1606
1606
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I look out of my window and see that a shower has just fallen: the
fields look green after it, and a rosy cloud hangs over the brow of the
hill; a lily expands its petals in the moisture, dressed in its lovely
green and white; a shepherd-boy has just brought some pieces of turf
with daisies and grass for his young mistress to make a bed for her
sky-lark, not doomed to dip his wings in the dappled dawn—my
cloudy thoughts draw off, the storm of angry politics has blown over
—Mr. Blackwood, I am yours—Mr. Croker, my service to you—Mr. T.
Moore, I am alive and well—Really, it is wonderful how little the
worse I am for fifteen years’ wear and tear, how I come upon my legs
again on the ground of truth and nature, and ‘look abroad into
universality,’ forgetting that there is any such person as myself in the
world!
I have let this passage stand (however critical) because it may
serve as a practical illustration to show what authors really think of
themselves when put upon the defensive—(I confess, the subject has
nothing to do with the title at the head of the Essay!)—and as a
warning to those who may reckon upon their fair portion of
popularity as the reward of the exercise of an independent spirit and
such talents as they possess. It sometimes seems at first sight as if
the low scurrility and jargon of abuse by which it is attempted to
overlay all common sense and decency by a tissue of lies and
nicknames, everlastingly repeated and applied indiscriminately to all
those who are not of the regular government-party, was peculiar to
the present time, and the anomalous growth of modern criticism; but
if we look back, we shall find the same system acted upon, as often as
power, prejudice, dulness, and spite found their account in playing
the game into one another’s hands—in decrying popular efforts, and
in giving currency to every species of base metal that had their own
conventional stamp upon it. The names of Pope and Dryden were
assailed with daily and unsparing abuse—the epithet A. P. E. was
levelled at the sacred head of the former—and if even men like these,
having to deal with the consciousness of their own infirmities and
the insolence and spurns of wanton enmity, must have found it hard
to possess their souls in patience, any living writer amidst such
contradictory evidence can scarcely expect to retain much calm,
steady conviction of his own merits, or build himself a secure
reversion in immortality.
However one may in a fit of spleen and impatience turn round and
assert one’s claims in the face of low-bred, hireling malice, I will here
repeat what I set out with saying, that there never yet was a man of
sense and proper spirit, who would not decline rather than court a
comparison with any of those names, whose reputation he really
emulates—who would not be sorry to suppose that any of the great
heirs of memory had as many foibles as he knows himself to possess
—and who would not shrink from including himself or being
included by others in the same praise, that was offered to long-
established and universally acknowledged merit, as a kind of
profanation. Those who are ready to fancy themselves Raphaels and
Homers are very inferior men indeed—they have not even an idea of
the mighty names that ‘they take in vain.’ They are as deficient in
pride as in modesty, and have not so much as served an
apprenticeship to a true and honourable ambition. They mistake a
momentary popularity for lasting renown, and a sanguine
temperament for the inspirations of genius. The love of fame is too
high and delicate a feeling in the mind to be mixed up with realities—
it is a solitary abstraction, the secret sigh of the soul—
‘It is all one as we should love
A bright particular star, and think to wed it.’
Those who are in love only with noise and show, instead of devoting
themselves to a life of study, had better hire a booth at Bartlemy-
Fair, or march at the head of a recruiting regiment with drums
beating and colours flying!
It has been urged, that however little we may be disposed to
indulge the reflection at other times or out of mere self-complacency,
yet the mind cannot help being conscious of the effort required for
any great work while it is about it, of
‘The high endeavour and the glad success.’
A passage like this indeed leaves a taste on the palate like nectar,
and we seem in reading it to sit with the Gods at their golden tables:
but if we repeat it often in ordinary moods, it loses its flavour,
becomes vapid, ‘the wine of poetry is drank, and but the lees remain.’
Or, on the other hand, if we call in the aid of extraordinary
circumstances to set it off to advantage, as the reciting it to a friend,
or after having our feelings excited by a long walk in some romantic
situation, or while we
‘——play with Amaryllis in the shade,
Or with the tangles of Neæra’s hair’—
The only opportunity for fairly studying this question was at the
period when people wore artificial hair; for then any well-disposed
person had only to pull off his wig, and show you his mind.[17] But the
hair is a sort of natural mask to the head. The craniologist indeed
‘draws the curtain, and shows the picture:’ but if there is the least
want of good faith in him, the science is all abroad again.
