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Carbon Colonialism: A postcolonial assessment of carbon offsetting

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University of Bonn / United Nations University - EHS

Prof. Dr. Julia Verne

RESEARCH PAPER

Image Source: Juergen PM (2019) Smoke

Carbon Colonialism
A Postcolonial Assessment of Carbon Offsetting

Submitted by
Caitlyn Eberle, Nadja Münstermann & Jana Siebeneck
Matriculation no. 3208970, 3214382, 3147213
M.Sc. Geography of Environmental Risks & Human Security
Postcolonial Perspectives
28 November 2019
 Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the many people who helped make this research a reality:

❖ To our interviewees who were so generous with their time and indispensable insights;
Dr. Jean Carlo Rodriguez, Tamra Gilbertson, Andrea Guerrero Garcia, Prof. Dr.
Almeida Sitoe, Kai Landwehr and Prof. Dr. Kristen Lyons - and to those who
preferred to remain anonymous.
❖ To our professor, Prof. Dr. Julia Verne, for helping us mold our ideas into something
we are proud to present.
❖ To our brilliant classmates who served as shining stars of motivation; Linus, Joshua,
Subasana, Angela, Johanna, Haniel, Flora, Alena, Nimmi, Nataliia, Than, Patricia,
Nathalie, Lorina, Melanie, Abhinav, Irfan, and Romy.
❖ To our podcast wizard, Clemens Binder, for composing the music and helping us
record our podcast that serves as a supplement to this paper.
❖ To our podcast coach, Andreas Lange, for his time and effort to teach us on how to
create a successful podcast.
❖ To our first listeners and readers, for providing constructive criticism and making us
think outside of our boxes; Alan Leoni, Dan Eberle.
❖ And finally, to all those out there who are fighting for fair and just climate action. We
see you, we hear you, and we thank you for your commitment.

From the very bottom of our hearts, ​thank you​. This project would not have been possible
without your help and inspiration.

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

ABSTRACT 4

INTRODUCTION 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 6
Theoretical Background 6
Literature Review 7
Expert Interviews 7

FINDINGS 8
Carbon Offsetting Mechanisms 9
The Kyoto Protocol 9
International Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation 10
The Clean Development Mechanism 10
REDD 11
From Kyoto to Paris 12
CDM in Paris 12
Criticism Across Scales 13
A Mechanism in Critique on a Global Level 13
Misplaced Eurocentric Knowledge 14
Neo-Imperial Practices - REDD in the Focus of Criticism 15
Economy of Spatial Conceptions and Political Ecology - The Case of Green Resources 16
Demands for Decision-Makers 17
Response to Criticism 18
A Last Resort 18
More Good than Harm 19
Save the Sinking Ship 21

DISCUSSION 22

FROM RESEARCH TO PODCAST 25

Behind the Scenes 25

CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 26

BIBLIOGRAPHY 28

ANNEX I: Interview Questions 34

ANNEX II: Interviewees 35

2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDM Clean Development Mechanism

CERs Certified Emissions Reductions
COP Conference of the Parties
EU European Union
GHGs Greenhouse Gases
IET International Emissions Trading
JI Joint Implementation
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry
NDC Nationally Determined Contributions
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WRM World Rainforest Movement

3
ABSTRACT

Carbon offsetting has been proposed as a win-win solution to mitigate climate change; one
that helps the Global North meet their emission caps while promoting sustainable
development in the Global South. However, this strategy has accumulated much criticism over
the years, particularly in regards to “carbon colonialism;” the practice of claiming space in the
Global South to meet the needs of the Global North in the name of carbon dioxide reduction.
Through literature reviews, policy analysis, and expert interviews, this research provides an
overview of carbon offsetting mechanisms as well as the opinions and positions from both
proponents and critics of carbon offsetting. We analyze this data through the lens of
postcolonialism to determine how far the term ​carbon colonialism is justified and hence, to
what extent this critique is reason enough to demand a systematic change in the way we deal
with carbon offsetting mechanisms on a global level. Emphasis is placed on reconciling the
Global North’s responsibility for historical emissions (and subsequent duty to help the Global
South survive its effects) with the legacy of colonialism and overarching power structures that
make such interventions difficult to implement responsibly.

Keywords: Carbon Offsetting, Postcolonialism, Clean Development Mechanism, Climate

Change, Carbon Market

4
 INTRODUCTION
Climate change is one of the defining issues of our time and there is a mounting urgency for
countries to reduce their emissions and to promote sustainable development initiatives. Over the past
two decades, the practice of carbon offsetting has been implemented as a climate policy mechanism
that combines development initiatives with carbon reduction efforts, touted as a win-win scenario. It
encourages continued economic output by allowing industries to maintain their emission rates under
the condition that they compensate for them by investing in carbon sequestration initiatives elsewhere.
Investing in emission reductions in other countries is seen as more of an incentive, as it is both
cost-effective and beneficial for technology and resource transfer. The rationale behind carbon
offsetting is that it has the same effect on the atmosphere to reduce a ton of carbon anywhere in the
world, so these mechanisms allow for those needed reductions to take place in the least expensive
manner while also supporting development in the Global South ​(​Roht-Arriaza 2010​)​.
This practice of carbon offsetting has faced mounting criticism, seen as allowing wealthy
countries to buy the right to pollute more than their agreed-upon caps and simultaneously transfer the
responsibility of mitigation and sequestration to the countries in which the investment is made, which
are predominantly located in the Global South [​Gilbertson 2017​, ​Agarwal & Narain 1998​,
Chakrabarty 2012​]. Industrialized countries like the U.S. and countries in the EU, which account for
10% of the world population, are responsible for around 45% of Carbon Dioxide (CO​2​) emissions
(​UN World Population Prospects 2019​). Exceeding allocated carbon caps by investing in carbon
sequestration initiatives in the Global South through carbon offsetting mechanisms has been seen as a
shirking of this responsibility ​(​Parker 1999​)​. Moreover, there are questions arising, such as: why should
non-industrialized countries sacrifice their autonomy and development opportunities to make up for
the damage caused by industrialized countries? These concerns have been captured by the phrase
“carbon colonialism,” pointing out the commodification behind these processes playing a role in
enforcing global power structures between Global North and Global South (​Bachram 2004​).
Our research will analyze the mechanisms of carbon offsetting, the critique labeled as carbon
colonialism, and how the criticism is addressed in climate politics. Building on this, our research will
respond to the resulting questions of how far the term carbon colonialism is justified and hence, ​to what
extent this critique is reason enough to demand a systemic change in the way we deal with carbon
offsetting mechanisms on a global level.
In the following chapters, findings from academic research, diverse expert interviews, and case
studies will be presented in order to analyze the practice of carbon offsetting. Subsequently, the
findings will be discussed through the lens of postcolonialism, post-development, and political ecology

5
in responding to the research question. In addition to this research, a podcast was produced to serve as
a dissemination tool for awareness-raising and as a stimulus for public discourse.
While there is an abundance of documentation on the criticism of the biggest polluters and
their impact on climate change (the substance of the carbon colonialism term), our research aims to fill
a literature gap on how this criticism is addressed in overarching climate change mitigation policies and
strategies. Furthermore, this research seeks to provide practical relevance as a thought-provoking
impetus to examine global practices for carbon mitigation and to rethink them for the benefit of
affected people and the environment.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter will present the methods that were used for approaching the research question.
Besides introducing the theories that later set the foundation for the analysis and discussion of the
findings, the following sub-chapters will portray how the literature review was conducted and expert
interviews were organized and structured. Finally, this chapter includes a critical reflection on the
methods and their limitations.

