Policy Brief

April 2022

NATO and Russia after the

Invasion of Ukraine
Liana Fix and Steven Keil

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy
centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security
services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revi-
sionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory.

NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an
aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively
normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European invest-
ments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when
Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts.

Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense,

augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe,
strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to
manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term
stabilization scenarios.

Washington, DC Ankara Belgrade Berlin Brussels Bucharest Paris Warsaw

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April 2022

Introduction The Militarization of Russian Foreign Policy

Over the past seven decades of NATO’s history, Russia The war in Ukraine is the consequence and culmination
has gone from the center of NATO strategy to the of a longer-term trend in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: the
periphery, and back again. With Russia’s war in Ukraine, militarization and securitization of its foreign policy.
NATO must return to its original mission: defending This is evident in Russia’s ever-increasing militarized
its member states in Europe against a Russian adver- and aggressive approach that enabled it to play a major
sary. In grand strategic terms, Russia and its relation- role in conflicts around the world in the last decade,
ship with NATO will remain highly consequential. But such as Syria. But the war in Ukraine demonstrates
relations will become much more volatile as the war in the extent to which the military, security services,
Ukraine continues and Russia persists in its efforts to and defense ministry took control of Russian foreign
destabilize Euro-Atlantic security. policy making at the behest of the Russian president,
Allies preparing for the upcoming summit in completely sidelining more traditional institutions,
Madrid and a new Strategic Concept must funda- such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those institu-
mentally rethink the security situation in Europe. tions were already weakened over the past decade with
This includes addressing shortfalls in capabilities and the increasing dominance of the siloviki [strongmen]
repositioning NATO along the eastern flank, while in Russian foreign policy making. But the irrelevance
preventing escalation between NATO and Russia. of the traditional institutions reached new heights and
At the same time, NATO must reconcile competing became glaringly visible to the outside world during
demands, especially those facing its largest member, the Ukraine war, revealing an even more centralized
the United States, which will continue to focus heavily decision-making in foreign and security policy than
on the challenge posed by China. previously assumed.
The question of how NATO deals with an aggres- The basis for Russia’s militarized foreign policy
sive, escalatory Russia alongside other competing has been a continuous process of modernization of its
demands is not new. Allies always had to adjust to armed forces, which rocketed after its successful but
the reality of having the United States as a lead power militarily weak campaign in Georgia in 2008. Since
with commitments across multiple theaters. But this then, Russia has invested around $159 billion per year
question is now more urgent as it interacts with the (based on purchasing power parity)1 in preparedness,
increasingly aggressive trajectory of Russian and equipment, and mobility for its military. The Russian
Chinese foreign policy. Russia is the more immediate military doctrine from 2014 reflects this development
challenge and will therefore require the most signif- and the offensive nature of Russia’s understanding of
icant attention in NATO’s short term. This must be warfare, which seeks to “decisively engage and resolve
reflected in the Strategic Concept. conflicts on terms favorable to Russia.”2 The most
How should NATO respond to Russia’s threat important development in Russia’s military thinking
in Europe? This brief examines the development of after the war in Georgia—as well as Moscow’s
Russian foreign and security policy with the Ukraine increased obsession with color revolutions—is
war as an inflection point and suggests a concrete action the widening of the concept of conflict to include
plan for NATO over the next five years. It addresses non-military means, such as cyber, and political tools,
what kind of threat Russia poses to NATO specifically emphasizing the information environment. As such,
and what type of posture, policies, and capacities are
needed to counter the threat and meet potential escala-
1 Jack Watling, “Russia’s callousness towards its own soldiers is undermin-
tion risks. The militarization of Russian foreign policy ing its combat power,” The Guardian, March 4, 2022.
will continue beyond the war in Ukraine. NATO’s 2 Congressional Research Service, “Russian Armed Forces: Military Doc-
mission has never been more relevant. trine and Strategy,” August 20, 2022.

