Cover

Indonesia MUN 2023

Indonesian Student Movement of 1997
Chairs Introduction

Rayhan Ekananto - Head Chair

Greetings Delegate, my name is Eka and I’m currently a fourth-year undergraduate

student majoring in Aerospace Engineering, at Bandung Institute of Technology. Despite
being a science and engineering student, I really enjoy discussing issues related to history,
politics, and international relations so much so that I’ve been doing MUN since 2017. This
year’s Indonesia MUN marks my second time chairing this excellent conference and I’m
absolutely delighted to be given the role of Head Chair alongside my fellow partners both
front and back. Furthermore, I’d like everyone to know that our chairs have brewed
something exceptional for D-Day thus we hope that everyone will have a good time in Crisis
IMUN 2023 and until we meet physically in Depok, May 2023!

Muhammad Adivian Hazakwan - Assistant Chair

Hi! delegates, welcome to the annual Indonesia Model United Nations. I’m usually
called Adiv, and I am very honored to be your Assistant Chair in this year’s IMUN 2023,
which at last will be held offline. Currently a second-year law student at Universitas
Indonesia, I still try to allocate time to join MUN’s mainly crisis councils. Model United
Nations has certainly become one of my greatest experiences both in high school and
university. Chairing multiple Crisis MUNs, both high school and varsity level, I hope that this
year’s board of DAIS will be able to give all of you delegates the best crisis experience ever.
I’m looking forward to seeing how the council will progress. Indonesia’s reformation is
certainly one of the largest turning points in Indonesia’s history. In this council, you will be
immersed in that major point in history. Once again I hope you have a great time in this
year’s IMUN 2023, good luck everyone.

Melvyn Zaafir Kairupan - Crisis Director

Greetings delegates! My name is Melvyn, a 3rd-year philosophy student hailing from

Parahyangan Catholic University., and I will be your Crisis Director for this year’s round of
Indonesia Model United Nations. As a person who has been in this circuit for the majority of
his MUN journey, the crisis council has always captivated me with its unique dynamic, the
tense flow of debates and discussions, and the necessary need for direct and swift actions. All
of those translate into a sense of realism and immersion that is just isn’t afforded in any other
councils, and that unique draw of immersive is what I’ve always held to high esteem, be it
during my tenure as a delegate, chair, and even organizing committee. Hence, within this
year’s round of Indonesia MUN, it will be no different. With my debut as crisis director, I
will ensure that you as delegates are able to fully immerse yourself in this small pocket of
history that we are trying to simulate. I am looking forward to crafting a unique and dynamic
story with you all. Good luck and salam pelajar!

Hans Marvin Tanuardi - Crisis Co-Director

Hello, delegates! My name is Hans Marvin and I’m currently working as a physics teacher at
my high school. I’ll serve as your crisis co-director in this one-of-a-kind historical crisis
council within IMUN 2023. I believe that the crisis team has put out their best efforts in
creating a fantastically immersive crisis council, looking to put the delegates into the shoes of
the university students of 1998, looking to make their voices heard in the chaos of a dubious
legislative election and a looming economic collapse due to the ‘97 Asian Financial Crisis. I
do hope that delegates, while still having fun, will understand the gravity of the situation and
will be able to put out various substantive discussions and proper measures in order to finally
topple a 30-year-old corrupt regime. SALAM PERJUANGAN!

Karisa Marleman - Crisis Co-Director

Hi, delegates! My name is Karisa Marleman and I am 2nd Year University Student of
Chemical Engineering at the University of Indonesia. This year I am privileged and thankful
of being able to be your co-crisis director in this year’s Indonesia MUN. Even with years of
being in the circuit, the crisis council has always had a constant tug on my interest, and I
believe this year’s Indonesia MUN Crisis will be a one-of-a-kind topic you cannot miss. We
will be revisiting one of the most pivotal moments the youths of Indonesia had to face. I
hope you will be able to understand and feel the spirits of those students fighting for
Indonesia’s freedom. Goodluck and have fun delegates!

