(eBook PDF) International Business 16th Edition

by John Daniels download

https://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-
business-16th-edition-by-john-daniels/

Download full version ebook from https://ebooksecure.com

We believe these products will be a great fit for you. Click
the link to download now, or visit ebooksecure.com
to discover even more!

(eBook PDF) International Monetary Financial Economics

by Daniels

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-monetary-
financial-economics-by-daniels/

(eBook PDF) International Business The Challenges of

Globalization by John Wild

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-business-
the-challenges-of-globalization-by-john-wild/

(eBook PDF) Adolescence 16th Edition by John Santrock

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-adolescence-16th-
edition-by-john-santrock/

(eBook PDF) International Business: The Challenges of

Globalization 9th Edition by John J. Wild

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-business-
the-challenges-of-globalization-9th-edition-by-john-j-wild/
(eBook PDF) International Economics 16th Edition by
Robert Carbaugh

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-
economics-16th-edition-by-robert-carbaugh/

International Business: The Challenges of

Globalization, Global Edition, 10th Edition John Wild -
eBook PDF

https://ebooksecure.com/download/international-business-the-
challenges-of-globalization-global-edition-10th-edition-ebook-
pdf/

International Business by Shad Morris (eBook PDF)

http://ebooksecure.com/product/international-business-by-shad-
morris-ebook-pdf/

(eBook PDF) International Business by Michael Geringer

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-international-business-
by-michael-geringer/

(eBook PDF) Business Law 16th Edition by A. James

Barnes

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-business-law-16th-
edition-by-a-james-barnes/
 C o nt e nt s v

• Part two: comParative environmental

FrameworkS 25

2 The Cultural Environments Facing Business 25

CASE: Saudi Arabia’s Dynamic Culture 26
Culture’s Importance in IB and Trickiness To Assess 29
National Cultures as a Point of Reference 29
The People Factor 30
Building Cultural Awareness 31
Shortcomings in Cultural Assessments 31
Influences on Cultural Formation and Change 32
Sources of Change 32
Language as Both a Diffuser and Stabilizer of Culture 32
Religion as a Cultural Stabilizer 34
Major Behavioral Practices Affecting Business 35
Issues in Social Stratification 35
Work Motivation 37
Relationship Preferences 40
Risk-Taking Behavior 40
Information and Task Processing 41
Problems in Communicating Across Cultures 42
Translation of Spoken and Written Language 42
Silent Language 43
Guidelines For Cultural Adjustment 45
Host Society Acceptance 45
Degree of Cultural Differences 45
Ability to Adjust: Culture Shock 46
Company and Management Orientations 46
Strategies for Instituting Change 47
Point-Counterpoint
Does IB Lead To Cultural Imperialism? 48

Looking to the Future

Scenarios on The Evolvement of National Cultures 50
CASE: Tesco PLC: Leveraging Global Knowledge 52
Endnotes 55

3 The Political and Legal Environments Facing Business 57

CASE: China: Big Opportunities, Complicated Risks 58
Politics, Laws, and Operating Internationally 60
The Political Environment 62
Individualism 62
vi C on ten ts

Collectivism 62
Political Ideology 63
Democracy 64
Totalitarianism 65
The State of Political Freedom 67
The Prevalence of Political Freedom 68
The Struggles of Political Freedom 68
The Allure of Authoritarianism 71
Looking to the Future
Political Ideology and MNEs’ Actions 72

Political Risk 74
Classifying Political Risk 74
Point-Counterpoint
Proactive Political Risk Management: The Superior Approach 76

The Legal Environment 78

Types of Legal Systems 79
The Foundation of Legality 80
Mapping the Basis of Law 81
Which Rule When? 82
Implications to Managers 84
Legal Issues Facing International Companies 84
Operational Concerns 85
Strategic Concerns 86
Politics, Law, and the Business Environment 88
CASE: It’s a Knockoff World 89
Endnotes 91

4 The Economic Environments Facing Businesses 93

CASE: Emerging Economies: Comeback or Collapse? 94
International Economic Analysis 95
Navigating Challenges 96
Who’s Who in the Global Business Environment 97
Developed Economies 97
Developing Economies 98
Economies in Transition 100
The Issue of Different Degrees of Development 101
Economic Freedom 103
The Value of Economic Freedom 105
The Prevalence of Economic Freedom 106
Economic Freedom and Type of Economic Environment 107
The Paradox of Promise Versus Prevalence 107
 C o nt e nt s vii

Looking to the Future

State Capitalism: Detour or Destination? 110

Types of Economic Systems 111

The Market Economy 111
The Command Economy 112
Mixed Economy 113
Assessing Economic Development, Performance, and Potential 114
Monetary Measures 114
Improving Economic Analytics 116
The Wildcard: The Shadow Economy 118
Sustainability and Stability 119
Sustainability 119
Stability 120
Point-Counterpoint
Growth: Positive and Productive? 121

Elements of Economic Analysis 123

Integrating Economic Analysis 123
Economic Freedom, Innovation, and Competitiveness 125
CASE: Economic Environments of the West:
Problems, Puzzles, and the 4th Industrial
Revolution 126
Endnotes 128

5 Globalization and Society 129

CASE: Ecomagination and the Global Greening
of GE 130
Introduction 132
Stakeholder Trade-Offs 132
The Economic Impact of the MNE 133
Balance-of-Payments Effects 134
Growth and Employment Effects 135
The Foundations of Ethical Behavior 136
Why Do Companies Care About Ethical Behavior? 137
The Cultural Foundations of Ethical Behavior 137
Relativism Versus Normativism 137
The Legal Foundations of Ethical Behavior 138
Legal Justification: Pro and Con 138
Corruption and Bribery 139
Petrobras: Corruption in Brazil with a Global Twist 140
The Consequences of Corruption 140
What’s Being Done About Corruption? 141
viii C on ten ts

Ethics and the Environment 142

What Is “Sustainability”? 142
Global Warming and The Paris Agreement on Climate Change 143
Ethical Dilemmas of Labor Conditions 144
Point-Counterpoint
Should MNEs Accept Full Responsibility for the Unethical
Behavior of Their Employees? 144
The Problem of Child Labor 146
What MNEs Can and Can’t Do 147
Corporate Codes of Ethics: How Should a Company Behave? 147
Motivations for Corporate Responsibility 147
Developing a Code of Conduct 147
Looking to the Future
Dealing with Ethical Dilemmas in the Global Economy 148
CASE: Anglo American PLC in South Africa: What Do You
Do When Costs Reach Epidemic Proportions? 149
Endnotes 151