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Russia’s approach grew across domains, and it placed a June 2020,4 the counterpart to the US Nuclear Posture
larger emphasis on non-military and asymmetric tools Review. The June 2020 document states that Russia’s
of warfare. Russia’s campaigns in Syria, Crimea, and nuclear forces are exclusively defensive and will only
eastern Ukraine are examples of this “cross-domain be used for deterrence purposes. However, it leaves
coercion” and warfare.3 However, in Ukraine today, ambiguity for the use in conventional contexts. In cases
Russia continues to lean heavily and foremost on where the existence of the state is threatened from an
brutal conventional tactics and kinetic means, while outside “aggression,”5 the use of nuclear weapons could
still trying to fight across the information, political, be considered. Another provision states that “nuclear
and cyber domains, albeit unsuccessfully. deterrence should prevent the escalation of hostilities
and allow their termination on conditions acceptable
A document crucial to understanding to Russia and its allies,”6 again reinforcing Western
Russia’s integrated conventional- concerns about Russia’s willingness to employ tactical
nuclear approach is the Basic weapons to de-escalate conflict. This has sparked
debate about a Russian “escalate to de-escalate”
Principles of State Policy on Nuclear
strategy, which would use Russian nuclear forces not
Deterrence from June 2020. only for deterrence, but also to coerce de-escalation by
threatening to escalate to nuclear use. The worrisome
Russia has also developed and/or deployed several nuclear signaling by Moscow in the first week of the
new weapons systems after their initial announcement Ukraine war underscored these concerns and demon-
in March 2018, such as the Avangard nuclear-capable strated that Russia’s nuclear forces—and the threat of
hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nucle- their use—are a fundamental element in Russia’s mili-
ar-powered cruise missile, the air-launched ballistic tarized foreign policy.
missile Kinzhal, the long-range, nuclear-powered Russia’s National Security Strategy, released in
underwater drone Poseidon, and the heavy intercon- July 2021,7 presented a step further in an increasingly
tinental ballistic missile Sarmat. The strategic stability adversarial stance toward Europe and the United
talks in July 2021 were designed to regulate some of States, compared to the previous strategy from 2015. It
these systems, but these efforts ended with Russia’s also demonstrated the dominance of the military and
invasion. In addition, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear security establishment in foreign policy thinking. The
weapons arsenal is concerning particularly to NATO, strategy lays out a worldview which perceives Russia as
as its reading of Russian strategy suggests that Moscow threatened externally and internally by the West. For
believes these capabilities can be deployed in conven- Moscow, the internal threat is evidenced by color revo-
tional contexts to precipitate the end of a conflict—a lutions and Western “ideology” in contrast to tradi-
scenario many observers of the war in Ukraine are tional Russian values. Externally, the Kremlin asserts an
worried about. allegedly menacing Western military posture. There-
A document crucial to understanding Russia’s inte- fore, becoming a self-sufficient power and securing
grated conventional-nuclear approach is the Basic
Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence from
4 The President of the Russian Federation, Executive order on basic prin-
ciples of state policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,
2019.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
3 Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of 7 The President of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of
Strategy,” Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015. the Russian Federation, July 1, 2022.