Muhammad Rafii Danendra - Crisis Co-Director

Greetings, esteemed delegates! I am honored to introduce myself as Mochammad Rafii

Danendra, an undergraduate student of International Relations at Bina Nusantara. I am
privileged to serve as your Crisis Co-Director in this unique IMUN topic, which places us all
in the position of the sons and daughters of our republic's reformation, also known as the
Student Movement. As an experienced Model UN participant, I have actively participated in
crisis councils throughout my academic career, starting from my high school years. My
extensive involvement in such councils, along with my skills in backroom diplomacy, will
enable me to create a conducive environment for this year's IMUN. I am eager to meet and
observe the delegates in action, and to witness the direction this council takes. I remain
hopeful that the council will make prudent decisions, either by peacefully toppling the corrupt
New Order regime and paving the way for reform or by seeking alternative means to achieve
the goal of overthrowing the New Order regime.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chairs Introduction​ 2
Rayhan Ekananto - Head Chair​ 2
Muhammad Adivian Hazakwan - Assistant Chair​ 2
Melvyn Zaafir Kairupan - Crisis Director​ 2
Hans Marvin Tanuardi - Crisis Co-Director​ 3
Karisa Marleman - Crisis Co-Director​ 3
Muhammad Rafii Danendra - Crisis Co-Director​ 3
Introduction​ 6
Introduction to Crisis Council​ 6
Introduction to the Indonesian University Students Assembly​ 7
The Mandate of the Indonesian University Students Assembly​ 8
Historical Background​ 9
Chinese - Indonesian Racial Tension​ 9
1997 Legislative Election Fiasco​ 10
Timeline​ 11
Status Quo​ 13
Current Security and Unrest Issues​ 13
Current Political Issues​ 14
Current Economic Issues​ 15
Main Areas of Discussion​ 16
Government Abuse of Power (Corruption & Dwi Fungsi ABRI)​ 16
University Students' Safety Concerns and Oppression​ 18
Freedom of Gathering, The Press, and Speech​ 19
Involved Factions​ 21
Indonesian University Students of Various Institutions​ 21
Dictatorial Regime Government and Oppressive Law Enforcements​ 21
Chinese-Indonesian Populace​ 22
Questions the Assembly Must Address (QAMA)​ 24
Bibliography​ 25
Introduction

Introduction to Crisis Council

The Crisis Committee is a unique council experience that is almost completely

different from the conventional MUN council experience. In a conventional council, the
delegates may only need to pour out their solutions on the Draft Resolution, but in a crisis
council, the delegates have the power to immediately implement solutions in the span of a
few committee sessions through the usage of another document named “Directives” which
would entail a chain of events published named “Crisis Updates” as outcomes of the
proposed solutions written on the directives. Due to this fundamental difference in council
dynamics, the delegates must have a problem-solving mindset as well as quick thinking due
to the fast pace and fluid nature of the council. Crisis Updates are crucial for the council as a
whole because they will determine the future actions of every delegate, and the direction of
the council. It is also common for crisis committee delegates to be given “Personal Goal(s)”
that may go along with or against the general council goal and the delegate must be able to
serve both in each delegate’s unique way.
There are commonly four types of directives: Personal Directive (Acted based on your
personal dossier), Joint Directive (Acted based on two or more dossiers), Committee
Directive (Acted based on the combined power of the whole committee, in this case, the
student’s movement for reformation), and Press Release (To release a personal or joint
statement to the ‘public’). In regular councils, debates are usually static while in Crisis new
events under the Crisis Updates may alter or create new points of contention. Each delegate
will be given a dossier (A document detailing personal information) describing their
background, objectives, list of concerns, and their mandate or resources. These resources can
be used via directives, or to garner influence through speeches. The key here is to achieve a
balance between your goals and the committee’s goal, alongside balance in both the front
room (caucuses, negotiations) and backroom (directives) performance.
This crisis council will include all those previously mentioned concepts, but this is no
usual crisis council. The backroom would like to emphasize the gravity of the situation by
implementing various special mechanics in this council. In other crisis councils, you usually
take the role of a minister or a member of any governmental organization, thus granting you
almost limitless jurisdictions, powers, and resources based upon your office. In this
particular council, you will be representing simple university students, trying to look for
ways in fighting injustices. Your powers will be limited, and you have to build your
connections and forge your own path. Any missteps taken will be a whole lot more
punishing. Thus, the team hopes that university students will be more calculative in their
planning.
In addition, seeing as how student assemblies most usually are self-governing bodies,
the chairing team will not take any specific boundaries onto the student assembly;
instead, the team will be giving that power to the students. It will be up to the students of
the assembly to decide on the boundaries of the assembly and any specific mechanisms it
would like to adopt. Not only that but to ensure better representation of pressure, all council
sessions will be considered as an assembly meeting session happening in real-time, thus
to follow through with this mechanic, all directives and updates will be given in “real-time.”
Gone is the notion that a committee session will pass through 5 years of time, an assembly
meeting will simply pass 2 hours of time, and events that will be reported are simply events
that will be happening in that same two-hours time. The team does hope that “delegates” will
be able to adapt to the new mechanics set and still be able to engage with the issues in a
nuanced manner.