• Part three: theorieS and inStitutionS: trade

and inveStment 153

6 International Trade and Factor Mobility Theory 153

CASE: The Evolution of Taiwan’s International Trade 154
Introduction: Why Do Policymakers Rely on International Trade and Factor
Mobility Theories? 156
Interventionist and Free Trade Theories 158
Mercantilism 158
Neomercantilism 158
Free Trade Theories 159
Theory of Absolute Advantage 159
Theory of Comparative Advantage 161
Theories of Specialization: Some Assumptions
and Limitations 162
Theories to Explain National Trade Patterns 164
How Much Does A Country Trade? 164
What Types of Products Does A Country Trade? 166
With Whom Do Countries Trade? 167
The Dynamics of Export Capabilities 168
Product Life Cycle (PLC) Theory 168
The Diamond of National Competitive Advantage 170
The Theory and Major Effects of Factor Mobility 172
 C o nt e nt s ix

Point-Counterpoint
Should Nations Use Strategic Trade Policies? 172
Why Production Factors Move 174
Effects of Factor Movements 175
The Relationship between Trade and Factor Mobility 176
Substitution 176
Complementarity 176
Looking to the Future
Scenarios That May Change Trade Patterns 177
CASE: Ecuador: A Rosy Export Future? 179
Endnotes 182

7 Governmental Influence on Trade 183

CASE: The U.S.–Vietnamese Catfish Dispute 184
Conflicting Outcomes of Trade Protectionism 186
The Role of Stakeholders 187
Economic Rationales for Governmental Trade Intervention
and Outcome Uncertainties 187
Fighting Unemployment 187
Protecting “Infant Industries” 188
Developing an Industrial Base 189
Economic Relationships with Other Countries 190
Governments’ Noneconomic Rationales and Outcome
for Trade Intervention 192
Maintaining Essential Industries 192
Promoting Acceptable Practices Abroad 193
Point-Counterpoint
Should Governments Impose Trade Sanctions? 193
Maintaining or Extending Spheres of Influence 195
Preserving National Culture 195
Major Instruments of Trade Control 195
Tariffs: Direct Price Influences 195
Nontariff Barriers: Direct Price Influences 196
Nontariff Barriers: Quantity Controls 198
How Companies Deal With Governmental Trade
Influences 201
Tactics for Dealing with Import Competition 201
Convincing Decision-Makers 201
Involving the Industry and Stakeholders 201
Preparing for Changes in the Competitive Environment 202
Looking to the Future
Dynamics and Complexity of Future World Trade 202
x C on ten ts

CASE: Should U.S. Imports of Prescription Drugs from Canada

Be Widened? 203
Endnotes 205

8 Cross-National Cooperation and Agreements 207

CASE: Toyota’s European Drive 208
Forms of Economic Integration 209
The World Trade Organization—Global Integration 210
GATT: Predecessor to the WTO 210
What Does the WTO Do? 210
Regional Economic Integration 211
Bilateral Agreements 211
Geography Matters 211
The Effects of Integration 212
Major Regional Trading Groups 213
The European Union 214
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 218
Regional Economic Integration in the Americas 221
Regional Economic Integration in Asia 223
Regional Economic Integration in Africa 225
Point-Counterpoint
Is Regional Economic Integration a Good Idea? 226
The United Nations and Other NGOs 227
Commodity Agreements 229
Commodities and the World Economy 229
Consumers and Producers 229
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) 230
Looking to the Future
Will the WTO Overcome Bilateral and Regional Integration
Efforts? 231
CASE: Walmart Goes South 232
Endnotes 234

• Part Four: world Financial environment 235

9 Global Foreign-Exchange Markets 235

CASE: Going Down to the Wire in the Money-Transfer
Market 236
What is Foreign Exchange and Who are The Major Players
in The Market? 237
 C o nt e nt s xi

Some Aspects of The Foreign-Exchange Market 238

How to Trade Foreign Exchange 238
Global OTC Foreign-Exchange Instruments 239
Size, Composition, and Location of the Foreign-Exchange Market 239
Foreign-Exchange Trades and Time Zones 241
Major Foreign-Exchange Markets 243
The Spot Market 243
The Forward Market 244
Options 244
Futures 245
The Foreign-Exchange Trading Process 245
Banks and Exchanges 245
Top Exchanges for Trading Foreign Exchange 246
How Companies Use Foreign Exchange 247
Cash Flow Aspects of Imports and Exports 247
Other Financial Flows 248
Point-Counterpoint
Is It OK to Speculate on Currency? 249

Looking to the Future

Where Are Foreign-Exchange Markets Headed? 251
CASE: Do Yuan to Buy Some Renminbi? 252
Endnotes 255

10 The Determination of Exchange Rates 257

CASE Venezuela’s Rapidly Changing Currency 258
Introduction 259
The International Monetary Fund 260
Origin and Objectives 260
The IMF Today 260
The Role of the IMF in Global Financial Crises 261
Evolution to Floating Exchange Rates 261
Exchange-Rate Arrangements 262
Three Choices: Hard Peg, Soft Peg, or Floating Arrangement 262
Hard Peg 263
Soft Peg 263
Floating Arrangement 263
The Euro 263
Point-Counterpoint
Should Africa Develop a Common Currency? 265

Determining Exchange Rates 266

Nonintervention: Currency in a Floating-Rate World 266
xii C on ten ts

Intervention: Currency in a Fixed-Rate or Managed Floating-Rate

World 267
Black Markets 268
Foreign-Exchange Convertibility and Controls 268
Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parity 269
Exchange Rates and Interest Rates 271
Other Factors in Exchange-Rate Determination 272
Forecasting Exchange-Rate Movements 272
Fundamental and Technical Forecasting 272
Fundamental Factors to Monitor 272
Business Implications of Exchange-Rate Changes 273
Marketing Decisions 273
Production Decisions 274
Financial Decisions 274
Looking to the Future
Changes in the Relative Strength of Global
Currencies 274
Case: Welcome to the World of Sony—Unless the Falling
Yen Rises (or Falls) Again 275
Endnotes 278

11 Global Capital Markets 279

CASE: Tax Wars: Pfizer Versus the U.S. Government 280
The Finance Function 281
The Role of the CFO 281
Capital Structure 282
Leveraging Debt Financing 282
Factors Affecting the Choice of Capital Structure 282
Global Debt Markets 284
Eurocurrencies and the Eurocurrency Market 284
International Bonds 285
Global Equity Markets 286
The Size of Global Stock Markets 287
Taxation of Foreign-Source Income 289
International Tax Practices 289
Taxing Branches and Subsidiaries 290
Transfer Prices 292
Double Taxation and Tax Credit 293
Dodging Taxes 294
Offshore Financing and Offshore Financial Centers 294
What is an OFC? 294
 C o nt e nt s xiii

Point-Counterpoint
Should Offshore Financial Centers and Aggressive Tax
Practices Be Eliminated? 296

Looking to the Future

The Growth of Capital Markets and the Drive by Governments
to Capture More Tax Revenues by MNEs 297
CASE: Does the Devil Really Wear Prada? 298
Endnotes 300

