The Global Islamic Revival

Alice Evans,
King’s College London

The Global Islamic Revival represents one of the most significant religious-political movements of
the past half-century, transforming societies across multiple continents. What were its causes?
Existing scholarship tends to focus on local idiosyncrasies – Egypt’s economic stagnation, Iran’s
religious authoritarianism, state weakness in the Sahel, Pakistani return migration from the Gulf,
repression in Uzbekistan, resistance to secular schooling in Indonesia, and Saudi-funded Wahhabism.
While these country-level analyses are hugely valuable, they fail to explain why the revival occurred
worldwide, even in prosperous countries like Qatar, Malaysia, and Britain. This review synthesizes
the global literature on the Islamic Revival and its profound impacts on gender relations, presenting a
novel theoretical framework to explain why modernization has strengthened rather than weakened
religious authority and homogenisation across the Muslim world1.

INTRODUCTION

The Global Islamic Revival has fundamentally reshaped national politics, religious practice, and
gender relations across the Muslim world. Transcending geographical regions, political systems, and
economic conditions, this movement requires a comprehensive analytical framework that addresses
both local specificities and global trends.

During the Global Islamic Revival, Muslims organized for stricter religious observance as Quranic
reading groups, publishing houses, cassette tapes, missionaries, and mosques proliferated across the
Islamic world. Central to this movement was a renewed emphasis on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and
akhlaq (Islamic ethics), derived from the Quran and Sunnah. This comprehensive framework
informed a broader mission of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ – spanning individual piety,
social policing, and political demands for sharia law.

Worldwide, Muslims now express strong religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and support for sharia
(Alexander and Welzel 2011; Arab Barometer 2025; Pew Forum, Washington, and Inquiries 2013;
World Values Survey 2024). Women’s bodies and gender relations have been a primary field of
contention. Back in the 1950s, Saudi-style abayas were rare in Sudan, Somalia, Kerala, Uzbekistan
and Indonesia, but have since become mainstream (Ahmed 2012). Diverse and syncretic practices
have lost ground to scriptural literalism (Hefner 2023, 83–84; Lesser et al. 2004; Schielke 2020, 56;
Thurston 2016), while Muslim liberals and feminists are frequently delegitimized (Akyol 2021;
Basarudin 2015). Importantly, the overwhelmingly majority of Muslims are non-violent and strongly
condemn jihad (Pew Forum, Washington, and Inquiries 2013).

This review proceeds as follows. First, I systematically analyze ten hypotheses for the Global Islamic
Revival: the historical Ulema-State alliance, religion as political legitimacy, the Arab-Israeli war,
economic stagnation, religious club goods, backlash against secular modernization, the Iranian
Revolution, Saudi-funded Salafism, technological advances, and mass schooling. Second, I present a
theoretical framework - the ‘Prestige-Piety Feedback Loop’ - to explain how modernization
paradoxically amplified religious authority. Third, I examine how the revival has transformed gender
relations across diverse regions.

1
Usama Polani provided superb research assistance. For valuable feedback, I thank Michael Cook, Robert
Hefner, Aaron Rock-Singer, Jared Rubin, Arpit Gupta, Daron Acemoglu and Malika Zeghal. All errors are mine.
This research was supported by the O’Shaughnessy Fellowship, Open Philanthropy, ACX Grants and
Leverhulme.
CAUSES OF THE GLOBAL ISLAMIC REVIVAL

Scholars have proposed numerous explanations for the Islamic Revival's emergence and global
spread. In this section, I examine ten hypotheses, assessing their explanatory power and exploring
potential connections.

Hypothesis 1: The ‘Ulema-State Alliance’

The Muslim world’s religiosity may have been inevitable, not due to the inception of Islam, but to
rather the historically contingent emergence of religious authoritarianism.

Before the 11th century, Islamic scholars maintained intellectual independence and pluralism, but this
freedom was gradually suffocated by an emergent 'ulema-state' alliance (Kuru 2019). Facing
existential threats from Shii powers, Abbasid caliphs established a Sunni orthodoxy that branded
dissenters as apostates. Concurrently, Iraq’s agricultural decline and courtly extravagance depleted
state treasuries, prompting a shift toward paying military officials with iqta land grants. Wealth and
influence thereby shifted from the merchants to military, undermining merchants’ private
patronage of independent ulema. The Seljuk Empire accelerated this transformation by expanding
the iqta system while establishing the Nizamiyya network of madrasas to produce state-aligned
religious scholars. Under the ‘ulema-state alliance’, ruling sultans empowered ulama - who controlled
the madrasas, served as judges and managed religious endowments, while preaching obedience to the
sultan. By the 16th century, this was entrenched throughout the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal
Empires.

This period also witnessed a profound shift toward scriptural literalism and scholarly consensus that
would shape Islamic thought for centuries (Kuran 2023; Kuru 2019). Shafii (767-820) established a
jurisprudential approach that prioritised the Quran, hadith and scholarly consensus while rejecting
reason as an interpretive tool. Ibn Hanbal (780-855) likewise insisted on the perpetual validity of
religious texts regardless of changing circumstances. This approach pervaded the Hanafi and Maliki
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, then hardened under Ghazali (1058-1111) and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-
1328). Uniformly, Sunni orthodoxy came to privilege text-based interpretation above reason.

As literalism gained prominence, blasphemy (kufr, shirk) and heresy (bid'a, zandaqa) became serious
religious offences, often equated with apostasy. Ghazali helped establish the practice of treating
heterodox Muslims as apostates deserving execution, urging the killing of independent-minded
philosophers and Ismaili Shiis. He even endorsed executing ‘secret apostates’ – outwardly Muslim
individuals merely suspected of unorthodox beliefs (Kadivar 2020; Kuran 2023; Kuru 2019).

The Ottoman and Safavid empires institutionalised religious repression at a larger scale. Between the
mid-1400s and late 1600s, Ottoman sultans targeted numerous heterodox communities, executing
members for apostasy. The Grand Mufti issued fatwas legitimising the killing of Muslims who did not
pray or fast during Ramadan. State-sanctioned violence thus enforced religious conformity (Kuran
2023).

But these institutional explanations may overstate state-capacity. Although Ottoman rulers sought to
stamp out apostasy, their reach was limited by low literacy, limited communications technology and
weak state institutions. Ottoman capacity to extract taxes was remarkably low (Karaman and Pamuk
2010). Since mosques and madrasas primarily relied on state financing, they too struggled financially
(Zeghal 2024). This enabled significant religious syncretism and diversity, including a strong tradition
of Sufism (M. A. Cook 2024; Lesser et al. 2004).

A second limitation of ‘ulema-state alliance’ is that it primarily refers to MENA, but yet this region
comprises only 20% of the world’s Muslims. In Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, Islam
spread not via state imposition but through merchants and missionaries. New converts selectively
embraced ideas that resonated with cherished local customs. At the turn of the 20th century, three
thousand miles from Mecca, Indonesian Muslims might offer rice porridge to appease local spirits at
sacred rocks and shrines. Unable to recite the Quran, they might practice Sufism, follow matrilineal
customs, eat pork, or recognize a third gender. In Mali and the Maldives, Muslim girls might walk
topless. Since most people only observed their neighbours, they naturally assumed this was perfectly
Islamic (Hefner 2023, 106–7). Sufism also gained popularity worldwide – with its emphasis on
personal engagement and mysticism, rather than fiqh jurisprudence. For centuries, self-identified
Muslims significantly diverged from scripture and deemed this perfectly permissible (Bernal 1994; M.
A. Cook 2024; Geertz 1976; Hefner 2023; Lal et al. 2004; Masquelier 2009). Indonesia’s nation-
building was encapsulated in the moto of Pancasila (‘unity in diversity’) (Hamayotsu 2002, 368;
Hefner 2023).