Theoretical Background
Foundational to answering our research question is an analysis of the relationship between the
colonized and colonizing powers in the international effort to mitigate the effects of climate change.
We conducted our analysis through the lenses of post-development and political ecology under the
more overarching theme of postcolonialism in order to create a multidimensional understanding of
the implications of carbon offsetting across scales.
The postcolonial discourse arose out of the 1970’s Marxist and liberalist conceptualizations as
a critique of the effects of colonization and imperialism on cultures throughout the world
(​Chakrabarty 2012​). ​Though historians used the term “postcolonial” to designate the period after
World War II when states were gaining independence from European colonizers, today the term has
come to refer to the persistent social, political and cultural effects of colonization. Post-colonial theory
assumes that, after the formal end of colonization, colonial thought patterns and structures continue
to exist and work in favor of former colonial powers. Thus, the legacy of colonialism can be seen in
eurocentric forms of knowledge, spatial conception, unjust global economic relations, and
neo-imperial policies as well as the efforts of resistance opposing them (​Gebhardt et al 2012​). In this
research paper we define postcolonialism as the analysis and criticism of the social and political power
relationships that identify the lingering unequal power structures that perpetuate colonialism, which
we used to analyze carbon offsetting initiatives and their impact on countries of the Global South.

6
 In addition, post-development theory argues that the discourse of development created more
harm than good over the past decades due to the division of the world into ‘developed’ and
‘underdeveloped’ countries and its underlying western-centred dissemination of cultural and societal
ideas, the definition of development as economic growth, and the exercise of power of the
industrialized countries over so-called developing countries through this narrative ​(​Escobar 1985​,
Matthews 2004​, ​Ziai 2004​). The main argument of post-development theory is that the development
process is socially constructed and continues to reflect a pattern of Western hegemony and economic
supremacy despite modern efforts to change (​Reuber 2012​). Hence, we will in particular focus on
these aspects while analyzing carbon offsetting against the backdrop of the predominant dichotomy of
the industrialized Global North and the Global South that is ‘lagging behind’ (​Ziai 2004​).
Political ecology, emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s, argues that the costs and benefits
of environmental change are not distributed evenly in the world (​Bryant & Bailey 1997​). This is
particularly relevant in discussions of the effects of climate change and its disproportionate effects on
developing nations. Different environmental factors reinforce or reduce already existing social and
economic inequalities, therefore the environment influences political and social systems. On the other
hand, the political and social systems in place have a direct effect on the way the environment and
corresponding resources are treated. We will focus this line of thinking on the spatial conceptions and
interactions between global and national political forces, private economic actors, as well as their
impacts on environmental consequences for local communities.

Literature Review
Our research reviewed and analyzed both academic and policy documents. As carbon
offsetting is an approved practice by the Kyoto Protocol and its amendments, public records by the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), legislative texts and the
related documents were fundamental for this research, as well as from organizations involved in
certifying emission reduction credits and implementing projects viable for those credits. Academic
journals and databases were searched using the terms “carbon colonialism,” “carbon offsetting,”
“environmental justice,” “climate change and human rights” and other similar phrases, input to
Google Scholar, JStor, Science Direct, and ResearchGate.

Expert Interviews
The nature of this paper’s research question resulted in the need for an analysis of values,
principles, and opinions of both sides of the debate. Justice and justification are social constructs
whose meanings depend on their contexts. Hence, an important aspect of our research included

7
focusing on the experiences of experts that needed to be interpreted in recognition of their diverse
backgrounds and operational contexts. In order to ensure that a representative range of the most
relevant expertise for the issue was covered, the chosen experts represent post-colonial researchers on
the one hand and on the other hand, academics and employees working in public and private
institutions and companies involved in or working with global offsetting mechanisms. Furthermore,
the selection of experts also intended to represent different regions in the world that are of importance
given the spatial dimension of the history of colonialism. The interviews were conducted both in
person and on the phone, usually via Skype; and a limited number of responses were received via email.
Interviewees were informed about the scope and subject of the project prior to the interview.
Although a set of questions were sent out to potential interviewees (Annex-I), the interviews were
semi-structured and informal, lasting for about an hour on average. Interviewees were also asked for
consent to have the conversation recorded for the purpose of transcribing and analyzing. Some
interviewees did so on the condition of anonymity.
Expert interviews are used in particular to analyze the perspectives, opinions and empirical
knowledge of the interviewees (​Flick et al 2013​). However, a disadvantage of expert interviews is that
the completeness of factual knowledge and the perfect truth cannot be guaranteed (​ibid​).
Additionally, other limitations encountered in our expert interviews revolved around time constraints
and scheduling conflicts, as well as difficulties accessing some relevant actors in this process. Finally, it
has to be considered that this paper faces certain methodological limitations. First, due to the limited
scope, the research does not include empirical data generated by the authors. Furthermore, we, the
authors, do not claim to represent any marginalized groups described in this paper. Therefore, it must
be considered that information presented, e.g., appraisals about indigenous people’s activities, lives, or
opinions, went through our own perspective that may have been influenced by our position.

FINDINGS
Based on the information collected from literature, policy documents, online public records,
and expert interviews analyzed through a theoretical lens, the following chapter presents our research
findings. They have been organized into thematic groups, following a conceptual storyline: from
explaining the background and logic of carbon offsetting, providing real-world case studies
exemplifying the carbon colonialism critique and its justification, and finally analyzing the criticisms’
impact on policy and the response from policymakers.

8
 Carbon Offsetting Mechanisms
Since the conceptualization and codification of carbon market mechanisms through the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 and its adoption in 2005 ​(U
​ NFCCC 1​)​, different categories and subcategories of
carbon markets and mechanisms have spawned on the international, regional and national level, which
are often -rather opaquely - interlinked with one another. We do not attempt to provide an in-depth
overview of all existing mechanisms here, as this would far exceed the scope and purpose of this
research paper, and has been extensively documented elsewhere (see for example Michaelowa et al.).
Instead, we will present a brief overview of the three core emissions market mechanisms introduced by
the Kyoto Protocol. We then provide a select review of market mechanisms that have developed on the
basis of Kyoto over time with a focus on the international carbon offsetting tool, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), due to its relevance to the colonialism critique, and concluding
with an outline of how market mechanisms are (to be) included in the latest iteration of a global
climate Agreement, the Paris Agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocols’ primary aim was to limit countries’ Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)
emissions by setting global emission caps. The Protocol recognized that the primary burden of
responsibility for emissions reductions falls on industrialised countries, in light of their
disproportionately emission-intensive 150 years of industrialization. Therefore, the global agreement
was anchored in the idea of ​common but differentiated responsibilities ​(​UNFCCC 1​).​ ​In practice, this
meant that while so-called “developing” or non-industrialized countries were included in the Protocol
and its global emission reduction targets, only industrialised countries, identified in Annex-I of the
Protocol, were given country specific “assigned amounts” i.e. emission caps, limiting how much they
were permitted to emit (​Prag et al 2012​)​. These caps and targets are split into two commitment
periods, from 2008 – 2012 and from ​2013 –
​ 2​ 020 (​UNFCCC 1​).
While the Kyoto Protocol calls for domestic measures as the primary means to achieve the set
emissions reduction targets, it also introduced additional means of doing so (​UNFCCC 1997​). These
took the form of three market-based mechanisms that bestowed emissions with economic value,
making them a tradable asset: the more emissions one reduces, the more economic benefit one reaps.
This was intended as a way to engage state and non-state stakeholders and incentivise their investments
in emissions reducing and sustainable development practices (​Prag et al 2012​, ​Kreibich & Hermwille
2017​).

9
 The three market-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are named: (1) International
Emissions Trading; (2) Joint Implementation and (3) the Clean Development Mechanism.

International Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation

The Kyoto Protocol foresaw international emissions trading as a tool for supporting Annex I
countries to achieve reductions. Emissions trading is permitted when countries have managed to
remain under their emission caps and therefore can sell their excess emissions allowances to countries
who have or will likely exceed their permitted emissions allowances ​(B
​ MU, “Kyoto Mechanisms”​).​
This aims to incentivize achieving emissions reductions beyond the set targets, and disincentivize
exceeding the set targets by introducing monetary consequences for doing so ​(​Kreibich & Hermwille
2017​).​ Because carbon dioxide is the chief GHGs in emissions, the tracking of the sale, price, and trade
behavior of this commodity is known as the c​ arbon market ​(​UNFCCC 2​)​.
A second mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is the Joint Implementation (JI) tool ​(​UNFCCC
3​)​. This allows for an Annex-I country to jointly invest in or co-finance emissions reduction projects in
other Annex-I countries. The emissions reductions attained through this project can be credited to the
investing countries’ target. The benefit of doing so for the investing country is that it provides a
flexible means for attaining their emissions targets, while the host country receives foreign investment
and technology transfer. These projects must adhere to the principle of additionality, and must
provide a reduction of emissions or enhance the removal of emissions (for example through GHG
sinks) (​ibid​).

The Clean Development Mechanism

“The mechanism is seen by many as a trailblazer. It is the first global, environmental investment and
credit scheme of its kind, providing a standardized emissions offset instrument, CERs” (​ U
​ NFCCC 5​).

Operational since 2006, the CDM allows for projects to be implemented in non-Annex-I
countries with no determined emissions reductions obligations. The projects’ achieved emissions
savings are certified as tradable standardized “Certified Emissions Reductions”, or CERs and can be
credited to Annex-I countries through their direct participation in a CDM project, or through
purchasing CERs from an accredited partner separately, therewith funding the projects without
participating in them (​ibid​). The goal is thus to make emissions reductions cost-effective and attainable
for Annex-I countries, while simultaneously assisting non-Annex I countries in achieving sustainable
development ​(​Lecocq & Ambrosi 2007​).​ CDM projects aim to induce investments in clean emissions
reducing projects in non-Annex-I countries, where they may otherwise have not occurred, and

10
simultaneously allow for “leapfrogging” over fossil fuel dependency through renewable energy
technology transfers from the participating, to the host countries (​ ​ENTTRANS Consortium 2008​)​.
The regulatory framework of the Kyoto mechanisms is contained in the Kyoto Protocol, its
Reference Manual as well in following Conference of the Parties (COP) agreements. The modalities
and procedures for the CDM were detailed in the Marrakesh Accords (​UNFCCC 2001​). These
Accords explain that the CDM must work on the basis of additionality, meaning that Parties are not
permitted to comply with their set emission reduction targets exclusively through the Kyoto
mechanisms, instead they can only use them in addition to domestic efforts. CDM activities may
moreover not divert any official development assistance that would have otherwise been committed.
Any CDM projects may only occur with the approval of the host countries’ Designated National
Authorities. The CDM is overseen by an Executive Board, which is accountable to the Parties of the
Kyoto Protocol (​UNFCCC 2001​). The legislative text, however, remains vague regarding the
percentile distribution of the additionality criteria as the Parties were unable to agree on more precise
wording for the regulation (​Kreibich & Hermwille 2017​). Through a levy on the CERs, the CDM also
functions as the main source of finance for the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund, which supports
adaptation projects in non-Annex I countries identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change
(​Grimm et al 2018​)​.

REDD

REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. REDD
embodies the international ambition to combat deforestation, conserve biodiversity and ecosystems,
while fostering sustainable development. REDD has its roots in the Kyoto Protocols’ Articles 2 and 3
which task Parties with (2:1:a:ii) protecting and enhancing GHG sinks [...] promoting sustainable
forest management, afforestation and reforestation (A/R), (2:1:a:iii) promoting sustainable
agriculture, and (3:3) states that removals of GHGs through sinks or Land use, Land-use Change, and
Forestry (LULUCF) activities limited to A/R shall be used to meet emissions commitments by Annex
I countries (​UNFCCC 1997​). In 2001, the Marrakesh Accords led to LULUCF activities limited to
A/R being recognised as a tool to be used as instruments to be used under CDM (CP.7:3:7:a)
(​UNFCCC 2001​). These REDD activities under the CDM are limited in their scope to A/R, and are,
in accordance with the fundamental CDM provisions mentioned above, required to provide
additionality, avoid leakages, and demonstrate permanence (​The REDD Desk 2016​). Between 2007
and 2013, 13 further decisions were taken by the UNFCCC in COPs on how REDD activities may
take place. The expansion of this legislative framework that goes beyond the CDM limit of A/R, has
since the 2010 Cancun Agreements been dubbed REDD+. This includes not only A/R but is tasked

11
with (a) Reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c)
Conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forests; (e) Enhancement of
forest carbon stocks (​The REDD Desk 2016​).

From Kyoto to Paris

The Kyoto Protocol is a pillar of the global legislative emissions regime and laid the
groundwork for a host of mechanisms and international agreements around climate change mitigation
efforts. Its targets provided a solid basis for the new global climate agreement negotiated in Paris in
2015. The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016. Its central aim is to keep global temperature rise
this century below 2 degrees Celsius and aims at limiting it to 1.5 degrees (​UNFCCC 2015​). The Paris
Agreement differs from its predecessor as regards carbon targets, as both Annex I and non-Annex I (in
Paris called “developed” and “developing”) countries adopted mitigation commitments in the form of
Nationally Determined Contributions (​UNFCCC 4​)​. Moreover, it places substantial focus on
supporting developing countries and the most vulnerable countries. It also clearly lays out that
emissions reductions will be scaled for developing countries in view of their delayed “emissions peaks”
vis-à-vis industrialised countries, highlighting that emissions reductions are based on the principle of
equity and sustainable development (​ibid​). Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement covers a
host of different climate change action mechanisms and does not focus solely on market-based
instruments (​UNFCCC 2015​, for a summary of these mechanisms and tools see: U
​ NFCCC 4​).

CDM in Paris

While the Paris Agreements’ Article 6 does establish a market mechanism to contribute to
GHG mitigation and sustainable development ​(​UNFCCC 6​)​, it is unclear how and if the CDM will
be taken up in the Paris Agreement concretely ​(​Kreibich & Hermwille 2017​, ​Michaelowa et al 2019​)​.
Indeed, Müller and Michaelowa call the vagueness of Article 6 a means of “constructed ambiguity”, to
provisionally include market based mechanisms, and temporarily avoid the difficulties associated with
attaining global agreement of its operationalisation ​(​Müller & Michaelowa 2019​)​. A search of the
online resources published by the United Nations (UN) revealed that recent initiatives post-2015
continue to refer to the Certified Emissions Reductions, introduced by the CDM. For instance,
Climate Neutral Now, an initiative launched by the UN in 2015, encourages governments,
organisations and citizens to compensate the climate footprint they cannot avoid by buying CERs for
“climate friendly projects vetted by the UNFCCC”, which “rewards these projects located in
developing countries” ​(​UNFCCC 1​)​. Similarly, the UN Carbon Offset Platform features projects

12
implemented in developing countries, following the CDM format. However, neither mention the
CDM and do not specify under which mechanism carbon offsetting is intended to function.
It is unclear how and on which legislative basis carbon offsetting is going to function after the
end of the Kyoto Protocols’ second commitment period in 2020. Indeed, the latest COP in Katowice
failed to agree on the rules for the Paris Article 6 market mechanism, and the decision was deferred to
the next COP ​(​Sharma et al 2018​).​ Interviewees from the UN confirmed that negotiations on these
mechanisms are still underway, with a plan to finalize decisions at the 2019 COP25 in Madrid,
(Anonymous UN New York, personal communication, Oct. 2019).

Criticism Across Scales

Whereas governments and international actors celebrated the negotiation successes that lead to
global climate agreements and carbon offsetting initiatives between the Global North and Global
South under the CDM, this market-based approach to mitigating climate change has been strongly
criticised for further increasing global power imbalances and providing a new platform for
exploitation across scales (​Bachram 2004​, ​Nüsser 2014​, ​McAfee 2016​). The research results in this
chapter will present an overview of the main points of criticism from the global to local scale and the
underlying empirical evidence on the basis of which critics justify the term carbon colonialism.

