn, 1888). Gurr summarizes Van Der Aa's position this way: "Since being
d lifers from non-being, this being from that being, and existent being from possible be-
Ing. I his difference cannot be because of nothing. Therefore it is due to something either
ex I rl lisle or Intrinsic Vhich is called ihe suflicient reason.' The causal principle here is
dear because, being a mere possible before existence, something cannot determine itself
In ex Is I and so, 'as In all analytic Judgment*/ It Is easy to conclude In the abstract from
existence of died in existence of cause," (Jurr, ISO,

HI
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

existence means enough of what it takes to be distinguished from nothing,

or simply, that which distinguishes it from nothing. It is, after all, incontro-
vertible that all beings are in fact distinguished from nothing. By using dis-
tinction from nothing or mere possibility as our primary means of explain-
ing the principal part of the principle of sufficient reason, it should be easy
to see how this proposition should be taken as a necessary proposition.66 To
ask why a thing exists is the same as to question what distinguishes this thing
from nothing. To lack distinction from nothing is to be identical to nothing,
and thus, not a being at all. Therefore, there must be something that makes
beings distinct from nothing - a reason or fundamentum distinctions - and
that reason cannot itself be "nothing," for then there would be no distinc-
tion! To hold two things as distinct with absolutely no difference between
them is a nonsensical position. In short, if nothing distinguishes a beingfrom
nothing, then it is not distinguished from nothing.

The Act of Being as a Reason for Existence

Before moving forward we should briefly address a possible termino-
logical point. Some might wonder if we are justified in calling this act of
distinction from nothing a "reason." In response we can certainly say there
is no incompatibility or inconsistency in doing so. In fact, given what we
said above when we clarified what a "reason" is, viz., that which accounts
for the being of a thing, clearly if this esse is anything at all, it is this! This
is precisely what Aquinas and the later Thomists have said about the act of
being. Esse is that in virtue of which something exists. Possessing an act of
being is certainly an answer to the question why this being exists, and thus
can certainly be said to be the reason why a thing exists.67 We could also
mention the fact that the Thomistic notion of esse is also equally as broad as
our notion of reason. Just as Aquinas says, it is impossible for something to
exist without esse, and thus every being must have it,68 so too we can, and

66 We will clarify the meaning of "necessary proposition" in a later chapter.

67 Again, we are talking about a reason in the order of existence without denying there
need be essence. But even here, the relation between the primacy of existence and essence
is being rethought in Thomistic circles, so I do not wish to discuss the onlological status
of essence. For a reappraisal of essence in light of the recent developments of'Ihomistic
existential metaphysics, see William E. Carlo, The Ultimate Reduclblltty oflisscnce to Ex-
istence in Existential Metaphysics (The Hague: M. Nljhof 1966), l'or furlhrr illaaisslon sec
KnasavS, Being and Some 2()lh Cenlury 'Ihomisln, 307
68 "Imposslblle est quod sit aliquot! ens quod nan habwt $$$0,u Ek V9W t|, <U a l\ vol, 22,5S>6

0* ••-—-•••
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

will argue later, that all beings must possess a reason for existence. Like the
act of being, a reason for existence is also universal to all beings. Just as one
might say nihil est sine ratione, one might also just as well say nihil est sine
esse. The scope and meaning of the terms are the same.
For this reason then we can put to rest any fears that we are in error
when we call the act of being a "reason" for existence. Hence, "reason"
and "act of being," as I am using the terms here, are interchangeable.69
'ftiis means we could now, if we were so inclined, give this principal part
of the principle of sufficient reason a more Thomistic formulation. Cast
in Thomistic terms, the principle would state that "Whatever exists must
have an act of being (esse).irjQ Regardless of whether one uses the term "rea-
son," "act of being," or "that which sets the being apart from nothing," the
result and meaning is the same. Thus, we are entirely justified in calling
the act of distinction from nothing a reason for existence.
So this is the principal part of the principle of sufficient reason. It can
be phrased in various ways, like, "Whatever exists must have a reason for
existence," "Whatever exists must have that in virtue of which it is distin-
guished from nothing," or the Thomistic formulation, "Whatever exists

69 To put the point syllogistically, "That which accounts for a thing's being is a reason
lor existence, esse accounts for a thing's being, therefore, esse is a reason for existence."
A nolher prominent Thomist, at least implicitly, seems to be making the same connection
between esse and a reason why something exists in discussing the difference between
essence and existence and the different kinds of questions they answer. <CI would ask the
reader evaluating my approach to distinguish two questions and, corresponding to this,
I wo kinds of intelligibilities. One question searches for that by reason of which something
is recognized as real or as sharing in being. Another seeks after that by reason of which
something enjoys a certain kind of being. If these are two different questions, it seems
Ihnl one is justified in offering two different answers for them. That intelligible content
hi (i thing by reason of which it is recognized as enjoying reality or being should be distin-
guished from that intelligible content by reason of which it is recognized as enjoying this
or I hat kind of being. Without presupposing that there is any being which is not living
it nil material and mobile, we can still ask why any thing which we experience enjoys being.
To nsk this is very different from asking what kind of being it enjoys. If these two ques-
I Ions are not identical, it follows that the answer to the one does not have to be identified
with I lie answer to the other. That by reason of which something is recognized as enjoying
hdng needs not be identified with that by reason of which it enjoys this or that kind of be-
ing." (John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought Of Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C.:
(Inlhollc University of America Press, 2000), 60-1, emphasis mine.)
70 Since it is Aquinas' view that "impossibile est quod sit aliquid ens quod non habeat
enc" (De Ver, Q. 21 A, 2; vol. 22, 596) we can say that Aquinas held, with the utmost con-
fidence, Ihwt "whatever «XU(N IIUINI luwe mi act of being (esse)"

83
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

must have esse" All of these formulations, I claim, are equivalent. They
merely say the same thing with different words. For the sake of clarity
however, it seems to me that the formulation the explicitly says what a
reason is will be the most useful for our purposes, namely, "Whatever ex-
ists must have that in virtue of which it is distinguished from nothing."
Presumably this is the clearest and least controversial way of stating the
principal part of the principle of sufficient reason, and so throughout the
rest of this work it will be the most common way I formulate it.
Having said that, and before we move on to the next part of the prin-
ciple, we need to say at least a few words here regarding the truth of this
statement. For reasons I will elaborate on later, but which are probably
already apparent to the reader, I will argue that the principal part of the
principle of sufficient reason, is a necessarily true proposition, that is to say,
a proposition that is known to be true immediately from the meaning of
its terms, such that a denial of this proposition would result in a patent
self-contradiction. In other words, this part of the principle is what the
scholastics call a necessary per se notum proposition and it will be defend-
ed as such via a reductio ad absurdum argument in a later chapter.

The "Source Portion" of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Having thus stated our position that the principle of sufficient reason is
a conjunctive proposition consisting of two claims, and having addressed
the formulation and meaning of that first claim, it remains for us to now
take a look at the second claim made by the principle. I call this second
conjunct the "source" portion, since the principal part indicated that all
beings need an act of being in order to be, this second proposition lays out
the possible options as to just where this act of being is, that is to say its
locus, or ontological "home". And just like the principal part, here with
the source portion there are different ways of saying the same thing. Typ-
ically it has been said that this reason for existence can be either "in itself
or from another," "essential or non-essential" or if we may borrow the di-
vision given by the Jesuit John Van Der Aa,71 the difference between being
and non-being must be either "intrinsic or extrinsic."
Now as every good student of logic knows, the primary concern when
making divisions like this is that they be exhaustive, that is to say, we want
to make sure all options are stated and on the table so thai when we make
use of these propositions in an argument we cannot be MCCUNCII of posing

71 ANCIICHI Indurr, 150.

 The Principle Stated and Us Meaning

a false dilemma. In other words, its good practice to make sure we dont
leave any openings for an interlocutor to point out a possible tertium quid.
The best way to ensure this is through contradictory opposition, but some-
times contrary opposition will work just fine (as when we say every whole
number must be either even or odd).
So with this in mind we can take the first division, namely, that "in
itself or from another." This is clearly an exhaustive division, for there is
nothing in the universe that is neither this thing itself (that I now des-
ignate) nor something else. Indeed everything that exists is covered by
cither "this thing" or "something else." So the first division is a complete
exhaustive disjunction. If all things need a sufficient reason, then that rea-
son must be located either in some thing we now designate, or something
else, for there simply are no other possible options.72
The next way of stating the source portion says that a reason for ex-
istence must be possessed either essentially or non-essentially. In other
words, the act of being either falls within what the thing is or it does not.
Now, this distinction is clearly one of contradictory opposition; that is, it
is an opposition of the strongest type. It is based on a simple affirmation or
denial of the same property, and so it should be easy to see that this type of
division is both exclusive and exhaustive. It is exclusive because both can-
not be true, and it is exhaustive in that there are no alternatives between
1 his stated pair. Just as something is either red or not red, a property must
ho possessed either essentially or non-essentially. Because of this, one of
I he disjuncts must be true and the other false.
When we apply this distinction to the having of esse, this esse must be
possessed either essentially or non-essentially. It cannot be neither, it cannot
be both; it must be one or the other. Essentially or non-essentially is the only
way a being can possess anything, and if an act of being must be possessed,
II follows that it can only be possessed essentially o r non-essentially.
But what does having something "essentially" mean? The scholastic
notion of having a property essentially means that the said property falls
within the very definition of the thing (for example, as the property of "ra-
tional ity" falls within the definition of "man"). Just as a thing cannot fail
In he itself, a man cannot fail to be rational by nature. Thus, essential prop-
er! Ics are characteristics that belong to the very essence of what the thing

72 'I hose who argue that only contradictory opposition provides certitude are simply
wmng» Nlncc again, sometime* contrary opposition does exhaust all of the alternatives.

85
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

is, that is, what it is necessarily and not contingently. To have existence
essentially, then, would be to have existence by nature, and thus to exist
necessarily. To have existence in this way is to have existence in a way that
one cannot lose it. It is an ens a se, and such a being cannot be deprived of
existence. If we express this notion of a necessary being in possible world
semantics, we can say that a necessary being exists in every possible world.
Just as the number nine has the property of being divisible by three in ev-
ery possible world (since divisibility by three is an essential property of the
number nine), so a being whose existence belongs to its very essence exists
in every possible world and cannot not exist.73
What would it entail to possess an act of being non-essentially? This is
just the opposite of necessary! To have existence in a non-essential way is
to have it non-necessarily, which of course means, to have existence in a
way that one can lose it Such a being is capable of not being. This would
mean that such a being is contingent^ that it may or may not exist, and that
existence does not fall within the nature or essence of that thing. Again to
borrow a phrase from possible worlds semantics, contingent beings exist
in some possible worlds but not others. If a being is not necessary, it has
non-essential existence and is therefore contingent.
The upshot then of the essential versus non-essential distinction is not
only that this is an exhaustive disjunction, but in addition to that we can see
that all being is either necessary or contingent. However one chooses to put
it, all being is either capable of not existing, or not, a thing can exist either
essentially from the necessity of its own nature, or not, necessary or contin-
gent, etc., the result is the same. There are no third options here.
Likewise we can say the same for the intrinsic versus extrinsic division.
If some quality is not intrinsic to a thing, then it must be, by definition,
extrinsic to it. There simply is no third option here. This division, like the
other two, is exclusive and exhaustive.
With these explanations of the possible sources behind us, it may not
matter which one we use. They are all exhaustive and seem to say the same
thing using different words. Yet my preferred way of making the disjunction
will be between the thing itself or by another. Everything then will be either
self-distinguishing (its own sufficient reason) or other-distinguishing. I pre-

73 For a relatively recent defense of the notion of essence by I'rnm mi mutlytlc philos-
opher, see Alvin Plantingu, The Nature of Necessity (New Yorki Oiritiril UnlviTslly Press,
1974), 54-77,
 Vic Principle Stated and Its Meaning

fer this way of stating the disjunction for two reasons. l;irst, "by another"
gives us a positive reference to some other being rather than a mere negation
like "not itself" or "non-essential".74 Secondly, such a formulation has the
benefit of being more "metaphysically generic," that is to say, this disjunc-
tion prescinds from any particular ontology. Unless one is a radical monist,
all metaphysicians should agree that "this thing itself or something else" is
an exhaustive and non-controversial disjunction. All we need to do at this
point is to reunite what we have distinguished. Taking the first principal
part of the principle of sufficient reason and joining it to the second, when
you join these two propositions together, you get the full blown principle of
sufficient reason: "Whatever exists must have an act of being (a reason, that
by which it is distinguished from nothing) either in itself or from another."75
hollowing Kleutgen from the text cited in Chapter I, what this principle re-
ally means is that all existing being either exists by itself or by something
else. Not one being escapes having a reason for its existence because no be-
ing escapes the necessity of being distinct from nothing. Thus, every being
must have a reason for its existence, and no being is without one: Omne ens
1 alionem sufficientem habet: nee ens sine ratione. We can graphically illus-
l rate the distinctions made in this section with the following diagram:

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

WHATEVER EXISTS MUST HAVE THAT IN VIRTUE OF
WHICH IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM NOTHING
(Necessarily true, perse notum)

(exhaustive division)

SELF DISTINGUISHING OTHER DISTINGUISHING

(the being distinguishes itself) (thebeingiscfisSnguisnedbyanolher)
- Exists perse (a se) -Exists peraliud(abatio)
- Necessary being - Contingent being

COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON:

WHATEVER EXISTS MUST HAVE THAT IN VIRTUE OF
WHICH IT 18 DISTINGUISHED FROM NOTHING, EITHER
IN n t l L F OR FROM ANOTHER.

87
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Clarifications of the Principle

That "Causes" are Only Types of Reasons
Although we have clarified the principle itself, still a few more clar-
ifications need to be made in order to anticipate and overcome some
common misconceptions. The first of these is that we must distinguish
between a reason and a cause. As should be evident from the source
portion of the principle, the principle of sufficient reason does not state
that "everything has a cause," nor is the principle based on an alleged
idea of a "cause" being contained in the very notion of "being." In no
way is the principle equivalent to saying "all beings have a cause" or
anything of that sort. The principle simply holds that all beings have
a reason for their existence, and this is quite a different claim than
saying all things have a cause. While we briefly mentioned this above,
it bears repeating again; there is an important difference between rea-
son and cause. "Cause," as it is used here, signifies when one being or
principle positively has an influence on the being of another. Thus, the
term "cause" is being used here in a very specific way. "Cause" does not
mean the same thing as "reason," nor does it have the same extension.
To look at it another way, a ratio is different from a causa, in the sense
that the genus is different from the species. Causa is a type of ratio;
we could even say that the concept "cause" is a species of reason. It's
the type of reason that comes from another. But of course, not all rea-
sons need to come from another. The extension of "reason" is therefore
broader than the scope of "cause." So although the principle of suf-
ficient reason claims everything needs a reason, it is not making the
claim that everything needs a cause. Again, if the God of classical the-
ism exists, then this being would not be "caused" (because it does not
depend on some other thing for its existence), but such a being would
still have a reason for its existence, e.g., it would be its own reason, a
ratio sui but not a causa sui.76

76 The Thomistic way of saying this is that God s essence would be identified with
existence, viz., what God is and that God is are one and the same. Such a being does not
"cause itself \ Cause by definition means something that exerts a poult Ivc Inlluniccon the
existence of another. Saying that a being causes its own existence lcfidn In absurdity (since
a thing cannot act as cause unless it first exists), but a being ihftt en lulu a *f (IN Its own
sufficient reason) docs not sullcr llnil difficulty.
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

That to Affirm the Principle of Sufficient Reason Does

Not Claim We Can Always Know the Reasons for Things
Nor is it the true that just because we say all beings have a reason, that
this also means human beings are capable of knowing what all of those
reasons are. To make a metaphysical claim about reality does not commit
us to making an epistemic claim about the capacity of the human intellect.
The reason we need to bring this point up is because sometimes it is ob-
jected that since we can never know all the reasons for a thing, that there-
fore people who employ the principle of sufficient reason are looking for
something that cannot be found.77 But this is surely mistaken. By holding
to the principle of sufficient reason, no cognitive competency of human
beings is implied. The principle affirms that there must be sufficient rea-
sons for a thing's existence, but it does not entail that we must know what
t hose reasons are in particular. We ought not to confuse the existence of
sufficient reasons with the ability to assign a sufficient reason. Knowing
a metaphysical principle that has true universal application is one thing,
knowing all of the concrete instances of that principle that apply to a cer-
tain event is, of course, something entirely different.

That a "Reason" Does Not Always Entail "Motive"

To clear up yet another far too frequent misunderstanding, not only is
"reason" not synonymous with cause, reason does not always mean "mo-
I ive" either. That all beings need a reason for their existence does not com-
mil one to any particular view of the will, namely, just because one thinks
all things need a reason for their existence does not mean that therefore a
deterministic view of the will is true. For example, it would not be incon-
sistent to say that all beings need a reason for their existence, while at the
same time maintaining that the will is a self-actualizing power, and thus,
tan choose without any external determining motive. In such a case, the
mere existence of a will making a choice would be the sufficient reason for
that choice. Whether or not the will always needs a motive exterior to itself
Is not a question about whether or not a choice needs a sufficient reason, but
nil her, what the sufficient reason for that choice is. The will's choosing might
he enough to account for the existence of a choice. If so, such a choice is not

77 Wc Nnw an example of ihU died nbovc where Berlrand Russell asserted this point
rtgnlnnt (loplcdlon In thtflrfamou*MIU: clclnUc,
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

without a reason, since the will chose it! So whether the mere existence of a
will choosing is a sufficient condition for choice can remain a matter of de-
bate without calling into question the principle of sufficient reason. Hence,
in our efforts to defend the principle of sufficient reason, we do not need to
maintain that an act of the will must always have a motive.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Its Relationship to

Other Principles
We said in chapter 1 that the principle of sufficient reason has taken
many forms throughout the history of philosophy, explicit at times but,
more often than not, it has taken some implicit form. To put this a little
differently we could say that the principle of sufficient reason is related, in
one way or another, to other commonly stated principles, such as the var-
ious forms of the principle of causality. The purpose of this section then
is to help clarify how the principle of sufficient reason is related to these
other principles. To do this, we will first make an important distinction
on what we call the "degrees" of the principle of sufficient reason and what
those degrees mean. Next, we will examine the close relationship between
the principle of sufficient reason and various ex nihilo principles, as well as
its relationship with the various formulations of the principle of causality.

The "Degrees" of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:

A Clarification
William Rowe mentions an important distinction between what he
calls a "weak principle of sufficient reason" and a "strong principle of suf-
ficient reason."78 The "weak principle of sufficient reason" is a principle
restricted to becoming, and can be stated as "whatever begins to exist has
a cause." What Rowe calls a "strong principle of sufficient reason" can be
stated as "Whatever exists has a reason for its existence - either in the ne-
cessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of some other being." This
78 "My purpose in constructing a simpler argument for Proposition I is to bring to light
two different versions of what is frequently called The Principle of Sufficient Reason -
hereafter referred to as PSR. According to the strong version of PSR, whatever exists must
have an explanation of its existence - either in the necessity of its own nature or in the caus-
al efficacy of some other being. According to the weak version of I\SK, wluitnvr comes into
existence must have an explanation of its existence. The explanation uf 11 M existence will
lie in the causal efficacy of some other being." William Rowi, 7ft* &JI mi i/njf/nj/ Argument
(Princelon, NJ: Princeton University Prcwi, 1975). 73, omphftlll idilfd,

90
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

distinction is helpful, as the weak principle of sufficient reason and strong

principle of sufficient reason are clearly different. The stronger is much
broader in scope and applicable to all beings, while the weak principle of
sufficient reason only speaks about beings when they begin to exist.
But there is a possible tertium quid in Rowe's distinction; namely, "Ev-
ery contingent being has a cause." By "contingent being," we mean what
whatever does not exist necessarily (e.g., by the necessity of its own es-
sence), or that which can lose its being. This statement is broader than
weak principle of sufficient reason because it applies to all contingent be-
ings and not just beings that come to be (for something could possibly be
caused and yet have existed indefinitely a parte ante), and yet it is more
narrow in scope than strong principle of sufficient reason since it would
not apply to a necessary being. Keeping in step with Rowe's terminology,
Id us call this tertium quid principle a "mild principle of sufficient reason"
In indicate its middle ground status. With this understanding in mind, we
now have three degrees of the principle of sufficient reason:
1. "Weak principle of sufficient reason": "Whatever begins to exist
has a cause for its existence." This is a principle applicable only to
becoming.

2, "Mild principle of sufficient reason": "Whatever exists contingently

has a cause for its existence." This is a principle applicable to all con-
tingent being.

}. "Strong principle of sufficient reason": "Whatever exists has a rea-

son for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in the
causal efficacy of some other being." This is a principle applicable to
all being whatsoever.
I low are these principles related? At first, we should notice the asym-
mcl rical truth-value between these degrees of principle of sufficient reason.
II I he slrong principle of sufficient reason is true, then all of them are true,
likewise, if the weak principle of sufficient reason is false, then all of them
AW false. However, this does not work the other way around. One could not
Inter the truth of a stronger degree from the truth of a weaker degree (i.e., just
lin tuise the weak principle of sufficient reason is true does not mean mild
nr I he slrong principle of sufficient reason is true), nor could one infer the
IMINII y of a weaker principle of sufficient reason from the falsity of a stronger.

91
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

In other words, if it were true that the strong principle of sufficient reas<on
were false, that would not by itself entail that the weak or mild versions were
false. So the defender of the principle of sufficient reason has a pitfall to
avoid, viz., one cannot argue for a strong principle of sufficient reason usiing
only mild or weak principle of sufficient reason evidence! If we show only
that whatever begins to exist has a cause, we have not necessarily shown tlhat
all beings need a reason (all the time).79
With this point in mind, our main concern is the truth of what Ronve
calls the strong principle of sufficient reason. As I formulated it, "What-
ever exists must have an act of being either in itself or from another." TThis
principle, as I have said, will be defended in a later chapter, but given wlhat
has been said here, if an argument can establish the strong principle of
sufficient reason (and I will argue that it can), then, because of their asym-
metrical truth value, it would also entail that all three degrees are trae.
Some of the dialectical arguments in the next chapter, however, will oinly
aim to establish a weak or mild principle of sufficient reason. I will indicate
which version the various arguments support at the appropriate point.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Some Ex Nihilo

Principles
We could make the same point about degrees with some ex nihi-
lo principles. There is a principle, ex nihilo nihil fit - that is, "Nothing
comes to be from nothing" - which is a principle of becoming. It is cer-
tainly true that this ex nihilo principle is equivalent to the positive ex-
pression, "Whatever begins to exist has a cause, or in other words, the
weak principle of sufficient reason."
But ex nihilo nihil fit might also be taken in a stronger sense; when fit
("comes") is used non-temporally, i.e., "to result from." This understand-

79 This is not to say that there may not be good arguments to show that once one accepts a
more modest principle that they are also committed to a stronger version. In fact, Alexander
Pruss has argued that to accept a weaker version of the principle of sufficient reason entails
accepting a stronger formulation, "that as soon as we accept even a relatively weak version
of the principle, such as that ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing), we should for
the same reason accept the stronger one that every contingent proposition luis an explana-
tion. This will allow us to harness the intuitions behind the ex nihilo nihil fit principle and
argument specifically tailored to this principle as evidence for iho full I'SU once we move
on to giving arguments for the l\SR." Alexander Pruss, 7h$ Principle qlStlJIItltftil Reason: A
Reassessment (New York, (aimbrldge University Press 2006, II.

M
 The Principle Stated and lis Meaning

ing of the ex nihilo principle is compatible with the mild principle of suf-
ficient reason, since if it is true that nothing results from nothing (in a
non-temporal sense), then every contingent being has a cause whether it
began to exist or not.80
A third ex nihilo principle, ex nihilo nihil est, "from nothing, nothing is,"
or "nothing that exists is from nothing," is the strongest version. This princi-
ple, properly expressed and expounded, is equivalent to the strong principle
of sufficient reason. The ex nihilo nihil est principle is universal and appli-
cable to all being, albeit indirectly in the sense that this ex nihilo principle
speaks universally when it says, "out of nothing, nothing is," meaning there
is no being whose existence is attributable to nothing. By "from nothing,"
I mean that a being s existence would be attributable to nothing; neither to
I he necessity of its own nature, nor to the causal efficacy of some other be-
ing. Conversely, to be "from something" means that a beings existence is at-
I ributable either to its own nature or the causal efficacy of some other being.
According to ex nihilo nihil est, if things cannot exist "from nothing," then
I hey must exist "from something," which is simply another way of stating
I he strong principle of sufficient reason.81

Ihe Principle of Sufficient Reason and Its Relation to

Other Causal Principles
We first need to clarify a few points about causal propositions. First,
no causal principle worthy of philosophical respectability states, "Every-
thing needs a cause." Affirming that statement would commit one to an
unsolvable infinite regress. Secondly, the principle of causality does not
i noun everything that begins to be has a material ox formal cause. It is at

HO I'or example, we saw in Ch. 1 that Etienne Gilson uses ex nihilo nihil fit in this broad
wmv when explaining Aquinas' five ways. Scotus too, as we saw in that same chapter, uses
un r.v nihilo principle in this broad sense as well since, like Aquinas, his proof does not
iti MIU* I hat the universe began in time.
HI (Ordinal Gerdil (1718-1802), in his "Reflections on a 'Memoir of Monsieur Beguelin
I inm/miing the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Possibility of a System of Chance*,"
held thai ihe principle of sufficient reason is different in nature from the principle of
linn contradiction. Along with it, truths like these lay at the foundation of human un-
i Ic ml in id ing. He argued that another maxim, "Nothingness produces nothing" is imme-
tllnldy evident without supposing a more exact knowledge of the principle of non-con-
lirtillillon. He concludes that the principle of sufficient reason is nothing other than the
rtKlom, "Nothingness produces nolhlng," and is as legitimate principle as the principle of
linn omlnidlctlon. CSurr, 105- ft.

93
St. 'Ihomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

least logically possible that a being be a cause of something without using

any preexisting matter (e.g., creation). Thirdly, as I mentioned above, some
principles of causality are not limited to temporal beginnings. Thus, not
every causal principle is adequately expressed in its full amplitude by for-
mulations like "whatever begins to exist has a cause/' for something could
possibly be caused and yet have existed indefinitely a parte ante. In this
case, the causal principle is concerned with contingency (i.e., dependen-
cy on another being) and not with temporal beginnings per se. In other
words, coming to be in time is not a necessary condition of contingency/
being caused, even though it would be a sufficient condition. Having a
temporal beginning indicates a species of the genus of contingency; yet it
is not an absolute requirement for it (although it is certainly true that hav-
ing a temporal beginning is probably the most common way we recognize
contingency).82 Correctly understood, the principle of causality then does
not automatically entail material causes; does not necessarily mean that
everything has a temporal beginning; and does not mean that everything
needs a cause. None of these are necessarily presupposed by it.
With these distinctions in hand, it is certainly easy to recognize that many
of the common formulations of the principle of causality are identical to the
weak and mild versions of the principle of sufficient reason. Statements like:
"Whatever happens has a cause," "There cannot be more in the effect than
was contained in the cause," "Whatever begins to be has a cause," "Whatev-
er is contingent has a cause," "The effect cannot be greater than the cause,"
and "Nothing occurs without a cause," etc., can be easily linked to one of the
degrees of the principle of sufficient reason above. So given the clarifications
above about the three degrees of the principle of sufficient reason and the cor-
responding ex nihilo principles, along with the various formulations of the
principle of causality, the relationships between them should be clear.

Does the Principle of Sufficient Reason Do Away With

"Brute Facts?"
Opponents of the principle of sufficient reason sometimes stress the
importance of "brute facts." The line of reasoning usually runs something

82 Thus, a more encompassing principle of causality as formulated by (loflcy goes, "An

existing contingent being, i.e., a being which does not exist by a ncccMlly of lis essence,
which does not contain in the concept of its essence the sufficient nullum (if Its existence
necessarily implies a cause for lis existence." Peter Cofley, Kplltf molugy ((iloua'Nler: Pe-
ter Smith Publishing, 1958) I, 225,
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

like, "If the principle of sufficient reason is true, then there are no "brute
I acts," and it is the absence of "brute facts" in the world that is supposed to
be undesirable and clearly false.83 But what exactly are "brute facts," and
what intuitions are we trying to preserve by holding them? Now it seems
lo me that when someone appeals to a brute fact, there are at least four
different senses one might mean by that term:
1. Self-explanatory brute fact - This is the sense of brute fact that means
something that is self-evidently true, no further appeal or evidence is
needed, and a fact that is obvious and in need of no further support.
For example, necessary propositions are true in a "brute fact" sort of
way because they are true in themselves ("Every triangle has three
sides" or "the whole is greater than the part") Facts known through
immediate sense experience, like "fire will burn you if touched," can
also be true in this way.

H J Ibis alleged conflict with "brute facts" and the infinite regress it is supposed to en-
gender, is something that has convinced more than one thinker that the principle of suffl-
t leu I reason is necessarily false! "This provides an occasion for pointing out that the Prin-
i l|»lc of Sufficient Reason, from which Leibniz developed his Cosmological Argument, is,
mi liir from being necessarily true, necessarily false. For Leibniz that great principle' was
"11 mt 'Nothing happens without sufficient reason,' But the truth is that every explanation
MI why things happen as they do is, and cannot but be, in terms of explanatory principles
U'\i>llcantes) that explain but which, at least at that stage, are not themselves explained
Uuv nol things needing to be explained—explicanda). So, however far the process pro-
i mis- -particular happenings explained in terms of general laws, general laws in terms of
ill III more general theories, and so on—there must always be something, or perhaps some
things, that will have to be accepted as the ultimate and inexplicable brute facts; the ulti-
nitilr explicantes in terms of which all the explicanda which can be explained have to be."
Antony Flew, Atheistic Humanism (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993) p. 47. Pope
iiguvs with Flew's criticism, "Why should the principle of sufficient reason be true? The
ilrlnulcrs of the cosmological argument feel that the Universe must at bottom be rational,
hul uguln, why should it? Antony Flew, who is the most profound of the contemporary
11II Us of theism, points out that not only is the principle of sufficient reason unjustified,
lull It Is actually demonstrably false! Any logical argument must start, with some as-
imiiptinns, and these assumptions must themselves be unjustified. We might of course
I if »il>lc lo justify these particular assumptions in the context of another demonstration,
I nun which the particular assumptions are deduced, but this just pushes the problem to
ii higher level; the basic underlying assumptions in the higher level argument are them-
M'lvi'N unjustified. At some point we have to just accept some postulates for which we can
glvr no reason why they should be true. Thus the nature of logic itself requires the principle
of nuJIklvHt reason to be false" A. Pope, "Two Design Arguments," in TheAnthropic Cos-
molo#hvl Principle, ed. John I). Barrow, Frank J. Tipler, and John A. Wheeler (New York:
(Word University Prow, 1V8H), 104, emphasis mine.

95
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

2. Practical brute fact - In this sense of brute fact, we mean having

enough of an explanation for practical matters, i.e., someone can
know all that is needed to explain this fire; viz., that a person has
struck a match and applied it to paper. For practical purposes, one
does not need to know precise details about how energy is released
from matter, the amount of oxygen necessary, or the history of the
box of matches and how they reached this vicinity. Simply knowing
that someone applied a lit match to a piece of paper is a practically
sufficient explanation for the fire.

3. Chance event - A brute fact in this sense is simply something that

"just happened" for no apparent reason. The roll of the dice turns up
double sixes. A meteorite crashes onto a particular place on Earth.
Why did these things happen? No real reason; things just happened
to turn out that way. They were purely accidental occurrences with
no reason. They just happened by chance.

4. Ontological brute fact - This kind of brute fact would be a being

whose existence is utterly unexplainable and attributable to nothing;
a thing that exists neither because of itself, nor because of another.
There is absolutely no ontological explanation for its existence.
Whether or not this listing is exhaustive of all the different senses of
"brute fact" does not matter. It is still enough to capture what most people
will mean by such a term, and gives us good insight into what aspect of re-
ality and common sense one may be attempting to preserve with that term.
So let us ask, just which senses of "brute fact" above are really incom-
patible with the principle of sufficient reason? There appears to be no rea-
son whatsoever why a person who holds the principle of sufficient reason,
as we have defined it, cannot also hold to brute facts in the first, second,
and third senses above. That things cannot exist from sheer nothing is
clearly compatible with beings and propositions being self-explanatory.
It is also compatible with stopping at certain things that are explanatorily
sufficient for practical purposes. Neither does holding to the principle of
sufficient reason mean there cannot be chance events, since chance events
do not need to be uncaused to be chance. Rather, the Aristotelian notion
of chance as an intersection between two independent lines of causali-
ty adequately captures all of our intuitions about the •xUtciwc of chance
 'flic Prtnvlpfa Sttttttt ttml lt» MPHHlhg

events. So it is only the "brute fact" in the fourth sense that is opposed lo
Ihe principle of sufficient reason. It is only this sort of "brute fact" that is
Incompatible with the principle of sufficient reason. This is what I will call
it "brute fact" in the strict and proper sense.
So the proponent of the principle of sufficient reason then can hap-
plly affirm that brute facts in the first three senses can exist; he or she
only needs to rule out the possibility of brute facts in the fourth sense.
lUil what, may we ask, is wrong with that? The notion of a brute fact as
a being whose existence is utterly unexplainable by any reason is hardly
an intuition we need to preserve. On the contrary, in the next chapter we
will argue just the opposite! That the principle of sufficient reason is in-
\ nmpatible with such "brute facts" in that sense is hardly a strike against
II. Whether or not there can be such beings remains to be shown when
we j^el to defending the principle of sufficient reason, but the point here is
•Imply to clarify in what sense the principle of sufficient reason rules out
"hrule facts" and the only kind of brute fact it does rule out is precisely the
highly counterintuitive one that our common sense intuitions don't need
anyway. All the other senses of "brute facts" are quite compatible with the
pi ineiple of sufficient reason.

Summary
So in this this chapter I have attempted to explain as precisely as
possible what is meant by the principle of sufficient reason. Most im-
port a nl in this discussion is the concept of "reason." If you'll remember,
"reasons" are that which account for something, and consequently there
tan be reasons in both the metaphysical and logical order, along with
a t<^responding logical and metaphysical version of the principle. It is
I he metaphysical version that is the focus, and the formulation I support
("Whatever exists must have a reason for its existence either in itself or
f t c 1111 another"), when stated in its proper logical form, is actually a con-
luik live proposition consisting of a "principal part" that establishes the
iun essily of having a sufficient reason in the first place ("Whatever exists
imi.Hl have a reason for its existence") and a "source portion" that claims
lu exhaustively delineate the manner in which a being can possess the
iruNnn for its being ("A sufficient reason is had either in itself or from
mini her"). vSpeaking metaphysically, I said that "a reason for a things
rxUlcnec" means simply that which accounts for the existence of some

97
wS7. 'Iliomas Aquinas and the Prkiple of Sufficient Reason

particular being, and that by which a being is distinct from nothing. This
notion of "reason for existence" can be explained in Thomistic terms by
an "act of being," that is to say, an actuality that makes a being distinct
from nothing or mere possibility. The principal part of the principle of
sufficient reason, I have said, is a necessarily true proposition that can be
known through the meaning of its terms while the source proposition is
an exhaustive disjunction.
I have also made it clear that causes are not to be completely identified
with reasons. A cause is a type of reason, and so the scope of "reason" is
broader than that of "cause." Also, by affirming the principle of sufficient
reason, no cognitive competency by human beings is implied. The princi-
ple affirms that there must be sufficient reasons for a thing's existence, but
it does not entail that we must always know what those reasons are.
When we acknowledge the tertium quid between Rowe's division, there
are three degrees of the principle of sufficient reason. The weak principle
of sufficient reason is a principle of becoming, the mild principle of suffi-
cient reason is a principle governing all contingent being, and the strong
principle of sufficient reason encompasses all being whatsoever. These var-
ious degrees are equivalent with various ex nihilo and causal principles.
Finally, I argued that of the many senses of "brute facts" that are avail-
able, only one of them - that a being exists without any sufficient reason
- is prohibited by the principle of sufficient reason. All the other common
sense usages of "brute fact" can be preserved while still maintaining a
strong version of the principle.
Now that we understand the meaning of the principle and its various
degrees, it is time that we proceed to argue on behalf of its truth. This re-
mainder of this work will proceed in five steps. First, we will look at a se-
ries, indeed a cumulative case, consisting of various dialectical arguments
showing that the weak and/or mild versions of the principle are true. In this
section, we will also look at the probative force of such dialectical arguments
and how they might serve as a road to recognizing first principles.
The second step of this case for the principle of sufficient reason will look
at what necessary truths are and how we know them. This step is obviously
helpful since we are claiming that the principle of sufficient reason is a nec-
essary truth. Hence, it will behoove us to delve into precisely what we mean
by necessary truths, that we are able to know necessary trullm, unci even go
so far as to say something about how we come to know n#cimiitry t rulhs.
 The Principle Stated and Its Meaning

Armed with this information about necessary truths we will then argue
(hat strong principle of sufficient reason itself is a necessarily true, per se
notum proposition, and can be shown to be such by a reductio ad absurdum
argument. This argument, if successful, will establish the strong principle
of sufficient reason, "Whatever exists has an act of being (reason why it is
distinct from nothing) either in itself or from another." Once this strong
principle of sufficient reason is established, it would also follow, given what
wo have said above, that the weak and mild versions are also true.84
In the fourth step of this effort, we will show how the insights gained
from the principle of sufficient reason could also be employed in other
arguments showing that the principle of causality, viz., that "every contin-
e n t being has a cause" is also necessarily true and thus cannot be denied
wil hout contradiction. To this end we will look at examples from the texts
of Aquinas and defend the arguments he makes there.
Finally, to round out our discussion we will answer all of the objections
I hal have been raised here against the principle of sufficient reason. In
I IK* end, I hope to show that there are very strong dialectical and demon-
s Ira live arguments for the principle of sufficient reason, and there are no
good arguments against it. Reason then would demand that we hold this
principle with a firm conviction.

H'i All hough I make use of scholastic/Thomistic style reasoning, the method here
IIMIUIIIIN strictly systematic. This work is not intended as a work of historical scholar-
ship, 1 hits, Ihls present work, to use the words of Norris Clarke, claims only to present a
"ihnmlNllculy Inspired metaphysics" with the possibility remaining that I am only mak-
ing u "creative retrieval" of hU thought.
 "Of course, some philosophers think that somethings having
intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think
it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything myself I really do not
know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about
anything, ultimately speaking"1
- Saul Kripke

l Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, page 42.