Even in countries formerly under an ‘ulema-state alliance’, the 19th and 20th centuries heralded
dramatic shifts towards secularisation. European imperialism had weakened Muslim rulers’
institutional power and ideological prestige, sparking major internal debates and ‘defensive
modernisation’. Reformist leaders sought to curtail religious influence in their efforts catch up with
the West, while liberal intellectuals celebrated an ‘awakening’. In Central Asia, mullahs were openly
mocked as backward and ignorant (Khalid 2022). From Cairo to Istanbul to Tehran, an aspirational
middle class enthusiastically adopted Western dress. Educated women not only shortened their
hemlines but established influential magazines advocating for greater equality (Badran 1996;
Jahanshahrad 2012; Keddie 2006; Najmabadi 2005; Sedghi 2007).

State policies led the way. Egypt’s President Nasser implemented comprehensive secularizing reforms
by abolishing Sharia courts, stripping Al-Azhar of its authority over family law, and introducing
secular subjects at Al-Azhar University itself. His 1962 National Charter explicitly championed
women's equality and freedom (Carvalho, Rubin, and Sacks 2024). Turkey’s government similarly
advanced secularism by curtailing religious expenditure and imposing media control, with film
censors actively suppressing religious imagery while promoting depictions of effective secular
governance (Mutlu 2013; Zeghal 2024). In 1960s, educated Saudi women anticipated progress
towards gender equality as inevitable (Le Renard 2014). Most drastically, Soviet Central Asia
experienced forced secularization through state atheism - the effects of which persist today, with only
half of Muslim Uzbeks observing Ramadan fasting and merely 30% considering religion highly
important (Pew 2012).

Islamic authority was clearly not predetermined. In the mid-twentieth century, Soviet Central Asia
enforced atheism, Indonesia’s government promoted ‘unity in diversity’, while Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Tunisia and Turkey actively advanced secularism. ‘God’s monopoly’ was weakening. This raises the
critical question: what catalyzed the subsequent religious revival?

Hypothesis 2: Political Legitimacy

An alternative hypothesis is that religion has always been crucial for Muslim polities, ever since early
conquests, and this becomes repeatedly important for nation-building and when states fail to deliver.

Jared Rubin (Rubin 2017) argues that Islam’s spread through conquest unified religious and political
authority from its inception, making rulers dependent on religious legitimation. Early Islamic scholars
formulated extensive legal and political theories that supported a ruler’s right to rule as long as he
acted ‘Islamic’. This made rulers much more dependent on religious authorities for political
legitimacy. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2021; Gitmez, Robinson, and Shadmehr 2023) similarly argue
that Islam is relatively ‘hard-wired’ with legislation remaining God’s monopoly.

Over the late 20th century, Muslim leaders frequently cloaked themselves in Islam in order to gain
legitimacy – as documented in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iraq, Indonesia and
Malaysia (Afzal 2018; Aljunied 2019; Freer 2018; Guirguis 2012; Lacroix and Holoch 2011; Riaz
2024; Sallam 2022; Thaler 2004). As early as 1977, as Pakistan’s Islamist parties gained popularity,
President Bhutto sought to maintain religious legitimacy by banning alcohol and nightclubs, declaring
Friday a national holiday, increasing the religious content in public schools, and heralding sharia law.
This was further strengthened by General Zia-ul-Haq’s religious authoritarianism (Afzal 2018; Fair et
al. 2004; Khan 2006; Sharlach 2008).

In Malaysia, religion was strengthened through a decades-long process of state-led Islamisation.

Beginning with symbolic gestures under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, this process
accelerated dramatically under Mahathir Mohamad, who established numerous Islamic institutions
including banks, universities, and administrative bodies while expanding Islamic education and
Shariah court jurisdiction. A key strategic move was Mahathir's co-optation of Islamic activist leader
Anwar Ibrahim into government in 1982. This institutionalization was largely motivated by
competition with the Islamic opposition party PAS, as the ruling UMNO party sought to undercut
PAS's claim to religious authenticity (Aljunied 2019; Basarudin 2015; Hamayotsu 2002).

Over in Indonesia, leaders adopted Islamising reforms to education in order to gain legitimacy. From
the mid-1970s, Indonesian students’ class performance in religious instruction counted towards their
GPA and college acceptance (Smith-Hefner 2019).

Bangladesh offers another clear example of Islam being used to garner political legitimacy. Despite
being founded in 1971 with secularism as a constitutional principle, Bangladesh has witnessed three
distinct authoritarian regimes strategically employing Islam to shore up their legitimacy when
democratic foundations weakened (Riaz 2024). When General Ziaur Rahman seized power following
a 1975 coup, he faced a legitimacy crisis that he addressed partly by appealing to religion. For
example, he amended the constitution to replace ‘secularism’ with ‘absolute trust and faith in
Almighty Allah’. More significantly, he allowed Islamic political parties. His successor, General
Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982-1990), declared Islam the state religion, changed the national
weekly holiday to Friday, established state support for Islamic education, and frequently invoked
religious rhetoric. Sheikh Hasina similarly declared governance would follow Islamic principles,
recognized conservative religious education, funded 560 mosques and Islamic centres, recognised
degrees from conservative madrassahs, revised textbooks to accommodate conservative demands, and
removed secular symbols. When democratic legitimacy falters, religious appeals provide alternative
justification for political authority. This pattern, consistent with Kuru and Rubin’s analyses of
historical Muslim polities, suggests that religion was institutionalised for legitimacy (Riaz 2024).

However, we still need to explain public demand for religiosity. In the late 1970s, Egyptian students
and Malaysian women factory workers lobbied their government for spaces to pray (Ong 1987; Rock-
Singer 2016). We also need to understand why Muslim leaders lacked alternative sources of
legitimacy.

Hypothesis 3: Arab-Israel Conflict, Economic Stagnation, and State Failure

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War represents a critical juncture in the Islamic Revival. Following the conflict,
Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries announced an embargo on
countries seen as supporting Israel, and cutback production. Oil prices suddenly increased by 370%,
leading to a shift in resources from oil-importing to oil-exporting countries (Hamilton 2011). In
response to persistent inflation, the U.S. Federal Reserve raised interest rates (Iacoviello and Navarro
2019), leading to lacklustre economic growth across the rest of the world.

The combination of the price shock and tighter global financial conditions hurt oil-importing Muslim
economies. Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh faced severe balance of payments
crises and spiralling debt service costs (International Monetary Fund 1980). Economic setbacks and
military defeat brutally undercut the legitimacy of secular modernisers (like Nasser) while also
stoking anti-Americanism (Lippert 2023; Thaler 2004, 71–88).

Egypt’s earlier uplift ground to a halt. Graduates from disadvantaged backgrounds were increasingly
unable to secure professional careers; many then turned to the Muslim Brotherhood (Amin 2001;
Binzel and Carvalho 2017; Chalcraft 2016; Harris 2016; Wickham 2002). Likewise in 1970s
Morocco, secular modernisation lost its lustre amid economic stagnation (Wainscott 2015). Clerics
effectively reframed economic failures and military defeat as divine punishment for abandoning Islam
(Guirguis 2012, 99).