A Mechanism in Critique on a Global Level

The objectives of the CDM are clear: creating a win-win situation for countries, companies
and local people in the Global South by providing socio-economic, environmental and infrastructural
benefits for their communities. However, according to critics, the reality looks different (​Lyons &
Westoby 2014​, ​McAffee 2016​). The mechanism is rather seen as shifting the problem and the
responsibility for emission reduction from polluters in the Global North to people in the Global
South, who are at the same time disproportionately affected by climate change (​Parker 1999​). The
opportunity to offset emissions is, despite the costs for carbon credits, cheaper than to reduce their
emissions at source and easier to implement than a systematic change (​ibid​). Tamra Gilbertson,
founder and Co-Director of Carbon Trade Watch, considers this to be a loophole that prevents
effective climate change mitigation and increases existing global inequalities between the Global North
and South (Gilbertson, personal communication, Oct. 2019). Even a climate policy expert from the
UNFCCC expresses doubt that local small-scale projects can make a difference in the light of
large-scale pollution and describes carbon offsetting as “[...]just a window to showcase that you are
doing something” while still striving for profit (Anonymous UNFCCC, personal communication,
Oct. 2019). The attempt to secure endless economic growth is seen as the capitalist logic that serves as

13
the foundation of the CDM, believing that the global market can handle climate change issues but is
instead creating winners and losers (​Ullström 2017​). Jean Carlo Rodríguez de Francisco, a researcher in
Environmental Governance at Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, argues that “capitalism
tries to reinvent itself as a solution to what it has created” and criticises that offsetting interventions
reinforce historical dynamics of postcolonial nature. ​Sassen (2013) refers to carbon offsetting under
the CDM as a neoliberal approach; a new global structural adjustment programme that leads to a
“process of disassembling of national territory” by promoting privatization and a shift in norms and
jurisdictions fostering land grabs and violent displacements (​Lyons & Westoby 2014​). The resulting
western-dominated commodification of forests and natural resources lays the ground for the criticism
of carbon colonialism (Gilbertson, personal communication, Oct. 2019; Lyons & Westoby 2014).
Carbon colonialism focuses on the domination and/or exploitation of land areas and local
communities (​Ullström 2017​) and can be defined as “(Climate) Violence and forced land
expropriation in countries of the Global South that is a consequence of carbon offsetting by
corporations of industrialized countries” (​Mittal 2017​). This means that colonialism, in the form of
eurocentric forms of knowledge, spatial conceptions, unjust global economic relations, and
neo-imperial policies, is seen as being promoted through global climate policies, specifically the CDM
as it is institutionalizing carbon offsetting initiatives of the Global North in the Global South
(​Gebhardt et al 2012​). In the following, evidence will be presented substantiating the indicators for
carbon colonialism.

Misplaced Eurocentric Knowledge

The building of large-scale dams for low-carbon hydro-power, especially in Asia, are
experiencing a new renaissance in the light of climate policies and the CDM, despite the fact that
mass-displacements and severe social and environmental impacts lead to a decline of those projects,
already in the 1990s. According to Nüsser (2014)​, this phenomenon reflects a postcolonial paradigm
of technological narratives in light of the socioeconomic, political and ecological aspects of
hydro-engineering. More concretely, studies by ​Baghel (2014) have shown that many hydrological
models that serve as a guideline for the dams in Asia are based on models of even-flowing perennial
rivers in the United States and Europe that refer to annual average rainfall and stream flow data instead
of using seasonal data that would be needed for the climate in South Asia. He criticises that this
undifferentiated misplacement of knowledge under the notion of universal replicability by national
authorities is fundamentally in conflict with local knowledge and traditional practices for water
management. ​Werner (2014) argues that indigenous knowledge, local infrastructure and conservation
efforts are of high value for evaluating the building of large dams beyond the top-down cost-benefit

14
analysis. Denying a contribution of large dams to sustainable development and calling them
carbon-colonialist, ​Erlewein (2014) demands a termination of CDM funds for those projects.
Moreover, he points out that the mechanism misses its goals of supporting poor countries, since the
dam projects are largely to be found in China, India and Brazil, which are enriched by the economic
advantages. Kristen Lyons, Professor of Social Science at the University of Queensland, Australia,
identifies a colonial narrative and supremacist thinking in the import of new technologies which
overlook indigenous approaches for solution, resulting in an overtone that outsiders know best
(Lyons, personal communication, Nov. 2019).

Neo-Imperial Practices - REDD in the Focus of Criticism

Due to its direct link to the CDM, especially REDD projects have been subject to many
studies, providing evidence for the indicators of carbon colonialism. In 2015, the World Rainforest
Movement (WRM) published a compilation of empirical evidence from 24 REDD projects in 12
different countries in Africa, Latin America and Indonesia, that show human rights abuses, land grabs
and violence ​(​Kill 2015​)​. Cases include violent displacements of communities for forest plantation
where people were shot by a so-called “green police” when they tried to enter the forest again that had
been their home for generations (Guaraqueçaba Climate Action in Paraná, Brazil, financed by General
Motors, American Electric Power, and Chevron). Other cases showed fines and prison sentences for
small-scale slash and burn agriculture without providing information, compensation or support for
alternative farming activities to local people (e.g. the Holistic Conservation Programme for Forests'
(HCPF) in Madagascar, run by World Wildlife Foundation Madagascar, financed by Air France, the
French Global Environment Facility and the French Development Agency). In all cases, governments
and companies from the Global North (mainly Sweden, Canada, France, Germany, Norway,
Switzerland, UK, USA) paid subsidiary companies in the respective countries and/or international and
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to set up and manage those land areas for carbon
offsetting projects under the CDM (​Kill 2015​). Whereas the projects were often based on the narrative
that traditional subsistence farming harms the environment, they resulted in severe consequences for
local communities and at the same time, generated large profits for the stakeholders and carbon credits
for polluting industries of the Global North (​ibid​). In the course of the study, the WRM captured
local voices that mirror the colonial aspect of these initiatives: We are "[...]suffering here to help them
over there"; “Through carbon credits, they keep polluting, they keep earning more. And it’s the
community that pays the price for all of this” ​(​Kill 2015​).​
Another risk for local communities is that they become highly dependent on the global market
price for tonnes of carbon through these projects, which has shown to be highly fragile, without a

15
back-up plan in case the forestry company gets into financial difficulties (Sitoe, personal
communication, Oct. 2019). For example, the N’hambeta Community Carbon Project in central
Mozambique promotes agroforestry systems, so that people can grow trees in their agricultural field
crops for carbon sequestration. In return, they get paid based on market conditions for carbon offsets
(ibid). However, due to the rapid decrease of the carbon price on the global market, the project ended
up failing as it lost its capital to cover the costs of the management. “So, the market mechanism,
actually killed the initiative” (ibid).
Jean Carlo Rodríguez de Francisco is aware of those cases and criticises REDD for focusing on
the small drivers of deforestation rather than using its political power to tackle large-scale industrial
root causes of forest loss and climate change. In our interview, he noted: “If you focus on small farmers
that have to pay the price so that companies in the Global North can keep emitting, then you have an
issue of environmental justice and great inequality” (Rodríguez de Francisco, personal
communication, Oct. 2019). In addition, Gilbertson points out that those approaches present a severe
risk to local communities all over the world as their livelihoods highly depend on those forests: “They
are earth protectors, they're protecting those forests, because the forests represent their spirituality, it's
their pharmacy, it's their life, like they can't live without them. They know that, and there's
generational, cultural significance and spiritual significance for them. And that goes for all indigenous
people on the planet” (Gilbertson, personal communication, Oct. 2019). Besides, Lyons adds that
while indigenous people make up only five percent of the world's population, they are home to and
manage lands that house over 80 percent of the world’s biodiversity. At the same time they are the ones
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Lyons, personal communication, Nov. 2019).

