Hastings International and Comparative Law Review

Volume 9
Article 2
Number 2 Winter 1986

1-1-1986

The Choice of Applicable Law in International

Arbitration
Vitek Danilowicz

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Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration, 9 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 235 (1986).
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The Choice of Applicable Law in
International Arbitration

By VITEK DANILOWICZ
LL.M. with Distinction, Uniwersytet Wroclawski (Poland), 1977 Diploma in
InternationalLaw and Development with Distinction,Institute ofSocial Stud-
ies (The Netherlands), 1982; J.D., LouisianaState University, 1985; LL.M.,
Louisiana State University, 1985: Associate, Vinson & Elkins, Houston,
Texas.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 236
PART I: THE CHOICE OF THE LAW GOVERNING THE
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS .................. 238
A. The Scope of the Lex Arbitri ............................... 238
B. The Distinction between Substance and Procedure in
International Arbitration ................................... 240
C. The State Interest in the Choice of the Lex Arbitri .......... 243
D. The Choice of the Lex Arbitri by the Arbitrator ............ 251
1. Lex Fori ............................................... 251
2. The Legal System "Significantly Related" to the Dispute 253
3. Denationalized Lex Arbitri .............................. 254
Conclusions .................................................... 257

PART II: THE CHOICE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW .... 258

A. Determination of the Substantive Law on the Basis of the
Rules of Conflict of Laws .................................. 259
1. Application of the Conflict Rules of the Seat of the
Arbitration ............................................. 259
2. Application of the Conflict Rules Other than Those of the
Seat of the Arbitration ................................. 261
a. The Conflict Rules of the Arbitrator's Home State ... 261
b. The Conflict Rules of the State Which Would Have
Had Jurisdiction in the Absence of the Arbitration
Clause .............................................. 262
c. The Conflict Rules of a State Where the Award Will Be
Enforced ............................................ 263
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

d. The Conflict Rules of a State Most Closely Connected

to the D ispute ...................................... 263
3. Cumulative Application of the Conflict Rules Related to
the D ispute ............................................ 265
4. General Principles of Conflicts of Laws ................. 267
B. The Determination of the Substantive Law without Resorting
to Conflict Rules ........................................... 268
1. Direct Application of the Substantive Rules of a National
L aw ................................................... 268
2. Application of the Terms of the Contract ............... 270
3. Application of Non-National Substantive Rules .......... 272
a. Rules of International Trade ........................ 272
i. Customs, Usage, and General Principles of Law .. 272
ii. Transnational Rules ............................. 274
b. Public International Law ............................ 276
Conclusions .................................................... 278
OBSERVATIONS .............................................. 282

INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have witnessed an unprecedented growth of
international trade and commerce which has generated the need for more
efficient methods of dispute resolution. Initially, arbitration was consid-
ered the best way of satisfying this need. Compared to court litigation,
arbitration was cheaper and faster. Arbitration also offered secrecy, pro-
cedural simplicity, and technically competent decision makers. Today,
however, many of the original reasons for using arbitration in interna-
tional disputes have disappeared. Arbitration is no longer necessarily
less expensive than court litigation; nor is it faster. Moreover, resort to
arbitration may deprive the parties of summary procedures available in
courts of law. Finally, the use of so-called "professional" arbitrators-
often lawyers with no business experience-casts doubts on the technical
competence of arbitrators.' Nevertheless, arbitration remains an attrac-
tive alternative to national courts, primarily because it allows the parties
to avoid the uncertainties and complexities of foreign litigation.2 Also,
arbitration serves as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign parties

1. Park, JudicialSupervision of TransnationalCommercial Arbitration:The English Arbi-

tration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 87, 116-17 (1980); see also Branson & Tupman,
Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective InternationalArbitration, 24 VA. J.
INT'L L. 917, 918 (1984).
2. Asken, The Need to Utilize InternationalArbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11
(1984).
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

which, though unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of foreign courts,

might agree to international arbitration. Equally important is the fact
that arbitration provides a certain and neutral forum.3 Finally, in arbi-
tration parties have more influence in determining applicable law than
they do in court litigation.
A carefully drafted arbitration clause is the prerequisite for taking
advantage of all the benefits of international arbitration. Indeed,
"[i]nsertion of an apparently simple arbitration clause in the contract can
seem an easy way to provide a cheap, quick and fair way of judging any
eventual contractual disputes .... With an apparently innocuous arbitra-
tion clause in place, the parties can get on to the 'important' parts of
their negotiations and avoid haggling over details of the proceeding
which they believe will never occur." 4 Unfortunately, however, this ba-
sic fact is often forgotten by those negotiating international contracts.
For instance, rarely do the contracting parties take advantage of the
power to designate the applicable law. Even when they do, they often
fail to specify whether the designated law should govern the substance of
the dispute, the arbitration procedure, or the arbitration clause itself. It
is then left to the arbitrator to resolve the choice of law questions left
open by the parties.
This study examines ways in which arbitrators choose the applicable
law. Several approaches adopted by international arbitrators are
presented and juxtaposed with the major theories on the juridical nature
of international commercial arbitration. The author also submits his
own views on the question of determining the applicable law in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. Although the author's views do not aspire
to be a comprehensive theory, it is hoped they might prove useful to
arbitrators facing choice of law problems.
An analysis of international arbitration must take two factors into
account: the sovereign's power to control arbitration and the needs of
the international business community. Significantly, the sovereign's
power to control arbitration includes the power to determine whether an
arbitration decision will be given effect. For example, by refusing to en-
force the arbitral award, the sovereign can deprive the arbitration of any
practical importance. The sovereign also has an interest in the develop-
ment of international arbitration as a means of promoting trade and com-
merce. Usually, the business community has a similar interest. Since

3. Park, supra note 1, at 117.

4. Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1035, 1035-36 (1980).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

promoting the state's interests and honoring the parties' intentions are
not necessarily antithetical goals, an arbitrator who balances these goals
can produce enforceable awards that satisfy the parties' expectations.
This study is confined to the question of the choice of the law gov-
erning the arbitration proceedings (lex arbitri) and the choice of the sub-
stantive law (lex causae). It does not address the problems of the choice
of law governing the arbitration clause itself.

PART I
THE CHOICE OF THE LAW GOVERNING THE
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Unlike a judge, an arbitrator in any international arbitration faces
the threshold question of which procedural law should govern the arbi-
tration process. This question does not arise in judicial proceedings be-
cause of the universally recognized principle that procedural issues are
governed by the lex fori, law of the forum, whereas substantive issues
may be governed by either forum or foreign law. Although the line be-
tween substance and procedure is not always clear, the distinction be-
tween the two categories is as old as the law of conflict of laws. One
consequence of this distinction is that matters falling into the procedural
category are not subject to the choice-of-law process because of the auto-
matic application of forum law.
Assuming that in international arbitration the lex causae may, or
should be, segregated from the lex arbitri,the second question that an
arbitrator faces is which law should govern the proceedings: the law of
the situs of arbitration, the law of the country of which the arbitrator is a
national, or another law. Commentators and arbitrators have responded
to this question differently, and their responses are discussed next.

A. The Scope of the Lex Arbitri

Although the problem of the scope of the law of the proceedings has
been addressed in numerous legal writings, there is no generally accepted
catalogue of the issues governed by the lex arbitri. According to Wilner,
the issues governed by the lex arbitri include the conflicts rules which
determine the lex causae, the need to give reasons for the award, the need
to base an award upon substantive rules of law, and judicial review of the
arbitrator's decision.5 According to Metzger, the lex arbitrigoverns the
first two issues submitted by Wilner, as well as the nationality of the

5. Wilner, Determiningthe Law GoverningPerformancein InternationalCommercial Ar-

bitration:A Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 646, 648 (1965).
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

award and the law applicable to the arbitration agreement.6 The scope of
the lex arbitriwas broadened by Hirsch, who added the following to Wil-
ner's and Metzger's lists: The ability to arbitrate a given issue; the
court's power to stay judicial proceedings and order arbitration; the
methods by which arbitrators are appointed and the opportunities for
challenging their mandate; the possibility of resorting to a court during
the arbitration; and, finally, whether, and to what extent, the parties de-
termine the procedural rules to be applied by the arbitrator.7 Recently,
Smedresman criticized these lists as overly inclusive. He proposed that
the scope of the lex arbitrishould be limited to all aspects of procedure in
arbitration, including the conduct of the arbitrator, and, crucially, the
extent of judicial supervision of the arbitration.8
Wilner's, Metzger's, and Smedresman's definitions of the lex arbitri
were formulated without reference to any particular legal order. It is
axiomatic that each legal system decides for itself which issues are sub-
stantive and which are procedural.9 Certainly, if the parties to the arbi-
tration are free to choose the lex arbitri, its scope may be discussed
without regard to national law. If, however, the choice of the lex arbitri
is determined by national law, its scope is also fixed by national law. The
classification of a given issue as substantive or procedural is, therefore, of
particular importance in those legal systems which limit the parties' free-
dom to choose the lex arbitri.

6. Metzger, The Arbitrator and Private InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE

ARBITRATION 233 (M. Domke ed. 1958). The difference between Metzger's and Wilner's defi-
nitions of the lex arbitri is less significant in light of Wilner's definition of the law of the
proceedings as "the legal system of the country in which the award is considered domestic for
purposes of obtaining confirmation." Wilner, supra note 5, at 648.
7. Hirsch, The Place of Arbitration and the Lex Arbitri, 34 ARB. J.43, 44-45 (1979).
According to Ehrenhaft, rules of procedure, as opposed to the law governing the proceedings
(law of the proceedings), govern the following issues: The arbitrator's general authority over
the proceedings, the service of process, the method each party may use to present its case, the
rebuttal rights of each party, the basic rules governing the reception of evidence, the use of
subpoenas, the close of hearings, the times for submitting briefs and announcing the final
award, and the form the award must take. Ehrenhaft, Effective InternationalCommercialAr-
bitration, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191, 1205 (1977).
8. Smedresman, Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 CAL. W.
IN'L L.L 263, 268 (1977). Smedresman noted that a "mere definition of the law of the pro-
ceedings... accomplishes little; the significant questions are whether the law of the proceed-
ings has an independent existence for conflict purposes, and how useful it is as an analytic
tool." Id.
9. Wetter, The Legal Framework of InternationalArbitral Tribunals - Five Tentative
Markings, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 278 (1981). The author admits, however, that
some jurisdictions "expressly or impliedly permit the parties to subject their proceedings in
large measure to a foreign procedural law." Id.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

B. The Distinction between Substance and Procedure in

International Arbitration
The dichotomy between substance and procedure has not always
been recognized in the law of arbitration. For a long time it was assumed
that the law applicable to the merits of a dispute should also govern the
proceedings. Consequently, the choice of the lex arbitri did not present
an independent problem for purposes of conflict of laws.
The independence of the lex arbitri in international arbitration for
conflict purposes was first recognized by the English courts in James
Miller & Partners,Ltd. v. Withworth Street Estates (Manchester)Ltd. 10
There, the parties entered into a contract whereby a Scottish company
agreed to remodel an English company's factory in Scotland. The arbi-
tration clause in the contract did not specify the applicable substantive
law, place of arbitration, or procedural law. Because the parties were
unable to agree on an arbitrator, the president of the Royal Institute of
British Architects appointed a Scottish architect, practicing in Scotland,
to serve as arbitrator. The arbitration proceedings were held in Scotland
based on Scottish procedure. During the proceedings, the respondent,
the English company, asked the arbitrator to state the award in the form
of a "case stated."' I Relying on Scottish law, which did not provide for
the "case stated" procedure, the arbitrator refused. The English com-
pany petitioned an English court to order the arbitrator to satisfy the
demand. In the meantime, the arbitrator rendered an award for the Scot-
tish claimant.
In the proceedings before the English court, the respondent com-
pany argued that the contract was governed by the law of England, and,
therefore, English law should govern the procedure as well. 2 The major-
ity of the Law Lords agreed with the respondent's contention that the
contract was governed by English law. Nevertheless, the Lords unani-
mously held that the lex arbitricould differ from the law governing the
merits, and Scottish procedural law was properly applied to the proceed-
ings. The Lords' holding was based on the finding that "the conduct of
the parties after the appointment of the arbitrator sufficiently showed an
agreement or acceptance on the part of the English company that the
arbitration proceedings should be governed by the law of Scotland

10. 1970 A.C. 583 [hereinafter James Miller].

