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Dominating the Mountain Warfare Narrative in the Indian Context

Article in Geopolitics · January 2017

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One of the most celebrated achievements by a military force of any consequence was probably
Hannibal's crossing of the Alps in 218 BC in the Second Punic War. Bypassing Roman and allied land
garrisons and naval dominance, Hannibal led his Carthaginian army over the Alps and into Italy to take
the war directly to the Roman Republic. It was his surprise night assault through the pass adjacent to
Mt. Du Chat that allowed him to take the fortified positions held by the Allobroges and descend into
Italy. Its importance lies in the fact that he was able to move his entire army, including his supply
columns, through mountains long considered impenetrable for large scale movement, and outflank the
enemy defences, thereby making them redundant and untenable.

History tells us that the Indian Sub- Continent, despite being protected by massive mountain
ranges, the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas and the Karakoram, has always been vulnerable to invasions
through these very ranges. While we are familiar with Alexander the Great’s attempt to invade in 326
BC, the Persian Kings had attempted to establish their hegemony in North West India, approximately
two hundred years earlier, led by King Cyrus, and following his death at the hands of an Indian soldier,
by his successor Darius in 530 BC. These invaders were followed by the nomadic savages or tribes who
lived in the neighbourhood of China, the Huna or Hephthalites, invasions between 458 and 470 AD. The
Muslim invasions followed, first by Central Asian Turks who established the Delhi Sultanate in 1206 AD
and then the Mongols who finally established the Mughal Empire in the 16 th Century. All of this
movement through the mountains was not one way and was interspersed with invasions by the
Mauryan (325 -185 BC) and Gupta (320-550 AD) Empires who’s territories stretched from parts of
present day Iran to Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Republics.

Even today, we are yet to fully overcome the trauma of the manner in which the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) outflanked and enveloped our defences in Arunachal Pradesh and
Ladakh, overwhelming 4 Infantry Division from the former. This was indeed ironic given the fact that the
Red Eagle Division, as it was famously known, made its formidable reputation in the mountains of
Eritrea in March 1941 where it defeated a hugely superior Italian Force at Keren and subsequently went
on to achieve even greater success at the Second and Third Battles for Monte Cassino in Italy against
strongly entrenched German forces. Field Marshal Lord Wavell said of the Division that “The fame of this
Division will surely go down as one of the greatest fighting formations in military history, to be spoken of
with such as The Tenth Legion, The Light Division of the Peninsular War and Napoleon's Old Guard"i.

This debacle resulted in wide ranging reorganizations and expansions within the Indian Army.
This included the upgrading of the Ski School into the High Altitude Warfare School and the raising of ten
mountain divisons that were organized equipped and trained for operations in High Altitude Areas
(HAA). Defensive tactics were evolved and our positions along the LAC were greatly strengthened. The
military’s self- confidence in its ability to fight and win conflicts in mountains received a boost firstly
because of the success achieved in the Nathu La-Cho La skirmish with the PLA in 1967ii and the manner
in which the Sumdorong Chu incident of 1987iii was robustly handled. The focus came back on the
mountains with the occupation of Siachin Glacier in 1984 by India just a day ahead of Pakistan’s
Operation Ababeel.

Operation Meghdoot successfully allowed Indian forces to occupy most of the dominating
heights on Saltoro Ridge to the west of Siachen Glacier. In hindsight attempts by China and Pakistan to
cozy up militarily has been thwarted to a large extent as the Saltoro Heights dominate the entire region
up to the Karakoram Pass including the Shaksgam Valley that has been illegally ceded to China by
Pakistan. It also provides depth to Leh and Kargil and has assumed greater importance in view of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is being constructed.iv Most importantly, operating at
5000m over the past four decades has given Indian forces valuable insights into specialized warfare and
greatly enhanced Indian capabilities to fight in Extreme Cold and High Altitude conditions and terrain.

To a large extent, it was the inability of the Pakistan Army to wrest Siachin from India that led
them to their launching the ill-fated operations that led to the Kargil Conflict of 1999. While Pakistan
used deception and surprise in the initial phase to occupy a large number of unoccupied heights
overlooking the Srinagar-Leh Axis, it was unable to sustain its troops logistically. Based on a political
directive disallowing any ingress into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the Indian Army was forced to resort
to a series of conventional frontal attacks along spur lines to evict Pakistani forces. This was successfully
achieved with the use of massed artillery and sheer determination, grit and dogged courage on the part
of the assaulting infantry. The use of cliff assault techniques too played a major role in achieving
success. But victory was won at great cost, with over 400 dead and another 1000 wounded.

While the LAC with China has remained quiet in recent times, with the occasional ingress into
Indian Territory, more to ensure that its claims continue to remain in the limelight rather than with any
real offensive intent. It is the LOC with Pakistan that has continued to be unsettled and active due to
Pakistan’s unfulfilled ambitions and its involvement in the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir.
Nonetheless, China does pose a serious concern in the long term given its ongoing attempts to challenge
United States domination, especially in Asia. Moreover, while our borders with China are in the
mountains and any conflict with them will obviously involve combat in mountainous and high altitude
terrain, it seems increasingly possible that conflict with Pakistan may also be primarily restricted to the
mountains as well. This is because given the fact that both states are declared nuclear powers
conventional operations in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan will be restricted in time and space to
avoid escalation leading to a nuclear exchange. Thus there is little choice for us except to focus on
enhancing our mountain and high altitude warfare capabilities.