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the information space plays a prominent role in the Returning to its core mission of defending Europe
strategy. The way Russia conducts its war in Ukraine as it did during the Cold War is to some extent well-
and its failures reflect the thinking behind this strategy. known terrain for NATO. But today’s Russia is not the
Putin’s speeches recognizing the so-called people’s same adversary as the Soviet Union. While drawing
republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and declaring upon lessons from the history of NATO-Russia rela-
war against Ukraine are the latest verbalized tions, NATO must understand that this is a new era
evidence of the military takeover of Russian foreign with a new opponent and a new set of goals. This
policy, commanded by a centralized system of deci- will require looking back, but also creatively thinking
sion-making for the purpose of restoring Russia’s ahead to address this challenge.
control over Ukraine and thereby allegedly its histor-
ical greatness. The speech was a turning point in NATO-Russia Relations in Perspective
Western thinking about Russia’s foreign policy aims. The alliance’s raison d’être is collective defense and that
Whereas the draft agreements provided by Moscow has always been, at least in large part, about Russia.
still convinced some observers that Russia’s aims in This started with the alliance’s founding purpose,
Ukraine are limited to foreign and security policy which was to protect Western European nations from
goals, such as Ukraine’s non-NATO membership, the Soviet threat. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet
the speech confirmed that Putin’s thinking about challenge remained a catalyzing feature of relations
Ukraine—and thus Russian foreign policy—is rooted between Western Europe and the United States.
in a deep revanchism and ideological understanding In the immediate post-Cold War context, US and
of Russians and Ukrainians as one people, denying alliance engagement with Russia was ambivalent.
Ukraine the right to exist as a nation-state. Russia’s NATO looked for a new purpose as Russia emerged
foreign policy has thus not only been overtaken by the from the Soviet period. Russia no longer seemed like
military, but the military is also a priority instrument the challenge it once was, with President Boris Yeltsin
to achieve broader political and ideological goals. signaling that Russia might one day join the alli-
The war in Ukraine and the full militarization of ance.8 Even short of that, things were fundamentally
Russian foreign policy is an entirely new category different. Conversations at NATO, albeit difficult,
of challenge for NATO in the post-Cold War era. It were about how to establish a new relationship with
suggests that Russia is on war footing with not only Russia and incorporate it into partnership structures,
Ukraine and the European security order, but with not necessarily how to deter it. As NATO reassessed
the Euro-Atlantic partners. It also understands war as its role in the post-Cold War era, Russia-NATO
encompassing geopolitical, economic, information, relations aimed at normalization. This included the
and military warfare. Even more, Russia’s leadership NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which would
is willing to sacrifice the state’s stability and founda- draw the contours of NATO-Russia cooperation
tion for the pretext that Russia is allegedly threatened among former adversaries.
and must defend itself through aggression against While relations with Russia were no longer adver-
other sovereign states. Russia’s military is not as profi- sarial in the strict sense, there were tense moments
cient as NATO forces. But Russia’s approach of inte- early on. This was particularly true around NATO
grating nuclear threats to coerce and compel rather enlargement and engagement in the Balkans. 1999 was
than to deter, together with an increasingly indiscrim- a pivotal year with three significant events: the NATO
inate way of warfighting in its conventional warfare,
presents NATO with new conceptual challenges for
8 Thomas Friedman, “Soviet Disarray: Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join
thinking about the Russian military threat. NATO,” The New York Times, December 21, 1991.

