The Little Book of Child and Adolescent Development
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Contents
Disclosure Statements | vii
1. A psychoanalytic orientation to development in the
twenty-first century | 1
2. Infancy: Psychoanalytic theory, developmental research,
and the mother–child dyad in the first year of life | 29
3. Toddlerhood: Separation–individuation, rapprochement,
and the forerunners of superego development | 51
4. The oedipal phase and the oedipal complex: Developmental
advances and theoretical considerations | 71
5. Latency: The era of learning, autonomy, and peer
relationships | 101
6. Preadolescence and early adolescence: Introduction to
the adolescent process and the challenges of
sexual maturation | 121
7. Middle and late adolescence: Sex and gender, individuation,
and identity in progression toward the threshold
of adulthood | 157
v
vi | Co nt en t s
8. Emerging adulthood and contemporary society: Development
in the third decade | 189
9. Conclusion: Why study development? | 213
GL O S S A RY | 219
I NDEX | 223
Disclosure Statements
There are no conflicts to disclose. I am clinical professor of psychia-
try at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, and
training and supervising analyst at the Columbia University Center
for Psychoanalytic Training and Research. There are no funding
sources or other possible conflicts of interest. Karen Gilmore, M.D.
I have no conflicts to disclose. I am assistant professor of medical
psychology in the Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University,
and training/supervising analyst and director, Child Division,
at Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and
Research. I am associated with no funding sources and there are no
possible conflicts of interest. Pamela Meersand, Ph.D.
vii
1
A Psychoanalytic Orientation
to Development in the Twenty-First
Century
The Challenge
In attempting to craft a concise introduction to human develop-
ment, we face a near impossible task in contemporary psychoanaly-
sis. Psychoanalytic theories of development, like their associated
psychoanalytic schools, suffer from proliferation, fractionation, and
a scarcity of shared theoretical assumptions. Moreover, the lack of
empirical foundations (with the exception of attachment theory)
and the failure to interface and integrate with progress in other
disciplines, such as biological research, neuroscience, and trends in
theory-making, has marginalized the entire field (Stepansky, 2009),
leaving the many developmental theories embedded within the
various schools untouched. Among these, a significant proportion
are “part” theories (ibid), tilted toward infancy and early childhood;
they produce “psychoanalytic babies” (Thoma & Kachele, 1987;
Tolpin, 1989) who (mostly) bear little resemblance to actual babies,
who fail to thrive because their schools abandon them after early
childhood, and who are rarely nurtured by the fruits of advances in
developmental science. In fact, many theories, or at least some of
their important adherents, openly discredit attempts to align devel-
opmental research and findings with the developmental theories of
their school; they dispute the psychoanalytic value of any observa-
tional data when obtained outside of the consulting room (Wolff,
1996). In the view of some commentators, efforts to integrate
1
2 | Little Book o f Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
psychoanalytic theories with each other, or to maintain a pluralistic
field, and/or keep pace with scientific progression have foundered
on the shoals of insular partisanship (Stepansky, 2009). In this
book, we sweep aside these differences and the historical resistance
to the integration of new scientific knowledge with an admittedly
biased broom: We propose a developmental orientation that incor-
porates what we consider fundamentals of psychoanalytic thinking
and developmental science, creating an open system that can be
inclusive and reconfigured in pace with knowledge. Developmental
thinking is work in progress and subject to continuous correction
and augmentation. Although discovery may not find immediate
application in psychoanalytic theorizing or clinical work, the active
interface between psychoanalytic developmental theories and
developmental science keeps our theory-making an organic, evolv-
ing process in sync with contemporary society, ultimately enriching
psychoanalytic theory and clinical work. And although postmod-
ern theories may disavow interest in childhood history, many were
themselves offspring of new findings from developmental research.
Indeed, it has been argued that developmental thinking is the pre-
miere fount of creativity in psychoanalysis (Govrin, 2006). We
believe that vibrant and relevant psychoanalytic developmental
thinking adds a crucial component to twenty-first century develop-
mental science and psychiatry, highlighting the importance of the
mind of the child and the autobiographical narratives that shape
adult experience: The child is (and always will be) the father to the
man (Cooper, 1989; Freud, 1938).