Economy of Spatial Conceptions and Political Ecology - The Case of Green Resources

The case of the private Norwegian company Green Resources is probably the case of largest
scale to which carbon colonialism critics relate. Due to elaborated studies on Green Resources by the
Oakland Institute and grassroot NGOs, detailed information is available on evidence in support of the
criticism. Founded in 1995, Green Resources consists of 105, mostly Norwegian, shareholders and
represents with ten plantations of over 38.000 hectare in Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique the
largest tree plantation company in Africa, South Africa excluded (​Green Resources​).
In Mozambique, the company set up main objectives for their first afforestation/reforestation
project in 2014, such as the “conservation of natural forests and biodiversity; and economic and social
development of the communities and areas encompassed by the plantations” (​WRM 2018​). However,
while Green Resources occupied land along water sources, rivers, roads and settlement areas for
subsistence farming, the prohibition of access for all communities lead to countless land conflicts

16
(​ibid​). According to Almeida A. Sitoe, Professor for Forestry at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
in Maputo, Mozambique, Green Resources participated in the usual procedures in the preparation
phases of the projects that consider negotiations for agreements between the companies, national or
local governments and community leaders. He argues that the company makes great promises for
economic development, job creation and building of infrastructure. However, after people agree to
provide access to their land, the promises are not fulfilled (Sitoe, personal communication, Oct. 2019).
Gilbertson argues that those tragedies often evolve on grounds of language problem between
community leaders and government or company representatives. Nevertheless, knowing that local
representatives most likely did not fully understand the consequences, all parties still have them sign
contracts that often include leases for up to 100 years for indigenous lands (Gilbertson, personal
communication, Oct. 2019). In response to the allegations, Green Resources called it a
misunderstanding and claimed that it rather was the government’s responsibility to develop social
infrastructure and seemed to forget about a consultation with local communities that was published
by the Woodmark Forest Certification Public Report, stating that “Green Resources promised social
infrastructure construction, including schools, water wells and health posts” (​WRM 2018​).
In Uganda, Green Resources' first CDM project was the Kachung Forest, for which the
company signed a 4 million USD contract with the Swedish Energy Agency for carbon offsetting their
emissions from 2012 to 2032 (​Westoby & Lyons 2015​). ​In this case, however, a Green Resources
subsidiary destroyed native forest of 8,000 to 10.000 hectares in Bukalega, only to replant
monocultures of eucalyptus and pine trees for commercial use (​Lyons & Westoby 2014​). About 8,000
people from 13 villages were denied their land rights and displaced from their homes without
compensation (​ibid​). In Tanzania, Green Resources plantation projects showed similar outcomes such
as “displaced communities, poor working conditions, the destruction of biodiversity [and] reduced
availability of water [etc.]” (​Karumbidza & Menne 2011​). Throughout the different regions, the
settling of Green Resources is widely associated with brutal or violent displacements of whole
communities, which is undertaken by company staff, national or state police (​Lyons & Westoby
2014​).

Demands for Decision-Makers

Against the backdrop of persisting power structures and human rights abuses, the World
Rainforest Movement demands a stop to funding REDD projects and address the root causes of
climate change and forest losses instead (​Kill 2015​). Gilbertson states that the practice of carbon
offsetting needs to be terminated altogether in order to focus solely on the taxation of pollution and an
effective reduction of greenhouse gases through legislation without rewarding it with carbon credits

17
(Gilbertson, personal communication, Oct. 2019) While Lyons agrees with Gilbertson on the
neglection of local voices with respect to her own field research, she does see some chances for carbon
offsetting initiatives in case of a strong integration in the ongoing efforts surrounding the Paris
Agreement: “We need to create platforms for participation where that diversity of interests is not just
heard but is actually influential in the decision making process” She demands “solutions based
approaches driven by the interests and ideas of particularly indigenous, those most vulnerable
communities” while referring to the principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent that are
recognised in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Lyons, personal
communication, Nov. 2019).
In conclusion, local people, research institutions, experts and organizations present evidence
for land grabbing, human rights abuses, violence, exploitation and conflict as direct consequences of
carbon offsetting initiatives under the CDM without a clear transparency for responsibility.

Response to Criticism
According to Kristen Lyons, ​the term ​carbon colonialism is purposefully severe in order to
elicit a response from private and public stakeholders, and thus there is a growing awareness of the
problematic nature of ignoring the social component of offsetting (personal communication, Oct.
2019). In the scope of this research, we conducted interviews with United Nations representatives and
people involved in carbon offsetting mechanisms in order to receive some responses to the criticisms
outlined above, which will be presented in the following chapter.

A Last Resort

Though carbon offsetting is criticized as a means for countries in the Global North to avoid
actually reducing emissions locally, the offsetting mechanisms in place have explicit regulations to keep
this from happening. The CERs under the CDM are written explicitly to be used as a supplement to,
and not in replacement of, significant domestic action on climate change (​UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol
Articles 2,6,17​). Several interviewees agreed on this, saying “the preferred option is to reduce pollution
at the source, eliminate it;” (Anonymous UNFCCC, personal communication, Oct. 2019) and
“[Offsetting is] kind of worse or useless if you don't try to avoid CO​2 emissions,” (Landwehr, personal
communication, Oct. 2019). Therefore, offsetting is a means of last resort when it is no longer possible
to reduce emissions in a country’s own industries, either because the technology is not available or the
cost would be too great to implement realistically. An official from UN New York made an example
from the country of New Zealand, saying “they’re at almost 100% renewable energy generation
already. The biggest part of their emissions profile comes from agriculture, which is actually relatively

18
limited to what you can do in terms of preventing emissions…” So, if New Zealand wants to
contribute to reducing carbon emissions, their only real option is to participate in the carbon market,
investing in emission reductions elsewhere to compensate for the inability to reduce more emissions
locally. He says, “if that genuinely results in reduced global emissions then I think it's a good thing”
(Anonymous UN New York, personal communication, Oct. 2019). The Carbon Footprint
Consultancy Group website made a similar claim in regards to individual emissions:

“...we should all try and reduce emissions as much as possible. However, it is not currently possible to reduce
emissions to zero on a global level […] No matter what you do to reduce your energy consumption and
carbon footprint you are almost certainly going to still be responsible for some carbon emissions - not just
from your direct energy usage, but indirectly from things you buy and services you use. - By supporting
carbon offsetting projects, you are supporting the solutions to climate change...”​ (​ C
​ arbon Offsetting FAQ​)

Therefore, carbon offsetting is a way to pay for the pollution generated in a way that reduces the
impact of that pollution. Kai Landwehr, the media manager for a private carbon offsetting company
called MyClimate, describes the situation as analogous to other types of pollution, such as wastewater
treatment. In the field of wastewater treatment, the government gives the pollution a price, the
wastewater management companies pay the price and the money is used to treat the problems,
(Landwehr, personal communication, Oct. 2019). Although carbon has a set price per ton, fines for
carbon emissions are not mandatory; the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are both voluntary
accords that individual countries do not have to commit to. The ideal situation is to have this
“polluter-pays” mechanism on a global scale; for all countries and all polluters to pay for their carbon
pollution and make efforts to reduce as much as possible at the source. An interviewee from the
UNFCCC stated that they view the CDM as a placeholder “just [to] avoid sitting doing nothing”
while we continue negotiations that will take us to critical source reduction, (Anonymous UNFCCC
2, personal communication, Oct. 2019).