Introduction to the Indonesian University Students Assembly

The Indonesian University Students Assembly is the ad-hoc assembly of student

movements and organizations from all over Indonesia, joined together for the same purpose
of discussing a response to the current status quo of the Indonesian government. Within this
assembly, representatives of numerous local and regional student-led movements will conjoin
to discuss matters relating to plans and actions to take to oppose the current wailing
authoritarian and kleptocratic government. And it is also within this council that we as
students will coordinate and cooperate for a more unified and organized struggle against
corruption and bad governance.
Though anti-establishment sentiment has existed and persisted all throughout the New
Order, evident by the plethora of organized student movements that came before us, the rising
prevalence of education has dramatically shifted the relationship dynamic between the
Indonesian government and its people. With more and more Indonesians gaining awareness
of the kleptocratic and corrupt nature of our government, the status quo is losing more and
more people who are willing to defend it on a daily basis. The climax of this growing
discontent is this year’s legislative election, where it is evidently clear that fraudulency has
been embedded deep into our government. It is becoming clear that the current status quo
simply cannot stand. And with no one else willing to take up the mantle and fight for what is
right, it comes down to us to take our future into our own hands.

The Mandate of the Indonesian University Students Assembly

Due to its very nature of opposing the status quo, and also due to the nature of the
status quo itself, it is in our best interest that this council works behind the scenes. Hence, it is
within the best interest of all parties involved that the existence of this assembly remains
clandestine and that the general public remains nescient of our existence. With that being
said, the possibilities, potentials, and restrictions that are afforded to this council are still to be
determined, and it is within the assemblies’ best interest to determine such structural
functions immediately. Though as such, the only thing limiting the council is the council
itself, and hence representatives are beholden to the utmost freedom in conducting their
actions.
Historical Background

Soeharto’s iron grip of Indonesia did not come suddenly. In fact, Indonesia was built
by the founding fathers using the basic concept of the current Indonesia ideology of Pancasila
and with values of democracy. However, how did such a central and powerful figure
eventually come to power? What are the factors that contribute to over 30 years of rule by
Soeharto in one of the largest nations in the world? As well as what are key events that lead
to Indonesia’s current situation? All questions shall be explained within this study guide
which are divided into several parts, namely historical background, status quo, main areas of
discussion, and involved factions.

Chinese - Indonesian Racial Tension

​ Historically, the spread of Chinese Indonesians follows the first migration of people
with Chinese origins, mostly from two Southeast China provinces of Fujian and Guangdong
with Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, and Cantonese as the predominant ethnic groups. Starting in
the 17th century, Chinese ethnic groups mainly spread to the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan,
and Java with some settling in the city (now Jakarta) as well (Turner, 2003). Referring to a
census by the Indonesian Population Census in the year 2000, DKI Jakarta is the province
with the most Chinese Indonesians, namely around 5.83% of the entire population of Jakarta
at the time or around 20% of all Chinese-Indonesians. Other provinces in Java also house the
most Chinese-Indonesians when compared to further provinces in Indonesia except for North
Sumatra and West Kalimantan (Indonesian Population Census, 2000). Their status as a
minority everywhere in Indonesia ultimately relates to how they are treated within the
old-order era of Soekarno as well as the new-order era of Soeharto.
​ Looking back to when the anti-communist purge of 1966, post the 30 September 1965
happened, many Chinese-Indonesians were unfortunately killed due to the Indonesian
Communist Party’s (PKI) affiliation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Cribb &
Brown, 1995). Furthermore, within the New Order Era, Chinese-Indonesians are classified by
the Indonesian state as nonindigenous (non-pribumi) and not belonging to the national ethnic
groups. Such that, Chinese-Indonesians had a separate legal position (Burhan & Sani, 2014a)
in which it is harder for them to deal with administrative matters such as identity cards and
birth and marriage certificates (Government Regulation Year 1959 no. 10); the ban on the use
of Chinese names and the limitation of business activity for Chinese Indonesians (Korstchak,
2012; in (Burhan & Sani, 2014b); further fueled by the targeting of Chinese-Indonesians as a
criminal target (Nasution, 2012; Tan, 2012; Burhan & Sani, 2014b).
​ Eventually, there are also some favorable policies for Chinese-Indonesians within
Soeharto’s era. These include creating Chinese language schools and giving Chinese
companies financial incentives. Chinese Indonesians were also favored by the government
when applying for jobs in the civil service, with a particular focus on employing Chinese
Indonesians for managerial posts in the armed forces, police, and civil service. Chinese in
Indonesia now have more access to influential positions in the government. Other than that,
Chinese-Indonesia companies are looked upon more favorably by Soeharto especially when
the economy is oriented toward export-oriented labor-intensive manufacturing. Such
orientation was partially due to the 1980 oil glut thus giving rise to a new group of
conglomerates that cannot challenge Soeharto’s rule due to their ethnic minority status (Rock,
2003). Unfortunately, the rise of Chinese-Indonesian economic prosperity leads to
Anti-Chinese riots in some parts of Indonesia (Elson, 2001).