Our Position in the Psychoanalytic Terrain
In brief, the fractionated landscape can be divided, for our purposes,
between the traditional or classical theories (see glossary) originating
before 1980 and the postmodern or post-postmodern schools that
have proliferated over the last three decades. Traditional schools—
those that emerged before 1980—have detailed developmental
ideas that are more or less comprehensive. Most incorporate some
A P s y c hoa na l y ti c a l O ri enta ti on t o D e v e l o p m e n t | 3
version of Freud’s original psychosexual progression, but these
developmental theories vary considerably in their school-specific
notions of psychopathology, their concepts of therapeutic action,
and their interest in actually observing infants and children to test
their hypotheses. The traditional developmental theories origi-
nated in psychoanalytic explorations of the mental life of adults
and children, but some have incorporated and integrated observa-
tional and research data, depending, of course, on its approach and
theoretical bias (Fajardo, 1993, 1998).1 In contrast, the psychoana-
lytic schools emerging in the last decades of the twentieth century,
the postmodern or post-postmodern schools, which, as noted, have
arguably sprung from advances in infant observation, question
the clinical utility of developmental thinking and data, childhood
history (Govrin, 2006), remembering and reconstruction (Blum,
2003a,b; Fonagy, 2003), and the mind of child. The here-and-now
is the primary focus of exploration, and the here-and-now is not
mined for its illumination of the past. Even those who utilize obser-
vations of mother–infant interactions to clarify the psychoanalytic
situation are not truly developmental by our definition, because
they do not explore the complex transformational journey from
infancy to the adult on the couch. As noted, many contemporary
analysts from the gamut of theoretical positions argue persuasively
that developmental theory and/or research findings are outside the
purview of psychoanalysis (Auchincloss & Vaughan, 2001; Wolff,
1996).
In this context, we position ourselves in the pre-postmodern
camp, because we believe in the centrality of emergent ego capaci-
ties as a crucial aspect of developmental progression and because
we adhere to the idea that effective treatment establishes links
to childhood history and facilitates continuous and coherent
self-representation. Our orientation is a highly selective amalgam
of psychoanalytic ideas and relevant information from general
theories of development and empirical research: an integration
of ego-psychological psychoanalytic thinking, developmental sci-
ence, stage thinking, systems theory, intrapsychic and environ-
mental considerations, and one- and two-person psychology. Our
4 | Little Book o f Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
utilization of developmental research as a rich source of data and
our openness to multiple theoretical approaches to developmental
progression is, we believe, in the tradition of Anna Freud’s emphatic
endorsement of actually looking at children, thereby gaining oppor-
tunity to see developmental transformations and the synthetic
function in action (A Freud, 1963, 1981). Moreover, despite her
theoretical conservatism, she offered an early example of nonlinear
systems thinking (i.e., the integration of complex strands of develop-
ment in multiple arenas—see glossary) in her proposal of develop-
mental lines (Mayes, 1999).2
We unapologetically embrace a degree of pluralism that, despite
prominent proponents such as Pine (1988), has historically been
disparaged among some psychoanalysts as “cut and paste” (Demos,
2001) or model-mixing theories (Mitchell, 1988). According to
Stepansky (2009), pluralism in psychoanalysis has begotten only
a “plurality of theories” (p. 110). We consider our synthesis to be
an integration of these pluralisms so that at the very least, there
is a psychoanalytic baby, toddler, latency age child, adolescent, and
emerging adult that is recognizable to psychoanalysts at large and
yet open to shifts in emphasis, new information, or advances in sci-
ence. We are heartened by the words of developmental scientist,
Alison Gopnik: “being a pluralist does not mean being a wimp. For
any particular developmental phenomenon, one theory or another
will be true, and we want to know which one it is” (Gopnik, 1996,
p. 221). That we freely utilize “theory fragments, almost-theories,
and pseudotheories” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 221)—what Stepansky calls
“part-theories”—reflects the reality that developmental scientists
increasingly acknowledge: “The fact of the matter is we do not yet
have a theory of development, and perhaps we never will” (Keller,
2005). There is no unified theory in psychoanalysis or in general
psychology. Even the holistic postmodern approach of systems
thinking, in ascendance for roughly half a century, has its detrac-
tors and, like most new ideas, has been critiqued, defended, and
finally diminished in its absolute hegemony, although still pro-
foundly applicable to many phenomena (Berman, 1996; L’Abate &
Colondier, 1987; Thelen & Bates, 2003).
