Cryptography and

Network Security
Chapter 13
Fourth Edition
by William Stallings

Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown

Chapter 13 – Digital Signatures &
Authentication Protocols

To guard against the baneful influence exerted by strangers

is therefore an elementary dictate of savage prudence.
Hence before strangers are allowed to enter a district, or
at least before they are permitted to mingle freely with
the inhabitants, certain ceremonies are often performed
by the natives of the country for the purpose of disarming
the strangers of their magical powers, or of disinfecting,
so to speak, the tainted atmosphere by which they are
supposed to be surrounded.
—The Golden Bough, Sir James George Frazer
 Digital Signatures
have looked at message authentication
● but does not address issues of lack of trust
digital signatures provide the ability to:
● verify author, date & time of signature
● authenticate message contents
● be verified by third parties to resolve disputes
hence include authentication function with
additional capabilities
Digital Signature Properties
must depend on the message signed
must use information unique to sender
● to prevent both forgery and denial
must be relatively easy to produce
must be relatively easy to recognize & verify
be computationally infeasible to forge
● with new message for existing digital signature
● with fraudulent digital signature for given message
be practical save digital signature in storage
 Direct Digital Signatures
involve only sender & receiver
assumed receiver has sender’s public-key
digital signature made by sender signing
entire message or hash with private-key
can encrypt using receivers public-key
important that sign first then encrypt
message & signature
security depends on sender’s private-key
Arbitrated Digital Signatures
involves use of arbiter A
● validates any signed message
● then dated and sent to recipient
requires suitable level of trust in arbiter
can be implemented with either private or
public-key algorithms
arbiter may or may not see message
 Authentication Protocols
used to convince parties of each others
identity and to exchange session keys
may be one-way or mutual
key issues are
● confidentiality – to protect session keys
● timeliness – to prevent replay attacks
published protocols are often found to
have flaws and need to be modified
 Replay Attacks
where a valid signed message is copied and
later resent
● simple replay
● repetition that can be logged
● repetition that cannot be detected
● backward replay without modification
countermeasures include
● use of sequence numbers (generally impractical)
● timestamps (needs synchronized clocks)
● challenge/response (using unique nonce)
Using Symmetric Encryption
as discussed previously can use a
two-level hierarchy of keys
usually with a trusted Key Distribution
Center (KDC)
● each party shares own master key with KDC
● KDC generates session keys used for
connections between parties
● master keys used to distribute these to them
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
original third-party key distribution protocol
for session between A B mediated by KDC
protocol overview is:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA]
4. B -> A: EKs[N2]
5. A -> B: EKs[f(N2)]
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
used to securely distribute a new session
key for communications between A & B
but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old
session key has been compromised
● then message 3 can be resent convincing B
that is communicating with A
modifications to address this require:
● timestamps (Denning 81)
● using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)
Using Public-Key Encryption
have a range of approaches based on the
use of public-key encryption
need to ensure have correct public keys
for other parties
using a central Authentication Server (AS)
various protocols exist using timestamps
or nonces
 Denning AS Protocol
Denning 81 presented the following:
1. A -> AS: IDA || IDB
2. AS -> A: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T]
3. A -> B: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T] ||
EPUb[EPRas[Ks||T]]
note session key is chosen by A, hence AS need
not be trusted to protect it
timestamps prevent replay but require
synchronized clocks
 One-Way Authentication
required when sender & receiver are not in
communications at same time (eg. email)
have header in clear so can be delivered
by email system
may want contents of body protected &
sender authenticated
Using Symmetric Encryption
can refine use of KDC but can’t have final
exchange of nonces, vis:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA] || EKs[M]
does not protect against replays
● could rely on timestamp in message, though
email delays make this problematic
 Public-Key Approaches
have seen some public-key approaches
if confidentiality is major concern, can use:
A->B: EPUb[Ks] || EKs[M]
● has encrypted session key, encrypted message

if authentication needed use a digital

signature with a digital certificate:
A->B: M || EPRa[H(M)] || EPRas[T||IDA||PUa]
● with message, signature, certificate
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
US Govt approved signature scheme
designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's
published as FIPS-186 in 1991
revised in 1993, 1996 & then 2000
uses the SHA hash algorithm
DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm
FIPS 186-2 (2000) includes alternative RSA &
elliptic curve signature variants
 Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)
creates a 320 bit signature
with 512-1024 bit security
smaller and faster than RSA
a digital signature scheme only
security depends on difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms
variant of ElGamal & Schnorr schemes
Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)
 DSA Key Generation
have shared global public key values (p,q,g):
● choose q, a 160 bit
● choose a large prime p = 2L
• where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64
• and q is a prime factor of (p-1)
● choose g = h(p-1)/q
• where h<p-1, h(p-1)/q (mod p) > 1
users choose private & compute public key:
● choose x<q
● compute y = gx (mod p)
 DSA Signature Creation
to sign a message M the sender:
● generates a random signature key k, k<q
● nb. k must be random, be destroyed after use,
and never be reused
then computes signature pair:
r = (gk(mod p))(mod q)
s = (k-1.H(M)+ x.r)(mod q)
sends signature (r,s) with message M
 DSA Signature Verification
having received M & signature (r,s)
to verify a signature, recipient computes:
w = s-1(mod q)
u1= (H(M).w)(mod q)
u2= (r.w)(mod q)
v = (gu1.yu2(mod p)) (mod q)
if v=r then signature is verified
see book web site for details of proof why
 Summary
have discussed:
● digital signatures
● authentication protocols (mutual & one-way)
● digital signature algorithm and standard