1997 Legislative Election Fiasco

The first legislative election of the new order period under Soeharto was on the 3rd of
July 1971 in which ever since then elections were always won by the party of functional
groups (Golongan Karya “Golkar”). Within such elections, the legislative branch of the
government would elect the next president, of which Soeharto is elected 100% of the time,
thus his tenure as president of Indonesia for more than 30 years. Policies such as dwifungsi or
dual-function allow the military to actively participate in all spheres of Indonesian politics,
the economy, and society as well as forcing opposition parties to merge in order to exert
better control over its leadership (Schwartz, 1992). Other than that, civil servants are required
to join the Employees' Corps of the Republic of Indonesia (KORPRI) such that the
government is able to control them more easily using policies that oblige civil servants to
vote for Golkar. Those who do not vote for Golkar are usually secluded from their
communities or fired from their positions.
On the 29th of May 1997, the entire population of Indonesia came to their registered
polling stations in order to vote for a political party. As per the previous legislative elections,
only three parties were allowed to contribute which are Golkar, the Muslim Oriented United
Development Party, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the nationalist-Christian
coalition Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) (Eklof, 1997). All
parties must adhere to the same state ideology/philosophy of Pancasila. Soeharto largely
promoted Pancasila as a unifying force for the Indonesian people in order to utilize it as a tool
to win elections in Indonesia. He used it to highlight how all Indonesians, regardless of their
political or religious convictions, share certain ideals. Moreover, he used it to discredit his
rivals and justify his own control. In order to do this, he placed a variety of limitations on
political speech and activity (Sarwono, 2018).
Eventually, with a voter turnout of 90.6%, Golkar won 74.5% of the votes, the most
the party has ever won in the history of Indonesia even though this election came during an
uneasy time for the government with signs of growing popular discontent. Riots regarding
social, religious, and ethnic issues also appeared more rapidly in the days preceding the
election (Eklof, 1997). Meanwhile, other parties such as the PPP won 22.4% of the votes and
PDI only 3.1%. A total of 75 remaining seats were given to appointed representatives of the
military due to the nature of Indonesia at the time (Eklof, 1997).

Timeline

Date Event

30 September 1965 In an event commonly known as G30S (The Thirtieth of September

Movement), six Indonesian Army Generals were assassinated
during a later-on failed coup (Crouch, 2007). Eventually, many
groups blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which was
followed by a massive purge against communists leading to
approximately 500,000 Indonesians dead (Friend, 2003).

11 March 1966 As an effort to stabilize the country, the first President of Indonesia,
Soekarno allegedly signed an order famously known as The Order
of Eleventh March (Supersemar) in which gives Lieutenant General
Soeharto authority to “Take all measures deemed necessary to
guarantee security and calm as well as the stability of the progress
of the Revolution”. Such an order was eventually ratified and led to
the overthrow of Soekarno and the rise of the “New Order”.

12 March 1967 Within a Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly

(MPRS), Soekarno was relinquished from all executive mandate
 and role as president, thus giving the role of acting president to
Soeharto (Henderson, 1970).

27 March 1968 Soeharto is officially elected by parliament as the second president

of Indonesia with a full five-year term.

1966-1997 During Soeharto’s new order era, the situation in Indonesia

drastically changed. The PKI was eventually disbanded and all signs
and figures of communism were banned. Political power within
Indonesia became centralized and the military was given much
more authority following the dual function (dwifungsi) policy that
allowed the military to have a more significant role in intervening
within the country’s government, economy, and society (Robison,
2004). Following the greater involvement of the military, political
suppression was rapid thus lowering public freedom in the process.
Improvements between Indonesian and western governments can
also be seen as efforts to neutralize the country’s foreign policy are
established. In 1975 however, Indonesia invaded East Timor, thus
annexing the region to become its 27th province to stop
communism (Human Rights Data Analysis Group, 2006).
On the other hand, due to a centralized figure and major political
party (Golongan Karya “Golkar”) for over 30 years, political
stability was definitely within the country such that economic
growth can also be seen throughout the years.