These developments are perfectly consistent with Modernisation Theory, which predicts that
economic impoverishment and negative shocks reinforce social conservatism. Prosperity, meanwhile,
is presumed to encourage embrace of science and self-expression. Inglehart and Baker add that while
Muslim societies are traditionally more conservative, they will slowly move in the same direction as
everyone else (Inglehart 2019; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

The Arab-Israeli war and oil price shock may well have been catalytic. The timing aligns with the
revival in many regions, but only partially. In post-Soviet Central Asia, for instance, the Islamic
revival gained significant momentum only in the 2000s, when leaders permitted more religious
expression (Collins 2023).

Further, religiosity does not necessarily weaken with prosperity. Analysing data from 100 countries
from 1989 to 2020, Roberts (2024) finds that ‘Modern Social Conditions’ (GDP per capita, Human
Development Index, education, and urbanization) do not consistently reduce religiosity. The effects of
income, education, and urban residence on religious commitment are statistically significant but
remarkably small -moving from lowest to highest education levels predicts merely a 1/10 standard
deviation decrease in religiosity. Although ‘Modern Social Conditions’ have improved in the Midde
East and North Africa, religiosity is persistently high. Moreover, even in wealthy countries (like
Britain), 2nd generation Muslims still express strong religiosity, staunchly opposing gay-marriage
(IPSOS Mori 2018).

Hypothesis 4: Religious Club Goods

Religious organizations may have gained followers by functioning as ‘clubs’ that provided material
benefits in exchange for piety. In Egypt, by the 1990s, Islamic organisations accounted for over half
of all welfare organisations. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt exemplified this approach, offering
members material aid, spiritual comfort and a sense of religious righteousness. By the 1990s, Islamic
organizations accounted for over half of all welfare organizations in Egypt (Bayat 2002; Wickham
2013).

In Turkey, financial liberalisation empowered a socially conservative bourgeoisie, which then funded
religious media and schools (Başkan 2014; Göçmen 2014; J. White 2014; J. B. White 2002). These
religious networks also offered fraternal community, patriarchal status, promises of paradise, and self-
worth. Collective rituals (like Friday prayer) may have also strengthened cohesion (Dunbar 2022). As
(Carvalho, Rubin, and Sacks 2024) suggest, families may have signalled strict piety to secure valuable
‘club goods’.

However, the ‘club goods’ hypothesis has significant limitations. Membership in religious
associations remains relatively low across the Arab world - ranging from just 2% in Tunisia and 6% in
Egypt to 17% in Iraq and 29% in Algeria (Arab Barometer 2025). Crucially, many of these
organisations actually receive substantial funding from the state, so this mechanism may have been
strengthened by rulers’ quests for political legitimacy (Zeghal 2024). But still, we need to ask why
economic pressures in Latin America so often led to secular organising and soup kitchens, while
welfare organizations in Muslim societies were often religious.

Hypothesis 5: Backlash to Secular Modernisation

Each society has a unique cultural inheritance, creating a spectrum of permissibility. Progressives and
conservatives constantly tussle for ideological persuasion and institutional power. But if one side
pushes too far, this can trigger antagonistic mobilisation. Across Muslim societies, secular
modernization frequently sparked religious backlash, particularly around gender.

Across the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Anatolia, the Quran maintained unquestioned
authority, while men’s honour depended on female seclusion. Modernisers’ push for secularism,
female education and employment proved deeply threatening. Women’s growing public presence was
perceived as encroaching on men’s domain – alarming pious Muslims, who fitna (disorder, chaos,
corruption) (Bier 2011; Rock-Singer 2019, 2022).

Women’s bodies became major battlegrounds in this ideological contest, with many unveiling (Ahmed
2012; Bier 2011; Cronin 2021). In response, Islamists and Salafi scholars organised to restore gender
segregation and modesty. Conservatives warned that female “flaunting” would lead to the “corruption
of morals and destruction of norms of comportment”, creating a ‘sea of forbidden pleasure’ (Rock-
Singer 2019). Religious magazines in Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia documented
widespread anxiety about gender mixing in beaches, buses, schools, universities and government
offices. Many expressed concerns about ‘evil actions’ and ‘illicit looking’, with Islamist elites
emphasising veiling as a way to maintain piety (Macleod 1990; Rock-Singer 2019, 2022). Similarly in
Qatar, Arab nationalism galvanised the Muslim Brotherhood to strengthen Islamism in schools (Freer
2018).

Governments responded to these demands to shore up legitimacy. Egypt’s Sadat regime sponsored
religious student organizations in the early 1970s and later made religious instruction a core
component of education, with performance counting toward students’ overall grades (Rock-Singer
2019).

Bazzi, Hilmy, and Marx (2020) provide a more qualified conceptualisation of backlash,
demonstrating that the expansion of state-run secular primary schools paradoxically increased
enrolment in Islamic schools (madrasas) and heightened overall religiosity. This was not merely a
response to perceived threats to religious identity, but also reflected strategic adaptation – Islamic
institutions evolved to compete more effectively with secular education while maintaining religious
instruction.

The backlash theory also finds strong support in Central Asia. When Soviets forced Uzbek women to
unveil, it triggered violent resistance resulting in approximately 2,000 women being killed, often by
their own relatives. Resistance was subsequently suppressed only through totalitarian repression
(Keller 2001; Massell 2016). In Afghanistan, tens of thousands joined the mujahideen to oppose the
Soviet-backed communist regime (Collins 2023).

(Collins 2023) proposes a multi-stage model: while violent repression initially silences believers,
when restrictions ease, religious entrepreneurs mobilize to defend their faith. When Kyrgyzstan
liberalized in the 1990s, religiosity surged dramatically—mosque construction outpaced schools,
madrasa enrollments increased by thousands annually, and religious organizations campaigned for
greater Islamic influence in public life.

However, the backlash hypothesis has limitations: it does not explain why Sufism has lost ground to
Salafism.

Hypothesis 6: Iranian Revolution

The 1979 Iranian Revolution is often cited as a pivotal moment that demonstrated the possibility of
establishing an Islamic state in the modern era. This successful overthrow of a Western-backed
secular regime provided a powerful model for Islamist movements across regions as diverse as
Lebanon, Nigeria, and Malaysia (Aljunied 2019, 57; Deeb 2006; Thurston 2017, 75). The revolution's
success potentially raised expectations and encouraged greater mobilisation – overcoming a
‘despondency trap’ (Evans 2020).
However, contemporary Islamic commentators did not necessarily view the Iranian Revolution as a
singular turning point. The Muslim Brotherhood's magazine al-Da’wa characterized it as merely one
manifestation of a broader ‘Islamic wave’ (al-mudd al-islami) that was simultaneously transforming
Afghanistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Chad (Rock-Singer 2016). That said, the Islamic
Republic of Iran may have been important in threatening Saudi prestige and prompting an even larger
bid for global dominance (Ghattas 2020).

Hypothesis 7: Saudi-funded Salafism

While earlier hypotheses suggest the Islamic Revival was inevitable, the global spread of Salafism
points to 19th and 20th century critical junctures. Three developments shaped the revival’s direction:
the Wahhabi-Saud alliance, the Arab-Israeli war, and labour migration.