11. Under the English Arbitration Act of 1950 the "case stated" (or "special case") proce-
dure allowed the English court to decide issues of law involved in the arbitration. This proce-
dure was abrogated by the new Arbitration Act of 1979. See infra text accompanying notes
41.
12. 1970 A.C. 583, 584.
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

",13

A few years after James Miller was decided, the Paris Court of Ap-
peals considered the dichotomy between the lex causae and the lex arbi-
tri. The issue arose in two combined cases, Societd 0. C.P.C. v. la Societd
KG. Wilhelm Diefenbacherand Societd 0. C..C. v. M, Wilhelm Godfried
Diefenbacher.4 Under the terms of the contract which gave rise to these
disputes, the respondents' (a German company, K.G. Wilhelm
Diefenbacher, and Mr. Diefenbacher in his individual capacity) granted
to the claimant (a Belgian company) an exclusive license for the exploita-
tion of the respondents' patents. The contract contained an arbitration
clause providing for arbitration under the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) and a choice of law clause providing for
application of Belgian substantive law to the merits of the dispute. The
I.C.C.-appointed arbitrator, sitting in Paris, found for the respondents
and the award was challenged by the Belgian claimant in the Paris Court
of Appeals. In its opinion the court noted that the parties submitted
their dispute to arbitration under the rules of the I.C.C., an international
institution based in France. The parties also agreed to the appointment
of a French arbitrator and to his choice of Paris as the seat of the tribu-
nal. Considering these facts, the Paris Court of Appeals held that the
parties implicitly had chosen French law to govern the arbitration pro-
ceedings." The choice of Belgian law to govern the merits did not, in the
court's opinion, mandate the conclusion that Belgian law also should
govern the procedure. 6 The court's decision was based on Rule 16 of
the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the I.C.C. as it then stood
and which read as follows:
The rules by which the arbitration proceedings shall be governed shall
be these [I.C.C.] Rules and, in the event of no provision being made in
these Rules, those of the law of procedure chosen by the parties or,
failing such choice, those of the law of the country in which the arbitra-
tor holds the proceedings.17
From the parties' choice of the I.C.C. Rules, among which was article
16, the court implied an intent to have the procedure governed by the

13. Id.
14. Judgment of June 18, 1974, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1975 REVUE D'ARBITRAGE [R.A.]
179 [hereinafter Dietenbacher]. The resolution of this question was the same in both cases.
15. Id.
16. Id..
17. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration in force
on June 1, 1955 (1964) (emphasis added). Rule 16 was amended in 1975 and the reference to
the law of the seat of arbitration was deleted. See infra text accompanying note 26.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

laws of the place of arbitration, rather than the law chosen to govern the
merits.
The segregation of the lex arbitri from lex causae by the English
court in James Miller and the French court in Diefenbacherwas an im-
portant breakthrough because it recognized that the choices of the lex
arbitriand the substantive law may be influenced by different considera-
tions. For example, parties to a dispute may choose English Maritime
Law based on its completeness and sophistication. Without more, how-
ever, the choice of English substantive law does not imply a choice of
English procedure and the parties may prefer another procedural law
which permits greater autonomy.
Although James Miller and Diefenbacherrecognized the distinction
between the lex arbitriand the lex causae, neither case decided how the
lex arbitrishould be chosen. In both cases the courts applied the law of
the country in which the proceedings were conducted. The soundness of
this approach will now be discussed.
In judicial proceedings, convenience and judicial economy justify
the application of the lexfori to procedural issues. Applying foreign sub-
stantive law, as well as procedure, would place too great a burden on
local judges.18 The same considerations do not apply in the field of inter-
national arbitration. Unlike a judge, an arbitrator often conducts pro-
ceedings in a country other than his or her own. Often, the parties choose
one country as the place of arbitration and then nominate an arbitrator
from a different country; on other occasions the arbitrator may choose an
arbitration seat not located in his or her home country. In either situa-
tion, the arbitrator may not be familiar with the procedural law of the
place of arbitration; therefore, the rationale for applying the lex fori is
not compelling. In fact, considerations of convenience suggest the oppo-
site result: that the arbitrator or the parties should have the freedom to
choose a procedural law other than the law of the place of arbitration.
Of course, it could be argued that what is at stake is not the arbitra-
tor's convenience and familiarity with the applicable lex arbitri,but the
convenience of the local judge who eventually may review the arbitra-
tion. Even if a court reviews the arbitration proceedings, however, the

18. "[I]t would obviously be quite inconvenient for the court of the forum ... to take over
all the machinery of the foreign court for the 'enforcement,' as we say, of the 'substantive
rights.'" Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 343-
44 (1933). See also DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1177 (10th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter DICEY & MORRIS]; P. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 686
(9th ed. 1974); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (1971); R.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS 239 (3d ed. 1977).
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

judicial convenience argument has little merit because it is always possi-

ble that court proceedings will be instituted in a jurisdiction other than
where the arbitration was conducted.19 Because considerations of con-
venience and ease of administration do not always justify application of
local law, the question is whether other considerations support the appli-
cation of local law.

C. The State Interest in the Choice of the Lex Arbitri

According to the territorial (or jurisdictional) approach to interna-
tional arbitration, arbitration operates within the framework of a na-
tional legal order. Thus, although arbitrators are free to apply foreign
substantive law, they are required to abide by local procedural law.2 0
The territorial approach can be found in the civil procedure codes of
some nations. For example, under article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil
Procedure, Italian nationals are not allowed to exclude the competence
of Italian courts.2 1 Under German law, parties can choose only the pro-
cedural law of those states whose courts have jurisdiction under interna-
tionally recognized principles. 2
The justification for limiting the parties' freedom to choose proce-
dural law is the sovereign's interest in administering justice within its
territory. From this standpoint arbitration is sometimes perceived as an
attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of local courts and bypass the sov-
ereign's rules regulating the administration of justice.
The critics of the territorial theory argue it is incompatible with the
needs of the international business community. As pointed out by one
commentator, "[t]he wishes of the international business communities
undoubtedly go towards denationalisation .... The parties ... want
their dispute, as far as possible, to be dealt with regardless of any specific

19. On the multiple-jurisdiction phenomenon in international arbitration, see infra text

accompanying note 60.
20. For the description of the territorial theory, see J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 52 (1978). When taken to its extreme, the territorial
theory leads to the conclusion that there may be no international arbitration:
Although, where international aspects of some kind arise, it is not uncommon and,
on the whole, harmless to speak, somewhat colloquially, of the international arbitra-
tion, the phrase is a misnomer. In the legal sense no international commercial arbi-
tration exists... [Elvery arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to
a specific system of national law.
Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 159-60 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
21. Coing, The Substantive Law and the Law ofArbitrationProcedurein INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 96, 107 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1975).
22. Id. at 105.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

national law." 2 3 Important as the business community's needs may be,

however, they cannot abrogate the sovereign's power to regulate arbitra-
tion held within its territory. Nevertheless, the sovereign may have no
interest in some arbitration proceedings, and in these cases there is no
reason to apply local procedural law.2 4 The increasing internationaliza-
tion of commercial arbitration has produced situations in which the sov-
ereign has no interest in regulating the dispensation of justice within its
territory. This occurs when a given locality has no contacts with the
dispute and is chosen as the seat of arbitration solely for its neutrality.
The recent French decision, Gdtaverken ArendalA.B. v. Libyan Gen-
eral National Maritime Co.,25 is a good example of an arbitration which
took place in a disinterested forum. The dispute arose from the purchase
of vessels by a Libyan company from the G6taverken shipyard in Swe-
den. Throughout the arbitral proceedings and the subsequent litigation,
the vessels were located in Sweden and none of the parties owned prop-
erty related to the dispute in France. The arbitration took place in Paris
under the I.C.C. Rules. The arbitral tribunal was composed of three ar-
bitrators - a French chairman, a Norwegian, and a Libyan. The parties
did not designate the lex arbitri,nor was it designated by the arbitrators.
The revised I.C.C. Rules in force at the time provided that:
The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator shall be
those resulting from these Rules and, where these Rules are silent, any
rules which the parties (or failing them, the arbitrator) may settle, and
whether or not reference is thereby made to a municipal procedurallaw
to be applied to the arbitration.26

The arbitration panel decided in favor of the Swedish claimant and the
Libyan company appealed to the Paris Court of Appeals. The Paris
court recognized that France's only contact with the dispute was as the
site of the arbitration, and that Paris had been chosen solely for its neu-
trality.2 7 Under these circumstances, the court found that the choice of

23. Sanders, Trends in the Field of InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 145 RECEUIL

DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 205, 262 (1975).
24. Metzger, supra note 6, at 235.
25. 107 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [CLUNET] 660 (1980) [hereinafter
G6taverken]. For a thorough analysis of this case and an English translation of the operative
part of the judgment, see Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detachedfrom the Law of its
Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358, 385-87 (1981).
26. 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 1, 8 app. II, art. 11 (W. Craig, W. Park & J. Paulsson eds. 1984)
(emphasis added).
27. The court apparently did not regard the French nationality of the chairman of the
arbitration tribunal as a relevant contact. See G6taverken, 107 CLUNET at 660.
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

France as the seat of arbitration could not be considered "an implicit

expression of the parties' intent to subject themselves, even subsidiarily,
to [French procedural law]." 28 Consequently, the Paris Court of Ap-
peals refused to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the
award "rendered in accordance with proceedings which are not those of
French law and which have no attachment whatsoever to the French
legal order ... may not be considered French."29
As in Diefenbacher, the arbitral proceedings in G6taverken were
held in Paris between non-French parties, and arose from contracts
which had no connection with France and did not designate the lex arbi-
tri. Despite these similarities, however, the Paris Court of Appeals de-
cided the two cases differently. The reason for the difference may be
attributed to an amendment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Rules of
the I.C.C. In Diefenbacher, the court was interpreting the old Rule 16,
mandating the application of the lex fori unless the parties chose some
other lex arbitri. Since the parties in Diefenbachervoluntarily agreed to
have their arbitration bound by the I.C.C. Rules, the court implied an
intent to have French law govern the proceedings. When the G6taverken
case reached the Paris Court of Appeals, the reference to the lexfori had
been deleted from the I.C.C. Rules. Consequently, the court could not
have applied French law on the basis of the implied intent of the parties.
The only other rationale for applying French law would have been the
territorial principle that calls for the application of the law of the seat of
arbitration. The court, however, declined to adopt this approach.
Despite different outcomes on the application of French law,
Diefenbacherand Gdtaverken represent a departure from the territorial
approach and a willingness to determine the lex arbitrion the basis of the
parties' intent. These cases indicate that when the local sovereign is dis-
interested, it might yield to the business community's wishes, rather than
insist on application of its own law. Nevertheless, it is for the sovereign
to decide whether it has an interest in the arbitration.
Some nations are particularily sensitive about their territorial sover-
eignty and regulate all arbitral proceedings within their territories. 0 It is
conceivable, therefore, that when confronted with a factual situation like
G'taverken or Diefenbacher, courts in these jurisdictions might refuse to
sanction the application of foreign procedural law. On the other hand, in

28. Quoted from the English translation of the decision, supra note 25, at 386.
29. Id.
30. According to Lew, the territorial approach is most clearly reflected in the East Euro-
pean attitude to arbitration: "the socialist tribunals of Eastern Europe are generally consid-
ered to be bound to 'their own' procedural ...rules." J. LEW, supra note 20, at 54.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

at least one case, a French court upheld the parties' choice of a foreign
lex arbitrifor an arbitration in France, even though the dispute had sig-
nificant contacts with the forum. In Monier v. S.A.R.L. Scali Frres,3 1
the Paris Court of Appeals upheld an award rendered in France under
the English law of the proceedings. The dispute in Monier involved two
French companies whose principal places of business were in France.
The arbitration was conducted under a contractual clause providing for
arbitration in Paris and directing the arbitrator to apply English substan-
tive and procedural law.
The liberal approach of the French courts was codified in the new
French Code of Civil Procedure which provides that the parties to an
arbitration are free to choose the law governing the proceedings. 3 2 Be-
cause of its liberal position, France has become one of the most popular
centers of international arbitration. The reasons France adopted this ap-
proach may range from recognition of the needs and customs of interna-
tional commerce 33 to promotion of national economic and commercial
interests.34
France is not the only country that has adopted a liberal approach
towards international arbitration. Other traditional centers of arbitra-
tion, such as Switzerland, have also become more liberal in this respect.
One example of this trend is the LIAMCO arbitration, 35 which involved a
dispute between a United States oil company and the Libyan govern-
ment. The arbitrator awarded the United States claimant a substantial
amount in damages. To secure execution of the award, the company at-
tached Libyan property in Switzerland. The attachment was challenged
by Libya in a Swiss court. Although it found the award enforceable in
Switzerland, the court dissolved the attachment because the Swiss forum