29 May 1997 On the 29th of May 1997, the Indonesian 1997 Legislative Election
was held. Such an election was held every five years with every one
of them giving clear results of an ultimate Golkar win. In 1997,
Golkar got 74.51% of the votes with other parties such as the United
Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party only
getting 22.43% and 3.07% of the votes respectively (Schiller, 1997).
Status Quo

Current Security and Unrest Issues

​ As the beginning of Soeharto’s rule was met with uncertainty following the state of
Indonesia at that time, many reform programs were proposed in order to systematically
consolidate power with Soeharto at its center. These programs, regulations, and actions will
define Soeharto’s rule until the year of 1997. Firstly, by surrounding himself with loyalists
mainly from the military, it allowed him to exert influence over the political environment and
preserve Indonesia's high degree of stability. A strong security force was also given by the
military that supported Soeharto, enabling him to put down any resistance and dissent.
One form of the strong security force that Soeharto uses is to control riots organized
against his rule namely the 1971 student movement. Virtually due to the violent crackdown
and reduction of any type of opposition through force, not many more notable riots happened
until now. Another example of a violent crackdown against certain groups was in the year of
1976 - 1979 against the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). Guerilla
warfare was conducted by the separatist movement however was brutally beaten by the
military with casualties to the hundreds. Furthermore, due to his anti-communist actions
during the Cold War era, President Soeharto was favored by nations such as the United States
of America.
Other forms of a strong security force being placed are by utilizing mysterious
shooters or penembak misterius (petrus). These shootings which mainly climaxed between
1982-1985 were mainly done by the military targeting criminals and people with disorderly
conduct (Colombijn, 2002). Despite being framed by military officials and Soeharto himself
as an effort to reduce crime in Indonesia, the fear of opposing the government was put in
place and violence was seen as the legitimate means of government problem-solving.
All of the aforementioned methods of retaining power have made any and all
preceding student led movements a failure. A vivid example to note is of the 1974 January
15th movement and the 1977 follow up movement, which all resulted in catastrophic losses.
The existence of governmental agents have managed to always subvert previous student
movements away from its intended goal, making sure to deny said movements any support
from the public. Another thing to note is that with the existence of extrajudicial governmental
assets, numerous vocal figures of the student movements have found themselves at immense
personal risk, falling victim to numerous intimidation tactics. Any succeeding movement
must take these factors into consideration.

Current Political Issues

​ It could be said that the political nature of Indonesia during the new order period was
very peaceful as power is centralized in one figure with the Golkar party dominating every
single legislative election since 1971 thus ensuring that no sudden change in power is to
happen at any time. Soeharto’s first legislative election was that of 1971 in which the
People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia (MPR-RI) members were chosen and then in a
year, otherwise 1968, the MPR was to choose the next president of Indonesia.
​ Since then, the nature of elections, mainly legislative elections that determine the
members of MPR has been the same in which Golkar is always the absolute majority and
used by Soeharto and his cronies as their political tool. Furthermore, the ideology of
Pancasila or Pancasilaisme is weaponized in a way to ensure that all organizations must
adhere to its principles. Those who do not adhere to the ideology are considered hostile and
organizations with different principles are commonly brought down (Ward, 2013).
​ Another issue that continues to be a main point of contention during Soeharto’s era is
the military’s dual function or Dwifungsi ABRI. Coming from a military background,
Soeharto actively favors the military, especially in filling crucial governmental positions
around him, Such Dwifungsi allows military people to fill certain government positions
without having to retire from the military thus consolidating significant power to them.
Political Islam was severely repressed during most of Soeharto's rule. Islamic
movements and parties were subject to restrictions on their political freedom, access to the
media, and capacity for the organization during the Soeharto regime. This may be due to the
possibility of prominent Islamic individuals and groups being a possible threat to Soeharto’s
leadership. Moreover, it outlawed sermons, publications, and journals that were seen to be
promoting Islamism. By mandating the teaching of the Pancasila philosophy in all schools,
the government also aimed to regulate Islamic education. These policies were utterly in
conflict with Political Islam's principles.
However, during the 1990s, Soeharto was seen trying to be closer with the islamic
factions of Indonesia such as the Islamic non-governmental organizations as well as Islamic
Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam). Other efforts done by Soeharto to appeal
to the islamists was by going to hajj and conducting revisions on certain Indonesia laws
favorable to muslims such as reallowing the use of hijabs in school.

Current Economic Issues

Political and security stability throughout the new order era comes with benefits as
Soeharto remains unchallenged, major policies that are deemed massive and bipartisan in the
usual democratic countries can easily be passed without much resistance thus defining how
Indonesia’s economy was during Soeharto’s era. The new order economic policies can be
divided per presidential term using what’s called Five Year Development Plans or Rencana
Pembangunan Lima Tahun (REPELITA). Each of these development plans focuses on
different developments in infrastructure, agriculture, technology, and much more.
A new group of oligarchs was also directly and indirectly established during the new
order era when Soeharto made the decision to encourage the expansion of a few
Chinese-Indonesian corporations through certain beneficial government policies. The main
motive expected is that they are unable to challenge the new order government owing to their
ethnic minority status. In return, these groups of people pay back with their loyalty and as a
result, Soeharto is able to exert control over the economy and develop a system of crony
capitalism and theft that serves as his main source of income. Theft in this case refers to
corruption, collusion, and nepotism which surrounds Soeharto’s cabinet and family members.
Main Areas of Discussion