Unfortunately for the credit due to his system, Dr. Spurzheim (or his
predecessor, Dr. Gall, who got up the facts) has very much the air of
a German quack-doctor. He is, so to speak it, the Baron Munchausen
of marvellous metaphysics. His object is to astonish the reader into
belief, as jugglers make clowns gape and swallow whatever they
please. He fabricates wonders with easy assurance, and deals in men
‘whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders, and the
anthropophagi, that each other eat.’ He readily admits whatever suits
his purpose, and magisterially doubts whatever makes against it. He
has a cant of credulity mixed up with the cant of scepticism—things
not easily reconciled, except by a very deliberate effort indeed. There
is something gross and fulsome in all this, that has tended to bring
discredit on a system, which after all has probably some foundation
in nature, but which is here overloaded with exaggerated and
dogmatical assertions, warranted for facts. We doubt the whole,
when we know a part to be false, and withhold our assent from a
creed, the great apostle of which wants modesty, candour, and self-
knowledge! Another thing to be considered, and in truth the great
stumbling-block in the way of nearly the whole of this system, is this,
that the principle of thought and feeling in man is one, whereas the
present doctrine supposes it to be many. The mind is one, or it is
infinite. If there is not some single, superintending faculty or
conscious power to which all subordinate organic impressions are
referred as to a centre, and which decides and reacts upon them all,
then there is no end of particular organs, and there must be not only
an organ for poetry, but an organ for poetry of every sort and size,
and so of all the rest. This will be seen more at large when we come
to details; but at present I wish to lay it down as a corner-stone or
fundamental principle in the argument.
Of the way in which Dr. Spurzheim clears the ground before him,
and disarms the incredulity of the reader by a string of undeniable or
equivocal propositions blended together, the following may serve as
a specimen.
‘The doctrine, that every thing is provided with its own properties,
was from time to time checked by metaphysicians and scholastic
divines; but by degrees it gained ground, and the maxim that matter
is inert was entirely refuted. Natural philosophers discovered
corporeal properties, the laws of attraction and repulsion, of
chemical affinity, of fermentation, and even of organization. They
considered the phenomena of vegetables as the production of
material qualities—as properties of matter. Glisson attributed to
matter a particular activity, and to the animal fibre a specific
irritability. De Gorter acknowledged in vegetable life something more
than pure mechanism. Winter and Zups proved that the phenomena
of vegetable life ought to be ascribed only to irritability. Of this,
several phenomena of flowers and leaves indicate a great degree. The
hop and French-bean twine round rods which are planted near them.
The tendrils of vines curl round poles or the branches of
neighbouring trees. The ivy climbs the oak, and adheres to its sides,
&c. Now it would be absurd to pretend that the organization of
animals is entirely destitute of properties: therefore Frederick
Hoffman took it for the basis of his system, that the human body, like
all other bodies, is endowed with material properties.’ Page 56.
‘Here be truths,’ but dashed and brewed with lies’ or doubtful
points. Yet they pass all together without discrimination or selection.
There is a simplicity in many of the propositions amounting to a sort
of bonhomie. There is an over-measure of candour and plainness. A
man who gravely informs you, as an important philosophical
discovery, that ‘the tendrils of vines curl round poles,’ and that ‘the
human body is endowed with material properties,’ may escape
without the imputation of intending to delude the unwary. But these
kind of innocent pretences are like shoeing-horns to draw on the
hardest consequences. By the serious offer of this meat for babes,
you are prepared to swallow a horse-drench of parboiled paradoxes.
You are thrown off your guard into a state of good-natured surprise,
by the utter want of all meaning; and our craniologist catches his
wondering disciples in a trap of truisms. Instances might be
multiplied from this part of the work, where the writer is occupied in
getting up the plot, and lulling asleep any suspicion, or feeling of
petulance in the mind of the public. Just after, he says—
‘In former times there were philosophers who thought that the
soul forms its own body; but if this be the case, an ill-formed body
never could be endowed with a good soul. All the natural influence of
generation, nutrition, climate, education, &c. would therefore be
inexplicable. Hence, it is much more reasonable to think that the
soul, in this life, is only confined in the body, and makes use of its
respective instruments, which entirely depend on the laws of the
organization. In blindness, the soul is not mutilated, but it cannot
perceive light without eyes, &c.’ with other matters of like pith and
moment. The author’s style is interlarded with too many hences and
therefores; neither do his inferences hang well together. They are ill-
cemented. He announces instead of demonstrating; and jumps at a
conclusion in a heavy, awkward way. He constantly assumes the
point in dispute, or makes a difficulty on one side of a question a
decisive proof of the opposite view of it. What credit can be attached
to him in matters of fact or theory where he must have it almost all
his own way, when he presumes so much on the gullibility of his
readers in common argument? ‘If these things are done in the green
tree, what shall be done in the dry?’—Once more:
‘No one will endeavour to prove that the five senses are the
production of our will: their laws are determined by nature.
Therefore as soon as an animal meets with the food destined for it,
its smell and taste declare in favour of it. Thus it is not astonishing
that a kid, taken from the uterus of its mother, preferred broom-tops
to other vegetables which were presented to it. And Richerand is
wrong in saying—“If such a fact have any reality, we should be forced
to admit that an animal may possess a foreknowledge of what is
proper for it; and that, independently of any impressions which may
be afterwards received by the senses, it is capable, from the moment
of birth, of choosing, that is, of comparing and judging of what is
presented to it.” The hog likewise eats the acorn the first time he
finds it. Animals however have, on that account, no need of any
previous exercise, of any innate idea, of any comparison or reflection.
The relations between the external world and the five senses are
determined by creation. We cannot see as red that which is yellow,
nor as great that which is little. How should animals have any idea of
what they have not felt?’ Page 59.