• Part Five: gloBal Strategy, Structure,

and imPlementation 301

12 The Strategy of International Business 301

CASE: Zara’s Disruptive Vision: Data-Driven Fast-Fashion 302
Strategy in the MNE 304
Getting Started: Vision and Mission 305
Moving Onward: Strategic Planning 307
Making Sense to Make Strategy 307
The Role of Resources, Capabilities, and Competencies 308
The Quest to Create Value 310
The Cost Leadership Strategy 310
The Differentiation Strategy 311
The Integrated Cost Leadership/Differentiation Strategy 312
Point-Counterpoint
Is Strategic Planning Productive? 313

Organizing Value Creation: The Value Chain 314

Configuring the Value Chain 315
Looking to the Future
Digits, Widgets, and Changing Location Advantages 319

Global Integration Versus Local Responsiveness 321

The Potential for Standardization 322
The Characteristics of Consumer Preferences 323
The Effect of Institutional Agents 324
Global Integration and Local Responsiveness: Mapping
their Interaction 324
International Corporate-Level Strategies 326
The International Strategy 326
The Localization Strategy 328
Global Strategy 329
Transnational Strategy 330
xiv C on ten ts

CASE: The Multinational Enterprise of the Future:

Leading Scenarios 332
Endnotes 334

13 Country Evaluation and Selection 335

®
CASE Burger King 336
The Importance of Location 338
Comparing Countries Through Scanning 338
Why Is Scanning Important? 338
Scanning Versus Detailed Analysis 339
Opportuniity and Risk Variables 340
Opportunities: Sales Expansion 340
Opportunities: Resource Acquisition 341
Risks 343
Analyzing and Relating the Opportunity
and Risk Variables 348
Sources and Shortcomings of Comparative Country
Information 350
Some Problems with Research Results and Data 350
External Sources of Information 351
Internally Generated Data 352
Point-Counterpoint
Should Companies Operate in and Send Employees
to Violent Areas? 352

Alternatives for Allocating Resources among Locations 353

Alternative Gradual Commitments 353
Geographic Diversification Versus Concentration 354
Reinvestment and Harvesting 355
Noncomparative Location Decisions 356
Looking to the Future
Conditions That May Cause Prime Locations to Change 356
CASE: Carrefour 357
Endnotes 360

14 Export and Import 361

CASE: SpinCent: The Decision to Export 362
Introduction 364
Exporting: Principles and Practices 365
Who are Exporters? 366
The Matter of Advantages 366
Characteristics of Exporters 367
 C o nt e nt s xv

Exporting: Motivation and Methods 368

Profitability 368
Productivity 369
Diversification 369
Export: Start-Up and Expansion 370
Incremental Internationalization 370
The Born-Global Phenomenon 371
The Influence of Time and Place 371
The Wildcard of Serendipity 372
Approaches to Exporting 372
Which Approach When? 373
Point-Counterpoint
Exporting E-waste: A Fair Solution? 374

Importing: Principles and Practices 378

Characteristics of Importers 378
Importing: Motivation and Methods 379
Import Drivers 379
Who Are Importers? 380
Importing and Exporting: Problems
and Pitfalls 380
Financial Risks 381
Customer Management 381
International Business Expertise 382
Marketing Challenges 382
Top Management Commitment 382
Government Regulation 383
Trade Documentation 384
Importing and Exporting: Resources
and Assistance 385
Public Agencies 386
Private Agents 387
Reconciling Opportunity and Challenge: An Export
Plan 390
Looking to the Future
Technology Transforms International
Trade 391

Countertrade 393
Costs 393
Benefits 394
CASE: The Borderfree Option: Going
Global—Simplified 394
Endnotes 396
xvi C on ten ts

15 Direct Investment and Collaborative Strategies 397

CASE: Meliá Hotels International 398
Introduction 401
Why Export and Import May Not Suffice 402
When It’s Cheaper to Produce Abroad 403
When Transportation Costs Too Much 403
When Domestic Capacity Isn’t Enough 403
When Products and Services Need Altering 403
When Trade Restrictions Hinder Imports 403
When Country of Origin Becomes an Issue 404
Why and How do Companies Make Wholly Owned FDI 404
Reasons for Wholly Owned Foreign Direct Investment 404
Acquisition Versus Greenfield 405
Why Companies Collaborate 406
General Motives for Collaborative Arrangements 406
International Motives for Collaborative Arrangements 408
Forms of and Choice of Collaborative Arrangements 409
Some Considerations in Choosing a Form 409
Point-Counterpoint
Should Countries Limit Foreign Control of Key
Industries? 410
Licensing 411
Franchising 412
Management Contracts 413
Turnkey Operations 413
Joint Ventures (JVs) 414
Equity Alliances 415
Why Collaborative Arrangements Fail or Succeed 415
Reasons for Failure 416
Helping Collaborative Operations Succeed 417
Looking to the Future
Growth in Project Size and Complexity 420
CASE: The oneworld Airline Alliance 421
Endnotes 425

16 The Organization of International Business 427

CASE: Organizing Global Operations: The “Gore
Way” 428
Introduction 430
 C o nt e nt s xvii

Changing Times, Changing Organizations 430

Expanding Scope of IB 431
The Internet as a Design Standard 431
Managerial Standards 431
Social Contract 432
Change and Challenge: MNEs Respond 432
Classical Organization Structures 433
Vertical Differentiation 433
Horizontal Differentiation 435
The Functional Structure 435
Divisional Structures 436
Global Matrix Structure 439
Mixed Structure 440
Neoclassical Structures 440
The Challenge of Boundaries 440
The Goal of Boundarylessness 441
The Network Structure 442
Virtual Organization 443
Neoclassical Structures in Action 444
Pitfalls of Neoclassical Structures 444
Point-Counterpoint
The Hierarchical Structure: The Superior Format 445

Coordination Systems 447

Coordination by Standardization 448
Coordination by Plan 449
Coordination by Mutual Adjustment 450
Control Systems 451
Bureaucratic Control 451
Market Control 451
Clan Control 452
Control Mechanisms 452
Which Control System When? 453
Organizational Culture 453
A Key Piece of the Performance Puzzle 453
The Power of Common Cause 454
Developing an Organizational Culture 455
Looking to the Future
The Rise of Corporate Universities 456
CASE: Building a Magical Organization at Johnson
& Johnson 458
Endnotes 460
xviii C on ten ts

• Part Six: managing international oPerationS 461

17 Marketing Globally 461

CASE: Tommy Hilfiger 462
International Marketing Strategies: Orientations, Segmentation,
and Targeting 463
Marketing Orientations 464
Segmenting and Targeting Markets 466
Product Policies: Country Adaptation Versus Global
Standardization 467
Why Firms Adapt Products 467
Alteration Costs 468
The Product Line: Extent and Mix 469
International Pricing Complexities 469
Potential Obstacles in International Pricing 469
Should Promotion Differ Among Countries? 472
The Push–Pull Mix 472
Some Problems in International Promotion 473
International Branding Strategies 475
Global Brand Versus Local Brands 476
Point-Counterpoint
Should Home Governments Regulate Their Companies’
Marketing in Developing Countries? 477