CHAPTER IV:
Dialectical Arguments
for the Weak and Mild
Principle of Sufficient
Reason
S
cholars of Aristotle have noticed that Aristotle endorsed two ways of
coming to know first principles; namely the way of the Topics (or what
we might call the dialectical method) and the way of the Posterior An-
tilvtlcs (or what we might call the nous method). How these two methods
wm k logelher is a point of deep dispute, but speaking broadly, this disagree-
mriil In Aristotelian scholarship can be said to be broken down into two
i ttmp.s. h'irst, there is what we might call the "old view" that the method of
I he Tosf trior Analytics replaces the older "Platonic" method of dialect we see
In the 'Topics. 'Ihen there is the "recent view" (or at least one that is gaining
Ktnuiul today) which holds that dialectic serves as a central part of Aristot-
I*''* philosophy, and should be considered as the proper method for arriving
nl I he knowledge of first principles.2

} I'm* rxitmplc, HCC Murlhn NuNNbnum, Ihe Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cam-

101
S(. 'Iliomns Aijuintts arid the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Which view is correct is not clear, and thus we will not pursue this
historical question here.3 What is clear is that Aristotle does say that
dialectic is a "road" to reaching first principles.4 The purpose of dialec-
tic is to cross-examine what we might call "common sense opinions"
or "common beliefs" (endoxa). Aristotle also calls these common beliefs
"appearances."5 Aquinas, at least, is clear that "the sole intent of a dia-
lectician is to proceed from things that are most probable, and these are
things that appear to the majority or to the very wise."6 Aquinas is also
clear that dialect, in itself, is a type of probabilistic reasoning that does
not attain scientific certitude:7
The philosopher differs from the dialectician in power, because
the consideration of the philosopher is more efficacious
than that of the dialectician. For the philosopher proceeds
demonstratively in dealing with the common attributes
mentioned above, and thus it is proper to him to have scientific
knowledge of these attributes. And he actually knows them
with certitude, for certain or scientific knowledge is the effect
of demonstration. The dialectician, however, proceeds to treat
all of the above-mentioned common attributes from probable
premises, and thus he does not acquire scientific knowledge of
them but a kind of opinion''8
If we take both Aristotle and Aquinas at face value, dialectic is
a type of probable reasoning that is nevertheless a "road" or "path"
to first principles. To put this another way, it seems that dialectical
argumentation "helps" us reach certain knowledge of first principles,
even if it does not take us all the way Following Aristotle and Aquinas,
my intent in this chapter is to offer various dialectical arguments for the

bridge University Press, 1986) and May Sim ed., From Puzzles To Principles: Essays On
Aristotle's Dialectic (Boston: Lexington Books, 1999).
3 This topic is thoroughly discussed in Terence Irwin's Aristotle's First Principles (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
4 "Dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inqui-
ries/' Topics L, 101b3-4.
5 See for example EE 1216b26-8, EN 1123b22-4,1145b2-3, and Topics l()5bl.
6 In. Post Ana. Lectio 31 Caput 19; vol. 1, 263.)
7 By "scientific certitude" Aquinas means that which is the rcmill of u demonstrative
syllogism, resulting in a causal knowledge of something which cannot hr otherwise.
8 In Meta, IV, 1.4, emphasis mine.

102
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

principle of sufficient reason. Even if it is the case that these arguments

do not take us to logically certain knowledge that the principle of
sufficient reason is true, still, they can play an important aid in coming
lo know that principle. How can this be? It seems to me that by showing
the foundational nature of the principle of sufficient reason, dialectical
arguments can be a helpful heuristic device in coming to understand the
principle on perhaps other more certain terms. Just as Aquinas says that
a house builder may be necessary for the coming to be of a house without
being the cause of the being of the house, so too, it seems, dialectical
arguments may be helpful for us to come to understand a principle
oven if they are not necessary to understand the principle. Hence, if the
principle of sufficient reason is a necessary truth known per se notum
(as I will argue later), still dialectical arguments can play an important
role in helping us to come to see its self-evidence, in an indirect way,
by showing how foundational and critical the principle is to rationality.
l;or example, it seems to me this is how Aristotle's dialectical arguments
lor the principle of non-contradiction work in Meta. IV. None of these
arguments given on behalf of the principle of non contradiction literally
prove or demonstrate that this principle is true, for all argumentation
must presuppose the principle of non contradiction in the first place.
Rather, what these dialectical arguments do is highlight the various
absurdities involved in denying this principle, such as an inability to
verbally deny it without presupposing it, in order to show what a deep
foundational position the principle holds in both thought and reality.
Hy highlighting such absurdities, one can in this way "indirectly"
demonstrate that the principle of non contradiction is in fact true.
liven if such probabilistic reasoning leaves us, as all dialectical
arguments do, with something less than logical certitude, still it can also
bo admitted that these arguments do give us some sort of non-logical
\crlitude," and this is not to be lightly dismissed. Just because such
arguments are logically defeasible in that one can deny their conclusion
without contradiction, still in no way does this mean they should be
i ausally dismissed as "inconclusive". Most of us are indeed "certain" in
some sense of the existence of horses, the ability of inductive reasoning to
arrive at truth, the efficacy the scientific method, etc., in spite of the fact
that we do not know any of these things with logical certitude. We harbor
no prudent fear of error about any of these beliefs. So if we extend the

103
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

notion of certitude beyond the logically necessary (like from no possibility

of error to no prudent fear of error), then dialectical arguments can
absolutely attain "certitude" in that sense.
In fact, the Thomistic commentator John Poinsot (John of St. Thom-
as) does precisely that. Taking his starting point from Aquinas' Com-
mentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Poinsot argues that "cer-
titude is nothing else than the adherence of the intellect to one side of
an alternative."9 Certitude then is holding to a proposition without fear
of error, and here Poinsot distinguishes between an intrinsic fear of er-
ror and an extrinsic fear of error. An intrinsic fear of error occurs any-
time we hold a proposition that is not necessary, such as the proposition,
"Rome exists." The subject and predicate are not connected "intrinsical-
ly", that is, in virtue of the terms themselves. Hence, one can deny these
propositions without contradiction. But this does not mean we cannot
be certain of these propositions in another sense, for Poinsot says there
is also an extrinsic fear of error. Even though "Rome exists" is not in-
trinsically necessary or self-evident through the meaning of the terms,
still one can accumulate enough evidence external to that proposition
such that we still have very solid and unwavering grounds for holding
"Rome exists," solid enough, Poinsot says, to remove all extrinsic fears of
being wrong about that proposition.10 Poinsot is surely correct here. An
accumulation of probabilistic arguments can reach what has been called
a "moral certitude" that, although falling short of logical certitude, is
still a type of certitude nonetheless in that all extrinsic (and we may add,
"prudent") fear of error is removed. It is this lesser sense of certitude that
I am claiming can be produced by strong dialectical argumentation and
in that sense, dialectic can also be an aid or "road" in coming to see a
necessary per se notum principle in an alternative light.11

9 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Volume I, Ars Logica, as ap-
pears in The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, tr. Yves Simon (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1955), 525. The cited text in Aquinas* Commentary on the Sentences is In Sent
III.23.2.2 sec.3.
10 "When there is such an accumulation of motives that credibility becomes evident
and no room remains for disbelief, all extrinsic fear is removed." Poinsot, ibid, 528.
11 Whether or not this lesser kind of "certitude" itself can serve as the basis for Aristote-
lian science, I leave to the Aristotelian scholar. It does not matter here, si live In the chapter
to follow, I argue that the strong principle of sufficient reason IN mclttphynk'ully necessary,
and thus, a contradiction to deny, which, if true, would clearly b* siittii tonl In urotmil an
Aristotelian notion of scientific knowledge.

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 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

Dialectical Arguments for the Principle of Sufficient

Reason
With that being said, it seems to me that there are at least seven good
dialectical reasons to think that some version of the principle of sufficient
reason is true:
1. The Argument from Metaphysical Intuition
2. The Argument from Induction I
3. The Argument from Induction II
4. The Argument from Absolute Skepticism
5. The Argument from the Inference to the Best Explanation and "Ock-
hams Razor"
6. The Argument from Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
7. The Argument from Conditional Syllogisms and the Scientific Method
My contention is that all of the above arguments are based on a wide-
ly accepted principle or method of proper reasoning. These principles
mid methods are widely-accepted guides to discovering truth and are
rarely, if ever, contested. Yet upon reflection, if it can be shown that these
principles and methods themselves cannot consistently be regarded as
reliable if some version of the principle of sufficient reason is not also
held to be true, a serious blow would be delivered to the position that
denies the principle of sufficient reason. To state the point another way,
I here are at least seven rational processes that, although varying in im-
portance, are nevertheless fundamental and foundational to all rational
I bought. The arguments presented here will attempt to show that to the
decree in which one denies the principle of sufficient reason, one also, to
I hul same degree, undermines the foundation for belief in these critical
hillonal processes. The point here is not to "prove logic" or anything of
I lull sort. I do not intend to show that these seven methods and processes
titv reliable knowledge-producing mechanisms. This I take for granted.
W luil I intend to show is that the denial of the principle of sufficient rea-
son results in an epistemically crippling situation.
'I he success of any one of these arguments has sufficient strength to
irtHl denying the principle ofsiiiricient reason into the realm of the odd,
hl/urrc, unwarranted* and radically counterintuitive. Yet when several ar-

105
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

guments taken collectively can show this, this builds an even stronger cumu-
lative case against such denials The individual probabilities of each argu-
ment accumulate, converge, and produce a degree of certitude that is greater
than any argument taken independently In the same way that individual
steel bands taken separately have a certain degree of strength to them, that
degree of strength is multiplied when all of those bands are woven into a
steel cable, so too the cumulative force of all of these arguments results in an
argument much stronger than any one argument taken in isolation.

The Argument From Metaphysical Intuition

This argument is very simple and straightforward, and there is nothing
complex or difficult to understand about it. It is the simple recognition
that the weak principle of sufficient reason (ex nihilo nihil fit, "Whatever
begins to exist has a cause") is widely accepted by all people of all cultures
without any argument at all. The prevalent and universal intuitive
acceptance of this principle is great and pre-reflective, so much so that
it can rightly enjoy a tremendous amount of intuitive plausibility. Prima
facie it certainly seems to be a universal principle without exception, and
this alone is reason enough to believe it to be true.
Now what I mean here by "metaphysical intuition,> is a simple, imme-
diate, and non-inferential take on reality, a certain "seeming" that some-
thing is the case. We have such intuitions that the past is real, that things
continue to exist when they are not observed, and so on. I do not claim
intuitions such as these are infallible, only that they should be held firmly
unless there is some good reason to think otherwise.12 Some may object
that such metaphysical intuitions are unreliable, but the fact is that we
cannot think rationally without them. It is clear that all of us (with the
possible exception of the insane and those who have been epistemically
handicapped by a graduate program in skeptical philosophy) admit things
like the reality of the past, the existence of the external world, that there
are minds other than our own, and things of this sort. Nearly all believe
in such things, and we are entirely rational in doing so. In fact, upon re-
flection it is evident that have several intuitions such as these, and I am
claiming that the same can be said for "out of nothing, nothing comes."

12 So we need to distinguish this sense of the word "intuition" an iwcil hrre In u fallible
or defeasible sense, from (he stronger infallible sense of Intuition thttl AI|IIIIUIN culls Intel-
lectus. We will, however, muke use of this stronger »cnM of Inlulllnn In tt lulor chapter,

106
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

The idea that things can just "pop" into being uncaused out of nothing is
a patently unreasonable position to hold. Such a metaphysically radical
position just seems obviously false. Asserting the possibility of something
popping into existence uncaused out of nothing would be considered ri-
diculous and out of the question in any aspect of everyday life (save for
philosophy). Imagine a man on trial telling the court that he has no idea
how the stolen $10,000 was found in his car. Perhaps it popped into being
out of sheer nothing? No one would accept this, nor should we entertain
(he possibility. Just like our metaphysical intuitions that tell us things re-
main in existence when they are not being observed, or that the world
was not created five minutes ago with an appearance of age, so too do we
have a fundamental intuition for ex nihilo nihil fit. The principle seems
so patently true, that to be skeptical and demand further proof should
be considered a textbook case of the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof
When something such as this seems so overwhelmingly obvious, surely it
is not up to those who hold it to prove there can be no exceptions, rather
I hat burden lies with those who argue against such certitudes.

Ihe Argument from Induction I: A Humean Argument

for the Principle of Sufficient Reason
But it's not just that we only have a mere metaphysical intuition that
things cannot pop into being uncaused out of nothing, but it's also the
case that this metaphysical intuition is confirmed all the time in our
experience! We never see any clear instance of anything popping into
being uncaused out of nothing. So the results of our inductive experi-
ence give us a tremendous amount of confirmation to our pre-reflective
metaphysical intuitions. Why should not we agree with Hume when he
says this sort of universal consistency amounts to a "full proof?"13 What
H<md reason is there to deny that "where the past has been entirely reg-
ular and uniform, we expect the event with the greatest assurance, and
leave no room for any contrary supposition?"14 If we are to act like "wise
l .1UA wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are found-
nl nn Infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and
u'Himls his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event." David
I luiiir. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. X (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
I'uhl tailing, 1993), 73. Also: "And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is
hrrr u ill reel and full proof.,." IbUU 77.
l4//j/fU8-S),

107
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

men," we should "proportion our belief to the evidence." If uniform ex-

perience amounts to a proof, then the weak principle of sufficient reason
is supported in a very powerful way.
The glib response that "inductive arguments don't establish absolute
certitude" manifests a gross ignorance of refutation. Inductive general-
izations do not attempt to establish a conclusion with absolute certitude,
so they cannot be faulted for not doing so.15 Here we infer a general rule
from a sufficiently enumerated list of instances and for this reason, such
inductive arguments can only be characterized as "strong" or "weak",
not "valid" or "invalid." So to press the response that inductive reason-
ing does not establish this conclusion with absolute certitude is to en-
tirely miss the point of what an inductive argument attempts to achieve.
Indeed, there could not possibly be any better case for an inductive gen-
eralization than the one we have here for the weak principle of sufficient
reason. If this is a hasty generalization, then a fortiori the same can be
said for any inductive generalization about anything, for there simply
are no stronger inductive arguments than what we have for ex nihilo ni-
hil fit In all of our experience of the world, there are no clear violations
of it and here we have the strongest empirical support one could possibly
have in support of a conclusion. To deny such a strongly supported in-
ductive conclusion by appealing to the "gap" inherent in every inductive
argument surely commits the fallacy of special pleading. It is an ad hoc
plea for an exception to a well-established standard without providing
any justifying reason as to why there should be such an exemption.16

15 Contrary to what some may think, it's actually not true that inductive arguments
never produce certain conclusions. The scholastic logicians distinguished between sev-
eral types of induction, two of which (viz., the complete enumerative induction and the
"virtually complete" induction), both establish their conclusions with certitude. Howev-
er, the inductive argument I am making here is a standard empirical "inductive general-
ization" which makes an inference that moves from an adequate sampling of things to a
conclusion about the whole. So there is no claim here being made of establishing the con-
clusion with absolute certitude since these arguments only claim to establish a conclusion
with a respectable degree of probability.
16 "For the fact that the validity of a proposition cannot be logically guaranteed in no
way entails that it is irrational for us to believe it. On the contrary, what is irrational is to
look for a guarantee where none can be forthcoming; to demand certainly where proba-
bility is all that is attainable." AJ. Ayer, "The A Priori" in Paul MoHer'a A Priori Knowledge
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 27. In fact, Bcrlrnnd Kimnrll, 'Ihr Problems of
Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), 68-9, aryiltfil ihe imimil principle
was as certain a« any other physical law Yet IUIMCII wanU to mlnlmltfe the mope of ihc

108
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

To borrow again from Hume, those who would assert that this posi-
tion is not universally true nor without exception have a quick and an
easy method of refuting it; provide an example of a being, which in their
opinion, is one that comes to be from sheer nothingness.17
However, it is not just the weak principle of sufficient reason that is sup-
ported by induction. This same argument that supports a weak principle
of sufficient reason can also be used in a different way that supports a mild
principle of sufficient reason ("Every contingent thing has a cause"). Just as
in all of our common experience, we never know of a being popping into
being from nothing, so too in all of our experience we know of no being that
is dependent on nothing for its existence. The existence of horses, for exam-
ple, presupposes a tremendous amount of causal factors necessary for their
continuance in being (not just their coming to be). In a similar way, just as
we intuitively recognize things that come into being need an explanation,
so loo we often recognize that contingent being needs an explanation, even
1 f we never witnessed it's coming into existence. This principle seems uni-
versally true for any observable substance. There is no physical being, for
example, whose existence does not presuppose a set of conditions such as
I he fundamental forces of physics, that are necessary for its existence. To put
111 is point another way, there is clearly more to causality than just becoming
unci we have good reason then to invoke Aquinas5 distinction between the
muse of becoming (causa fieri) and the cause of being (causa essendi)}8 A
home builder is the cause of the home s becoming, but he does not cause the
i onlinued being of the home, since the builder of the home may no longer
exisl while the being of the home continues to depend upon other causal
I tu tors (such as the law of gravity, a certain temperature range, the nature of
I he building materials, etc.). So our inductive experience goes further than
|iisl cases of becoming, we also know that all of the observable substances
In I he physical universe need causes for the maintenance as well as a cause
lor 1 heir coming to be. Thus, our inductive generalization also supports the

I it liu Iplc, claiming that the principle is a physical principle, and not a true metaphysical
Inilghl. 1 bis last move is erroneous, as I will explain later.
1/ ()r to borrow a point from Adler, "having an open mind about future possibilities
tlmuM noi be equated, as unfortunately it sometimes is, with having an undecided mind
about present actualities; for we are obliged, at any time, to judge in the light of the evi-
IUMKT thai Is then available." Morlimer Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It
Mttkr* (New York: Meridian, IV73). 113.
IMS//'. 1 II, 104,1.

109
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

mild principle of sufficient reason (every contingent thing has a cause) in

the same way it supported the weak principle of sufficient reason (whatev-
er begins to exist has a cause).

The Argument from Induction II

It is not only the results of induction that point us to a principle of
sufficient reason; but the very method of induction as a means of discovery
also presupposes that reality is intelligible and things have reasons
why they exist. To see this point, we need to examine the rationale and
principles that underlie the inductive process. What must be presupposed
and assumed to be true in order for induction to "work?"
I take it as relatively uncontroversial that inductive reasoning can
lead us to knowing truth about the world, and it is entirely reasonable
to believe that it can. Those who deny induction in toto are certainly in
the philosophical minority. Oddball beliefs have always been present
in the history of philosophy, so we cannot say that everyone takes
induction to be a licit means of attaining knowledge. By and large,
however, most people do, and that is enough to take it as a reasonable
position to hold.
But the question is this; can one reasonably and consistently hold this
position about induction while at the same time denying the principle
of sufficient reason? There are good reasons to think one cannot and the
problem lies not with the reasoning itself, but the way in which the world
must really be like in order for that method of reasoning to get a grasp on
what is true about that world.
It's clear that inductive reasoning is a critically important method of
discovery about the world. The process of induction is how we ascertain
how the world works. We are not born with knowledge of the world's
operations, that knowledge must come through experience. When we
rise from the knowledge of particular facts to arrive at a general law we
uncover an explanation that tells us why something happened. We see, for
example, that this person gained weight, and that person gained weight
and so on, is because they have all been overeating. The "because" tips us
off to a reason or explanation as to why those individuals gained weight,
So by the very fact that the inductive process aims lo explain I he why of
something, the very purpose of this process is to provide im wilh reasons
as to why things happen the way ihey do. The Inductlv* proce** as a means

110
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

of discovery then, necessarily presupposes that things happen because of

reasons and can therefore be explainable.
So induction, if it is anything, is a method of discovering explanations.
We are seeking the why of some phenomena.19 All induction (at least pro-
visionally) presupposes the validity of the general notion that nature is
intelligible, and therefore uniform and predictable. In other words, nature
does not operate in a chaotic, capricious, or unreliable manner. This ex-
pectation of a standard and regular operative consistency is necessary for
Induction to even get off the ground as a means of discovery.
But now suppose that the weak or mild principle of sufficient reason is
false. That would mean contingent things could begin to be, or continue
W> be, without any reason whatsoever. In such a case, there would be no
predictability or reliability in nature. Such a world would be unintelligi-
ble, random, and unpredictable - things would just "happen" for no rea-
son at all. You could never know the "why" in such a world because in a
world where things occur and exist for no reason at all, there is no "why."
Without the weak and mild principle of sufficient reason being really true
about real things, nature would act capriciously, lacking any kind of dis-
i overability or predictability20 It is only in a world that operates accord-
ing to reasons and causes that one can possibly explain that world. Only
when there is an explanation available to be discovered can one possibly
discover it. Since the inductive process itself seeks explanation and caus-
es, it necessarily presupposes that the world operates according to caus-
es, reasons, law, and uniformity. Without these presuppositions - without
presupposing the weak or mild principle of sufficient reason - induction
would be a hopeless exercise of the mind, for it would attempt to seek that
which cannot be found:

1K) 1 he classical view is that we understand things by knowing their causes. Things of a
i crlu In nature or type behave in similar ways, and there is a certain uniformity and com-
innimlily that underlies and grounds our inductive inference. What is unarguable is that
In likluclion we rise from facts to laws, because we are seeking reasons or explanations for
1111111' phenomenon. We look for the similarity amongst the variety, and seek the how and
why things happen.
JO To pui the point in Aristotelian terms, there is no science of the accidental. "That
I here IN no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is al-
ways or of lhal which is for ihe most part. For how else is one to learn or to teach another?
I he ihlng must be determined us occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that
honey water Is useful for a pal taut In n fever Is iruc for ihe most part." Meta. VI, 1027a20.

Ill
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Inductive reasoning rests on the principle of induction, which is

a derivative of the principle of the raison d'etre. If the same cause,
in the same circumstances, did not produce the same effect, the
change in the effect, without a previous change in the cause or the
circumstances, would be without a sufficient reason for its existence.21
Again, lam not claiming that this proves induction is a reliable knowledge
producing process. Rather, the point is that it is entirely reasonable to think
that it is, and one cannot do this without also presupposing the weak or
mild principle of sufficient reason. We can summarize this point with the
following argument:
If the principle of sufficient reason were false, induction would be
an inherently unreliable form of reasoning.

But induction is not an inherently unreliable form of reasoning.

Therefore the principle of sufficient reason is not false.

The major should be clear from what I argued here, and the second
premise is eminently more plausible than any ad hoc claim that the
principle of sufficient reason, in its weak or mild form, is false.

The Argument from Absolute Skepticism

In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas remarks that if natural things
were incapable of causal efficacy, it would be impossible to know any-
thing about them, since it is through natural things acting as causes that
they manifest themselves to us by their effects and thus become known.22
While Aquinas was arguing against the Islamic occasionalists who denied
causal efficacy to anything but God alone, the same point can be used
against those who deny the principle of sufficient reason. We have already
seen that to deny the weak version of this principle is to claim that things
really could come into being uncaused. What we might call "pop theory"
is similar to the occasionalist theory in that it too calls into question the
causal efficacy of the things around us. But, as Aquinas said, denying the
causal efficacy of the natural things around us delivers a serious blow to
our ability to know much, if anything, about the real world.

21R. Garrigou Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Ntitur** /, I .18,
2TSi igitur res creatai* nan habeant actiones ad productndoi ifl'wtu$t miitctunjttod nun
quam natura allcuitts rrl creator poterlt co^nosclptntffMtum? &(.'.<•, Ill, 0Vi vol,12 ,200,
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

The reason why is because out knowledge is inherently bound up in

causality. We acquire knowledge of the external world by experiencing it.
The external world has a causal effect on us that causes us to have various
sensory impressions. So our connection to the external world is by way
of a causal connection between some extra-mental object and our sense
impressions, and these sense impressions are an important part of what
helps constitute our conscious states.
But now suppose we deny the principle of sufficient reason in either its
weak or mild form. The causal connection between reality and the mind at
that point is severed. If the principle of sufficient reason is false, anything
can happen anywhere, for absolutely no reason at all. That means our sense
impressions can just "happen" uncaused, without any explanation or con-
nection to reality whatsoever. In such cases they just "are" and that's all.
Without a foundational presumption to the effect of "sense impressions
are sufficiently accounted for and caused by an "external world," one cannot
say with any degree of confidence they are in contact with external reality.
Hither we know with some degree of certainty that real things in the real
world cause our sensory knowledge, or we do not. To the degree in which
one knows anything about the external world, one must also know "out of
nothing, nothing comes" to that same degree; and to the degree in which
one denies that principle, one should, for the sake of consistency, also deny
I heir certainty about anything in the external world to an equal degree.
So denying the weak and mild principle of sufficient reason comes at a
iosl, indeed a very high philosophical price tag of severing thoughts from
reality. Unless we presuppose "something cannot come from nothing," we
cannot presuppose that our sense impressions do not do so. Accordingly,
I ho denial of either the weak or the mild principle of sufficient reason leads
lo a solipsism of the most radical kind. Far more radical than any evil de-
mon hypothesis where my conscious states might be caused by an omnip-
otent deceiver, if the principle of sufficient reason is false, there might not
be anything that is causing those impressions. In such a case, we would
have no absolutely no grounds whatsoever for holding that we are in fact
experiencing the external world, which of course is absurd.
None of this proves that our knowledge of the external world is veridi-
4 a I; I hat is not the point. I simply take it for granted that we do have a re-
liable sensory awareness of the world around is. The point is that in order
In have that veridical sense experience, one must presuppose the principle

113
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

of sufficient reason because all sensory experience is grounded in a cause

and effect relation between the external world and our senses. This makes
the weak and mild versions of this principle radically fundamental to all
veridical acts of sensory knowledge, and to the degree in which one doubts
these principles, one must also doubt, to that same degree, the veridicality
of their sensory experience. To put this point formally:
If the principle of sufficient reason were false, we could not
justifiably claim to know things about the external world.

But we can justifiably claim to know things about the external

world.

Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is not false.23

The Argument from Inference to the Best Explanation

and "Oakham's Razor":
Charles Sanders Peirce, along with others, realized that it is certainly
true that all thinkers are in the business of inferring explanations. That is to
say, as thinking and reasoning creatures, we come up with hypotheses that
might explain various phenomena. Most people, including philosophers,
tend to think of explanation in terms of causation. In this way, to explain an
event is to point out its cause. Take the classic example of how to explain wet
grass. We wake up in the morning and find that the grass is wet. Mentally,
we canvass the pool of reasonable options that could explain the moisture.
Given that we do not live in the desert, nor do we see the hose disturbed,
etc., we conclude that rain is the best explanation for the wet grass. If we
observe that the driveway, however, is not wet, rain may be ruled out, since
rain would certainly have made the driveway wet as well. Thus, we will find
another explanation (e.g., the sprinkler system) for the wet grass.
It is an entirely reasonable and normal endeavor for humans to explain
things, and it is equally clear that citing just any old explanation will not
suffice. Maybe the tooth fairy secretly watered the grass while everyone
slept? Of course, it is not just any explanation we seek, but as thinkers
who want to understand the world, we want the "best" explanation. This

23 Again, it seems to me this argument would be applicable both I IK- coming to be of

sensations and the being of sensations, In other worda, thin a Tyumen I inn mippori both
the weak and mild versions of the principle of nuflklent mum.

114
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

inference to the best explanation is the process of selecting the hypothesis

that best explains the data at hand.
Just what an "explanation" is and what qualifies as the "best" explanation
are certainly debatable issues. There are fundamental disagreements on the
nature of explanation, and I do not in any way attempt to resolve them here.24
My point is more modest; namely, that we attempt to find and give explana-
tions for things, and that in doing so, we inherently and reasonably recognize
that not all explanations are equal. Some explanations are better than oth-
ers. Some explanations are good and some explanations are bad, and it is this
lack of equivalence that makes seeking the best explanation such a reasonable
t hing to do. So while people may debate over the nature of explanation and the
criteria of what constitutes a good or the best explanation, one thing we do not
debate about is the rational nature of this very enterprise. The mere seeking of
better explanations for phenomena is about as fundamentally reasonable of an
activity as one can do. I accept this as uncontroversial.
Additionally, it is equally clear that whatever else constitutes a good ex-
planation, any explanation that is a candidate for being a good one should
be at least comprehensive and simple. An explanation is comprehensive
when it does not lack explanatory scope. To claim that the sprinkler sys-
Icm is the best explanation for the wet grass would not do if the grass
In your entire city were wet. Such an explanation would lack explanatory
scope. By the same token, rain would not be a suitable explanation of the
wcl grass if only the grass is wet, and your car, house, driveway, etc. is not.
Such an explanation of "rain" would be too broad in such a case because
11 would invoke more water than was needed to explain just the wet grass
on the single lawn. Good explanations should be neither too broad nor
I no narrow.25 Also, an explanation is simple when it does not invoke more

M For the different takes on "explanation* see for example, "Theories of Explana-
tion," by G. Randolph Mayes, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002,
lillp://www,iep.utm.edu/explanat/, retrieved Sept. 30th 2012.
15 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Fogelin, Understanding Arguments: An
Introduction to Informal Logic, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 254-8
lor ii laudable attempt at listing all the criteria for the best explanation. Their list reads:
I, I ho explanation should really explain the observations (not lack explanatory scope).
.'. '1 he explanation should be deep in that if it is just as obscure as the thing that needs to
be explained, no progress is made.
V "I he explanation should be powerful in that it should apply to a wide range of cases or a
wider range of phenomena. 'I he explanation that explains more is better than one that
cxplultiN ICHH.

115
,S7, ihotiuis Aquinas and the Priciplc of Sufficient Reason

explanations than are needed to explain some event. If rain suffices to ex-
plain the wet grass, it would be unreasonable to invoke the additional el-
ements of a sprinkler, busted water pipe, and open fire hydrant to explain
the water on the ground.
So to summarize this point so far, we can make three unassuming and
uncontroversial claims:
1. It is entirely reasonable to give explanations for phenomena.

2. Not all explanations have equal explanatory power. Some are better
than others and it is more reasonable to seek the best explanation.

3. The best explanation should at least be comprehensive and simple.

That is to say, the best explanation must explain the phenomena and
not fall short by lacking explanatory scope (thus leaving some things
unexplained), nor should it be too complex and multiply causes with-
out necessity.
This established, now let us ask: can one consistently hold the above
three points about explanation while at the same time denying the
principle of sufficient reason? In other words, is it consistent to maintain
that 1) giving explanations for phenomena is a reasonable thing to do, 2)
not all explanations are equal, and 3) the best explanation must be at least
comprehensive and simple, while still holding, 4) the principle of sufficient
reason is false and not everything needs a reason or explanation?
Clearly the addition of that last proposition is highly problematic for
maintaining the other three, and the reason is obvious. Once we affirm
that things do not need reasons we have thereby ipso facto removed any
basis for maintaining that things require explanation. Brute facts have
no explanation; they are not even self-explanatory. If the principle of
sufficient reason were false, then anything can happen at any time, for
absolutely no reason whatsoever, and if that is the case, then we cannot
hold with confidence that there should be any need for explanation. Why
should we bother with trying to explain anything if events can happen

4. The explanation should befalsifiable.

5. The explanation should he simple (Ockham's razor). One ought mil. to clnini more than
is needed.
6. An explanation should be conservative, rlhls follow* from lh« prvvlium point, lc, expla-
nations arc heller when Ihey force us lo give upfiiwtrtitibllihfil M i r k

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 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

without any reason or explanation whatsoever? If the answer is that at

some times things need explanations but not at other times, then how are
we to ever discriminate the difference? When is the appropriate time to
seek explanation? Should it be on Tuesdays that the wet lawn needs to have
a reason but not on Wednesdays? If the response is that only some things
need explanation but not others, we should rightly ask why "nothing"
is so discriminatory. If some things are able to occur in a completely
unexplained manner, why cant anything and everything do so? Once
the falsity of the principle of sufficient reason is admitted, any restrictions
start to sound curiously arbitrary.
To make matters worse, if one denies at least the weak principle of
sufficient reason, then we could ask why must good explanation be
comprehensive? What is wrong with leaving out a few things here and
I here, allowing some elements to remain unexplained, if, after all, not
everything needs an explanation? In such a case there is absolutely no
justification for penalizing an explanation for "lack of explanatory scope,"
since any of the "out of scope" elements might be one of those brute facts
that do not have any explanation. Unless one could show that these out
of scope elements are also in need of explanation (and how could do
that without showing at least something very much like the principle of
sufficient reason?) there is no basis for criticizing an explanation due to
lack of comprehension.
r
Ihat the best explanation should be simple deserves special attention
as well, since, the principle of parsimony, or "Ockham's razor,"26 is inde-
pendently assumed and invoked all the time in academic circles. It is safe
(() say that Ockham's razor is very commonly and unquestionably accepted
as a normative, pragmatic principle geared toward helping us discover ex-
planations that are more likely to be true. The most common formulation
of I his principle "do not multiply causes without necessity" (pluralitas non
est ponenda sine necessitate) sounds entirely reasonable. We ought not to
Invoke superfluous, unneeded, or excessive entities to explain some phe-
nomena. We should use "only what we need" to explain something unless
"necessity" demands otherwise. It is not that we can never invoke more

lb Of course, the recognition of the importance of "Ockham's Razor" did not begin
wllh William of Ockham. In fact, Aristotle attributes the principle to Empedocles, "And
II IN belter to assume a nmttllcr and finite number of principles, as Empedocles does."
/>/i>'j/a, I, l88al7-l8(nec*Uo Phyilu 189a, 15-18),

117
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

entities; the principle simply holds that we should only do so when "ne-
cessity" demands. This prohibition of invoking entities has been called the
"negative edge" of Ockham's razor, yet as stated, this principle also implies
also a "positive edge." "Do not multiply causes without necessity" implies
that when there is "necessity," one ought to multiply causes. Sometimes
called Walter Chatton's "anti-razor,"27 viz., "If three things are not enough
to verify an affirmative proposition about things, a fourth must be added,
and so on." Ockham's razor principle clearly implies that when insufficient
reasons are present, a positive edge of the razor is invoked. That is to say,
Ockham's razor is a meaningful and helpful principle if and only if it also
implies that positive edge that spurs us onward to "add more." After all,
if we are to avoid multiplying causes even when there is an apparent lack
of necessity, the principle devolves into a pointless assertion of simply "do
not multiply causes," for any reason, which is a position that no serious
thinker would want to maintain. So the "necessity" involved here in Ock-
ham's razor when we say don't multiply causes beyond necessity, hinges
upon a recognition of sufficiency and insufficiency in explanation. If we do
not have enough entities to explain event X, we are to invoke more; if we
do have enough entities, we should not invoke more.
Now with this obvious point understood, we can again see the subtle pre-
supposition of the principle of sufficient reason at play here, and it is precisely
the same problem as it was in the prior problem regarding explanatory scope.
The very "necessity" that would motivate us to add more entities would do so,
indeed could only do so, because some prior explanation was somehow seen as
insufficient. It would only be because the current explanation lacked explana-
tory scope that we would be justified in seeking more explanatory entities. But
again, how can an explanation ever be faulted for lacking explanatory scope if
the principle of sufficient reason were false? Brute facts do not need explana-
tions. What would it mean to say "do not multiply causes beyond necessity"
when there can never he any necessity? There is no reason why we would ever
feel compelled into fortifying an explanation by adding more entities if we are
entirely content with the idea that things do not need sufficient explanations
in the first place. If the principle of sufficient reason were false, then there is
absolutely nothing wrong with insufficiency and lack of comprehension in
explanation. Just like the demand that a good explanation be comprehensive,

27 See Rondo Keeles cnlry on Waller Chatlon In the 8tttr\ford Hmyvhimltu of Philoso-
phy: found nt hllp;//pluLablUillui'd^

118
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle af Sujlhient Hatmw

accepting Ockham s razor too presupposes the principle of sufficient reason.

Hence, by denying the principle of sufficient reason, one also undermines any
effort to require any sort of sufficiency in explanation. To summarize this ar-
gument formally we can say:
If the principle of sufficient reason is false, inferences to the best
explanation and appeals to parsimony are unjustified.

But inferences to the best explanation and appeals to parsimony

are not unjustified.

Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is not false.

Does any of this demonstrate that the principle of sufficient reason is
true? Not directly, of course. These are probabilistic reductio ad absurdum
arguments which, in this case, simply show that to the degree in which it
is reasonable to accept or make any meaningful use of an "inference to the
best explanation" or "Ockham s razor," it is equally, to that same degree, also
reasonable to accept some version of the principle of sufficient reason.28

The Argument from Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

This argument can be simple and brief. I take it for granted that the
cl i stinction between necessary and sufficient conditions is both a useful and
coherent notion. That is to say, it is reasonable to reason with, utilize, and
employ the notions of necessary and sufficient conditions. Philosophers,
scientists, and everyday folks do it all the time, and nobody violates any
canon of reason or vitiates any epistemic duties in doing so.
Just to clarify, by "necessary condition," I simply mean a condition that
must be satisfied in order for a thing to occur or for a proposition to be
i rue. By "sufficient condition," I mean a condition that, if satisfied or met,
Is enough to bring about the occurrence of an event or a statement's truth,
even if there are other ways about which to bring it. A condition can be
either necessary or sufficient without being the other. Being a mammal is
necessary to being a human, but it is not sufficient. Also, falling 3,000 feet
Is sufficient to bring about one's death, even though it is not necessary for it.

-}.H At least the weak version of the principle, but I am also inclined to think they show
the mild version to be prcauppoHcd as well since explanation is not always restricted to
hreumlng but can alio r»f*r It) I hi? being of a conllngcnt event. It is not only the becoming
ol green In the plant thlt m|ulr#» eitplaiwtlnn, but the maintenance of thai color as well.