Government Abuse of Power (Corruption & Dwi Fungsi ABRI)

On August 16, 1967, Soeharto criticized Soekarno's (Old Order or Orde Lama) failure
in eradicating corruption. This was conveyed by Soeharto during his state address, as the
Corruption Eradication Team (TPK) was formed which was chaired by the Attorney General.
The TPK was seen as a failure to have the ability and willingness to eradicate corruption.
This was clearly seen when the corruption case at Pertamina which was filed by the TPK was
not responded to by various other law enforcement agencies. The weakening of the TPK
prompted the establishment of an Operasi Tertib (Opstib) to eradicate corruption. Such an
option eventually did not function due to internal disputes (Admin, 2018).
In reality during the New Order era of Soeharto, corruption, collusion, and nepotism
was one of its largest issues. To picture Soeharto’s family’s wealth, they were included in the
top ten largest corporations in Asia. As the Soeharto family controlled major portions of
Indonesia's economy throughout their three decades as President of the Republic of
Indonesia, their estimated net worth was pegged at $30 billion (Admin, 2018). All facets of
the economy were touched by Soeharto's family companies, which also had a significant
influence on both the public and private sectors. Soeharto appears to have had "political
connections" to every economic venture in Indonesia. Other conglomerate businesspeople,
such as Salim of the Salim Group, Eka Tjipta Widjaja of the Sinar Mas Group, and Bob
Hasan of the Nusamba Group, were also associated with the Soeharto family enterprises in
addition to Soeharto's children and other relatives operating affiliated businesses.
Soeharto developed a policy to establish a direct mechanism tied to the President in
order to safeguard and benefit the family enterprises. This was true for all organizations
linked to the Soeharto family, who later formed more corporate organizations through shared
ownership or management. In addition, President Soeharto administered a "franchise system"
that offered rewards to public servants in state-owned businesses, political parties, the
judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military, and the police.
Each of Soeharto's six children, both sons and daughters, had businesses that he
sponsored. They were all business owners. Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut), the first child of
Soeharto, was the owner of Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada. A 1982-founded firm called
Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada has Tutut as a 35 percent stakeholder and her husband as a 20
percent shareholder (Admin, 2018). The business included stakes in more than 90 businesses,
from telecommunications to infrastructure, including tollways in the Philippines and
Indonesia.
The grip of Soeharto doesn't stop in the business side, he held control of the
Indonesian political climate through the Dwi Fungsi ABRI doctrine adopted in the New
Order. It should be noted that the main idea of ABRI's dual function is the participation of the
armed forces in politics. In this case, the originator of the idea itself was General (Ret.) Abdul
Haris Nasution who during the 1960s served as Army Chief of Staff. General Nasution
brought up the concept of the 'middle way' which became the forerunner of ABRI's dual
function. Along the way, General Nasution's concept of a middle ground finally paved the
way for the military to enter into the world of politics, even intervening in civil affairs in the
name of "national stability". What is clear is that General Nasution's concept of the 'middle
way' has indeed become the starting point of army politics.
Through its dual function and the New Order as a political vehicle, the army was able
to fit into all layers of Indonesian society, in this way which reached its peak in the 1990s, but
has remained strong since then. Military officers during Soeharto's presidency held key
positions in all levels of government in Indonesia, including mayors, provincial governments,
ambassadors, state-owned companies, the judiciary, and Soeharto's cabinet.
One of the impacts of ABRI's dual function concept in people's lives is the reduced
share of civilians in the government sector because many ABRI members are serving in
government. Then, the involvement of the military in social and political life also resulted in
the military turning into a tool of regime power to justify government policies. The peak of
ABRI's heyday occurred in the 1990s, when ABRI played an important role in the
government sector, starting from regents, mayors, provincial governments, ambassadors, and
heads of state-owned companies, to becoming ministers in Soeharto's cabinet. Over time,
ABRI was considered to have interfered too much in state civil affairs, to the point where it
violated human rights (HAM).
University Students' Safety Concerns and Oppression