More Good than Harm

Another of the aforementioned criticisms is that offsetting mechanisms harm local

communities by taking resources away from them, displacing them from their land, and pushing them
to be further marginalized. Our sources indicate that there are some instances in which this may be
true, however, the mechanisms in place specifically outline protocols against this, (​UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol Article 2:3​). Sometimes the mechanisms fail and have unfortunate consequences, but that is
neither unique to carbon offsetting nor is it a reason to discount the principle of offsetting itself
(Garcia Guerrero, personal communication, Oct. 2019). Many sources view offsetting, particularly
under mechanisms like the CDM, as a means to provide vital resources and support to countries that

19
would otherwise suffer under the consequences of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol specifically
sets this mechanism up to help non-Annex I countries (developing countries) achieve sustainable
development (​UNFCCC 1997​) and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is likely to set up a similar
initiative during negotiations at COP25 in December 2019. The UN initiative, Climate Neutral Now,
provides a list of benefits that carbon offsetting provides. They state that carbon offsetting rewards the
investment in projects in developing countries, brings sustainable development to communities (in
fields such as air/water quality, income, health, renewable energy, etc), and contributes directly to the
UN Sustainable Development Goals. ​The Japanese Ministry for the Environment, for example, has set
up what they call a “Co-Benefits Approach for GHG Emission Reduction Projects.”

“In addition to GHG mitigation CDM projects are expected to contribute to the technology transfer and
sustainable development of developing countries. It is also strongly desirable that “co-benefits” type CDM
projects will be implemented—projects that not only mitigate GHG emissions but also address local needs
for environmental quality improvement.” (​ ​Ministry for the Environment 2009​).

Forest conservation under REDD projects maintain added benefits that forests provide, such
as “water regulation, soil protection, non-timber forest products including food and fibre, climate
regulation and biodiversity” (​UN-REDD Programme 2019​). They also contribute to sustainable
livelihood development; such as forest-aquaculture management in Vietnam or enrichment planting
in Nigeria. The latter involves planting new forests consisting of indigenous timber species
intercropped with non-timber products such as bush mango with can yield up to $10,000 USD per
hectare per year from selling fruits (​UN-REDD Programme 2018​). As Landwehr puts it, “it's not only
about saving CO​2 emissions, it's about an increase in the life standards, it's about protecting biological
habitats. It's about saving animals. It's about creating jobs. It's about creating opportunities for
education for children” (Landwehr, personal communication, Oct. 2019).
One of our interviewees from the UNFCCC had first-hand examples of projects that
impacted the people in very positive ways. One project allowed households to get energy for cooking
and lighting from biomass production. He mentioned that previously, where families might have to go
to bed at six in the evening when the sun sets, they can now have the energy to read and study for
school. Another example was from a World Bank project in Uganda where the project constructed
facilities to collect urban waste and convert it into compost that is sold to farmers to put on their
fields. This means that farmers are “improving their yields from that kind of compost and also the
town is remarkably cleaner than it was before because there is now a waste management system,”
(Anonymous UNFCCC 1, personal communication, Oct. 2019). The UNFCCC published a report
stating that between 2001 and 2018, more than 1 million efficient cookstoves were installed, more
than 840,000 people were provided access to clean drinking water and more than 150 million trees

20
were planted, (​UNFCCC 2018​). Almeida Sitoe, professor of forestry from Mozambique, mentioned
that CDM projects incentivize more sustainable methods of agriculture or forestry. He spoke mainly
of West African countries (that previously used slash-and-burn agriculture techniques) who get
compensation from carbon offsetting mechanisms to invest in different agricultural techniques and
improve production capacity. He mentioned specifically that carbon offsetting mechanisms are really
good for the local people, saying “[It is] not that someone is imposing because we are poor people. No,
I see this as an opportunity to improve our living conditions” (Sitoe, personal communication, Oct.
2019).

Save the Sinking Ship

Lastly, there is a pressing urgency for climate action that surpasses any of the aforementioned
criticisms. One of our interviewees mentioned that “...the absolute priority has to be to save the
sinking ship. You know, we're in deep trouble. So, I think a lot of this stuff is quite a luxury to speak
about. I think we absolutely have to reduce emissions and then everything else I think has to be
secondary to that,” (Anonymous UN New York, personal communication, October 2019). REDD
projects are especially crucial to this point. Deforestation and land degradation account for 11% of
global carbon emissions, more than the entire global transportation industry, and the situation is only
getting worse. Since 2001, there has been a 9% decrease in global tree cover, equivalent to emitting 98.7
gigatons of CO₂, predominantly from forestry and commodity-driven deforestation (​Global Forest
Watch 2018​). There is a pressing urgency to conserve, manage and replenish our remaining global
forest stock, for carbon sequestration purposes and for all of the previously mentioned additional
benefits, before they are gone (​ibid​).
Carbon offsetting is also presented as a means to involve multiple stakeholders and spread the
word of climate action. The CDM mechanisms, in particular, encouraged the private sector to reduce
their carbon footprint voluntarily. By allowing thousands of companies to develop projects and trade
CERs, private companies “[pump] money into a wide range of projects: wind, biomass and solar
energy production; efficient cookstoves; landfill and waste management; afforestation and
reforestation; and more,” when they wouldn't have otherwise done so without the motivation
(​UNFCCC 2018​). Our interviewee from the UNFCCC said something similar, that the UN level
mechanisms put a lot of emphasis on the non-party, non-government actors and reiterated that it is a
“good approach bringing everybody on board,” (Anonymous UNFCCC 1, personal communication,
Oct. 2019). Not only companies are being made aware and motivated for climate action, but
individuals and communities too. The UNFCCC writes that the CDM has contributed to “awareness
of and action on climate change” by exposing communities to new technologies and techniques while

21
helping them understand the importance of climate action, (​UNFCCC 2018​).
Although colonialist criticism states that the Global North is imposing on the Global South
and is shirking its responsibility for emission reductions, the counter-argument is directly opposite. As
an interviewee from Uganda said,

“From the perspective of a person from the North, that is a straightforward criticism. When you look at
the perspective of a person like me coming from the South, in Uganda in particular, […] 30 years ago,
there was [sic] these emissions coming from big emissions from the North and they never used to give me
anything after all, and then right now, they are still doing the same, they haven't stopped, but they are
giving me something” (​ personal communication, Oct. 2019).

Since the Global North is responsible for the largest share of historical emissions and the Global South
will be the most disadvantaged by the effects of climate change, sustainable development is described
as a moral imperative. The legacy of colonialism allowed for countries in the Global North to be
powerful and wealthy, they have a responsibility to contribute to the sustainable development of the
Global South (​Osborn et al 2015​). In fact, simply reducing emissions at the source is not enough.
Scientists have concluded that even the strongest mitigation efforts would not avoid the further
impacts of climate change for the next few decades. Therefore, the more pressing issue now is
adaptation (​IPCC 2007​). Our interviewees described how sustainable development allows for
developing countries to become stronger while “leapfrogging” over the dependency on fossil fuels and
skip straight to renewable energy sources (Anonymous UN New York, personal communication, Oct.
2019). Offsetting is a means to invest in sustainable development and adaptation projects, which are
essential for the livelihoods of people who will be most at risk of the impacts of climate change.