31. Judgment of July 5, 1955, Cour d'appel, Paris, 45 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL PRIVf_ [R.C.D.I.P.] 79 (1956), with note by Metzger.
32. Cf Delaume, International Arbitration Under French Law, 37 ARB. J. 335, 341
(1982).
33. This reason is typically stated by the French Cour de Cassation. See Batifol, Arbitra-
tion Clauses Concluded between French Government-Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private
Parties, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32, 35 (1968). See also Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
34. Cf. Carboneau, The Elaborationofa French Court Doctrineon InternationalCommer-
cial Arbitration:A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1980).
Carbonneau suggests that, by adopting a liberal attitude towards international commercial
arbitration, the French courts "emphasized - at least impliedly - their view that France
should respond positively to the modifications in the international economic order and,
thereby, make its contribution to a stable and viable world community." Id. at 6.
35. Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,
Award of Apr. 12, 1977, 62 I.L.R. 141 (1982).
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

was not sufficiently connected to the dispute.3 6 Because the arbitration

involved two non-Swiss parties and property located outside Switzerland,
the seat of arbitration was Switzerland's only contact with the dispute.
Without more, this contact did not justify the attachment. The Swiss
court emphasized that the decision regarding the seat of the arbitral tri-
bunal was made by the arbitrator and not by the parties. 37 In the
LIAMCO case, therefore, the Swiss court adopted the approach of the
French court in G6'taverken and recognized that the mere fact that an
arbitration takes place in a certain jurisdiction does not automatically
give the sovereign an interest in regulating the proceedings.
In England, the rule that arbitration taking place there must be gov-
erned by English procedural law is well-established. In dictum in the
James Miller case, however, Lord Wilberforce suggested that this rule
might not apply to arbitral proceedings conducted under the I.C.C.
Rules.3 8 Although Lord Wilberforce did not explain why an I.C.C. arbi-
tration should receive this special treatment, one commentator suggested
the reason might be that many I.C.C. proceedings are conducted in
places unrelated to the disputes. Furthermore, I.C.C. rules are well-de-
veloped and adequately protect the rights of the parties.3 9 Assuming
these were the reasons that Lord Wilberforce had in mind, one might ask
why the more liberal approach should be limited to proceedings con-
ducted under the I.C.C. Rules. Why should a case in which the parties
arbitrate their dispute in London under French procedural law be treated
differently from a case in which the parties arbitrate in London under the
I.C.C. Rules? If England had no connection to the dispute other than as
the seat of the tribunal, it would be a completely disinterested forum.
Moreover, French law would protect the rights of the parties in the same
manner as the I.C.C. Rules. There is no rational explanation, therefore,
for treating these two situations differently. In sum, Lord Wilberforce's
dictum in James Miller seemed to reflect the uncertainy of the English
courts to expanding I.C.C. arbitration, rather than a change of attitude
towards the application of English procedural law to arbitration proceed-
ings conducted in England.
In 1979, the British Parliament enacted a new Arbitration Act.
Among other things, the Act permits parties to a contract to stipulate

36. Socialist Libyan Arab Popular Jamahiriya v. Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO),
Judgment of June 19, 1980, BGE I, Switz., 62 I.L.R. 228, 236 (1982).
37. Id. at 235.
38. 1970 A.C. 583, 616.
39. See Smedresman, supra note 8, at 282.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

that the courts will not have power to review the arbitration award.'
Thus, the Act abolished the "case stated" procedure which gave English
courts the power to review the arbitrator's determination of legal is-
sues.4 Several factors prompted the British Parliament to enact the Ar-
bitration Act. According to one author, "the parliamentary debate on
the Act reveals that its architects were concerned with commercial as
well as legal considerations."4 2 Furthermore, the "stated case" proce-
dure was blamed for the relative unpopularity of London as a seat of
international arbitration. 43 It was suggested that abolition of that proce-
4
dure would revive interest in London as a seat for arbitral panels.
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the nature and needs of
45
international arbitration in the case of Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.
Scherk was a dispute between a United States plaintiff and a German
defendant, arising out of a contract under which the plaintiff purchased
cosmetic companies and their trademark rights from the defendant. The
companies were organized under the laws of Germany and Lichtenstein.
The contract contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration
under the I.C.C. Rules. The contract itself was to be governed by Illinois
law. The plaintiff brought the suit upon discovering that the trademarks
were subject to serious encumbrances. Rather than invoke the arbitra-
tion clause, the plaintiff prosecuted his case under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. In a motion to dismiss, the defendant asserted that
the arbitration clause in the contract precluded the plaintiff from seeking
redress in the courts.
One of the issues in Scherk concerned the application of section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act to void all agreements purporting to
waive compliance with the Act. In an earlier case, Wilko v. Swan,4 6 the
Supreme Court had decided that section 14 was applicable to arbitration
agreements and refused to enforce an arbitration clause. The Scherk
Court distinguished Wilko, emphasizing that the contract between the
parties in Scherk was a "truly international agreement." The parties in

40. The Act does not permit the parties to make this stipulation in contracts concerning
maritime, insurance, or commodities matters. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42.
41. Park, supra note 1, at 87; Schmitthoff, The United Kingdom ArbitrationAct of 1979, 5
Y.B. COM. ARB. 231, 231-39 (1980).
42. Park, supra note 1, at 95.
43. Schmitthoff, supra note 41, at 232.
44. Lord Cullen of Ashborne estimated that a new arbitration law might attract to Eng-
land as much as 500 million pounds per year in "invisible exports" in the form of fees for
arbitrators, barristers, solicitors, and expert witnesses. Park, supra note 1, at 95. See also
Rippon, Recent Trends in InternationalLaw, 15 INT'L LAW. 287, 291-92 (1981).
45. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
46. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

Scherk were of different nationalities, negotiations took place in five

countries, and the purpose of the contract was to sell companies incorpo-
rated in Europe whose activities were predominantly directed to Euro-
pean markets.4 7 According to the Court, the international character of
the contract brought to light new interests which required protection.4 8
The Court pointed out that a "parochial refusal by the courts of one
country to enforce an international arbitration agreement" might have an
adverse effect on international trade by "hampering the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international agreements." 4 9 The
Court's underlying concern was that a hostile attitude towards interna-
tional arbitration could have an adverse effect on United States economic
interests. Consequently, the Court subordinated the national interest in
regulating securities transactions to the national interest in promoting
international trade. From the perspective of this study, the importance
of Scherk is that it acknowledged that international arbitration calls for a
different analysis of state interests than do local arbitrations.
With regard to the choice of the lex arbitri,the Scherk Court said
that "[ain agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of50
the suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute."
This language seems to suggest that the Court would allow the parties to
choose the applicable procedural law. In analyzing this part of the opin-
ion, however, it is significant that the arbitration clause in Scherk pro-
vided for application of the I.C.C. Rules, including the old Rule 16
which provided for the subsidiary application of the lex fori. The refer-
ence to the law of the forum since has been deleted from Rule 16, and it
is unclear how this change would have affected the Scherk Court's con-
clusion. For example, will the Court enforce arbitration awards rendered

47. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.

48. Id.
49. This language was quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3359 (1985). In that case,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its policy supporting international commercial arbitration and
observed that:
[The potential of [arbitral] tribunals for efficient disposition of legal disagreements
arising from commercial relations has not yet been tested. If they are to take a cen-
tral place in the international legal order, national courts will need to "shake off the
old judicial hostility to arbitration," and also their customary and understandable
unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign
or transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary for national
courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring international arbitration.
Id. at 3360 (footnotes omitted).
50. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

in proceedings conducted in the United States under a foreign lex arbitri,

or under procedural rules drawn by the parties themselves? If the Court
were influenced by the same considerations which led it to uphold the
arbitration clause in Scherk it might approve arbitration conducted
under a foreign lex arbitri.51
The cases discussed above suggest that, at least in situations where
the forum has no significant contacts with the dispute, the courts are
willing to allow parties and arbitrators to choose a lex arbitri other than
the law of the forum. Cases in which a dispute has some significant con-
nection with a forum pose a more difficult problem because the local
sovereign has a genuine interest in regulating the proceedings. Under the
traditional approach, if the sovereign decides to protect its interest the
parties are obligated to yield to its will. An alternative view was first
suggested by Sauser-Hall in his so-called "mixed-theory" of the juridical
nature of arbitration. In his 1957 report to the Institute of International
Law, Sauser-Hall suggested that arbitration should be defined as a "ju-
ridical institution of a mixed character, sui generis,which has its origin in
the agreement and which draws its jurisdictional effects from the law
governing the proceedings." 5 2 Other authors have gone further and de-
veloped a contractual theory of arbitration, according to which all essen-
tial elements of arbitration, including submission, proceedings and
award, are contractual. Under this latter view, arbitration is merely a
series of contractual relations between parties who have agreed to submit
disputes to arbitration and abide by an award.5 3 Accordingly, arbitration
would function independent of any national legal order, and arbitrators
would be free to choose any procedural law.
There is little doubt that arbitration is derived from and based on
the agreement of the parties. As long as the parties fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations, the agreement provides a sufficient basis for the arbitral
proceedings. A problem arises when the parties interpret the agreement
differently, or when one party refuses to fulfill its obligations. 54 In this

51. The following language from Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971),
quoted with approval in Scherk, reveals the court's concerns: "The expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."
Id. at 9.
52. Sauser-Hall, L'arbitrageen droit international,47-II ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 394, 399 (1957) (Author's translation).
53. See generally J. LEw, supra note 20, at 54-56; P. FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COM-
MERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 320-21 (1965).
54. Hirsch, supra note 7, at 45. See also de Vries, InternationalCommercialArbitration:A
ContractualSubstitutefor National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42, 47 (1982); see generally Wil-
ner, supra note 5, at 649.
 Choice of Law in International Arbitration 251

situation, the only remedy available is to seek judicial assistance. At this

point, a court applying national law would have the opportunity to ex-
amine the choice of the lex arbitri.
The attitude taken by national law with respect to the parties' choice
of the lex arbitrireflects the sovereign's understanding of its interests in
regulating arbitration proceedings. The crucial question is not whether
the arbitration is jurisdictional or contractual in nature, but to what ex-
tent the sovereign controls, or should control, the proceedings. Recent
developments in international arbitration indicate that, at least in the
most developed countries, the state's interest in promoting commerce
prevails over its interest in subjecting arbitral proceedings to national
law. As a result, parties and arbitrators are given more freedom to
choose the lex arbitri. Nevertheless, some authors still argue that the
state where the arbitration procedings takes place should be able to con-
trol these proceedings to ensure respect for traditional standards of fair-
ness, as well as the "limits of the arbitral mission" and the rights of third
parties.55

D. The Choice of the Lex Arbitri by the Arbitrator

If the parties to the arbitration choose the lex arbitri,whether in the
arbitration clause or in the compromise, the arbitrator should abide by
this decision. In many instances, however, the parties either neglect to
choose the law governing the arbitral proceedings or are unable to agree
on the applicable law. In these cases, the lex arbitrimust be determined
by the arbitrator who may approach the problem by inquiring into the
implied intent of the parties.56 The arbitrator cannot always follow this
approach, however. For example, when the parties cannot agree on the
applicable law, it would be senseless for the arbitrator to inquire into the
parties' intent. The arbitrator also faces a difficult task when there is no
evidence of the parties' intent. The ensuing question of which law should
govern the proceedings in the absence of any explicit or implied choice
by the parties is considered next.

1. Lex Fori
In discharging his or her duties, an international arbitrator must be

55. Parte, The Lex LociArbitriand InternationalCommercialArbitration, INT'L & COMP.

L.Q., 31, 51 (1983).
56. "[W]hen the arbitration clause does not specify the lex arbitrior the place of arbitra-
tion, the lex arbitri has to be determined in conformity with the general principles of the
conflict of laws, that is, in accordance with the implied will of the parties." Hirsch, supra note
7, at 47.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

guided by the objective of producing an enforceable award57 and conse-

quently the lex arbitri must be chosen with this objective in mind. This
consideration led the arbitrator in the B.P. v. Libyan Arab Republic arbi-
tration 58 to adopt Danish law to govern the arbitration proceedings:
By providing for arbitration as an exclusive mechanism for resolv-
ing contractual disputes, the parties to an agreement... must.., be
presumed to have intended to create an effective remedy. The effec-
tiveness of an arbitral award that lacks nationality . . . generally is
smaller than that of an award founded on the procedural law of a spe-
cific legal system and partaking of its nationality. Moreover, even
where the arbitrators do, as the Tribunal does in this instance, have
full authority to determine the procedural law of the arbitration, the
attachment to 59
a developed legal system is both convenient and
constructive.
This language is based on the premise that, unless the parties chose
the lex arbitri,the arbitrator is not compelled to adopt the procedural
law of any particular country and need not adopt the procedural law of
the forum. Although the arbitrator in the B.P. arbitration did apply fo-
rum law, his choice was dictated by convenience and effectiveness rather
than by a legal norm.
The B.P. arbitration award should not be interpreted to mean that
considerations of convenience and effectiveness always will lead to appli-
cation of the lex fori. One of the main characteristics of international
arbitration is its multijurisdictional character. An international arbitra-
tion usually involves at least two jurisdictions: The forum state and the
state in which the award will be enforced. Legal proceedings may be
instituted in a third jurisdiction, for example, the home state of one of the
parties. It is also possible that a party might seek redress in the courts of
the state whose law governs the merits of the dispute.60 The legal system
of any of these jurisdictions could serve as the lex arbitri. Perhaps the
main reason that arbitrators choose the lex fori more often than another
law is that the place of arbitration is the most likely forum for court
proceedings concerning the arbitration.
In James Miller, a majority of the four Lords held that when the
parties fail to choose the lex arbitri,the proceedings should be governed
by the law of the state where the arbitration is held because that law

57. Paulsson, supra note 25, at 376.

58. Arbitral Award of Oct. 10, 1973, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979) [hereinafter B.P. arbitration].
59. Id. at 309.
60. See, e.g., Int'l Tank & Pipe S.A.K. v. Kuwait Aviation Fueling Co. K.S.C., 1975 Q.B.
224.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

usually is most closely connected to the proceedings. 6 1 Where the arbi-

tration has no substantial contacts with the forum, however, local courts
might decline to assert jurisdiction, as in G6taverken; therefore, adopting
forum law to govern the arbitral proceedings would serve no purpose.

