On the "Asiatic" Mode of Production and More

Grigory A. Zavalko

The new book by Yuri Ivanovich Semenov, The Politarian (“Asiatic”) Mode of

Production: Essence and Place in the History of Humanity and Russia. 2nd Edition, Revised and

Expanded, is dedicated to a specific but highly intriguing question in history: the mode of

production known as the "Asiatic" mode. Since the 1970s, Semenov has used the term

"politarian." The book consists of seven essays written between 1957 and 2008. The latest essays

have been significantly revised compared to the first edition (2008).

The book contains an extensive collection of factual material, which I will not cite here to

save space. Therefore, I will get straight to the point.

What does ancient Eastern society look like? The state owns the means of production; the

population is divided into the state apparatus and ordinary people, mainly peasants; slaves exist,

but there is no mass use of them in production, which would signify a slave-owning mode of

production (slavery is a legal status, and slaves can be warriors, musicians, officials, etc.). The

immediate question arises: what type of ownership does state ownership belong to? The answer

is obvious: private ownership—ownership by a part of society. This part, owning the means of

production, thereby has the ability to exploit the labor of another part. For Europeans, the

familiar form of private ownership is the personal ownership characteristic of capitalism. But

this is not the only form. Under feudalism, private ownership takes on a corporate character,

while under politarism, it is class-wide. The state apparatus is not only a class of owners but also

a class-owner. Distribution within it is based on hierarchical position: the higher the position, the

greater the share of surplus product received in the form of privileges. Naturally, the pyramid has

a peak, where the head of the class—the politarch (pharaoh, mikado, shah, sultan, etc.)—is
 2

positioned. Europeans often mistook him for the sole owner of the land. But the politarch exists

only as the head of the class: it is the position, not the individual, that matters.

Peasants are also owners of land: subordinate owners. Private property is absolute when

members of the ruling class hold undivided ownership of the means of production, while

members of another class are entirely alienated from them. This is the case with slave-owning

and capitalist private property. However, private property can be fragmented into supreme

private property held by members of the ruling class and subordinate separate property held by

members of the exploited class. This, for example, is the case with feudal private property. In

such cases, the antagonistic mode of production is two-tiered. The feudal socio-economic

structure encompassed the peasant-communal structure as its foundation. Supreme private

property always implies ownership not only of the means of production but also of the persons of

the direct producers. The latter are subordinate owners not only of the means of production but

also of their own persons" (Semenov, 2014, p. 224). This is also the case under politarism.

Officials (politarists) command, and peasants obey. A shortsighted view sees in this an

imaginary distinction between East and West: in the West, property gives rise to power, while in

the East, it is supposedly the opposite. But this contradiction is imaginary. One official does

indeed possess power and therefore controls property, but a single official does not exist. He is

part of the state apparatus. And for the state apparatus, property gives rise to power, as it should

"according to Marx." However, Marx and Engels themselves, approaching the solution to this

problem, stopped halfway: the inertia of thought led them to assert that the "key to the Eastern

sky" was the "absence of private ownership of land." This assertion was a glaring contradiction:

exploitation exists, but it is not based on private ownership. Opponents of Marxism exploited this
 3

gap (Semenov, 2014, p. 290); it could only be closed by creating a Marxist theory (not just a

description) of politarism, which is what Y. I. Semenov has done.

What drives politarian production relations to stimulate production? There are several

ways to develop productive forces. Again, we are familiar with the one used under capitalism—

technology. But under slavery, another method is used—increasing the number of workers, while

under politarism, the method is increasing working hours. In pre-class societies, people work

100–150 days a year, while in politarian societies, they work at least 250 days (Semenov, 2014,

p. 316).

The politarian mode of production presupposes ownership by politarists not only of the

means of production, primarily land, but also of the persons of the direct producers. This means

the existence of the right of the class of politarists over the life and death of all its subjects.