119
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Note that both necessary and sufficient conditions are explanatory - they
tell us why an event occurs. Another way to say this is that both necessary
and sufficient conditions are reasons as to why something happens. Usually
when we use these terms we are talking about causes of some kind. To say
oxygen is a necessary condition of fire is to say oxygen must be present in
order for the fire to be, in other words, oxygen is a necessary albeit partial
cause of thefire.But once we deny the principle of sufficient reason, if things
do not need reasons to make them happen, what could ever justify such talk
about necessary or sufficient conditions?
The problem is that inherent in any appeal to necessary and sufficient
conditions, is the presumption that things are intelligible and do happen for
reasons. The universe does not operate haphazardly, and things do not occur
"brute factily" If they did, the usage of the necessary or sufficient condition
distinction would be terribly problematic. To underscore this difficulty,
suppose we ask just what are the grounds for holding that there is such a
thing as a "necessary condition?" How can any condition be "necessary"
if at the same time, it is posited that things can be without any reason?
If no reasons are needed, then there can be no such thing as a necessary
condition, and the term becomes meaningless. In a similar way, how can
an appeal to something like a "sufficient condition" be substantiated if one
also denies things do not need sufficient reasons? After all, what is the
difference between a sufficient condition and a sufficient reason? The two
seem remarkably similar in meaning. A sufficient condition is something
that, if satisfied, is enough to bring about the occurrence of something, but
that just states what a sufficient reason is using different terms. A sufficient
reason is that by which something is; a.k.a., that which, when met, is
enough to make something be. The only difference here is a difference
in words. Hence, if things do not need sufficient reasons, for either their
becoming or their being, they do not need sufficient conditions either. To
summarize this point we can argue:
If the principle of sufficient reason is false, the appeal to necessary
and sufficient conditions is unintelligible.

But the appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions is not

unintelligible.

Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason li not faluc,

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 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle oj Sujlhlent Retitim

The point here again is a modest claim. If it is reasonable to appeal

10 and use the necessary/sufficient condition distinction, then it is also
reasonable, to that same degree, to hold a weak or mild version of the
principle of sufficient reason.

'The Argument from Conditional Syllogisms

The use and acceptance of the conditional syllogism (a.k.a. hypothetical
syllogism) in logic can hardly be overstated. Both modus ponens and modus
(aliens have enjoyed a morally unanimous approval in the history of philos-
ophy since Theophrastus.29 Furthermore, as we will see, the application of
modus tollens to the scientific method is of decisive importance. Widely used
and accepted in all branches of philosophy and common everyday inferences,
11 is manifest that the validity of the hypothetical syllogism is one that is not
only taken for granted by all of us, but it is also one of high importance.
Proceeding then on that basis, let's now ask a critical question - what prin-
ciples need to be accepted and assumed in order for these forms of argumenta-
tion to have that validity and applicability in the first place? More particularly,
ki us ask whether one can consistently maintain the hypothetical syllogism
us a valid form of inference while at the same time denying the veracity of the
principle of sufficient reason. It seems to me this cannot be done.30
To see this, first let us consider the application of modus tollens to the
scientific method. While there are many interpretations of what is the
"proper" understanding of the scientific method, it should be unarguable
1 hat at the very least we begin with some hypothesis that predicts some
vx perimental result. If the expected result occurs, the hypothesis is verified.
I,el us suppose that I have a hypothesis H that predicts an experimental
result E. If I observe not E (~E), Then I can conclude that H is false.
((H => E) & ~E) => ~H
29 1 n fact, many modern logicians, out of fear of a "null class," have even gone so far
its lo assert that hypothetical propositions are a support and corrective to universal affir-
mnltve propositions, thus making the hypothetical proposition foundational to the syllo-
gism. See for example Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic (Upper Saddle
Ulvcr: Prentice Hall, 1998) 241.
.10 'Ihis is not the first venture into examining the role of the principle of sufficient
imson in formal logic. For example, see, Ni Dingfu, "The Principle of Sufficient Reason
mid I he Development of Formal Logic," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 12, 1981,16-28; Ni
Dingfu, "rIhe Development of the Law of Sufficient Reason and Formal Logic" Chinese
Studies in Philosophy 13, 1982, 66-78; and Ma Pei's "The Law of Sufficient Reason is an
Important Law of Formal Loyk\" Contemporary Chinese Thought, 12(3) 1981, 3-15.

121
JN W»Nrt1rfl A^fffrM' urn/ f/ii« ft-U-lph of Sujlidrnt Reason

No problem NO far - after all, this is how the scientific method should
work, lUil suppose 1 also say that not everything that is contingent needs
tin explanation. This changes things entirely, for if not everything needs
an explanation, the modus tollens fails, for it maybe that ~E is one of those
happenings that has no explanation. If so, it is not explained by anything,
including the failure of H. Therefore, it is possible that H could be true
(<>H). Then we have (~H & <>H), which is a contradiction, so the modus
tollens has failed. Denying the principle of sufficient reason, in at least its
weak form (if not also its mild form), then destroys the applicability of
modus tollens to the scientific method, which seems to jeopardize the sci-
entific enterprise itself.
Of course, the same could be said for modus ponens. If p, then q, p
therefore q - but how can this be valid without presupposing the truth of
the principle of sufficient reason? Again, q could be one of those events
that are not explained by anything, including the success of p. Under the
hypothesis of denying the principle of sufficient reason, the positing of p
may in some instance, for no reason whatsoever, not produce q. P for no
reason whatsoever does not produce q, and q itself can be for no reason at
all. Modus ponens has failed.
At this point, some modern logicians may object saying that all that is
needed for the truth of modus ponens is that the antecedent not be true
and the consequent false. In other words, why do we need to presuppose
that there is any connection between consequent and antecedent? Impli-
cation, it may be argued, can get along just fine without such a presuppo-
sition. All one needs to do is posit that this material implication is the best
way to understand implication and that with material implication, there
need not be any connection between the consequent and antecedent. So by
taking this tack, one might think t,hey can avoid the above argument and
in so doing, avoid presupposing the principle of sufficient reason when
using hypothetical syllogisms.
In response we can say that there are very strong reasons to think that
material implication is not correct and that strict implication is a much
more realistic and plausible method of how implication should be under-
stood. Because of this difference in understanding implication, and be-
cause the question of which side is correct is very important to under-
standing the role that the principle of sufficient reason play* In conditional
syllogisms, this topic is worthy of some exlenalve nntmrku hrrr.

122
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Hen»on

'I he debate over the nature of implication goes back to the Megarian
jiiid Stoic logicians. Diodorus stressed the need for a necessary connection
In implication, and it is this understanding of the nature of implication
Ihal has predominated throughout the scholastic era and remains today
with logicians who prefer the traditional logic. With "strict" or Diodorean
Implication, the conditional proposition is true when the antecedent can-
nnl be true without the consequent also being true. This is because for a
i onditional proposition to be true, the connection between the antecedent
and consequent must be necessary in some way such that the consequent
must really follow from the antecedent. To put it another way, in Diodor-
nm implication, the antecedent and consequent must be causally related*
I.e., if P is true then Q must be true.31
However, Philo argued for what is today known as "material implica-
llon," viz., that a conditional proposition is true when it is not the case
I hal it begins with the true and ends with the false. This "Philonian" un-
derstanding of implication, known as "material implication," is the com-
mon way implication is described and understood in most modern logic
lexis. Philonian implication differs from Diodorean implication in that
Phi Ionian implication cares nothing about causal connections. Philonian
Implication prescinds from looking at connections between consequent
and antecedent and instead focuses on the abstract "truth values" of each
rlement.32 All that is needed for a conditional proposition to be true is that
II Is not the case that the antecedent be true and the consequent false.
An example may help the reader better grasp the difference. The
proposition, "If it rains, the ground will be wet" is true in a Diodorean
sense because rain causes the ground to become wet. The Diodorean
understanding of conditional propositions is that what is asserted is a
connection between P and Q. This "causal connection" understanding of
Implication in a proposition signifies a real causal connection in reality. In
I >iodorean implication, there is a relation of sequence and dependence in
hypothetical propositions, and one would have to know what the elements
were about in order to determine the truth value of the statement, since

M Such an understanding of implication is what does justice to our common sense

InltM'cnccs like, "If I touch the fire, then I will be burned." What makes such statements
line Is lhe causal relation between the antecedent and the consequent.
,USee I. M. Bochenskls A History of Formal Logic (South Bend, IN: University of Notre
Dwmcl'rcHH, 1961), llfi-7,

123
St Thomas Aquinas and the I7 r leipie of Sufficient Reason

we cannot possible ascertain any necessary connection between the

antecedent and consequent without knowing that to which they refer.
So again, in Diodorean implication, what is asserted in hypothetical if-
then statements is not the truth of two propositions per se, but the causal
connection between them. If that causal connection is necessary, then it
cannot be the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false.
This understanding of implication does not sit well with modern logic;
in fact, it will not work in symbolic logic at all and the reason why is
that modern symbolic logic is very formal, such that the symbols P and
Q can abstract from any material content whatsoever and be assigned
an arbitrary truth-value.33 More common today with modern logicians
is material or what I am calling Philonian implication. As we have said,
Philonian implication looks at merely the truth-value of the two elements
P and Q, and cares nothing for any connection between them. So as long
as you do not have a situation where P is true and Q is false, the statement
is true according to the Philonian understanding. This method can be
proven as valid with "truth-tables," and it works fine for some examples.
"If Darwinism is true, then many biologists will rejoice" works fine, but
the problem is that the Philonian understanding of true conditional
propositions also justifies some bizarre examples:
"If 2 + 2 = 5, then Chicago is a big city."

"If I am a monkey's uncle, then apples are purple."

"If naturalism is all the rage these days, then Mozart was an
outstanding musician."
Such strange and uncanny propositions are all true under the Philonian
understanding of implication, but all false under a Diodorean sense.
Focusing on the independent truth-value of statements without regard as
33 By "material content" here I mean what the proposition is about (what scholastics
called the "matter" of propositions). This use of "material" here is different from what the
modern logician means by "material implication." This latter sense of "material" is an
attempt to capture what is meant by the English phrase "If...then" in a way that no real
connection is suggested between the antecedent and the consequent. All that is being
asserted in material implication is that, as a matter of fact, it is not the case that the an-
tecedent is true while the consequent is false. As used by Copl and Cohen, "we propose
to translate any occurrence of the "if-then" phrase into our logical uymbol... This means
that in translation conditional statements into our symbolt$m> wt trmt tlwm all as merely
material Implications" Copl nnd Cohen, Introduction to Logict JM, unphmU added.

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 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

to how they are connected allows for any highly counterintuitive "true"
propositions that contain such weird accidentally joined elements.34 The
mere fact that Philonian implication justifies such bizarre examples,
nhould be enough to convince us that something is seriously wrong with
I his understanding of implication. But if that is not enough to convince
one that Diodorean implication is to be preferred, there is also this
devastating criticism of Philonian implication by the medieval scholastic
Icihn Buridan:
"If no proposition is negative, then some proposition is negative."35
'I his is surely a knockout blow to the Philonian understanding of
Implication. The statement itself is entirely nonsensical, self-contradictory
In fact, yet since the antecedent is false (necessarily), and the consequent is
I rue (necessarily), then this bit of nonsense is "true" in a Philonian sense!
Iluridan decisively shows here, (correctly to my mind) that Philonian
Implication justifies this nonsense as a valid inference.
But just as Buridan points out serious problems with the truth of
^Moments under Philonian implication, we could also analogously point
mil serious problems regarding the validity of arguments under a Philonian
hike on implication. If we ignore the connection between antecedent
itiul consequent, as Philonian implication suggests we do, suddenly we
lose any justification for the rules of validity. Consider, for example, the
In I lacy of affirming the consequent. This fallacy arises precisely from the
recognition that the relationship between antecedent and consequent is
not bidirectional. "If it is raining, then the ground is wet" does not mean
that "if the ground is wet then it is raining". But if we do not consider
i rial ions between antecedent and consequent, what justification is there
lor saying such a move is fallacious? If we can truthfully say, "If 2+2=4,
then Chicago is a big city" why cant we also say that "if Chicago is a big
i It y, t hen 2+2=4"? If causal connections are disregarded in the former, why
should the latter proposition be faulted for assuming such connections
are bidirectional? That is to say that if relations between propositions are

i»J Surely Veatch is right in dividing compound propositions into conjunctive com-
I urn nils and implicative compounds. Implicative compounds are ones where one P implies
»tmil her, whereas In conjunctive compounds two Ps can be joined accidentally. Henry B.
Watch, "Aristotelian mul Mnlhcninllcal Logic," The Thomist, 13 (Washington D.C.: The
IhomUt [>rcH«, 1953), 71,
t!S AM reported In I.M. Hoilwukl, A History of Formal Loglct 196.

125
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

irrelevant, then we cannot object to the direction of that relation. The

devastating consequence of such a doctrine is that the entire justification
for the validity of conditional syllogisms becomes wholly arbitrary. There
is no basis here for saying there is a fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Affirming the consequent under the Philonian understanding of
implication can be nothing more than an arbitrary restriction. One might
as well say one can make such arguments on odd numbered days but not
even numbered days.36
All of this tells us that the Diodorean take on implication and the con-
ditional syllogism is to be preferred.37 But, as I have argued above, that
same Diodorean implication presupposes causal relations and so in turn
presupposes the principle of sufficient reason. So with that being said, we
can summarize our argument from conditional syllogisms with our own
modus tollens:38
If the principle of sufficient reason is false, then the validity of
conditional syllogisms is unjustified.

But the validity of conditional syllogisms is not unjustified.

Therefore the principle of sufficient reason is not false.

Difficulties Involved in Falsifying the Principle of

Sufficient Reason
We have just seen seven dialectical arguments in favor of the weak and
mild versions of the principle of sufficient reason. I have said these are
probabilistic arguments and so do not claim to establish their conclusions
with logical certitude. We do not know things like the reliability of our
metaphysical intuitions, inductive generalizations, the reliability of sense

36 Hie same goes for the fallacy of denying the antecedent, since this fallacy too results
from misunderstanding the direction of the conditional relationship.
37 Yet even if these arguments against Philonian implication fail, still clearly condi-
tional statements like "If I touch fire, I will burn" and other common sense phrases im-
plying strict implication are meaningful and useful. We need Diodorean statements even
if Philonian implication can be reasonably defended. For a full critique of material impli-
cation, see Henry B. Veatch, "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," The Thomlst, vol. 13
(Washington D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1953).
38This seems applicable to both the weak and mild principle of milllclcnl rciiHon, since
not all causality brings a thing into being, but maintains a thing In III being,

126
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

experience etc. with logical certitude. This leaves the door open for the
possible exceptions, that the principle of sufficient reason could still pos-
Nlbly be false. Future evidence may reveal that the principle has been vi-
olated. For this reason, part of our confidence in the conclusions of these
arguments comes from our estimation of how reasonable it is to expect
I hat the principle of sufficient reason will ever be overturned by future ev-
idence. For this reason, let us now take a moment to consider the question
ill' falsifying the principle of sufficient reason and whether or not we can
reasonably expect that the principle of sufficient reason will ever be under-
inined by a counterexample. As I see it, there are three difficulties involved
In falsifying the principle of sufficient reason.

Difficulty #1:
Past Experience and Popper's Law
1 his argument is based on the first inductive argument above. There
it iv no known cases of a being that violates the weak or mild principle of
Millicient reason. In the history of the human race, there is no single clear
example. Popular claims about quantum physics mistakenly claim that
events occur "uncaused" at the subatomic level.39 This is not at all the case
lor a couple of reasons. First, not all scientists agree that quantum events
iu air without a cause. There are at least ten different interpretations of
i|tiantum mechanics, some being fully deterministic. To date, no one can
nhow which is correct. Secondly, even on the "Copenhagen" interpreta-
I Ion, particles do not into being from true nothing. On the contrary, par-
I li los arise from fluctuations of energy in the subatomic vacuum, which is
tint a metaphysical "nothing," as it is a sea of fluctuating energy governed
by physical laws. Hence, there are no grounds for appealing to quantum
physics as a basis for denying the principle of sufficient reason.40

W Peter Atkins, for example, thinks that "a particle and its anti-particle can be gen-
nulal out of essentially nothing." Peter Atkins, Creation Revisited (Hardmondsworth:
IViiKiiln Books, 1994), 139.
•10 As (>aig states, "This objection [that quantum physics shows something can come into
lu'lnn from nothing], however, is based on misunderstandings. In the first place, not all sci-
I'MltalN agree that sub-atomic events are uncaused. A great many physicists today are quite
iflMitllNficd wilh this view (the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation) of quantum physics
unil are exploring deterministic theories like that of David Bohm... Second, even on the
itmlltlonal liulclermlnlnllc interpretation, particles do not come into being out of nothing.
Ihry urine an uponlBncuui UucUmtUniH of I he energy contained in the sub-atomic vacuum,

127
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

What do such universal inductive conclusions get us? Such repeated

verification of the principle of sufficient reason does more than just
show that "it is never happened" in the past; it also alters our reasonable
expectations of the future. Karl Popper's well-known principle is
applicable, viz., that a hypothesis that has been repeatedly verified
and not falsified gains in credibility. Even if it can never be completely
confirmed, repeated verification of a position becomes more confirmed
in truth and worthy of acceptance the more times it is confirmed. The
flip side of this principle is that a position that has repeatedly proven to
be false loses credibility over time. The more times observation does not
confirm a position, the more credibility that position loses. Since the weak
or mild principle of sufficient reason is confirmed all the time in human
experience and never falsified, the principle has merited the strongest
credibility it can while its negation earns the very least credibility one
can possibly attribute to it. So it is not enough to merely say "it has never
happened in the past" we must also say "it is also extremely unlikely that
it will ever happen in the future." Past inductive inferences that are this
strong set powerful restrictions on what can reasonably be expected in
the future. It is thus very unreasonable to even expect that the principle
of sufficient reason will ever be violated.

Difficulty #2:
Any Case Brought Against the Principle of Sufficient
Reason Must Assume the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Those who deny the principle of sufficient reason must make a case
against it. To make a case against something is to bring forth reasons
why it should not be believed. These reasons must be either sufficient or
insufficient. If the reasons are insufficient, it cannot amount to a proof.
Therefore, any successful criticism of the principle of sufficient reason
must itself make use of a sufficient reason, and in so doing, assume the
very same principle it denies, meaning that any such argument would be
trapped in self-referential inconsistency.

which constitutes an indeterministic cause of their origination,.. Popular magazine articles

touting such theories as getting "something from nothing" uimply do nol understand that
the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea offluctuatingenergy endowed wllh a rich structure
and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefor* Involve n true origination ex
nihilor William Une Craig, Reasonable Faith (Wheitom Cruniwey, ailOH), IIS,

128
 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle of Sufficient Reason

Note that this is not merely a requirement of the logical principle of

sufficient reason (i.e., that all propositions must have a reason for the truth
value that they have), for it is difficult to see how an argument against
the principle of sufficient reason could avoid helping itself to some of the
i ntuitions and argumentation methods mentioned above which depend upon
real causal interaction. Just how might an argument against the principle of
sufficient reason work? Would it be inductive? Would it make use of a "best"
explanation, or appeal to any necessary and sufficient conditions? Would
it presuppose knowledge of the external world, the validity of conditional
syllogisms, etc.? As we have seen, all of these processes critically rely on the
metaphysical notion that things cannot be explained by nothing.41

Difficulty #3:
The Difficulty of Ever Proving Something Came
from Nothing
Even if we were to set aside the previous argument and allow for the
possibility of a real counter-example to the principle of sufficient reason,
what would this violation of the principle of sufficient reason look like in
reality? The clearest case of something existing without a sufficient reason
would be the observance of a being that begins to exist, unambiguously,
without any cause whatsoever. A being just popping into existence
uncaused out of nothing would be a patent violation of the weak principle
of sufficient reason, and thus, would be a good candidate for undermining
I he universality of this principle.
But per Anscombe,42 how could it ever be shown that something really
did come into being from nothing? Suppose our hidden stash of cash tri-

41 For example, at least the real causation needed for knowledge would be necessary,
since if we cannot know that our mental processes are reflective of and caused by real things,
we would be cut off from knowing the external world. Moreover, without real causation,
conditional syllogisms could not reflect real world causation, and would become useless in
explaining real world phenomena. Essential to any criticism of the principle of sufficient
reason is the hypothetical proposition, "If sufficient reasons are brought against the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, we should regard the principle of sufficient reason as false." But
purportedly any alleged "evidence" showing the principle of sufficient reason to be false
would itself have to presuppose some real world examples that would cause us to reject the
principle of sufficient reason, meaning that a real world to mental causal interaction would
always be required for any Hrjtuincnl against the principle of sufficient reason to succeed.
42 (i. H. M, Amicombtfi 'Whrtlrver HUN a beginning of Existence Must Have a Cause:
I lumi\H Argument ltxpoml/' Analytic Vol, Ht No, 5 (April 1974), 145-51.

129
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

pled since the last time we looked at it; or a magician pulled a rabbit out
of a hat; or a basket that once only contained five loaves and two fish sud-
denly now had enough fish to feed a crowd offivethousand? We would not
typically be inclined to accept that something literally came from nothing
in these circumstances, but would offer alternative explanations that seem
more intuitively plausible, i.e., that we were originally mistaken about the
amount, the hat had a secret pocket, a miracle from God has occurred,
etc. Our willingness to accept these other alternatives as more plausible
speaks to the strength of the original metaphysical intuition - that some-
thing cannot come from nothing. That is not to say this intuition cannot
be overthrown, but it's difficult to see how one could ever show that some-
thing really did in fact come into being from absolute nothing.
This three difficulties show that 1) it is very unreasonable to expect a
violation of the principle of sufficient reason, 2) any argument aimed at
establishing a violation of the principle of sufficient reason would itself
have to presuppose the principle of sufficient reason and 3) it could never
be conclusive shown that something really did in fact come from nothing
in the first place, Leibniz issued a challenge to those who denied the
principle of sufficient reason over 300 years ago: give just one example
of some entity in our experience that does not abide by the principle of
sufficient reason. To this day his challenge has never been answered, and
there are strong reasons to think that answer will never come.

Summary of the Arguments Presented

In this chapter, I have offered seven dialectical arguments in support of
some version of the principle of sufficient reason. I have argued that it is
entirely reasonable to hold and maintain the metaphysical intuition that
things just cannot pop into being out of nothing; that induction leads us
to knowledge; that the process of induction itself is a valid and knowledge
producing mechanism; that we do at least know some things about the
external world; that the process of seeking a best explanation is reasonable
and leads to knowledge; that the use of necessary and sufficient conditions
is a rationally acceptable and reliable method of attaining knowledge; and
that the conditional syllogism is a rational process that reflects reality and
leads us to truth. All of these beliefs and methods seem patently true. But
all of these methods presuppose some version of the principle of sufficient
reason. Just as we unquestionably assent to auch method* of acquiring

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 Dialectical Arguments for the Weak and Mild Principle ofSuJIUiviit Reason

knowledge without any fear of error, we should, by the same token, accept
the principle of sufficient reason with an equal degree of certitude.
At the beginning of this chapter I cited John Poinsot's distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic certitude. The arguments in this chapter
have not attempted to show that the principle of sufficient reason is
intrinsically certain (true in virtue of the terms themselves). What they
do attain, however, is an extrinsic certitude, and this certitude is increased
when the arguments are taken cumulatively. These arguments converge
and provide us with a very strong degree of confidence that the principle
of sufficient reason is true. That confidence is again strengthened when
we consider that there are also three complementary reasons for thinking
ihe principle will never be shown to be false. In total then, we have a
converging accumulation often lines of dialectical reasoning that provide
a very powerful cumulative case on behalf of the principle of sufficient
reason. This convergence is more than enough to remove any extrinsic
fear of error, and thus allow us to be certain, in a sense, of the weak and
mild principle of sufficient reason.
 "Those who admit nothing destroy discussion and reasoning in
general and thus there is no reasoning with such men."1
- Aristotle

"Some things are so true that their opposites cannot be conceived

by the intellect. Therefore, they cannot be challenged in the inward
reason but only by an outward reason which is by the voice"2
- St. Thomas Aquinas

"If you hold that nothing is self-evident, I will not argue with you
for it is clear that you are a quibbler and are not to be convinced."3
- Duns Scotus

1 Aristotle, Meta. XI, 1037b9

2 St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post Ana. 1.19
3 Duns Scotus, Opus Qxonlen$e> I, dlsl. Ill, q. Iv, In PhlloiQphkul Writings Ir. Allan
Wollcr (Indluimpollii, Hacked, 1987) 119,
CHAPTER V:
Necessary Truths and
Our Ability to Know
Them
O
ne of the frustrations that those trained in classical Greek and
medieval philosophy often have in communicating with modern
thinkers is the feeling of constantly having to go back over and
"rehash" the basics. To the modern scholastic looking at the contempo-
rary philosophical landscape, it often seems as if 1500 years of philosoph-
ical thought has been simply overlooked and ignored. Many of the alleged
"problems" often discussed in contemporary philosophy have been antic-
ipated and already been given plausible solutions from high level ancient
and scholastic thinkers, yet these solutions are rarely even known, let
alone discussed, in the present-day literature.4
But ignoring a position is certainly not refutation of it and there is
| KThaps no better example of this problem than the question over necessary

4 I'or a llsl of examples written for a more popular audience, see Mortimer Adler, Ten
Philosophical Mistakes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985),

133
SI, 'I bourns Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

truths, that is, what necessary truths are, that we know them, and how we
know them.5 Since we are claiming that the principle of sufficient reason is
a necessary truth, and given that our current academic climate is, to say the
least, very confused about such things, it is important that we spend some
time discussing this question here. Thus, in this chapter we will cover three
topics, namely; what necessary truths are, that we are able to know them,
and finally we will say a few words on how we come to know them.

What Are "Necessary True" Propositions?

In this work, I am arguing that the principal part of the principle
of sufficient reason is a self-evident first principle that is necessarily
true. Of course, challengers to the veracity of this principle will want
to know what exactly we mean when we say a certain proposition
such as this is necessarily true.

The Problem with Modern Notions of Propositional

Necessity
One thing I do not mean is what many philosophers influenced by
modern philosophy or contemporary empiricism and logic mean when
they say a proposition is "necessary" or "true by definition." It is too
frequently assumed that everyone is on the same page when it comes to
propositions that are claimed to be "necessary" or "true by definition." The
problem with such assumptions is that it is a great mistake to conflate
what most modern and contemporary philosophers mean by propositional
necessity with what the more classically-minded scholastic might mean.

Scholastic Understanding Modern Understanding

How P is i*ropositio per se rmta A priori

Known OS, vs.
propositi® jwrutiud nota a posteriori

In materia necessaria Analytic

How P is
V*,
Grounded in materia crmtingenli synthetic

5For a more complete account of this problem, see Henry II, Walch, '/too Logics: The
Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytical Philosophy (UvamUoit. IN; Northwestern
University Press, l%y),

134
 Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know 'llicm

The diagram on the previous page serves as a point of reference lo

explain the difference. We can talk about how propositions (P) are known
jind how they are "grounded" (in other words, what is it that serves to
make them true).
Regarding how they are known, the modern view is "a priori" vs.
"</ posteriori," where the former is a proposition that is knowable prior
lo further experience and the latter is something that is known from
experience. It should be evident that this distinction is epistemological in
nature. The division refers to how a proposition is known to be true (either
prior to experience or based upon further experience) with "experience"
here meaning an experiencing of the particular contingent features of the
world. Thus, not things like introspection and mathematical "experience."
Some things can only be known after experiencing those contingent
features and other things can be known "a priori," that is, prior to
experience of those contingent features.6
On this division, the scholastics make a similar distinction - proposi-
1 ions that are known "through themselves" (per se) v. propositions that are
known through others (per aliud). Regarding the per se, these propositions
are "self-evident" in that they can be known to be true by understanding the
meaning of the terms, without any appeal to other propositions. Once one
understands the terms in the proposition, the connection between subject
and predicate is seen as a necessary one. In this regard, the per se notum is
quite like the modern "apriori" and even the "analytic" about which we will
speak. Per se notum propositions are a priori in the sense that they do not
depend on a positive appeal to further experience with contingent features of
flic world, but only on an intuitive insight into reality, which Aquinas called
ik
iniellectus"7 even if the persons ability to understand the terms contained
in the proposition derives, in whole or in part, from experience.
Thus far, there is not much of a problem. Both scholastics and moderns
recognize that one can know certain propositions to be necessarily true
wilhout further experience. The problem often arises in the second section
regarding how propositions are grounded. The ordinary modern distinction
Is between propositions that are "analytically" true compared to proposi-

ti Some philosophers insist that a minimal amount of experience be necessary to un-

iliTNlniul Ihc proposition, A priori in such cases means no further experience is necessary
once IMN understood,
7 More on lhi« polnl will be nlven below.

135
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

tions that are "synthetically" true. When propositions are analytically true,
they are said to be "true by definition," that is, via a relation of ideas within
the proposition. (So far so good, as far as a scholastic may be concerned.)
But the problem rears its head when we ask about details about that "defi-
nition" When we say something is "true by definition," what exactly does
that mean? Of course, it depends on whom you ask, but the ordinary answer
that some modern thinkers give is problematic. More often than not, mod-
ern thinkers influenced by Kant and Hume simply take "true by definition"
to be true by a mere relation of ideas, such as the form "All AB s are B."
The word "mere" here is important, for far too often, analyticity degenerates
into subjectivity A mere subjective relation of ideas compels many of these
thinkers to adopt the position that necessary propositions do not refer to
anything in the real world (sometimes stated as "analytic truths cannot be
synthetic truths")! In this epistemically handicapped view, "analytic" truths
are just about relations of ideas, which usually entails they are just products
of human convention. The problem is that justifying necessary truths based
on linguistic convention or definition deprives them of their strength, since
the necessity in such cases is merely subjective. When the modality is sub-
jective, the certitude of the relation between subject and predicate is based
on convention, and the loss of realism is replaced with a surrealism, which
interestingly enough is not all that necessary.8 If the necessity of these prop-
ositions is based on something entirely subjective, then of course there are
no grounds for claiming an objective necessity.
The lesson to be learned from this is that you do not explain things if
you are only explaining words. Talk about how a proposition can be known
"prior to experience," and talk about the containment of the predicate in
the subject is all well and good as far it goes, but it does not go far enough
to adequately express what a necessary proposition really is.
Let us repair this modern notion of propositional necessity with a more
traditional one. When a scholastic meant a proposition was necessarily
true, it meant it was a judgment based on "necessary matter" {in necessar-
ia materia), as opposed to a judgment based on "contingent matter" (in
materia contingenti).9 The "matter" of these judgments naturally refers

8 The failure of such alternatives like these were no doubt pnrl of Quine's mo-
tivation to rejecting a priori justification altogether.
9 See for example, John of Si. Thomas, Outlines of Formal Logh\ fine Mnllcr of Prop-
ositions") 59.

136
 Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know l\\pm

to what the judgment is about. Pace the Kantian dogma, i.e., necessary
judgments refer only to thought, judgments referring to necessaria ma-
teria are both necessary and refer to reality. The "necessary matter" was a
reference to the way things really are. This is an objective, reality-based
necessity.10 How does reality provide a basis for necessity? It is obvious
t hat things are what they are, and if we can know what things are, we can
make necessary propositions about them11. In virtue of the principle of
identity, everything is what it is, and necessarily so (everything is neces-
sarily itself). That which a thing is (meaning it could not be itself without
il), is what it is essentially. When we predicate something essential about
a thing, we are saying that it has something that it must have, that it has
I hat property essentially. Thus when a proposition is necessary, this simply
means that to deny it would be to say that the subject is not itself- that it is
not what it is essentially. In this way, to deny of a subject what it is essen-
1 ially is not merely false, but a contradiction.

10 Many moderns reject the idea that necessary propositions can be about reality, but
we are almost never given a good reason for accepting this dogmatic claim. Surely some
propositions are both necessary and refer to the real world. What about the oft repeated,
"Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time?" There are numerous
other examples, like "There are no round squares," "All cubes have 12 edges," or even the
principle of non-contradiction itself. All of these seem necessary and refer to the real
world. Moreover, it seems apparent that there is at least one necessarily true statement
nbout the world, since the statement that "There are no necessary facts about the world"
Is ilself necessarily false! Thus, by contradictory opposition, it must be the case then that
I he statement, "Some proposition is a necessary fact about the world" is necessarily true.
More argumentation for this position is given below.
11 Aquinas says per se notum propositions and first principles are known from abstract-
ing intelligible species of things: "Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse
tillud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sedhoc esse non potest, quia
rtlum ipsaprincipia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus, utdocetphi-
losophus in I Poster. Unde oportet praeexistere intellectum agentem habitui principiorum
slcut causam ipsius; quia vero principia comparantur ad intellectum agentem ut instrumenta
(fiiaedam eius, quia per ea,facit alia intelligibilia actu? Quaest. De anima , Q. 5. See also
S.'i, HI, 51, 1. As the later Thomist, John of St. Thomas puts it, "It is not the signification
of I he terms but the connection of the things signified which causes a proposition to be de-
monstrable by a middle term or devoid of a middle term and consequently immediate or
Nt'lf- evident." John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Volume I, Ars Logicay
us appears in The Material Logic ofJohn of St. Thomas, tr. Yves Simon (Chicago: University
of (Chicago, 1955), 463, emphasis added. Also, Owens puts the point this way, ""all the sim-
ple natures that are known to man come to the intellect from sensible things through simple
apprehension, these immediate judgments of essence are all based upon the way things are
In the HciiNlblc world." Oweim, UkmvnUiry Christian Metaphysics, 273.

137
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

In the scholastic view then, necessary truths are based on a real mate-
rial necessity. The key difference here is that the necessity involved does
not depend upon the subjective state of ones knowledge or even the ad-
equacy of ones concepts.12 In other words, the scholastic position rejects
the modern bent of making necessity subjective via conventional or nom-
inal understandings of definitions. Nominal definitions are definitions of
words, in that they directly refer to how a word is used (often based on
convention). Real definitions, on the other hand, relay information about
the actual thing signified, saying what something is (defining the essence).
So when we really define a triangle as a "three-sided polygon," we do not
just imply that the word "triangle" conventionally means that; we mean
that this is what triangles really are. We are stating that the essence of a tri-
angle is to have three sides, and something could not be a triangle if it had
any more or any less. In other words, to say that a triangle drawn on the
chalkboard is not a triangle is not just false, it is necessarily false because
the statement entails a contradiction:
Moreover, when one undertakes to say what any particular kind
of thing is - say, that a triangle is a three-sided rectilinear figure,
or that a human being is a rational animal - then one cannot put

12 Per se propositions can be per se "in itself" {in se) or for us {quoad nos). This distinc-
tion acknowledges that there could be necessarily true propositions that we do not yet or
may never know (it does not have to be self-evident that P is self-evident). These would be
true "in themselves," meaning that the objective situation to which they refer would be
such and such a way, even if nobody ever knew it. In this way, John of St. Thomas answers
an objection he attributes to Scotus, saying that Aquinas doesn't consider just the formal
proposition or merely the signification of the terms, rather he also considers the founda-
tion that self-evident propositions have as grounded in things. So it is not the signification
of the terms but also the connection of the things signified that makes a proposition self-ev-
ident "in itself"; "There is no impropriety in considering it [the proposition] objectively
rather than formally, in other words, from the standpoint of the thing signified... It is
now easy to answer the argument used by our opponents. Let it be said that in St Thomas
'self-evident proposition' designates not only proposition formally understood but also in
an objective sense and in the foundation of its truth. A proposition is self-evident in itself
when there is an immediate connection in the object, and it is self-evident to us when this
connection is manifested and explained by terms of such nature that without discourse
and by the mere understanding of the terms we come to know the connection." John of St
Thomas, Material Logic, 464 emphasis added. That a perse proportion that Is known by
us can be known by nearly all or only to the wise: "Some thlngn, however, HIT Immediately
evident only to those with trained minds, who know th« m i n i n g of the terms, whereas
ordinary people do not know them." De tor,, 10» 12i vol, 23, MO,

138
 Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know Uttm

forward such assertions as being other than necessary truths. For

they are no more than specifications of the principle that any one
kind of thing is the kind of thing that it is; and to suppose that it
were not would be patently self-contradictory13
Scholastic necessary truths are based on the ability to know and refer
to what a thing is, not merely what the word means (nominally). We do not
merely analyze a concept in scholastic necessary statements, but rather,
we also refer to the natures of actual things. In this way, the Kantian rigid
dichotomy that says a statement cannot be both analytic and synthetic
(about the real world) would deprive us of being able to say what anything
is. The key point of separation between the scholastic necessary truth
and the modern is the insistence on the objective situation to which the
proposition refers.14

The Modes of Necessary Predication

Another area of disconnect between modern versus ancient and me-
dieval thought is how the necessary connection between the subject and
predicate is understood. The typical modern take on necessary proposi-
lions occurs, as we have said, when the predicate is contained in the defi-
nition of the subject. On the whole this, this is where the modern take
slops. But following Aristotle, the scholastic take on the nature of neces-
sary propositions is more refined and nuanced. In the Posterior Analytics,
lor example, Aristotle lists four ways that something can be said to be "per
13 Henry B. Veatch, Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytical Phi-
losophy (Evanston, IN: Northwestern University Press, 1969).
14 "Nevertheless, I should like to suggest that such total skepticism in regard to self-ev-
ident principles proceeds in large measure from a tendency to think of self-evidence pure-
ly psychologically and subjectively - as if an evident principle were one which necessarily
iind infallibly compelled conviction. As over against this way of viewing self-evidence, my
»u count of it would make it something much more objective. Indeed, in accordance with
my continued emphasis on intentionality, I should say that the self-evidence of a prop-
osition is determined not by the psychological effect it has on one who understands the
proposition, but rather by the sort of real situation that is intended by the proposition
Accordingly, once self-evidence is given an objective basis in the objects intended by cer-
Itiln propositions, it would seem difficult to deny that there are self-evident propositions.
To he sure, we may often be mistaken as to just which propositions are self-evident, and
even I hose which we in Ink to he so may be few in number. Still, it must be acknowledged
Iluit al least sonic proportion* WIT nuch lo be evident only in and through themselves and
nol through any dtftnoiMtriillon In tcrniN of external causes and principles/' Henry B.
Vcntcli. Intentional Logi* (N#w I INVVIII Yule University Press, 1952) 296-7,

139
,S7. 'llwnniM Aquinas tttnl (he I'rlclplc of Sufficient Reason

se", three of which apply to propositions.15 These modes of necessary per se

predication will be called the first, second, and fourth mode respectively.16
The first way of saying something per se occurs when that which is
predicated of a subject pertains to its form or essence. Since the form or
essence of a thing is what is signified by the definition, we can say that the
first mode of per se predication is when the definition itself or something
contained in the definition is predicated of the thing defined. For example,
if we were to say "Man is an animal," that statement is necessarily true, in
the first mode, since "animal" is included in the very definition of "man."
Likewise, "The whole is greater than its part" is also per se notum in the
first mode for the same reason.17 Clearly, this first mode of necessary per
se predication is the one that most resembles the common "predicate con-
tained in the definition of the subject" version we have discussed above.
But Aquinas does not stop there. Following Aristotle, Aquinas goes on
to say there is a second mode of necessary per se predication.18 Aquinas
says the second mode of predicatingper se, is when the subject is mentioned
in the definition of a predicate which turns out to be a "proper accident" of
the subject.19 For example, if we were to say that "Every number is even or
odd." This statement is necessarily true in the second mode because "num-
ber" enters into the definition of "even or odd" in the sense that number

15 Posterior Analytics, 73a34-b26.

16 The third mode of per se> Aquinas says, is a mode of being and not predication. In
I Post. Ana.y 1. 10. Thus, this third mode does not apply to propositional necessity and so
does not concern us here.
17 Aquinas calls this first mode of perse one of "formal causality" because "the defini-
tion is predicated of the thing defined." In I Post. Ana., 1.10.
18 "The second mode of saying per se is when this preposition per implies a relationship
of material cause, in the sense that that to which something, is attributed is its proper
matter and subject. For it is required, when defining an accident, to mention its proper
subject in one of the oblique, cases: thus when an accident is defined abstractly, we say
that "aquilinity" is a curvature of a nose," but when it is defined concretely, the subject is
put in the nominative case, so that we say that "the aquiline is a curved nose." Now the
reason for this is that since the being of an accident depends on its subject, its definition—
which signifies its being—must mention that subject. Hence it is the second mode of say-
ing per se, when the subject is mentioned in the definition of a predicate which is a proper
accident of the subject." Ibid. For a more complete account on this second mode of per se
predication, see William Walton, "The Second Mode of Necessary or PerSv Propositions
According to St Thomas Aquinas," The Modern Schoolman v. 29 (4) (1 ¥52). 293-306
19 "Hence it is the second mode of saying per se, when tho luhjwl IN mentioned In the
definition of a predicate which Is a proper accident of tht iub)f€t." IbUi

140
 Necessary Truths ami Our Ability to Know Ihnn

is the proper subject of that property.20 Aquinas says this second mode of
per se predication implies a relationship of material cause since, in this
case, "number" is the proper subject of the properties "even or odd". Take
another example, "Man has the ability to laugh." Aquinas says this prop-
osition is also necessarily true in the second mode because "man" is the
proper subject of the property "able to laugh." Accordingly, just as we have
a necessary connection when the predicate is contained in the definition
of the predicate, we also have a necessary connection when the subject is
contained in the definition of the predicate. Just as you cannot take away
from "man" that he is an animal (first mode of per se) so too you cannot
take away from the notion of number that it be even or odd (second mode
of per se).21 The necessary connection runs both ways.22
With that being said however, there are a couple of important differ-
ences between the first and second mode predication that are worthy of
mention. The first difference is that, although the second mode of per se
predication is a necessary one, still in second mode predication, one can
conceive of the subject without conceiving of the predicate. In other words,
when considering the definition of the subject, the predicate need not be
considered. This might sound counterintuitive to modern ears but the ra-
I ionale Aquinas gives for this point is compelling and to understand it we
have to remember precisely what the claim is here. The claim is that second
mode per se predication is predicating proper, or we could say necessary,
accidents to a subject. In such cases, the predicate is an accident in the
sense that it is a non-essential quality, yet it is still necessary. This notion
of a "necessary accident" is not a contradiction in terms. These properties
are truly accidents in the sense that they do not enter into the definition or

20 "In another way, a proposition is called necessary whose subject, on the other hand,
is placed in the definition of the predicate; as when we say that a nose is snub or that a
number is even. For a snub nose is nothing else than a curved nose, and an even number
Is nothing else than a number divisible by two" In II de Anima, lect. 14.
21 "Whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of itself cannot be taken away from it. For
example, you cannot take away from man that he be an animal, nor can you take away
I rum number that it be even or odd." Quaest. De anima, 14.
11 "We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms... as
when Ihc subject belongs to the notion of the predicate: thus it is necessary that a number
he either odd or even." SX I. 19.3. Again, "there is absolute necessity [necessitas absoluta]
In things from the order of their essential principles to the properties flowing from their
nuttier or form; a saw, heciuinc It Is made of iron, must be hard; and a man is necessarily
umuble of learning" S,c;,C#\ ILK).