Distribution Practices and Complications 479

Deciding Whether to Standardize 479
Internalization or Not? 480
Distribution Partnership 480
Distribution Challenges and Opportunities 481
Gap Analysis: A Tool for Helping to Manage the International
Marketing Mix 482
Usage Gaps 483
Product-Line Gaps 484
Distribution and Competitive Gaps 484
Aggregating Countries’ Programs 484
Looking to the Future
How Might International Market Segmentation
Evolve? 485
CASE: Grameen Danone Foods in Bangladesh 486
Endnotes 491
 C o nt e nt s xix

18 Global Operations and Supply-Chain Management 493

CASE: Apple’s Global Supply Chain 494
Global Supply-Chain Management 496
What is Supply-Chain Management? 496
Global Supply-Chain and Operations Management Strategies 497
Operations Management Strategy 497
Global Sourcing 499
Why Global Sourcing? 501
Major Sourcing Configurations 501
The Make-or-Buy Decision 502
Point-Counterpoint
Should Firms Outsource Innovation? 502
Supplier Relations 504
Conflict Minerals 504
The Purchasing Function 504
Information Technology and Global Supply-Chain
Management 505
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 505
Enterprise Resource Planning/Material Requirements
Planning 505
Radio Frequency ID (RFID) 505
E-commerce 506
Quality 507
Zero Defects 507
Lean Manufacturing and Total Quality
Management (TQM) 508
Six Sigma 509
Quality Standards 509
Looking to the Future
Uncertainty and the Global Supply Chain 511
CASE: Nokero: Lighting the World 511
Endnotes 516

19 International Accounting and Finance Issues 517

CASE: GPS Capital Markets: In the Market for an Effective
Hedging Strategy? 518
The Crossroads of Accounting and Finance 520
What Does the Controller Control? 520
xx C on ten ts

Differences in Financial Statements Internationally 521

Differences in the Content of Financial Information 521
Factors Affecting Accounting Objectives, Standards, and Practices 522
Cultural Differences in Accounting 523
International Standards and Global Convergence 524
Mutual Recognition Versus Reconciliation 524
The First Steps in Establishing IFRS 525
The International Accounting Standards Board 525
Point-Counterpoint
Should U.S. Companies Be Allowed to Use IFRS? 526

Transactions in Foreign Currencies 527

Recording Transactions 527
Correct Procedures for U.S. Companies 528
Translating Foreign-Currency Financial Statements 528
Translation Methods 529
International Financial Issues 531
Capital Budgeting in a Global Context 531
Internal Sources of Funds 533
Global Cash Management 534
Foreign-Exchange Risk Management 536
Types of Exposure 536
Exposure-Management Strategy 537
Looking to the Future
Will IFRS Become the Global Accounting Standard? 539
CASE: H&M: The Challenges of Global Expansion
and the Move to Adopt International Financial
Reporting Standards 541
Endnotes 543

20 International Human Resource Management 545

CASE: Globalizing Your Career 546
International Human Resource Management 548
The Strategic Role of IHRM 550
IHRM’s Mission 551
The Perspective of the Expatriate 551
Who’s Who? 551
Trends in Expatriate Assignments 552
The Economics of Expatriates 554
The Enduring Constant 554
Staffing Frameworks in the MNE 554
The Ethnocentric Framework 555
 C o nt e nt s xxi

The Polycentric Staffing Framework 556

The Geocentric Staffing Framework 558
Which Staffing Framework When? 559
Expatriate Selection 560
Technical Competence 560
Self-Orientation 560
Others-Orientation 561
Resourcefulness 561
Global Mindset 561
Expatriate Preparation and Development 562
Pre-Departure Preparation Programs 563
In-Country Development Programs 564
Family Matters 564
Point-Counterpoint
English: Destined to Be the Global Language? 565

Expatriate Compensation 567

Types of Compensation Plans 568
Components of Expatriate Compensation 569
Compensation Complications 570
Expatriate Repatriation 570
Repatriation Challenges 571
Improving Repatriation 571
Expatriate Failure 572
The Costs of Failure 572
The Wildcard 573
Looking to the Future
I’m Going Where? The Changing Locations of International
Assignments 573
CASE: Tel-Comm-Tek: Selecting the Managing Director
of its Indian Subsidiary 574
Endnotes 577

glossary 579
company index 589
name index 595
Subject index 614
 Preface
This textbook is one of the best-selling U.S. and worldwide international business
(IB) textbooks. Widely used in both undergraduate and MBA level courses, this text
has had authorized translations into Albanian, Chinese, Macedonian, Russian,
Spanish, Korean, and Thai. Its first edition in 1976, according to many professors,
defined the IB field. Its subsequent 14 editions have set the global standard for
studying IB’s environments and operations. Students, faculty, and managers have
praised our text for its compelling balance between rigorous, authoritative theory
and meaningful practice within the context of a fresh, current analysis of IB. The
elements of success that have driven this performance anchor our efforts to make
this 16th edition the best version yet. We believe these efforts result in a textbook that
provides you and your students the best possible understanding of what is happen-
ing and is likely to happen in the world of business.

WHAT’S NEW TO THE SixTEENTH EdiTiON?

Ongoing trends and new development in the global business environment called for
us to rethink and revise our interpretations of the environments of operations of inter-
national business. Incorporating the corresponding changes convinced the publishers
and the authors of the usefulness of publishing a 16th edition.

• Global Changes
IB, probably more so than any other subject, needs updating because of the number
of and rapidity of global changes. The period since our last edition was no exception.
Among the many changes we have referenced in our text are the spread of mosquito-
borne epidemics (Zika, Ebola, dengue fever, and yellow fever); changes in national
borders (e.g., Crimea now a part of Russia rather than the Ukraine); the rise of ISIS
and its extended terrorism; the expanding scale and scope of technology; oil technol-
ogy that has altered global supply locations and prices; the evolving role of Bitcoins
for international currency exchange and investment opportunities; the emergence
of disruptive technologies such 3-D printers, robotics, and artificial intelligence; the
opening of U.S.–Cuban diplomatic exchanges; the advent of negative interest-rate
policies in many Western markets; the termination of an embargo on Iran; the near
breakup of certain countries (e.g., the United Kingdom and Spain); the use of cor-
porate inversions to reduce taxes; ongoing ups and downs by prominent emerging
markets; accelerating sophistication of communication systems; decreasing degrees
of political and economic freedom throughout the world; greater agreement that the
global climate is warming; the game changing implications of social media; an almost
unprecedented refugee movement into Europe; and greater support in many coun-
tries for more national sovereignty leading to the possible breakup of regional eco-
nomic groups.