Therefore, politarian societies are characterized by the practice of constant, systematic state

terror against all their subjects. This terror could take various forms, but it always existed. It was

particularly brutal and widespread during the formation of any form of politarism (Semenov,

2014, pp. 303–304).

Its goal was not to punish the guilty but to create an atmosphere of universal fear. People

had to remember that they lived by the grace of their superiors. However, the behavior of the

authorities was not arbitrary. Politarian terror is non-economic coercion to labor. It is thus driven

by economic causes. It is a necessary moment in the evolution of politarism, preparing the labor

force for subordination to the owner (the state), just as the importation of slaves was necessary

for slavery or the separation of workers from the means of production was necessary for

capitalism.
 4

Terror was directed not only at ordinary people but also at politarists. The explanation

lies in the fact that any exploiting class, at its inception, is not parasitic. It is an organizer of

production. It too must be stimulated, both positively and negatively. For the bourgeoisie, the

positive stimulus is enrichment, and the negative is ruin. For an official, the positive stimulus is

promotion, but it is not limitless (unlike profit). Hence the importance of the negative stimulus—

removal from office and, inevitably, execution (since a person removed from the top becomes a

source of discontent). "The politarian apparatus cannot function well unless it is periodically

lubricated with the blood of its members" (Semenov, 2014, p. 185).

Therefore, in the early stages of politarism, there is a high degree of "vertical mobility."

The politarch seeks to destroy the aristocracy, which has a certain independence from them, and

to fill positions in the apparatus with people who owe everything to them personally—and who

can easily be sent to the chopping block (slaves, even eunuchs). No one will stand up for them.

There is a limit to increasing working hours. The pressure of exploitation destroys

society: peasants rebel, flee to barbarians, etc. But it is not only the peasants who are dissatisfied.

A politarist wants guarantees, wants their own wealth, not just wealth tied to their position. This

is easiest for viceroys. When the politarch is weak, they carve up the country into several similar

entities. (Hence, a strong politarch keeps an eye on them, moves them around, and periodically

executes them.) Ordinary politarists strive to acquire personal wealth—usually land, turning

politarian-dependent peasants into their own, exclusive workers (usually working off debts). The

result of the fragmentation of state land is a decrease in taxes and the weakening of the state.

Finally, after the completion of politarian class formation, a secondary class formation occurs—

some ordinary people acquire personal wealth. These rich individuals need the services of

officials, who, in turn, need their money. This creates a connection known as corruption, which
 5

also weakens the state. In the later stages, the corrupt politarian apparatus becomes a hereditary

caste.

For all these reasons, politarian societies weaken, disintegrate, or even disappear,

replaced by pre-class societies.

And then? Then they inevitably reappear in almost the same form—because the level of

development of the productive forces gives rise to the same politarian relations of produtctions.

This is the explanation of the notorious cyclical nature of the East.

Therefore, the essence of politarism is that private property (property held by a part of

society) in the means of production takes on a class-wide (rather than personal) character and

thus appears in the form of state ownership. The class-owner is the state apparatus.

What is the place of politarism in human history? Here we come to the problem of

periodization of the historical process. A formation is a type of society, defined not only by its

mode of production but also representing a stage in world history.

Y. I. Semenov poses the question as follows: does the scheme of the succession of

formations represent an ideal model of the development of each socio-historical organism taken

separately, or does it express the internal necessity of the development only of all of them taken

together, i.e., only of human society as a whole? Almost all Marxists leaned toward the first

answer (linear-stage), which is incorrect. But a second answer is possible. In this case, socio-

economic formations appear primarily as stages in the development of human society as a whole.

They may also be stages in the development of individual socio-historical organisms. But this is

not necessary. The linear-stage understanding of the succession of socio-economic formations

contradicts historical reality. But there is another possibility—global-stage approach, a vivid

example of which is Hegel's philosophy of history. It dialectically combines the unity and

diversity of the historical process.