DISCUSSION
In regards to the findings presented above, a strong case is made for the justification of the
term carbon colonialism. From our working definition of colonialism, the practice must include
eurocentric forms of knowledge, spatial conceptions, unjust global economic relations, and
neo-imperial policies (​Gebhardt et al 2012​). Carbon offsetting can be shown to exemplify eurocentric
forms of knowledge in the idea that the Global North controls the means of reducing emissions, and
seemingly “know better” than local populations on how best to treat their environment. Especially
given that many of the sustainable development solutions are very technocratic; this can be seen as
giving rise to a new technological determinism and additionally creating new dependencies on the
technology of the Global North. Carbon offsetting is also a market-based system, relying on capitalist
motivations to ensure its viability. This understanding of development plays into the
post-development critique of strengthening the western hegemony and determining the dichotomy of

22
developed and underdeveloped countries, that are in need of help (​Escobar 1985​). Offsetting also relies
on eurocentric spatial conceptions in the form of commodities and ownership. This highlights the
issue of land rights in some countries, where there is no “ownership” of land, but rather cultural and
historical occupation; and populations are subsequently under threat once their land is determined to
be useful as a carbon sequestration tool. Again, even the idea of creating a market structure for carbon
dioxide is a reflection of the Global North’s commodity culture. Unequal power structures and
mismatched global economic standing stems from the history of colonialism and puts pressure on the
Global South to introduce and accept carbon offsetting projects. All of these traits can be captured
under the practice of neo-imperial policies and the political ecology of land expropriation; the idea of
the Global North appropriating lands and livelihoods in the Global South for their own gain.
While most of our findings showed that there was a case to be made for the use of the term
carbon colonialism​, not all of our findings agreed on this assessment. Firstly, it is unsubstantiated that
the Global North always claims to “know better.” Indeed, carbon offsetting mechanisms attempt to
include local perspectives in projects, such as the inclusion of indigenous species in reforestation
procedures and encouraging traditional methods of foraging and farming. Additionally, the biggest
response to the criticism of neo-imperial policies is that the Global North is not appropriating for their
own gain, but rather for the gain of the world as a whole.
Even with those ideas in dispute, there is enough other undisputed evidence to justify calling
out the colonial nature of carbon offsetting; but is that reason enough to stop the practice altogether?
Most of our findings agree that the system of offsetting is flawed in some way and should be changed
in one way or another. There are questions of efficacy, social justice concerns, colonialism arguments,
cost vs. benefits etc. regarding the mechanisms, but no clear consensus on how it should be changed.
Some critics would have the system be dismantled altogether and leave the responsibility of emissions
to each individual country. Others would have the system work better to include more marginalized
voices and revitalize the carbon market to incentivize more businesses and stakeholders to participate.
The next section will provide our analysis of how the carbon offsetting system is flawed and how it
could be changed or restructured in a way that attempts to remove the colonial overtones.
First, prevailing carbon offsetting mechanisms separate the Global North and Global South in
the agreements, either directly like in the CDM, or through exclusion, like in the JI. This
differentiation serves to perpetuate the biased image of the Global South as the other, the poor, the
developing and in need, which in itself is heavily problematic and carries postcolonial overtones.
Stressing the dichotomy between the North and South neglects the interdependencies of all
international actors involved in offsetting mechanisms. In a globalized world, each country is
inevitably impacted by emissions from other countries. Therefore, emissions should be reduced

23
globally in a concerted effort, as a whole. The North-to-South transfer of policy and technology opens
a pathway to fostering and even exacerbating lingering power imbalances by vesting the Global North
with the power to determine how sustainable development is to take place in the Global South.
Secondly, carbon offsetting mechanisms rely on market forces. Projects are undertaken in the
Global South because they are cheaper to implement there. This not only takes advantage of the lands
and livelihoods of people in the Global South - already stifled by the history of colonialism - for the
purpose of mitigating climate change, but similar efforts are not made in the Global North, where the
problems are occurring. The US, for example, is the world’s second largest polluter, but conservation
of forest land and renewable energy projects are not funded under the system of carbon offsetting
because it is cost-prohibitive and would not be permissible through North-to-South mechanisms like
the CDM. Additionally, markets are highly volatile because they rely on collective imagination and
belief; once people stop believing that CO​2 has any value, it no longer does. Capitalism is moreover a
tool historically rooted in the Global North. Thus imposing a market-based system on carbon furthers
western hegemony and dependencies on the part of the Global South given the relative economic
advantages bestowed on the Global North through their stronghold on capitalist systems. Relying on a
climate action regime based on the perceived economic value of carbon detracts from the importance
and urgency of mitigation measures. Investing in making existing GHG-heavy industries more
sustainable in the Global North may not seem economically viable, but only when assessed in the short
term and in comparison to the instant-gratification of fossil fuels. Our first priority should be to
mitigate and adapt to climate change wherever possible, no matter the perceived economic loss.
Additionally, the current carbon offsetting systems lack enforcement. There are caps that
countries have agreed upon under the Kyoto Protocol and again under the Paris Agreement, but these
are not necessarily binding. Though probably for the best, there is no global police force that can hold
countries accountable for meeting their targets. Given the absence of force, the only means to
encourage participation is incentivization which is largely subject to political opinion and power
structures. To put it simply, the countries of the Global North do not need to participate in carbon
offsetting unless they feel a strong motivation to act against climate change.
Lastly, the premise of carbon offsetting is flawed at the core by supporting carbon neutrality
rather than actual emission reductions. As the Chairman of the Kyoto Conference, Raul Estrada, put
it, “I do not understand how commitments can be implemented jointly if only one of the Parties
involved is committed to limit or reduce emissions” (​Lecocq & Ambrosi 2007​). Carbon offsetting
mechanisms like the CDM allow countries of the Global North a literal ‘cheap way out’ of reducing
their own emissions. Though source reduction is always preferred, there is no international limit on
how much of a country’s cap can be met through offsets. This means that the Global North can make

24
up for their emissions and create a zero sum in atmospheric CO​2 when the reality of climate change
requires a negative sum; we should be offsetting more than we emit. Carbon offsetting does not put
emphasis on keeping fossil fuels in the ground, rather on weighing the cost of using fossil fuels against
the cost of sustainability and livelihoods of people in the Global South as well as of future generations.
In light of the problems with the current climate action regime of the Kyoto Protocol that
have been highlighted in this research paper, the authors call for future climate change action packages
to ensure that these limitations are adequately redressed. Climate change is a global problem that
requires global solutions; therefore the dichotomy between the Global North and Global South
perpetuates the “othering” and marginalization of the Global South and should be resolved. Future
climate change mitigation and adaptation mechanisms should not be made on the foundation of
capitalism, driven by incentives, but rather be based on the acceptance of shared responsibility and
accountability. This also means that it must be ensured that local voices are part of the
decision-making processes operating on the principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. Ideally,
future climate action regimes would enforce emissions caps on all countries through imposing fines
on countries who exceed their caps. Such fines could be used to finance funds such as the Adaptation
Fund or the Green Climate Fund which can, in turn, finance grants to countries for implementing
adaptation projects. This would remove the market-based emphasis of carbon-offsetting and furnish
countries with responsibility for their own adaptation plans, whilst holding each country accountable
to reduce (and not displace) their own emissions. Without incentives, there is a need for enforcement;
therefore it is essential for citizens and politicians across the world to recognize the urgency of climate
action and commit to holding each other accountable to reduce emissions and remove dependency on
fossil fuels.

FROM RESEARCH TO PODCAST

Considering the need for an improvement of climate policies, this paper serves to create
awareness of the failures of carbon offsetting and to give an impulse for public discourse. Building on
this, it was used as the basis for a podcast episode created in order to disseminate the perspectives it
addressed, to a global audience. A podcast, if it is provided online and for free, can have various
benefits such as a wide geographical reach and the ability to connect with people through a medium
that they mostly use in a self-determined and focused way. Educational podcasting can create a
borderless, mobile classroom (​Wang et al. 2010​). ​Our target audience consists of diverse groups that
have a potential influence on climate change action or policies such as engaged teenagers, students, and
professionals from all sectors who have a connection to, or interest in carbon offsetting.