• Theories and Evidence to Explain IB and Globalization

It is now over 40 years since we started writing this text’s first edition. We can remem-
ber when the Academy of International Business (AIB), the main IB academic orga-
nization, attracted fewer than 40 attendees for its annual meeting; now it routinely
xxii
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
never let dignity stand in the way of business. What to most women would
have been an insupportable humiliation did not cost her a pang. She even
found amusement in it. From the nature of the case, she could not take one
of her counsellors into her confidence. There was no chance of imposing
upon foreigners unless she could persuade those about her that she was in
earnest. They were amazed that she should run the risk of establishing the
French in the Netherlands. She had no intention of doing so. When Philip
should be brought so low as to be willing to concede a constitutional
government, she could always throw her weight on his side and get rid of
the French.
The match with Alençon had been proposed six years before. It had
lately slumbered. But there was no difficulty in whistling him back, and
making it appear that the renewed overture came from his side. After
tedious negotiations, protracted over twelve months, he at length paid his
first visit to Elizabeth (August 1579). He was an under-sized man with an
over-sized head, villainously ugly, with a face deeply seamed by smallpox,
a nose ending in a knob that made it look like two noses, and a croaking
voice. Elizabeth’s liking for big handsome men is well known. But as she
had not the least intention of marrying Alençon, it cost her nothing to affirm
that she was charmed with his appearance, and that he was just the sort of
man she could fancy for a husband. The only agreeable thing about him was
his conversation, in which he shone, so that people who did not thoroughly
know him always at first gave him credit for more ability than he possessed.
Elizabeth, who had a pet name for all favourites, dubbed him her “frog”;
and “Grenouille” he was fain to subscribe himself in his love-letters. This
first visit was a short one, and he went away hopeful of success.
The English people could only judge by appearances, and for the first
time in her reign Elizabeth was unpopular. The Puritan Stubbs published his
Discovery of a Gaping Gulf wherein England is like to be swallowed by
another French Marriage. But the excitement was by no means confined to
the Puritans. Hatred of Frenchmen long remained a ruling sentiment with
most Englishmen. Elizabeth vented her rage on Stubbs, who had been so
rude as to tell her that childbirth at her age would endanger her life. He was
sentenced to have his hand cut off. “I remember,” says Camden, “being then
present, that Stubbs, after his right hand was cut off, put off his hat with his
left, and said with a loud voice, ‘God save the Queen,’ The multitude
standing about was deeply silent.”
 Not long after Alençon’s visit, a treaty of marriage was signed
(November 1579), with a proviso that two months should be allowed for the
Queen’s subjects to become reconciled to it. If, at the end of that time,
Elizabeth did not ratify the treaty, it was to be null and void. The appointed
time came and went without ratification. Burghley, as usual, predicted that
the jilted suitor would become a deadly enemy, and drew an alarming
picture of the dangers that threatened England, with the old exhortation to
his mistress to form a Protestant league and subsidise the Scotch
Anglophiles. But in 1572 she had slipped out of the Anjou marriage, and yet
secured a French alliance. She confided in her ability to play the same game
now. Though she had not ratified the marriage treaty, she continued to
correspond with Alençon and keep up his hopes, urging him at the same
time to lead an army to the help of the States. This, however, he was
unwilling to do till he had secured the marriage. The French King was
ready, and even eager, to back his brother. But he, too, insisted on the
marriage, and that Elizabeth should openly join him in war against Spain.
In the summer of 1580, Philip conquered Portugal, thus not only
rounding off his Peninsular realm, but acquiring the enormous transmarine
dominions of the Portuguese crown. All Europe was profoundly impressed
and alarmed by this apparent increase of his power. Elizabeth incessantly
lectured Henry on the necessity of abating a preponderance so dangerous to
all other States, and tried to convince him that it was specially incumbent
on France to undertake the enterprise. But she preached in vain. Henry
steadily refused to stir unless England would openly assist him with troops
and money, of which the marriage was to be the pledge. He did not conceal
his suspicion that, when Elizabeth had pushed him into war, she would
“draw her neck out of the collar” and leave him to bear the whole danger.
This was, in fact, her intention. She believed that a war with France
would soon compel Philip to make proper concessions to the States;
whereupon she would interpose and dictate a peace. “Marry my brother,”
Henry kept saying, “and then I shall have security that you will bear your
fair share of the fighting and expenses.” “If I am to go to war,” argued
Elizabeth, “I cannot marry your brother; for my subjects will say that I am
dragged into it by my husband, and they will grudge the expense. Suppose,
instead of a marriage, we have an alliance not binding me to open war; then
I will furnish you with money underhand. You know you have got to fight.
You cannot afford to let Philip go on increasing his power.”
 Henry remained doggedly firm. No marriage, no war. At last, finding she
could not stir him, Elizabeth again concluded a treaty of marriage, but with
the extraordinary proviso that six weeks should be left for private
explanations by letter between herself and Alençon. It soon appeared what
this meant. In these six weeks Elizabeth furnished her suitor with money,
and incited him to make a sudden attack on Parma, who was then besieging
Cambray, close to the French frontier. Alençon, thinking himself now sure
of the marriage, collected 15,000 men; and Henry, though not openly
assisting him, no longer prohibited the enterprise. But, as soon as Elizabeth
thought they were sufficiently committed, she gave them to understand that
the marriage must be again deferred, that her subjects were discontented,
that she could only join in a defensive alliance, but that she would furnish
money “in reasonable sort” underhand.
All this is very unscrupulous, very shameless, even for that shameless
age. Hardened liars like Henry and Alençon thought it too bad. They were
ready for violence as well as fraud, and availed themselves of whichever
method came handiest. Elizabeth also used the weapon which nature had
given her. Being constitutionally averse from any but peaceful methods, she
made up for it by a double dose of fraud. Dente lupus, cornu taurus. It
would have been useless for a male statesman to try to pass himself off as a
fickle impulsive, susceptible being, swayed from one moment to another in
his political schemes by passions and weaknesses that are thought natural in
the other sex. This was Elizabeth’s advantage, and she made the most of it.
She was a masculine woman simulating, when it suited her purpose, a
feminine character. The men against whom she was matched were never
sure whether they were dealing with a crafty and determined politician, or a