(a) The Wahhabi-Saud Alliance

Without the Wahhabi-Saud authoritarian alliance, Mecca might not have been so puritanical. Before
Ibn al-Wahhab made his alliance with Ibn Saud in the 1740s, Islamic scholars complained that there
was major shirk: praying at shrines, worshipping saints, ‘polytheism’, and even ignoring the call to
prayer. Instead, by virtue of this recent historical contingency, the Islamic heartland entrenched
fundamentalism. Ordinary citizens were obligated to shun and ostracise deviants. Abd al-Latif (d.
1876) called for strong enforcement of pilgrimage, prayer and religious instruction. Non-attendance
should be reported to the ruler. Sufi texts were destroyed. “Men were appointed to patrol the markets
at the times of prayer and order people to pray” (M. A. Cook 2024).

The brief Wahhabi control of the Holy Cities (1803-1813) marked an aggressive imposition of their
ideology, including the destruction of Sufi texts. However, this dominance was short-lived and
subsequently criticised by scholars in Hijaz. When the Ottomans reasserted control, they banned
Wahhabis from pilgrimage to Mecca (Farquhar 2016). This ideological tug-of-war persisted
until 1924, when Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud’s forces violently seized power in Arabia, institutionalizing
Wahhabism through state-approved curricula and examinations while outlawing Sufi rituals. In the
1960s-80s, the House of Saud further buttressed Wahhabism in response to secular pan-Arabism,
militant Islamists’ seizure of the Grand Mosque, and the Iranian Revolution (Al-Rasheed 2013; Freer
2018; Ghattas 2020; Mandaville 2022; Thaler 2004, 102).

Wahhabism builds on earlier traditions of scriptural literalism, espoused by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). It
emphasises two interconnected doctrines: al-walaʾ wa-l-baraʾ (loyalty and disavowal) and takfir
(religious excommunication). Wahhabists demonstrate their faith through exclusive loyalty to fellow
adherents while actively disavowing non-adherents - potentially to the point of declaring jihad.
Meanwhile, takfir enables the declaration of nominal Muslims as unbelievers (kafir) if they neglect
religious duties or violate Islamic tenets despite receiving guidance. Together, these principles create a
powerful mechanism for community policing - banishing corrupting innovations, such as Sufism
(DeLong-Bas 2022, 13; Hefner 2023, 160; Kadivar 2020; Mandaville 2022; Thaler 2004, 100).

(b) Saudi Petrodollars

Petrodollars enabled Saudi Arabia to export Wahhabism worldwide – by funding for mosque
construction, religious schools, publishing houses, religious scholarships and media campaigns
(Ahmed 2012; Farquhar 2016; Ghattas 2020; Kadivar 2020; Mandaville 2022).

The Islamic University of Medina’s budget soared from 40 million Saudi Riyals in 1975 to 381
million in 1982 (approximately $111 million), with student enrollment reaching 3,100. By the late
1990s, the university had invested an estimated $1.4 billion in religious education. Residential
religious training is offered to non-Saudi male students, who may then return home (Farquhar 2016,
23). Wahhabis have tended to scorn alternative Islamic practices as bid’ah (corrupting innovations). In
Nigeria, over half of Kano's prominent Salafi preachers were IUM graduates. Returnee activists have
become a major political force, purifying Islamic practices and condemn Sufism (Thurston 2015).
Between 1999 and 2001, twelve northern Nigerian states increasingly enforced sharia (Thurston 2017,
23)

The IUM curriculum focused on Hanbali jurisprudence with core tenets including: emulating the
‘pious ancestors’, enforcing tawhid (divine unity), combating ‘innovations’, and recognizing only the
Quran, Sunna, and consensus of the Prophet's companions as legitimate religious authority.
Unorthodox creeds were attacked, e.g. refuting Ahmadis, Shi’a, Sufism, visiting shrines and tombs, as
well as seeking the intercession of saints, using charms, and sorcery. Instead, students focused on al-
Wahhab, the Hanbali tradition, and the Salafi method (Farquhar 2016). Sufism is banned (Thaler
2004, 75).

Saudi Arabia has also provided overseas funding. Saudi Arabia also pressured Sudan’s president to
adopt sharia law in 1983 and funded the Muslim Brotherhood (Bernal 1994). Since the 1970s, Saudi
Arabia has given billions of dollars to Pakistan – supplanting Sufi Islam with textual literalism (Afzal
2018). Similar patterns emerged in Central Asia following the Soviet collapse. When Kyrgyzstan
liberalized in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia established numerous foundations and financed religious
knowledge exchange (Nasritdinov and Myrzabaev 2022).

In Indonesia, Saudi influence has been especially significant. Thousands of mosques have been built
with Gulf funding, while the Saudi-supported Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA)
teaches Wahhabism with strictly gender-segregated classes (Beech and Suhartono 2019). Beginning
in the 1970s, Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir pursued closer ties with Saudi Arabia and established
the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytizing (DDII). By 1981, Saudi Arabia had established
LIPIA and was funding mosques, madrasas, radio programmes, and Islamic training throughout the
country. Returnees from Saudi education have consolidated networks, established Salafist madrasas,
and propagated Wahhabist ideology emphasizing tawhid (strict monotheism), obedience, and total
submission to Allah. By the 1980s, the Salafi da'wa movement became visible through young
Indonesians adopting Arab dress, with men wearing jalabiyya (robes) and growing beards (Aidulsyah
2023; Hasan 2022; Hefner 2023, 164; Qurtuby 2019)

Salafists seek to enforce and institutionalise the correct interpretation of Islam, while purging
deviation. Individuals must prove their piety by avoiding corrupting forces, strictly following the
Qur’an and hadith, emulating the Prophet and ‘pious ancestors’ (al-salaf al-salih). Deviation is
condemned as misguided innovation (kullu bid’a ḍalāla), leading to to Hell (kullu ḍalālat fi’l nār).
Mosques preach that men should separate themselves from non-Islamic influences to be ‘saved’
Da’wa (propagation) is seen by Salafists as Fard al-ain (an individual obligation) (Aidulsyah 2023;
Chaplin 2020; Hasan 2022).

Saudi Wahhabism was never a one-way export, but a transnational exchange. Egyptian Salafis
maintained theological independence through their own periodicals and institutions (Freer 2018;
Guirguis 2012; Rock-Singer 2019). Muslim Brotherhood members exiled from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq
found refuge in Saudi Arabia, gaining influence in both formal education and extra-curricular
activities. By establishing Quran memorization circles, Islamized student clubs and summer camps,
the Brotherhood nurtured religious devotion and social activism (Lacroix 2011; Thaler 2004, 102).
India had its own Deobandi movement – started in the 19th century, requiring scriptural literalism
(Zaman 2007).

(c) Labor Migration to the Gulf

Millions of migrants - primarily from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Philippines, and Indonesia -
have worked in Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf countries since the 1970s oil boom (Valenta and
Jakobsen 2016). Migrants who travel to the Gulf for work often adopt Arabic culture, ideals of female
seclusion, and Salafism. This is reiterated by studies in Jordan, Kerala, Bangladesh, Sudan and Egypt
(Ahmed 2012, 11; Bernal 1994; Bertoli and Marchetta 2015; Chalcraft 2011; Gardner 1993a, 1993b;
Kamal 2020, 2022a, 2022b, 2024; Kibria 2008, 2008; Schielke 2020; Taukeer 2022, 2022; Tuccio and
Wahba 2018; Valenta and Jakobsen 2016).