2. The Legal System "Significantly Related" to the Dispute

The application of local procedural law is justified when the forum
has significant connections to the dispute. An important question is
which contacts between the forum and the arbitration justify the choice
of the lexfori. In the Sapphire arbitration 62 the arbitrator declared that
the proceedings were governed by the lexfori on the basis of the implied
intent of the parties. As an alternative reason for adopting the lex fori,
the arbitrator referred to a "general rule" which, according to the arbi-
trator, provides that in the absence of a choice by the parties, the arbitra-
tion is to be governed by the law of the place where the tribunal has its
seat. As if to justify this rule, the arbitrator enumerated the contacts
which the proceedings had with the Swiss canton of Vaud, where the
arbitration took place: Lausanne was the headquarters of the judicial au-
thority which would nominate the arbitrator if the parties were unable to
agree; the arbitrator was domiciled in Lausanne; and the proceedings,
including rendering of the award, took place there.63
None of the contacts present in the Sapphire arbitration, however,
related to the forum's interest in regulating the proceedings. Conse-
quently, these contacts may not create a nexus between the proceedings
and the forum sufficient to justify application of the lex fori.
The G6taverken court held that the choice of a given place to serve
as the seat of a tribunal solely because of its neutral character does not
implicate the sovereign's interest in regulating the arbitral proceedings.6 4
If, on the other hand, the seat of the tribunal is chosen because of the
local law, and this law is also designated as the applicable law, the result
might be different. Thus, in the B.P. arbitration the arbitrator chose Co-
penhagen as the seat of the tribunal because of the "wide scope of free-
dom and independence enjoyed by arbitration tribunals under Danish

61. Lords Hudson, Guest, Wilberforce, and Viscount Dilhorne are quoted in support of
this proposition in DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 18. James Miller, 1970 A.C. at 612, 616, 687,
689.
62. Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award of Mar. 15, 1963,
35 I.L.R. 136 (1967) [hereinafter Sapphire arbitration].
63. Id. at 169. It is to be noted that the arbitrator's choice of the lex arbitriin the Sap-
phire arbitration was challenged by the parties. The case ended, however, with an amicable
settlement, so this issue remained unsolved. Hirsch, supra note 7, at 47.
64. 107 CLUNET 660 (1980).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [V/ol. 9

law." 6 5
Even when the domicile of the arbitrator and the seat of the tribunal
coincide, these contacts are not sufficient to implicate the sovereign's in-
terest if neutrality was the sole reason for choosing the arbitrator. Again,
the result might be different if the arbitrator was chosen because of ex-
pertise in the forum's legal system.
The state's interest usually would be involved in cases where the
forum is the domicile of one or both of the parties, the place where the
contract is to be performed, or the location of disputed property. As the
Monier case indicates, however, the fact that both parties to the dispute
are nationals of the forum, without more, might not be sufficient to man-
date application of the lex fori.6 6
When sitting in a forum unrelated to the proceedings, the arbitrator
is advised to adopt the lex arbitri of one of the jurisdictions having a
significant relationship with the arbitration. Alternatively, an arbitrator
could conduct the proceedings under the law governing the merits of the
dispute6 7 so that all aspects of the dispute would be governed by a single
legal system.
In some circumstances, the choice of a lex arbitri unrelated to the
dispute is justified. For example, if a legal system is exceptionally well-
developed or particularly suited to the arbitration proceedings for some
other reason such a choice may be warranted. The choice of an unre-
lated lex arbitri,however, might render the award unenforceable since a
court might refuse, on jurisdictional grounds, to entertain an appeal or
execute the award. The LIAMCO arbitration is an example of such a
situation.68
Some jurisdictions permit an arbitrator to adopt a foreign lex arbi-
69
trin; others do not. As a result, an arbitrator who defies local law and
applies foreign procedural law faces the risk that the proceedings will be
found invalid under the lexfori and that the award will be unenforceable
not only in the forum state but possibly also in other jurisdictions.

3. Denationalized Lex Arbitri

Finally, an arbitrator might decide not to follow any particular lex
arbitribut to conduct the proceedings under general principles of proce-

65. B.P. arbitration, 53 I.L.R. at 309.

66. See supra text accompanying note 31.
67. Provided that the legal system governing the merits permits the arbitrator to hold the
proceedings abroad.
68. See supra text accompanying note 36.
69. France is one such nation.
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

dure or international rules prepared by one of the international institu-

tions such as the I.C.C. or the United Nations Conference for
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). If one of the parties is a sover-
eign state, the arbitrator also may have the option of conducting the pro-
ceedings based on principles of public international law. In all these
cases, the arbitrator would render an award unattached to any national
legal system, a so-called "floating" or "drifting" award.7 0 An example of
a floating award is found in the Texaco Overseas Oil Co. v. Libya arbitra-
tion. 7 1 The seat of the tribunal was Geneva. The arbitrator specifically
rejected Swiss lex arbitriand declared that the proceedings would be gov-
erned by public international law. Another floating award was rendered
in the Gdtaverken arbitration,7 2 in which the proceedings were conducted
under the I.C.C. Rules.
The effectiveness of floating arbitral awards can be tested in the na-
tional courts when one party challenges the award or petitions a court to
enforce it.73 Of course, when the parties implement the award volunta-
rily, the courts have no opportunity to pass on the validity or enforceabil-
ity of the award.
A court called upon to exercise its supervisory function over the
arbitration is not bound by the arbitrator's decision on the law governing
the proceedings. In particular, the court is not bound by the arbitrator's
exclusion of the local law. The court could, therefore, disregard the arbi-
trator's decision and declare the nationality of the award itself. The
court could also find that the arbitrator violated the forum's mandatory
rules by applying foreign rules of procedure, and, consequently, refuse to
recognize the award. The court's decision always will be based on na-
tional law, even if the arbitrator intended to make the arbitration interna-
tional and detached from any national legal system.
The denationalization of arbitration proceedings is further compli-
cated by the multijurisdictional character of international arbitration.

70. See Paulsson, DelocalizationofInternationalCommercialArbitration: When and Why

It Matters, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 57 (1983). Responding to the argument of the oppo-
nents of delocalized arbitration who argue that there can be no legal obligation independent of
a legal order, Paulsson explains: "What this critique misses is that the delocalized award is not
thought to be independent of any legal order. Rather, the point is that the delocalized award
may be accepted by the legal order of an enforcement jurisdiction although it is independent
from the legal order of its country of origin." Id.
71. Award of Jan. 19, 1973, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979) [hereinafter Texaco arbitration].
72. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text; Cases No. 2977, 2978 & 3033, 1978;
I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 133 (1981).
73. The Texaco award never was tested in a court due to the settlement arrived at by the
parties. The G5taverken award was enforced in Sweden. See Paulsson, supra note 25, at 380.
See generally Wilner, supra note 5, at 649.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

While some jurisdictions recognize floating awards, others do not. Be-

cause the arbitrator cannot foresee where the prevailing party will seek to
enforce the award, detaching the proceedings from national law might
result in an unenforceable award. For this reason, some scholars
strongly criticize the concept of proceedings based on non-national
rules.7 4
In support of arbitration proceedings detached from national law, it
is argued that "it is both pointless and misleading to create a link be-
tween the arbitrator and some national law just in case ... one of the
parties wishes to resort to the courts."' 75 Also, in support of detached
proceedings is the experience of the international business community
which has successfully carried on arbitral proceedings detached from na-
76
tional legal systems.
A substantial number of arbitration proceedings are governed by a
lex arbitriother than the lex fori. One commentator notes that arbitral
proceedings detached from national legal systems constitute the major
portion of international commercial arbitration.77 Denationalized arbi-
tration has been successful for two reasons. First, the majority of arbitral
awards are implemented voluntarily so their validity and enforceability is
never litigated. Second, a number of states, recognizing the needs of the
international business community, permit enforcement of floating
awards.7 8
One obstacle to the development of the denationalized arbitration,
however, is lack of uniformity in national arbitration rules. This diffi-
culty might be overcome by an international convention confirming the
parties' right to choose the lex arbitri.79 A more urgent subject for an
international convention, however, is the need to ensure that proceedings
conducted outside the national legal systems will be recognized and float-
ing awards will be enforced.

74. See, e.g., Wetter, supra note 9, at 273, who regards the concept of proceedings based
on non-national rules as "excessive and without support in law."
75. J. LEW, supra note 20, at 253.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 17. The author notes, however, that the detachment of the arbitration from a
national legal system might not always be recognized by national legal orders. Id. at 40 n.
25.2. See also Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of
States, 157 R.C.A.D.I. 49-50 (1977).
78. See Delaume, L'Arbitrage Transnationalet les Tribunaux Nationaux, 111 CLUNET
521, 546 (1984).
79. McClelland, Towards a More Mature System of InternationalArbitration: The Estab-
lishment of Uniform Rules ofProcedureand the Elimination of the Conflict of Laws Question, 5
N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 186 (1980).
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

CONCLUSIONS

In the past it has been assumed that the state always has an interest
in regulating the administration of justice within its territory. This as-
sumption explains why arbitrators, while permitted to apply foreign sub-
stantive law, have been required to apply the procedural law of the
forum. In recent decades, however, the development of international
trade and the recognition that national intervention hampers business
transactions, have led to a softening of the territorial approach. It has
been recognized that foreign trade, a substantial source of revenue for
most nations, is incompatible with a policy of strict supervision over in-
ternational arbitration. On this issue, the interests of the business com-
munity and states coincide. Thus, the question, whether and to what
extent states should regulate international arbitration, must be answered
by balancing two competing state interests: Regulating the administra-
tion of justice and promoting foreign trade. The importance of these two
interests differs from state to state and from case to case. Nonetheless, an
analysis of recent jurisprudence and legislation in a few industrialized
nations permits some generalizations.
The major trading nations have recognized the business commu-
nity's need for international arbitration detached from the lex arbitri of
the forum. Where local fora have no interest in the proceedings, national
courts are willing to allow arbitrators to conduct proceedings under for-
eign or non-national rules of procedure. On the other hand, when the
dispute has substantial connections with the forum, national courts are
more reluctant, with the exception of France, to permit application of
foreign procedural law. In the future, however, this reluctance might
diminish. Developments in the last twenty years indicate that in many
instances the state's interest in regulating arbitration has been
subordinated to its interest in promoting international trade. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that a fully detached international arbitration universally
will be recognized in the future.
The arbitrator who approaches the problem of the choice of lex arbi-
tri should inquire into the forum law governing the arbitration. If
awards based on foreign or non-national rules of procedure are consid-
ered invalid under forum law, the arbitrator would be advised to follow
the forum's procedural law. If lex fori requires application of its own
procedure only when the arbitrated dispute has substantial contacts with
the forum, the arbitrator must determine whether such contacts exist.
When the dispute has no significant contacts with the forum or when the
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

forum permits application of foreign law even when significant contacts

exist, the arbitrator may choose a lex arbitri other than forum law.
Given the basically contractual nature of arbitration, the arbitrator
should decide which procedural law to apply based on the intent and
interests of the parties. Thus, when the intent of the parties with regard
to the lex arbitrican be established, that law giving effect to the parties'
intentions should be applied. When the parties' intent cannot be estab-
lished, the arbitrator should choose suitable rules for the proceedings.
This could be either the lex arbitriof the place most closely related to the
dispute or procedural rules prepared by an international organization.
The application of non-national rules of procedure is probably the
most desirable choice because these rules are supported by the interna-
tional business community and reflect its needs and expectations. Since
the concept of a truly international arbitration, detached from every na-
tional legal system, is not yet universally recognized, application of non-
national rules is sometimes impractical. Nevertheless, growing support
for denationalized arbitrations will make non-national rules of procedure
a more attractive alternative in the future.

IL THE CHOICE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW

The choice of the substantive law is a critical issue in international
arbitration. Nevertheless, this issue is often disregarded by the parties
and the arbitrators."0 This part of the study considers the choice of the
lex causae by an arbitrator when the parties did not specify their choice
of law.
To choose the substantive law, an arbitrator may rely on the conflict
of laws rules or choose the substantive law directly. The former approach
leads to a double conflict of laws: The first is the selection of a national
system of conflict rules and the second is application of the substantive
law indicated by the conflict rules. At this point, the difference in the
tasks of a judge and an arbitrator again becomes apparent. A judge is
concerned only with a conflict between substantive laws, the so-called
conflict "au premier degr6". Unlike an arbitrator, a judge is never con-
fronted with the conflict "au deuxi~me degr6", the choice of the applica-
ble system of conflict rules, because a judge will always apply the forum's
conflict of laws rules.

80. "Arbitrators, as well as judges, may be faced with the problem of determining which
one of several legal systems should be applied in a given dispute. This problem cannot be
disregarded, albeit parties and arbitrators often pretend that it does not exist." Metzger, supra
note 6, at 229.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

The international and multijurisdictional character of international

arbitration makes the conflict "au deuxi~me degr6" difficult to resolve.
Initially, commentators suggested that an arbitrator must apply the con-
flict rules of one of the jurisdictions related to the dispute."1 Later, it was
proposed that an arbitrator should determine the lex causae on the basis
of a comparative analysis of all the conflict rules involved. The modern
approach takes the position that an arbitrator can determine the applica-
ble substantive law without resorting to conflict rules at all. According
to this approach, an arbitrator should choose the law applicable to the
merits either by examining the substantive laws involved in the dispute or
by rendering an award based on non-national rules, such as the lex mer-
catoria, international or transnational law. 2
All these solutions have been applied by international arbitrators.
This section will discuss the practical application and value of these
solutions.