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intervention in Kosovo, admission of the first wave and the oligarchy in places like Ukraine and Georgia
of new alliance members, and Yeltsin’s exit from the hit close to home. These developments had nothing
Russian presidency, to be replaced by Vladimir Putin. directly to do with NATO, but given that Georgia and
Putin emerged as a far more vigorous critic of Ukraine were both actively and adamantly pursuing
NATO. A year and a half after taking office, Putin NATO membership, it married with an overarching
made it clear he no longer saw the need for NATO, narrative of Euro-Atlantic overreach. Considered by
arguing that Russia should either join NATO, effec- Moscow as a part of a sphere of privileged interests,
tively giving Russia veto power due to NATO’s consen- anything that would move the two closer to NATO’s
sus-based decision-making model, or NATO should orbit challenged Moscow’s own foreign policy vision
be disbanded.9 and regional hegemonic ambitions.
Even against this more contentious backdrop, the
early Putin years saw an upgrade of the Permanent Over time, Putin’s public antagonism
Joint Council (created by the NATO-Russia Founding toward NATO only increased, which
Act) to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. often correlated with dynamics in
At the NRC, consultations and cooperation focused
US-Russia relations.
on risk reduction, including arms control and crisis
management, as well as counterterrorism and missile
defense. Here, NATO also worked with Moscow on Over time, Putin’s public antagonism toward
Afghanistan, which facilitated NATO’s most signif- NATO only increased, which often correlated with
icant supply route during the initial International dynamics in US-Russia relations. This culminated in
Security Assistance Force mission that ran through 2007 when President Putin delivered remarks at the
Russia. But on other issues like theater missile defense, Munich Security conference deriding what he saw
relations hit another rough patch. In 2001, in order to as a tendency to substitute NATO for the UN and
reportedly deploy systems to defend against Iranian calling NATO enlargement a provocation. He also
missiles, President George W. Bush announced claimed that by strengthening anti-missile defenses,
the United States would withdraw from the 1972 the United States was making it possible that “threat
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. While unhappy with the from our [Russia’s] nuclear forces will be completely
move, Putin initially suggested this decision posed no neutralized…the balance of powers will be absolutely
threat to Russia as Russian missiles could overcome destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from
any subsequent defense systems deployed by NATO.10 the feeling of complete security.”12
But over time, Putin increasingly decried the missile From there on, a cascade of events further soured
defense project as anti-Russian in nature.11 NATO-Russia relations. Events like the 2007 cyberat-
Meanwhile, Putin’s own suspicion grew as color tack against Estonia and the Russo-Georgian war a year
revolutions swept through various post-Soviet states. later fueled broader concerns about Russian foreign
The liberalization and Western integration of former policy and NATO-Russia relations, and NATO’s inter-
Warsaw Pact countries was unpleasant for Moscow, vention in Libya alarmed Moscow. Things drastically
but popular uprisings challenging unfair elections worsened in 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine—the
annexation of Crimea took NATO-Russia discord to
new post-Cold War heights. Russia’s interference in
9 Associated Press, “Putin Sees No Need for NATO,” July 18, 2001. various electoral processes, alongside assassination
10 Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a
Mistake,” The New York Times, December 13, 2001.
11 Bilyana Lilly, “How Putin uses missile defense in Europe to distract 12 Vladimir Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich
Russian voters,” NATO Review, January 29, 2015. Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2017.

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attempts in NATO members states like the United tional military personnel and equipment to NATO
Kingdom and Germany, damaged relations. For states nearest Russia, through additional deploy-
NATO, Russia’s actions made clear its willingness ments or by bolstering efforts through vehicles like
to employ a range of political and military tactics to the Enhanced Forward Presence. This will also
undermine NATO members and partners, and in the include new battlegroups in southeastern Europe.13
case of Ukraine, change borders by force. NATO has also deployed components of the NATO
The annexation of Crimea drove allies toward Response Force, including the Very High Readiness
strengthening deterrence and adding capacity for Joint Task Force.14
territorial defense in the Baltics and elsewhere. As Putin tries to assert a new chapter of Russian
Enhancing readiness initiatives, increasing defense foreign policy and revise the post-Cold War reality,
spending, and rethinking the necessary capabilities to efforts within NATO to deter Russia and defend
effectively deter Russia became core tenets of NATO’s NATO territory will remain central. At some point,
Russia policy and NATO’s purpose. The focus was so will finding ways to decrease tensions, if possible.
once again on Russia and collective defense, but in But it is increasingly difficult as the space for trust and
a more limited sense. Today, Putin’s expanded inva- dialogue, already minimal before Russia’s most recent
sion of Ukraine—and the brazened aims and tools of intervention in Ukraine, is all but gone.
Russia’s militarized foreign policy—demonstrate how For allies, it is important to understand Russia’s
broad-reaching Russia’s challenge to NATO is and motivations and find ways to de-escalate. This is
how NATO’s strategy and posture toward Moscow challenging because Putin’s logic is clearly driven by
must change. a multitude of overlapping and expanding concentric
circles of perceived interests. To start, Russia’s chal-
For allies, it is important to understand lenge to NATO’s open door is motivated by Russia’s
Russia’s motivations and find ways belief that it has a privileged claim to and interest in the
to de-escalate. region. As already discussed, Putin’s speech justifying
the need to recognize the independence of Luhansk
Just before the outset of the war, Russia’s ultima- and Donetsk exposed how deep-seated this sentiment
tums to NATO would require NATO to reset its is, to the point of suggesting that Ukraine lacks sover-
posture—rotational or permanent—to 1997, alongside eignty, a suggestion echoed by other Russian officials.15
the demand that NATO close its open-door policy. Accompanying such sentiment is the will to use mili-
These demands demonstrate how incongruent NATO tary force to impose quick de facto realities, which it
and Russia views of Euro-Atlantic security are today. is trying to do in Ukraine. This creates difficult ques-
It also shows how emboldened Putin is to offer such a tions for the future of NATO’s open-door policy and
maximalist position. engagement in the region. It also raises significant
Russia’s actions in and around Ukraine confirm
that Putin has abandoned all notional attachment
to the principles that have governed the Euro-At-
13 Rehanna Jones, #NATO defence ministers agree to develop options to
lantic security order, from the Helsinki Final Act to strengthen deterrence & defence, “including to consider establishing
the Budapest Memorandum. A unilateral disarming new NATO battlegroups in central & south-eastern Europe,” says @
of NATO is the opposite of what the current secu- jensstoltenberg. #France has already offered to lead a battlegroup in
#Romania, Twitter, February 16, 2022.
rity environment demands. And it is also the oppo-
14 Oriana Gonzalez, “NATO Response Force deploys for first time,” Axios,
site of what NATO is doing. In the wake of Russia’s February 25, 2022.
invasion, several NATO members—including France, 15 Reuters, “Russia’s Lavrov questions Ukraine’s right to sovereignty,”
Germany, and the United States—are adding addi- February 22, 2022.