141
St. 'lliomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

essence of the thing, but they are necessary in the sense that they are prop-
erties that naturally and necessarily arise from that essence.23 So their acci-
dental characteristic comes from the fact that they are non-essential, but
their characteristic of necessity comes from the fact that such an essence
cannot possibly exist without its proper accident. The proper accident is
a natural concomitant of the essence, that is to say, it is a property that is
necessarily derivative, or, to use Aquinas* terminology, a "certain natural
resultance" from the essence of the thing.24
The justification for claiming a thing can be conceived of without its
proper accident but cannot be said to exist without its proper accident cor-
responds well with Aquinas' teaching on the two acts of the mind. The
first act of the mind, called by logicians "simple apprehension", merely
considers what something is without affirming or denying anything about
it. There is no truth value assigned to the first act of the mind, since no
affirmations or denials are being made here. The second act of the mind,
called "judgment", is where truth value comes into play. In the act of judg-
ing, we either unite or divide two concepts and say this is the way they are
in reality, and this judgment is the mental act that produces propositions.
Relating this back to the second mode of per se predication, one can, for
example, conceive of number without having to conceive of either even or
odd. Likewise, one can conceive what a man is without having to think
about his ability to laugh. Such conception in the first act of the mind
occurs by way of simple apprehension and only considers the essence of
the subject, nothing else. The necessary accidents that are natural con-
comitants of that essence are not included in the essence and so therefore
are not considered. Accordingly, one can conceive of the subject without
conceiving of the predicate when we are talking about second mode pred-
ication, but it would be erroneous to infer from that fact that therefore such
a thing can exist without that necessary accident. How a thing must be
conceived of essentially does not give us all that is necessarily entailed by

23 "Accident is predicated in two ways. In one way it is predicated as a separable acci-

dent which can be present in a thing or absent from it, such as to sit. In another way it is
predicated as an inseparable and necessary [per se] accident!' In I Phys., lect. 6, emphasis
added. Thus, Aquinas' explicitly holds to both separable (or we could say "non-neces-
sary") and inseparable (necessary) accidents.
24 "The emanation of proper accidents from their mibjecl U not by way of trans-
mutation, but by a certain natural resultance \per aliquam nttttmibm wmUatlonem) -
just as one thing naturally rcsullN from another, «N color from Ilflht," S,T. 17ft nil.3

142
 Neiwutry l)vth» ml Uut Ability M KhttW fftlfft

its existence. Simple apprehension can leave out any neceMimry y*t IU)I1*M*
sential properties, while judgment, the second act of the mind thai relrw
lo existence, cannot. It is true that one does not need to conceive of "even
or odd" when you think about the nature of number, but that does not
mean that there could be a number that was not even or odd. Likewise, one
can conceive of a man without thinking of his risibility, but it would be a
contradiction to say a man exists without this property of risibility.25 The
contradiction arises precisely here in the second act of the mind because
although the property is not in the essence, still, that property is a neces-
sary concomitant of that essence and so that essence cannot exist without
t hat property To put this point most succinctly, simple apprehension can
leave out properties but judgments cannot. We can know what it is with-
out thinking about any of its proper accidents but we cannot say that it is
without its proper accidents.26 The proper accidents of a thing necessarily
follow from the essence even though they are not included in that essence,
and this connection is immutable.27
The second important difference between first and second mode per se
predication is that while first mode predication is immediately necessary,
in second mode propositions the predicate mediately belongs to the sub-
ject by way of a middle term. In other words, second mode propositions are
necessary but they are conclusions to a demonstration. The proper accident
Is a necessary resultance of that essence, but that property belongs to the

25 As Aquinas says, "Therefore, although what the soul is can be understood without
I hem, yet that the soul be without them is neither possible nor intelligible." Quaest. De
ttttlnia, 12, ad. 7.
J.6 "The activity of the mind is twofold... One whereby it understands what something
IN: and in such an operation of the mind the essence of a thing can be understood, both
iipnrt from a property and apart from an accident, since neither of these things enters into
I lu* essence of the thing... The other activity of the mind is combining and dividing;... By
II lis |sccond] activity of the mind, however, a substance cannot be understood without its
property; for that man has not the power of laughing is not intelligible, nor that a triangle
«lncs not have three angles equal to two right angles; for here there is a repugnance of objects
t if thought [repugnantia intellectuum], since the opposite of the predicate depends upon the
mil urc of the subject." De Spiritualibus 11 ad. 7, emphasis added. Again, "So in the first op-
nul Ion of the intellect the essence of the soul is understood apart from its powers, but not
In I he second operation - that is, so that it is understood not to have powers." Ibid. Also, "If
mimcoiic thinks man, not thinking of his power of laughter, he is not in error; but he would
be II'he ihought man is not capable of laughter." De Spiritualibus 3 ad 14.
11 "Whatever is present In a thing necessarily [per se] is either part of its essence or
rrnuIlN from lis eHMenLlMl prlnciplcH." /V Pot. 10,4.

143
 W WlHWrti AtjUhhl* Hful the hit (pie ofSulliviunt Reason

illh|*tt via it middle lerm. "Risibility" belongs necessarily to man, not di-
rn tly, Iwl by way of the middle term, "rational animal." Such propositions
I hen should not be called "immediate", or "self-evident" principles, for
I hey are ultimately known as conclusions to a demonstration. They are
necessary however because they proceed from self-evident principles.28
Finally, there is a rarely mentioned but importantfourth mode of neces-
sary per se predication.29 This fourth mode is very important precisely be-
cause this is the type of proposition that Aquinas says is the major premise
of a demonstration,30 However, Aquinas tells us very little about this sort
of per se. All we see is that this notion ofper se designates a relationship of
efficient cause and occurs when the "predicate is the proper attribute, and
whose subject is the definition which contains the principles of the prop-
er attribute.31 In other words, the subject is the principle that necessarily
causes the proper attribute, which means the fourth mode, at least at first
glance, seems very much like the second mode! Here again in the fourth
mode we are talking about a necessary, non-essential property being pred-
icated of subject. The only difference here is that in the second mode, we
saw that the property belongs to the subject by way of some middle term
but in the fourth mode the property belongs to the subject directly. That is
to say, in the fourth mode the essence of the subject serves as an immedi-

28 "Furthermore, it should be noted that, since in a demonstration a proper attribute

is proved of a subject through a middle which is the definition, it is required that the first
proposition (whose predicate is the proper attribute, and whose subject is the definition
which contains the principles of the proper attribute) be perse in the fourth mode, and that
the second proposition (whose subject is the subject itself and the predicate its definition)
must be in the first mode. But the conclusion, in which the proper attribute is predicated of
the subject, must be perse in the second mode' In I Post Ana., 1.13. Emphasis added.
29 "Then he gives the fourth mode, according to which the preposition per designates
a relationship of efficient cause or of any other. Consequently, he says that whatever is
attributed to a thing because of itself, is said of it per se; but whatever is not so attributed is
said per accidens, as when I say, "While he was walking, it lightened." For it is not the fact
that he walks that causes lightning, but this is said by coincidence. But if the predicate is
in the subject because of itself, it is per se, as when we say, "Slaughtered, it died." For it is
obvious that because something was slaughtered, it died, and it is not a mere coincidence
that something slaughtered should die" In I Post. Ana., 1. 10.
30 Again, this is mentioned in the text cited above; "Furthermore, it should be noted
that, since in a demonstration a proper attribute is proved of a subject through a middle
which is the definition, it is required [oportet] that thefirstproposition (whose predicate is
the proper attribute, and whose subject is the definition which contain* the principles of the
proper attribute) be per se in the fourth mode..," In 1 Post, Ami., I. I J. lUnphuNld added.
3\ In I Post Ana. 1.13.

144
 Necessary 'Druthi mil Our Ability hi KHUW 1h$m

ate efficient cause of that property. The stock Aristotelian example of I hi

fourth mode is, "The slaughtered thing died." This is necessarily Iru* In
the fourth mode since the nature of a "slaughtered thing" gives immediate
and inevitable rise to the property "died." Or perhaps we can clarify the
difference better through our earlier example. Take the difference between
the statements, "Every man is risible," which according to Aquinas, is true
in the second mode of per se predication, versus "Every rational animal is
risible," which is true in the fourth mode ofper se predication. Admittedly,
on the face of things there is not much of a difference here, except for the
fact that risibility is a direct result of the essence of mans rationality while
that same predicate applies to "man" mediately, that is again, by way of
some middle term, namely "rational animal".32
What is most useful for our purposes regarding this fourth mode is
Aquinas' recognition of an immediately true, necessary proposition that,
unlike the first mode, is not the result of the predicate being contained
in the definition of the subject, but like the second mode, occurs because
I hat subject necessarily gives rise to some property when that thing exists.
I lowever, unlike the second mode, it is an immediately known self-evident
proposition, i.e., a true first principle, knowable directly by the meaning of
its terms, and thus is not known on the basis of some other proposition
or middle term. Propositions in the fourth mode are the principles of
demonstration and so cannot be conclusions to a demonstration (like
I he second mode is). So it is precisely the presence of these three factors,
necessity, predicate not contained in the subject but naturally occurs from it,
and immediate self-evidence that makes the rarely discussed fourth mode
unique and quite important to Aquinas' understanding of demonstration.
None of the above is intended to be an exhaustive take on all forms
of necessary truths.33 The purpose of this overview is to simply show the

32 Aquinas even implicitly acknowledges the close resemblance between these two
((inns of per se necessity when he says that conclusions to demonstrations, which are
I rue in the second mode of per se predication, can also be said to be true in the fourth
mode as well. "But first it should be noted that, since science bears on conclusions, and
understanding bears on principles, the scientifically knowable are, properly speaking,
I he conclusions of a demonstration wherein proper attributes are predicated of their ap-
propriate subjects. Now the appropriate subjects are not only placed in the definition of
til I rlbulcs, but they are also their causes. Hence the conclusions of demonstrations involve
I wo modes of predicating parse, namely, the second and the fourth." In I Post. Ana., 1.10.
33 Indeed there arc undoubtedly other types of necessary truths we have not discussed,
much UN certain dtujunctlvp proportion* like, "Hither horses are possible or they are not,"

145
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

reader that in addition to the radical difference between the way a scho-
lastic grounds necessary truths, it is also the case that the scholastic has
a very different and indeed more refined understanding of propositional
analyticity than what we see in the typical "predicate contained in the
definition of the subject" idea. Even though these fine distinctions may
appear complicated to some readers, we cannot let the complexity of care-
ful nuancing to cause us to overlook its importance. The gravity of these
scholastic distinctions will become apparent later when we see how Aqui-
nas anticipated David Hume s objection to the principle of causality by
about five hundred years.

That We Know Necessary Truths

Having thus set forth what necessary truths are according to a scholastic
mind like Aquinas, we are ready to look at the question of whether or
not we do in fact know any necessary truths about the world. As briefly
mentioned earlier, the main reason for any skepticism regarding our
ability to know necessary truths is, presumably, directly attributable to
the misunderstanding of what necessary truths are, which is, as we said in
the prior section, a statement grounded in the real nature of things. So in
a sense, we have already laid the groundwork for much of what needs to
be done in defense of our ability to know necessary truths. Given that we
have a very plausible account of how such truths are grounded, much of the
motivation for denying necessary truths should be removed. However we
can go further, since in addition to offering an account as to what necessary
truths are, there are also other independent arguments that show that we
must in fact know them. That is the point of this section.
So do we in fact know any truths about the world that are necessary
and per set There are at least three decisive reasons for thinking so. First,
clear examples show that the existence of necessary truths is self-evident.
Second, denying that we know any necessary self-evident truths leads to
absurdities and the destruction of all knowledge. Finally, possible worlds
semantics helps us see that denying necessary truths lands one in a self-
contradiction. We will now look at each one of these arguments in turn.

or universal negative propositions such as, "No man lltt«U>n»," 'I him. I he three modes
mentioned here should not he taken as an cxhaunllvf lilting,
 Necessary 'Ihiths timl Our Ability hi KmtW IHm

That We Know Necessary Truths Is Self-Evident

The clearest and most direct way to show that we know necessary truths
is to highlight obvious examples. Doing this is quite easy, for there are nu-
merous examples that can confirm our intuitive capacity of knowing some
truths about which we cannot be mistaken. For example, mathematical
truths such as 7 + 5 = 12, that "every triangle has three sides", "two lines
can never enclose a space," etc., are all necessary truths and have been
recognized as such by a commanding majority of thinkers throughout the
history of philosophy. These mathematical truths are not merely "truths
of thought" but they are also truths of reality. If one has seven apples and
then adds five more, there must be twelve. The same goes for geometri-
cal truths.34 Moreover, certain metaphysical truths like the principle of
identity ("everything is itself"), and the principle of non-contradiction ("a
t hing cannot both be and not-be at the same time and in the same way")
are necessarily true statements about the world. It is intuitively certain
I hat given anything that exists, that thing is itself and cannot be some-
thing else. So the straightforward claim here is that the intuitive necessity
of examples like these makes it obvious that we do in fact know necessary
I ruths about the world.

Denying that We Know Necessary Truths Leads to

Absurdities and the Destruction of All Knowledge
The second reason to think that we know necessary truths is that
any denial of that fact leads to ridiculous and embarrassing absurdities.
Take the principle of non-contradiction, which is the support behind the
evident fact that there cannot be such a thing as say a "round square".
'Ihe reason there cannot be a round square is because the notion is in-
herently contradictory and impossible. It's not merely that we cannot
conceive of a round square, rather more fundamentally, the reason we
cannot conceive it is because there cannot be such a thing. The natures
of "round" and "square" being united in the same object is ontologically

M The alleged "collapse" of Euclidean geometry does nothing to undermine the truth
of these statements. The question of whether or not space is really curved (whether or
nol Euclidean space is a valid description of our own three-dimensional space) is not the
.sit me question as whether a triangle may or may not have three sides. Even if space really
IN non-Euclidean, that IIOCN nol mean that the proposition, "All triangles have three sides,"
U nol necessary, ll would only mean there are no actual instances of Euclidean triangles.

147
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

repugnant.35 But now suppose one says there are no necessary truths
about the world. If that is true then all bets are off, because at that point
the principle of non-contradiction cannot be universally true either. A
person who made such a claim would have to be open to the possibility
of things like a round square, five sided triangles, or anything else that
is a self-contradiction. No absurdity is off limits for anyone who denies
that the principle of contradiction is necessarily true. But of course, if
anything is patent nonsense, it is this. To deny that we know necessary
truths would mean that we do not know if there could really be things
like a round square or not, and this is evidently absurd. Nothing more
needs to be said about this point.
Another absurdity of denying per se notum truths is that, as both
Aristotle and Aquinas recognized, such a denial would result in the de-
struction of all knowledge. The reason is because if there are no first
principles that are directly known, then everything must be known on
the basis of something else. But if everything is known on the basis of
something else, then that entails that anything one claims to know must
be based on knowing an irresolvable infinite regress of other things,
which cannot be done and thus, all knowledge at that point becomes im-
possible.36 So in order to avoid the destruction of all knowledge, we must
admit there are some things that are knowable per se and not known
through another.37 To put this point formally we can say:

35 Or put in scholastic terminology, such propositions are about "impossible matter".

Impossible matter is opposed to both necessary and contingent matter. As Aquinas says,
"In addition, a fifth division of the enunciation can be made, a division in regard to mat-
ter. It is taken from the relationship of the predicate to the subject. If the predicate is per
se in the subject, it will be said to be an enunciation in necessary or natural matter. Exam-
ples of this are "Man is an animal" and "Man is risible." If the predicate is perse repugnant
to the subject, as excluding the notion of it, it is said to be an enunciation in impossible
or remote matter [materia impossibili]; for example, the enunciation "Man is an ass." If
the predicate is related to the subject in a way midway between these two, being neither
per se repugnant to the subject nor per se in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or
contingent matter." In I Peri Herm. I 13.
36"Just as in demonstration it is necessary to reduce to some principles that are known
through themselves [per se] certain principles directly known by the intellect, so also it
must be when investigating the nature of anything; otherwise, both types of knowledge
will become involved in an infinite regress, and so all science and knowledge of things
will perish." De. Ver. Q.l, a.l
37 Aquinas, following Aristotle, points out that thtf ultllTMtf flril ul nil of IIK\HC neces-
sary truths is again, the principle of non-contradiction. HWh»r#fnr* lh* firm Indcmon-

148
 Necessary Truths and Our Ability U) Know HiPtn

Either all propositions are known through another {per all ltd)
or there are at least some propositions that are known through
themselves, (perse).

It is not the case that all propositions are known through another.

Therefore, some propositions are known through themselves (perse).

The first premise is exhausts the possible options and is therefore true.
The second premise is true given the problem of the infinite regress, and
thus the conclusion follows necessarily.
But we can readily imagine an objection to the effect that just because all
reasoning depends uponfirstprinciples, that doesn't mean those first principles
have to be necessary. For if we are only affirming contingent propositions,
contingent propositions do not have to be, nor could they be, entailed by
necessary propositions anyway. A first in such a case would only be a first
contingent proposition, and so, the argument may go, Aquinas' argument can
be avoided. We do not need to affirm a necessary truth as afirstprinciple. The
first truths we know could be contingent ones and that's all.
To this objection however, the obvious answer is that although it is
t rue that in the contingent order there cannot be an infinite regress and
I hat there must be a first in the contingent order just as there would be
in the necessary order, still this recognition does nothing to extricate the
objector from the problem posed by Aquinas. For it is still the case that
any contingent proposition, in order to be meaningful and in order to be
true, must presuppose knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction.
Take for example a contingent truth like the fall of Nazi Germany. We can
only maintain that statement as true if we also maintain that a proposition
cannot both be true and false at the same time, or more foundationally,
I hat things cannot both be and not be at the same time (and in the same
way). It cannot be the case that Nazi Germany both fell and did not fall
in the same sense. So contingent facts still presuppose the truth of the
principle of non-contradiction even if the denial of those facts itself does

NI ruble principle is thai "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,"
which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others
ktre based, as IN Hinted In Mrtafih, Iv, text. 9" S.T. HI, 94.2. Also, "Among these principles
I here Is a certain order, NO that wine are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
are reduced, MM to th#lr ttril principle, lo I IIIN one: "'I he same thing cannot be affirmed and
denied ttl the nam* tlmti" «« lit* Philosopher ululca {Metaplh Iv, Icxl. 9)." S.T, I MM.7.

14V
.S7 'Ihtimn* Aq\ilm\* mitt the h'lciplc of Sufficient Reason

not cnlail a contradiction. In other words, even contingent truths still

presuppose necessary truths in important ways.
But it is not only the principle of non-contradiction that must be known
given any contingent truth. Other necessary truths are entailed as well. As
Scotus argued, given any actual and contingent state of affairs, one can
validly infer from that actuality to its possibility (ab esse ad posse valet
illatio)y and that possibility is a necessary truth.38 Put more succinctly, giv-
en that any contingent state of affairs exists, it is necessary that contingent
state of affairs be possible. Any contingent de inesse proposition can be
transformed into a necessary de possibili proposition, and the possibility
of things are necessary, unalterable features of the world. If any contingent
event exists, like the fall of Nazi Germany, then the statement, "The fall of
Nazi Germany is possible," must be necessarily true.
So reason demands that it is simply not the case that every truth is
known by appealing to other truths. To try and demonstrate every truth
by appealing to other statements is a hopeless enterprise that destroys rea-
son and, as Aristotle humorously put it, displays "a want of education."39
There must be necessary truths about the world, some of which are first
principles; statements that are indemonstrable and intuitively known
through the very meaning of their own terms.40

Denying that We Know Necessary Truths Results in

Self- Contradiction
If this were not enough, possible world semantics can help us see the self-
refuting nature of denying that we know necessary truths. A proposition
is necessary when it cannot possibly be false, that is to say, when it is true
in all possible worlds. But now suppose someone actually says there are

38 See Duns Scotus: Metaphysician, William A. Frank and Allan Wolter, (Purdue Uni-
versity Press, 1995) 80-81
39 "For not to know of what things one should seek demonstration and of what things
one should not shows want of education. For it is altogether impossible that there should
be demonstration of all things, because there would then be an infinite regress so that
there would still be no demonstration. But if there are some things of which it is not
necessary to seek demonstration, these people cannot say what principle they think to be
more indemonstrable." Aristotle, Meta, IV 1006a5-10
40 "For first principles become known through the natural llghl oi'lhc ugent Intellect,
and they are not acquired by any process of reasoning but by having llwlr icrma become
known." Aquinas, In Meta IV, 1.6

150
 Necessary Truths arid Our Ability to Know litem

no necessary truths. What in the world could this mean? If it's true that
u
No truths are necessary," then, by obversion, the statement, "Every truth
is contingent" must also be true. But if every truth is contingent, then so is
I hat truth that says, "Every truth is contingent!" Now a contingent truth is,
obviously, one which could have been false. In other words, a contingent
truth is one that is true in some possible worlds but false in others. So if
"Every truth is contingent" is itself contingent (which it must be in order
lo avoid self-contradiction), then there must be some worlds in which that
statement is false. In that case, the contradictory statement, "Some truths
are not contingent" would have be true, which can only mean, by obversion
again, that "Some truths are necessary." But a necessary truth, by definition,
is true in all possible worlds. So if "some truths are necessary" is true in at
least one possible world, then it must be true in all possible worlds. But this
contradicts the original hypothesis, "No truths are necessary." It cannot
possibly be the case that both, "No truths are necessary" and "Some truths are
necessary" are true, since these are contradictory assertions. Thus, the claim
u
No truths are necessary" ends up resulting in a manifest contradiction.
Apparently there is no escaping the dilemma. Either we affirm that there
are some necessary truths, or we become trapped in self-contradiction.
Affirming necessary truths is unavoidable.41
So to summarize, the whole point of this discussion is to show that there
must be at least some propositions that are necessarily true. Equally, some
of these propositions are those which we know "immediately" through the
lerms themselves. There are not only obvious self-evident examples that
show this, but also the denial of this claim entails absurdities, the destruc-
I ion of all knowledge, and outright contradiction. Consequently, reason
demands that we maintain the classic Aristotelian position, namely, that
some of the things we know are not known on the basis of knowing other
I lungs, but are intuitively seen as necessarily true. Philosophy will always
have its share of verbal deniers who continue to argumentatively deny such
1 hings, but we have seen that they cannot reasonably do so. "What a man
says, he does not necessarily believe." Aristotle reminds us.42

41 To put it a different way, the statement, "There are no necessary facts about the
world" is itself a universal and necessary fact about the world which is blatantly self-re-
lull ng and thus neccHtmrlly false. This means that, via contradictory opposition, "Some
proposition Is a necewmry fuel uboul Ihc world" would have to be true.
42 ArlHlollt, M$t* /V, clU. KH)5b25
St. 'Ihomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

How We Know Necessary Truths

Now that we have set forth an account as to what necessary truths are
and have seen strong reasons showing that we do in fact know such things,
it is appropriate at this point to provide some account as to how we come to
know these truths in the first place. But this explanation must come with a
caveat. That we know necessary truths is logically prior to any explanation
as to how we come to know them. We can even say we are more certain
that we know than we are about how we know.43 Since reason demands
that we proceed from the more certain to the less certain, this certitude
is prior to, and cannot be undermined by, any uncertainty in explaining
how we know necessary truths. So even if our account of how we come to
know necessary truths is incomplete or even if our opponents think it is
inadequate in some way, still that does not undermine our certitude that
we do know such things.
However, the account given by Aristotle and Aquinas is quite credible.
Their position begins with the point mentioned above; that in order to
avoid an infinite regress in the things we know, there must be some prin-
ciples that are "first" and knowable through themselves.44 In contrast to
various rationalistic epistemologies however, Aquinas' understanding of
the intellect is that it does not come "pre-loaded" with knowledge of these
principles. The intellect is in potency to knowing these principles and it
is not until one actually has the appropriate sense impressions that one
can acquire knowledge of various concepts.45 The mind does not have a

43 "The certitude and the ontological validity of primary ideas and first principles is nat-
urally and logically prior to that theory by which the philosopher seeks to explain how this
certitude is acquired, how our intellect comes into contact with being, and is determined
and measured by it." Garrigou Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, op. cit, 155-6.
44 "...not all knowledge depends on previous knowledge, for that would involve an
infinite process." In I Post Ana. 1.1
45 "The knowledge of principles does not come about in us from pre-existing knowledge
in the same way as things which are known through demonstration...Hence he concludes
that there do not pre-exist, any habits of principles in the sense of being determinate and
complete... rather the habits of principles come to exist in us from pre-existing sense." In
II Post. Ana. 1. 20. "The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that
it is like 'a tablet on which nothing is written*... Now we observe that man sometimes
is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he Is reduced from
such potentiality to act through the action of sensible objccl* on hla MCIIHCH, lo ihe act of
sensation-by instruction or discovery, lo the act of undemanding. Wherefore we mual
say thai ihe cognlllve soul IK In potentiality bolh lo lha lmagtM which are Ihe principle* of

152
 Necessary lYutht ami Our Ahillty In Know Ihm

priori knowledge of any concepts until it comes Into contact with rraltty.
Take the axiom, "Every whole is greater than its part." Some experience
is required in order to know what the concepts "whole" and "part" mean.
We have to experience things like pizzas and six packs in order to come to
know the meaning of these terms. Yet once one has acquired knowledge
of those terms, no further experience is necessary. Once experience has
enabled us to understand the meaning of "whole" and "part" we can now
know for certain that the statement, "Every whole is greater than its part,"
is necessarily true. The proposition is known to be true through the very
meaning of the terms.46 Knowledge of necessary truths begins with, but is
not limited to, our experience.
Now an objector might think all of this is wrongheaded for the sim-
ple fact that one cannot possibly know about all things by observing only
some. And if one is not certain about this, an objector may say, then
Aquinas' claim to know universal truths by past experience is hopeless-
ly flawed. In other words, we have here the classic problem of induction.
What is the justification for claiming to know a universal truth based only
on particular observances?
In response to this contention, we need to first point out that the ob-
jection presupposes that the only way to be certain of a universal is by
knowing all of the individual instances. But is this true? In other words, is
complete enumeration the only way to know universal truths? It is interest-
ing to note that both Aristotle and Aquinas agree that empirical observa-

sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding/' S.T.L84.3. "At first, all
our cognition consists in the knowledge of first undeducible principles. But the cognition
of ihese arises in us from sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our
knowledge arises from sense." De Ver. 10.6. "For certain seeds of knowledge pre-exist in
us, namely, the first concepts of understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect
arc immediately known through the species abstracted from sensible things. These are
I'll her complex, as axioms, or simple, as the notions of being, of the one, and so on, which
llic understanding grasps immediately. In these general principles, however, all the con-
sequences are included as in certain seminal principles." De Ver. 11.1
46 "There are two ways of acquiring science: one is through demonstration, and the other
Is 1 hrough induction [inductionem]... it is impossible that universals be known scientifically
wllhout induction... the principles of abstracted [isolated] things, from which demonstra-
I Ions regarding them are formed, are not made manifest to us except from certain particu-
lars which we perceive by sense. Thus, from the fact that we see some single sensible whole
we are led to know whnl n whole is and what a part, and we know that every whole is greater
ihnn ItvS pari by conHldcrlng ihlN In many. Thus the universals from which demonstration
proceeds are mud* known In UN only l hrough Induction." In 1 Post Ana, 1.30

153
,S7. 'I ho mas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

tion alone is insufficient for acquiring universal knowledge, in other words,

there is a sense in which they agree with this objection!47 Yet they also reject
the conclusion drawn by many empiricists that therefore we cannot know
necessary truths because they explicitly reject the idea that one needs a
complete enumeration of individual instances in order to know something
about all instances. How is this possible? Well, the only way someone like
Aquinas can maintain both that a) knowledge of universal necessary truths
is initially grounded in experience and b) that a complete experience of all
particulars is not required to know universal truth, is to be committed to c)
some mechanism by which one can extract universal truth from something
less than a complete enumeration. In other words, there needs to be some
method by which one can turn a numerically incomplete enumeration into
a virtually complete enumeration. How is this done?
For Aquinas this mechanism is twofold. First, the natures of real things
provide the ontological basis for making necessary statements. As we have
said above, the natures of things are the "whats" of reality. Everything is
what it is and cannot be what it is not. Therefore, when we make state-
ments about what things are we are making necessary statements about
them. The second part of this mechanism is an epistemic factor, namely an
intellectual faculty that is not limited to sense perception. In addition to
our sensory powers, there is also the intellectual act of understanding or

47 Aquinas concurs that "induction' (in the sense of looking at just the enumerat-
ed instances and not their nature) is inadequate for knowing a certain conclusion. "It
might be remarked here that he quite fittingly compared division to induction. For in
both cases one is required to suppose that he has listed all the things contained under
some general heading; otherwise, the person inducing could not conclude a universal
from the singulars he assumed, nor could the person dividing conclude to one member
just because the others have been eliminated. Thus it is obvious that one cannot in vir-
tue of the fact that Socrates and Plato and Cicero run, induce of necessity the conclusion
that every man runs, unless his audience concedes that nothing more is contained un-
der man than the ones listed." - In I Post. Anal, 1. 4. Aristotle says the same; "...even if
one prove of each kind of triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles, whether
by means of the same or different proofs; still, as long as one treats separately equilat-
eral, scalene, and isosceles, one does not yet know, except sophistically, that triangle
has its angles equal to two right angles, nor does one yet know that triangle has this
property commensurately and universally, even if there is no other species of triangle
but these. For one does not know that triangle as such has this properly, nor even that
'all* triangles have it — unless *aIP means 'each taken singly*! If'nil' menus 'us a whole
class', then, though there be none in which one doei not ricognlxv thin properly, one
does not know it of 'ftll iiianglciT Post. Ana. /., ch, S., 74i2M0

154
 Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know litem

intellectus.4* This intellectus is an intuitive rational insight into the nature

of things. This intellectual power gives the knower access to those un-
changing natures. Empirical experience provides the material upon which
the act of intellectus operates. Using our example from above, once one has
enough experience to know what "part" and "whole" mean, an intuitive
act of understanding immediately sees that "whole" is always greater than
"part". This is an immediately known, non-inferential, non-discursive
necessary judgment. The necessity of an empirical beginning does not en-
tail empirical limitations in the end. It is not by mere empirical experience
alone that we acquire knowledge of universal truths, rather it is empirical
experience in cooperation with the intuitive faculty of intellectus. For that
reason, some propositions can be perse notum, known as certain and uni-
versally true without having to undergo a complete enumeration of all the
individual instances of parts and wholes. The observed instances suffice to
make the enumeration complete, not actually, but virtually.
To make this point another way, we can have knowledge of the whole
without individually verifying all of the parts because the intellect is able
lo make use of an abstract universal and not a mere enumerative univer-
sal. The mind can know the abstract natures of "part" and "whole" without
having to mentally collect all the instances of parts and wholes. With this
twofold mechanism of real natures on the side of things combined with
an intuition that abstracts the necessities inherent in those natures, the
objection fails. It is by this intuition that we come to know first principles
and the most fundamental truth, like the principle of non-contradiction,
are immediately intuited upon contact with being.49
48 Aquinas says that it is by means of understanding (intellectus) that we are able to
know first principles. This knowledge is an immediate intuition, and is not a discursive
operation. "Unde sicut nos sine discursu principia cognoscimus simplici intuitu? De Ver.
K. 15; vol. 22, 269. Mans act of reasoning is based upon this intuitive insight as a starting
point and immovable principle. "Ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellec-
/// progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationisy sicut
n (juodam principio immobile S.TI, 79,12; vol. 5,279.
49 Aquinas says our reasoning begins with an intuition of first principles and ends in an
I nl uition of first principles by reducing all knowledge back down to them. "But man arrives
tt 11 he knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore
he Is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is
lo resl, or acquisition lo possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the
Imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends
in something at mil hence It IN thul human reasoning, by way of Inquiry and discovery,
tulvnnccN from certain thing* limply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again,

155
St ViuiHttt Atjulmtx ami the I'rlclplc of Sufficient Reason

Ihe Problem of the Enumerative Universal

Supposing one is still not satisfied with our positive case that we can
intuit necessary truths byway of a virtually complete induction, one should
consider the impossibility of the alternative. Either complete enumeration
is necessary to know universal truth or it is not. Now there are at least two
good reasons to think that complete enumeration is not necessary to know
universal truth, which if successful, would mean that either we do not
know any necessary truths (which I have argued is utterly impossible), or
if we do, one would need some sort of non-empirical intuitive justification
(that is an account at least somewhat similar to Aquinas'), for knowing
them. Any thinker who holds that complete enumeration is necessary to
know universal truths runs into two insuperable problems.
The first problem starts with the obvious examples of necessary uni-
versal truths that we do in fact know, a point we stated above. Again, it
is self-evident that things like the principle of non-contradiction or that
"every triangle is a three sided polygon" are necessarily true. Taken that as
given, we now must ask, how then do we know these things? It certainly is
not and cannot be through a complete enumeration. For starters, obvious-
ly a complete enumeration is impossible. In no way could we collectively
experience say, all being to know that the principle of identity is universal-
ly true. The demand for the enumerative universal is physically unattain-
able and so is an utterly inadequate account of the universal truths that we
do in fact know. Even if such a complete enumeration were possible, it still
would not provide an adequate basis for knowing necessary truths. Neces-
sary truths apply to all instances, past, present and future. Complete enu-
meration looks only at a past collection and can never provide the basis for
the certitude we have, for example, in the principle of non-contradiction.
Such enumerations without any rational insight into the necessary fea-

by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines
what it has found." S.T. I, 79, 8; vol. 5, 274. These principles that are immediate and known
in this way are better known than the conclusions derived from them. "Now it is plain that
the principles of demonstrations are better known than the demonstrated conclusions, as
was established in Book I. Moreover, it cannot be through science that we have those prin-
ciples, because science is the result of reasoning, namely, demonstrative, whose principles
are the very things about which we are speaking. Therefore, because nothing can be truer
than science and understanding (for wisdom is included In them), what follows from our
consideration of the foregoing is thai, properly speaking, the knowledge of principles U
understanding \intellectu$lH In, U Post, Ana., 1.20 ch, lty vol. MOA.