Thin air at high altitudes combined with extremely low temperatures and uncertain and rapidly
changing weather conditions poses unique challenges that test human endurance and the military’s
capabilities to wage war at those altitudes to extreme limits. The rarefied atmosphere and cold reduce
human ability to sustain at such altitudes for long periods despite acclimatization. The heights, terrain
and gradients make movement on foot extremely slow and torturous apart from greatly hampering the
ability to construct required infrastructure for sustaining operations. Weather conditions and cold
greatly reduce accuracy and effectiveness of weapons and equipment, including helicopters, aircraft,
artillery and electronic equipment.

Therefore, while technology, especially ICT, Artificial Intelligence and robotics may have
transformed warfare, including traditional organizational structures, its impact on forces deployed and
required to fight in mountains has been minimal. The old adage that “mountains eat up troops”
continues to hold good despite state of the art technology, especially force multipliers such as
surveillance systems, communications equipment, light weight weapons and survival gear along with
precision munitions, having impacted the theatre of operations. These technologies have however
allowed for changes in tactical doctrine as it has made it feasible for troops to remain in combat for
longer durations, improved survivability and enhanced fighting potential and destructive capabilities.

In his thesis “High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future” Marcus P Acosta
correctly concludes that “Revolutions in technology drive tactical change. Yet certain regions of the
world remain largely unaffected by the full reach of advances in military technology. Thin air, cold
weather, and mountainous terrain combine to create a uniquely inhospitable battlefield at high altitude.
The elements of military victory at high altitude have not dramatically changed. Overwhelming fire, in
concert with bold maneuver, continues to determine victory on the high altitude battlefield. The
emergence of precision warfare has yet to dominate combat in the timeless environs of the world’s
highest mountains.”v

In our context, there have been attempts to enhance our war waging capabilities in the
mountains, especially against any potential adventurism by China. While there has been increasing focus
on improvement of infrastructure in the North- East and some roads and other infrastructure have
either been constructed or improved, there is a long way to go in this regard. This is especially urgent if
our Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) that is being raised is to be able to meet its mission objectives. It is
another matter that in its present avatar the MSC is incapable of acting as a strategic countervailing
force for sustained offensive actions against the PLA mounting bases in Tibet. Most analysts see this
force as being prepositioned as uncommitted reserves to be utilized to stabilize the situation if required.

While there are those who question the very viability of any corps level offensive against the
PLA into Tibet, the fact of the matter is that offense is the best form of defense and we must change our
military’s mindset from avoiding defeat to grasping for victory, much in keeping with Sun Tzu......
“Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the
offensive”.vi In this context there is an urgent need to reconsider the organization of the MSC as it
presently stands and reorient its capabilities to be able to undertake offensive tasks in depth in
conjunction with our Special Operations Forces (SOF). It needs to be considerably lighter and provided
with air-mobile specialized mountain warfare trained and equipped units with adequate and compatible
combat support and logistics elements. The procurement of the light weight M777 155mm Howitzers
from the United States is a welcome step in this direction as it will greatly enhance available firepower.
 Given the size and capabilities of our SOF there is an urgent need to reorient them, especially
the Parachute Brigade, for operations in mountains. In any future conflict our SOF must have the ability
to conduct irregular warfare and tie down PLA formations prior to hostilities. Subsequently they should
prepare the theatre of operations by isolating the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) by cutting off road
and rail communications. At the commencement of hostilities at an appropriate time provide a suitable
air head(s) from where strike elements can debouch to capture vital areas that would either
delay/dissuade the PLA from launching an offensive or force them to recoil, if they have already done
so. Such a capability has an added advantage in that it also gives our political leadership additional
strategic options in any conflict that may occur against Pakistan.

In conclusion it is necessary for our politico-military leadership to reorient our forces for dealing
with any contingency that may arise along the LOC/LAC in our mountainous regions. In any event we
must take full advantage of the long experience and high levels of expertise and skill-sets available
within our army for combat in extreme high altitudes and mountainous terrain. These are battle winning
factors and need to be supplemented with the required infrastructural development and procurement
of suitable weapons and equipment that will ensure victory.

(The writer is a military veteran and consultant with the Observer Research Foundation)
 End Notes

i
Das, Chand; "Indian Infantry Divisions in World War II – Part I". Journal of the United Service Institution of India.
CXXVI (525: July/September 1996): 374–387.
ii
Further elucidated by Maninder Dabas in “The Story Of Indian Army's Nathu La & Cho La Stands That Saved
Sikkim From The Chinese Army!” http://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/the-story-of-indian-army-s-nathu-la-cho-
la-stands-that-saved-sikkim-from-the-chinese-army-257995.html
iii
To know more read the Sumdodrong Chu Incident at
https://www.bharatrakshak.com/ARMY/history/siachen/286-Sumdorong-Incident.html
iv
Rajat Pandit; Siachen height provides military depth India can’t afford to lose; The Times of India 12 Feb 2016.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Siachen-height-provides-military-depth-India-cant-afford-to-
lose/articleshow/50953480.cms
v
Marcus P Acosta; “High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future”; Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California; 2003;pg75.
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1043/03Jun_Acosta.pdf?sequence=1
vi
The Art of War by Sun Tzu; Translated by Lionel Giles, Originally published 1910; www.suntzusaid.com

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