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questions for those in Europe that are not currently NATO should accomplish its transition from
part of the alliance. forward deterrence to forward defense.
Beyond the open door, allies along Eastern Europe After the annexation of Crimea, NATO established a
perceive these attempted revisions by Putin as threat- rotational presence in Eastern European member states
ening to their own security, particularly for those who known as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).
are seen as part of the category of former socialist Each EFP grouping consisted of roughly 1,000 troops
republics, but also any members of the Warsaw Pact. or one battlegroup. The intent of these battlegroups
Putin continually recalls 1997. Rather than drawing was to serve as a “tripwire” that would engage multiple
down forces in these places most threatened, Putin’s NATO members in the event of an invasion. This was
aims have catalyzed additional NATO presence as an to signal the seriousness of NATO’s commitment that
immediate reaction. an attack on its eastern members will be considered
But where does NATO go from here? Russia’s inva- an attack on all. At the recent extraordinary summit
sion of Ukraine and the absence of any trust is the in Brussels, NATO added four similar deployments to
defining element of NATO-Russia relations. Defense countries in southeastern Europe, including Bulgaria,
and deterrence are of primary importance, and NATO Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.
will need to frame the threat posed by Russia for its While the assurances provided by these tripwire
new Strategic Concept in Madrid. forces have been key to the security of countries in
the Baltics and Central Europe, now it is time to move
An Action Plan to Meet NATO’s Russia Threat from forward deterrence to forward defense. As such,
The war in Ukraine has changed NATO’s under- NATO needs to establish a force that would be able
standing of Russia’s priorities, risk tolerance, and to effectively repel an initial provocation or attack
ultimate foreign policy aims. This forces NATO to while follow-on forces are prepared. This will require
not only return to its core mission—the defense of substantial and permanent troop deployments in
Europe—but also to adapt its posture accordingly as new NATO member states and will mean the formal
quickly and sustainably as possible. The militariza- end of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which has
tion of Russian foreign policy and its revisionist already been fundamentally violated by Russia’s war in
aims in Ukraine will prompt NATO to transition its Ukraine. Rather than withdraw, NATO could suspend
existing strategy of forward deterrence in Eastern the act, as some of the provisions therein may be useful
Europe to forward defense. NATO must also take for de-escalation in the future.
seriously Russia’s use of nuclear coercion and ensure
the efficacy of NATO nuclear policy and capabil- NATO should augment its capabilities in
ities. In the short term, NATO will be required to Europe.
resolutely and carefully handle any escalatory risks Alongside the transition to forward defense, NATO
emanating from the war in Ukraine for European must consider what adjustments are needed to meet
security broadly. the current environment, and what capabilities may be
NATO should hold fast to key areas of risk reduc- required. Unfortunately, procurement processes and
tion where possible and think about long-term capability developments take years. But there are key
avenues to enhance stability. But allies should have steps that NATO can take now.
no illusion about the likelihood of these scenarios First, given Russia’s use of nuclear rhetoric as
unfolding under Putin. NATO-Russia relations will part of its overall militarized foreign policy, assuring
be defined by confrontation for the foreseeable future. continuity in NATO’s nuclear posture is critically
The following action plan should guide NATO policy important. To these ends, a quick replacement of
in the next five years. Germany’s expiring Tornado fleet is more important