In Sudan, Islam was initially spread by Sufi brotherhoods. In the early 1980s, it was rare for Muslim
women to perform prayers. A bride might celebrate her wedding day by dancing in front of a mixed
audience, while wearing a revealing dress. But return migrants criticised such practices as haram:
funeral customs and reverence for holy men were also (violently) condemned as deviations. As
villages moved to embrace scripture, female seclusion became more common, with new forms of
dress and high courtyard walls, signifying moral superiority and Saudi orthodoxy (Bernal 1994).
Similarly in rural Sylhet, Bangladesh, villagers used to worship revere a pir (sufi saint). Ritual
activities typically included ecstatic dancing and devotional Sufi songs, but these are now dismissed
as ‘ignorant’. Return migrants keenly enforce purism, following ‘adab’ (the correct procedure laid
down by the Quran) (Gardner 1993a). More broadly, Bangladeshi returnee migrants have adopted
Arabic language and religious practices (Taukeer 2022).

Keralan return migrants from Saudi Arabia are more likely to say that a man should have the final
word, more tolerant of gender-based violence and more likely to blame a woman if she gets molested
(Joseph et al. 2022). In Jordan, women in Gulf returnee households demonstrate significantly less
support for female leadership, exercise less personal autonomy, and are less likely to work outside the
home (Tuccio and Wahba 2018). This pattern of increasing conservatism following Gulf migration
appears consistent across multiple societies, though its effects may vary over time. Schielke (2020,
58) notes that by the 2000s, Egypt had already developed strict conservatism, thus moving to the Gulf
had little further impact.

(Taukeer 2022; Valenta and Jakobsen 2016)

Hypothesis 8: Arab Prestige Bias

Saudi Arabia’s capacity for ideological persuasion may not just be a function of oil wealth, but also
prestige. Throughout Islamic history, Muslims have attributed greater religious authenticity to Arab
institutions, scholars, and practices from the religion's birthplace. If Saudi Arabian and Egyptian-
trained imams accuse other Muslims of ‘takfir’, it has some authority and credence.
Even before the 1970s oil boom, Muslims were travelling to the Hijaz – a sacred place of pilgrimage
and religious learning (Farquhar 2016). When Mecca was overtaken by Wahhabis, pilgrims returned
to Minangkabau and launched a radical reform movement (Cook 2024:640). In the early 1900s,
Southeast Asian Muslims requested fatwas from the ulama in Mecca, and published the opinions of
ulama at al-Azhar - the pinnacle of Islamic learning (Kushimoto 2015; Shiozaki 2015). By 1925, 200
Southeast Asian students attended Al-Azhar. Returnee students established influential journals like
Seruan Azhar (Call of Azhar), widely read by religious leaders throughout the Malay archipelago.
(Shiozaki 2015).

In the Islamic context, this bias is rooted in several historical and theological factors. The Prophet
Muhammad, his companions, and the two generations that followed are universally regarded as the
‘pious ancestors’ (al-salaf al-salih) whom Muslims should emulate (Graham 1993). The major
schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) were established in the 8th and 9th centuries CE in the Islamic
heartland.

Mecca houses the Sacred Mosque, Medina has the Prophet’s Mosque (Qurtuby 2019). Islamic
empires - the Abbasids, Mamluks, Ottomans, and Mughals - provided financial aid to Mecca as
demonstrations of piety, while Mecca conferred legitimacy upon ruling sultans (M. A. Cook 2024).
Even the Arab language is seen to symbolise piety, since it is the language of the holy Qur’an (Wahib
2017). Muslims also pray five times a day in the direction of Mecca, while the hajj pilgrimage is a
religious duty for those with means. Today, Saudi Arabia announces the start and end of religious
festivals (Ramadan and Eid), based on their own sighting of the moon.

Islam’s distinctive epistemology may have laid the theological groundwork for religious
homogenisation. Within the Hadith literature and subsequently, authoritative knowledge is established
through person-to-person learning and connection to the religious tradition (Graham 1993; Zaman
2007, 3). For instance, in medieval Cairo, Islamic students sought out respected scholars, collecting
ijazas (teaching licenses) that derived their authority from the issuing teacher’s reputation. Scholars
maintained careful intellectual genealogies (isnad al-'ilm), tracing their teachers back through
generations to establish legitimacy. This personalized system created powerful incentives to
reproduce established orthodoxy, as scholarly credibility depended on connection to revered
authorities (Berkey 2011).

Cairo’s Al-Azhar University has been a prominent centre of Islamic learning since the 10th century.
Scholars trained in Mecca, Medina, and Cairo continue to command exceptional respect, with global
demand for Al-Azhar’s fatwas (Bano 2015; Gesink 2009). In the Maghreb, Egypt-trained teachers
have been especially influential (Lal et al. 2004). When French President Sarkozy introduced the hijab
ban, he sought approval from Al-Azhar, recognizing its authority among French Muslims. Given this
prestige, over 30,000 foreign students are enrolled in Islamic Studies at Al-Azhar University,
including 4,000 from Africa, 3,000 from Russia, 5,000 from Malaysia, and 400 from the UK (Bano
2015). This influence extends internationally – Malaysia’s religious schools are explicitly modelled
on Al-Azhar, adopting its textbooks and pedagogy (Kushimoto 2015).

Struggles for prestige are not set in stone, but constantly reshaped by geopolitics. US support for
Israel, the war in Palestine, and the Gulf wars have repeatedly fuelled anti-Americanism, which is
exploited by Islamists (Lal et al. 2004; Thaler 2004). This has been reinvigorated by ongoing conflict
in Palestine (Lippert 2023; Pew Research 2013).

Hypothesis 9: Technological Advances in Communications

If Arab prestige bias was embedded in Islam, why did fiqh jurisprudence only become popular in the
late twentieth century? The answer may lie in technological advances in communication.

For most of Islamic history, villages and towns were extremely disconnected. The hajj pilgrimage was
a sacred duty, yet prohibitively expensive. Even if peasants sold their land to fund the journey, they
faced bandits, disease and shipwrecks (Aljunied 2019, 118; Sidel 2021). Amid weak communications,
the world was much more culturally fragmented, with villages across the Sahara and Indian Ocean
maintaining localized interpretations of piety. Ideologically isolated, these communities rarely faced
external scrutiny. When everyone around them practiced the same rituals - whether venerating local
saints or freely mingling across genders – there was little reason for doubt. By adhering to local ideas
of piety, one could still have every hope of salvation. Diversity flourished (Bernal 1994; Masquelier
2009). In colonial India, muftis applied considerable flexibility, perhaps even personal bias (Zaman
2007, 20). In early 20th century Morocco, Egypt’s al-Azhar was largely unknown (Wainscott 2015).

The 20th century then unleashed a revolutionary process of transnational learning. Rotary printing
presses facilitated the publication of hundreds of books, newspapers, and periodicals in Aleppo,
Cairo, Mecca, and Delhi, which were then exported via steamships to bookshops in Southeast Asia.
Railways, roads, radio, cassettes, and print media turbo-charged connectivity. Muslims could
undertake the hajj, bring back new ideas, and establish reformist movements (Aljunied 2019). Foreign
students typically studied in Mecca with a scholar from their country, eventually mastering Arabic
and joining study circles in the Haram Mosque. The Hijaz was a focal point for scholars from around
the world, who returned home with ‘spiritual capital’ and often spearheaded reform (Farquhar 2016).