Politarism is the first class formation in human history. The second—slave-owning—

grew out of politarism as its predecessor. The cultural achievements of antiquity, from the

alphabet to coinage, would have been impossible without 25 centuries of politarism in the Near

and Middle East. There is no Eastern "path"; there is a stage in the East.

The global-stage approach inevitably raises the question: are there modes of production

that are not stages of world history? The facts indicate that yes, there are. Y. I. Semyonov calls

them paraformations.

These include several politarian modes of production different from the ancient Eastern

mode. Recall that there were also two slave-owning modes of production (ancient and plantation

slavery), and they differed from each other.

Polis politarism in Sparta, where the ruling class coincided not just with the state

apparatus but with the polis community; the helots belonged to the polis community as a whole;

terror took the form of so-called "cryptias" (secret killings).

Next, three paraformations associated with the crisis of formational modes of production.

The politarian-slave-owning system of the Roman Empire, arising from the crisis of

ancient slavery, culminating in the Dominate. Rome became orientalized, transforming into an

Eastern despotism; in Byzantium, this process reached complete transformation. The terror was

called "proscriptions."

The absolutist politarism that arose from the crisis of feudalism. The state became the

supreme owner; feudal lords, cities, peasants, and provinces fought each other for centuries—
 7

subordinated. The terror was called the "witch hunt." It is very characteristic that at the very

beginning of this process, Étienne de La Boétie (1530–1563) in his book Discourse on Voluntary

Servitude noted that the French had forgotten how to say "no" to royal authority and called for

relearning this. The expression itself was borrowed from Plutarch, who saw the inability to say

"no" to the monarch as the difference between Persians and Greeks. But history cannot be turned

back, and Louis XIV would say, "The state is me!"

The politarian-capitalist synthesis of Nazism emerged from the crisis within part of the

capitalist system. Adolf Hitler said, "Why should we socialize banks and factories? We will

socialize people" (Semenov, 2014, p. 331). Enough is known about Nazi terror; its victims

included Nazi functionaries themselves. Testimony of Heinrich Böll (1917–1985): On June 30,

1934, "I took out from my desk drawer a collection of cigarette labels with portraits of the Nazi

leadership, selected those who had been shot. The result was a quite impressive stack" (Böll,

1989, p. 292).

The paraformational society of Muscovy, distinct from absolute politarism, is called

derzhavopolitarism by Y. I. Semenov, who distinguishes between the systems of purely

politarian and politarian-feudal relations within it. Ivan the Terrible said: "The tsar has the right

to reward his serfs and also to execute them" (Semenov, 2014, p. 324). As Y. I. Semenov notes,

among all the politarchs, only he clearly articulated his main right. The terror, as is well known,

was called "the Oprichnina."

The emergence of any form of politarism was a blow to the former elites, the Roman

senators, the French and English feudal lords, the Russian feudal princes and boyars, the German

bourgeois, who were unexpectedly reduced to the position of subordinate owners and became a
 8

nullity before the all-powerful state apparatus, within which upstarts—freedmen, plebeians, petty

nobility, and workers—made their careers.

A poet of the aristocracy, A. K. Tolstoy (1817–1875), felt the class antagonism 300 years

later: "The tsar prays, that the Lord bless him to finish the work of sweat and hardship, to level

the strong with the weak, that there be no one higher than another in Russia, that all be equal, and

that he would stand alone above all, like an oak in the open field! The tsar prays and bows to the

earth. The stars look at him through the crooked window, they look bright, dimming—dimming,

as if thinking: 'Oh, you are the tsar Ivan Vasilyevich! You have begun this task at an inopportune

time, you began it without consulting us: two ears cannot grow at the same level, steep

mountains cannot be made equal to hillocks, and there will be no land without boyars!'" (Tolstoy,

1988, p. 188).

A peculiar conflict arose: the former privileged began to fight for freedom, defending

their—and thus in some way universal—rights, as their fate began to align with that of the

people. Let us recall Cicero, Prince Kurbski, the French "monarchomachs," Italian and German

liberals, down to Colonel von Stauffenberg.