156
 Necessary 'Ituilt* timlOui Ability In Ktww llwm

lures of things can have only a temporary value. All we could »«y IN thai
"so far" such and such is the case but there is no warrant for any universal
claims here. Reference to a mere empirically observed collection in the
past gives us no basis upon which we can make necessary judgments about
possible instances in the future.50 The lesson to be learned here is as old as
Aristotle; the collective universal is not an abstract universal If empiricism
cannot account for necessary truths, then the reasonable thing to do is not
lo call necessary truths into question, rather we should scrap empiricism.
The second problem is as old as Sextus Empiricus. If complete enu-
meration is necessary to know universal truths, then the validity of all
syllogistic reasoning is destroyed. This is because if the enumerative uni-
versal is our only way of knowing universal truth, then every syllogism
commits a patent begging of the question. For example, if the only way
we can know, "Every man is mortal" is by enumerating each and every
individual man, then the conclusion, "Socrates is mortal," must already
have been included in that initial enumeration. Consequently, if the hu-
man mind only had access to the enumerative universal, there could never
be any valid syllogistic reasoning, for one could never know the major to
l)c true without already explicitly knowing the conclusion.51 This problem
is so severe that it completely undermines any empiricist's demand for
complete enumeration since such a position is self-destructive and can
only be maintained if the following syllogism is sound:
All universal truths can only be known by complete enumeration

This major premise in this argument is a universal truth.

The major premise in this argument can only be known by

complete enumeration.

50 As put by Coffey, "As long as we have any doubt about the completeness of our enu-
meration - which is nearly always, - and still rely on it alone for our conclusion, we can
only have provisional and probable, not absolute and certain, knowledge of the truth of
11 u* latter as a really general proposition." Peter Coffey, The Science ofLogic, v. II. (London:
Longman, Greens and Co., 1938), 32.
.ri I By contrast, Aquinas* position of what we are calling the virtually complete induction
(lot's not suffer from this problem. We can know the nature of man without having to know
nidi and every individual. Thus, Socrates would be included only virtually in the proposi-
tion, "livery man IN mortal" and not actually. In this way, the syllogism simply makes actual
what was only potential In the premises. Thus the syllogism, under Aristotle and Aquinas'
uiuliTHlundlngof how Ihr imlvrnml proposition is formed, does not beg the question.

157
HI VutHhii Aijuiittt* mut the Ptlciplc o/SuJIkicnt Reason

IhU nrguniciU Calls and will always fail because anyone who asserts
Ihr major Is placed In Ihe self-refuting position of not being able to meet
their own demands. If all universal truths are known only by complete
enumeration, then the same goes for the major premise in this argument.
Since this cannot possibly be done, anyone who asserts the major premise,
paradoxically, cannot say the major itself is true.
Live by enumeration, die by enumeration. It is simply not the case that
complete enumeration is needed to know a universal truth. If we are going
to hold that we do in fact know necessary truths, as I have argued we must,
Aquinas' point that we can know these truths from reality via a rational
intuitive insight is certainly a cogent account of how we come to know
such things.52

Summary of Necessary Truths and Our Ability to Know

Them
What does all of this have to do with the principle of sufficient reason?
Quite a bit actually. As we said at the beginning of this chapter, I propose
to claim that the principle of sufficient reason is a necessary truth and
in today s philosophical climate that calls for some clarification as to just
what "necessary truth" means. It is indeed germane to our discussion to
explain not only what necessary truths are, but also to give some good
reasons to think that we know such truths as well as providing some justi-
fication as to how we come to know them. As we have been at much pains
to explain, the answers to these questions have already been adequately
given by Aristotle and Aquinas. To this end, I hope to have shown that
Aquinas' testimony is at least quite strong, if not decisive, on this score.
In light of such an explanation, we are now ready to look at the principle
of reason as a necessary truth and inquire as to how we might go about
defending such a claim.

52 For a more recent work on the inadequacy of emplrlclim U> ttccmml lor necessary
truths, see Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reasom A RtitlomlUt Account of A Priori
Justification (New York: Cambridge University Pr«n), IWOM.

158
 "And if [the one] were the same as another, it would be that other
and not be itself331
- Parmenides

"Does not everything which comes into being of necessity come into
being through a cause?"2
- Plato

"Everything which comes to be comes to be by something and from

something and becomes something... .It is impossible for anything
to be produced if nothing pre-exists"2*
- Aristotle

"When we apprehend that it is impossible a thing can arise from

nothing, this proposition, ex nihilo nihil fit, is not considered as
somewhat existing, or as the mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth
having its seat in our mind, and is called a common notion or axiom"4
- Rene Descartes

"[Newton] pretended that I have been guilty of a petitio principii.

But of what principle, I beseech you? Would to God less clear
principles had never been laid down... has not everybody made use
of this principle upon a thousand occasions?"5
- G. W. Leibniz

1 Parmenides in Plato's Parmenides 139c.

2 Plato, Philebus, 6e.
3 Aristotle, Meta. 1032al3-14> 1032b30.
4 Rene Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, XLIX,
5 G. W. Leibniz, Fifth Letter to Clarke.
CHAPTER VI:
The Reductio Ad
Absurdum Argument
for the Principle of
Sufficient Reason
I
n an earlier chapter, we looked at several dialectical arguments for the
weak and mild versions of the principle of sufficient reason. How far
these dialectical arguments get us to certitude is, as we said, seems to
he an open question in Aristotelian studies, but I have argued that there is
a sense in which Aristotle s claim about dialectical arguments taking us to
I he knowledge of first principles is correct.
In this chapter, however, we move to consider the strong principle of
siillicient reason, and here I make a stronger claim. I will argue that the
si rong principle of sufficient reason is self-evidently true, and thus, to deny
I his principle actually entails a contradiction. If the denial of the strong
principle of sufficient reason is contradictory, then there is no possible
world in which that denial Is true. Much then like the principle of non-

161
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

contradiction, principle of identity, and law of bivalence, the strong

principle of sufficient reason in that case is necessarily true, and therefore
must be true in every possible world at every possible moment.6
To show this we need to take each conjunct one at a time. Given any
conjunctive proposition, if and only if both conjuncts are true, then the
whole proposition is true. In the same way, if both conjuncts of a conjunc-
tive proposition are necessarily true, then the whole is necessarily true as
well If one were to say "All squares are four-sided figures and every man
is an animal/' that whole proposition is necessarily true because both of
its conjuncts are. By the same token, if "every being has a reason for its
existence," and "every reason for existence is either in this being or from
another" are both necessarily true, then the conjunctive statement "Every
being has a reason for its existence either in itself or from another" is nec-
essarily true as well.
Toward this end, this chapter will proceed in three steps. First, we will
demonstrate by reductio ad absurdum that the principal part of the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason is necessarily true. Second, we will show why the
source portion of the principle of sufficient reason is exhaustive of all op-
tions, and thus also necessarily true. Finally, we will end by addressing
a possible objection that our method of defending the principle, namely
reductio ad absurdum, "begs the question" and commits the petitio prin-
cipii fallacy.

That the Strong Principle of Sufficient Reason is

Necessarily True
Some necessary propositions are demonstrable, and some are not.7
Propositions that are not demonstrable are indemonstrablefirstprinciples
{prima principia indemonstrabilia), and I claiming the principle of suffi-
cient reason has this status. Now the fact that such a principle cannot be
demonstrated is nothing against it. It would be a complete misunderstand-

6 Note that the principle of sufficient reason being self-evident in this way does not
entail that our dialectical arguments in favor of the principle were misguided. As we said,
dialectical arguments are probabilistic arguments and give extrinsic reasons for joining
the predicate to the subject. Appealing to self-evidence appeals to Intrinsic reasons and
the reductio ad absurdum is intended to indirectly show this IntrhiNlc connection.
7 As we saw earlier, Aristotle argued that the second mode u( per se predication was
necessary, but a demonstrable conclusion. The other I wo mode*, llntl and fourth, were
necessary and IndcmonNlrnhlc. Post, Anal, 73«34-b26,

162
 The Reductio AdAbsurdum Argumentfartht PflMtpb </fH|lf fflff

ing to think that because self-evident proposition* are not d#muMtftM#i

they are instead not evident at all, but wholly arbitrary pronounci itlfMlt
Quite the contrary, indemonstrable self-evident propositions are better
known than demonstrable statements; otherwise no argument could ef-
fectively proceed from them.
But just because a necessary proposition is "indemonstrable" doesn't
mean it cannot be argued for all. The standard scholastic weapon of
choice for showing first principles to be necessarily true is the reductio ad
absurdum? This procedure shows that to deny such a principle results in
a contradiction. This is also referred to as an indirect proof, A good way to
understand such a proof is to contrast it with a direct proof. A direct proof
shows the connection of S and P by way of a middle term. The reductio
ad absurdum argument for first principles does not do this, but instead
assumes the truth of an opponent's position, and shows how that position
leads to contradiction. If the opponent's view leads to contradiction, the
opposite of the opponents view (the original principle in question) must
I hen be true - indirect proof.
Yet no sooner do we provide an argument for our indemonstrable prin-
ciple than some will object by wondering what the purpose of such argu-
mentation is. After all, this is supposed to be an indemonstrable principle,
and if so, how can it then be demonstrated in any way? The answer to this
question lies in what we mean be "indemonstrable." When we say "inde-
monstrable" we do not mean that there is no argument of any kind that

8 Reductio ad absurdum arguments on behalf of the principle of sufficient reason are

ioinmon amongst its defenders. Some examples: "Omne ens habet rationem essendi, sive
In se sive in alio... .Nam ratio sufficiens est id, quo aliquid est id, quod est (sive secundum
I'sscntiam sive secundum existentiam) quo est sufficienter determinatum, ut sit id, quod
est (sive secundum essentiam: ut sit tale quid, sive secundum existentiam: ut sit existens..
, .Si aliquid esset sine ratione sufficiente, simul esset id, quod est, et simul non esset, quia
non haberet in se id, quo esset id, quod est!y Iosepho Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristo-
(clIco-Thomisticae, vol. II (Friburgi: Herder and Co., 1937), 152. "..That without which an
object is not. If therefore, anything exists which has no sufficient reason for its existence,
I luil is to say, which has neither in itself nor in something else that in virtue of which
It Is, this object exists and does not exist at the same time. It does not exist because it
links I hat without which it does not exist." Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958), 101. "Omne ens debet habere rationem propter quam
sit jnHlusquam [rather than) non sit". . . "Si quodlibet ens non haberet rationem essendi,
rationem propter quam sit potiusquam no sit, non distingueretur a nihilo, quiaproprium
nihil v$t non habere rationem mendU cum opponatur enti" Reginald Garrigou Lagrange,
Of/if w/fif/oflcf. op, dt.i 122,

163
SI llinmiis Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

can be given in favor of it, rather we mean that it cannot be demonstrated

in the strict sense of showing that the predicate belongs to the subject by way
of some intrinsic middle term. Demonstrations, in the Aristotelian sense,
are not merely "arguments/' rather they are a particular sort of argument;
namely, a syllogism that produces episteme or "scientific knowledge." Not
every syllogism is a demonstration. Demonstrative syllogisms are a syllo-
gism that also satisfies certain material requirements.9 It is in this sense
that I say the principle of sufficient reason is indemonstrable. The subject
term "being" and whichever predicate you choose like, "having esse? hav-
ing a reason for existing," "having that in virtue of which it differs from
nothing," etc., attaches immediately to the subject. There is no room here
for a middle term to be inserted between the two. There is a real identity
between the subject and predicate even though they differ logically.10 It
may even be that we help explain the principle by expanding on the mean-
ing of its terms, and it may even be that this explanation itself could take
the form of a syllogism, but still this "explanatory syllogism" would not
be a strict demonstration as we have defined it here. For this reason, no
argument can directly demonstrate this immediate intrinsic connection.
Accordingly, reductio arguments for self-evident indemonstrable princi-

9 A propter quid demonstration is a syllogism consisting of premises that are true, pri-
mary, immediate (per se), prior to the conclusion, better known than the conclusion, and
the cause of the conclusion. In I Post. Ana., 1.4.
10 To claim that this subject and predicate are immediately connected does not commit
one to also being certain on the mode of that connection. We saw earlier that there are
two modes of immediate per se predication. In this case, the intellect cannot tell which
mode the principle of sufficient reason is. The reason for this is the nature of the subject
"being." As Scotus well recognized, the primary attributes and disjunctions of being are
indemonstrable for three reasons. First, the concept of being is irreducibly simple and
transcends the Categories, meaning that being cannot be properly defined in terms of
genus and specific difference, which means there cannot be a definition to serve as a mid-
dle term. Indeed, being is always inherently indefinable since to define is to set limits, and
being as such is unlimited. The second reason the properties of being are indemonstrable
is because even if some attribute were not immediate, it is difficult to see what attribute
could be a middle term to link it with being since it is not easy to discern order among the
attributes of being, and finally, even if we knew of such an order among them, any prop-
osition that used them would hardly seem more evident than their conclusion. See the
selection in Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Hacked, 1987) 8. For these
reasons, we cannot say if a predicate like "having a reason for exigence" IN ihc "essence" of
being or just an immediate property. But it does not matter, forlhln In merely an academic
question, for our poinl Is to show that the principle IN ntceiurlly true mid Nhnwlng the
contradiction entailed by denying the principle U lufflclf 111 for ihlft ttmk,

164
 The Reductio AdAbsurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason

pies do not make the intrinsic connection between subject and predicate
directly known. Rather, in a case where the impossibility of denying I hem
is better known, one can argue for it indirectly via reductio ad absurdum
by showing, as we said, that such denials entail a contradiction.

The Reductio ad Absurdum Argument for the

Principal Part
The question that concerns us is whether the strong principle of sufficient
reason belongs in this category. I have set up the reasons for thinking that
il should be in Chapter III. There I argued that the principal part of the
principle of sufficient reason could be thought of in terms of distinction.
'I his part of the principle is simply saying that all beings have that which
distinguishes them from nothing. Indeed, something must distinguish
I hem from nothing, or else they would not be distinguished from nothing.
Whatever "it" is that distinguishes something from nothing, that is the
reason for the thing s existence. This statement applies universally to all
beings. Thus, every being has a reason for its existence, and no being is
without one. Not one being escapes the need for a reason because no being
escapes the necessity of being distinct from nothing.
For if anything is immediately obvious, it is the statement, wherever there
is no real difference there is real identity. A clearer proposition could scarcely
be formulated. By the same token, per impossibile, any "being" that does not
d i (fer in any way from nothing, is not really a "being" at all,/or then it would
be identical to nothing}1 When this principle of sufficient reason is stated
in terms of distinction like this, it casts a scope as broad as identity and
contradiction.12 In this sense the principle of sufficient reason is analytical,
since there is a real identity between the subject and predicate even though
I hey differ logically and because of this identity to whatever degree one

11 Hume's authority aside, it is impossible to even conceive of any alternative to this. It

IN Impossible to conceive of two entities exactly alike in every way yet distinct. But we do
iml say that since we cannot conceive it, it is impossible. Rather, we say that because it is
I in possible, we cannot conceive it. Just as it is impossible to conceive of a five-sided square
beouise such a thing really cannot be, so too it is impossible to conceive of two things as
illsllncl without anything whatsoever that is different about them.
12 So the principle nl'miNkienl reason cannol be limited to either just a "law of thought"
mid nol reality, nor enn II he limited lo JUNI the physical universe (merely a physical law
of nature). An ilttlcd hir*, ihv principle ofnuflklcnl reason Is inextricably connected to
Identity unci til vanity and thui, to I'liiuriulk'ilon.

165
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

denies or doubts the principle of sufficient reason, one must also, to that
same degree, deny or doubt the principle of non-contradiction.
With that being said, let us now undertake the reductio proper. To defend
the principle of sufficient reason in this way, we assume the denial of the
principle of sufficient reason is correct. Let us assume that there could be
a being that does not have a sufficient reason for existing, in fact, we will
call this possible being a "PSR defiant being/* Let us assume a PSR defiant
being is possible. But just would this PSR defiant being have to be? Any PSR
defiant being is, by definition, a being that exists without a sufficient reason
for its existence; that is to say, it would be a being that exists and yet lacks any
distinction from nothing But once we understand what a PSR defiant is, we
can see that such a being cannot possibly exist. For it is immediately obvious
that it is impossible that anything actually exists but at the same time has
absolutely nothing, no reason by which it could be said to be distinguished
from nothing. To say something exists, but yet simultaneously has nothing
in virtue of which it is distinct from absolute nothing or even mere
possibility isflagrantnonsense. Such a thing is utterly inconceivable because
it is metaphysically impossible. To say, "A PSR defiant being exists" refers
to impossible matter and is every bit as necessarily false and intellectually
repugnant as saying, "A triangle hasfivesides." With this understanding in
mind, we can formalize our reductio this way:
Whatever is not distinct from nothing, is nothing.

A PSR defiant being is not distinct from nothing.

Therefore, a PSR defiant being is nothing.

The major premise is clearly undeniable. Not much needs to be said
here except by way of a brief reiteration: to utterly lack all distinction from
nothing is to be the same as nothing. If there is no difference between
anything X and nothing, X and nothing are identical. The minor premise
is also self-evident once the terms are understood. A PSR defiant being is,
by definition, that which utterly lacks any distinction from nothing neither
in itself nor from another. To say something exists but yet completely lacks
any distinction from nothing entails a manifest contradiction - a being
both is and is-not.13 Thus proceeds our indirect proof - since this denial of

13 "What is neither positively Its own reason for exlitonci nor derive* tIIIH reason from
something else, IN not only unintelligible hut aliottbiurd«tul ImpuMlhlc aiul cunnot be

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 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason

the principle of sufficient reason is necessarily false, the opposite of that

denial, the principle of sufficient reason itself, is necessarily true.
There are only three ways to attack an argument. Point out a false
premise, an error in the validity of the reasoning, or show an equivocation
in the terms. But the premises in the above reductio are certainly true.
Moreover, the syllogism itself is cast in a valid form. Finally, the terms of
this argument are clearly defined and consistent. Therefore, with three of
these elements are in place the conclusion is inescapable. Since nothing
can be a PSR defiant being; every being must have a reason for its existence.

That the Source Portion is Necessarily True

So if everything must have a reason, where is this reason to be located?
This question is covered by what I have called the "source portion" of the
principle of sufficient reason, stated as "... either in itself or from another."
All that is needed for this disjunction to be necessarily true is for it to be
exhaustive of all options.
Now it should be evident that the only things in reality are either this
(king (that I now designate) or something else. This disjunction covers
literally anything and everything that could possibly exist. There is
nothing that does not fall under either "this thing or something else," the
entire realm of reality is covered in that statement Outside of this thing or
something else, there is nothing at all. Since we have already established
the necessity of having a reason, if a being does not distinguish itself from
nothing, then something else must. It is not a question of "maybe it is
something else," or "probably it is something else." No, if it is not this
thing, it must be something else. No third possibility can be imagined.
U
T his thing or something else" is an exhaustive disjunction.
This too then is a necessary proposition of which we can all be
certain, and it is something that anyone, regardless of philosophical
predilections, should be able to understand. The source portion of the
slrong principle of sufficient reason is unquestionably exhaustive and
therefore is necessarily true.
What the above arguments show is that we have a necessary principle
on our hands. Through the simple device of reductio ad absurdum we can
he certain that "every being must have a reason for its existence," and by

illHllngulshed from nothlngncN*." (iurrlgou Lagrange, God> v, I, op. ell., 188.

167
St, IhotiHis Aquinas and the I'rkiplc of Sufficient Reason

seeing the exhaustive nature of "either in itself or from another" we can

likewise know that these are the only options for such a reason. By putting
those necessary propositions back together we reach the conclusion that
the strong principle of sufficient reason, "every being must have a reason
for its existence, either in itself or from another/' must be a necessarily
true metaphysical principle.

Solid Argument or Petitio Principii Fallacy?

Now some might think that reductio arguments like the above com-
mit the fallacy of "begging the question/' The reductio, an objector might
maintain, assumes what it is trying to prove in order to prove it. It is only
by assuming that things need a sufficient reason that the above argument
allegedly succeeds in showing that things need a sufficient reason.
In order to properly respond to this charge, we first need to ask a more
fundamental question; namely, is there in fact such a fallacy of "begging
the question," and if so, what precisely is the nature of it? The first ques-
tion may strike some philosophers as preposterous. Of course, there is a
fallacy of begging the question, they may think, and at least nearly every
philosopher since ancient Greece has thought so. This gut reaction is cer-
tainly correct in at least one sense. Most philosophers throughout history
have thought there was a begging the question or petitio principii fallacy
of some sort; however, not all have been clear on exactly what kind of
argument constitutes such a fallacy. To exacerbate the issue, at least in
more recent times, some philosophers have argued there is no real falla-
cy of begging the question. That is, what one really does when they "beg
the question" is merely violate one of the rules of the old Greek game of
elenchus.14 This modern debate has raised important questions about the
existence and possible nature of this fallacy, and this is something worth
delving into here.
Why would any serious thinker have a problem with recognizing that if
an arguer assumes what he is trying to prove during the course of an argu-

14 In the game of elenchus, one called the "answerer" admits a thesis and the "question-
er," or opponent, tries to refute and trap him in contradiction from his own mouth. The
rules disallowed the questioner to "ask" for the conclusion from the beginning, such as
if it were disguised by synonyms. What this "fallacy" is here Is a debuting trick - getting
someone to admit something he does not want to admil by pulling 11 In another form
and then telling him you have proved ll. See Richard Robimon, "Hewing ihc Question,"
Analysis 1\ (4) (1971): 113-17.
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument far tht Print tpb nf Snftii IfM kMMti

ment, that argument fails to establish its conclusion? 'Ihe Intuition Wfllll
entirely justified. A "question" is a disputed proposition, and one of I he dl«j
putants has the burden of proving it to the other. A petitio principii argu-
ment tells us nothing new; it provides no independent reason for accepting
an already denied conclusion. After all, the whole point of an argument is to
make a non-evident conclusion become evident by means of more evident
premises. Assuming the conclusion is true by covertly using it as a premise
to "prove itself" fails to fulfill this burden. Assuming a conclusion to be true
when an opponent has already denied it argues "in a circle," and so cannot
remove the doubt about that conclusion. The disputant who has attempted
to prove the proposition has not really done so, but merely took that con-
clusion for granted and used it again (often in covert form) as a premise.
Accordingly, when this happens, a fallacy of sorts seems to have occurred,
as the disputant has failed to meet the burden of proof.
This all sounds perfectly acceptable when speaking at the general lev-
el, but if one presses the issue to define more precisely when such a fal-
lacious move occurs, we can quickly see this as another example of "the
devil is in the details."

The Problem of Begging the Question

What details, one may ask? Just what does it mean to "assume" a con-
clusion is true in the course of trying to prove it? Copi and Cohen think
t he problem is satisfactorily described this way: "To beg the question is
to assume the truth of what one seeks to prove, in the effort to prove it."15
I hey say in order to avoid this fallacy, one of the premises cannot be "the
conclusion itself, disguised in other language." The petitio principii is
technically valid, they say, but worthless as a means of proof.
Let us call this take the "propositional equivalence" conception of the
fallacy.16 In the propositional equivalence conception of the fallacy, one
commits a begging the question fallacy if and only if one assumes a propo-
sition as a premise that is explicitly or tacitly equivalent to the conclusion.
In this conception of the fallacy, any time one uses a premise that is the
same as the conclusion, whether openly or unstated, a fallacy in reasoning

15 Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 10th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice
Hull, 1998), 186.
16 Following Douglau Walton's terminology in Begging the Question: Circular Reason-
ing as a Tactic of Arguttumttitkm (Wcutporl, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991),

169
St. 'lluwHis Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

occurs. It is safe to say that this propositional equivalence conception of

the begging the question fallacy is popular amongst philosophers.
But there are some major problems with this idea. The first problem
with the propositional equivalence conception is that it seems to render
all immediate inference as fallacious. If begging the question means
using a premise that by itself entails or is equivalent to the conclusion,
then that would suggest that all immediate inference is "begging the
question." In that case, the inference from "No snakes are squirrels"
to "Therefore, no squirrels are snakes" would be a fallacious move. But
clearly, immediate inference is not fallacious; in fact, it can even provide
new information to someone, and so there must be something wrong
with this conception of the fallacy.
One might, in an attempt to hold on to both this conception of begging
the question and the validity of immediate inference, object to this
example by saying the premise is only somewhat "like" the conclusion,
but not "equivalent enough." True, "No snakes are squirrels" is not
precisely the same proposition as "No squirrels are snakes," but there is a
considerable degree of similarity there; otherwise the inference could not
be made immediately at all (it would have to be done through a mediate or
"middle"). In that case, we have to ask just how equivalent does a premise
have to be relative to a conclusion in order for a fallacy to occur? How can
this ambiguity be eliminated? It is hard to say.17

17 To pursue the difficulties of what constitutes propositional identity further, see Da-
vid H Sanford, "Begging the Question" Analysis 32 n. 6 (1972): 197-99. After pointing out
the difficulties with coining up with a workable notion of propositional identity, Hoff-
man goes on to say that even if an adequate understanding of propositional identity were
found, still there are more problems. Take for example, "God has all the virtues, therefore
he is benevolent." This statement does not make use of identical propositions (they are at
least not orthographically identical), yet the statement would be commonly regarded as
question-begging. Or consider the following:
John says something
Indeed, John says something false
Therefore, John says something false
Sanford says this argument would be begging the question according to the propositional
identity thesis, but there are other examples that seem to skirt around that criterion:
John says something
Either he says something false or he says nothing at all
Therefore, he says something false
Since the conclusion Is not identical to a premise, Sanford nrgUM again lluil something li
amiss with the proportional Identity position regarding hinging llu> i|urmlon. I bid, 19H.

170
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for tlw Print Iph nf Sitflkbnt NMIMH

Let us move forward. Both Sextus Empiricus and J. S. Mill though!

all syllogistic inference "begged the question," because they thought the
general principle could only be established by knowing all the particulars.
Yet this objection only holds if some version of nominalism holds, which,
in my mind, is difficult if not impossible to establish. Still, under the
propositional equivalence conception of begging the question, why would
not the conjunct of the major and minor premise qualify as a fallacious
attempt at proving the conclusion? For example, suppose one denies that
Socrates is mortal. He would surely also deny the conjunctive proposition,
"All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man." Does this beg the question?
Consider this dialogue:
John: I deny that Socrates is mortal

Bill: But you're wrong, and I can show you so. Here's my argument:
All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore Socrates is
mortal.

John: You just begged the question! Since I deny that Socrates is
mortal, it begs the question to assume that set of premises.
We need only to ask two questions here to make our point. First,
does the conjunct of the major and minor premise make a proposition?
Secondly, if so, is that conjunctive proposition "equivalent" to the con-
clusion? The answer to both questions seems to be a definite "Yes." If
I his is correct, then either all syllogistical forms of reasoning formerly
regarded as valid commit the fallacy of "begging the question," or there
is something seriously wrong with the propositional equivalence con-
ception of this fallacy.18
In case one is still not yet convinced that the propositional equivalence
conception of the fallacy is fatally flawed, there is one final nail for its

1H Just because a premise implies a conclusion does not mean it is an inevitable ques-
I Ion begging. As Russell put it: "In all correct deductions, if the conclusion is false, so is at
Ini.sl one of the premises. The falsehood of the premises presupposes the falsehood of the
II inclusion, but it by no means follows that the truth of the premises presupposes the truth
affile conclusion. The root of the error seems to be that, where a deduction is very easily
drawn, il comes to be viewed as actually part of the premises; and thus the very elementa-
ry iirgumcnls acquire the appearance, quite falsely, of petitiones principal Bertrsmd Rus-
ncll, '"Ihc Axiom of Infinity," In Essays in Analysis, ed. Douglas Lackey (London: Allen
mul Unwln, 1973), 256-9, AN cited In Wallon, 259,

171
St. 'Iltonuis Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

coffin. The clearest and most decisive method of refuting the propositional
equivalency interpretation of the begging the question fallacy is to provide
clearly sound arguments that consist of the very propositional repetition
that this theory regards as fallacious.19 If this can be done, the propositional
equivalence conception will be soundly refuted. Surprisingly enough,
such counterexamples are not hard to find.20 All that is needed are clearly
sound arguments that follow a "P therefore P" form. The good thing about
using the "P therefore P" format is simply that one cannot get much more
"equivalency" between a premise and conclusion than the same identical
phrase that was stated as a premise, repeated as a conclusion. Here we
show that since propositional identity between premise and conclusion is
not always fallacious, a fortiori, neither is any lesser kind of equivalency
always fallacious.
What arguments show this, one may wonder? Suppose we simply
consider examples of self-validating arguments:
1. Some arguments are in black ink, therefore some arguments are in
black ink.

2. Some premises contain exactly six words, therefore some premises

contain exactly six words.

3. Elvis was a rock star, some arguments have irrelevant premises,

therefore some arguments have irrelevant premises.

4. Someone is thinking about an argument, therefore someone is think-

ing about an argument.

5. Some arguments contain misssspellings, therefore some arguments

contain misssspellings.

6. Propositional repetition is insufficient for begging the question, there-

fore propositional repetition is insufficient for begging the question.
Examples like these show that far from all "P therefore P" arguments
being "fallacious," on the contrary, sometimes they can be the soundest

19 By "argument" here I mean in the loose sense, namely, where w conclusion is estab-
lished from a supporting premise or premises.
20 Roy Sorensen lists several In "P Iherefore P Without Circularity," 7/icr Journal of
Philosophy vol. 88, (1991), 245-66. We ll»l «omc mmplfl from him h m .

172
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument Jar the hltulfilp \)j SuJtU itnt M'HKMf

of arguments! 21 Maybe not all arguments like this arc valid, bill ihry nr*
certainly not all fallacious either.
For the above reasons, it should be very clear at this point thai I lie
propositional equivalence conception of the begging the question fallacy
is at best suspect and should probably be entirely rejected. Why focus
on "equivalence" when not even a strong orthographic identity between
premise and conclusion (the greatest form of "equivalence") is a sufficient
condition for the occurrence of this fallacy? Could it be that some form
of equivalence, while not a sufficient condition for begging the question,
still be a necessary condition for the fallacy? This is quite possible, and
if so, the error pointed out here is conflating a necessary condition for a
sufficient one.
Accordingly, we should reject the equivalence understanding of the
fallacy; however this does not mean we are finished quite yet. Walton
lists another conception of the fallacy, what we can call the "propositional
dependency" conception of begging the question. 22 In the propositional
dependency conception, begging the question occurs when a premise
Is actually proved from the conclusion. In other words, one would only
believe a premise if they already believed the conclusion. In this case, when
someone provides an argument where the premise can only be known if
I he conclusion were known, one commits a fallacy.
What should we think of this "take" on the fallacy? At first glance,
II looks certainly more promising that the propositional dependency
conception, yet some problematic counterexamples can be shown too.
'Ihere are arguments which seem clearly valid, yet one could arguably

21 Now some may object that these are not truly "arguments" in the classical under-
sluncling since there is no movement in the mind. The objection may run that since, in
I hesc examples, one does not move from one thing to knowing something else, that there-
lore these "arguments" could hardly be said to constitute "reasoning." However, this ob-
|(Tl Ion seems to be false. There is some mental movement here with these self-validating
iii^uinents. The conclusion is established by the argument with necessity. We move from
not knowing the conclusion to knowing the conclusion with absolute certitude. It is not
I he lack of mental movement in, for example, saying "The dog is black therefore the dog
IN black." Rather the conclusion in these examples is established with necessity by the
iirjtimicnl itself, as when we say, "Some arguments appear in footnotes, therefore some
iirnimicnls appear in footnotes." Admittedly, the movement here is not like the mental
inovcnicnl wc see in standard argumentation, but there is enough discursive movement
here to consider these "arguments" at least in an analogous sense.
11 Walton, op. cit„ page 2.

173
Si. Ihomns Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

make the claim that a premise could be known only if a conclusion were
known. For example:23
If there are syllogisms, then information can be combined,

There are syllogisms,

Therefore information can be combined.

Clearly this argument is self-supporting (it itself is a syllogism), and so
seems perfectly sound, but can one form an argument for the conclusion
"information can be combined" without already presupposing the truth
of it? If "information can be combined" was questionable, how could the
syllogism be formed in the first place? One might "bite the bullet" on this
one, and counter that this argument does beg the question. Yet that might
be a tougher claim to make stick than one might think. As the argument
is presented, at what point does the begging the question occur? When
the major is stated? Does it beg the question to just state, "If there are
syllogisms then information can be combined?" Surely this is not even yet
an argument, so there seems to be no way it can commit a fallacy. So how
about when the minor premise is stated, "There are syllogisms?" Have we
"begged the question" at this point? It is hard to see how, for the instant the
minor premise is stated, the conclusion follows necessarily and inescapably.
One might claim that the stating of the second premise is the instant when
information is combined and so begging the question occurs, but it also
seems true that the conclusion follows simultaneously. Which is prior, the
proving or the fallacy? It is not entirely clear. The argument seems sound,
it doesn't appear fallacious. Showing that it is fallacious would be a very
difficult thing to do. So we do, perhaps, have a good counterexample to the
propositional dependency notion of begging the question.
But let us now move to a clearer counterexample. Consider a sophist
arguing with Socrates about a self-evident proposition:
Socrates: "Every triangle has three sides."

Sophist: "I do not believe it - prove that it is so, Socrates."

Socrates: "Because if it did not have three sides, it would not be a

triangle."

23 Sorenson, ibid.

174
 The Reductio AdAbsurdum Argument for the Principle oJ SuJ/hfant liptixon

Socrates' argument is that having three sides is essential to being a tri-

angle; therefore, every triangle has three sides. The sophist asks Socrates to
show this, and Socrates responds the only way he could - if something did
not have three sides (if it had less or more), it could not possibly be a trian-
gle. Taking for granted that Socrates has not begged the question (I think
most will agree that he has not), what occurred here? Could Socrates, or
anyone else for that matter, know the conclusion, "Every triangle has three
sides," without also knowing "If a thing does not have three sides, it would
not be a triangle?" Such a case seems impossible. Since the premise and
conclusion are virtually identical one could not believe the premise to
he true without already believing the conclusion to be true. Surely both
of these propositions - conclusion and premise - are known, and indeed,
must be known simultaneously. But according to the propositional depen-
dency conception of the fallacy of petitio principle this action of Socrates
would be fallacious.
Moreover, if this conception of the fallacy were true, again it would
render all immediate inference as fallacious. How could one know that
"No snakes were squirrels" if they could not also know "No squirrels were
snakes?" Clearly, immediate inferences are not fallacious, and there must
he something awry with this definition of the petitio principii fallacy.
Finally, against the propositional dependency conception of the fallacy,
we can offer clear "P therefore P" counterexamples, as from before. "Some
arguments are typed, therefore some arguments are typed." "An argument
Is offered in the year 2012, therefore an argument is offered in the year
.'.() 12," etc. These arguments are self-validating, yet it is difficult to see how
one can know a premise without also knowing the conclusion, since it is
I he same proposition.
What are we left with? We have seen that the most common concep-
lions of the begging the question fallacy, while perhaps necessary condi-
lions, are at least not sufficient for the occurrence of a fallacy. Does this
mean we should think there is no such fallacy after all? No, for two rea-
Hi >ns. The original intuition that there is such a fallacy is very strong. If one
denies a conclusion, one cannot prove that conclusion by stating it over
a«ain. An independent reason needs to be offered, and there does seem to
he some validity to this fundamental intuition. We do not need to scrap
I he notion that this action is fallacious; instead, what we need is a better
definition of the petitio principii fallacy.

175
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Back to Aristotle
I think we can find that better understanding if we return to Aristotle.
Not in the Topics (as some might be prone to do), for there Aristotle says
he is only giving an account of the fallacy on the level of popular opinion.24
To get the true account of this fallacy, we need to look at the Prior Analyt-
ics. The relevant passage is worth quoting at length:
To beg and assume the point at issue is a species of failure to
demonstrate the problem proposed; but this happens in many
ways. A man may not deduce at all, or he may argue from
premises which are more unknown or equally unknown, or he
may establish what is prior by means of what is posterior; for
demonstration proceeds from what is more convincing and prior.
Now begging the point at issue is none of these; but since some
things are naturally known through themselves, and other things by
means of something else (the first principles through themselves,
what is subordinate to them through something else), whenever a
man tries to prove by means of itself what is not known by means of
itself then he begs the point at issue. This may be done by claiming
what is at issue at once; it is also possible to make a transition to
other things which would naturally be proved through the point
at issue, and demonstrate it through them, e.g. if A should be
proved through B, and B through C, though it was natural that C
should be proved through A; for it turns out that those who reason
thus are proving A by means of itself.25
After saying what the petitio principii fallacy is not, Aristotle gives
the necessary and sufficient condition for the fallacy. First, he recalls the
fact that some propositions are known through themselves {per se), while
others are known through something else {per aliud). This is an essential
distinction to make, for if all propositions were known through others, a
vicious infinite regress would result. Next, he indicates that when a man
tries to prove something that is not known per se as if it were known per
sey he begs the point at issue. In other words, if one, either directly or indi-

24 "Of the ways in which a questioner may postulate the point al INNUC and postulate
contraries the true account has been given in the Analytic*; hut an waounl on the level of
opinion must be given now." Topics, Bk. 8,162b31-163*28,
25 Prior Analytics Bk. 2 64b29-65u9, emphttiU mlntr

176
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum ArguntPHtftir lh* PrlMlpb ttf *H(lltl$Ht NMMff

rectly, treats a proposition that is really known per aliud (through Mlllthff)
as if it were known per se (through itself), he commit* the fallacy of hfg*
ging the question.
Let us call this the per aliud as per se conception of begging the ques-
tion. To put this conception in a nutshell, to beg the question is to assume
that a P which is knowable only through independent reasons be known
through itself. What does this definition get us? First, we see inherent in
I his understanding the need for an independent reason for accepting the
conclusion. When disputed, per aliud propositions need an independent
reason for their acceptance, and the reason is simply that it is the kind of
proposition that by its very nature it is known through another, Aristot-
le's definition captures our positive intuitions about begging the question,
viz., that oftentimes a reason other than the conclusion is needed. Indeed,
I he demand for an independent reason for accepting the proposition un-
der question is "built in" to this understanding of the fallacy.
Not only does this "take" on the fallacy capture what we would want
lo preserve about the petitio principii fallacy, but it also avoids all of the
problems we saw with the alternative explanations of this fallacy, Take im-
mediate inference, for example. Immediate inference is a means by which
only one other proposition is needed to make an inference. So if we say,
"No snakes are squirrels" is per aliud, the "aliud" in this case can simply be
I he proposition, "No squirrels are snakes." In this way, immediate infer-
ence does not seem to beg the question under the Aristotelian definition of
I he fallacy since it does not treat the per aliud as if it were per se.
What about the "begging the question" charge regarding the nature of
I he syllogism? One might say that the conjunct of major and minor is not
really "other than" the conclusion, and no set of premises in a valid argu-
ment can ever serve as a "per a/iW7independent reason for knowing the
conclusion. Is this a valid counterexample to Aristotle s understanding of
IwIiHo principii fallacy?
It seems to me that Aristotle could maintain his definition of the fallacy
and answer this charge by his robust understanding of the syllogism. Ar-
Islotle could respond that no individual premise is equivalent to the con-
i-kision. Moreover, the premises in any good argument should be better
known than the conclusion, and thus knowable on independent grounds.
So the premises taken individually are not the same as the conclusion,
and can validly function as true per aliud reasons for the conclusion. As

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

far as taking the two premises and conjoining them, that is precisely what
a syllogism accomplishes. Syllogisms, by design, take a potentially known
conclusion contained in the premises and make it actually known. The act
of conjoining those premises creates a syllogism and, of course, a conjoined
proposition that contains those two premises is somehow "equivalent" to
and/or entails the conclusion. But it is a complete misunderstanding to
think that the act of actualizing what was previously only potentially known
is fallacious. At no point in this process is the per aliud treated as per se.26
What about those curious "P therefore P" without circularity exam-
ples? With those we could say that just as some propositions are known
through themselves, so too some arguments can be known through them-
selves in that they are self-validating. "Some arguments really only consist
of 17 words, therefore some arguments really only consist of 17 words" is
an argument form that is knowableper se and not per aliud, thus the beg-
ging the question charge need not apply here either.27
What about Socrates' argument above about the nature of triangles? For-
mally this argument was not really P therefore P, but rather —P therefore
P, but still, under the per aliud asperse conception of begging the question
no fallacy occurs here either since the proposition "All triangles have three
sides" really is per se in the first place, so it cannot fall under Aristotle's defi-
nition of the begging the question fallacy either. Aristotle's understanding
of the fallacy is that it can only occur when one uses the per aliud statements
as per se. If one is using per se to begin with, there is no fallacy.
So it seems to me that Aristotle's definition of begging the question can
maintain all of the positive intuitions regarding a failure of proof that mo-
tivates us in saying there is a petitio principii fallacy while at the same time
avoiding the pitfalls and shortcomings inherent in the competing concep-
tions of this fallacy. Hence, Aristotle's definition of begging the question
is to be preferred.