A. Determination of the Substantive Law on the Basis of the Rules

of Conflict of Laws.
1. Application of the Conflict Rules of the Seat of the
Arbitration.
One theory for determining the lex causae, proposed by supporters
of the territorial theory, is that the conflict rules of the seat of arbitration
should apply. 3 In practice, the conflict rules of the seat of the arbitral
tribunal often are applied by international arbitrators, especially those
sitting in Eastern European countries. This fact is not surprising since
the Eastern European states staunchly adhere to the territorial theory of
arbitration. For example, in a dispute between a Soviet claimant and a
Sri Lankan respondent, the arbitrator of the Foriegn Trade Arbitration
Commission at the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry in
Moscow stated that "[s]ince the contract did not contain a reference to
the law to be applied, this question had to be determined in accordance
with Art. 126 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R.
and the Union Republics." 8 4 Unfortunately, the arbitrator did not ex-
plain why it was necessary to apply Soviet conflict rules.

81. See Crof, The Applicable Law in InternationalCommercialArbitration: Is It Still a

Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613, 632-33 (1982).
82. See id.; see also Sapphire arbitration, 35 I.L.R. at 170-71.
83. Mann, supra note 20, at 167; Wetter, supra note 9, at 231, 239.
84. Art. 126 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation is a conflict of laws rule. Award of
Oct. 6, 1977, Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, Moscow, 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 209 (1980).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

Similarly, in an arbitration concerning truck leases between Aus-

trian and Czechoslovakian parties,85 the Arbitration Court at the Czech-
oslovakian Chamber of Commerce in Prague applied a Czechoslovakian
statute. The statute provided for the application of the law most closely
related to the contractual relationship. Since the lease was negotiated in
Austria, the trucks were used there, the respondent was an Austrian
company, and the disputed rent was to be paid in Austrian currency, the
arbitrators applied Austrian substantive law.
Of course, the application of the forum's conflict rules is not limited
to Eastern European arbitrations. In the Grtaverken arbitration,8 6 a dis-
pute between Swedish sellers and Libyan buyers concerning the unpaid
balance on three ships built and located in Sweden was submitted to
I.C.C. arbitration in Paris. With regard to the applicable substantive
law, the arbitrators declared that the "applicable law to the contracts is
determined either by an international convention or by the conflicts of
laws rules of France, as the country of the place of arbitration." 87 Since
the arbitrators did not believe that the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to International Sales of Goods of 1955 applied to ships, their
decision was primarily based on French conflict of laws rules.8 8 This
territorially-oriented reasoning is based on two assumptions: a) that an
arbitral tribunal exercises the same functions as a court of law, and b)
that the conflict rules of a given jurisdiction apply not only to judicial
proceedings but also to international arbitration proceedings.
One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the functions of
an arbitrator differ substantially from those of a judge. Arbitration is
based upon a private agreement, and not a sovereign compulsion, and
consequently an arbitrator does not render an award in the name of a
state.9 Thus, the argument that arbitrators must abide by all the rules
which bind a judge is not well-founded. Furthermore, although the con-
flict of laws rules reflect the sovereign's "political and judicial concept of
the delimitation of the legislative competence of the State," 90 the state

85. Award of Jan. 9, 1975, Arbitration Court of the Czechoslovakian Chamber of Com-
merce, Prague, 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 143 (1976).
86. See Gdtaverken, 107 CLUNET 660 (1980).
87. Id. at 136.
88. Id. at 137. The question of the applicability of the Hague Convention was left
undecided.
89. "[The arbitrator] draws his power from the arbitration clause and does not, in any
manner, render justice in the name of a given state, whether a state of the seat [of the arbitra-
tion] or any other state." Lalive, Les regles du conflict de lois appliquedsau fond du litige par
l'arbitre internationalsiegean en Suisse, 1976 R.A. 155, 159. (Author's translation).
90. "[The national judge] applies the rules of his own private international law, by means
of which the state, whose authority he exercises, expresses certain political-juridical visions or
 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

did not necessarily intend to impose these rules on arbitrators. The hold-
ing of the Paris Court of Appeals in the G6taverken case supports this
position. There, the Court held that French procedural law did not ap-
ply in the arbitration because the nexus between the dispute and the fo-
rum was insufficient. For similar reasons, an arbitrator should not be
bound by the French conflict rules. If a state has no interest in regulating
the arbitration procedure, it probably has even less interest in determin-
ing the substantive law applied by the arbitrator. In the Gdtaverken arbi-
tration, the dispute had absolutely no contacts with the forum; this fact
made the interest analysis relatively simple. A case involving a forum
which has significant contacts with a dispute might pose a more difficult
problem. Even if a forum is significantly related to the dispute, however,
the sovereign may have no interest in applying its conflict rules.
The existence of significant contacts between the forum and the dis-
pute warrants the assumption that the forum has an interest in regulating
the arbitration. Hence, the state may bind the arbitrator with its own lex
arbitri. These contacts may or may not justify the application of the fo-
rum's rules of conflict of laws, however. The purpose of the conflict rules
is to regulate the scope of the state's legislative competence. This pur-
pose would not be advanced by requiring an international arbitrator, who
is not an organ of the state, to apply the conflicts rules.

2. Application of the Conflict Rules Other than Those of the

Seat of Arbitration
a. The Conflict Rules of the Arbitrator'sHome State.
One method of determining the applicable lex causae is application
of the conflict rules of the arbitrator's home state. This approach is
based on the assumption that the arbitrator is most familiar with the
home state's conflict rules. This method is flawed for several reasons.
First, if the arbitrator's familiarity with a legal system plays a role in
choosing the applicable law, it should influence the choice of substantive
rather than conflict law,91 because the substantive law determines the
rights and obligations of the parties. Second, the proposition that the
conflict rules of the arbitrator's home state should apply underestimates
the arbitrator's intellectual capacities.9 2 Third, this approach runs into
the practical problem of determining the arbitrator's home state, namely

concepts concerning the delimitation of its own legislative competences." Id. (Author's
translation).
91. Lalive, supra note 89, at 160.
92. "[The proposition that an arbitrator should apply his own conflict law] would unjustly
underestimate the intellectual capacities and resources of the majority of international arbitra-
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

whether it is the place of the arbitrator's nationality, citizenship, domi-

cile, or residence. 93 Finally, application of the conflict rules of the arbi-
trator's home state implies a nexus between that state and the dispute. In
most cases, however, such a nexus does not exist. Unless the arbitrator
was chosen specifically for knowledge of the legal system governing the
arbitration, the arbitrator's nationality, domicile, or residence are irrele-
vant for the purposes of conflict of laws.

b. The Conflict Rules of the State Which Would Have Had

Jurisdiction in the Absence of the Arbitration Clause

Eighty years ago, Anzilotti advanced the view that arbitrators

should apply the conflict of laws rules of the state which would have had
jurisdiction over the dispute in the absence of the arbitration clause.
Anzilotti based his argument on the theory that an arbitration clause
deprives national courts of jurisdiction over the case. 94 As pointed out
by Anzilotti's critics, however, this theory is based on circular reasoning.
To determine the applicable conflict rules, an arbitrator must first deter-
mine which state would have had jurisdiction in the absence of the arbi-
tration clause, a determination that can be made only by applying the
conflict of laws rules.9 The criticism of Anzilotti's theory, however,
might not be correct. The critics assume that the jurisdictional and con-
flict rules are the same, a proposition which is at least debatable. Certain
contacts between the dispute and the forum, while sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the forum's courts, might not justify application of forum
law. Thus, when one of the parties is a national of the forum but all
other contacts are with another jurisdiction, the application of forum law
might not be warranted, despite the fact that local courts would have
jurisdiction because one party is a national.
The main reason why Anzilotti's theory is of only historic interest
today is that international arbitration is no longer considered an attempt
to deprive national courts of jurisdiction over the case. Today, arbitra-
tion is considered a convenient way of resolving international commer-
cial disputes and is supported not only by the international business
community but also by states themselves.

tors since in effect it suggests that they are incapable of resorting to a system of private interna-
tional law other than their own." Id. (Author's translation).
93. Id.
94. Croff, supra note 81, at 624.
95. Lalive, supra note 89, at 161.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

c. The Conflict Rules of a State Where the Award Will Be

Enforced.
Another theory is that, to ensure enforceability of the award, the
arbitrator should apply the conflict rules of a state where an arbitral
award will be enforced. For example, under Article V of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 9 6 a state can refuse to recognize a foreign arbitral award if the
award violates public policy. If the application of foreign conflict rules
were viewed as a violation of the public policy of the state where enforce-
ment is sought, the award would be unenforceable. The narrow interpre-
tation the courts give to the public policy exception in the New York
Convention9 7 makes it unlikely that a state would refuse to recognize an
award on this ground.
Furthermore, practical considerations reinforce the conclusion that
application of the conflict rules of a state where the award will be en-
forced is not a viable alternative. In most cases, when the arbitrator
makes a decision concerning the applicable conflict rules, the state where
execution of the award will be sought is unknown. 98 Moreover, enforce-
ment of the award might be sought in more than one jurisdiction.

d. The Conflict Rules of a State Most Closely Connected to the

Dispute.
Under the influence of modern United States approaches to choice-
of-law problems, some arbitrators apply the conflict rules of the state
most closely connected with the dispute. Although this approach has
proved successful with respect to the choice of substantive law by the
courts, it is debatable whether the same analysis can be applied in deter-
mining the applicable conflict rules in international arbitration.
In a case arbitrated in Paris under the I.C.C. Rules, the arbitrator
applied Italian conflict rules because the Italian legal system was most
closely connected to the dispute.99 In that case, a Swiss company was
distributing products of its Italian partner in Mexico and the United
States. The contract was signed in Italy, and the contract was to be exe-
cuted in Italy (the Italian company was delivering the goods to the Ital-
ian port of Genoa where the property rights passed to the Swiss

96. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (entered into force with respect to
the U.S. Dec. 19, 1970).
97. See id.
98. Lalive, supra note 89, at 162.
99. Case No. 1422, 1966, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 101 CLUNET 884 (1974).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

company). " Although Italy's contacts with the dispute were signifi-
cant, their existence justified the application of Italian substantive law
rather than Italian rules of conflict of laws.
In some cases, application of the conflict rules of the most closely
related jurisdiction may also result in the application of that state's sub-
stantive law. This was the result in the I.C.C. arbitration between the
Italian and Swiss parties described above.'0o Since under Italian law con-
tracts are governed by the lex loci contractus, the arbitrator applied Ital-
ian substantive law. Very often, however, determination of the lex
causae through the conflict rules of the most closely related jurisdiction
does not ensure that the substantive law of the state most closely related
to the dispute will be applied. The following hypothetical illustrates this
situation. A contract between Italian and Swiss parties is signed in Paris.
Under the terms of the contract the Italian party is to deliver machinery
to the Swiss party's plant located in Italy. The machinery will be used to
manufacture goods for the Italian market. Undoubtedly, the Italian legal
system is most closely related to the dispute. Under the Italian lex loci
contractus rule, however, an arbitrator would have to apply French sub-
stantive law. Since France has no meaningful contacts with the dispute it
has no interest in having its law applied. Consequently, the application
of French law in this situation is not justified. Although courts have used
the closest-connection approach successfully to choose substantive law, it
is debatable whether arbitrators should use the same analysis to deter-
mine the applicable conflict rules.
By applying the conflict rules of the state most closely related to the
dispute, an arbitrator relinquishes to the state the power to determine
applicable law. In doing so, the arbitrator furthers the state's interests
and policies, as expressed in its conflict rules. When the state's interests
are of a fundamental nature, for example, when a personal status of a
citizen is involved, the arbitrator is justified in yielding to the state.
Cases of this nature, however, are rare in international arbitration. Typi-
cally, disputes submitted to international arbitration are commercial.
When commercial matters are involved, there is no justification for an
international arbitrator, who is apppointed by the parties and does not
represent a state, to further the state's interests embodied in its conflict
rules. The following observations by the arbitrator in the Sapphire arbi-
tration illustrate this point:
Since the arbitration has its seat in Switzerland, Swiss Private Interna-

100. Id. at 885.

101. See supra text accompanying note 100.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

tional Law might be applicable, as the lex fori, for determining the
substantive law applicable to the interpretation and performance of the
agreement. However, in the view of some eminent specialists in Pri-
vate International Law, since the arbitrator has been invested with his
powers as a result of the common intention of the parties he is not
bound by the rules of conflict in force at the forum of arbitration. Con-
trary to a state judge, who is bound to conform to the conflict law rules
of the state in whose name he metes out justice, the arbitrator is not
bound by such rules. He must look for the common intention of the
parties, and use the connecting factors generally used in doctrine and
in case law and must disregard national peculiarities . . For these
reasons, since the agreement contains no express choice of law, the
arbitrator will determine which system of law should best be applied
according to the evidence of the parties'
02
intention and in particular the
evidence to be found in the contract. 1

3. Cumulative Application of the Conflict Rules Related to the

Dispute.