Aljunied suggests that “the improved communications in Malaysia made Muslims more conscious of
the backward nature of their communities and beliefs… They derived intellectual inspiration
from global intellectual, political and religious streams of thought which they were plugged into...
[Reformists wanted] to critique and purify the adat [custom] and religious practices from bid’ah
(innovations) and khurafat (animistic superstition) that characterized the Muslim faith”.

Transnational organizing boomed in the 1970s with the establishment of new international
organizations: the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisation (IIFSO, 1969), World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, 1972), and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT,
1981). These organizations facilitated the exchange of ideas and resources across national boundaries,
contributing to standardization (Aljunied 2019, 190).

Cassette tapes of sermons became a particularly powerful medium for galvanising piety. Emotionally
charged rhetoric, easily reproduced and distributed, mobilized Muslims to defend their faith against
perceived threats (Hirschkind 2006; Rock-Singer 2019, 124).

Salafist preachers used radio, television, and later the internet to condemn local innovations as ‘un-
Islamic’ and destined for hellfire. Muslims who had previously considered their local practices
perfectly pious now discovered they were being judged against more scripture. In Sudan, “villagers
who in the early eighties tended to assume that to be Muslim was to be like them, now increasingly
see their own way of life partly refracted through the (critical) gaze of others, such as urban Sudanese,
Gulf Arabs, school textbooks, and religious authorities on the radio” (Bernal 1994).

Technological innovations have globalized access to prestigious Islamic authorities. On television

channels (like Al-Jazeera and the UK’s Islam Channel), Al-Azhar and IUM-trained preachers
encourage strict adherence to scholarly consensus and gender segregation, while on TikTok Muslim
men are shamed for lacking proper protective jealousy (‘dayooth’), while women are reprimanded for
‘tabarruj’ (Aidulsyah 2023; Aljunied 2019; Bano 2015; Collins 2023; Evans 2024; Hasan 2022; Saat
2020; Wai Weng 2024; Wickham 2002, 97, 2013).

Modern technological advances have enabled preachers (including those with prestigious training
and/or Saudi funding) to police at unprecedent scale.
Hypothesis 10: Mass Schooling

The expansion of mass education in the 20th century created another powerful mechanism for the
Islamic Revival by institutionalizing religious instruction at unprecedented scale. As Muslim-majority
states modernized their educational systems, they expanded Islamic education, creating generations of
citizens with formal religious knowledge previously limited to specialized scholars.

Zeghal argues that Middle Eastern and North African Muslim leaders universally concurred that the
state should be the custodian of Islam. While they debated how the state should uphold Islam, few
questioned whether it should do so. The 20th century’s rising prosperity enabled states to dramatically
expand educational access, including religious instruction. Even as religious teachings declined as a
proportion of the total curriculum, the increasing number of children spending more years in school
meant a net increase in religious instruction across entire populations. This religiously educated public
then championed Sharia.

This trend is evident in state expenditure patterns. In Turkey, per capita state religious expenditure
rose from less than USD $1 in 1950 to over $60 by 2020, reflecting both increased national wealth
and a growing allocation of GDP to religious institutions (from 0.09% to 0.56%). Egypt, Tunisia, and
Morocco followed similar trajectories, with much of this expenditure concentrated on religious
schooling. A more powerful state could thus champion Islam at scale, extending Quranic studies
beyond traditional ulama to the general population.

Zeghal estimates that Muslim children born in 2020 will be exposed to an average of about 500 hours
of Islamic instruction in Tunisia and about 1,000 hours in Egypt and Turkey. This represents 7, 6, and
15 times more Islamic education than the average lifetime exposure for Muslim children born a
century earlier. Additionally, as prosperity enabled more young people to pursue higher education,
many chose to study Islam at specialized institutions like Morocco’s Qarawiyyin, Tunisia's Zaytuna,
and Egypt's Al-Azhar. In Egypt, Islamic studies account for approximately 10% of all university
enrolment.

Within this broader rise in religious education, there is also diversity. In Tunisia, Bourguiba
institutionalised ‘religious thought’ which emphasised intellectual reflection and tolerance, rather than
sharia (Cesari 2014; Masri 2017; Zeghal 2009). Government priorities may also shift in response to
popular demand: as the AKP triumphed in elections, it quadrupled state spending on religion (Aksoy
and Gambetta 2021), which can be seen visually in the graph I made below.
Evans, based on data from (Zeghal 2024)

Evans 2025, data from Zeghal 2024

Indonesia’s governments have mandated religious instruction since the 1970s, but also championed
‘pancasila’ (unity in diversity). This has inculcated greater respect for alternatives and democracy
(Hefner 2023). However, alongside the shift towards fiqh, 20% of school children are now enrolled in
madrasas (Asadullah and Maliki 2018; Bazzi, Hilmy, and Marx 2020). These institutions vary in
curriculum. At the most extreme Salafist boarding schools, students study ‘tauhid hakimiyah’ - the
principle that Allah alone is sovereign and scripture is the only legitimate moral authority. These
institutions contrasting ‘us versus them’, ‘loyalty and disloyalty’ (Al Wala’ Wal Bara) (Ismail 2023;
Marcoes 2023; Nisa 2022; Smith-Hefner 2019, 36). (Bazzi, Hilmy, and Marx 2020) find that madrasa
enrollment correlates with greater religious practice: praying five times daily, fasting during
Ramadan, reading the Quran, attending Friday prayer, performing Sunna prayers, joining prayer
groups, and paying zakat (charity). From the late 1980s, Muslim activists organised across
universities, carefully avoiding ‘inappropriate proximity’ (khalwat) (Smith-Hefner 2019, 37).

Mass schooling may have thus encouraged a shift towards jurisprudential Islam – the study and
application of the Quran. However, this would not explain the current onus on scriptural literalism,
nor threats of excommunication (‘takfir’), nor deference to established authorities, who are uniquely
capable of ‘tafsir’.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE PRESTIGE-PIETY FEEDBACK LOOP

Contributing to the rich literature on the Islamic Revival, I propose a complementary mechanism that
resolves a central paradox: why modernization has strengthened rather than weakened religious
authority across the Muslim world.

Any analysis of the Islamic revival must begin with Muslims' foundational belief that there is no God
but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger. The Quran is the word of God, while the Sunnah records
the teachings and practices of Muhammad, whom all Muslim men should emulate. Any person who
seeks status and social inclusion within the Islamic community thus becomes vulnerable to charges of
‘takfir’, justified by scripture. Modernization (rising prosperity, state capacity, mass education,
technological advances, and increased freedom to practice religion) then enabled Muslims to deeply
engage with the most prestigious knowledge: fiqh (jurisprudence) and akhlaq (ethics of conduct).
These structural changes enabled a self-reinforcing process I call the ‘Prestige-Piety Feedback Loop’.

Mass education and communication technologies facilitated unprecedented connectivity, radically

improving understanding of jurisprudential Islam. Islamic preachers and believers embraced their
religious duty to ‘command right and forbid wrong. Piety and gender segregation became primary
markers of prestige, also rewarded in the afterlife. Politicians then sought legitimacy by expanding
state funding for religious organizations, religious instruction, and sharia implementation, further
institutionalizing religious authority.
By contrast, during the European Enlightenment, secular-liberal values gained cultural prestige
(Almelhem et al. 2023; Israel 2011; Jacob 2019). As liberals secured institutional power and
ideological persuasion, these ideas became more engrained in school curricula. Schools, print media,
and later the internet then became vectors for secular learning. Thus, as more Europeans and Latin
Americans went to school and watched television (often imported from the US), they increasingly
adopted secular-liberal worldviews. As my second diagram illustrates, this creates a parallel feedback
loop, but with secular learning and liberal values at its core.