A P s y c hoa na l y ti c a l O ri enta ti on t o D e v e l o p m e n t | 5
However, to the extent that any classical theory presumes to
discover the origins of all mental phenomena in mental conflict (as
delineated in classical metapsychology [Rapaport & Gill, 1959]) we
diverge and decamp. We share the conviction that neurotic psycho-
pathology originates in childhood, that transference contains cru-
cial elements of the patient’s past relationships that enter into the
co-construction of the here and now, and that therapeutic technique
involves transference exploration in order to understand its mean-
ing and gain access to childhood dynamics, positions, and conflicts;
however, these propositions do not demonstrate that the “roots and
causes” of mental phenomenon can be discovered by the analytic
method. The psychoanalytic method examines the historical vicis-
situdes of object relations, fantasy, cognitive capacities, talents and
drives, but cannot say that prodigious musical talent, for example,
has a “psychological cause.” We nonetheless believe that psychoan-
alytic exploration of personal history is fundamental to the treat-
ment process, in contrast to “post-postmodern thinkers” who have
(more or less) dispensed with the baby in favor of the here-and-now
and the equal contributions of patient and analyst to transferences.
However, in keeping with the spirit of developmental scientists,
insights and new perspectives from contemporary theories “bob-
bing about around us” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 221) are incorporated into
our thinking when they fit the phenomena being considered.
Contemporary Developmental Science
The larger field of developmental science has its own theoretical
controversies and its own struggle with causality. Nonlinear sys-
tems theory, a paradigm that was applied to psychological entities
since its early origins in family work, conceptualizes processes in
ways that resonate with psychoanalytic notions of complex, mul-
tiply determined transformative exchanges between environment
and inner life (Seligman, 2003). Systems theory is especially favored
by the co-constructionist post-postmodern schools (Demos, 2001,
2007) because it decenters causality, leading to the characterization
6 | Little Book o f Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
of both the psychoanalytic endeavor and human development as
transactional processes that self-organize. Dynamic systems theory
does away with the Aristotelian notion of “efficient cause;” that is,
the assumption that an event is the result of prior events, in favor
of “formal cause,” which locates causality in the organization or pat-
terns of component systems that arise from their flow and dynamic
exchange to produce a “whole.” The second half of the twentieth
century reverberated with the rise of postmodern systems think-
ing, which created seismic shifts in the fields of developmental psy-
chology, sociology, history, and evolutionary sciences, to name just
a few. But systems theory also has a “shadow side” (Berman, 1996).
Most relevant to this discussion is the usual problem of the new-
est revelatory theory: Systems thinking has become the explana-
tory tool applied to all natural and man-made phenomena, leading
one critic to complain, “if it is everything, it is really nothing. If all
phenomena follow the same system principles, we have no basis
for understanding anything apart from anything else” (Littlejohn,
quoted in Jurich & Myers-Bowman, 1998, p. 83). The idiosyncratic
past history of holistic systems and their components, the unique
and specific processes that govern different aspects of human exis-
tence, the distortions created by convulsive disasters, and primary
causality, even in regard to very limited outcomes, are homogenized
by a theory that purports to be entirely free of context and specificity
in regard to content. The neglect of the part for the whole disallows
the contributions from innate or genetic predispositions and leads
to considerations of larger and larger systems to effect, permit, or
sustain individual transformation. There is no schizophrenia, only a
schizophrenogenic family system embedded in a schizophrenogenic
society (Jurich & Myers-Bowman, 1998). Causality or, at least,
probabilistic causality is inconsistent with such thinking, as is the
possibility that knowledge (of the patient) is, at least in part, inde-
pendent of the knower (Held, 1995). The theory also can be read to
downplay the role of conflict in the transformative process; indeed,
“the underlying ‘hum’ as it were, is the karmic notion that conflict
is unreal, that there are no accidents in the universe, and that all
systems are essentially perfect as they are” (Berman, 1996, p. 44) or,
A P s y c hoa na l y ti c a l O ri enta ti on t o D e v e l o p m e n t | 7
at the very least, moving toward perfection. The theory thus para-
doxically lends itself to a kind of “systemic determinism,” similar
to psychoanalytic “psychic determinism,” which neglects external
impingements and catastrophes, context, individual constitution,
genetic blueprint, and any other forces not intrinsic to the intersys-
temic dynamic in its backward search for causes.