But "no autocratic ruler could carry out their mockeries against democracy for the few if

it had not been so restricted" (Lifshitz, 1988, p. 425). The same author—M. A. Lifshin (1905–

1983)—notes that no matter how bad tyranny is, aristocracy is worse. In this matter, as in any

other, dialectics is necessary. Sometimes it's worse, sometimes it's better. The question is

whether politarism was progressive in each specific case.

Among politarian paraformations there were both undoubtedly progressive (absolutism)

and undoubtedly regressive (Nazism). Politarism, like everything in history, is neither purely evil

nor purely good.

Now we can address the question that any reader has been waiting for, with sadness, joy,

or indignation. Yes, we lived under politarism: a neopolitarian socio-economic paraformation,

calling itself "real socialism" through the mouths of its ideologists.

To understand whether it was progressive, let us look at its emergence.

First of all, the modern world is not a collection of parallel developing countries but a

single system where there are world "upper" and world "lower" strata, exploitative states and

exploited states. Capitalism is not just about the Western countries, but also the dependent

periphery with its debts, dictatorships, cultural degradation, and hopeless, insurmountable

poverty. Within capitalism, there is no way out for dependent countries. The study of peripheral

capitalism began in the 1940s in Latin America. The Argentine economist R. Prebisch (1901–

1986) introduced into scientific discourse the concepts of "center" and "periphery" as

interconnected. The center is a group of developed capitalist countries, while the periphery is

underdeveloped countries of the "Third World." According to R. Prebisch, capitalism spreads

outward not to foster the development of the periphery but to exploit it. There are two types of

capitalism—capitalism of the center and capitalism of the periphery. The latter is a product of the

former, its necessary complement, and cannot develop independently. Peripheral capitalism is

not a stage on the way to Western capitalism, but a dead-end complement to it.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was the largest debtor, an agrarian appendage, whose industry

and finances were controlled by Western capital—not "backward," but a dependent country. The
 10

superstructure corresponded to the base: the Romanov clan ruled Russia for its pleasure, just as

clans like the Nazarbayevs, Aliyevs, etc., now rule other countries. The economic rise before the

revolution was driven by external factors: another cycle of capital accumulation on the West.

Money needed investment—and it was invested in Russia's economy and the economies of Latin

America. But once the crisis of overaccumulation had passed, repayment was demanded.

Russia’s debt was paid not only with money but also by changes in political course. And when

Russia entered the world war, paying the Entente with blood, the revolution became inevitable.

There were no objective preconditions for a classless society. Therefore, after the

destruction of the old ruling class, a new process of class formation began; peripheral capitalism

was replaced by neopolitarism, which was not a return to the ancient East, but a new, previously

nonexistent mode of production. The process of nationalization after 1917 was spontaneous (the

bourgeoisie fled), thus the state apparatus ("nomenklatura") inadvertently became the owner of

the means of production. As such, it inevitably developed a system of privileges ("feeding

troughs," as the politarists would call them). The politarch had to be someone who ensured the

support of the majority of the new owners of life. This person turned out to be Stalin (Semenov,

2014, p. 176).

The characteristic terror accompanying the formation of politarism, which destroys any

independence of people from the state, completed the formation of a class society in the USSR.

The first cycle (from 1928, including collectivization) affected ordinary citizens; the second—

1934–39 years, as expected, affected the nomenklatura. The ideas used to justify terror can be

very diverse: "sorcerers," "wreckers," "heretics" could be destroyed—it doesn't matter. Stalin's

terror was not a continuation of the Red (or White) terror, but an analogue of the actions of Nero,

Ivan the Terrible, Henry VIII, and other politarchs. "A significant part of the class of politarists

was destroyed or sent to the camps, but the class, of course, not only survived but strengthened.
 11

Changes occurred in its composition... many people who had long envied the ruling elite flooded

into it" (Semenov, 2014, p. 186).