A cumulative analysis of the conflict rules of all related jurisdictions

is another method of determining the lex causae. This approach devel-
oped from the modem United States conflict of laws analysis which looks
directly to the substantive laws involved in the dispute. In international
arbitration, arbitrators have used this approach to find the solution for
conflicts au deuxime degri. Arbitrators usually have adopted this ap-
proach to avoid choosing any single system of conflict rules.
When the conflict rules of all the jurisdictions related to the dispute
point to the same substantive law (the so-called "false conflict situa-
tion"), 1 3 it is not necessary to determine the applicable legal system. If
satisfied that all conflict rules lead to the same conclusion, the arbitrator
may proceed to apply the substantive law directly.
A good illustration of this approach can be found in an I.C.C. arbi-
tration between a German claimant and a Greek respondent."° The dis-
pute arose when the Greek party refused to accept or pay for the goods it
agreed to purchase from the German party. The Swiss arbitrator consid-
ered which law to apply and noted that "the answer to the question is
much facilitated by the fact that the principles of private international
law, as they are developed under German law and Greek law (as well as

102. See supra note 62, at 170-71.

103. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 187 (3d. ed. 1977).
104. Case No. 953, 1956, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 3 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 214 (1978).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

under Swiss law) lead to the same result." 10 5

A similar approach was adopted by an arbitrator in a dispute be-
tween an Italian claimant and a Spanish respondent concerning an alle-
gation of unfair competition. 106 In determining the law applicable to the
tort, the arbitrator stated:
In this respect mention should be made of the conflict of laws rules
contained in Art. 25, para. 2 of the Preliminary Provisions of the Ital-
ian Civil Code, which confer the legislative competence governing the
extra-contractual obligations to the law of the place where the facts,
from which these obligations derive, have occurred. This solution is
also in conformity with the general principles of Spanish private inter-
national law.07
For the arbitrator to apply the cumulative-application approach the
conflict rules involved need not be identical. For example, a false conflict
could exist even if one of the jurisdictions adheres to the principle of lex
loci contractus and the other to the lex loci solutionis principle, if the
contract was concluded and was to be performed in the same place.'
One difficult issue arising in the cumulative-application approach is
whether the country in which the arbitration is conducted is a related
jurisdiction. While some arbitrators consider the law of the forum an
indispensable element of the cumulative-application analysis, others ex-
clude it altogether. These two approaches reflect the doctrinal contro-
versy between supporters of the territorial and contractual theories of
international arbitration. Those who view the arbitration as an extension
of the national judicial system consider the forum a related jurisdiction
for purposes of the cumulative-application approach. Proponents of the
contractual theory, on the other hand, deny it such a role.19
According to one commentator, the cumulative-application ap-
proach satisfies the parties and ensures that the award will be recognized
in all related jurisdictions. "0 Moreover, by detaching the arbitration
from any particular national legal system, the cumulative-application ap-
proach brings it closer to a true international award. The commentator
admits, however, that this effect is relative and coincidental. 1 '

105. Id.
106. Case No. 1990, 1972, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 217 (1978).
107. Id. at 218.
108. See Case No. 3043, 1978, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 106 CLUNET 1000 (1979). See
also Comment, Case No. 3043, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 106 CLUNET 1002 (1979).
109. See Derains, L 'applicationcumulativepar l'arbitredes systimes de conflit de lois inter-
essds au litige, 1972 R.A. 105.
110. Id. at 121.
111. See id.
 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

Despite its limitations, the cumulative-application approach should

be welcomed as a forerunner of the new thinking in conflict of laws in
international arbitration. The main contribution of the cumulative-ap-
proach is that it stresses the need to consider more than one system of
conflict rules. The cumulative application approach does not, however,
go far enough in its analysis of conflict issues. While recognizing the
need for an analysis of all the conflict rules involved in the dispute, the
proponents of the cumulative-application approach refuse to extend this
analysis to the cases where the analysis is most needed-the true conflict
situations.

4. General Principles of Conflict of Laws

Unlike proponents of the cumulative-application approach, arbitra-

tors applying general principles do not limit their analysis to the rules of
the jurisdictions connected with the dispute. Instead, through a compar-
ative analysis of all conflict systems, they attempt to establish the exist-
ence of universally recognized principles of conflict of laws.
In an I.C.C. arbitration between a Pakistani bank and an Indian
company the arbitrator observed that:
The international arbitrator has no lexfori, from which he can borrow
rules of conflict of laws .... The problem has often been debated in
doctrinal writings where various solutions are put forward .... How-
ever this may be, the three or four solutions ... with regard to the
various systems of private international law to be applied by the arbi-
trator, would, in the present case lead to the same practical result in all
likelihood, since there exists a large measure of agreement and concor-
dance, on the question of applicable law to contracts, not only between
the various systems deriving from English conflict of laws, but also,
more generally, between the main systems of conflict of laws in the
world. 112
The cumulative-application approach and the general principles ap-
proach offer solutions only to false conflict situations. The general prin-
ciples approach avoids one problem of the cumulative-application
approach-determining the jurisdiction to which the dispute is related.
The general principles approach is limited, however, because with the
exception of a few basic rules, very few conflict rules are recognized uni-
versally. The application of general principles of conflict of laws might
lead to the unification and harmonization of conflict rules." 3 One should

112. Case No. 1512, 1971, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 128, 129 (1976).
113. P. FOUCHARD, supra note 53, at 319; Smedresman, supra note 8, at 290.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

not be too optimistic about this result, however.1 14

B. The Determination of the Substantive Law without Resorting to

Conflict Rules
Most business people envision arbitration as "practical proceedings
wherein ... [they] can quickly arrive at a determination of the dispute
without any legal complications." 11' 5 Parties that agree to arbitrate ex-
pect procedural simplicity as well as certainty of applicable law. These
expectations are not met when the arbitrator applies conflict of laws
rules.
The application of the conflict rules limits the distributor's choices
of the applicable laws to the rules of a national law and excludes applica-
tion of rules of non-national origin. On the other hand, an arbitrator
who determines the applicable lex causae without resorting to the con-
flict rules may apply the laws of a related national system, the terms of
the contract and the trade usage, or substantive rules of non-national
character.

1. Direct Application of the Substantive Rules of a National

Law
An arbitrator who applies a national substantive law without resort-
ing to conflict rules looks directly to the substantive rules of all jurisdic-
tions involved in the dispute. When all substantive rules offer the same
solution, the "false conflict" situation arises and the arbitrator's task is
simple. Thus, in a dispute arising out of a contract between German and
Swiss parties, the arbitrator did not find it necessary to designate the
applicable law. Although the parties argued for the application of Ger-
man or Swiss law, the arbitrator stated that:
It is necessary to underline from the outset that the question of the law
applicable is only of interest if there exists between the systems of law
to which the parties are submitted a true conflict of laws. As German
and Swiss law impose similar solutions in matters of the law of obliga-
tions and of commercial law, one can thus, as a general rule, abandon
1 16
the research for the applicable law.
Often, arbitrators fail to perceive false conflicts of substantive laws.

114. "'In theory and in court practice we are still far from harmonisation of rules of con-
flict, not to speak of unification. Arbitration, however, may pave the way. We should, how-
ever, not be too optimistic about the result." Sanders, supra note 23, at 260.
115. Abrams, Arbitration Courts and Corporate Problems: A Semantic Approach, 9 ARB. J.
120, 123 (1954).
116. Case No. 2172, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, cited in J. LEW, supra note 20, at 376.
 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

In a case heard by the Arbitral Tribunal of Hamburg, the arbitrator de-

cided to apply German law for the following reason: "The agreement is
concluded through the intermediary of a German broker in respect of
goods warehoused in Germany and drawn up in German language. Con- ' 17
necting factors pointing to the application of Dutch law do not exist." "
From this it is apparent that the arbitrator overlooked the Dutch nation-
ality of the respondent. Nationality of one of the parties undoubtedly is
an important factor, suggesting application of Dutch law. Even if Dutch
law were applied, however, the outcome would have been the same, since
Dutch and German law on the issue did not differ.
When the substantive laws of the jurisdictions related to the dispute
do not coincide, the arbitrator is confronted with a "true conflict." One
solution to a true conflict situation was suggested in the celebrated
ARAMCO arbtitration.1 18 This case arose out of a concession agreement
between a United States oil company (claimant) and Saudi Arabia (re-
spondent). The arbitrators found that some disputed issues were gov-
erned by law of Saudi Arabia, as provided for in the contract. Then the
tribunal had to decide the law governing the remaining matters:
As for the law to be applied to matters which are not governed by the
law expressly chosen by the Parties... the Tribunal adopts the follow-
ing solution. Influenced by the most progressive teachings in that part
of private international law which deals with the autonomy of the will,
the Tribunal ...decides to apply the law which corresponds best to
the nature of the legal relationship between the parties, without look-
ing for the tacit or presumed intention of the contracting parties. This
is the law of the country with which the contract has the closest con-
nection ....Relying on objective considerations, the Tribunal believes
that the governing law should coincide with the economic milieu
where operation is to be carried out. 1 19
Following the closest-connection approach, the arbitrator considers
20
all aspects of a case in light of the potentially applicable legal systems.
This solution also guarantees that the choice of substantive law will not
be fortuitous from the perspective of the parties or with respect to the
disputed issues.
Although the closest-connection approach has many advantages, it
also has some drawbacks. The arbitrator has great discretion in analyz-

117. Arbitral Tribunal of Hamburg, Jan. 15, 1976, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 212, 213 (1978).
118. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), Award of Aug. 23, 1958, 27
I.L.R. 117 (1963) [hereinafter ARAMCO arbitration].
119. Id. at 167.
120. Sanders, supra note 23, at 265.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

ing the contacts between the dispute and related legal systems because
the weight attached to different factors is based on subjective criteria.
The arbitrator's decision, therefore, may be criticized as arbitrary.
The application of the closest-connection approach led to a contro-
versial result in an ad hoc arbitration between a Dutch seller and Swedish
buyers in Sweden. 2 1 The dispute arose from a contract to sell the motor
vessel Mare Liberum. Although the contract did not provide for the ap-
plicable law, the parties stipulated that any arbitration would take place
in Gothenburg, Sweden. Following the closest-connection analysis, the
three arbitrators (a Norwegian chairman, a Dutchman, and a Swede)
concluded that the choice of Sweden as the seat of arbitration out-
weighed the contacts with the Netherlands. Numerous factors pointed
towards application of Dutch law: The vessel was registered in the
Netherlands, the sellers were domiciled there,122 the contract was dated
Rotterdam (although it was signed in Gothenburg, Sweden), the vessel
was to be delivered to the Dutch port of Vlaardingen, and the purchase
price was to be paid to a Rotterdam bank. In the light of these contacts
with the Netherlands, the arbitrators' decision to apply Swedish law is at
least debatable.
Although the closest-connection approach is only one of many theo-
ries, it is the only recent United States theory which has been applied in
international arbitration. For example, other United States theories,
such as the interest analysis, have never been employed by arbitrators.
Possibly this can be explained by the fact that interest analysis is ill-
suited to international arbitration. A judge, using an interest analysis,
approaches conflicts problems from the perspective of the sovereign's in-
terest in regulating a given activity. Unlike a judge, however, an arbitra-
tor is answerable to the parties and not to a sovereign. Consequently, to
determine the applicable law, the arbitrator should choose the legal sys-
tem which best serves the interests of the parties and not those of a sover-
eign. Moreover, the sovereign does not usually expect arbitrators to
implement policies embodied in domestic legislation.

2. Application of the Terms of the Contract

Some disputes can be resolved by arbitrators without the application
of rules of substantive law. Instead, an arbitrator may base the decision

121. Award of July 1966, 1 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 141 (1976).

122. See Convention on the law applicable to international sales of goods, done at the
Hague June 15, 1955, art. 3, 510 U.N.T.S. 147. Due to the fact that under the Hague Conven-
tion of 1955 sales of movables in international trade are governed by the law of the seller, this
connecting factor assumes particular importance.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

solely on an interpretation of the parties' contract.'2 3

On many occasions, the language of the contract may provide an
adequate basis for a solution to the dispute: "The contract normally sets
down the relative rights and duties of the parties. It will state the subject
of the transaction, what constitutes performance, and what excuses non-
performance. This, for the most part, supplies the substantive 'law'
against which the facts of a dispute are to be weighed."' 2 4
For example, a dispute arose out of a license and exclusive sales
agreement, under which an Italian claimant promised to provide a Span-
ish respondent the know-how necessary to manufacture certain products
in Spain. The arbitrator found that:
In so far as the questions in dispute are regulated by the parties in their
contract and this contractual regulation does not contravene the
mandatory rules of the two laws in question, it is permitted to resolve
them on the basis of the contract. This applies in the present case to
the validity, execution, rescission or adaptation to the circumstances of
125
the contract.
This Italian-Spanish arbitration also illustrates the limits of basing a
decision on the contract terms. In many instances, the terms of a con-
tract will not provide a solution for all the disputed issues because certain
aspects of the parties' relationship may have been omitted from the con-
tract, either deliberately or accidentally. Moreover, a dispute might in-
volve a question which is non-contractual in nature. The arbitrator in
the Italian-Spanish arbitration was confronted by both of these problems.
There, the parties failed to determine the rate of interest on damages for
non-performance. Furthermore, the claimant asserted a claim on the
grounds of unfair competition, which is clearly a non-contractual
issue. 126
Where interpretation of the contract does not provide a solution for
all the issues in the arbitraton, the arbitrator could resort to external
sources of interpretation, such as customs and practices of trade. In this
context, the arbitrator should analyze general customs and trade prac-
127
tices, as well as customs and practices between the parties.