In short, when societies modernise through mass education, advanced communication technology and
political liberalisation, these forces amplify whichever belief systems already command prestige. As
Nigeriens, Uzbeks, Pakistanis and Indonesians learned about the Quran, they increasingly shed
'backward' practices and emulated religious authorities. The supply of religious education then creates
its own demand for religious piety, veiling and sharia. What matters is not an individual’s years of
education, but rather what a community regards as prestigious.

This prestige-piety framework complements existing explanations by providing connecting tissue

between seemingly disparate factors. It acknowledges how early Islamic conquests and the ulema-
state alliance established religion's centrality to political legitimacy, while the 9th century shift toward
scriptural literalism was later institutionalized through the Wahhab-Saud alliance. In the 20th century,
economic downturns undermined secular modernization, prompting leaders to embrace Islam - a
process dramatically accelerated by the 1973 oil price shock and subsequent hike in interest rates,
which immiserated oil-importing Muslim countries while simultaneously enabling Saudi’s export of
Wahhabism. Prestige, persuasion and policing – amplified through technology - help explain how
global shocks and local reactions coalesced into a coordinated global movement.
THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND GENDER RELATIONS

Having examined the rise of jurisprudential Islam, we now consider its cultural impacts. This section
provides my theoretical framework, then synthesises a global literature on the cultural evolution of
Muslim gender relations.

Each society has a unique cultural inheritance, creating varying spectrums of permissible behavior.
Within each community, individuals seek status and social inclusion, closely observing and emulating
peers and high-status individuals (Hrdy 2024; Lanman and and Buhrmester 2017; Morris 2024;
Whitehouse 2024). Theoretically, I suggest that cultural conformity is motivated by both ‘internalised
gender ideologies’ (personally endorsed beliefs) and ‘norm perceptions’ (about what is widely
practised and supported by peers). If individuals only observe one pathway to status, they tend to
follow suit.

Within each society, conservatives and progressives nevertheless tussle for ideological persuasion,
prestige and institutional dominance. When literacy was low and communications limited,
communities primarily followed immediate neighbours, generating local idiosyncrasies. As
technology improved, prestigious individuals could exert influence at larger scales. This framework
explains both historical diversity and contemporary convergence in the Islamic world – given recent
technological advances, mass schooling, political liberalization, and Saudi petrodollars.

As part of the Islamic revival, there have been concerted calls for jurisprudential Islam and gender
segregation (Basarudin 2015; Bernal 1994; Hasan 2022; Masquelier 2009; Rock-Singer 2019, 2022).
This aligns with classical Islamic scholarship, which has historically advocated for moral codes
limiting women's public visibility and interactions with unrelated men (M. Cook 2001).

Ideological persuasion and shifting notions of prestige may have impeded progress towards gender
equality. Through my comparative global research, I find that in communities where men's honor
depends on female seclusion, women tend to remain at home. Female labor participation only
increases when economic incentives are sufficient to outweigh men's perceived loss of honor. But this
transition is constrained by a coordination challenge – individuals may be reluctant to be the first to
deviate and suffer a loss of honour. I conceptualize this dynamic as the “Honor-Income Trade-Off”.

The Islamic revival may have reinforced both norm perceptions and internalized ideologies regarding
gender segregation. Two additional factors are key: First, when families prioritize the afterlife,
material incentives in this life may fail to override the “Honor-Income Trade-Off”. Second, the
growing prestige of textual literalism and Saudi or Egyptian-trained religious authorities may
undermine the legitimacy of feminist or liberal critiques, narrowing the scope of contestation.

Methodologically, it is difficult to identify the Islamic revival’s causal effects. We lack both
representative longitudinal data on gender ideologies over the past century and natural experiments
that would reveal counterfactuals. Nevertheless, we can cautiously synthesize evidence from
qualitative studies, recent surveys, and emerging big data analyses to discern local and global patterns.

Recognising the diversity of the Islamic world, the following sections are organised by geographical
region. In the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, male honour has long depended on female
seclusion, with the understanding that ‘legislation was God’s monopoly’. 73% of Arab Muslims
primarily identifying with their religion rather than national identity, compared to 46% of non-Arab
Muslims (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). In regions where Islam spread through trade rather
than conquest, it often blended with existing customs that included women’s public participation and
bilateral kinship. This historical variation created different spectrums of permissible behavior and
significantly different levels of support for female employment across the Islamic world.

Southeast Asia: Indonesia and Malaysia

Indonesia presents a particularly revealing case study as one of the most diverse, democratic and
gender-equal countries in the Muslim world, which has seen a trend towards jurisprudential Islam,
specifically focusing on gender (Riyani 2020; Smith-Hefner 2019).

Religious education has expanded dramatically. 20% of Indonesian children are now enrolled in
madrasahs, where girls outnumber boys two-to-one (Bazzi, Hilmy, & Marx, 2020; Asadullah &
Maliki, 2018). Religious teachers emphasize women’s responsibilities of modesty and veiling to
prevent temptation (fitna), while sexual submission is legitimized through widely cited hadiths
(Chaplin 2020; Hasan 2022; Nisa 2022; Pirmasari 2021; Riyani 2020; Smith-Hefner 2019, 45–46;
Wahib 2017). 80% of surveyed Islamic school teachers believe women should not take long trips
without male relatives (compared to 61% of the general population), while 67% support governmental
surveillance to ensure men and women walking together in public are married or related (versus 44%
of the general public) (Assegaf 2023; Hefner 2023, 240).

Given the Quran’s prestige, young women struggle to contest ‘kodrat’ (divinely ordained gender
differences) (Smith-Hefner 2019, 98). White et al. (2024) found that over the past twenty years,
Indonesians have become less supportive of female leaders, with Muslims significantly less likely to
vote for female candidates. Younger Indonesians are also more likely to justify wife beating (World
Values Survey, 2024).

Indonesia’s female labor force participation is among the highest in the Islamic world, but has
nevertheless stagnated since the 1990s. Schaner and Das (2016) find this surprising given rising
education and economic growth. They document persistent gender wage gaps unexplained by
education, location, or occupation, with women significantly underrepresented in management.
Among entrepreneurs, striking gender differences emerge—men typically establish small or medium
enterprises, while women's businesses are predominantly micro-enterprises run from home without
paid employees (World Bank, 2023a).

Importantly, even though the majority of Indonesians voice support for sharia, this has not translated
into high support for religious parties. Indonesians have overwhelmingly prioritised economic
development (Hefner 2023; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018). That said, in the past few years, the
Indonesian parliament has voted unanimously to expand the punishments for blasphemy, and
criminalise consensual sex outside marriage and cohabitation. Nationwide, 120 local regulations
mandate the hijab, with 150,000 schools requiring it as part of uniforms (Human Rights Watch 2024;
Kholid 2024).