25
 Behind the Scenes
In order to exploit these advantages, a number of aspects had to be considered in the making
of this podcast. For didactic reasons, we decided to present the various points of view to the audience
in a simplified form with clear roles. Hence, we performed as three experts for international
agreements on climate change (Nadja), the carbon colonialism critique (Jana) and the response from
the United Nations and different actors in favor of carbon offsetting mechanisms (Caitlyn) while
remaining in the roles of researching students. In addition, we largely avoided the use of academic
jargon. Even though we all share the expertise for the whole research and conducted all interviews
together, this division was designed to create a clear understanding of the discussion also for
non-experts. Hearing a different voice for each of the different standpoints also helps to clearly
differentiating the positions. With regard to connecting voices and opinions, we decided not to
include excerpts from the expert interviews that we conducted. This is due to the fact that a number of
interviewees prefered to stay anonymous by reason of their professional position. This, however,
mostly applied for United Nations employees who responded to the criticism. Therefore, an equal
representation of quotes by standpoint could not have been guaranteed.
Furthermore, the length of the podcast does not exceed 35 minutes for two reasons. According
to Walch and Lafferty (2006) it is crucial for educational podcasts to assume an attention span below
45 minutes. Plus, the length of a podcast is ideally not longer than the average commuting time, which
is globally 69 minutes per day on average, which means approximately 35 minutes one way (​Walch &
Lafferty 2006​, ​Lam 2017​). In addition, it was important to consider that hearing is more abstract than
seeing something. Therefore, we used visual language and examples describing how situations were
experienced by affected people so that the listeners could get a picture of the respective circumstances.
This was also considered while the music for the podcast was composed. A deep sound and a fast
drum in the beginning create tension and drama to reflect the seriousness of the topic before the
addition of a higher melody mirrors the many voices and opinions surrounding the discourse on
climate policies, including an extract from a demonstration that calls for immediate climate action.
With a view to provide potential change makers with further information, we included this
research paper and our contacts in the show notes as well as links to important references, such as the
CDM, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, the research on Green Resources by the Oakland
Institute​ (​ L
​ yons & Westoby 2014​) and the study on REDD projects by the WRM​ ​(K
​ ill 2015​).

26
 CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK
Over the course of our research, we came to the conclusion that the use of the term ​carbon
colonialism is justified in respect to its usefulness in describing the flaws of the current system of
carbon offsetting that is tinged with colonial overtones. We nonetheless also recognise the need to
discriminate between systemic issues like colonialism paired with the underlying structures of the
current world order and the urgent need for climate action in view of the rapidly advancing negative
effects of climate change. The overarching conclusion based on the findings of this paper can be
summarized threefold: (1) the term carbon colonialism is justified as we were able to identify clear
colonial practices and tendencies of the climate action regime set up by the Kyoto Protocol. (2) Even if
the debate on whether carbon offsetting is colonial in nature is irreconcilable, the term carbon
colonialism is valuable as it allows for the flaws of the system to be pointed out. These flaws are
recognised by actors on both sides of the carbon colonialism critique. (3) This recognition of the flaws
of the current system needs to be utilized in order to ameliorate future climate action regimes, in
particular any future carbon offsetting mechanisms.
Indeed, the carbon colonialism critiques may have already had some impact on the
formulation of new mechanisms. Whereas the Kyoto Protocol was articulated in a very technocratic
manner, it seems that in the years that have elapsed since 1997, the ever increasing call from academics,
advocates and practitioners to be more inclusive, to recognise issues of social justice and to adhere to
principles of equity and humanitarianism, has taken a foothold in international negotiations. A
prospective avenue for future research on the topic could therefore entail a discourse analysis that
compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement to identify in how far the carbon colonialism
critique has been taken up in the Paris Agreement vis-à-vis its predecessor.
The final commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2020. In how far the
market-based, capitalist-centric mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol will be taken up by in the Paris
Agreement as yet remains to be seen. In 2018, the COP 24 in Katowice, Poland, agreed on the
implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement. While this clarified questions surrounding how to
finance action and capacity building in developing countries post-2020, guidance regarding
market-based mechanisms according to the UNFCCC “still needs to be finalized” ​(​UNFCCC 4​). ​In
December 2019, two days after the deadline for submission of this paper, the COP25 will be held in
Madrid, Spain. This COP will hopefully bring some clarity to if and how market-based mechanisms
will be codified with regard to social justice in the future. For future research, it will therefore be
interesting to monitor whether the carbon colonialism critique had enough resonance and reach to
influence the formulation of post-2020 market-based mechanisms, and how this will impact future

27
Global North - Global South interactions as well as projects at local level.
In closing, we urge for research and discourse on the topic of colonialism in climate
agreements to continue and encourage efforts to bring it into the foreground of public consciousness.
Only if questions surrounding post-colonial power structures are addressed in a continuous and
systematic manner can the flaws of the system be identified and adequate safeguards be put in place.
The authors therefore strongly advocate not only the need for the promotion of greater awareness of
the topics raised in this paper, but also call for greater international recognition of the realities and
dangers in prevailing post-colonial structures that may often be overseen in a field as saturated with
urgency as climate change.

28
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Image Title Page: ​Juergen PM (2019): Smoke. Pixabay. Available at:

https://pixabay.com/photos/smoke-smoking-chimney-fireplace-258786/​ [10 Oct 2019]

34
ANNEX I: Interview Questions
1. What is your experience in the fields of climate change, global environmental policy and/or
colonialism?

2. Carbon emission trading is a mechanism promoted by the Kyoto Protocol. What is your opinion on
emission trading and its effectiveness as a climate change mitigation tool?

3. Do the benefits outweigh the disadvantages in carbon offsetting programs like the Clean
Development Mechanism?

a. How would you respond to the criticism that “CDM does not significantly contribute to
sustainable development?” (Olsen 2007).

4. Have you come across / how would you interpret the term “carbon colonialism?”

5. Who, in your opinion, bears the responsibility for carbon sequestration initiatives?

6. Do countries in the Global North have a responsibility to provide those in the Global South with
financial/managerial assistance for carbon sequestration initiatives?

a. If they DO have a responsibility; how can they exercise that without falling into a “colonial”
power structure?

b. If they DON’T have a responsibility; how do we (universally) ensure that everyone is able to
make climate change mitigation efforts?

7. In recent years, there has been increasing criticism of “colonial nature” of carbon offsetting
programs from the Global North:

a. Have you heard about this in relation to cases such as REDD and/or Green Resources
GmbH which promote reforestation initiatives, but also have resulted in biodiversity damage
and land grabbing/forced displacement? How do you see the practice of carbon offsetting in
the light of these events?

b. Do you have ideas, recommendations or professional experience for how to prevent such
practices?

35
ANNEX II: Interviewees
Andrea Garcia Guerrero. Climate Change Specialist at the United Nations; New York, NY, USA.
Skype interview​. October 2019.

Tamra Gilbertson. Founder and Co-Director of Carbon Trade Watch & former Project Coordinator
of the Environmental Justice Project of the Transnational Institute; Knoxville, TN, USA.
Skype interview​. October 2019.

Kai Landwehr. Press Officer and Media Manager at MyClimate; Zürich, Switzerland. ​Skype interview​.
October 2019.

Prof. Dr. Kristen Lyons. Professor of Social Science at the University of Queensland; Brisbane,
Australia. ​Skype interview​. November 2019.

Dr. Jean Carlo Rodríguez de Francisco. Researcher in Environmental Governance at Deutsches

Institut für Entwicklungspolitik; Bonn, Germany. ​In-person interview conducted in DIE office.
September 2019​.

Prof. Dr. Almeida Sitoe. Associate Professor of Forestry at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane;
Maputo, Mozambique. ​Skype interview​. October 2019.

Anonymous UNFCCC 1. I​ n-person interview conducted at Bonn UN Campus.​ October 2019.

Anonymous UNFCCC 2. I​ n-person interview conducted at Bonn UN Campus​. October 2019.

Anonymous UN New York. S​ kype interview.​ October 2019.

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Name: Jana Siebeneck Date: 30th November 2019 Signature:

Name: Caitlyn Eberle Date: 30th November 2019 Signature:

Name: Nadja Münstermann Date: 30th November 2019 Signature:

37