26 This explanation is available to anyone who accepts Aristotle's take on the syllogism,
including those who might also accept what I have argued was a flawed understanding of
the petitio principii fallacy. Not every logician (i.e., Empiricus and Mill) thinks of syllo-
gisms in Aristotelian terms. So those that hold an equivalence or dependency notion of
begging the question could also make use of this response, In such a case, other reasons
against those notions of begging the question would need to be conaUiercd.
27 This explanation is an expansion of what Aristotle meant by per tc% bul li still solve*
the problem while remaining faithful to the definition af'helny "known through Itself"
that he laid out,

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 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle ofSuflkleut Kenton

The Reductio as Petitio Principii Fallacy?

With the correct understanding of the petitio principii fallacy in hand, we
are equipped to return to the charge that the reductio ad absurdum defense
offered in behalf of the principal part of the principle of sufficient reason
commits the begging the question fallacy. Before beginning, it is important
to recall this part of the principle of sufficient reason as presented here is a
primum principium indemonstrabile. I claim that the proposition, "what-
ever exists must have a sufficient reason for its existence," is a per se notum
necessary truth. I do not claim that this principle is known through another
proposition. As presented here, this part of the principle of sufficient reason
is a true first principle, viz., it is not a conclusion to a demonstration via
other premises that are better known. It is knowable through itself, and is
necessarily true (in a scholastic sense) once the terms are understood.
The reason this is important is because it can shed light on just what
a reductio ad absurdum argument on behalf of per se notum propositions
is designed to do. Since per se notum propositions are knowable through
t hemselves, it would be a counterproductive effort to attempt to prove those
propositions through other premises. Statements like the principle of suf-
ficient reason are set forth as being se/f-evident; they stand on their own,
and do not need a proposition other than themselves. Even if such a demon-
si ration using different propositions were successful, it would do nothing to
show that the principle of sufficient reason is per se notum. At best, it could
only show that the principle could be known from other propositions.
For this reason, the reductio defense does not claim to offer independent
reasons other than the conclusion in order to prove the conclusion. On the
contrary, the goal of the reductio argument is simply to highlight the contra-
diction involved in denying the principle. It aims to show what should have
been seen already; that to deny the proposition lands one in contradiction.
r
rhe formal structure of a good reductio argument is actually quite sim-
ple. P is true, because ~P is obviously false. Again, consider the example
regarding the triangle:
Socrates: Every triangle has three sides. (P)

Sophist: Why? Prove it!

Socrates: If lomclhlng were called a triangle but did not have three
sides. It would both b# uml nol be n triangle - which is absurd! (~~P)

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

In this reducttOy all that can be said on behalf of P is Socrates' appeal to

—P. In other words, the reason offered (which to my mind is a perfectly
good one) for P being true is because —P is true. The same could be said
for this example:
1. Every bachelor is unmarried. (P)

2. Prove it! Why cannot a married man also be a bachelor? (~P)

3. If a man were married, he would not be a bachelor. (~~P)

In both cases, the reason for believing P is ~~P, and this is the heart of
the reductio ad absurdum argument for self-evident principles. The P in
question, which should be clearly true, is stated another way. One might
say it is saying the same thing, but in a different way, P and —P are in-
deed equivalent. Restating P negatively should not be seen as an attempt
to offer an independent reason for P. It is the same evident truth stated
in a slightly different way, and this is precisely what we should expect if
a proposition is self- evident.
If Socrates were arguing for the principle of sufficient reason in the
same way, it would look like this:
Socrates: Every being has a sufficient reason for existing. (P)

Sophist: Prove it! Maybe there exists a being without a sufficient

reason? (~P)

Socrates: If some being was said to exist, but did not have a
sufficient reason for its existence, then it would both exist and not
exist - which is absurd! (~~P)

Sophist: That begs the question, Socrates.

In the —P clause, Socrates is merely stating another self-evident truth
as a reason for why P is true. —-P is explanatory in that it tries to show
more clearly the contradiction that arises in denying P. The reductio argu-
ment proceeds by stipulating the truth of denying P (~P), and goes on to
show its impossibility, indirectly proving the original P (~~P therefore P).
The big question arises: does using ~~P to prove P commit a fallacy??
For starters, we know that "P therefore P" is not always fallacious, so why
should we think "~~P therefore P" always t«? Merely pointing out ah equiv-

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 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason

alence (or identity) between premise and conclusion does not prove that a
fallacy has occurred. Moreover, just as there are clear examples showing
clearly valid "P therefore P" arguments, there are also good examples that
show there are clearly valid —P therefore P arguments as well. For exam-
ple, there is no fallacy in any of these inferences:
Every triangle has three sides; therefore, every triangle has three
sides. (P therefore P)

Every triangle has three sides; therefore, whatever does not have
three sides cannot be a triangle. (P therefore ~~P)

Whatever does not have three sides cannot be a triangle; therefore,

every triangle has 3 sides. (~~P therefore P)

Every, bachelor is unmarried, therefore every bachelor is

unmarried. (P therefore P)

Every bachelor is unmarried, therefore no married man is a

bachelor, (P therefore —P)

No married man is a bachelor, therefore every bachelor is

unmarried. (—P therefore P)
These "P therefore P" and "~~P therefore P" variations are all valid and
not fallacious, and this should not be much of a surprise. We have already
seen that it is not sufficient to point out propositional equivalency or even
blatant repetition in order to make a "begging the question" charge stick.
In truth, the only reasonable conception of the "begging the question" fal-
lacy was Aristotle's, and in that conception, begging the question occurs
when an arguer attempts to prove his position by treating the per aliud as
if it were perse.
We are claiming that this part of the principle of sufficient reason is
(rue per se. In other words, why cannot the reductio argument for this
part of the principle of sufficient reason look like these valid arguments?
Indeed, it should look like them since it is exactly what we would expect
lo see in a reductio argument for a self-evident proposition. My insistence
Is lhat a) the first purl of the principle of sufficient reason is a self-evident
principle known per *r» unci b) the reductio argument for this principle
looks precisely as It should lor Ju*l Much a principle. There is no "begging of
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

the question," because we do not treat the per aliud as the perse. Quite the
opposite; we are treating the per se as the per se.28 To stress this point, let
us look at that reductio argument for this part of the principle of sufficient
reason in its syllogistic form once more:
Whatever is not distinct from nothing, is nothing.

A PSR defiant being is not distinct from nothing.

Therefore, a PSR defiant being is nothing.

Where exactly does this argument "beg the question?" Surely, it is not
the first premise. Would the point of contention be the second? A PSR de-
nier might say that the second premise is equivalent to the principle of suf-
ficient reason itself, and one cannot assume the equivalent of what one is
trying to prove. But we have not "assumed" the truth of that proposition;
on the contrary, we clearly see it. The truth that "A PSR defiant being is not
distinct from nothing" is not an "assumption," it is a rationally intuited
necessity.29 Whatever does not have that which renders it distinct from
nothing is nothing. Whenever there is a complete lack of distinction, iden-
tity occurs, and whatever is not distinct from nothing, is, in fact, nothing.
This is precisely how a PSR defiant being must be defined. Moreover, a
statement like "where there is no difference or distinction there is identi-
ty" is, to my mind, the clearest of statements. One would be hard-pressed
to find a more obvious and patently true proposition, and this part of the
principle of sufficient reason is equally clear.
At this point in the debate, we can turn the tables on the objector by
asking the objector to prove that this argument begs the question. We have
given good reasons to think that this argument does not beg the question.
What good reasons are there for thinking that it does? How will he prove

28 There is, of course, a danger of misconstruing all reductio proof of self-evident prin-
ciples as "begging the question" - and this danger is quite obvious. The man who rejects
the self-evident statement wants an independent reason for accepting the principle. Yet
self-evident principles are by nature known per se and not per aliud. If a man demands
an independent reason for a proposition that is not known through independent reasons,
conflict and charges of "begging the question" are highly probable.
29 Again, we showed earlier that in what the scholastics called intellectus, one does not
"assume" a necessary connection - they clearly see it. The clarity ofint uiting the necessary
connection is far cry from a mere assumption or "leap In the dark," Quite the contrary, It
is an intuited necessity. There Is no lack of justification or evidence In uuch cnse«; rather,
it is the best kind of Justification and evidence.

182
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason

that the argument "begs the question?" Which premise and in what way?
The objector cannot merely point out propositional equivalency or propo-
sitional repetition, as we have shown these to be deficient understandings
ofthe fallacy. He cannot prove that we "assume" it to be true as opposed to
clearly seeing it to be true. What the objector now needs is a non-question
begging argument to show that the reductio argument begs the question.
How will he do this?
Given the correct understanding of the petitio principii fallacy, the
objector needs to show that the principle of sufficient reason is not a per
se notum proposition, but that it must be made known through another
{per aliud). Of course, he needs to show this, not assume it. For it is not
self-evident that the principal part of the principle of sufficient reason is
not self-evident, so the statement, "The principle of sufficient reason is not
self-evident," if it is true, it must be shown through another. The objector
cannot assume this per aliud statement as per se> or he would be commit-
ting the very same "begging the question" fallacy with which he wants to
charge his opponent.

Petitio Principii Backfire

The 19th century logician Augustus De Morgan noted that sometimes
an overly aggressive petitio principii charge can backfire. To unreasonably
and unjustly impute charges of "begging the question" itself is a fallacy,
what he called the opponent fallacy. Just as begging the question can be
seen as being too aggressive in trying to push an argument forward, the
opponent fallacy is too defensive in refusing to acknowledge clear points
I hat would support the opposition. De Morgan sees this as a deceptive
lactic that merits the name of fallacy:
There is an opponent fallacy to the petitio principii which I suspect
is ofthe more frequent occurrence: it is the habit of many to treat
an advanced proposition as a begging ofthe question the moment
they see that, if established, it would establish the question.
. . .Are there not persons who think that to prove any previous
proposition, which necessarily leads to the conclusion adverse to
them, is taking an unfair advantage?30

M) AugiiNlUN Do Morgan, Vormtil Logk (London: Taylor and Wallon, 1847). Reprinted
Im ulinllc (Honton, MAi AiUmnnl Med!A (lorporutlon, 2005), pngc 255,

183
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

When principles like the principal part of the principle of sufficient

reason are claimed to be first and self-evident (thus, not known on the
basis of other premises), the demand for "other justification" is unreason-
able, and actually itself commits a petitio principii fallacy. To ask that a
per se first principle be meta-justified by appeals to other propositions is
an implicit claim that such per se first principles were really made known
on the basis of another hidden premise. The obvious problem posed by
such a response is simply this - there is no way in which the defender of
the principle of sufficient reason can hope to provide "other justification"
for such a principle claimed to be indemonstrable. In fact, to construe it is
justified by another proposition is to abandon any claim that the principal
part of the principle of sufficient reason is an indemonstrable self-evident
first principle. If knowing the principle were dependent on knowing other
propositions, the original claim could never be known as self-evident.

Have We Accomplished Anything?

As defined here, the strong principle of sufficient reason is a necessary,
indemonstrable and self-evident metaphysical principle. Based on a prim-
itive notion of distinction, the principle cannot be denied without contra-
diction. Presuming one cannot see the intrinsic connection between sub-
ject and predicate directly, one can indirectly show it by way of a reductio
ad absurdum. Since the denial of the strong principle of sufficient reason
is necessarily false, the principle itself must be necessarily true. As far as
the "begging the question" charge goes, I respond that this charge rests on
a faulty understanding of the petitio principii fallacy, and, when corrected,
no such fallacy occurs. In fact, it is the objector demanding an indepen-
dent reason for a self-evident principle that stands in danger of commit-
ting that fallacy by asking that the self-evident be treated as other-evident.
At this point, the PSR skeptic may simply say he does not see the
self-evidence. But even if this were true, it would not undercut against
our argument here since the defender of the self-evident principles is
not committed to the claim that everyone can see their necessity. Not
everything is per se notum quoad omnes. One's inability to see it does not
mean the principle of sufficient reason is "unproven" or unnecessary. The
connection in scholastic necessary truths is objective one and therefore
subjective recognition by all is not necessary. But whul might a principle
of sufficient reason defender do with someone who Kllll, after all of this,

184
 The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason

cannot see the principle of sufficient reason as self-evident? Aquinas

says that even a self-evident principle known only to the learned "can
be strengthened by external reasoning, that is, by some argument."31 As
said earlier, dialectical argumentation can lead someone to "come near"
to proper principles.32 Thus, in a similar way, if one honestly (and not
argumentatively) does not intuit the self-evidence of the principle of
sufficient reason as stated, the principle of sufficient reason defender could
resort to the dialectical arguments of the previous chapter in hopes he will
more deeply grasp the importance and necessity of the principle. Perhaps
the self-evidence of the principle of sufficient reason will then be made
more manifest.

31 "Dicit ergo quod illud principium, quod necesse est non solum per seipsum esse, sed
rlium ulterius necesse est, ipsum videri, scilicet communis animi conceptio vel dignitas, non
est neque petitio neque suppositio. Quod sic probat. Petitio et suppositio exteriori ratione
ivnfirmari possunt, idest argumentatione aliqua. Sed communis animi conceptio non est
ad exterius rationem, quia non potest probari per aliquam argumentationem..." In Post.
An. 11,1. 19, n. 3.
32 Although dialectic usually starts and ends only in mere opinion, sometimes dialec-
IU" can lead one to an insight into the starting points of a science. As Aristotle says, dia-
led ic "is also useful for [discerning] the first things of every science. For it is impossible,
111 whatever science is put forth, to say anything about these [first things] from the proper
principles because the first Ihings are the principles of all the others; so it is necessary
lo come near to I hem \twnxkP peri ant on dielthein] through the reputable opinions [dia
iflti rudoxdn] In reference In each |sdcncc|. And this is a property of, and most of all be-
longs to dialectic, l'or Hud (being skillful at scrutinizing things, [dialectic] bears the path
\hotbn\ toward lh« principle of nil Mih«ei|iicnt paths \methoddn\." Aristotle, Topics I, 2,
H)lu3ri-b4,

185
 "Whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the
constituent principles of that essence. . . .or by some exterior agent,
as heat is caused in water byfire.Therefore, if the existence of a thing
differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some
exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for
a things existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles,
for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its
existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from
its essence, must have its existence caused by another"1
- St. Thomas Aquinas

1 St. Thomas Aqulnun. S.T, I, 3, 4; vol, 4, 42.

CHAPTER VII:
Causal Principles and
Conclusions
I
n the previous chapter, I employed the Thomistic notion that there
must be, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, a fundamental act of
being, or what I am calling a "reason" within every being that ac-
counts for the existence of that thing and its differentiation from noth-
ing. I have expressed this proposition as "Whatever exists must have
I hat in virtue of which it exists," "Whatever exists must have an act
of being," or more simply, "Whatever exists must have a reason for its
existence." I have said that this proposition is a necessary per se notum
proposition, and that its denial entails a manifest contradiction. I have
iilso argued that the whole principle of sufficient reason is a conjunctive
statement actually containing two propositions. Ihe proposition just
defended as necessarily true, I call the "principal part," since the truth
of l his statement establishes the fact that beings need a sufficient reason
lor I heir being in the first place. The second part of that principle, what
I have called the "source portion," I have argued must be necessarily
exhaustive. In this way ihcn ihe strong principle of sufficient reason is a
necessarily true principle.

187
SI Ihitmtt* Atfuliiii* <uul lit? Vihljilc of Sufficient Reason

'Ihrtl IN not to say, however, that there cannot be other arguments in

Niippnrt of I he mild principle of sufficient reason, "Every contingent thing
has a cause." While it is certainly the case that if the strong principle of
sufficient reason is true then, by extension, the weak and mild forms of
the principle are also true, still, there can be additional albeit related
arguments that directly conclude that the weak and mild form of the
principle are also necessarily true.
A brief clarification on terminology: the title of this chapter is "Causal
Principles and Conclusions." As mentioned in an earlier discussion, the
weak and mild formulations of the principle of sufficient reason are
identical to various formulations of the principle of causality. This is
because, as we said, any reason for existence that comes from another
is a cause. In other words, what we are calling the "weak" and "mild"
principle of sufficient reason is just a principle of causality by another
name. For this reason we are free to use these labels interchangeably and
will do so in this chapter.
So are there any conclusive arguments in support of either, "Every
contingent being has a cause," or "Whatever begins to exist has a cause?"
The purpose of this chapter is to see what the texts of Aquinas have to say
about this question. To this end we will proceed in two steps. First, we
will survey four key texts in Aquinas that are pertinent to this matter. By
selecting these four texts, I make no claims whatsoever to have completely
exhausted all of the arguments for a principle of causality in Aquinas. The
reason why I have selected these four primary texts is because they all
bear on a common topic, namely, whether or not all being is created by
God. Surely if there is a good place to look for a universal causal principle
in Aquinas, it is in texts like these. In addition, we will also consider
a few further texts that discuss how the Thomistic doctrine of act and
potency relates to a causal principle of "coming to be." The second step
in this chapter will be to distill any sound causal arguments or principles
that can be found in those texts. In the end, I argue that there are four
formulations of a principle of causality that can be found in these texts,
three on behalf of the mild principle of sufficient reason and one in favor
of the weak principle of sufficient reason, and that compelling arguments
show these principles must all be necessarily true.

188
 Cnuaul Piltntpht iitutt'>omhuliin*

A Brief Textual Survey of Causal Arguments in Aquinas

The point of this section is to first examine significant texts in Aquinas
lo see what he has to say in support of either, "every contingent thing has a
cause," or "whatever begins to exist has a cause." The first four texts we will
look at are the Summa Theologiae 1.44.1, the Summa Contra Gentiles 11.15,
l)e Potentia 3.5, and the De Ente et Essentia ch. III. The common thread
behind all of these texts is that Aquinas is arguing that all beings other
than God, that is, all contingent beings, are created by God. Accordingly,
I hese texts aim to support a mild principle of sufficient reason, viz., "every
contingent being has a cause." Following that, we will look at various
texts involving act and potency and how they support a weak principle of
sufficient reason, namely, "whatever begins to exist has a cause." Although
I will strive to be faithful to the actual texts, this is not intended to be
a work of historical scholarship, that is to say, I am not attempting to
contribute to our knowledge of the historical Aquinas. What I do claim
is that the interpretation of these texts given here is, at least, a plausible
interpretation of what Aquinas meant, and more importantly, that the
conclusions derived from this interpretation are true according to reality.

Summa Theologiae 1.44.1

The first text is a commonly cited passage from the Summa Theologiae.
I lore Aquinas is addressing the question "Whether it is necessary that every
being be created by God?" This text is critical for understanding Aquinas'
view on a universal principle of causality, and the importance begins with
I be very first objection Aquinas raises against his own position:
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being
be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thingfrom being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore
it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.2
l;or all who have mistakenly thought David Hume was to first raise this
objection against ihc principle of causality, this text stands as a decisive

I SX 1.44.1. BmphttilMiliM.

189
If fttitfftfl AilUlHto Mitt flip h tit/tic oj Sujlivlvnt Reason

MPfMlrtllnil, A» IhlM lii'Nl objection shows, Aquinas was well aware of the
Ulri I lumrMii argument that a thing can be conceived of without thinking
ul' ttN cause. In fact, Aquinas anticipates this objection of Hume by about
live hundred years. We will return to this important objection below. As
for now, here is Aquinas' general response in the article:
I answer that, it must be said that every being in any way existing
is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation,
must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above when
treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-
subsisting Being; and also it was shown that subsisting being must
be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since
whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart
from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.
Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the
diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are
caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.3
Key texts are italicized here. After arguing that there can be only one
self-subsisting being, Aquinas says all other beings must be "beings by
participation" and that whatever is found in something "by participation"
must be caused. These beings by participation are defined here as "beings
that are not their own being" {omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed
participant esse). To formalize Aquinas' argument succinctly, we can say:
Every being by participation is caused (by God)

Every being apart from God is a being by participation

Every being apart from God is caused (by God)

3 "Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo
esse. Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in
ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem
supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et
iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut si albedo esset
subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia,
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse
est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint
perfectius vel minusperfecte, causari ab una prlmo entf, quotl pvrfectissime est.n Ibid. Iim-
phasis added,

190
 Causal l>rlmlpb» ami Coihhniom

The key premise for our purpose is the major premise and we need
lo clarify what is being said here. Presumably the only ambiguous term
here is a "being by participation" but we have seen that Aquinas thinks
of such beings as a "being that is not its own being." Combining this with
our previous discussion of esse, a "being by participation" is one that does
not have esse essentially. Such a being can be or not be, that is to say, its
non-existence is possible. Such a being then is contingent because it does
not exist necessarily. With this definition in hand, the premise, "Every
being by participation is caused," means the same thing as, "Every being
(hat is not its own being is caused," or even "Every contingent thing has a
cause." The conclusion here in this passage then, if established, would be
establishing a mild principle of sufficient reason.
But it needs to be asked, how does Aquinas know, "Every being by
participation is caused?" While we will discuss this question in more
detail below, for now we point out that two clues here are important in
providing an answer. First, Aquinas follows the above argument with a
reference to Plato, saying "Therefore Plato says that it is necessary to place
unity before every multitude."4 On the face of it, this might seem like
n rather strange insertion. Upon investigation here however, Aquinas is
appealing to a principle that appears several times throughout his works.
We will return to this principle and those supporting texts later. As for
now, another important clue for understanding Aquinas' argument comes
from his answer to that first objection we saw above. The response to that
objection is truly valuable and deserves a full citation here:
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a
thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs
to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by
participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot
be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the
faculty of laughing But, since to be caused does not enter into the
essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a
being uncaused.5

4 "Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem"
Aquinas also refcrH to it Plutonic sounding passage in Aristotle, "and Aristotle said that
wluUcver Is greolcil In helny unittyrcntcstin truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; Just us whatever IN lh« j|r«?tttf«l In heal Is the cause of all heal," Ibid.
5 Ibid, Hmphnili ttdtltd.

1VI
ill VHMM* Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

In response to the proto-Humean objection that the notion of "cause" is

not contained in the essence of the subject "being by participation," Aquinas,
agrees but points out that the notion of cause still follows as a necessary
consequence from that essence. In other words, Aquinas is saying that the
proposition "Every being by participation is caused" is a necessary per se
notum proposition in the second mode. Now this point, it will be remembered
from our earlier discussion, is reinforced by the fact that Aquinas compares
this statement to another well-known second mode proposition. A being by
participation cannot be without a cause just like a man cannot be without the
faculty of laughing. The reference to a second mode of per se necessity here
is unmistakable. Accordingly, the major premise in Aquinas' argument,
according to his thinking, is a necessarily true second mode proposition^
which means that this proposition is not a self-evident proposition, but
a conclusion to a demonstration. This is because, as we saw in an earlier
chapter, all second mode propositions are conclusions to an demonstration.
The philosophical significance of this point is twofold. First, as we have
said, Aquinas anticipates the argument later propounded by David Hume
and responds by agreeing that the idea of "cause" is not contained in the
essence of a being by participation and it is also true that one can conceive
(in the first act of the mind) of such a thing without including the notion
of cause). It does not follow, however, that such a being can be without a
cause, nor could one conceive of such a being as existing (in the second
act of the mind) without contradiction, and therefore the objection fails.6
The other piece of philosophical import is that Aquinas' explicit mention
that this universal causal proposition in true in the second mode ofper se>
and consequently a conclusion to a demonstration, calls for yet another
casual proposition that is a true self-evident principle. In other words, if
there is a causal proposition that is a conclusion to a demonstration (as
Aquinas says here) then there must be another self-evident principle of
causality. The reason why is because, "Every being by participation is
caused," is a universal affirmative conclusion to a demonstration. Now
the rules of formal logic show that there is only one valid syllogistic form
that provides a universal affirmative conclusion. That form is traditionally
called, "BARBARA," viz., a syllogism where the major and minor
premise are also universal affirmative statements and the middle term is
in the first figure. This means, for those who can recall their training in
6 We will develop this point ami make u more cxlcnulvc reHpoiwc lo Hume helow.

192
 Causal Principles and Conclusions

formal logic, that the predicate of the conclusion, in this case, "caused,"
must appear as the predicate of the major premise. If "caused" appears in
(he conclusion, it must also appear in the premises. So if there is a causal
conclusion, there must be, given the very laws of formal logic, a causal
premise that is not a conclusion but a self-evident first principle. For this
reason it would be impossible to have a demonstrated causal conclusion
without there also being a self-evident principle of causality, a principle
I hat would be necessary, as we saw above, in the fourth mode J
We will evaluate this argument for a principle of causality later. Our
immediate task is to pull out the significant features of this passage. The
important things to learn here are; first, the causal argument here ends
up with a conclusion in the second mode of per se necessity. Second, this
means that, pace Hume, that we should not expect "cause" to be contained
i n the definition of the subject, yet this fact does not undermine its necessity.
Third, the notion of a "being that is not its own being" is important for
understanding the principle of causality. And finally fourth, the argument
rests entirely on some principle of unity that Aquinas attributes to Plato.

Summa Contra Gentiles 11.15

The context of this text is to show that God is the cause of all being
(Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi). There are several arguments given
here, but for the sake of brevity we will focus on just one:
Everything which is able to be and not-be has a cause; for
considered in itself it is indifferent to either, so that something else
must exist which determines it to one. 8

7 This insight resolves many of the scholastic disputes about whether or not the caus-
al proposition is a self-evident principle or a conclusion to a demonstration. For further
illscussion, see the exchange between Joseph Owens and John Cahalan. Joseph Ow-
ens, "The Causal Proposition - Principle or Conclusion." The Modern Schoolman, 32
(I l>55): 323-39 and John Cahalan, "On the Proving of Causal Propositions." The Modern
Schoolman 44 (1967): 12-20. Also of help in this area is Henry Veatch's "St. Thomas and
I he Question, "How Are Synthetic Judgments A Priori Possible?", The Modern School-
man 42 (3): 239-263. Veatch and Cahalan are surely correct in saying the laws of logic
show that any causal conclusion demands a causal principle that is self-evident, howev-
er they mistakenly ihlnk such a causal principle is true in the second mode (Cahalan)
or first mode (Veatch), l-'or I he reasons given above, such a causal principle would have
to he true In the fourth mode ui'prrtr necessity given how it is explained by Aquinas in
his Commentary on th* ftnt*rlor AfialyUcs,
K "Omri* tjuod Hi pMilM* mi *t turn I»MI«, habrt causam alkjuam: quia in se consider-

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St. Ihomas Aquinas antl lite Priciple of Sufficient Reason

We see here the same idea mentioned in S.T. 1.44.1. The idea of a being
that is not its own being, something that is "able to be and not be", needs
a cause for its existence, because, in and of itself it is indifferent to either
existing or not existing. There is an appeal here to the inherent metaphysical
indifference to existence that all contingent beings have. The idea is that
this metaphysical indifference needs to be overcome, and one can almost
see an implicit "scale analogy" being employed here, as we saw in chapter
one with Avicenna and Leibniz, where there must be some determination
to account for why the metaphysical scale tips one way over another. Since
these kinds of things are existentially indifferent, there must be some cause
that overcomes this indifference if such a being is to exist.

De Potentia IIL5
To take another example of an argument aimed at showing all
contingent beings are caused, we now turn to the Disputed Questions
on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputate De Potentia Dei) As in the
previous examples, the context here is the same, "Whether there is able
to be anything that is not created by God?"9 Several arguments are given
here; we look at only the first:
First, if in a number of things we find something that is common
to all, we must conclude that this something was the effect of some
one cause: for it is not possible that to each one by reason of itself
this common something belong, since each one by itself is different
from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of
effects. Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things,
which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of
necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but
by the action of some cause. Seemingly this is Plato's argument,
since he required every multitude to be preceded by unity not only
as regards number but also in reality}0
Aquinas is saying that if we find some element that is common to
all things, that commonality cannot be accounted for in virtue of those

atum ad utrumlibetse habet; et sic oportet esse altquod aliud quod ipsum ad unum deter'
minet." S.C.G 11.15. Emphasis added.
9 "Quaeritur utrum possit esse aliquid quod non ilt a D$o outturn" I>r Pot III.5.
10Ibid. Emphasis added,

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 Causal Principles and Conclusions

differing particulars themselves, since qua differing, they cannot account

for the common factor of being. Aquinas then tells us this principle is
from Plato, a comment we also saw back in S.T. 1.44.1. Whether or not
I his is actually true of the historical Plato makes no difference. Our point
is that Aquinas thinks the statement "it is necessary to place unity before
every multitude" is true and he clearly thinks it has some importance
in establishing the principle of causality since this is the second explicit
reference to it we have seen. In this text however, he does not elaborate any
further on the necessity of this principle.

De Ente Et Essentia III

We now turn to another celebrated passage, De Ente et Essentia III. The
beginning context is not exactly that all contingent beings are created by
(lod, but more precisely, whether the separate immaterial substances need
lo be created by God. But the point Aquinas makes about these separate
substances needing a cause would equally apply to material substances
as well, and Aquinas will indicate as much towards the end. Hence the
passage is still quite relevant for our purposes. The germane text in this
section reads:
Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles
of its nature, as the ability to laugh in man, or comes to itfrom some
extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun.
But it cannot be that the existence of a thing is caused by the form
or quiddity of that thing — I say caused as by an efficient cause —
because then something would be its own cause, and would bring
itself into existence, which is impossible. It is therefore necessary
that every such thing, the existence of which is other than its nature,
have its existence from some other thing}1
There are two points to highlight here. First the context explicitly
indicates that Aquinas is talking about beings that are not necessary, that
Is, I heir existence is other than their nature. In such beings, their existence
Is accidental to the essence, as attested by the phrase "whatever belongs to
i\ tiling". So the esse here is of a non-essential character. The second thing
we should take note of regarding this passage how it's meaning can be
Illuminated by u parallel text from the Summa Contra Gentiles:

I )t Unit ///. HmphftiU *dd*d,

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

But whatever belongs to a thing and is yet not of its essence belongs
to it through some cause; for, if things that are not one through
themselves one are joined, they must be joined through some cause}2
So what was seemingly implicit in the De Ente is explicitly stated in the
parallel. Like we have seen in ST. 1.44.1 and in De, Pot III.5, again we see
an unambiguous appeal to a need for some unifying factor necessary for
all for composed beings. If things are not one through themselves they
must be made one by something else. Again we are not given any further
justification for this principle, however we will examine and attempt to
justify this claim below.

Act-Potency Passages Regarding Becoming

We would be remiss if we did not include some mention of various
passages regarding "coming to be" and how it relates to the metaphysical
principles of act and potency. On more than one occasion, Aquinas appeals
to his act/potency doctrine to establish a causal principle about becoming.
For example he writes, "Likewise, if anything that has not always existed
begins to be, it needs some cause for its existence. Nothing brings itself
forth from potency to act or from non-being to being."13 Consequently, it
is evident that Aquinas thinks the doctrine of act and potency can ground
a weak principle of sufficient reason. Accordingly, in another place he
writes, "That which comes to be anew must take its origin from some
innovating cause; since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from
non-being to being."14 Here again we see another explicit defense of the
statement, "whatever begins to exist has a cause" by way of an appeal
to the act/potency doctrine. However, no elaboration or other lines of
justification are offered in these texts. Nevertheless, we will also evaluate
the merits of this reasoning below.

Summary of Textual Analysis

In our brief analysis of several relevant passages in Aquinas that
attempt to establish some formulation of the principle of causality, we can
distill at least three lines of argument for the mild principle of sufficient

12 "ea enim quae per se non sunt unum, si coniungantur, oportet per aliquam causam
uniri. Esse igitur convenit illi quidditatiper aliquam causam."S.C.G, 1.22, emphasis added.
13 "Comp. Theo. 1.7
14 S.C.G. T.ch.13.

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 Causal Principles and Comlutlant

reason and one line of argument for weak principle of NiiHidcnl rcuNon.11
First, and most commonly, in three of the passages we see thiil Aquinas
appeals to some "unity principle" he often attributes to Plato. This we
saw in Summa Theologiae 1.44.1, De Potentia 3.5, and it was presumably
implicit in the De Ente ch. Ill text (as evinced by the parallel text in Summa
Contra Gentiles 1.22). Secondly, in one passage, namely Summa Contra
Gentiles 11.15, Aquinas offers a different line of reasoning. Here he says,
"Everything which is able to be and not-be has a cause; for considered
in itself it is indifferent to either, so that something else must exist which
determines it to one." 16 Here the argument is not based upon the notion
of two things needing a source of unity, but rather upon the metaphysical
indifference of something that is able to "be and not be." This seems to
me to be two different lines of argumentation and I will proceed on that
presumption. Thirdly, there seems to be some significance to the fact that
(he being of these things is accidental. This is not explicitly stated but
I he implicit understanding of the accidental character of being seems to
nlso be in the background. Finally, we saw at least two instances where
Aquinas appeals to his act/potency doctrine to support a weak principle
of sufficient reason.
With this brief examination of texts behind us, we now move to con-
sider whether or not these arguments succeed in showing either that every
contingent thing has a cause or whatever begins to exist has a cause.

In Defense of Four Causal Principles in Aquinas

Appealing to Platonic principles and other metaphysical notions that
sound so alien to modern ears can make it difficult for modern readers
lo understand these passages. For this reason, one might be tempted to
Impatiently reject his reasoning out of hand. Not quite so fast though!
Aquinas often speaks very succinctly and often times his brief statements
»ire densely packed with philosophical significance. Indeed, I think that
Aquinas' arguments are sound once the summaries and brief appeals he

I .s '1 his is not to say that these arguments cannot do "double duty" and serve the other
wnik or mild principle of sufficient reason respectively. The point here is that the context
hi which these argument appear do so in one that is either on behalf of the weak or mild
VIM'NIOII of ihe principle.
Ift"Omrie quod tit ptmlblb pnt el noti esse, habet causam aliquam: quia in se con-
nlderatum ad utrumUbit $0 htibtti *t */<' ofnwtei esse alhjuod aliud quod ipsum ad unum
d?tmntnet"S,C.U II,It, Hmphmilft NiUkd,

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

gives are properly explained. In order to show this, we will look at each
one of the causal arguments in order.

Every Composed Thing Has a Cause

The first causal principle comes from looking at the contingent being as
a whole, that is, as composed with existence. The most common appeal in
the texts above is a need for a source of unity amongst composite beings,
such as, "whatever belongs to a thing and is yet not of its essence belongs to it
through some cause; for, if things that are not one through themselves one are
joined, they must be joined through some cause"17 Other appeals to this prin-
ciple are scattered throughout the works of Aquinas. For example, he writes,
"Every composition needs some composer. For, if there is composition, it is
made up of a plurality, and a plurality cannot be fitted into a unity except
by some composer... Now, the composer is the efficient cause of the compos-
ite."18 Later in that same passage, Aquinas says, "Prior to all multitude we
must find unity. But there is multitude in every composite."19 Aquinas says
that denial of this principle is "impossible" (impossibilis) for, "If things that
differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement,
since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves."20 Finally,
and most directly, Aquinas says, "every composite has a cause, for things in
themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite."21
In support of this position, the first question we need to ask is this: is
it true that every contingent is a unity of two different principles? A little
metaphysical reflection shows this must be the case. First, every existing
contingent thing must be a composite being. If a thing is not its own
existence (remember, Aquinas is talking about a "being that is not its own
being"), then obviously the thing and its being must be different. These
two entities are non-identical This is necessarily true by definition.22 By
definition, every contingent thing need not exist. It can possibly not have

17 "ea enim quae per se non sunt unumy si coniungantur, oportet per aliquam causam
uniri. Esse igitur convenit Mi quidditatiper aliquam causam." SCG 1.22, emphasis added.
18 S.C.G. 1.18
19 Ibid.
20 Haec autempositio est omnino impossibilis. Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse
est huius unionis causam esse aliquam, non enim diversa secundum si1 uniuntur. S.T. 1.65.1
21 S.T. 1.3.7
22 This does not mean contingent things connlitu of two illfhwul things In their own
right, only of two MXmnl principles, yd the r«iionln( tijuit M upplti-uhk.