It is characteristic that in other peripheral countries that took the neopolitarian path, we

observe the same pattern. "The same two cycles of repression are seen in the history of the PRC.

One of them took place in the 50s—early 60s, the second ("proletarian cultural revolution") in

1966–69" (Semenov, 2014, p. 185).

(For comparison: P. Anderson writes: "By all signs, as if under the power of some

inescapable common dynamic, the PRC reproduced two of the worst cataclysms experienced by

the USSR" (Anderson, 2010, p. 65). What would we say about a physicist who wrote: "A

magnet, as if under the power of some inescapable common dynamic, attracts iron in the

Siberian taiga just like in Piccadilly"? Strange? And this is the level at which they try to

understand society.)

Every class needs an ideology to justify its rule. The ideology of the Soviet nomenklatura

was based on the claim that socialism was being built in the USSR, in a single country. "The

Asiatic mode of production" was not even recognized as a scientific issue, and two major debates

(in the 20s–30s and 60s–70s) were forcibly suppressed.

For peripheral countries, in essence, there are two options—global revolution or slavery

under the global bourgeoisie. Politarism in the USSR, the PRC, Eastern Europe, Libya, Iran, etc.,

became a compromise: on the international stage, the nomenklatura was mainly concerned with

gaining recognition from the global bourgeoisie, while preventing it from sharing in the country's

wealth.
 12

The establishment of politarism was the only possible result of the revolution’s victory,

absolutely unforeseen by the Bolshevik leaders. History played a cruel joke on them, but Russia

benefited, as societies always do from revolutions. The famous phrase of P. A. Stolypin about

Russia needing 20 calm years to change radically for the better is well known. Stolypin believed

they could be achieved without a revolution, but in reality, such a period could only come after a

change in the social system. And they did come: the period from 1956–86 remains the calmest

and most prosperous period in the history of our country.

The reason lies in the fact that under neopolitarism, resources cease to flow to the West;

the country no longer imports equipment at the expense of raw material exports; it keeps

building and building, which is why it needs the brains and hands of people. People began to live

much better (life expectancy increased from 30.5 to 70 years; 100% literacy, etc.) and thus

recognized the progressive nature of the new system, even in the midst of the purges. From an

interview with writer and historian A. A. Govorov (1925–2003): "I’m often asked: what stood

out to me the most when I was 23 in the camps? What I remember is that the Soviet authorities

had no enemies.

— The authorities who put you and them there?

— What do you think? Maybe I was young, a romantic. But even at Lubyanka and Butyrka, I

see—these are not enemies! Here’s the personal chauffeur of Dzerzhinsky’s personal chauffeur

was arrested for saying: 'If only Felix Edmundovich were to wake up!' Or the son of the founder

of the Armenian Socialist Party, who was born and raised in Paris, and upon returning, became

the chief engineer of AZLK. How could he be an enemy if he came here to help the authorities?

And I, too, was not their enemy. Why did they have to send me to Vorkuta? If they had said,

'Govorov, we need you to go voluntarily for the Motherland,' I would have gone and worked just

as I did" (I Have Been Striving for My Goal Since the Age of Thirteen, 1995, pp. 16–17).
 13

Within the framework of a class society, progress took place, and sacrifices were not

made in vain, but socialism and labor liberation were never in question. Socialism is

incompatible with forced labor and the privileges of the elite.

(The resemblance to Nazism, so cherished by liberals, does not equate identity: Nazism

did not involve an "iron curtain"; on the contrary, it was a struggle for hegemony within the

capitalist system, which led to a war for world domination. The reason lies in the fact that Nazi

politarism was different, aiming not to destroy but to preserve the bourgeoisie; both exploiting

classes moved towards each other. Some political cadres acquired factories and estates, while

some capitalists gained positions in the state apparatus (Semenov, 2014, p. 156). The only

prospect for the exploited under this regime, with additional exploiters upon their necks, was a

world war.)