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today than in the past. It is critical that there is no be directed at well-placed capability targets.18 They
lapse in NATO’s current nuclear posture or policy. should also be aimed at complementing or freeing up
Similarly, there should be no change in the US declar- US capabilities.
atory policy on nuclear first use. However, signaling Consequently, thinking more deliberately about
by other members of the alliance is welcome.16 The mechanisms to enhance non-US capabilities in NATO,
modernization and adaptation of nuclear forces will including collective European capability targets or a
also grow more important—the United Kingdom’s measurable war-fighting competence (for example,
most recent efforts to augment its nuclear forces as the old European Security and Defence Identity or
part of its integrated review stand out. ESDI)19 or a revised ESDI+ concept)20 would be an
Secondly, investment in air defenses (medium- and important step. This could simultaneously enhance
long-range) and MANPADs should be on the agenda NATO while creating avenues for EU-level capabili-
after witnessing their importance in Ukraine. This ties that can be used in a more ad hoc fashion. Ulti-
should include ramping up or reopening produc- mately, NATO would be well served to focus less on
tion lines of Stinger (anti-air) and Javelin (anti-tank) spending metrics and more on capability targets,
missiles.17 Here, NATO can support partners and particularly those that enhance European contribu-
replenish their own stocks. Beyond this, deploying and tions to high-end capabilities such as precision-guided
augmenting air-defense systems and sensors along the munitions (also including long-range strike capabili-
eastern flank will also be important, particularly in ties), air defense, air refueling, drones, and strategic
areas of the greatest potential for friction or escalation airlift, as well as other key enablers.21
between Russia and NATO. NATO already coordinates with the EU on critical
issues for European security, but for a new posture
NATO should create a larger European role on the eastern flank, military mobility will continue
in Euro-Atlantic security and defense. to play a large role in defense, supply, and reinforce-
NATO is best placed to strengthen the eastern flank. ment efforts. The EU remains central here. Forward
Its planning process (the NDPP) is also best situated defending the eastern flank will take a serious coor-
to create key targets for capabilities. But it should be dinated movement from numerous European states.
in NATO’s interest, especially against the backdrop of Moreover, preliminary plans overcoming bureau-
the challenge by China, to integrate a greater non-US cratic hurdles and improving infrastructure to
ambition. Augmenting the role of European allies must provide the much-needed forces forward in the event
be a priority. This should include European efforts in of a conflict is of the utmost importance. And while
territorial defense and crisis management. Fundamen- some progress has been made since the launch of the
tally, a more robust European security and defense Military Mobility Permanent Structured Cooperation
ambition in NATO (and beyond) must be the result
of the current security environment. Current signals
across the alliance, particularly in places like Berlin,
to spend more are welcome, but the spending must 18 See Steven Keil, “NATO Burden Sharing in a New Geopolitical Era,”
in Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, and Nele Marianne
Ewers-Peters (eds.), NATO 2030 Towards a New Strategic Concept and
Beyond, Johns Hopkins University SAIS/Brookings Institution Press,
2021.
19 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Closing Ranks: Aligning NATO and the EU’s Strate-
16 Geert de Clercq, “France says Putin needs to understand NATO has gic Priorities,”German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 2015.
nuclear weapons,” Reuters, February 24, 2022. 20 Keil, NATO Burden Sharing in a New Geopolitical Era, pp. 227-228.
17 Craig Hooper, “Ukraine’s Use of Stinger and Javelin Missiles is Outstrip- 21 Derek Chollet, Steven Keil, and Christopher Skaluba, “Rethink and
ping US Production,” Forbes, March 8, 2022. Replace Two Percent,” Atlantic Council, October 14, 2020.