In our view, the “shadow side” critique is applicable to the rela-
tional, two-person turn in psychoanalysis, especially insofar as
the theor(ies) deemphasize the role of biological givens, memory,
unconscious fantasy, “deficits” (Pine, 1994), and the events and
traumas of childhood that are experienced and contained within
the individual psyche. Their position challenges the foundational
idea that the patient’s history is discovered in the transference and
undermines notions of therapeutic action based on elucidation of
the meaning of transference enactments and memories that bear
the imprint of the child’s mind (Govrin, 2006; also see Lafarge,
2012). There is no revelation of childhood templates, relationship
dynamics, or working models that point to a meaningful piece of the
patient’s psyche independent of the knower, and therefore intrinsic
to the patient’s mental life. In defense of developmental thinking
and the psychology of the individual mind, Govrin (2006) critiques
such “post-postmodern” theorists’ reluctance to embrace develop-
mental theory due to “its objectivized universal childhood stages or
psychobiological drives that determine or predict later psychologi-
cal experience and universalist claims about the panhuman content
of unconscious fantasies.” Govrin asserts that such a disclaimer is
“not only denied by their own clinical material, which itself relies
on such formulas, but also threatens a deep source of psychoana-
lytic thinking and creativity grounded in the conviction that we can
‘know’ something about another human being separate from our-
selves” (Govrin, 2006, p. 526 referencing Chodorow, 1999).
Rejection of pluralism and the findings of related sciences would
seem contradictory to the complexity and uncertainty that dynamic
systems theory embraces. Like developmental scientists Gopnik and
Keller, we consider theoretical pluralism to be a legitimate starting
point on the way to (perhaps unachievable and even undesirable)
8 | Little Book o f Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
integration. Demos, following the tradition of Mitchell (1988),
decries cut-and-paste theorizing as an avoidance of the inevitable
incompatibility of fundamental principles with findings of contem-
porary research; in her view traditional schools must give up hal-
lowed ideas like drive and other biologically based motivational
systems, including attachment (Demos, 2001, 2008). However, true
to Govrin’s hypothesis, psychoanalysts who think developmentally
and utilize new findings in developmental science to advance, aug-
ment, refine, reconfigure, and broaden psychoanalytic ideas, add
immeasurably to psychoanalytic thought: Recent examples include
Fonagy’s “truly developmental” theorizing about sex (Fonagy,
2008); Lafarge’s remarkable blending of classical and new thinking
in her explication of screen memories (LaFarge, 2012), and Vivona’s
revelatory use of current research to refute a “nonverbal” period
of development, with repercussions in our conceptualization of
infants’ minds (Vivona, 2012).