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 Causal Principles and Conclusions

existence. But since nothing can be separated from itself, the thing and I lie
existence are non-identical, and if that, a multiplicity absolutely must be
present - that to which the contingent is identical, and that to which it is
not. To deny this point would be to deny the very principle of identity itself
and would land one is self-contradiction, for such a denial would be saying
that "a being both is and is not its own being" which is evidently impossible.
Since the contingent itself and its existence are different in themselves,
whenever we posit a contingent being in existence, we are necessarily
saying that these two different entities are now united. The contingent
thing would have to join with existence in order for it to be. It would be
impossible for a contingent thing to exist if it did not have existence. To
deny this point would, again, land one in a flat out contradiction. So given
(he existence of any contingent thing, there would have to be a unification
of two different principles. To put this same point in different words, if a
being that is not its own being exists; it must be a composite unity. It is,
as Aquinas says, an undeniable, metaphysical necessity then that every
contingent being must be a composed unity of itself and its existence.23
Having established a unified composition for any existing being that
is not its own being, we have now laid the foundation for understanding
why all such entities need a cause. Through a little metaphysical reflection,
we should be able to intuit the insight that things different in themselves
cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. In other words, the old
scholastic axiom, "multitude cannot give the reason for unity" (multitudo
turn reddit rationem unitatis) is applicable here. In no way can diversity,
qua diversity, account for unity. Differing things cannot, as differing
things, account for why those things are one.24 Unity cannot be grounded

23 It is not to our present purpose to present everything that can be said about Aquinas*
position on the real distinction of essence and existence, but what we have said so far is suffi-
cient to show all existing contingent beings are composites. "If something can exist only when
several elements come together, it is composite. But nothing in which the essence is other than
the being can exist unless several elements come together, namely, the essence and the being.
I lence, everything in which the essence is other than the being is composite." S.C.G. 1.22.
24 '1 his dictum would apply to every instance of causal interaction, even when the same
Mibstance acts upon itself".,, even if the same thing might be acted upon by itself, this still
does not happen hmol'iir UN It IN the same, but insofar as it is other. Now this potency is
reduced to afirNtactive potency, hci'iuiHo when anything undergoes change this is caused
by un agent, And for thin rewncm pwAAlve potency Is also reduced to active potency." (etsi
Idem patiatur a $0lpiQ> mm tnm*H mundttm idem, sedsecundum aliud. Haec autempo-
tMttttt mlucitur &dprtmm potthtltim tuttvum, quia passlo ah a^entc causatur. Et propter

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

in diversity. This too is a necessarily true proposition, to deny this principle,

again, would do violence to reason, since, by reductio ad absurdum denying
this principle is the same as saying, "A thing is one precisely because it is
two," which is patently contradictory. It cannot possibly be that two things,
qua diverse, are one thing. Two things cannot be one thing in virtue of their
differences. Division stands in a fundamental opposition to unity.
But if a contingent being differs from its existence, as we argued must
be the case, then there must be some other principle that accounts for the
present unity. So what accounts for the unity between the contingent and
its being? It cannot be pure nothing, for then there would be no unity at
all. Nor can it be either of the diverse elements themselves. There must
then be some real unifying factor that is the ground or cause of unification
between these diverse elements. As put by Clarke:
Diversity and multiplicity as such cannot be the ground of
any unity... Diversity as such can never be the cause of unity.
Therefore ontological similarity among many, to have an
adequate sufficient reason, must be grounded somewhere in a
concrete ontological unity..}5
Since a union of diverse elements without anything other than those
diverse elements is impossible, and all contingent beings are a union
of diverse elements, all of this is but another way of saying there is a
composition based principle of causality. To put the point syllogistically:
Every unification of things differing in themselves is caused.

Every contingent being is a unification of things differing in

themselves.

Therefore, every contingent being is caused.

As we have been at pains to show, the major is a necessarily true
principle that cannot be denied without contradiction. The same goes for
the minor premise once a contingent being is posited in existence. Hence
the conclusion, which is the mild principle of sufficient reason as we have
defined it, follows necessarily.26 Every composed thing has a cause.

hoc etiam potentia passiva reducitur ad activam) - In Meta /X, 1,1,

25 Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God: A New 'Ihomlstlc Perspective
(New York: Fordham 2007) 51-2
26 In fact, (his seen™ U> rcprcNcnl a perfect df monitritlon *• tlfttiml by AquiiuiN In an

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 Causal Principles and Conclusions

Every Possible Has A Cause

The second causal principle comes not from looking at an existing
contingent being as a whole, but rather from looking at the contingency
part of such beings as possible. For this reason, we will call this an
indifference based principle of causality since it appeals to the existential
indifference inherent in all beings that are not their own being. As we
saw above, Aquinas argued that God must the cause of all being since all
things other than God are able to be and not be, "Everything which is
able to be and not-be has a cause; for considered in itself it is indifferent
to either, so that something else must exist which determines it to one."
27
This, of course, is not the only text where Aquinas says such things.
There are quite a few of these "indifference" passages, such as, "Now
whatsoever is possible to be has a cause, because, as in itself it is equally
related to two things, namely being and not being, it follows that if it
acquires being this is the result of some cause."28 And again, "Everything
that has a possibility of being and of not being, needs something else
to make it be, for, as far as it itself is concerned, it is indifferent with
regard to either alternative. But that which causes another thing to be,
is prior to that thing. Hence something exists prior to that which has
the possibility of being and of not being." 29 More directly, "Whatever
is a possible being has a cause,"30 and finally, "That which is possible
needs something to make it actual. Some cause, therefore, will have to
be posited in order to do this."31

earlier chapter. The major premise being true in the fourth mode ofperse necessity, while
I he minor premise is certainly an essential definition of a contingent being and thus nec-
essary in the first mode of per se necessity. The conclusion is true in the second mode of
perse, all of which is consonant with what we saw about the causal principle in S.T. 1.44.1.
27 "Omne quod est possibile esse et non esse, habet causam aliquam: quia in se con-
sideratum ad utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet esse aliquod aliud quod ipsum ad unum
determineC S.CG 11.15
28 "Omne autem quod est possibile esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se
httbeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex ali-
iliuj causa"S.CG. 1.15
29 "Omne quod est possibile esse et non esse, indiget aliquo alio quodfaciat ipsum esse:
quia quantum est in se, se habet ad utrumque. Quod autem facit aliquid esse, estprius eo.
liiyo omni quod est possibile esse el non esse, est aliquid prius" Comp.Theo. 1.6
M) "omne auttm quod *»t possibile esse, habet causam" S.CG. 1.16
M "quod auttm #*f pouihiht indict aliquo quo reducatur in actum; oportebit igitur
l*onere aliquam cfiUMM fun flat ut tflpvtu* reducatur in actum" S.CXi II, 32

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Now we must note that by "possible" here Aquinas means a being which
is not necessary, i.e., a being that is capable of being or not being.32 We are
not using the term "possible" in the broader sense that would include the
necessary (in the sense that all necessary things are possible). Here we
are using the more restricted sense of the term, meaning by "possible"
that is able to be and not be. These beings are rightly called "possible" in
this sense simply because their existence is non-essential and therefore
merely possible and not necessary. In other words, we are talking about
contingent beings or beings by participation. So these possibles do not, in
and of themselves, account for their own existence.33
Thus to bring the issue directly to the fore, what justification is there for
Aquinas' claim that all possibles need a cause? To answer this question, it
will not be amiss to reiterate a point we have regularly made above, namely
it is necessary for everything existing thing to have a fundamental act of
esse in order to be. There cannot be a PSR-defiant being. But by definition,
the possible being does not contain in itself (as possible) the note of actual
existence. So if we conceive of a possible being as actually existing, we
cannot even conceive of it as actually existing in virtue of what it is in
itself, that is, what is contained in its concept qua possible. So where is
the actual reason or distinguishing act from mere nothing to be found?
By definition again, it is emphatically not in virtue of the possible being
as possible. Yet since it must be something; which means in this case it
must be something else. For any being that is not its own being, that is, any
possible, it simply must be the case that its being comes from outside and
other than itself This is simply another way of saying the being is caused.
The alternative is not only metaphysically impossible; it is also, contra
Hume, actually inconceivable. To conceive of actually existing possible

32 "Now in order to understand this we must note that the word possible is used in
two senses: (1) It is used, first, in contradistinction to the necessary, as when we call those
things possible which are capable either of being or not being...The word possible is used
in a second sense inasmuch as it is common both to those things which are necessary
and to those which are capable of being or not being, according as the possible is distin-
guished from the impossible." In IXMeta, 1.3, c.f., S.C.G. 111.86.
33 "Everything, furthermore, exists because it has being. A thing whose essence is not
it's being, consequently, is not through its essence but by participalion in something,
namely, being itself. {Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse, Nulla igltur res cuius essentia
non estsuum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participation* altculus, scilicet ipsius esse),
S.C.G. 1.22. "It is true lhai what has Its being from another IN nothing amnklered In itself,
if It be distinct from the being ihul It receive* from Mfilhir.,." DP hit,, 1,3,13 acl.4.

202
 Causal Principles and Conclusions

we must, in order to avoid the contradiction of thinking that the possible

being itself accounts for distinction from nothing, posit some extrinsic
reality, an existing being that is other than the possible. This extrinsic
reality is what makes the possible real, in other words, the extrinsic reality
is a cause. In our thinking as well in our metaphysics we are necessarily
referred to some reality beyond the concept of a possible essence to an
external reality that accounts for the possible being's distinction from
nothing. This inseparability in thought is simply a reflection of reality To
put the point syllogistically, we can say:
Whatever gets its existence from another is caused

Every possible gets its existence from another

Every possible is caused.

The argument is logically valid, the major is necessarily true in that
subject is the very definition of the predicate (Aquinas' 4th mode of per
se necessity). The minor is also unassailably true as well, given that this
is precisely what a possible or being by participation is, i.e., a being that
is not its own being - not its own distinguishing from nothing. The
demonstration then appears sound.34 Just to illustrate the continuity
in our terminology, we could restate the same argument in using
synonymous terms this way:
Whatever is distinguished from nothing by another is caused

Every being that is not its own being is distinguished from nothing
by another

Every being that is not its own being is caused

The conclusions are the same. The key premise questioned by Hume
would of course be the second, but we have shown that to deny such a
premise results in contradiction. A being that is not its own being cannot

34 If an objector asks for the justification of attaching the property "caused" to a contingent
being, we can say thai I lint It Is not because "cause" is contained in the definition of the subject
l>ul l he property neccmmrlly wises from such an essence as existing simply because of the lack
ni'csse in that CNHCIICC. 1 he rtlwnce o f i w In the essence calls for a positive non-essential esse
property If such a thing IN in exUL So It U not the positive presence of "cause" that grounds the
iKWNHiu'y connection bf twtfi) Ntihjwt ttiul predicate, it IN the luck of esse In the essence that
nerve* m the JunllAcitlcm farMylug "VMUHHI" IN H neieumry accident,

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St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

distinguish itself from nothing. A "self-distinguishing possible being" is

an inherently contradictory notion. As Garrigou Lagrange says correctly:
We are absolutely certain that every being which is indifferent to
existence requires an efficient cause, that is to say, has to be realized
(whether in time or eternity, makes no difference), because
the intellect knows intuitively that this being does not exist as
something which has existence intrinsically and primarily as its
own {per se primo), but as something which gets this existence
from another (ab alio or per aliud).35
This indifference based principle of causality takes as its starting point
the metaphysical indifference to being inherent in any being that is not its
own being, leading inexorably to the conclusion "every possible has a cause,"
which is another way of stating the mild principle of sufficient reason.

Every Being with Accidental Existence Has a Cause

The third causal principle comes from looking at the other part of an
existing contingent being, that is, its being as a prior accident. Joseph Owens
has pointed out that by doing this Aquinas has recourse to yet another causal
proposition; what we will call an accidental based law of causality. The textual
basis for this argument is found in the same De Ente et Essentia passage
we looked at above. Here Aquinas presents what I will call a "Thomistic
Dilemma," which is simply a disjunctive syllogism where the major premise
is a strong disjunction offering two possibilities (where only one of which
can be true), and the minor premise destroys one of these possibilities,
leaving the conclusion to simply affirm the disjunct that remains. The formal
structure of this style of argument is valid if the disjuncts stated in the major
are exhaustive, and all but one is denied in the minor.
To set the stage for this argument, Aquinas argues that there can only be
one being who is pure act (whose essence is identical to its existence), and

35 Garrigou Lagrange, God, v. I, op. cit., 193. As Maritain also argues, "contingent
being posited in existence', the other what I shall term caused/ that is to say, 'having
ground, a sufficient reason other than itself. When our mind contemplates these two
notions we see that in being outside the mind they are necessarily identical. Accordingly
we formulate the axiom: Every contingent being has a ground other than itself, exterior
to itself, that is to say an efficient cause. It Is a self-evident Nxloin »uul, like the principles
we have already examined, can be al Inched by A rtductlo ad abiurdum In ihc principle of
Identity." (Maritain, Metaphysics, op, clt„ 133),

204
 Causal Principles and Conclusions

that everything else has a composition of act and potency.36 He then moves
to discuss all of these latter things whose existence is not identical to their
essence.37 It is important to note that the discussion is now restricted to
what we can call non-necessary or contingent beings. With this setting in
mind, Aquinas gives the following argument, cited again here in full:
"Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles
of its nature, as the ability to laugh in man, or comes to it from
some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the
sun. But it cannot be that the existence of a thing is caused by the
form or quiddity of that thing -1 say caused as by an efficient cause
- because then something would be its own cause, and would bring
itself into existence, which is impossible. It is therefore necessary
that every such thing, the existence of which is other than its nature,
have its existence from some other thing."38
To simplify Aquinas' argument for our purposes, we can state it this
way:
Whatever belongs to a thing non-essentially is either caused by
the essence or comes to it from something else.

But when existence belongs non-essentially to a thing, it cannot

be caused by the essence (for that would mean the thing would
cause itself, which is impossible).

Therefore, when existence belongs non-essentially to a thing, it

comes to it from something else.

36 "Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi una" Aqui-
nas, De Ente Et Essentia, Caput 3. Textum a L. Baur Monasterii Westfalorum 1933 editum,
cmendatum a J. Koch ac translatum in taenias magneticas a Roberto Busa SJ. Source listed
ul www.CorpusThomisticum.org; vol. 43, 377.
37 "Whence it is necessary, that in everything other than this one its existence be other than
Its quiddity, or its nature, or its form." {"Unde oportet quod in qualibet alia repraeter earn aliud
sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua") De Ente, Ibid.; vol. 43,377.
38 "Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum exprincipiis naturae suae, sicut
rislbile in nomine, vel advenlt ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influen-
tia soils. Non autem potest esse quod Ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei
(tllco sicut acausu efficient?) quia >'/<" allqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam
In esse producmtt quod t$t Impouiblle, lir#o oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est
aliudquam nature IWM HtbMt Ml* lib alio" Ibid, cl., S,CXl» I, 22 para. 6; vol. 13, 68, and
.SV/: 1.3.41 vol. 4, 42,

205
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

The major premise states a dilemma. Whatever belongs to a thing non-

essentially must either come from the essence as a property, or it comes
from some other thing. The minor premise destroys the first option for
non-essential existence. This option might work fine for other properties
of a thing; properties like risibility that comes from the essence of a man, or
the property of having three angles of a triangle equaling two right angles
which arises comes from the nature of a triangle. It is not that having a
non-essential element coming from an essence is inherently impossible;
rather, Aquinas is saying that an act of being cannot belong to thing in this
way. There is something unique about the characteristic of an act of being
that prevents a thing from possessing it in this fashion, and the reason he
gives is because that would mean that the thing would first have to exist
before it existed in order to cause its own existence! Aquinas correctly sees
this as impossible. Thus, the second premise stands on exceptionally solid
philosophical ground. It is impossible that a things act of being be caused
by its essence. When we are talking about an act of being, the first horn of
the dilemma is destroyed.
This means that Aquinas' conclusion that "every being that has non-
essential existence is caused by another" follows necessarily (/"the major
premise is exhaustive. But some might wonder: has Aquinas given us
all the options? Might there be a third? Some have certainly thought
so.39 But if there is a tertium quid, it would have to be something like
"the esse of the thing comes from nothing.''40 Could it be that the act of

39 "At first sight, Thomas' argument simply begs the question. The esse of a thing must
arise from its essence or from outside. In saying this, Thomas leaves out precisely the op-
tion an opponent who denies the CP will choose: the esse of a thing not being caused by
anything, and not following from the thing's essence. A simple explanation why Thomas
does not feel obliged to discuss this option, crucial as it appears to philosophers these
days, might be that it is intuitively obvious to him that if you have a composition of two
factors (in this case the existence and the essence), there has to be an explanation of why
there is such a composition. Obviously, this will not do if we are trying to find an ar-
gument for the CP in Aquinas." Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A
Reassessment, 28.
40 It could not be that the whole being comes from nothing since that would presup-
pose the thing could exist without any reason or act of being at all, and we have already
seen this is impossible. If a thing does not have esse, it does not exist. It is this notion that
is presupposed by this reasoning in the De Ente, "Nothing can he described as existing
unless it has esse." (Quia nihil potest did existens nisi hubmt me.") Si, 'Ihomas Aquinaa,
De divinis nominibus, cap, 51. 2. Owens alao nay* that thli r#Monln||o! Si. Ihomas "starti
from being as a common and neceiwary characltfrUHc of thlngM," |n*eph Owens, "The

206
 iUiMMlft'lHilph*tiHtlComluifan*

being itself comes from "nothing," that is, neither from the CSMCIICC nor
from some extrinsic principle? If it can be shown that a non-essential
act of being can come from mere nothing and have no reason at all for
its existence, then the dilemma that Aquinas gives us here is a, false
dilemma. If on the other hand, Aquinas' disjunction does exhaust all the
options, his argument successfully goes through. This is the question
that needs to be addressed.
In order to answer this question, it is crucial to understand that the act
of being is a prior accidents All accidents by nature are modifications of
things, that is, they modify substances, and do not exist in their own right.
Redness, for example, exists in red things; the property of weighing 150
pounds does not exist on its own but in a thing that weighs 150 pounds,
and so on. The point is that an accident, by its very nature, must and
without exception, exist in things and there is no way to remove this note
of dependency on a substance from an accident.42
So all accidents exist only in substances, but which substance? Clearly
it cannot be dependent upon the very substance it actuates, since the act of
being must be is ontologically prior to that thing. Unlike other Aristotelian
accidents that are posterior to the substance, the act of being is accidental
in a prior sense, meaning that as the primary act in a being, it cannot come
"later." It must be the first act of a being before anything else the being
possesses; it is the act of all its other acts and the perfection of all its other
perfections. "If its being were not presupposed, there would be no nature. It

Analytics and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure," Mediaeval Studies vol. 26, 1964, 94.
Lhis is not to say the Owens called this proposition a "principle of sufficient reason," but it
is to say that he found that statement to be a necessarily true proposition and the starting
point for Aquinas' reasoning here.
41 Comp. Theol LXVI; vol. 42,102. Also, "Only that which does not enter the definition of
A thing seems to be outside its essence or quiddity; for the definition signifies what a thing is.
I kit it is only the accidents of a thing that do not fall in the definition; and therefore only the
accidents in anything are outside its essence." S.C.G. 1.21.1 am greatly indebted for recogniz-
ing the notion of an act of being as accidental to Fr. Joseph Owens and John F. X. Knasas.
42 "As Owens puts it, "The note of dependence, accordingly, cannot disappear from the
notion of an accident without completely destroying the accident. The very presence of
an accident involves 1U dependence on something else." Joseph Owens, "The Accidental
and lissenttol-ChnrmMcr of Being," Salnl Thomas Aquinas On the Existence of God: The
Collected Pap$r$ oflonph ()wpti»t ed. John Calan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York PreiM, 1VH0)« 77«H, A||«ln. "liy 11N very nnlurc il [an accident] is dependent upon a
NunNlunce," OwilMi Ah thnmitiryChrhtittn Metaphysics, 75-6.

207
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

would be nothing/'43 This sort of accident is the most basic and fundamental
reality in the thing. Because the esse is what brings that substance into being
in the first place, it is not possible that this accident also depends on that
same substance it brings into being, for that would be tantamount to saying
the accident causes its own existence, which is clearly impossible.44
So having established the fact that the major premise is speaking about
accidents, and that the sort of accident in question is prior to the thing
it actuates, we can see why Aquinas is entirely justified in refusing to
consider "nothing" as a possible third option. With these clarifications in
place, we can summarize the Thomistic Dilemma this way:
Every accidental esse must depend upon the substance it actuates
or upon another

No accidental esse depends upon the substance it actuates

Therefore, every accidental esse must depend upon another.

The major premise is an exhaustive disjunction. As an accident, esse
must depend upon either the substance under consideration or some
other substance. There is no third alternative.45 Since it is impossible for
accidental esse to depend upon the very same subject it actuates, it must be
the case that every accidental esse depends upon another. In other words,
every contingent being has a cause.

43 Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 73.

44 "Since the being of a sensible thing is both accidental and prior to the thing's nature,
it is dependent on something external to the sensible thing itself. This is the same as say-
ing that any sensible thing is caused efficiently by something other than itself." Owens,
Elementary, 78. "The reasoning of St. Thomas then shows that being has to lie outside any
finite nature. There is no question of may or may not, It is a question of 'has to/ It is an
entirely necessary sequence. The same holds for the priority of being to finite essence. It is
not a case of may or may not be prior/ Here the act of being, regarded in this perspective,
has to be prior. The reasoning follows the necessary phases of being and the necessary
phases only.... There is no possibility at any stage in the reasoning that some finite being
may or may not be dependent on another." Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Char-
acter of Being," 96.
45 In his Commentary on the De Ente Et Essentia, Cajetan puts it simply: "The major
is proved as follows. Everything having something distinct from lis quiddity is such that
either it itself is the efficient cause of that, or it has that from another as efficient cause;
since no third possibility can be imagined'' ThomaH Cajotan, Commentary on Being and
Essence, tr. Lottie Kendzerski and Francis Wade (Mllwaulw, WIi Marquette University
Press, 1964) 209, emphauls mine.

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 Causal Principles and Conclusions

It is fitting at this point to point out that the above texts of Aquinas have
given us three different lines of justification for the mild principle of
sufficient reason. Granted they all lead to the same conclusion, but they do
so by means of different starting points. Taking any contingent being, one
can look at that contingent as a whole, one can look just the contingent
part of that thing as possible, or one can start by looking at the other part
of an existing contingent being, namely the being of that contingent as
prior accident. Whichever way one chooses to begin, one winds up with
the same conclusion, "every contingent being has a cause."

THREE THOIVtlSTlC ARGUMENTS FOR THE

MILD PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

BASED ON THE THREE WAYS OF LOOKING AT CONTINGENT BEING

EVERY COMPOSED EVERY POSSIBLE BEING ACODEN^

BEING HAS A CAUSE HAS A CAUSE HAS£ CAUSE
(Contigentbetngasavi^ofe} (Con&igentpatftaspossflWe) (Being part as prior accident)

EVERY CONTINGENT BEING HAS A CAUSE

{Synoncmous with all of the above)

Whatever Begins to Exist Has a Cause

Finally, to round out our discussion of certain texts in Aquinas that
argue on behalf of a causal principle, we can evaluate the act/potency
texts that Aquinas uses to support the weak principle of sufficient reason,
"Whatever begins to exist has a cause." To appreciate the force of Aquinas'
reasoning, it behooves us to briefly examine three things: 1) what potency
and act are, 2) that whatever begins to exist requires an actualization of
potency, and lastly 3) that every actualization of potency requires some
act. Having done this, we will be in a better position to appreciate Aquinas'
claim that every actualization of potency has a cause.
Taking the first topic, the import of the act-potency distinction is the
fundamental recognition that potency and act are irreducibly distinct
metaphyseal principle*, Act U being in an absolute sense, or simply that

209
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

which is. "Being in act" is an actual existent thing or state. "Being in

potency," on the other hand, is a capacity to he. An acorn has the capacity to
become an oak. The acorn is not an actual oak, yet it does have some reality
about it that a screwdriver does not have, namely the ability to become an
oak. So being in potency is not absolute nothing, but it is not full blown
actuality either. It lies between these extremes as is best considered as
being in a qualified sense. Potency is related to act as that which can be is
related to that which is. With this clarification in mind, we can see the real
distinction between potency and act. Act and potency cannot possibly be
the same. It would be impossible for the same thing to both have a mere
capacity for acquiring some property x, and at the same, to already have
that same property. If a thing is able to acquire heat (meaning that it does
not yet have it), it cannot also be said to already actually have heat. "That
which is" and "that which can be" cannot be the same. To deny this would
be to deny the principle of identity itself.46
Having covered what potency and act are and why they are fundamentally
distinct, we can see why whatever begins to exist requires an actualization
of potency. First, it must be that whatever begins must first be in a state
of potency. Prior to anything coming into existence, there must at first be
a real potency for that thing's existence or else it could never come into
being at all. If there is no ability to become x a thing cannot become x,
hence potency serves as the necessary foundation for all becoming.
But this potency by itself is not sufficient since it also needs to be
actualized. An unactualized potency is just mere ability and does not
bring anything into existence. There must be some additional reality by
which the potency becomes actualized. If there were no such reality, if
there was nothing to account for the difference between the actual and
potential state, there would be no difference between them. But since
clearly there is a difference, the difference must be due to something. But
what could possibly do this? This "something" cannot be the potency
itself, because potency is not actual. It cannot "do" anything. The potency
needs to be really actualized (rendered really different from its potential

46 "Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which IN potentially hot, to be
actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it, Now it in not pomillilc I hut the same thing
should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the N«m« Ptfupoct, but only in different
respects. For what 1H actually hot ennnot »lnuilUn*ouily hf potentially hot," S.T, 1.2.3,

210
 (lausttl ft'int'lplr* tttitl (.nttihiihni*

state). Therefore, whatever actualizes potency must be something in uel.'"

The net result of this reasoning is, "Every actualization of potency has a
cause" that is, it requires some real actuality other than the potency to
bring that potency into realization.
What we hope has become clear from our discussion is that since it is
both the case that every actualization of potency requires a cause, and it
is also the case that whatever begins to exist must be an actualization of
potency, the causal conclusion that we have been calling the weak principle
of sufficient reason follows.48 To summarize this argument, we can say:
Every actualization of potency requires a cause

Whatever begins to exist is an actualization of potency

Whatever begins to exist requires a cause

Again, for the reasons stated above, the major premise is necessarily
true. The same is true for the minor premise, and so Aquinas' conclusion
is demonstrably true.49

Conclusion
In a survey of several relevant texts in Aquinas we find compelling
argumentation in favor of various formulations of the principle of causality.
47 "That which comes to be anew must take its origin from some innovating cause;
since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from non-being to being" S.C.G. I,
ch.13. "It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing
should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another. S.T. 1.2.3.
48 "A being, then, which begins to be must have part of its sufficient reason for exis-
Icnce in some being outside itself, or, in other words, must have a cause. In this way we
can arrive at the principle of causality: Whatever begins to be must have a reason for its
existence outside itself. But though this principle is thus shown to be a special application
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to a special class of beings, i.e., beings that begin to
he, it is really self-evident in its own right, for the two concepts, "to begin to be" and "to be
wilhout a cause" are evidently contradictory. For that which begins to be must first have
been in a state of potentiality, and as we have seen above, potentiality cannot become ac-
I ual without the intervention of some already actual being." John McCormick, Scholastic
Metaphysics (Chicago: Loyola University Press 1928). 141
49 The same reasoning nl.so Justifies the negative formulation ofthis principle, "out of noth-
ing, nolhlng come*" (r.v nlhilo nihil Jit), Iflhcre is nothing, there is not even the potency for
something to comn Into UtUty llcimnlng In lhal case would therefore be impossible. There
iiumt be ut u Icttll bfttpottiuy fur mining to be, unci thai potency cannot be mere nothing. Yet
potency, filboll niCHHfy, U mil miltkltml for becoming, and NO an act IN ulso needed.

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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

From these texts, one can distill three lines of support for the mild principle
of sufficient reason, "every contingent being has a cause." These three lines
of support are based on the three possible ways of looking at any "being
that is not its own being." Thefirstargument looks at such a being as a whole,
that is, as united with being. Such a composite of different elements requires
some cause for unification, leading to the conclusion that "every composite
has a cause," which gives us a composition based principle of causality The
second argument commences from just the contingent part of a "being that
is not its own being." Such an entity is a metaphysically indifferent possible
in need of some other reality to make it actual, leading to the conclusion
"every possible being has a cause," giving us an indifference based principle
of causality. The third argument looks at the being part that actualizes any
being that is not its own being, and since this act must be both prior to the
contingent that it actuates and is nevertheless accidental in character, such
an entity depends upon a prior substance other than the one being actuated,
leading to the conclusion that "everything with accidental existence has
a cause," giving us an accidental based principle of causality. All three of
these formulations are metaphysical equivalents to the expression, "every
contingent being has a cause."
Finally, we saw similar argumentation in Aquinas on behalf of a
weak principle of sufficient reason, "whatever begins to exist has a
cause." Given that act and potency are irreducibly distinct metaphysical
principles, that every beginning of existence requires an actualization
of potency, and that every actualization of potency must be exercised
by something in act, we are inexorably led to the conclusion, "whatever
begins to exist has a cause."
At this point it is helpful to review the ground we have covered. We
have addressed what the principle of sufficient reason is and its various
modes. We have given several lines of dialectical argumentation on
behalf of the weak and mild principle of sufficient reason. We have
explained what we mean by a necessarily true proposition, delineated
various modes of propositional necessity, argued that we know such
things, and have offered some explanation as to how we come to know
them. We have defended the strong principle of sufficient reason as a
self-evident and metaphysically necessary principle by way of reductio
ad absurdum. We have also defended the method of reductio ad
absurdum from the charge of begging the qumllon. Having established

212
 (.'iimil/ ft hit f/i/jfi Mid ( HMr/to/HHI

this strong principle of sufficient reason U enough to ttUo |u*tlfy

the weak and mild versions; but in this chapter we have gone a utep
further and, with help from the texts of Aquinas, offered additional
demonstrations for the weak and mild principles of sufficient reason.
Having supported our position from all conceivable angles; dialectical,
self-evident, and demonstrative, it is now time to respond to those
objections that have been offered against the principle.
 "I have often defied people to allege an instance against that great
principle, to bring any one uncontested example wherein it fails.
But they have never done it, nor ever will. It is certain there is
an infinite number of instances wherein it succeeds, or rather it
succeeds in all the known cases in which it has been made use of
From whence one may reasonably judge that it will succeed also in
unknown cases, or in such cases as can only by its means become
known, according to the method of experimental philosophy which
proceeds a posteriori, even if the principle were not otherwise
justified by pure reason, or a priori."1
- G. W. Leibniz

"That something should spring into existence out of nothing is so

counter-intuitive that to attack Maimonides and Aquinas at this
point seems to color one's intellectual integrity. The old principle
that ex nihilo nihil fit appears to be so manifestly true that a sincere
denial of this axiom is well-nigh impossible"2
- William Lane Craig

1 G. W. Leibniz, Fifth letter to Clarke.

2 William Lane Oaig, The Kalam Cosmologlcal Argument diligent1,1 >R: Wlpf and Slock,
2000), 143.
CHAPTER VIII:
Replies to Objections
I
n Chapter II, we looked at several arguments that attacked the princi-
ple of sufficient reason in a number of ways. Some arguments attacked
our ability to know its necessity, others attacked the scope of the prin-
ciple, and yet another attacked the veracity of the principle by arguing
that, far from being necessarily true, on the contrary, the principle is de-
monstrably false.
In order to more efficiently address those arguments, I will organize
them in the following way. We can bring together and crystallize all of the
points in that chapter into four main arguments against the principle of
sufficient reason:
1. The Argument from David Hume
2. The Neo-Humean Argument
3. The "Contingent State of Affairs" Dilemma
4. Limitation Attempts
a. The principle of sufficient reason is true, but "just a law of thought."
b. The principle of .sufficient reason is true, but "just a physical law."
I will reapotul to rwch argument In turn.

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St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Hume's Argument Exposed

As we saw, Humes entire argument rests on the possibility of the anti-
causal proposition ("Something can begin to exist without a cause") being
true. Hume based the possible truth of this anti-causal proposition on an
"imagination argument"; namely, that since cause and effect are distinct
ideas, one could imagine one of them without the other. Since imagining
the separation of these ideas is clearly possible for the mind, the actual
separation of these realities is also possible. We summarized Hume s
argument this way:
1. If the anti-causal proposition is not impossible, the causal proposi-
tion is not certain.
2. The anti-causal proposition is not impossible.
a. Imagination argument:
i. Whatever is separable in the imagination (without contradic-
tion) is separable in reality.
ii. The concepts of cause and effect are distinct and separable in
the imagination (without contradiction).
iii. Therefore, cause and effect are separable in reality.
3. Therefore, the causal proposition is not certain.
Here we have two arguments with one nested inside the other. The main
argument is an epistemic argument because it attempts to establish the
epistemological claim that the causal principle is not certain. Yet to support
the second premise of this "epistemic argument," Hume needs a second
argument (i.e., the "imagination argument") to establish a metaphysical
conclusion (cause and effect are separable in reality) via the premises that
"whatever is separable in the imagination (without contradiction) is also
separable in reality," and "cause and effect are distinct and separable in the
imagination (without contradiction)."
To my mind, there are major problems with this argument. In order
to show this, let us start with the problems inherent in the imagination
argument, and then move to the epistemic argument.

Three Problems with the Imagination Argument

The imagination argument stiffen from at leant thrrc problems:

216
 lii'l'lle* to Objection*

1. The major is not self-evident, nor is it known by dcniomitritllon. In

duction, or sense experience.

2. The major is demonstrably false.

3. The minor is false: an "existing uncaused contingent being" is incon-

ceivable.
Unless these three problems are overcome, Hume does not successfully
establish the conclusion that "cause and effect are separable in reality."

The Major is not Self-Evident, nor is it Known by

Demonstration, Induction, or Sense Experience
How does Hume know that epistemic possibility parallels metaphysical
possibility? The claim is strong and universal; everything that is
epistemically possible is also metaphysically possible, and vice versa.
Hume bases the entire argument on the notion that epistemic
possibilities (via the powers of the imagination) are an accurate yardstick
for measuring metaphysical possibilities. Yet he gives us no argument or
reason for accepting this proposition. Does he really know this, and if so,
how? He does not tell us. Is it known through intuition or demonstration?
Does Hume know the major a priori or a posteriori7. From what sense
impression does it come? Accordingly, the major is simply an unjustified
assertion that no rational person is obliged to accept.

The Major Premise is Demonstrably False

Not only does Hume fail to give us any good reasons for thinking the
major is true, but there are very good reasons to think it is false. Consider a
jar of jellybeans. We can imagine ajar of jellybeans without imagining any
specific number of them. Does this mean there could be a jar of jellybeans
with no specific number? We can imagine a number of jellybeans without
imagining that number being even or odd, but this does not mean there
could really be a jar of jellybeans whose total number was not even or odd.
Examples like these abound. We can imagine Mary Poppins existing with
no particular height or weight. We can imagine Vincent Price laughing, but
at no particular geographic location. We can imagine Ronald Reagan giving
an address, but al no parlicuhir time. We can imagine Goldbach's conjecture
("Hvery even Integer greater lluin Iwo can be expressed as the sum of two

217
St. Ihoinits Aquinas arid the Pridple of Sufficient Reason

prime numbers") as being true, or we can imagine it as being false, even

though one of those options is wrong, and very likely necessarily wrong.
The point is that just because we can imagine something in such and such
a way does not mean it can really be that way.3 The imagination is capable of
things not possible in reality. By conceiving of things in an incomplete way,
it is able to "set aside" some aspects of a thing s existence. Things can exist
in the imagination in various degrees of hazy ambiguity. The obscurity of
thought can overlook realities that reality itself will not ignore.
In Thomistic terms, we saw above that in the first act of the mind
known as simple apprehension, one can conceive of things without having
to conceive of their necessary accidents, but that does not show that such
a thing can be without those necessary accidents. In other words, we can
conceive of the jar of jellybeans without having to conceive of an actual
number in the first act of the mind, but we cannot judge that such a thing
can exist that way, in the second act of the mind, without contradiction.
So under a Thomistic analysis of the acts of the mind Humes argument
proves very little. In fact, we saw that Aquinas was willing to accept
Hume's claim that we can conceive of a thing without conceiving of its
cause, but as Aquinas points out, it does not follow that such a being can
be without such a cause.
So Hume's point is really a "shell game." Using a classic "bait and
switch," he first gets us to buy into a shallow concept (that which is grasped
by the first act of the mind) and then, with a swift mental "sleight of hand,"
he makes a judgment that such a thing could really exist in that way (in
the second act of the mind). The move could aptly be called the fallacy
of conceptual superficiality. This would be the fallacy of taking what is
deemed conceivable by first act of the mind, and then claiming that such
a notion can actually exist in that state. As Aquinas has argued, simply
apprehending the essence of something does not always tell us all of the
properties at thing must have when it in fact exists. This is because there
are necessary accidents that follow upon the existence of the thing Hume's
assertion that simple apprehension alone can give us the full story about

3 As Anscombe responds to Hume, "But from my being about to do that [something

coming into being uncaused from nothing], nothing whatever followa aboul what is pos-
sible to suppose 'without contradiction or absurdity' as holding In reality," (}. E. M. Ans-
combe, "Whatever has a Beginning of Existence Muil h«v« n (Inline: I lunies Argument
Exposed," Analysis, 34 (1974), 150.

218
 Replies to Objections

a thing's existence is fundamentally incomplete. Just as we can conceive

of a jar of jellybeans without any particular number doesn't mean such a
thing can exist that way, so too just because the notion of "cause" doesn't
enter into the definition of "contingent being" or "being that begins to
be" doesn't mean such a thing can exist without such a cause. Hume's
argument, namely that "whatever is separable in the imagination (without
contradiction) is separable in reality," is a demonstrably false proposition.