Contrasting with Indonesia’s strong movement of Islamic feminism, parallel organisations have
struggled in Malaysia – where there has been much stronger support for sharia (Aljunied 2019; Pew
Forum, Washington, and Inquiries 2013; Roces 2022). ‘Sisters in Islam’ have organized feminist
discussions of scripture and mobilized against patriarchal laws, but are frequently derided – as lacking
prestige and requisite training from Arab institutions. One official insisted: “Shariah is Allah's will
and cannot be tampered with. Who are they to say that Allah's laws are not just?” (Basarudin 2015).

Across both Indonesia and Malaysia, there has also been a marked increase in hostility towards
LGBT, sharply contrasting with the legalisation of gay-marriage in neighbouring Thailand (Kholid
2024, 2024; Roces 2022).

Sub-Saharan Africa: Niger and Sudan

Within Africa, men and women who live in Muslim-majority societies are much less supportive of
women’s equal rights (Charles 2020). To trace the cultural evolution of religious practice, we turn to
longitudinal qualitative research. The villages of Dogondoutchi (Niger) and Wad al-Abbas (Sudan)
exemplify the shift toward jurisprudential Islam. In the 1970s, Nigerien women rarely prayed and
consulted spirit healers, while Sudan’s Sufi-centered communities featured unveiled dancing brides.
By the 1990s, Salafist movements had been significantly strengthened by Gulf labor migration, Saudi
funding, improved communications, and religious education. In Sudan, returning Saudi migrants
condemned traditional practices as haram while building high walls for female seclusion. In Niger,
community enforcement included public humiliation of ‘immodestly’ dressed girls, while preachers
threatened divine punishment for disobedient wives (Bernal 1994; Masquelier 2009).

The Middle East and North Africa

For the most granular, cross-culturally comparative analysis of contemporary gender relations, we
turn to (Bailey et al. 2025) analysis of 1.8 billion Facebook connections. Their Cross-Gender
Friending Ratio (CGFR) measures opposite-gender friendships, revealing that throughout the Middle
East, North Africa, Anatolia and South Asia, men and women maintain remarkably few cross-gender
friendships. Their heat maps display these segregated regions in deep red. Across these regions where
men and women have very few friends of the opposite sex, there is also much lower female
employment and lower support for gender equality (Bailey et al. 2025).
(Bailey et al. 2025)

Egypt’s ultra-low rates of female labour force participation (16%) reflect widespread ideals of female
seclusion. 63% of Egyptian men said that married women should be fully devoted to their family, and
not work. 66-70% of Egyptians believe work exposes women to harassment, while 60% expect
working women to face marital problems. Women’s likelihood of working was strongly associated
with their male relatives’ beliefs about women’s right to work and expectations about marital
problems (Hassan, Roushdy, and Sieverding 2021; Koning 2009; UN-Women and Promundo 2017;
World Bank 2023). Across MENA, young men are no more supportive of gender equality than their
grandfathers (UNFPA and Equimundo 2022).

While it is difficult to disentangle the effect of religiosity, MENA individuals who report frequently
attending religious services are also less supportive of gender equality (Glas et al. 2019). Across
MENA and South Asia, belief in the moral authority and legal enforcement of the Quran is strongly
associated with support for both women’s pre-marital virginity, husbands’ authority over wives'
employment and wife-beating (Charles et al. 2023). Across the Islamic world, female labour force
participation is negatively associated with veiling (Diwan and Klugman 2016).

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the state has harassed, imprisoned and killed dissidents (especially
women who contest patriarchy) (Abedinifard 2019; Afary 2009; Hashemi 2020; Moghissi 2008;
Ramazani 1993; Rezai-Rashti 2015; Sedghi 2007).

South Asia

Pakistan has become increasingly religious and patriarchal – significantly strengthened by General
Zia-ul-Haq’s religious authoritarianism, Saudi funding, and Islamic social movements (Afzal 2018;
Khan 2006; Sharlach 2008). Politicians – who have demonstrably failed to provide public goods, rule
of law, upward mobility, and economic growth – frequently invoke religion to gain legitimacy (Mufti,
Shafqat, and Siddiqui 2020).

Growing Salafism may help explain why younger generations of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are
actually more supportive of men’s right to employment, as well as wife-beating (Bussolo et al. 2023).
Pakistani Facebook users who pray daily and endorse religious absolutism are more likely to think
that men have the right to beat their wives and refuse permission to work (Charles et al. 2023). In
India, Muslims are more likely to say that men should be providers (Corichi 2022). Returning to my
theory of an “Honour-Income Trade-Off”, if female employment exposes families to rumours of
impropriety and jeopardises their place in paradise, families may be willing to accept large
opportunity costs. Muslim women indeed less likely to participate in the labour force and earn money
(Desai and Temsah 2014).

European Muslims

In 2024, the UK Labour party lost five seats to pro-Palestinian independents in areas with large
Muslim populations (Gross 2024). While this shift was inflamed by the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is part
of growing political contestation. Harnessing liberal democratic freedoms, European Islamists have
campaigned for sharia, opposed LGBT teaching in schools, and laid out plans for continued activism
(BBC News 2019; Ferguson 2019; Karasik et al. 2004; The Muslim Vote 2024).

Among British Muslims, 44% believe that schools should be able to require girls to wear hijab, and
40% support gender-segregated education - a view shared by 36% of British Muslim university
graduates. Regarding family law, 43% express support for Sharia (Frampton, Goodhart, and
Mahmood 2016). Only 37% of British Muslim women work (Office for National Statistics 2023). In
Germany, only 20% of Syrian refugee women are in employment – a rate comparable to their native
regions. On Facebook, Syrian women are also much less likely to form native German friends (Bailey
et al. 2022) – also consistent with gender segregation in Syria.

(Bisin and Verdier 2000) offer a theoretical model to explain European Muslims’ persistent religiosity.
They argue that cultural minorities actively employ strategies of ‘homogamy’ (marriage within the
same cultural group) and intensified socialization efforts to preserve their cultural traits. Minority
status creates stronger incentives for religious maintenance precisely because of the perceived threat
of assimilation. However, this omits the South Asian diaspora’s religious divergence: Hindu British
women work at high rates, while Muslims closely mirror their countries of origin.

Migration patterns may also be pertinent. Half of British Muslims marry someone from their ancestral
country of origin (Farahzadi 2024), potential reinforcing ideals of seclusion. Low rates of female
employment may have political consequences: if the welfare state is strained and public services
deteriorate, this may weaken ruling regimes’ legitimacy (Acemoglu et al. 2021).

CONCLUSION

The Global Islamic Revival represents one of the most significant religious-political transformations
of the past half-century. Previous explanations have tended to focus on country-specific
idiosyncrasies: economic frustration in Egypt, political legitimacy in Bangladesh, religious backlash
in Central Asia, or Saudi funding in Indonesia. These are all valuable, but fail to explain global
homogenisation. Once we recognise that the Islamic Revival occurred worldwide, we move to
consider interactions with transnational factors - including the cultural evolution of Islamic theology,
secular modernisation, rising prosperity, mass schooling, technological advances, Saudi funding and
prestige. Contributing to this literature, my ‘Prestige-Piety Feedback Loop’ helps explain how
modernization paradoxically amplified religious authority across diverse Muslim societies.

Important questions remain unresolved. While Saudi Arabia successfully exported Salafism, will its
recent shift towards secularisation cause similar emulation, or are religious movements now
independently entrenched by the Prestige-Piety feedback loop? Further, why did printing press
catalyse the Protestant Reformation, but online connectivity has not created similar effects in the
Muslim world? Quite simply, why are conservatives winning?

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