Guided Pluralism
Therefore, with the caveats that follow, we find ourselves mostly
allied with the traditional (also called “grand” [Govrin, 2006] or
“modern” [Chodorow, 2004]) schools, as “modern ego psycholo-
gists.” According to a comprehensive exegesis by Marcus (1999),
modern ego psychology is a pluralistic world unto itself: It offers
a “general psychology describing all mental function” (p. 867) (note
that describing is a far more modest claim than “discovering roots
and causes”), focuses on ego development and mental structure,
diminishes the preeminence of drive and appreciates other motives,
integrates object relations, and keeps abreast of advances in cogni-
tive neuroscience and developmental research. Marcus’ definition
implies that psychoanalytic theory cannot illuminate psychologi-
cal origins of such mental phenomena as autism, heterosexuality,
homosexuality, or addiction—that is, it cannot answer why ques-
tions—but rather examines how the ego grapples to synthesize
these and myriad other complex outcomes derived from biological
A P s y c hoa na l y ti c a l O ri enta ti on t o D e v e l o p m e n t | 9
and environmental sources. This is not equivalent to systems the-
orists’ rejection of causality, but rather reflects our humble rec-
ognition that knowledge of ultimate causes is not only beyond
psychoanalytic research, but also beyond the reach of contemporary
developmental science.
Modern ego psychology is thus at variance with the early ego
psychologists’ versions of “general psychology” intended to eluci-
date the “psychological origin and development” of all psychological
phenomena (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Even though we share an inter-
est in describing how mental structure is formed during infancy and
early childhood—building up agencies, processes, and contents,
how development proceeds to its completion, how meanings and
motives evolve over time, and how childhood conflicts are rewrit-
ten and reissued over the course of a life, we do not claim to know
“why.” Moreover, despite many commentators’ refutation of the
antiquated notion that psychopathology can be positioned along
a developmental continuum, this idea continues to lurk in aspects
of our lexicon and should be extinguished (Rinsley, 1985; Vaillant,
1992; Wallerstein, 1994; Westen, 1990, 2002). So, even while agree-
ing with Freud’s basic assumption that a formulation of the mental
life of the child is necessary in order to scaffold the search backward
for the psychological history of a given symptom or trait, we do
not insist that we know or can discover exactly what went awry in
development and at what moment, based on adult presentation and
recall. Memory, especially screen memories, are rich veins of psy-
choanalytic exploration and understanding, capturing a complex
mixture of veridical perception, experience, naïve cognition, uncon-
scious fantasy (Erreich, 2003), and moments of personal meaning
that have lasting impact on autobiographical narratives (Lafarge,
2012), but they do not offer simple causality.
Phases
Most traditional developmental theories, both within psychoanaly-
sis and developmental science, identify universals in developmental
10 | Little Book of Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
acquisitions and tasks and adhere to the progression of development
as a maturational program (without necessarily embracing Freud’s
singular psychosexual motor). Within traditional psychoanalysis,
differences accrue in regard to timing, presumptions regarding
normative progression, and relative emphases on psychosexual-
ity, object relations, or narcissistic needs. Moreover, as previously
noted, the various schools differ about the value of actually look-
ing at children to confirm their hypotheses (Grignon, 2003). The
“grand” schools consistently emphasize early childhood and accept
the presence of the oedipal period as a watershed, but they differ in
terms of how they conceptualize and weight the oedipal versus pre-
oedipal period, how they elaborate development across the lifespan,
their interest in emerging capacities, and in environmental impinge-
ments. In concert with these theories, we continue to see the oedi-
pal period as pivotal, because it marks a developmental shift that
introduces remarkable new capacities in symbolic thought, triadic
relations, affective range and nuance, mentalization, and creative
imagining, reorganizing prior development and reverberating into
the future. It encompasses a revolutionary transformation of the
mind and a shift in memorial capacity that essentially alters access
to prior content (Shapiro, 1977).