The Malari Affair was the first student movement to monumentally oppose the New
Order's development policies. The student movement at that time was directed against the
New Order's pro-foreign capital policies as a new occupation in Indonesia, especially against
Japan economically. To avoid further actions by students, that's why the New Order
government issued a policy through the decree of the minister of education and culture,
Daoed Josoef, No. 0156/U/1978 concerning the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK)
(Mpmutama, 2023). Followed by SK No. 0230/U/J/1980 regarding general guidelines for
organization and membership of the Student Coordinating Board (BKK).
NKK or "Campus Life Normalization" and BKK or Student Coordinating Board were
a policy of the New Order Regime in 1977-1978. The aim is so that students do not interfere
in government affairs and limit students' freedom of expression as they should. This includes
eliminating the "Student Government" system such as the Student Council. The point is that
students are not allowed to criticize the government in the sense that students are not allowed
to take part in political activities.
This policy is part of efforts to depoliticize the campus and reduce student political
activity. Students are prohibited from engaging in politics or engaging in activities that are
politically motivated, campus intellectual freedom is castrated, and strong control over
student organizations is tightened. The campus becomes a thinking prison for students.
Student activities in the form of demonstrations are said to be practical political activities that
are not in accordance with the climate of the scientific community. Student activities are
limited to areas of interest and talent, spirituality, and reasoning only (Mpmutama, 2023). In
addition, in the Tri Darma of Higher Education, it is stated that the function of a higher
education institution is to carry out education, research, and community service. During this
period, the Semester Credit System (SKS) was also implemented, so that students were
encouraged only to quickly finish study/college and achieve a high GPA.
Besides the oppression through the university system itself, Indonesian university
students were also oppressed through forceful means. During the 1974 Malari Riots,
demonstrators were shot with bullets. However, the students denied having committed
violence, because at that time they were demonstrating around Jalan MH Thamrin. The 1974
Malari Riots caused 11 people to die, 685 cars were burned, 120 shops were destroyed and
damaged, and 128 victims suffered serious and minor injuries (Hardiyanto, 2021). Hariman
Siregar who was the chairman of the Universitas Indonesia Dewan Mahasiswa or Student’s
Board went on trial for about four months, he was then sentenced to six years in prison by a
panel of judges at the Central Jakarta District Court (Hardiyanto, 2021).

Freedom of Gathering, The Press, and Speech

"Freedom of the press is the crown of the New Order," said Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo,
Minister of Information (1978-1983). The statement made by one of Soeharto’s ministers is
certainly not a reflection of the reality that happened during the new order. During the New
Order era, a term was widely known by members of the press, namely "free but responsible",
but with an unclear definition. Entering the decade of the 70s, the sharpening relations
between the press and the government can be felt. Tension peaked in the middle of 1974 and
1978, which was marked by a mass ban by the government. In January 1974 when the Prime
Minister of Japan, Tanaka arrived, he was greeted by a sea of demonstrators. This action was
triggered by the public's dissatisfaction with government policies in social and cultural fields
which were increasing day by day (UMY, 2021). This incident known as Malari resulted in
the arrest of 450 people, including Mochtar Lubis, and as many as 12 publishers lost their
publishing licenses.
The Student Press also had a say to pound on and speak loudly against all the rotten
practices of the government. In 1978 the same wave of protests occurred as in 1974, corrupt
practices and promises that were not realized properly received strong protests from various
campuses in Indonesia. The student press who are involved in the wave of protests in 1978
such as ITB’s “Media Kampus” and UI’s “Salemba” claimed that their newspaper sold over
30,000 copies. The widespread use of campus-published media in the midst of society was
detected by the authorities, and through the information department the permit for publication
of the student press was revoked, the reason being that this publication violated the STT
(Registered Certificate issued by the rector of each campus) (UMY, 2021). As a result, a
number of student presses, such as the Gelora Mahasiswa by Universitas Gadjah Mada
(UGM) dan Derap Mahasiswa (IKIP) at Yogyakarta are banned by the rectorate. On the other
hand, Salemba (UI), Airlangga (Airlangga University), Kampus dan Media (ITB), and
Almamater (Bogor Institute of Agriculture) got their license revoked by the Minister of
Information. In line with what the Minister of Information has done, the Minister of
Education and Culture, Daoed Josoef, enacted a regulation known as Normalization of
Campus Life (NKK), in order to "enclose" students on campus without being actively
involved with political issues (UMY, 2021).
 The Department of Information (often referred to by its Indonesian acronym
"Deppen") has the responsibility to "carry out part of the general obligations of Government
and of growth in the field of information," as stated by presidential decrees in 1974. The
President directly has control over the Information Minister, who is in charge of the
department's several formal duties, including "developing the Pancasila national spirit." In
that spirit, the Indonesian Department of Penerangan, used Pancasila as a legitimization of
banning press speech and also gathering.
Involved Factions

