The Development of Judgment and Decision Making in Children and Adolescents, 1st Edition Scribd PDF Download
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BF723.J8D48 2005
155.4'1383-Klc22 2004050658
CIP
Preface xi
—Janis E. Jacobs
—Paul A. Klaczynski
REFERENCES
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking: From childhood to adolescence. New
York: Basic Books.
Jacobs, J. E., & Klaczynski, P. A. (2002). The development of judgment and decision making
during childhood and adolescence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11,145-149.
I
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACHES TO JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING
1
2 PARTI
making (e.g., a relevant and accurate knowledge base; working memory ca-
pacity) that support and sometimes constrain the utilization of decision-
making competencies. The SRM model thus shares some assumptions with
traditional competence-performance theories of cognitive development and
the "bounded rationality" theories that are currently in vogue among adult
decision theorists. More importantly, Byrnes' theory pinpoints a variety of
sources that may help explain the developmental mechanisms responsible for
age differences in decision making, as well as inter- and intra-individual vari-
ability in decision making.
The focus of Klaczynski's chapter (chap. 2) is on the role of dual process-
ing for understanding the development of reasoning and decision making. In
the dual-process theory he presents, development is conceived as occurring
in two separate information-processing systems. The "analytic" system in-
volves conscious deliberation, metacognitive reflection and monitoring of
reasoning, decontextualized task representations, and attempts to arrive at
precise, accurate inferences and decisions. By contrast, the "experiential"
system relies on processing that occurs at or below the "periphery" of con-
sciousness. This system is considered the predominant or default processing
system on most everyday reasoning and decision tasks. Klaczynski augments
his analysis of dual processing by arguing for the importance of metacognitive
functioning in normative reasoning and decision making. Specifically, a case
is made that, although contextual cues typically result in the automatic acti-
vation of heuristics and stereotypes, this preconscious activation does not
necessarily lead to preconscious implementation. Children, adolescents, and
adults have at least the opportunity to "metacognitively intercede" before
the products of experiential processing are actually applied, allowing reason-
ers to reflect on experientially produced responses and to override their im-
plementation with analytically based responses. Klaczynski suggests that this
ability increases with age, particularly around the beginning of the adolescent
period.
In the final chapter of this section, Reyna, Adam, Poirier, LeCroy, and
Brainerd (chap. 3) also propose a dual-process model of decision making and
apply this model to adolescent sexual risk taking. In their "fuzzy-trace" the-
ory, Reyna et al. argue that real-life decision making cannot be adequately
explained by traditional decision analysis. Fuzzy-trace theory thus predicts
that decisions are not based on "rational" integration of risks and rewards.
Rather, decisions are based on "gist" processing. Reyna et al. further argue
that adaptive decisions are typically made on the basis of intuitive semantic
representations (i.e., gist—the "core meaning" of a decision) that are en-
abled by experiences, culture, and development. A key assumption of fuzzy-
trace theory is that decision makers' default processing preference is to oper-
ate on the least precise representation available to accomplish particular
tasks. That is, decision makers prefer to operate in gist representations (qual-
PARTI 3