This is what might be termed the inclusive style in argument. It is
impossible to distinguish the premises from the conclusion. We have
facts for arguments, and arguments for facts. He plays off a
phantasmagoria of illustrations as proofs, like Sir Epicure Mammon
in the Alchemist. It is like being in a round-about at a fair, or skating,
or flying. It is not easy to make out even the terms of the question, so
completely are they overlaid and involved one in the other, and that,
as it should seem, purposely, or from a habit of confounding the
plainest things. To proceed, however, to something more material. In
treating of innate faculties, Dr. Spurzheim runs the following career,
which will throw considerable light on the vagueness and
contradictoriness of his general mode of reasoning.
‘Now it is beyond doubt, that all the instinctive aptitudes and
inclinations of animals are innate. Is it not evident that the faculties
by which the spider makes its web, the honeybee its cell, the beaver
its hut, the bird its nest, &c. are inherent in the nature of these
animals? When the young duck or tortoise runs towards the water as
soon as hatched, when the bird brushes the worm with its bill, when
the monkey, before he eats the may-bug, bites off its head, &c. all
these and similar dispositions are conducive to the preservation of
the animals; but they are not at all acquired.’
If by acquired, be meant that these last acts do not arise out of
certain impressions made on the senses by different objects, (such as
the agreeable or disagreeable smell of food, &c.) this is by no means
either clear or acknowledged on all hands.
‘According to the same law,’ he adds, [What law?] ‘the hamster
gathers corn and grain, the dog hides his superfluous food’—[This at
any rate seems a rational act.]—‘the falcon kills the hare by driving
his beak into its neck,’ &c.
‘In the same way, all instinctive manifestations of man must be
innate. The new-born child sucks the fingers and seeks the breast, as
the puppy and calf seek the dug.’
The circumstance here indiscreetly mentioned of the child sucking
the fingers as well as the nipple, certainly does away the idea of final
causes. It shows that the child, from a particular state of irritation of
its mouth, fastens on any object calculated to allay that irritation,
whether conducive to its sustenance or not. It is difficult sometimes
to get children to take the breast. Dr. S. takes up a common
prejudice, without any qualification or inquiry, while it suits his
purpose, and lays it down without ceremony when it no longer serves
the turn. He proceeds—
‘I have mentioned above, that voluntary motion and the five
external senses, common to man and animals, are innate.
Moreover, if man and animals feel certain propensities and
sentiments with clear and distinct consciousness, we must consider
these faculties as innate.’—[The clear and distinct consciousness has
nothing to do with the matter.]—‘Thus, if in animals we find
examples of mutual inclination between the sexes, of maternal care
for the young, of attachment, of mutual assistance, of sociableness, of
union for life, of peaceableness, of desire to fight, of propensity to
destroy, of circumspection, of slyness, of love of flattery, of obstinacy,
&c. all these faculties must be considered as innate.’—[A finer
assumption of the question than this, or a more complete jumble of
instincts and acquired propensities together, never was made. The
author has here got hold of a figure called encroachment, and
advances accordingly!]—‘Let all these faculties be ennobled in man:
let animal instinct of propagation be changed into moral love; the
inclination of animals for their young into the virtue of maternal care
for children; animal attachment into friendship; animal
susceptibility of flattery into love of glory and ambition; the
nightingale’s melody into harmony; the bird’s nest and the beaver’s
hut into palaces and temples, &c.: these faculties are still of the same
nature, and all these phenomena are produced by faculties common
to man and animals. They are only ennobled in man by the influence
of superior qualities, which give another direction to the inferior
ones.’ Page 82.
This last passage appears to destroy his whole argument. For the
Doctor contends that every particular propensity or modification of
the mind must be innate, and have its separate organ; but if there are
‘faculties common to man and animals,’ which are ennobled or
debased by their connexion with other faculties, then we must admit
a general principle of thought and action varying according to
circumstances, and the organic system becomes nearly an
impertinence.
The following short section, entitled Innateness of the Human
Faculties, will serve to place in a tolerably striking point of view the
turn of this writer to an unmeaning, quackish sort of common-place
reasoning.
‘Finally, man is endowed with faculties which are peculiar to him.
Now it is to be investigated, whether the faculties which distinguish
man from animals, and which constitute his human character, are
innate. It must be answered, that all the faculties of man are given by
creation, and that human nature is as determinate as that of every
other being. Thus, though we see that man compares his sensations
and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, draws
consequences and discovers laws and general principles; that he
measures distances and times, and crosses the sea from one end to
another; that he acknowledges culpability and worthiness; that he
bears a monitor in his own breast, and raises his mind to the idea
and adoration of God:—yet all these faculties result neither from
accidental influence from without, nor from his own will. How
indeed could the Creator abandon man in the greatest and most
important occupations, and give him up to chance? No!’ Page 83.
No, indeed; but there is a difference between chance and a number
of bumps on the head. One would think that all this, being common
to the same being, proceeded from a general faculty manifesting
itself in different ways, and not from a parcel of petty faculties