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project, much more needs to be done to move these domains including conventional, cyber, and informa-
key efforts forward.22 tion. The Russian military’s shortcomings in Ukraine
Transatlantic allies should work hard to avoid provide several examples of how to boost the quality
becoming embroiled in age-old debates about (the of Georgia’s defense in concrete ways.
lack of) European investments in security and Given that there remains no consensus in NATO
defense. Instead, the United States should create real over Ukraine’s membership prospects, future engage-
political support (and guidance) for Europe, working ment with the alliance is to be mostly determined by
closely through NATO to achieve maximum impact Kyiv. NATO should stand by and support Ukraine as
across institutions. long as necessary and as comprehensively as possible
with military aid and intelligence. Depending on the
NATO should strengthen relations with outcome of negotiations with Moscow for a potential
partnership countries, especially Finland, end to the war, Kyiv has already signaled that removing
Sweden, Georgia, and Ukraine. its ambition to join NATO from the constitution could
With regard to partnership engagement with Finland be a possible concession. In this case, NATO should
and Sweden, the case for eventual NATO member- continue assisting Ukraine as a close partner country,
ship is obvious. Both countries are highly integrated ensuring that Ukraine remains in a position to defend
with NATO and work as closely as possible with the itself against any future renewed Russian attack.
alliance as any non-member. Should Sweden and
Finland’s decision around NATO membership change NATO should manage escalatory dynamics
in the future given rising domestic support, NATO with Russia through risk-reduction
should be prepared to admit them. They would mechanisms but communicate a redline on
provide a valuable contribution to regional security “limited” nuclear use.
and demonstrate that NATO is not giving Russia a Russia’s threats of nuclear use have demonstrated
veto right on its own affairs. Especially as Russia has that the current situation of conflict extends beyond
threatened Finland and Sweden in the past, coopera- Ukraine and escalation dynamics—both conven-
tion should be enhanced where possible, keeping the tional and nuclear—can become a serious concern for
door wide open. NATO. Russia’s draft agreements to NATO and the
A more difficult question is how best to engage United States prior to invasion suggest multiple Euro-
Georgia and its prospective NATO membership. At pean security crises down the road. Most importantly,
the moment, granting a more serious prospective NATO should seek to maintain military-to-military
membership would put Georgia at serious risk if it contacts when possible and rely on bilateral chan-
were not accompanied by an immediate willingness nels of member states. The US-Russia military chan-
by NATO to defend the country, which is unlikely. nels established during the Ukraine war are a good
NATO therefore needs to maneuver very carefully in example. Further escalatory dynamics across multiple
engaging Georgia if it is not willing to admit Georgia domains, especially along the Polish-Belarusian and
as a member. This could include helping Georgia Polish-Ukrainian borders and the Baltics, are easily
enhance its own defense through military aid and imaginable. (Re)establishing risk-reduction mecha-
additional training and assistance across multiple nisms, where possible, such as on the prevention of
unintended incidents on land, air, and sea, are neces-
sary in this era of escalation risks.
22 Sebastian Sprenger, “US-European momentum on military mobility still The possibility of Russia stationing nuclear forces
stuck in bureaucracy,” DefenseNews, August 25, 2021; and Curtis Scap-
arrotti and Colleen Bell, “Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of in Belarus should also be taken seriously. Such a move
European Military Mobility,” Atlantic Council, April 22, 2020. would indicate that Russia is only growing more