In contrast, postmodern theorists tend to dispense with the
familiar developmental stages that, beginning with Freud’s psy-
chosexual stage progression, have traditionally served to organize
psychoanalytic—and in fact, general developmental—thinking
(Lyons-Ruth, 1999). Their reasons for doing so are complex and
multiple, ranging from their emphasis on systems thinking, which
posits unweighted lifespan processes, to their rejection of pre-
set/hardwired stages/singular narratives (Arnett et al., 2011;
Chodorow, 1999; Demos, 2008; Harris, 1996; Hendry & Kloep,
2007), to the political climate that challenges the idea of normative
pathways that have served to designate variations as healthy, patho-
logical, or disordered (Auchincloss & Vaughan, 2001). These think-
ers, in accord with lifespan theorists outside psychoanalysis, view
the developmental process as continuous and universal, extending
over the entire course of life, with sustained momentum from birth
A P s y c hoa na l y ti c a l O ri enta ti on t o D e v e l o p m e n t | 1 1
to death. The formulation of psychoanalysis as a developmental pro-
cess is more or less included in this thinking (for examples illustrat-
ing broad application of developmental ideas, see Settlage, Curtis,
Lozoff, Silberschatz, & Simburg, 1988; Shane, 1979, 1980). In con-
trast, developmental ego psychologists in the Anna Freud tradition,
like Neubauer (1996, 2001) and Abrams (1990), disagree with the
notion that the process of change during psychoanalysis itself is
“developmental” and view development as a limited process that
ends with the attainment of adulthood. For them, developmental
progression is a series of novel mental organizations and emerg-
ing capacities due to maturational advances; once the adult form
is achieved, other processes assume importance and account for
change.
The current literature emanating from general developmental
science reflects parallel tension between “stage thinkers” and “pro-
cess” (or systems) thinkers. Similar to their psychoanalytic brethren,
process thinkers see transformation occurring across the lifespan,
arising from the “systemic interaction of different resources and
challenges, and not simply the passing of time” (Hendry & Kloep,
2011, p. 71). They consider human development to be a continuous
self-organizing process inseparable from the surround. Some of the
moderate theorists in this group differentiate among processes that
impact human development and acknowledge agents outside the
patterns produced by interaction: Humans experience maturational
shifts, such as the universal experience of physical maturation; they
experience normative social shifts dictated by the particular culture,
such as the expectations about academic capacities or age at mar-
riage. Finally, there are non-normative shifts determined by indi-
vidual resources and prior experience (Hendry & Kloep, 2002). To
all these thinkers, generalizations about stages of life, even those
confirmed by research, are inevitably a reflection of the culture in
which they occur. Although the process of transformation is univer-
sal, generalizable, and perpetual, the content and reflections upon
these processes are context specific.
In contrast, phase theorists contend that “typical” features and
challenges meaningfully identify a given stage and a child who
12 | Little Book of Ch i l d an d A d ol esc en t D e ve l o pm e n t
belongs there, even while acknowledging the vast variations pos-
sible. Phases are partly determined by environmental demand, but
are also solidly embedded in biological maturation, which loops
back to pace environmental expectation. Certainly, all individuals in
a phase are not alike and all psychological arenas in one individual
in a phase are not at the same level of development. This idea is
fully incorporated in developmental lines (nonlinear and synthetic)
thinking (A Freud 1963, 1981). But, like Anna Freud, we find that
such groupings serve to organize our thinking and reflect the envi-
ronmental reality. Most children grapple with bodily transforma-
tions, maturation, and environmental demands in roughly the same
time period. Cultural expectations, applied to all children in a cer-
tain phase within that culture, have an impact on the developmental
experience, including on its timing, especially as the child interfaces
with extrafamilial society in latency, adolescence, and adulthood.
Unfortunately, thinking in phases has been equated with rigid
linear sequences and normative paths, and has rightfully required
correction within psychoanalysis. We are confident that a more
open-ended and updated psychoanalytic view of development can
serve to redress some real errors committed in the name of psy-
choanalytic developmental theory in the past. We also believe that
developmental phases scaffold understanding of the serial mental
organizations that characterize the mind of the child as it evolves
and allow us to recognize naïve cognitions that emerge in the mental
life of adults. Ours is a compromise position that sees developmen-
tal phases as a series of new organizations of multiple individually
evolving but mutually interactive systems, replete with variability
but nonetheless identifiable and implicitly acknowledged by chang-
ing environmental demands.
Errors and Correctives
Many problematic psychoanalytic assertions are part of the psy-
choanalytic positivist past and reflect the arrogant overreach of
the then-dominant theory in mental health. However chastened
