the three Pramänas admitted by Jainism.

Avadhi-jnäna, Manah-
paryäya-jnäna and Kevala-jnäna, are the three kinds of immediate
knowledge which may be called extra-ordinary and extra-sensory
perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance; Manahparyäya is telepathy; and
Kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a
distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or ‘limited’ because it
functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot
go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manah-paryäya is direct know­
ledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and tem­
poral conditions. In both Avadhi and Manahparyäya, the soul has
direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are
called immediate, though limited. Kevala-jnäna is unlimited and abso­
lute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the liberated souls. It is not
limited by space, time or object. Besides these five kinds of right know­
ledge, we have three kinds of wrong knowledge— Sarhshaya or doubt,
Viparyaya or mistake and Anadhyavasäya or wrong knowledge through
indifference.

I ll
PR A M Ä N A AND N AYA

kn o w ledg e may again be divided into two kinds— Pramäna or

knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a thing in its
relation. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make
a statement about a thing.1 All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial
knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called ‘naya’.2
Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in ‘naya’.
There are seven ‘nayas’ of which the first four are called ‘Artha-naya’
because they relate to objects or meanings, and the last three are called
‘Shabda-naya* because they relate to words. When taken as absolute,
a ‘naya’ becomes a fallacy— ‘nayäbhäsa*.
The first is the ‘Naigama-naya’. From this standpoint we look at a
thing as having both universal and particular qualities and we do not
distinguish between them. It becomes fallacious when both universals
and particulars are regarded as separately real and absolute, as is done
by Nyäya-Vaishesika. The second is the ‘Sangraha-naya’. Here we
emphasize the universal qualities and ignore the particulars where they
are manifested. It becomes fallacious when universals alone are treated
as absolutely real and particulars are rejected as unreal, as is done by
Sänkhya and Advaita Vedanta. The third is the ‘Vyavahära-naya’ which
is the conventional point of view based on empirical knowledge. Here
things are taken as concrete particulars and their specific features are
1 ekade$havi$hi$to'rtho nayasya viçayo matah, Nyäyävatära, 29. 3 nïyate gamyate
arthaikadesho'neneti naya}?, Syâdvâdaratnâkara, p. 8. Also Äptarmmämsä, X , 106.

D — CS1 P 37
emphasized. It becomes fallacious when particulars alone are viewed as
real and universals are rejected as unreal, as is done by Materialism and
Buddhist realistic pluralism. The fourth is called ‘Rjusütra-naya*. Here
the real is identified with the momentary. The particulars are reduced to
a series of moments and any given moment is regarded as real. When
this partial truth is mistaken to be the whole truth, it becomes fallacious,
as in some schools of Buddhism. Among the nayas which refer to words,
the first is called ‘Shabda-naya*. It means that a word is necessarily related
to the meaning which it signifies. Every word refers either to a thing or
quality or relation or action. The second is ‘Samabhirüda-naya* which
distinguishes terms according to their roots. For example, the word
‘Pankaja* literally means ‘born of mud’ and signifies any creature or
plant bom of mud, but its meaning has been conventionally restricted
to ‘lotus* only. Similarly the word ‘gauh’ means ‘any thing which
moves’, but has conventionally become restricted to signify only a ‘cow*.
The third is called ‘Evambhüta-naya* which is a specialized form of the
second. According to it, a name should be applied to an object only
when its meaning is fulfilled. For example, a cow should be called ‘gauh’
only when it moves and not when it is lying down.
Each naya or point of view represents only one of the innumerable
aspects possessed by a thing from which we may attempt to know or
describe it. When any such partial viewpoint is mistaken for the whole
truth, we have a ‘nayâbhâsa’ or a fallacy. The ‘nayas’ are also distin­
guished as ‘Dravyarthika* or from the point of view of substance which
takes into account the permanent nature and unity of things, and as
‘Paryäyäthika’ or from the point of view of modes which takes into
account the passing modifications and the diversity of things. When
a thing is taken to be either as permanent only or as momentary only,
either as one only or as many only, fallacies arise.IV

IV
ANEKÄNTAVÄDA

the Jaina metaphysics is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. It is

called Anekäntaväda or the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Matter
(pudgaia) and spirit (jlva) are regarded as separate and independent
realities. There are innumerable material atoms and innumerable indi­
vidual souls which are all separately and independently real. And each
atom and each soul possesses innumerable aspects of its own. A thing
has got an infinite number of characteristics of its own.1 Every object
possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. It is not possible
for us, ordinary people, to know all the qualities of a thing. We can know
1 anantadharmakam vastu. anantadharmâtmakameva tattvam— Anyayoga, p. 22.

38
only some qualities of some things. T o know all the aspects of a thing
is to become omniscient. Therefore the Jainas say that he who knows
all the qualities of one thing, knows all the qualities of all things, and
he who knows all the qualities of all things, knows all the qualities of
one thing.1 Human knowledge is necessarily relative and limited and
so are all our judgments. This epistemological and logical theory of
the Jainas is called ‘Syädväda*. As a matter of fact, both Anekän­
taväda and Syädväda are the two aspects of the same teaching— realistic
and relativistic pluralism. They are like the two sides of the same coin.
The metaphysical side that reality has innumerable characters is called
Anekäntaväda, while the epistemological and logical side that we can
know only some aspects of reality and that therefore all our judgments
are necessarily relative, is called Syädväda.
A thing has many characters and it exists independently. It is called
substance (dravya). It persists in and through all attributes and modes.
Substance is defined as that which possesses qualities and modes.2 Out
of these innumerable qualities of a substance, some are permanent
and essential, while others are changing and accidental. The former are
called attributes (guna) and the latter modes (paryäya). Substance
and attributes are inseparable because the latter are the permanent
essence of the substance and cannot remain without it. Modes or modi­
fications are changing and accidental. Reality is a unity-and-difference
or difference-and-unity. Viewed from the point of view of substance,
a thing is one and permanent and real; viewed from the point of view of
modes, it is many and momentary and unreal. Jainism here becomes a
‘theological mean, between Brahmanism and Early Buddhism’. Brah­
manism emphasizes the one, the permanent, the real; Early Buddhism
emphasizes the many, the changing, the unreal; Jainism points out that
both are the two sides of the same thing. Substance, therefore, is also
defined as that which possesses the three characteristics of production,
destruction and permanence.3 Substance has its unchanging essence
and therefore is permanent. But it also has its changing modes and
therefore is subject to origination and decay. T o mistake any one-sided
and partial view as the whole truth is to commit the fallacy of
Ekäntaväda. As Jainism takes into account all these partial views, it is
called Anekäntaväda.

V
SYÄDVÄDA

syädväda which is also called Sapta-bhangi-naya is the theory of

relativity of knowledge. Sapta-bhangi-naya means ‘dialectic of the seven
1 eko bhâvah sarvathS vena df^ ah sarve bhâvâh sarvathâ tena df$tâh. * guna-
paryäyavad dravyam.— Tattvärthasütra, V, 37. 3 utpâdavyayadhrauvyasamyuktam
sat.— Ibid, V, 29.

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