123. Sanders, supra note 23, at 264; J.LEW, supra note 20, at 493-94.
124. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1212.
125. Case No. 1990, 1972, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 217, 217-18
(1978).
126. See id.
127. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1212.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

3. Application of Non-National Substantive Rules.

The application of non-national substantive rules has been discussed
widely in recent years. The departure from national law as the source of
standards for international commercial relations was triggered by a com-
bination of factors, including discontent
128
in the international business
community with the law and lawyers.
Traditionally, parties to an arbitration have preferred arbitrators to
apply practical rather than legal principles. 129 Moreover, national legis-
lation often does not address all the complex issues that arise from trans-
national commercial relations. As a result, the business community
turned to rules which developed outside the realm of national legal
systems.

a. Rules of International Trade

International arbitrators also can apply non-national substantive
rules arbitrators called the "law merchant" or lex mercatoria.3 ° The
origins of these rules can be traced to the merchant law of the Middle
Ages"' and English commercial and maritime principles. 3 2 Among the
sources of the modern lex mercatoria are customs and usages of trade,
general principles of law, international 6onventions, acts of international
organizations, and codes of conduct.

i. Customs, Usage, and General Principles of Law

Writers do not agree whether the customs of trade and general prin-

128. Freedom from the application of binding legal rules has been advanced by many
observers, including the most fervent supporters of arbitration, as a major benefit of
the process. Arbitration, which is "confidential," owes no higher duty to the evolu-
tion of a society-wide body of legal principles. It is thought sufficient that the partic-
ular controversy be fairly and equitably decided and then relegated to the private files
of the arbitral institution. No precedent need be established. Such is the discontent
with the law and lawyers that these ideas have a powerful appeal in the international
business community.
Higgens, Brown & Roach, supra note 4, at 1040 (footnote omitted).
129. In the absence of an express intent, it seems more in keeping with what the every-
day businessman actually had in mind to presume that they intended practical rather
than technical and legal principles to form the criteria for the arbitrator. Indeed,
how can an arbitrator who is not trained in the law possibly be expected to apply
legal principles?
Abrams, supra note 115, at 135.
130. See generally J. LEw, supra note 20, at 346, and sources cited therein. The law
merchant does not include public international law.
131. Sanders, supra note 23, at 263.
132. Smedresman, supra note 8, at 299.
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

ciples of law constitute one 13 3 or two independent1 34 sources of lex mer-

catoria. Customs of trade are widely accepted and applied in
international trade and commerce. While some customs might apply to a
particular type of commercial activity, others represent more general
principles.
The general principles of law are universally recognized rules, at
least in the major legal systems. Unlike customs and usages which need
not conform to the national rules, the general principles of law, by their
nature, are deeply rooted in national laws. It could be argued that the
general principles of law also form part of the trade customs. For exam-
ple, basic principles like pacta sunt servanda andforce majeure are widely
recognized by the business community.
Arbitrators often turn to general principles of law and customs of
trade. 135 In many instances, arbitrators invoke the general principles and
customs of trade to support their interpretation of a contract. In other
cases, arbitrators use these rules and principles to avoid application of
national laws: "[I]n contract cases national laws can be escaped by label-
ling an issue as one of contract construction. Trade usage and custom
clearly have an important role in this technique, and indeed it may be
difficult to maintain a precisely defined distinction between law and cus-
tom. ' ' 136 Finally, on some occasions arbitrators rely on customs of trade
and general principles of law as the only source of substantive rules. An
example of an arbitral decision based solely on trade customs is the
award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Coffee Trade. 137 The
dispute arose when the seller of coffee138 invoked Article 4 of the Condi-
tions of Trade in Indonesian Coffee. This article provides that the in-
crease or reduction of freight after the conclusion of the contract was for
the benefit or account of the buyer. Based on this provisions, the seller
demanded an additional payment from the buyer. The seller's claim was
rejected by the arbitrator who noted that sellers in the coffee trade cus-
tomarily include in the price any freight increases applicable at the time
of shipment.
The Sapphire arbitration is one of the best examples of an award
based on general principles of law. The arbitrator concluded that the par-

133. See P. FOUCHARD, supra note 53, at 402.

134. See Sanders, supra note 23, at 263.
135. See Goldman, Les conflicts de lois dans l'arbitrageinternationalde droit privd, 109
R.C.A.D.I. 366, 477 (1963).
136. Smedresman, supra note 8, at 299.
137. Award of May 19, 1971, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 136 (1976).
138. The nationalities of the parties were not reported by the editors of Y.B. COM. ARB.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

ties intended to avoid national law and to submit the interpretation and
performance of the agreement to the "general principles of law based
upon the practice common to civilized countries."' 139 The arbitrator gave
the following grounds for the application of the general principles of law:
Article 38 of the agreement, which confirms an intention already ex-
pressed in the preamble, provides that the parties undertake to carry
out its provisions according to the principles of good faith and good
will, and to respect the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement ....
It is... perfectly legitimate to find in such a clause evidence of the
intention of the parties not to apply the strict rules of a particular sys-
tem but, rather, to rely upon the rules of law, based upon reason,
which are common to civilized nations. These rules are enshrined in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as a
source of law, and numerous decisions of international tribunals have
made use of them and clarified them ....
The arbitrator will therefore apply these principles, by following,
when necessary, the decisions taken by international tribunals. He
points out that, this being so, he has no intention of deciding the case
according to "equity," like an "amiable compositeur." On the con-
trary, he will try to disentangle the rules of positive law, common to
civilized nations, such as are4 formulated
°
in their statutes or are gener-
ally recognized in practice.'
It should be noted that in many instances, the application of the
customs of trade and general principles alone cannot resolve a dispute
because these principles do not cover all issues. For example, at present
there are no customs in international commerce regarding the periods of
prescription. Since national rules differ on this matter, there are no gen-
eral principles,"' and therefore the application of customs of trade and
general principles would be impossible.

ii. Transnational Rules

The term "transnational rules" is used in this study to describe the
substantive rules which have been created by international organizations
and conferences. These rules are primarily contained in international
conventions, codes of conduct, uniform laws, and other resolutions of
international organizations. The common feature in these sources of in-
ternational trade law is that they are created as a result of international
cooperation. Unlike rules of public international law, however, transna-

139. Award of Mar. 15, 1965, 35 I.L.R. 136, 173 (1967).

140. Id. at 172-75.
141. Sanders, supra note 23, at 263.
1986] Choice of Law in International Arbitration

tional rules do not govern relations between states; they regulate ques-
tions of private law in the international business arena.
International conventions regulating issues of private law play a
dual role in international commercial arbitration. When ratified or ac-
cepted by a state, the rules embodied in these conventions form part of
the national legal system and can be applied by arbitrators as rules of
national law. These same rules, however, may also be applied by arbitra-
tors as non-national standards. For example, an arbitrator may apply a
rule embodied in an international convention without reference to any
national legal system.
Codes of conduct and uniform laws usually are prepared by interna-
tional intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations14 2 and are
aimed at universal or regional unification of substantive laws. Some of
the laws contained in codes of conduct and uniform laws are adopted
voluntarily by states and form part of the national legal systems. An
arbitrator's willingness to apply these rules depends on their recognition
by the international community. Certainly, legal instruments which have
received wide recognition (as reflected by the number of ratifications and
acceptances) are more likely to be applied by arbitrators.
Another group of transnational rules available to international arbi-
trators are the rules promulgated by international organizations. The
most important rules are promulgated by two European organizations:
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 4 3 and the
European Economic Community (E.E.C.).
The legal character of non-national substantive rules has been the
subject of controversy for some time. It has been argued that all rules
applied by arbitrators must be derived from some legal system and sup-
ported by means of sovereign compulsion. Others have argued that arbi-
trators should not apply non-national rules because they are uncertain.
On the other hand, proponents maintain that the rules of interna-
tional trade form an a-national legal system of merchants and people
from the business world. 1 Others argue that the wide application of the
non-national rules in international arbitration sufficiently demonstrates

142. One has to distinguish between the uniform laws contained in international conven-
tions like the Geneva Convention Providing the Uniform Law for Cheques of 1931, Mar. 19,
1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 355, and the uniform laws discussed in this paragraph. The uniform laws
of the latter type constitute merely the recommendations of international organizations, while
the former are binding treaty law.
143. See, e.g.,The General Conditions of Assembly and the Provisions on Other Technical
Services of 1962, The General Conditions for the Technical Servicing of Machinery, Equip-
ment and Other Items of 1968, and The General Conditions of Delivery of 1968.
144. P. FOUCHARD, supra note 53, at 404.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

that such practice is commonly accepted.' 4 5

It appears that the existence of a legal sanction is not a condition to
lex mercatoria'sapplication by international arbitrators. It has been sub-
mitted that "there is no reason why the rules, practices and customs of
international trade cannot individually and per se be applied, where rele-
vant to particular commercial arrangement."' 4 6 Even if treated as
"spontaneous" rules of law,' 47 however, rules of international trade have
a great role to play in promoting the development of international com-
mercial arbitration.

b. Public International Law

Public international law governs relations between states and inter-
national organizations. For that reason, its rules are generally not appli-
cable to international commercial transactions that are private and non-
governmental. In some instances, however, a commercial dispute might
involve issues requiring the application of public international law. In an
arbitration between an Indian company and a Pakistani bank,' 4 8 the re-
spondent, a Pakistani bank, asserted that the arbitration clause contained
in the contract was invalid as a result of a "state of war" between India
and Pakistan in 1965-66. The arbitrator sitting in Switzerland decided,
based on rules of public international law, whether a state of war existed.
The direct application of public international law to private or semi-
private commercial relations often occurs in arbitrations between states
and international corporations. For example, the arbitrator in the Sap-
phire arbitration based the award on general principles of international
law recognized by the civilized nations, as defined in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The arbitrator then ob-
served that:
Their application is particularly justified in the present contract, which
was concluded between a State organ and a foreign company, and de-
pends upon public law in certain of its aspects. This contract has
therefore a quasi-international character which releases it from the
sovereignty of a particular legal system, and it differs fundamentally
from an ordinary commercial contract .... [The application of the
general principles of law] seems particularly suitable for giving the
guarantees of protection which are indispensable for foreign compa-
nies, since these companies undergo very considerable risks in bringing

145. Goldman, supra note 135, at 477.

146. J.LEw, supra note 20, at 437.
147. Luzzatto, supra note 77, at 64.
148. Case No. 1512, 1971, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 129, 131 (1976).
 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

financial and technical aid to countries in the process of development.

It is in the interest of both parties to such agreements that any disputes
between them should be settled according to the general principles uni-
versally recognized and should not be subject to the particular rules of
national laws, which are very often unsuitable for solving problems
concerning the rights of the State where the contract is being carried
out, and which are always subject to changes by this State and are
often unknown or not fully known to one of the contracting parties.14 9
In a more recent case dealing with the same issue, S.P.P. (Middle
East) Ltd. v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, 5 0° the arbitrator took a differ-
ent position. Although the agreement did not specify the applicable law,
the parties agreed that Egyptian law should apply. The claimants ar-
gued, however, that Egyptian law could not override principles of inter-
national law applicable to international investments. The defendants
maintained that Egyptian law should govern all disputed issues. The ar-
bitrators characterized the problem in the following way:
In concrete terms the basic issue to be dealt with is whether contracts
between States and private Law persons can be removed at least to a
certain extent from domestic law and made subject to International
Rules.
The theories which have emerged on the subject differ sometimes
to a considerable extent. Some have gone so far as to invoke under
certain circumstances full "denationalisation" of international con-
tracts to the extent that they should only be governed by Rules and
Principles drawn from International practice and Trade usages.
Others do not discard the reference to domestic laws, provided, how-
ever, that even when placed within the legal framework of a domestic
system, arbitrators are empowered to apply those principles of interna-
tional law which ensure protection to the contractual rights of the pri-
vate party vis-a-vis the sovereign state.
In the field of international investments the problem has been ex-
pressly dealt with in Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention reading as
follows:
"The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party of the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable."
Obviously the specific proviso of art. 42 only applies to investment
agreements and disputes that may arise thereunder. However, we take

149. Award of Mar. 15, 1967, 35 I.L.R. 136, 137-76 (1967).

150. Award of Mar. 11, 1983, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 22 I.L.M. (1983).
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

the view that "in the world today, there is no reason why this solution
should be limited to a particular category of state contracts. In other
words, the rule formulated in article 42 can be considered as illustra-
tive of a principle of wider application."
May we observe, ad abundantiam, that failing contractual
designation of the governing law the same result (i.e., reference to the
law of the host country) would also normally be achieved by applying
the ordinary principles of conflict of laws.
In the case at issue the governing law is, in our opinion, the law of
Egypt. The Agreements were both made in Egypt. The place of per-
formance was almost entirely Egypt.5 1 There are numerous references
to Egyptian law in the agreements.1
Nevertheless, the court applied the rules of international law based
on the following reasoning: "We have found that International Law
principles such as 'Pacta Sunt Servanda' and 'Just Compensation for Ex-
' 52
propriatory Measures' can be deemed as part of Egyptian law."'

