Peace Continuum UN Peace Operations

addressed more widely in the Pact under peacebuilding and sustainable Council sanctions committees and the newly established AUPSC Sub-
development. China often calls for international support to build the nation- Committee on Sanctions.
al capacity of post-conflict countries by focusing on key sectors that are
vital to their long-term peace and stability.122 Russia maintains that “pro- Action 21(g) Ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable financ-
viding States with long-term assistance in the areas of development and ing for AUPSOs mandated by the Security Council in line with Secu-
human rights through peacekeeping organizations is not appropriate”.123 rity Council resolution 2719 (2023).
While acknowledging the links among peace and security, development, and
human rights, it maintains that this should not “serve as a pretext for mixing Council Action
the mandates of United Nations organs and offices of the Secretariat”.124 The adoption of this resolution is considered a major milestone in UN-AU
Other members draw attention to the issues of human rights, women’s cooperation. However, its implementation appears to be fraught with many
participation in political processes, the rule of law, and transitional justice challenges. The AU may need to manage the expectations of certain mem-
as crucial factors for addressing the root causes of conflict. Some mem- ber states advocating for full UN funding of AUPSOs and show a commit-
bers have strongly advocated for the integration of adequate analytical and ment to sharing the financial burden. In the Security Council, navigating
programmatic capacity in addressing climate-related security risks and the influence of some powerful members who strongly oppose applying
strengthening their resilience to these risks. resolution 2719 to potential cases such as Somalia and the financing of the
AU Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) to be deployed on 1 Janu-
Recommendations for Council Members ary 2025, despite support from the host country and the AU, is likely to be
• Focus on tasks in peace operations mandates that could help countries a challenge. The recent decision by the AUPSC “to use part of the interest
transition from conflict to peace; accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment and the Crisis Reserve Facility
• Include transitions planning in the annual UN-AU annual consultations (CRF) to substantially contribute to the financing of AUSSOM”125 is a step in
in order to exchange information on best practices on transitions; and the right direction. Ultimately, Council decisions are expected to be guided
• In order to craft more realistic mandates, members could make greater by the relevant provisions of the resolution, which outlines clear parameters
use of the PBC’s convening role to enhance engagement with UN Coun- for decision-making and authorisation.126 However, the implementation of
try Teams (UNCTs) to better understand the capacities and constraints resolution 2719 is likely to be further complicated by the return of the Trump
of UNCTs administration, which may be less open to its implementation.
Council members are expected to receive the first report on the imple-
Action 21(f): Encourage the Secretary-General to convene regular mentation of resolution 2719 in December 2024. The UN and the AU have
high-level meetings with relevant regional organizations to dis- been working to lay down the groundwork for the operationalisation of this
cuss matters pertaining to peace operations, peacebuilding, and resolution. At the 8th UN-AU high-level conference held in Addis Ababa
conflicts. on 21 October, the joint roadmap developed by the UN and the AU was
endorsed. This roadmap ensures institutional readiness for the authorisa-
Council Action tion of a new AUPSO under resolution 2719.
The UN maintains cooperation with various regional organisations across
different continents, including the AU, the EU, the League of Arab States, Recommendations for Council Members
and the Organization of American States, among others. The UN has more • Convening a meeting on the Secretary-General’s report on the imple-
extensive cooperation with the AU than with any other regional organisa- mentation of resolution 2719 to receive a briefing and exchange views
tion. UN and AU officials meet regularly at various levels to coordinate their on the challenges ahead;
cooperation covering peace and security, development and human rights. • Securing US support or abstention in authorising the deployment of
The annual consultation between the Security Council and the AU Peace AUPSOs under resolution 2719; and
and Security Council (AUPSC) and the Peacebuilding Commission and the • Holding informal consultations on other possible test cases that could
AUPSC have also been a regular feature of the UN-AU cooperation. The be authorised under resolution 2719 over the next two years. (The Coun-
challenge is how to move from formalities and ritual engagements to hold a cil is expected to review the implementation of the resolution three years
frank exchange of views aimed at forging a shared perspective on address- after its adoption.)
ing pressing peace and security challenges on the continent.
Observations
Recommendations for Council Members Opinions on the future of UN peace operations appear to be divided. Some
• Institutionalising the retreat format initiated by Switzerland during the tend to downplay the ongoing relevance of UN peace operations, given
18th annual consultation in Tarrytown, New York, to encourage less current challenges and the growing emphasis on strengthening the role of
scripted interactions between the two Councils; regional forces, while others remain nostalgic, reluctant to accept that UN
• Initiating discussions on the modalities for joint visits agreed in principle operations can no longer function as they did in the past. The reality, how-
by the two Councils; and ever, is more nuanced than either perspective suggests.
• Exploring the possibility of cooperation between the two Councils at the Simultaneously, interest is growing in the role of regional forces
subsidiary level, including closer working relations between Security to undertake peace enforcement or counter-terrorism operations, but
122 Security Council Meeting Record. (8 September 2021) (S/PV.8851).
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1238 (28 October 2024)
126 For more, see our In Hindsight on “UN-AU Cooperation: A Path Toward Networked Multilateralism or Fragmented Responses?” for the November 2024 Monthly Forecast.

30  The Future of the Pact Recommendations for Security Council Action