The Minor is False: A "Being Without a Sufficient

Reason for Being" is Inconceivable*
Moving along, let us examine Hume's second premise. Are the concepts
of cause and effect really distinct and separable even in the imagination
(without contradiction)? In other words, can we imagine something
that does not have a sufficient reason for its existence? Hume thinks he
adequately makes this point by asking us to imagine a being just coming
into existence uncaused out of nothing, and he thinks this is plainly
possible for the mind to conceive of such a thing.
Many philosophers simply take it for granted that Hume was right
about this, but I would like to differ. It seems to me that a "being without
a sufficient reason for being" is actually inconceivable and impossible,
even for the imagination, when again, that imagination takes the form of a
judgment about the existence of the thing.
The key point we have to keep in mind is that "coming to be," if it means
anything, is that the possible becomes actual Likewise, if coming to be without
a cause means anything, it means that the possible becomes actual with
nothing to make it distinct from that possible state. This is an inconceivable
contradiction. Why? We said earlier that it is axiomatic that "where there is
no difference there is identity." It is impossible to think of two things without
any distinction between them. In other words, it is impossible to imagine
"two red balls" without any difference between them. No color difference, no
size difference, no spatial difference, no material difference - nothing. Try to
imagine such a thing, and one will quickly find it impossible. What may start
as "two" balls in the beginning will merge into a unity.
In the sume way, Iry to imagine the rabbit in the purely possible
state and conlrmil lint! wllh a rabbit in the actual state. Try to see if you

4 A nlmllftr urgumfltt Ift rmuul In < miry'* lipixtrmoloxy '• 22ft 7.

St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

can conceive of these two states of the rabbit, potential and actual, as
remaining two distinct states, without there being any difference between
them. Something must be different about the actual state in order to avoid
a real identification with that possible state. Yet the moment you add that
"something,'* i.e., some real difference to that merely possible state, you
have just stipulated something by which that rabbit is distinctfrom nothing.
In other words, conceiving of an actual rabbit without any distinction
from a mere potential rabbit is impossible even for the mind. One may
choose not to say what the reason of difference is. One may refuse to
indulge in the quest to determine which property of that rabbit suffices
to account for its distinction from mere possibility. To be sure, one can
always refuse to consider these deeper metaphysical questions, but the one
thing one cannot do is conceive of an actual existing rabbit that lacks any
distinction from mere possibility.
As we have seen Aquinas argue above, before the rabbit begins to be it
must first be in potency, and if we add nothing to this potency, potency
is all that remains. In order for potency to be actualized, in order for
that potential state to really be different, something must be added to it.
"That which comes to be anew must take its origin from some innovating
cause; since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from non-being
to being."5 This is not only true for reality, but it is also true for the mind,
given the conceptualization goes deep enough. The only reason why
Hume thinks that cause and effect are separable in the imagination is
because the imagination is capable of some very hazy concepts that would
not really exist in that way. Humes conception stops at the level of simple
apprehension and is therefore far too superficial about actual existence.
This is why his point succeeds only at a very superficial level, but it is the
deeper level to which we must descend if the argument is going to have the
real-world relevancy that he wants.

Problems with the Epistemic Argument

The whole point of the imagination argument is to establish the second
premise of the epistemic argument that "the anti-causal proposition is
not impossible." But that imagination argument is in a shambles. We
have seen good reasons to think that neither of its premises are true.

5 S.C.G. I, ch.l 3.

220
 Replies to Objections

Since the imagination argument fails to establish lis conclusion, il also

fails to do what it is supposed to do; namely, support I he second premise
of the epistemic argument. For this reason, Humes epistemic argument
fails too.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is In Fact a

Contradiction to Deny
But not only is it the case that Humes epistemic argument fails because
the imagination argument does not support its second premise, it fails
also in a secondary way. This is because that same second premise, "the
anti-causal proposition is not impossible," is also positively refuted by
our arguments regarding the necessary self-evidence of the principle of
sufficient reason. If Hume's anti-causal proposition were possibly true,
that means there could be a PSR-defiant being. But as we saw above, a
PSR-defiant being is a contradictory notion. In other words, the principle
of sufficient reason is in fact a contradiction to deny, which means there is
no possible world in which the anti-causal proposition is true. Therefore,
Humes claim that the anti-causal proposition is possible is demonstrably
false via the self-evident principle of sufficient reason. We can summarize
our argument this way:
If the anti-causal proposition is possible, then the principle of
sufficient reason is not necessarily true.

But the principle of sufficient reason is necessarily true.

Therefore, the anti-causal proposition is not possible.

Unfinished Humean Business

I have dealt with Hume's main argument in sufficient detail. As to his
claim that one cannot know the causal principle as a necessary truth, we
have already addressed this in an earlier chapter. As to Hume's claims
about John Locke and Samuel Clarke's defenses of the causal principle
"begging the question," I will not comment on whether Hume is right
about Locke and Clarke. I will only say that I have defended my reductio
argument from I hut charge in an earlier chapter as well.

221
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Response to the Neo-Humean Argument

Here we consider the first points offered by Rowe. Are his arguments
any different than Hume's? Is there any point of significance that we have
not already considered in Hume s argument? We can gather two main
arguments from his work:
1. The principle of sufficient reason rejects out of hand the possibility
of uncaused beings springing into existence out of nothing, since the
principle of sufficient reason is not a truth known by experience or
intuition.

2. The principle of sufficient reason (at least some versions) is demon-

strably false, since if it was true, there would be no contingency in
the world.
Setting the second "neo-Humean" argument aside for the next section,
let us address the first. Rowe argues that there could possibly be uncaused
beings springing from nothing. He thinks that only when there is a known
contingency do we need a cause, and the problem with the principle of
sufficient reason, he argues, is that it a priori discounts the possibility of
these "brute fact beings" without justification. Like Hume, Rowe does not
think the principle of sufficient reason is necessary. Unlike Hume, however,
he goes into more detail about what he means by "necessary." Rowe thinks
there are two candidates for necessity: analyticity or synthetic necessity.
Regarding analyticity, Rowe does not think the principle of sufficient
reason is necessary, because it does not fit into Quine's notion of a logical
truth. Against the claim that the principle of sufficient reason might be true
with synthetic necessity, Rowe invokes Hume's conceivability argument as
grounds for rejecting this notion.6 We can summarize Rowe's view with
the following argument:
1. If the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, it must either defi-
nitionally reduce to a logical truth, or the anti-PSR proposition must
be inconceivable.
6 "The difficulty with the view that [the principle of sufficient reason], in either its
strong or weak form, is necessary is that we do seem able to conceive of things existing, or
even things coming into existence, without having to conceive of those things as having
an explanation or cause. Unlike the proposition, 'Some red thing* are colored,' it does
seem conceptually possible lhal something exUli thai him no CAUAC or explanation of its
existence." Rowe, lht> Cosmologies ArgumtnU HS.

222
 Replies to Objections

2. The principle of sufficient reason does not reduce to a logical truth.

3. The anti-PSR proposition is not inconceivable.

4. Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is not necessary.

The problem with this argument are premises one and three. One
is a false dichotomy, because, as we have seen, there are other notions
of propositional necessity other than Quine's, and a scholastic does
not need to be bothered that his methods fail to ape Quine's notion of
analyticity.7 The second disjunct of one is just another version of Hume's
conceivability/imagination argument, and we have already shown this
to be false. So apart from an unconvincing appeal to Quine's logical
truth and overall layout, the premises in the neo-Humean argument do
not substantially differ all that much from Hume's, and consequently the
argument is no more successful.

Response to the Contingent State of Affairs Dilemma

Hume did not use this one, and I am not sure who was the firsl
philosopher, but nevertheless, it is a commonly cited argument again si
the principle of sufficient reason today.8 Let us review it again using
Rowe's formulation. The argument attempts to conclude that there must
be some events for which there is no reason whatsoever.9 To summarize
his reductio:
1. If there is a sufficient reason for a contingent state of affairs, that suf-
ficient reason itself is either contingent or necessary.

2. Not contingent, because a contingency cannot fully explain another

contingent state of affairs.

7 Quine's notion of analyticity is a good example of what is wrong with modern no-
lions of propositional necessity, as it seems to be based solely on a "true by definition"
model with no further extension to real things. Such limited views of necessity are, to
my mind, erroneously based on nominal definitions and come from a logic that, in the
words of Veatch, "Can't say what anything is." It is interesting that Rowe chose Quine's
notion of analyllclly, when 1( was the failure of such alternatives that were, no doubt, part
of Quine's molivwllon In \v\w 11 w^o priori justification altogether.
8 As wc have won wllh Knwc unii Ross above. For another defense of the principle of
Nulliclcnl rcttnon ugaltml IIIIH nrtiumrul, ntx Lloyd Gcrson, "Two Criticisms of the Principle
of Sufficient RIMCM" tnbrmUoml humuil for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987), 129-42.
VRowi.HKMOI.

,—^. 223
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

3. Not necessary, because it cannot be that the existence of a contingent

state of affairs is a necessary matter.

4. Therefore, there cannot be a sufficient reason for a contingent state

of affairs.

What Exactly is the Problem?

We have to ask: just what is it about "contingent states of affairs"
that is so intuitively true that we need to preserve it? To answer this, we
need to ask what it is that we mean by "contingent?" It is clear that by
"contingent," the argument cannot mean anything like "that which is
utterly unexplainable," "that which defies all explanation," or "that which
is a through and through brute fact." If it did, this would beg the question,
since such a definition presupposes that the principle of sufficient reason is
false in order to prove the principle of sufficient reason is false.10
More commonly, I presume by "contingent" Rowe means something
like affairs that do not have to be; that is, a recognition that things could
have been otherwise. Certain counterfactuals could have obtained, had
things been different. For example, there could have been six planets,
the Nazis could have won WWII, George W. Bush could have lost a
presidential election, etc. Clearly, there are contingent states of affairs,
and no contradiction results from denying them. So it seems that it is a
metaphysical contingency which we need to keep when trying to preserve
our common sense intuitions that things could be other than the way they
are. To put it in possible world semantics, contingent means that which
does not obtain in every possible world; the contingent is true in some
worlds, but false in others.
With this in mind, the point of this argument is that // the principle
of sufficient reason were true for everything, there would be nothing that
could be otherwise. This point is important and worthy of attention. The
statement, "there cannot be a sufficient reason for a contingent state of
affairs," is equivalent to the statement, "If the principle of sufficient reason
were true for everything, everything would be necessary." We need to
conduct our evaluation of the argument with this question in mind: is it
really true that the principle of sufficient reason is incompatible with things

10 This would commit a petitioprincipii fallacy In thf tru» Arlnlotdlwn sense which we
discussed In I he previous chapter,

224
 Replies to Objections

being otherwise7. Can there be things that have a sufficient reason for their
existence, yet their existence still remains contingent? This is the question
we have to explore.
The best place to start is with the notion of "necessity." Necessity can
mean lots of things. First, there is the physical necessity of the laws of
nature, i.e., gravity, the strong force, etc., but nobody thinks that this
kind of necessity is incompatible with contingency. The physical necessity
inherent in the law of gravity does not take away our intuition that things
could not be otherwise (even that power of gravity itself could have been
different). It is not physical necessity to which we refer when we say that
necessity eliminates contingency. Necessity could also mean what the
scholastics called suppositional or hypothetical necessity (e.g., given that
Socrates stands, it is necessary that Socrates stands). But this notion of
necessity does not do away with contingency either, since after all, it is a
conditional necessity after all (e.g., if Socrates stands, it is necessary that
Socrates stands - but he need not stand!). This notion of necessity does
not mean that whatever is chosen could not have been otherwise in the
sense that it was impossible so this notion of necessity is compatible with
ontological contingency. In fact, there is only one sort of necessity that is
incompatible with contingency - what we can call logical or metaphysical
necessity, where the denial entails a real impossibility. Whatever state
of affairs is true with metaphysical necessity cannot be otherwise,
since that state of affairs obtains in every possible world.11 There are no
counterfactuals to a metaphysically necessary state of affairs - things just
have to be that way, and that is all.
So it is not just any sort of necessity that is incompatible with a
contingent state of affairs; it is only the metaphysical sort that entails the
impossibility of any alternative. Applying this to the principle of sufficient
reason, it is only if a sufficient reason accounts for a state of affairs with
metaphysical necessity that such a state of affairs is necessary and not
contingent. Again: necessity eliminates contingency if and only if that
necessity is a metaphysical necessity.
This means there is some truth to the contingent state of affairs
dilemma. In other words, there could be a scenario where having

11 Some may pr«l<?r to mil (IIIN n logical necessity. In either case, ihe meaning is the
same, via,, thm which t'MUinl not he. l'or Ihe Nuke of cortNlslency, we will use the phrase
mcl«phyilctl nihility In my lit* Mine tiling with illlfcrcnl words,

225
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

a sufficient reason might rule out a contingent state of affairs. Going

deeper, let us examine what that scenario would have to look like in even
greater detail. Suppose that necessary reason P causes state of affairs Q
in such a way that Q must also be necessary. Such a sequence would have
to assume three logical steps.
First, if P is to be the explanation for a necessary state of affairs Q, P
itself would have to be necessary. The reason is that contingency cannot
ground necessity Any explanation for a metaphysically necessary state
of affairs must itself be metaphysically necessary. Moreover, this "chain
of metaphysical necessity" would have to remain constant through any
subsequent explanatory steps, because if contingency were allowed to
creep in at any point, the necessity of the end result would be violated.
Just as nothing contingent can be entailed by what is logically necessary,
it is also intuitively true that metaphysical necessity cannot be based on
metaphysical contingency.
Second, it is not just the existence of P that must be necessary, but it
must also be necessary that P act as an explanation. If it could be that P
existed necessarily, but could act contingently in producing Q, Q would
be contingent, since P need not cause Q. So P's acting causally would
also have to be metaphysically necessary to produce a metaphysically
necessary result.
Third, it is not enough to say that P exists necessarily, and that P
necessarily acts. It must also be the case that Q is the only possible
outcome of that action. For if P existed necessarily, and P acted
necessarily, but could produce something other than Q, Q would be
contingent. After all, P might have produced something other than Q,
like some counterfactual R.
So in order to get a metaphysically necessary result from a sufficient
reason, all three of the above factors must obtain with metaphysical
necessity Allowing just one of them the possibility to be otherwise would
spoil any necessity in the resulting state of affairs Q.
The following explanatory filter shows this process schematically.
Assuming some reason P accounts for the existence of a state of affairs,
we proceed through a logical sequence of three questions. If there is no
metaphysical necessity at any point in this process, the state of affairs
produced by that reason would be contingent and not necessary:

226
 Replies to Objections

EXPLANATORY FILTER
FOR DETERMINING THE MODALITY OF A STATE OF AFFAIRS

existence of P
metaphysically
necessary?

yes

act of P
metaphysically
necessary?

yes

4
product of P
metaphysically
necessary?

yes

necessary
state of
affairs

The vertical sequence all the way through is exactly what the relation
of explanans to explanandum must look like if that explanans is to entail
metaphysical necessity in the explanandum. In other words, this is the
model thai musl always he the case if this argument against the principle
of sufficient rcuiiun IN to succeed.12

12 Of couraii ihli dtA(Mm nml mil need rcprcticnt a temporal order, but rather a pri-
ority of being,

227
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

The big question now of course is this: does insisting on the principle
of sufficient reason as a universally valid principle mean that all causal/
explanatory sequences must follow that vertical path of metaphysical
necessity? In other words, has the contingent state of affairs dilemma
given us good reason to think that this path must always be the case? This
is the question that must be answered.

Criticism of the Argument

Now that we have clarified exactly what the problem is, we are ready to
address the argument. There are at least two problems here: first, premise
one asserts a false dichotomy in stating a sufficient reason must be either
necessary or contingent. The premise assumes that a reason must be
necessary or contingent in all respects. But why can t a sufficient reason be
a combination of both factors? Suppose the sufficient reason for contingent
beings is a being that exists necessarily, but can act contingently. Is a se
existence incompatible with contingent actions? Why can there not be
a being that exists a se, but has actions and choices that are contingent? I
see no reason why there cannot be such a being. Surely, we can separate
the metaphysical necessity of this being's existence from the metaphysical
contingency of its actions. This premise fallaciously insists on an either/or
option where there is clearly a "both/and" possibility and for this reason a
defender of the principle of sufficient can happily adopt a third possibility,
the sufficient reason for all contingent beings can be a combination of a being
that exists a se but acts to produce those contingent beings contingently.
Thesecond problem with thisargumentisthatpremisetwocontroversially
assumes that no contingent event can ever be self-explanatory. How does
one know this? For example, many philosophers have held that acts of the
will are free (contingent) yet self-explanatory, and this premise has not given
us any reason to doubt those views.13 As long as this remains a possibility,
the second premise need not be accepted either.
So pace these premises, let us assume that a being could exist a se, but
also possesses a power of volitional freedom to bring about the existence

13 Such as philosophers who adopt what is commonly labeled the "libertarian" posi-
tion on the will. Scotus is a classic example, holding that the will IN nn "active potency",
meaning that the will has the power to determine itself. Sec Allan H. Woller, trans. & ed.,
Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C.i Catholic Unlvcmlly of America
Press, 1986).

228
 Replies to Objections

of other beings. Thus, this necessary being has the ability to make free
choices or simply refrain from action altogether. In this sense, the a se
being's choices are contingent. Here we have a necessary being that
nonetheless has a contingent power. Having the properties of both necessity
in existence but contingency in action allow us to say two things. First, this
beings existence is self-explained, viz., the reason why it exists is because
it is of such a nature that it cannot not exist. The existence of this being
does not violate the principle of sufficient reason. Secondly, if this being
decides to produce something through its contingent powers, that product
will be contingent and dependent upon this action. The existence of the
product would be contingent, since its existence would be dependent upon
the contingent actions of the a se being. In such a case, the existence of the
product has not violated the principle of sufficient reason either.
Let us say that this a se being freely decides to exercise its causal power
and produces three apples. These three apples do not have to exist; after all,
the being could have decided to make watermelons, grapefruit, or simply
make nothing at all. Thus, the existing three apples are a contingent state
of affairs. Referring to the explanatory filter above might help us see the
modality of this result. In step one, we have metaphysical necessity, i.e.,
the existence of the being is metaphysically necessary, but in step two,
this being has volitional freedom and need not cause anything. Already we
have contingency, and if we assume in step three that the being possesses
enough power that it could have made just two or four apples, or a set of
watermelons, a second layer of contingency will be established. Thus, we
have a workable counterexample to the argument, viz., a cogent case of
a necessary being causing/explaining a contingent state of affairs via a
contingent power.14

14 Does this mean that the a se being cannot be simple? It is not my intention here to
defend any particular position on divine simplicity. The recognition that a necessary be-
ing can have a contingent act of the will is held by philosophers who hold to a strong sense
of divine simplicity and those who do not. For example, Aquinas, a champion of divine
simplicity and a se existence, nevertheless was insistent that God willing things apart
from Himself Is not absolutely necessary {S.T. 1,19,4, ad. 4), and that such a contingent act
of the will docs nol Inlroclucc division into the divine nature (even if we cannot explain
how this 1« HO wc cnn know thai II is so). Scotus, on the other hand, opposed Aquinas'
view by polling In (itul «n ud mil formal distinction prior to any act of the mind (Oxon,
L, d.2 q,7,), 'lh« rtiullitlon ol thin debate IN not germane to the discussion, since both sides
admit Ihftl * nwiflftiry bflng inn have n free act of the will. Whether or nol the '1 horn 1st,
the Scotiit, thl lUirilllft (Mr Mint* ulhf r nhool for llnil mutter) IN correct IN Nlmply not

. _ > — . . 2 2 9
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

So a metaphysically necessary reason can cause a metaphysically

contingent state of affairs as long as metaphysical necessity is not operative
at every logical stage of the process. In order to be otherwise, one would
need to show that all choices and actions of the necessary being are also
metaphysically necessary. The argument has not accomplished this, nor
do I see any convincing way to do so.15
If it is objected that if the state of affairs signified by "the a se being caused
there to be contingent states of affairs" is itself a necessary or contingent
state of affairs, I answer that it is both. It took both a being that exists a se
coupled with a volitional power that could be conditionally exercised.
If it is objected that the choice of that being needs a sufficient reason
as to why one state of affairs was chosen over the other (i.e., referring to
a motive for the will), I answer that we have formulated the principle of
sufficient reason in such a way to avoid this objection. The existential
version of the principle of sufficient reason defended here is compatible
with different takes on the will, even allowing for an element of brute
facts regarding choice.16 Earlier, we saw that it would not be inconsistent

an issue that concerns us. In other words, if it turns out that a necessary being having
a free act of the will does introduce some sort of distinction in the divine nature, all it
would show is that some non-Thomist view of a necessary being is correct, not that a suf-
ficient reason cannot be a combination of necessary and contingent factors. For a defense
of Aquinas* view of divine simplicity see, J. F. X. Knasas* "Contra Spinoza: Aquinas on
God's Free Will," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002), 417-29. For an
alternative defense of Aquinas, see Norris Clarke's "A New Look at the Immutability of
God," Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-God-Person (South Bend, IN: University of No-
tre Dame Press, 1995). For a sympathetic analysis of the classical theists view of God, see
Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of God (South
Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). For a contemporary analytic defense
of the classical notion of divine simplicity, see William Vallicella's "Divine Simplicity: A
New Defense," Faith and Philosophy 9(4) (1992), 471-78 and Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann, "Absolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy 2(4) (1985), 353-82.
15 We can characterize the problem another way through formal notation. The contin-
gent state of affairs dilemma stands or falls on the validity of the following argument:
DP
P>£L
• Q
The nuances of normal language are hard to capture in formal notation. The "neces-
sarily" part of P can refer to P's mode of existing (not P's actions). There is no inherent
problem with saying a necessary being can act contingently. ThuH, P exists necessarily, but
can act contingently, and therefore can entail or cause Q conllngcnlly. If this is possible,
then the argument is invalid since Q In that caic would hi conllnyenl,
16 As argued above, In ouch a CUMC the mere exlulinci of itn A gen I chonning would he the

230
 Replies to Objections

in any way to say that all beings need a reason, while also maintaining
that the will is a self-actualizing power and therefore can choose without
any motive at all. All that is required for our formulation of the principle
of sufficient reason is that there be two - and only two - kinds of beings:
necessary beings that exist from their own nature, and contingent beings
whose existence is caused by something other than themselves.
If an objection is raised that the act of the will of such a being is a
contingent fact, and no contingent fact can fully explain others, I say it is
not just that contingent act of the will alone that explains the contingent
state of affairs, but a combination of a necessary and contingent factor,
viz., a being that exists necessarily but which can contingently choose to
create. Moreover, it may also be the case that this a se being freely willing
X can be self-explanatory; contingent but self-explanatory. Premise two
assumed, as we said, without warrant, that no contingent act of the will
could be self-explained.

Limitation Attempts
While not usually explicitly stated as an independent argument
against the principle of sufficient reason, some thinkers, perhaps feeling
persuaded by the plausibility of the principle, opt for a more "hedged"
response by admitting the principle of sufficient reason to be true, albeit
limited in scope. This limitation of scope usually comes in two ways - some
say the principle is true, but limited to thought (the "it is just a law of
thought" response), while others degrade the scope of the principle down
to the physical world only ("it is just a physical law"). In this section I will
address these limitation attempts.

"The Principle of Sufficient Reason is Just a Law of

Thought?"
As we showed in Chapter IV, the principle of sufficient reason is very
important and foundational to the reasoning process. When the
significance of such a principle is shown to a denier, sometimes that denier
will opt to admit the principle, but only as to satisfy the requirements for
reasoning processes, while denying that the principle is applicable to the
sufficient rwion lor that i'hnlu?. I'm* thin reason, whether or not the will always needs a
motive exttrlur to It If If ll hot rwllyfli|ucNllnn about whether or not an act of the will
need* a lufflellM mien* hut Mthtr, wluit it h that accounts for a sufficient reason,

,••-«-• 231
St Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

"real outside world." The denier would argue that the principle of sufficient
reason is only a "law of thought," but not a reality.
But if we are required to think that the principle of sufficient reason is
true, yet the principle of sufficient reason is not really true, then we are in
a very sorry epistemic position, indeed. For that means nothing else than
we are forced to think of reality in a way that reality is not, in other words,
we are forced to think of reality falsely. Our minds only "work" when
reality is literally twisted and construed in a way different than it really is.
If this is true, how can it be said that our minds "work" at all? How can a
mind be a reliable true belief-producing faculty when it must operate on
presuppositions that are actually false? For this reason, the objection that
the "principle of sufficient reason is just a law of thought" reduces to the
claim that our minds are unreliable. To put the point formally:
If the principle of sufficient reason is "just a law of thought," then
we must think of reality falsely.

The principle of sufficient reason is "just a law of thought."

Ergo, we must think of reality falsely.

Now this way of avoiding the principle of sufficient reason is an exer-
cise in philosophical self-destruction since there is a patent incoherence
here. If we have to think of reality in a way that it is not, (and thus think
of reality falsely), then this goes for any thought about reality - including
the thought about how we think about reality! Thus any attempt to assert
this argument is self-defeating, since the argument itself attempts to assert
something true about reality. Thus, this attempt to avoid the principle of
sufficient reason escapes only by embracing a self-refuting skepticism.
But there is another problem. This limitation attempt is not really an
"argument" to begin with. An argument is when reasons are offered on
behalf of conclusions. What we have here is an assertion that the principle
of sufficient reason is "just a law of thought" - a assertion without any
support. But what good reasons exist for thinking this claim to be true?
How does one know that the principle of sufficient reason is "just a law of
thought?" Are there any inductive or deductive arguments showing such
a thing? Such an assertion is highly counterintuitive, since the principle
of sufficient reason certainly seems to be a law of reality; why should not
we think it really is when there is no good rcftion lo think otherwise?

232
 Replies to Objections

Categorical assertions can be met with categorical denials, and one mans
modusponens is another mans modus tollens:
If the principle of sufficient reason is "just a law of thought," then
we must think of reality falsely.

We must not think of reality falsely.

Ergo, the principle of sufficient reason is not "just a law of thought."

A defender of the principle of sufficient reason can justifiably insist that
the second premise of this counterargument is immensely more plausi-
ble than the second premise of the limitation argument. Ergo, our modus
tollens is preferable to the denier's modus ponens.

"The Principle of Sufficient Reason is Just a Physical

LawV
There is another limitation attempt that could avoid all of this. May-
be the principle of sufficient reason is true, but just as a physical law, i.e.,
like the law of gravity, or something like fire is hot, etc. This argument
attempts to strike a middle ground by admitting the principle of sufficient
reason is true, a bit further than just in the mind, but not so far as to ad-
mit it as a true metaphysical principle. Thus, in this view, the principle of
sufficient reason is perfectly valid as long as its scope remains limited to
the physical world.17
Is this limitation attempt compelling? I think not; in fact, there are at
least four good reasons to deny this claim.

There are Clear Examples of Known Metaphysical Laws

Some who make this claim might hold it on an empirical basis that all
the laws we know are physical laws; thus, the principle of sufficient reason
is not any different. This position, however, is highly problematic as we saw
in above when discussing necessary truths. As mentioned there, there are
clear examples of universal truths we all know such as the law of excluded
middle, the principle of non-contradiction, and others. Indeed, even the
very distinction between "the physical world" and the "non-physical

17 On* mightttUocall ihU (he "Kantian" argument, because Kant would deny that
principle! lUtihft!111* urliulpl* ul nulllilcnl rcuimn could he known lo apply lo anything
hcynndflfMMJipfrlfWf.

233
St. Ihomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

world" presupposes that these principles must also apply to that very same
non-physical world, or else such a distinction would be meaningless. In
order to say such things one must hold that this is not that Thus, to say
for example that the principle of non-contradiction applies only to the
physical world and not the non-physical is self-refuting, as it presupposes
what it denies.
Now pointing out other examples of other known metaphysical laws
does not, by itself, demonstrate that the principle of sufficient reason is
also a metaphysical principle, but it does undermine a possible reason
for denying its metaphysical status. If principles like the principle of non
contradiction, the principle of identity, and the law of excluded middle
can be applicable to a possible non-physical realm, why not the principle
of sufficient reason?

Nothing in the Principle of Sufficient Reason says the

Reason Must be Physical
The second response to this limitation attempt is that it is totally ar-
bitrary and ad hoc. There is nothing in the principle of sufficient reason
that outlines that the reasons or causes must be physical. Consider the
truth-value of the following claims:
• Every contingent being must have a cause (true).

• Every contingent being must have a physical cause (false).

• Whatever exists must have a sufficient reason for its existence (true).
• Whatever exists must have a sufficient and material reason for its ex-
istence (false).
Nothing stated in these principles calls for such an arbitrary restric-
tion, nor is physicality necessitated in any of these formulations.

No Physical Law is a Contradiction to Deny

It is not a contradiction to deny physical laws, because physical laws
are logically contingent. There are possible worlds in which they do not
obtain. The force of gravity could have been otherwise, the speed of light
could have been different, etc. Metaphysical laws do nol work that way
To deny a metaphysical law results in an impoilibl* contradiction. To say

234
 Replies to Objections

there could be a four-sided triangle is to assert a real impossibility, some-

thing that is not true in any possible world. So metaphysical truths and
their contradictory denials by their very nature point us to something be-
yond just the actual physical world; they carry us to every possible world.
We have argued that the principle of sufficient reason is a metaphysical
truth. It is absolutely necessary that every being must be truly distinct
from nothing. Conversely, it is impossible for anything to be distinct
from nothing by nothing. Such an idea is absurd, and cannot be true
in any possible world, because it is a manifest contradiction. Thus, the
impossibility of denying the principle of sufficient reason is an indicator of its
metaphysical necessity. We can summarize this argument using CESARE:
No physical law is a contradiction to deny.

The principle of sufficient reason is a contradiction to deny.

The principle of sufficient reason is not a physical law.

The "Species of Nothing" Problem

Another absurdity arises if we look at the principle of sufficient reason
in one of its negative forms. "Out of nothing, nothing comes'* - is this just
a physical law? To claim that it is just a physical law seems to suggest there
can be two types of "nothing" - the "nothing" of the physical universe, and
the "nothing" of the non-physical realm. If this ex nihilo principle is only
a "physical law," then that means it is only the "physical nothingness" (sic)
that cannot produce being, but perhaps there could be a "metaphysical
nothingness" that could account for being.
Of course, this is absurd. Absolute "nothing" has no properties at all.
There cannot be the "physical universe" nothing and the "non-physical"
type of nothing. If we know "out of nothing, nothing comes," there is
only one type of "nothing" we are talking about, and it is without any
physical limitation.
Attempts to limit the principle of sufficient reason to the physical world
are problematic. First, there are other principles we all know that are truly
metaphysical, which tells us that metaphysical laws are at least knowable.
Second, nothing In Ihc principle of sufficient reason suggests a physical
limitation, Infact,when the principles are stated with physical limitations,
they seem Uttirly arbitrary ttiul ul least prima facie false. Third, the denial

233
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

of the principle of sufficient reason entails a contradiction, which can only

mean it is truly impossible and thus false in every possible world (not just
the actual physical realm). Finally, the limitation attempt seems to posit a
bizarre species of nothing problem that simply cannot be true.

Summary
A critical examination of the four most popular arguments against the
principle of sufficient reason shows that these arguments all contain seri-
ous defects. None succeed in subverting the metaphysical intuition that
things cannot come into being from nothing, and thus, there are always
reasons for a thing s existence. The argument from David Hume rested
on demonstrably false premises in both his epistemic argument and his
imagination argument. The Neo-Humean argument fared no better in
trying to impose a Quineian notion of necessity and analyticity that is
problematic and would not be accepted by thinkers in the scholastic tra-
dition such as Aquinas. The contingent state of affairs dilemma asserted
a false dichotomy by overlooking a third possibility; namely, that the ne-
cessity of a being's existence can be separated from the contingency of its
actions, thus allowing for the possibility of a necessarily existing being
contingently producing and being the reason for a contingent state of af-
fairs. Finally, both limitation attempts suffered from serious defects. To
limit the principle of sufficient reason to "just a law of thought" is an un-
substantiated assertion resulting in the absurd claim that our minds are
forced to think of reality falsely in order to work properly. The attempt to
limit the principle of sufficient reason to just the physical world ran into
numerous difficulties as well, such as the fact that denying the principle of
sufficient reason results in a contradiction and so must be true in all pos-
sible worlds (not just our physical world). Finally, limiting the principle of
sufficient reason to the physical realm seemed to entail the impossibility
of different "species" of nothing. Hence, we have not seen any reasons to
cause us to doubt that the principle of sufficient reason is a necessarily true
metaphysical principle.

236
 "One cannot take the principle of sufficient reason for granted:
one must prove it. And that is something that neither Leibniz nor
anyone else has ever done."l
- David Blumenfeld

"Now the principle of causality cannot be denied or doubted

without denying or doubting the principle of contradiction, for "a
contingent and uncaused being" would exist neither of itself nor
by reason of another, and consequently, could not be distinguished
from nothingness, since it would exist without a sufficient raison
d'etre, either intrinsic or extrinsic."2
- Garrigou Lagrange

1 David Blumenfeld, "Leibniz's Ontological and Cosmological Arguments" in Jolley,

Nicholas (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
2 Garrigou Lagrange, God: His Existence and Hi$ Nututf /, Wl,
CHAPTER IX:
Conclusion
N
o one ever gets the final word in philosophy. I certainly have not
entertained any intention of writing the definitive work on the
principle of sufficient reason. In fact, I see this as more of a life-
long project. It is and will be a continual "work in progress.,>
There are surely other important metaphysical questions raised by the
principle of sufficient reason that we did not cover. Our effort here was, in
a sense, modest; to provide good reasons for thinking that the principle
of sufficient reason is true and responding to those who argue otherwise.
Omissions aside, I hope the reader will find that what was covered to be
both important and compelling. In chapter one, I attempted to relay the
ubiquity and importance of the principle. It is difficult to find a philosopher,
scientist, or everyday person who does not presuppose this principle in at
least some form in order to conduct work or everyday living. The principle
of sufficient reason certainly enjoys a widespread acceptance, even if that
acceptance is subtle and subconscious.
As it is the task of philosophy to question, in Chapter II we looked
at what I have found to be the most common and pervasive arguments
against the principle of sufficient reason. I do not claim that I have covered
them fill, bul I nmialn confident that these objections to the principle of
sufficient niton IN the mont well-known and often cited.

239
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Priciple of Sufficient Reason

Next I attempted to lay out, in as clear a way possible, what I meant by

the principle of sufficient reason. I made a distinction between the logical
principle of sufficient reason and the metaphysical principle of sufficient
reason, and confirmed that the focus of this work was to defend the latter.
I also argued that the principle of sufficient reason I intended to defend
was "existential" in nature; that is, referring only to the existence of
things. Thus, in our discussion of the principle we have explicitly excluded
saying that acts of the will must have motives. Our metaphysical principle
of sufficient reason was formulated in terms of distinction. Taking the
notion of distinction and applying it existentially gave us the metaphysical
formulation, "Whatever exists must have a reason (or act of being, or that
in virtue of which it is distinct from nothing), either in itself or from
another." We also argued in this chapter that the principle of sufficient
reason was actually a conjunctive proposition of two statements. I called
the first statement ("Whatever exists must have a reason for existence")
"the principal part of the principle of sufficient reason," because it
establishes the necessity of a sufficient reason in all things. I also argued
that this statement is a necessary per se notum proposition. The second
statement of the principle, "Every reason is possessed either in itself
or from another" is also a necessarily true statement. In this chapter, I
also noted Rowes distinction between a weak and a strong principle of
sufficient reason, adding to that a "mild" formulation of the principle, and
discussed how these formulations related to various ex nihilo principles
and various principles of causality.
Following, I offered several dialectical arguments for the weak and mild
versions of the principle. By showing that many common sense principles
and methods of reasoning (such as induction and inference to the best
explanation) were intuitively justifiable methods of reasoning, I showed
how these methods presupposed some version of the principle of sufficient
reason. Thus, to reject the principle of sufficient reason would undermine
these obvious truths.
We then saw what a scholastic like Aquinas means by "necessary truth".
We looked at what necessary truths, that we know them, and gave some
explanation as to how we come to know them.
Next I argued that the strong principle of sufficient reason is necessarily
true in the sense that it is a true first principle, viz., where lhe denial entails a
contradiction, I argued that this part of the principle of miflicient reason was

240
 Conclusion

self-evident, and defended that view with the standard scholastic weapon
for such a purpose, the reductio ad absurdum argument. I then stated that
this reductio argument, contra what others have said, does not commit the
petitio principii fallacy when that fallacy is properly understood.
Subsequently, we looked at various texts in Aquinas that argued on
behalf of the weak and mild principles of sufficient reason. There we saw that
four arguments could be distilled from the texts of Aquinas. The first three
were on behalf of the mild principle of sufficient reason, "every contingent
being has a cause/' We saw that a contingent being can be considered in
three ways; as a whole, as the contingent part, or as the act part. In each way
we demonstrated an equivalent of the mild principle of sufficient reason;
respectively, "Every composed thing has a cause," "Every possible has a
cause," and "Everything with accidental existence has a cause." We then saw
how Aquinas' doctrine of act and potency can demonstrate a weak principle
of sufficient reason, "whatever begins to exist has a cause."
In the final section I responded to the arguments against the principle
of sufficient reason. There, for the various reasons presented, I argued (hiU
none of the four arguments we looked at were successful in undermining
our certitude regarding the principle, nor were they successful In
convincingly limiting that principle to just the mind or the physical world.
Noted philosophical atheist J. L. Mackie once said, "There is no
sufficient reason to regard the principle of sufficient reason to be valid."'
Have I shown Mackie's statement to be false? That is something every
reader must decide for themselves.

31.1.. Mftcklfi 1k$ Mthuh of'lheiami Arguments Ivr and Against the Existence of God
(New Yorki Onfttni Unlwitty Prm, tutu), ui\,
The principal aim ol ihis essay, however, is tmi i«> dcirriiiiiie ihc
historical pedigree ol an idea. I I civ we are eoiuvmrd with a single
question; namely, what good reasons are there for dunking die pi im ipl.
of sufficient reason is true? Ihis all-important question must he handled
by arguments and not historical surveys. Given the above, 1 hope it is
clear that this question is of fundamental importance to philosophy.

Many laypeople will find this purpose silly. Our metaphysical intuitions
tell us that or course, something cannot be caused or determined by
nothing. Almost all of our day-to-day actions presuppose that something
cannot come to be from nothing. We hear a knock on the door and seek
to see who is doing the knocking. We get sick and wonder where we
caught the disease. Everyday life is literally inundated with causal
inferences. On this score, the layperson has a good point; the principle ol
sufficient reason certainly enjoys a tremendous amount of intuitive
plausibility.

Yet a defense of the "obvious" has never been anathema in philosophy.

Aristotle devoted a significant amount of time to defending the principle
of non-contradiction, and such an effort is not misguided. A sound
philosophy attempts to explain "the obvious." A defense of the principle
of sufficient reason is important because a defense of first principles is
important.

Scott M. Sullivan holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of St.

Thomas in Houston, TX. He is the author of An Introduction To Traditional
Logic and is also the founder of Classical Theist productions, a company
devoted to teaching the Christian intellectual tradition and making it
accesiblc through modern technologies.

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