vain, flighty, amorous woman. This uncertainty was constantly putting them
out in their calculations. Alençon would never have been so taken in if he
had not told himself that any folly might be expected from an elderly
woman enamoured of a young man.
On this occasion Elizabeth scored, if not the full success she had hoped
from her audacious mystification, yet no inconsiderable portion of it. Henry
managed to draw back just in time, and was not let in for a big war. But
Alençon, at the head of 15,000 men, and close to Cambray, could not for
very shame beat a retreat. Parma retired at his approach, and the French
army entered Cambray in triumph (August 1581). Alençon therefore had
been put in harness to some purpose.
 Though Henry III. had good reason to complain of the way he had been
treated, he did not make it a quarrel with Elizabeth. His interests, as she saw
all along, were too closely bound up with hers to permit him to think of
such a thing. On the contrary, he renewed the alliance of 1572 in an ampler
form, though it still remained strictly defensive. Alençon, after relieving and
victualling Cambray, disbanded his army, and went over to England again
to press for the marriage (Nov. 1581). Thither he was followed by
ambassadors from the States. By the advice of Orange they had resolved to
take him as their sovereign, and they were now urgently pressing him to
return to the Netherlands to be installed. Elizabeth added her pressure; but
he was unwilling to leave England until he should have secured the
marriage. For three months (Nov. 1581—Feb. 1582) did Elizabeth try every
art to make him accept promise for performance. She was thoroughly in her
element. To win her game in this way, not by the brutal arbitrament of war,
or even by the ordinary tricks of vicarious diplomacy, but by artifices
personally executed, feats of cajolery that might seem improbable on the
stage,—this was delightful in the highest degree. The more distrustful
Alençon showed himself, the keener was the pleasure of handling him. One
day he is hidden behind a curtain to view her elegant dancing; not, surely,
that he might be smitten with it, but that he might think she desired him to
be smitten. Another day she kisses him on the lips (en la boca) in the
presence of the French ambassador. She gives him a ring. She presents him
to her household as their future master. She orders the Bishop of Lincoln to
draw up a marriage service. It is a repulsive spectacle; but, after all, we are
not so much disgusted with the elderly woman who pretends to be willing
to marry the young man, as with the young man who is really willing to
marry the elderly woman. Unfortunately for Elizabeth, her acting was so
realistic that it not only took in contemporaries, but has persuaded many
modern writers that she was really influenced by a degrading passion.
Henry III. himself was at last induced to believe that Elizabeth was this
time in earnest. But he could not be driven from his determination to risk
nothing till he saw the marriage actually concluded. Pinart, the French
Secretary of State, was accordingly sent over to settle the terms. Elizabeth
demanded one concession after another, and finally asked for the restitution
of Calais. There was no mistaking what this meant. Pinart, in the King’s
name, formally forbade Alençon to proceed to the Netherlands except as a
married man, and tried to intimidate Elizabeth by threatening that his
master would ally himself with Philip. But she laughed at him, and told him
that she could have the Spanish alliance whenever she chose, which was
perfectly true. Alençon himself gave way. He felt that he was being played
with. He had come over here, with a fatuité not uncommon among young
Frenchmen, expecting to bend a love-sick Queen to serve his political
designs. He found himself, to his intense mortification, bent to serve hers.
Ashamed to show his face in France without either his Belgian dominions
or his English wife, he was fain to accept Elizabeth’s solemn promise that
she would marry him as soon as she could, and allowed himself to be
shipped off under the escort of an English fleet to the Netherlands (Feb.
1582).
According to Mr. Froude, “the Prince of Orange intimated that Alençon
was accepted by the States only as a pledge that England would support
them; if England failed them, they would not trust their fortunes to so vain
an idiot.” This statement appears to be drawn from the second-hand tattle of
Mendoza, and is probably, like much else from that source, unworthy of
credit. But whether Orange sent such an “intimation” or not, it cannot be
allowed to weigh against the ample evidence that Alençon was accepted by
him and by the States mainly for the sake of the French forces he could
raise on his own account, and the assistance which he undertook to procure
from his brother. Neither Orange nor any one else regarded him as an idiot.
Orange had not been led to expect that he would bring any help from
England except money supplied underhand; and money Elizabeth did
furnish in very considerable quantities. But the Netherlanders now expected
everything to be done for them, and were backward with their contributions
both in men and money. Clearly there is something to be said for the let-
alone policy to which Elizabeth usually leant.
The States intended Alençon’s sovereignty to be of the strictly
constitutional kind, such as it had been before the encroachments of Philip
and his father. This did not suit the young Frenchman, and at the beginning
of 1583 he attempted a coup-d’état, not without encouragement from some
of the Belgian Catholics. At Antwerp his French troops were defeated with
great bloodshed by the citizens, and the general voice of the country was for
sending him about his business. But both Elizabeth and Orange, though
disconcerted and disgusted by his treachery, still saw nothing better to be
done than to patch up the breach and retain his services. Both of them urged
this course on the States—Orange with his usual dignified frankness;
Elizabeth in the crooked, blustering fashion which has brought upon her
policy, in so many instances, reproach which it does not really deserve.
Norris, the commander of the English volunteers, had discountenanced the
coup-d’état and taken his orders from the States. Openly Elizabeth
reprimanded him, and ordered him to bring his men back to England.
Secretly she told him he had done well, and bade him remain where he was.
Norris was in fact there to protect the interests of England quite as much
against the French as against Spain. There is not the least ground for the
assertion that in promoting reconciliation with Alençon, Orange acted under
pressure from Elizabeth. Everything goes to show that he, the wisest and
noblest statesman of his time, thought it the only course open to the States,
unless they were prepared to submit to Philip. Both Elizabeth and Orange
felt that the first necessity was to keep the quarrel alive between the
Frenchman and the Spaniard. The English Queen therefore continued to
feed Alençon with hopes of marriage, and the States patched up a
reconciliation with him (March 1583). But his heart failed him. He saw
Parma taking town after town. He knew that he had made himself odious to
the Netherlanders. He was covered with shame. He was fatally stricken with
consumption. In June 1583 he left Belgium never to return. Within a
twelvemonth he was dead.
 CHAPTER VII