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unpredictable and moving further from the norms of idency in 2000. With the war in Ukraine, they have
the late- or post-Cold War era. Any potential regional reached a new level of confrontation not witnessed
use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a supposedly since the most difficult days of the Cold War. Histor-
“limited” way should be communicated as a horrific ical analogies to describe the current situation—
and unacceptable breach of international norms that whether the beginning or end of the First or Second
would lead to a full military involvement of NATO. World War—do not neatly fit. If anything, as a poten-
Current reports suggest that the United States and tial reference point for NATO, the current period best
NATO nations are already thinking through this.23 mimics the early Cold War, which lacked the stability
of the late 1980s. It was marked by continuous escala-
NATO must think about stabilization tory risks and unknowns.
scenarios in the long term. And while this is true today, that period was also
Historically, periods of escalation, such as those during marked by war exhaustion. Current Russian foreign
the Cold War, were followed by periods of stabiliza- policy follows the opposite trajectory. When drafting
tion. In this current phase of escalation, scenarios of its Strategic Concept, NATO must prepare to confront
stabilization will not materialize for several years, if a new era that only appears similar to the Cold War.
not decades, down the road. NATO must prepare for In reality, NATO faces an adversary determined to
a long confrontation and posture itself accordingly. It rewrite the terms of the post-Cold War era and willing
should think ahead but look to the past to see when to use all military means necessary to achieve those
and how windows of opportunity for stabilization ends. Today’s Russia is more unrestrained, risk-prone,
have opened and which conditions and measures were and escalation-driven than the late Soviet Union. It
conducive to stabilization. At the top of the list, such is also optimistic about its own trajectory in world
measures include (re)building transparency, like the politics and in its historic mission to upend the post-
measures anchored in the Vienna Document, and Cold War order. In its wake, Russia’s war and its mili-
arms control agreements in the long term. It is also tarized foreign policy is leaving untold destruction
in the interest of all sides to maintain the New START and suffering in Ukraine and raising NATO-Russia
treaty beyond its current expiration date of February tensions to new heights. Russia revisionism and
2026. For now, offers to discuss missile defense and revanchism requires NATO to find new purpose and
work on a new, reciprocal INF-regime (as outlined in a new posture. This may not be a Cold War redux,
the US and NATO responses to Russia’s draft agree- but the challenges ahead are no less dangerous than
ments) are out of question. As long as Russia’s brutal the ones NATO met during its founding years. Rela-
campaign in Ukraine marches on and the Kremlin tions between NATO and Russia will be defined by
continues its nuclear saber-rattling, those discussions confrontation for the foreseeable future, and NATO
are impossible. But in the long term, these ideas can must prepare accordingly.
and should be revived. Even if not part of the imme-
diate policy toolbox, stabilization should not be
forgotten as a long-term strategic goal.

Is NATO entering a Cold War Redux?

The trajectory of NATO-Russia relations has been
gradually souring since Vladimir Putin took the pres-

23 David Sanger et al., “US Makes Contingency Plans in Case Russia Uses
Its Most Powerful Weapons,” The New York Times, March 23, 2022.

Fix and Keil : NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine 10
 Policy Brief
April 2022

As a non-partisan and independent research institution, The About GMF

German Marshall Fund of the United States is committed to research The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
integrity and transparency. non-partisan policy organization committed to the idea that the
United States and Europe are stronger together. GMF works on
The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the issues critical to transatlantic interests in the 21st century, including
views of the author(s) alone. the future of democracy, security and defense, geopolitics and the
rise of China, and technology and innovation. By drawing on and
fostering a community of people with diverse life experiences and
About the Author
political perspectives, GMF pursues its mission by driving the policy
Liana Fix is programme director for international affairs at Körber-
debate through cutting-edge analysis and convening, fortifying civil
Stiftung’s Berlin office. Her work focuses on topics related to Euro-
society, and cultivating the next generation of leaders on both sides
pean security, Russian foreign policy, and Eastern Europe.
of the Atlantic. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a
tribute to the Marshall Plan, GMF is headquartered in Washington,
Steven Keil is a fellow in GMF’s Washington office. His work focuses
DC, with offices in Berlin, Brussels, Ankara, Belgrade, Bucharest,
on transatlantic security, with an emphasis on the United States,
Paris, and Warsaw.
Russia, Germany, and NATO.
Acknowledgments
This brief is part of a project at the German Marshall Fund of the
United States supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

Ankara • Belgrade • Berlin • Brussels • Bucharest

Paris • Warsaw • Washington, DC

www.gmfus.org