CONCLUSIONS
Because of the contractual nature of arbitration, the arbitrator's
choice of applicable law should be guided by the intent of the parties. If
the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained, the arbitrator must decide
whether to resort to conflict rules to determine the applicable substantive
law. Choosing the applicable substantive law based on conflict rules,
however, is impractical because the result is the double conflicts problem,
which in turn leads to uncertainty of the applicable law. From a theoret-
ical point of view, application of conflict rules often does not promote the
purpose of the rules or the interests of the parties. Nevertheless, some
arbitrators still consider application of the forum's conflict rules conve-
nient and practical. Thus, in a dispute between a West German claimant
and a Yugoslavian respondent concerning the exclusive right to sell and
distribute claimant's goods in Yugoslavia, a Swiss arbitrator sitting in
Switzerland said that:
There are no rules of conflict of laws.., in force that could indicate to
the arbitrator of a third country, which has no connection with the
legal relationship existing between the parties, according to which
country's private international law he should determine the law to be
applied to the substance. Nor does there exist a criterion which is suit-
able for deciding in favor of either the private international law of Ger-
many nor the one of Yugoslavia; such an investigation would not

151. Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted).

152. Id. at 771.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

sustain criticism and the result would always have the appearance of
an arbitrary preference. Therefore, the solution which is in practice
the most convenient, and which is recognized as such by the most re-
cent doctrine,
3
consists in the reference to the conflict of law rules of the
15
forum.

Although the arbitator's contention that his position is supported by

legal doctrine is debatable, 154 his remarks concerning the convenience of
applying the forum's conflicts rules are worth considering. The arbitra-
tor was aware that Swiss law had no relation to the dispute. At the same
time, he disregarded German and Yugoslavian law, which were related
to the dispute, because no criteria existed for choosing between the two.
Thus, the arbitrator probably applied Swiss conflict rules because they
were neutral and he was familiar with them.
The Swiss arbitrator proceeded on the assumption that applicable 155
law must be decided on the basis of a single national conflict system.
This is the major flaw in his reasoning. The application of Swiss conflict
laws created a situation where the substantive law was determined based
on a legal system with no connection to the dispute and no interest in its
outcome. The application of the Swiss rule did not promote the objec-
tives of the Swiss legal system or the interests of the parties. For this
reason, it must be regarded as the least sensible choice. Furthermore, the
arbitrator failed to consider whether any differences existed between the
German and Yugoslavian conflict rules. If the German and Yugoslavian
rules were identical, but different from the Swiss rules, the application of
Swiss law clearly was unjustified. If the German and Yugoslavian con-
flict rules led to different results, the arbitrator should have applied non-
national conflict rules or he should have applied the substantive laws
directly.
Sometimes the application of the forum's conflicts rules may be nec-
essary to ensure the enforceability of the award. For example, under Ar-
ticle V(l) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,1 56 the recognition and enforce-
ment of an award may be refused abroad if the award is not valid under
the law of the country where rendered. Thus, if a state refuses to uphold
awards based on lex causae other than that indicated by its own conflict

153. Case No. 1455, I.C.C. Arbitration Tribunal, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 215, 219 (1978) (foot-
notes omitted).
154. See Croft, supra note 81, at 625.
155. See Case No. 1455, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 215, 219.
156. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

rules, an award based on non-forum rules might not be recognized or

enforced abroad. For this reason, some commentators endorse the appli-
cation of the forum's conflict rules, even though it leads to arbitrary re-
sults in some cases. 157 The present trend in international arbitration,
however, is away from application of the forum's conflict rules.
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion of 1961 is evidence of this trend. " Article VII(l) of the Convention
states:
The parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, the law to be
applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any
indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall
apply the proper1 59
law under the rules of conflict that the arbitrators
deem applicable.
Thus, the European Convention confirms the parties' autonomy to
choose the substantive law and gives arbitrators freedom to determine
the applicable conflicts systems. This provision was later interpreted by
arbitrators and courts as permitting arbitrators to apply substantive law
directly. 60 The 1961 European Convention codified proposals of various
international bodies all of which would accord a great degree of flexibil-
ity to arbitrators in determining the applicable lex causae. This trend
ultimately may result in universal recognition of awards in which the
applicable lex causae was determined without the assistance of the con-
flict rules.
An arbitrator who determines the lex causae without resort to the
conflict rules must choose between the law of one of the national legal
systems involved in the dispute, the terms of the contract, or, finally,
substantive rules of non-national character.
Where possible, the arbitrator should resolve the dispute on the ba-
sis of the contract itself because such terms correspond to the interests of
the parties. Since the principle of parties' autonomy in contractual mat-

157. P. O'KEEFE, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 191-92 (1975).

158. Done Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; see I.C.C., ARBITRATION LAW IN EUROPE
351 (1981).
159. 1961 European Convention, 484 U.N.T.S. at 374. The Working Group formed by the
UNCITRAL and entrusted with the task of preparing a model law on international commer-
cial arbitration decided to provide, as do the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that the Tribunal
should apply "the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable."
Broches, A Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration?18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 79, 90 (1984). See United Nations Commissionfor InternationalTrade Law Arbitra-
tion Rules, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 35-50, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 178 (1976),
reprintedin U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, Decision on UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules and Text of the Rules, 15 I.L.M. 201 (1976).
160. Luzzatto, supra note 77, at 63.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

ters is universally recognized, the danger that an award based on the

terms of the contract will not be enforced abroad is remote.16 1 Finally,
by relying on the terms of the contract, the arbitrator need not choose
between the legal systems involved in the dispute, and he thus can avoid
problems arising from the application of the conflict of laws rules.
When the arbitrator cannot resolve a dispute on the basis of the
contract itself, he must resort to the rules of substantive law. In some
instances the arbitrator may resolve a dispute by relying on trade usages
or general principles of law. Only on rare occasions, however, will us-
ages and general principles provide a solution for all disputed issues, and
the arbitrator should then turn to the transnational rules. In this way, an
arbitrator applies rules which are familiar and accepted by the parties,
without giving preference to any national legal system. Moreover, appli-
cation of transnational rules allows the arbitrator, at least in some in-
stances, to avoid potentially rigid conflict rules.' 6 2 In applying the rules
of international trade, however, the arbitrator should ensure that
mandatory rules of the seat of arbitration or place of enforcement of the 63
award are not violated. Otherwise, the award may be unenforceable.1
The application of transnational rules instead of national law was
recently argued before a French court. In Societd Norsolor v. Societd
Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi,164 the Tribunal de grande instance was asked to
rule on the validity of an I.C.C. arbitral award rendered in Vienna. The
dispute arose out of a contract of representation concluded between
French and Turkish companies. The I.C.C. arbitration clause contained
in the contract was invoked by the Turkish claimant after unilateral ab-
rogation of the contract by the French company. Emphasizing the inter-
national character of the contract, the arbitrator refused to base the
award on a national law, deciding instead to apply "international lex
mercatoria."' 16 1 The arbitrator resolved the issue of the contract abroga-
tion by reference to the principle of good faith and computed damages on
the basis of equity ("en equit6"). The French plaintiff alleged before the
Tribunal de grande instance that an arbitrator not empowered to render
an award based in equity may not render an award on a basis other than
a national law. Consequently, according to the plaintiff, the arbitrator in

161. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1212.

162. J. LEav, supra note 20, at 438.
163. See Loquin, Les pouvoirs des arbitresinternationauxa la lumire de l'dvolution rdcente
du droit de Parbitrageinternational,110 CLUNET 293, 342 (1983).
164. Judgment of Mar. 4, 1981, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 108 CLUNET 836 (1981), with note by
Kahn.
165. Id. at 838.
 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

this case acted ultra vires. The court emphasized that under the I.C.C.
Rules the arbitrator applies the law "designated as the proper law by the
rule of conflict which [the arbitrator] deems appropriate."' 6 6 Although
the court found the term "equity," as used by the arbitrator, unclear and
confusing, it nevertheless upheld the award because it did not violate
French public policy.
The Norsolor decision recognized the power of the arbitrator to de-
part from the national substantive law in favor of rules of international
trade. Moreover, the decision approved the direct application of the sub-
stantive rules, at least in an arbitration conducted under the I.C.C.
Rules. The Norsolor decision constitutes a significant step in the develop-
ment of a truly international or denationalized arbitration.
An arbitrator who cannot find transnational rules governing the is-
sue in dispute, or is unwilling to apply these rules, must apply national
law. The arbitrator's preliminary inquiry should determine whether a
true conflict exists. If there is no true conflict, the determination of ap-
plicable law is of little importance.
When a true conflict exists, commentators suggest that the closest-
connection approach offers a desirable solution.' 67 The closest-connec-
tion analysis assumes that the legal system of the jurisdiction most
closely connected to the dispute should govern the disputed issues. The
problems associated with this analysis in international arbitration con-
cern the manner in which the most closely related jurisdiction is deter-
mined. Because the arbitrator determines the relative weight of the
connecting factors, he therefore has great discretion. An abuse of this
discretion will frustrate the parties' expectations with respect to the ap-
plicable law. Nevertheless, the closest-connection analysis is a preferable
manner of solving a true conflict situation in international arbitration
because it focuses on the relationship between the dispute and the appli-
cable national law. The soundness of this solution was noted by the arbi-
trators in the ARAMCO arbitration: "[T]he governing law should
coincide with the economic milieu where operation is to be carried
16 8
out."'

OBSERVATIONS
Most legal systems recognize the principle of the autonomy of the
parties and their freedom to choose the law governing the contractual

166. Supra note 26, rule 13(3).

167. Crof, supra note 81, at 633.
168. ARAMCO arbitration, 27 I.L.R. at 167.
19861 Choice of Law in International Arbitration

relationship. The arbitrator's power to determine the governing lex arbi-

tri and lex causae should be considered an extension of the principle of
party autonomy because an arbitrator acts as an agent of the parties in
determining the laws governing the dispute. Consequently, the arbitrator
should try to determine the intent of parties with regard to the applicable
law. Moreover, the arbitrator should have as much power as the parties
to choose the applicable law.
The recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a clear trend
toward recognizing the business community's needs for international ar-
bitration detached from the lex arbitri.Where the local forum has no
interest in the proceedings, national courts permit arbitrators to conduct
the proceedings under foreign or non-national rules of procedure. On the
other hand, when the arbitrated dispute has substantial connections with
the forum, national courts are more reluctant, with the exception of
France, to permit application of foreign procedural law. Consequently,
an arbitrator who must choose the lex arbitrishould inquire into the law
governing the arbitration in the forum. If the lex fori considers invalid
awards based on foreign or non-national rules of procedure, the arbitra-
tor should follow the lex arbitriof the forum. If the local law requires
application of its own rules of procedure only if the arbitrated dispute has
substantial connections with the forum, the arbitrator must determine
the relationship between the dispute and the forum. When the dispute
has no significant contacts with the forum or the forum permits applica-
tion of foreign law even when significant contacts exist, the arbitrator
may choose a lex arbitri other than the local rules.
Given the contractual nature of arbitration, the arbitrator's decision
on the applicable law should reflect the interests of the parties. Thus,
when the intention of parties as to the lex arbitrican be established, that
law should apply. When the parties' intent cannot be established, the
arbitrator should determine which set of rules is best suited to the pro-
ceedings. This could be either the lex arbitri of the place most closely
related to the dispute or the rules of procedure prepared by an interna-
tional organization. Application of non-national rules of procedure of-
fers the most desirable alternative because these rules stem directly from
the international business community and reflect its needs and
expectations.
In selecting the applicable substantive law, the parties usually are
influenced by considerations such as the neutrality and sophistication of
a legal system. The parties are not concerned with the state's interest in
applying its law to the dispute. By analogy, the arbitrator choosing the
substantive law should not begin an analysis by considering the state's
284 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 9

interest and, therefore, should not turn to the conflict rules. The conflict
rules codify state policies with regard to choice of law questions. Since
the arbitrator is accountable to the parties rather than the sovereign, the
arbitrator need not implement state policies. Consequently, the arbitra-
tor's determination of the applicable law should be based on an analysis
of the substantive rules rather than on application of conflict of laws
rules. This same conclusion could be reached by an examination of the
purpose of the national conflict rules, which indicates that a sovereign
has no interest in binding an arbitrator by the sovereign's own conflict
rules.
In choosing the substantive rules, the arbitrator should consider the
national legal systems involved in the dispute, as well as non-national
rules. The arbitrator's choice should be made on the basis of the com-
pleteness and sophistication of a set of rules, rather than their source.