THE PAPAL ATTACK: 1570-1583

SOVEREIGNS and statesmen in the sixteenth century are to be honoured or

condemned according to the degree in which they aimed on the one hand at
preserving political order, and on the other at allowing freedom of opinion.
It was not always easy to reconcile these two aims. The first was a
temporary necessity, and yet was the more urgent—as indeed is always the
case with the tasks of the statesman. He is responsible for the present; it is
not for him to attempt to provide for a remote future. Political order and the
material well-being of nations may be disastrously impaired by the
imprudence or weakness of a ruler. Thought, after all, may be trusted to take
care of itself in the long-run.
To the modern Liberal, with his doctrine of absolute religious equality,
toleration seems an insult, and anything short of toleration is regarded as
persecution. In the sixteenth century the most advanced statesmen did not
see their way to proclaim freedom of public worship and of religious
discussion. It was much if they tolerated freedom of opinion, and connived
at a quiet, private propagation of other religions than those established by
law. It would be wrong to condemn and despise them as actuated by
superstition and narrow-minded prejudice. Their motives were mainly
political, and it is reasonable to suppose that they knew better than we do
whether a larger toleration was compatible with public order.
We have seen that under the Act of Supremacy, in the first year of
Elizabeth, the oath was only tendered to persons holding office, spiritual or
temporal, under the crown, and that the penalty for refusing it was only
deprivation. But in her fifth year (1563), it was enacted that the oath might
be tendered to members of the House of Commons, schoolmasters, and
attorneys, who, if they refused it, might be punished by forfeiture of
property and perpetual imprisonment. To those who had held any
ecclesiastical office, or who should openly disapprove of the established
worship, or celebrate or hear mass, the oath might be tendered a second
time, with the penalties of high treason for refusal.
 That this law authorised an atrocious persecution cannot be disputed, and
there is no doubt that many zealous Protestants wished it to be enforced.
But the practical question is, Was it enforced? The government wished to be
armed with the power of using it, and for the purpose of expelling Catholics
from offices it was extensively used. But no one was at this time visited
with the severer penalties, the bishops having been privately forbidden to
tender the oath a second time to any one without special instructions.
The Act of Uniformity, passed in the first year of Elizabeth, prohibited
the use of any but the established liturgy, whether in public or private, under
pain of perpetual imprisonment for the third offence, and imposed a fine of
one shilling on recusants—that is, upon persons who absented themselves
from church on Sundays and holidays. To what extent Catholics were
interfered with under this Act has been a matter of much dispute. Most of
them, during the first eleven years of Elizabeth, either from ignorance or
worldliness, treated the Anglican service as equivalent to the Catholic, and
made no difficulty about attending church, even after this compliance with
the law had been forbidden by Pius IV. in the sixth year of Elizabeth. Only
the more scrupulous absented themselves, and called in the ministrations of
the “old priests,” who with more or less secrecy said mass in private houses.
Some of these offenders were certainly punished before Elizabeth had been
two years on the throne. The enforcement of laws was by no means so
uniform in those days as it is now. Much depended on the leanings of the
noblemen and justices of the peace in different localities. Both from
disposition and policy Elizabeth desired, as a general rule, to connive at
Catholic nonconformity when it did not take an aggressive and fanatical
form. But she had no scruple about applying the penalties of these Acts to
individuals who for any reason, religious or political, were specially
obnoxious to her.
So things went on till the northern insurrection: the laws authorising a
searching and sanguinary persecution; the Government, much to the disgust
of zealous Protestants, declining to put those laws in execution. Judged by
modern ideas, the position of the Catholics was intolerable; but if measured
by the principles of government then universally accepted, or if compared
with the treatment of persons ever so slightly suspected of heresy in
countries cursed with the Inquisition, it was not a position of which they
had any great reason to complain; nor did the large majority of them
complain.
 Pope Pius IV. (1559-1566) was comparatively cautious and circumspect
in his attitude towards Elizabeth. But his successor Pius V. (1566-1572),
having made up his mind that her destruction was the one thing necessary
for the defeat of heresy in Europe, strove to stir up against her rebellion at
home and invasion from abroad. A bull deposing her, and absolving her
subjects from their allegiance, was drawn up. But while Pius, conscious of
the offence which it would give to all the sovereigns of Europe, delayed to
issue it, the northern rebellion flared up and was trampled out. The absence
of such a bull was by many Catholics made an excuse for holding aloof
from the rebel earls. When it was too late the bull was issued (Feb. 1570).
Philip and Charles IX.—sovereigns first and Catholics afterwards—refused
to let it be published in their dominions.
After the northern insurrection the Queen issued a remarkable appeal to
her people, which was ordered to be placarded in every parish, and read in
every church. She could point with honest pride to eleven years of such
peace abroad and tranquillity at home as no living Englishman could
remember. Her economy had enabled her to conduct the government
without any of the illegal exactions to which former sovereigns had
resorted. “She had never sought the life, the blood, the goods, the houses,
estates or lands of any person in her dominions.” This happy state of things
the rebels had tried to disturb on pretext of religion. They had no real
grievance on that score. Attendance at parish church was indeed obligatory
by law, though, she might have added, it was very loosely enforced. But she
disclaimed any wish to pry into opinions, or to inquire in what sense any
one understood rites or ceremonies. In other words, the language of the
communion service was not incompatible with the doctrine of
transubstantiation, and loyal Catholics were at liberty, were almost invited,
to interpret it in that sense if they liked.
This compromise between their religious and political obligations had in
fact been hitherto adopted by the large majority of English Catholics. But a
time was come when it was to be no longer possible for them. They were
summoned to make their choice between their duty as citizens and their
duty as Catholics. The summons had come, not from the Queen, but from
the Pope, and it is not strange that they had thenceforth a harder time of it.
Many of them, indignant with the Pope for bringing trouble upon them,
gave up the struggle and conformed to the Established Church. The temper
of the rest became more bitter and dangerous. The Puritan Parliament of
1571 passed a bill to compel all persons not only to attend church, but to
receive the communion twice a year; and another making formal
reconciliation to the Church of Rome high treason both for the convert and
the priest who should receive him. Here we have the persecuting spirit,
which was as inherent in the zealous Protestant as in the zealous Catholic.
Attempts to excuse such legislation, as prompted by political reasons, can
only move the disgust of every honest-minded man. The first of these bills
did not receive the royal assent, though Cecil—just made Lord Burghley—
had strenuously pushed it through the Upper House. Elizabeth probably saw
that its only effect would be to enable the Protestant zealots in every parish
to enjoy the luxury of harassing their quiet Catholic neighbours, who
attended church but would scruple to take the sacrament.
The Protestant spirit of this House of Commons showed itself not only in
laws for strengthening the Government and persecuting the Catholics, but in
attempts to puritanise the Prayer-book, which much displeased the Queen.
Strickland, one of the Puritan leaders, was forbidden to attend the House.
But such was the irritation caused by this invasion of its privileges, that the
prohibition was removed after one day. It was in this session of Parliament
that the doctrines of the Church of England were finally determined by the
imposition on the clergy of the Thirty-nine Articles, which, as every one
knows, are much more Protestant than the Prayer-book. Till then they had
only had the sanction of Convocation.
During the first forty years or so, from the beginning of the Reformation,
Protestantism spread in most parts of Europe with great rapidity. It was not
merely an intellectual revolt against doctrines no longer credible. The
numbers of the reformers were swelled, and their force intensified by the
flocking in of pious souls, athirst for personal holiness, and of many others
who, without being high-wrought enthusiasts, were by nature disposed to