Before and during the revolution, the Bolsheviks expressed both the interests of Russia as

a whole and those of its working classes. Lenin, who did not foresee the possibility of the

formation of a politarian ruling class, believed that it would always be this way. But after the

revolution's victory, these interests diverged.

The apparatus of the RCP(b) became the foundation for the formation of a new exploiting

class, the only one capable of organizing production in an independent country and therefore

progressive. The existence of a legal opposition is not permitted by the politarian

superstructure—Soviet workers had no party of their own.

Politarism, like any system, can be criticized both from the left—for the persistence of

inequality—and from the right—for the sharp reduction of inequality (the decile coefficient was

1:4, compared to today's 1:17). A vast gulf separates these two types of criticism. Right-wing
 14

criticism is always false, and a Marxist must defend not only Stalin but, for example, Nicholas II

as well. One can say about Stalin the same that Pushkin said about Napoleon: "Heir to rebellious

liberty and its murderer. " Rather of a murderer, but still an heir. And when he is criticized or

praised, one must always ask: for what? For being the murderer of the revolution or for being the

heir of the revolution?

"Stalin, whose name evokes pathological hatred in many, " writes the well-known lawyer

Yu. V. Golik, "introduced one truly terrifying thing for the so-called elite: he made higher

education accessible to all Ivan and Marusya. He lifted the veil of inaccessibility and mystery

from it. Not the repressions, but this step is what they will never forgive him for—the ones who

wanted to keep the people of their country under control" (Golik, 2011, March 15).

When politarism turned from a driving force into a brake on development, the

nomenclature, once a progressive class, became reactionary. Here, we need to pay attention to an

important point. Politarism is effective as long as the system of terror is in place. After 1956, the

looming axe over politarists disappeared, the top-down control ceased to exist, and bottom-up

control (democracy) did not emerge. This is both Khrushchev's achievement and his failure, and

the key to understanding his role in history (Semenov, 2008, p. 186).

Thus, the nomenclature rushed to find ways of personal enrichment. Underground

capitalism inevitably arose, existing only through "protection" in the party apparatus. On pages

342–349, terrifying figures of the "second economy" in the USSR are given. Overall, it reached

30% of GDP, surpassing the legal economy in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The more

resources went into the illegal economy, the emptier the shelves in state stores became, and the

more the dissatisfaction of people grew, who quietly blamed Lenin and the October Revolution

for all the country's misfortunes and listened attentively to Western propaganda. But it wasn't
 15

only the lower classes who were dissatisfied. The upper classes were even more dissatisfied.

After all, "privileges have only half their value if they cannot be passed down to children,"

Trotsky noted (Trotsky, 1991, p. 2010). The position of the underground bourgeoisie was even

more unstable: it violated the law and constantly feared its occasional application (Semenov,

2008, p. 349).

The class interest of both the nomenclature and the criminal bourgeoisie required the

legalization of personal wealth and the restoration of capitalism. The completely opposite

interest of the working masses required socialism. When, in 1989, the people awoke to political

activity, the main demand was: "Down with privileges! " But by 1990, this slogan was replaced

by another, reflecting the interests of the Soviet upper classes: privatization and "returning to the

civilized world. As so often in world history, the elites won, and the lower classes lost. The

forces were unequal. The victorious counter-revolution received full support from the West,

which took historical revenge: 74 years later, the wealth of one-sixth of the earth's surface lay

before them, unguarded. All that remained was to take it. And it was taken.

The Russia that we, fortunately, lost in 1917 has returned in all its peripheral capitalist

ugliness. Capitalist Russia will always be poor and ignorant. Therefore, let me add, in our

country, patriotism cannot be anti-Soviet in nature.