Indonesian University Students of Various Institutions

Indonesian students from various universities have always been one of the largest
driving motors in Indonesia’s history. Throughout Indonesia’s independence, students were
the ones who pushed hard on fighting both the Japanese and Dutch. The same case was for
the Old Order under Soekarno. One of the reasons for Soekarno's downfall other than the
G30S-PKI (Gerakan 30 September PKI), was the protests done by students on the inflation
that had happened during the Soekarno era. Hence throughout the New Order under Soeharto,
multiple protests were done by Indonesian Students. From MALARI, which was one of the
largest protests done in Indonesia. One protest was regarding Indonesian economic relations
with Japan and also the rapid inflation during that time.
Throughout the 1980s and also early 1990s, the movement criticizing the New Order
was high. Adding to that the progressive student movement emerged from the late 1980s to
the 1990s, this is due to the evermore authoritarian and repressive acts of the New Order.
Students learned from the mistakes and defeat after 1965 which plunged into a moral
movement that was separate from the power of the people and did not have a strong or broad
base. Based on data from the Insan Politika Foundation, the number of student protests has
soared since 1992. There were 71 protests in 1993 and 111 in 1994. These data do not include
movements combined with labor and peasant actions which have also developed. When the
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) conflict broke out, 37 leaders from the PRD (People's
Democratic Party) who supported Megawati were arrested, including Budiman Sudjatmiko.
As a result, the PRD was banned, and its activists went underground by influencing student
movements and organizations.

Dictatorial Regime Government and Oppressive Law Enforcements

With the iron grip of Soeharto, his family, and the army, there were multiple
stakeholders who wanted the New Order to stay in power. The oppression of demonstrators in
all the various ways made by the Soeharto cabinet to make sure students and other groups of
people in Indonesia did not criticize and act upon the government was made to ensure the
continuation of the New Order. As was aforementioned, the educational system, political
system, and also press was all designed to make sure that protests against the New Order
were lessened.
 The Soeharto regime had multiple times made some minuscule changes in order to
entertain the protesters, though those changes did not satisfy the protesters. Two years before
the 1997 elections, the government attempted to reduce political tension by issuing Law No.
5 of 1995 concerning the Composition and Position of Members of the Legislature which
regulated reducing the number of ABRI seats in the DPR from 100 to 75. Other than that
after the Malari tragedy, one of the demands of the students was the deactivation of
Soeharto’s Asisten Pribadi or ASPRI which was fulfilled by Soeharto. That was one of the
ways the New Order satisfied the masses. This shows that the New Order still has some will
to relatively please the masses in order to stay in power.

Chinese-Indonesian Populace

In 1966–1967, the General Soeharto-led New Order administration enacted a

governmental system that was solely based on the Pancasila (five principles) doctrine.
Soeharto's "Pancasila democracy" aimed for a depoliticized system in which suggestions of
forging a coherent ethnic Chinese identity were forbidden in order to avoid the ideological
conflicts that surfaced during Sukarno's presidency (Indonesia, 2021). In order to investigate
various facets of the "China Issue" or Masalah Cina, a government committee was
established in 1967 (Indonesia, 2021). The ethnic Chinese were forced to take on names with
an Indonesian accent and were forbidden from expressing their identity through language,
religion, and traditional festivals.
Soeharto and his administration recruited Chinese Indonesian companies to take part
in the New Order's economic growth initiatives throughout the 1970s and 1980s while putting
them in a precarious position to bolster the government's control and stifle political liberties.
As the ethnic Chinese upheld a social compact by which they could assert a sense of
belonging in the nation, patron-client relationships, mostly via the exchange of money for
protection, became the norm among them. Stereotypes of the rich few came to be regarded as
generic realities. These businessmen were rare in comparison to small shopkeepers and
dealers.The economic contribution made by people of Chinese ancestry was paradoxical
since it did not convert into recognition of their standing in broader society. They frequently
endured social discrimination and had poor political positions.
By the 1990s, anti-Chinese prejudice became more prevalent. At a 1990 national
televised conference at his own ranch, President Soeharto called on the most influential
businessmen, the majority of whom were Chinese Indonesians, to give over 25% of their
shares to cooperatives (Radiawati, 2015). The show was referred to as "excellent theater" by
commentators since it only helped to fuel locals' animosity and mistrust of ethnic Chinese.
Questions the Assembly Must Address (QAMA)

1.​ What should be the appropriate mandates of the Indonesian University Students
Assembly?
2.​ What should be the appropriate response considering the results of the 1997
Legislative Election?
3.​ How should the Indonesian University Students Assembly deliver their voice to the
government and people of Indonesia?
4.​ What are efforts that can be done to ensure the safety of students within the
Indonesian University Students Assembly as well as students in general?
5.​ Are there ways to protect ethnic minority groups considering they have been targets
of riots over the past few years??
6.​ Are there ways to fundraise or gather money in order to coordinate actions done by
the Indonesian University Students Assembly
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