Moreover, if such capitalism was a stimulus for progress in serfdom-era Russia, enabling

the revolution, for Soviet Russia, it became a stimulus for degradation. The sacrifices made

today are in vain, for the enrichment of a worthless handful of owners, who are implanting a vile

cult of success into our minds. All calls to make Russia competitive or build a sovereign

'democracy' (i.e., capitalism) will lead to nothing. Wheels do not compete with an engine. As
 16

long as there is a car, the wheels will remain wheels, and the engine—an engine. It is enough to

say that 95% of our large industry is under foreign jurisdiction (Semenov, 2014, p. 363).

But politarism has not disappeared without a trace; on the contrary, it has partially

revived in the last decade. In Russia, there are two exploiting classes (or two factions of one

class): the subordinate class of actual capitalists and the dominant (leading from the

nomenclature) class, which Yu. I. Semenov calls "kleptocracy" (the popular term "dolbin" or

"official with business interests")—officials who fulfill or do not fulfill their duties depending on

their financial interests. To maintain relative order among them, the so-called "fight against

corruption" is applied, which is a degenerated form of politarian terror.

Liberals, for whom politarism, known under the pseudonyms of "totalitarianism,"

"empire," "closed society," etc., is considered absolute evil (because of its anti-market nature and

vertical mobility, which they mistake for egalitarianism), noticed something was wrong sooner

than the left did, and reacted to the partial revival of political realism by accusing the current

government of "creeping Sovietization."

In any foolishness, as we see, there is a kernel of rationality, but the overall statement is

incorrect: our society, in its essence, is peripheral-capitalist. The term "dolbins" applies to other

peripheral countries as well, especially in regions of the old politarism. The term "kleptocracy"

was coined in reference to Africa; the current wave of uprisings in the Arab world shows the

same problems.

The liberal prescription for curing Russia is also wrong: to finish what the "August

Revolution" started, to liberate entrepreneurs. In this case, we would face the complete sale of

the country, from the blood of the peasantry to military secrets; the 'invisible hand of the market'
 17

would turn everything into a commodity, selling it to the highest bidder. But liberals are liberals

because they worship the "invisible hand"; for them, the visible hand of the state is the only

enemy of freedom. The question of achieving freedom from the market does not exist for them in

principle. Capitalism is good because, if it is bad, then it is not capitalism. Therefore, we

constantly hear that "the government is run by Chekists" (the term "Chekist capitalism" has even

been invented), that "mummy hinders the modernization of the country, " that we must ban The

Invisible Avengers, rename streets, demolish monuments, etc. All of this would be the foolish

prattle of political corpses if it weren't for the fact that kleptocracy owes most of our citizens so

much that they are ready to support the side for which the sun rises in the West. In fact, in the

battle of the nanai twins, the working people will gain nothing. This is one of those cases when

both sides are worse. Meanwhile, the left movement cannot stand on its feet and flounders

between two factions of exploiters, picking up either conservative plague, as in the 1990s, or

liberal cholera, as now.

Of course, the reason for this is not only theoretical weakness, though this plays a large

role. Lenin once noted that if we don't resolve general questions, we will continue stumbling

over unsolved general ones when addressing particular issues. Among the general questions that

Yu. I. Semenov has solved, in my opinion, are:

• The global-stage understanding of the transition of formations.

• The concept of class-wide private property.

This leads to the solution of the problem of the "Asian" mode of production, the essence

of Soviet society, and the current state of the country.

If a scholar proposes a concept, it is their colleagues' duty to try to refute it by finding

factual or logical inconsistencies. If refutation is not possible, it is their duty to accept this

concept. This is the scientific way of doing things. There is also the unscientific way—

pretending that the concept does not exist. But, as history has shown, this approach is hopeless.

The eloquent silence of potential refuters speaks for itself.

References

Anderson, P. (2010). Две революции [Two revolutions]. Alternatives, 4, 65.

Böll, H. (1989). Каждый день умирает частица свободы [Every day a part of
freedom dies]. Moscow.

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