value whatever seemed to make for a purer morality. The religion which
had nurtured Bernard and À Kempis was deserted, not merely as being
untrue, but as incompatible with the highest spiritual life—nay, as
positively corrupting to society. This imagination, of course, had but a short
day. The return to the Bible and the doctrines of primitive Christianity, the
deliverance from “the Bishop of Rome and his detestable enormities,” were
not found to be followed by any general improvement of morals in
Protestant countries. He that was unjust was unjust still; he that was filthy
was filthy still. The repulsive contrast too often seen between
sanctimonious professions and unscrupulous conduct contributed to the
disenchantment.
In the meanwhile a great regeneration was going on within the Catholic
Church itself. Signs of this can be detected quite as early as the first rise of
Protestantism. It is, therefore, not to be attributed to Protestant teaching and
example, though doubtless the rivalry of the younger religion stimulated the
best energies of the older. No long time elapsed before this regeneration had
worked its way to the highest places in the Church. The Popes by whom
Elizabeth was confronted were all men of pure lives and single-hearted
devotion to the Catholic cause.
The last two years of the Council of Trent (1562-3) were the starting-
point of the modern Catholic Church. Many proposals had been made for
compromise with Protestantism. But the Fathers of Trent saw that the only
chance of survival for a Church claiming to be Catholic was to remain on
the old lines. By the canons and decrees of the Council, ratified by Pius IV.,
the old doctrines and discipline were confirmed and definitely formulated.
One branch indeed of the Papal power was irretrievably gone. Royal
authority had become absolute, and the kings, including Philip II., refused to
tolerate any interference with it. The Papacy had to acquiesce in the loss of
its power over sovereigns. But as regards the bishops and clergy, and things
strictly appertaining to religion, its spiritual autocracy, which the great
councils of the last century had aimed at breaking, was re-established, and
has continued. The new situation, though it seemed to place the Popes on a
humbler footing than in the days of Gregory VII. or Innocent III., was a
healthy one. It confined them to their spiritual domain, and drove them to
make the best of it.
Until the decrees of the Council of Trent, the split between Protestants
and Catholics was not definitely and irrevocably decided. Many on both
sides had shrunk from admitting it. The Catholic world might seem to be
narrowed by the defection of the Protestant States. But all the more clearly
did it appear that a Church claiming to be universal is not concerned with
political boundaries. The resistance to the spread of heresy had hitherto
consisted of many local struggles, in which the repressive measures had
emanated from the orthodox sovereigns, and had therefore been fitful and
unconnected. But not long after the Tridentine reorganisation, the Pope
appears again as commander-in-chief of the Catholic forces, surveying and
directing combined operations from one end of Europe to the other. Pius IV.
had been with difficulty prevented by Philip from excommunicating
Elizabeth. Pius V. had launched his bull, as we have seen, a few months too
late (1570); and even then it was not allowed to be published in either Spain
or France. The life of that Pope was wasted in earnest remonstrances with
the Catholic sovereigns for not executing the sentence of the Church against
the heretic Queen. Gregory XIII., who succeeded him just before the
Bartholomew Massacre, took the attack into his own hands. He was a warm
patron of the Jesuits, who were especially devoted to the centralising
system re-established at Trent. He and they had made up their minds that
England was the key of the Protestant position; that until Elizabeth was
removed no advance was to be hoped for anywhere.
The decline of a religion may be accompanied by a positive increase of
earnestness and activity on the part of its remaining votaries, deluding them
into a belief that they are but passing through, or have successfully passed
through, a period of temporary depression and eclipse. Among the Catholics
of the latter part of the sixteenth century there was all the enthusiasm of a
religious revival. In no place did this show itself more than at Oxford. There
the weak points of popular movements have never been allowed to pass
without challenge, and what is really valuable or beautiful in time-worn
faiths has been sure of receiving fair-play and something more. The gloss of
the Reformation was already worn off. The worldly and carnal were its
supporters and directors. It no longer demanded enthusiasm and sacrifice. It
walked in purple and fine linen. Young men of quick intellect and high
aspirations who, a generation earlier, would have been captivated by its fair
promise and have thrown themselves into its current, yielded now to the
eternal spell of the older Church, cleansed as she was of her pollutions, and
purged of her dross by the discipline of adversity.
The leader of these Oxford enthusiasts was a young fellow of Oriel,
William Allen. In the third year of Elizabeth, at the age of twenty-eight, he
resigned the Principalship of St. Mary Hall. The next eight years were spent
partly abroad, partly in secret missionary work in England, carried on at the
peril of his life. The old priests, who with more or less concealment and
danger continued to exercise their office among the English Catholics, were
gradually dying off. In order to train successors to them, Allen founded an
English seminary at Douai (1568). To this important step it was mainly due
that the Catholic religion did not become extinct in this country. In the first
five years of its existence the college at Douai sent nearly a hundred priests
to England.
It was the aim of Allen to put an end to the practical toleration allowed to
Catholic laymen of the quieter sort. The Catholic who began by putting in
the compulsory number of attendances at his parish church was likely to
end by giving up his faith altogether. If he did not, his son would. Allen
deliberately preferred a sweeping persecution—one that would make the
position of Catholics intolerable, and ripen them for rebellion. He wanted
martyrs. The ardent young men whom he trained at Douai and (after 1578)
at Rheims, went back to their native land with the clear understanding that
of all the services they could render to the Church the greatest would be to
die under the hangman’s knife.
Gregory XIII. hoped great things from Allen’s seminary, and furnished
funds for its support. In 1579 Allen went to Rome, and enlisted the support
of Mercurian, General of the Jesuits. Two English Jesuits, Robert Parsons
and Edward Campion, ex-fellows of Balliol and St. John’s, were selected as
missionaries. Campion was eight years younger than Allen. He had had a
brilliant career at Oxford, being especially distinguished for his eloquence.
He was at that time personally known to both Cecil and the Queen, and
enjoyed their favour. He took deacon’s orders in 1568, but not long
afterwards joined Allen at Douai, and formally abjured the Anglican
Church. He had been six years a Jesuit when he was despatched on his
dangerous mission to England.
Tired of waiting for the initiative of Philip, Gregory XIII. and the Jesuits
had planned a threefold attack on Elizabeth in England, Scotland, and
Ireland. In England a revivalist movement was to be carried on among the
Catholics by the missionaries. Catholic writers have been at great pains to
argue that this was a purely religious movement, prosecuted with the single
object of saving souls. The Jesuits have always known their men and
employed them with discrimination. Saving of souls was very likely the
simple object of a man of Campion’s saintly and exalted nature. He himself
declared that he had been strictly forbidden to meddle with worldly
concerns or affairs of State, and nothing inconsistent with this declaration
was proved against him at his trial. But without laying any stress on
statements extracted from prisoners under torture, we cannot doubt that his
employers aimed at re-establishing Catholicism in England by rebellion and
foreign invasion. This was thoroughly understood by every missionary who
crossed the sea; and if Campion never alluded to it even in his most familiar
conversations he must have had an extraordinary control over his tongue.
The evidence that the assassination of the Queen was a recognised part
of the Jesuit plan, determined by the master spirits and accepted by all the
subordinate agents, is perhaps not quite conclusive. If proved, it would only
show that they were not more scrupulous than most statesmen and
politicians of the time. Lax as sixteenth century notions were about political
murder, there were always some consciences more tender than others. It is
likely enough that Campion personally disapproved of such projects, and
that they were not thrust upon his attention. But he can hardly have avoided
being aware that they were contemplated by the less squeamish of his
brethren.
Campion and Parsons came to England in disguise in the summer of
1580. Their mission was not a success. It only served to show how much
more securely Elizabeth was seated on her throne than in the earlier years of
her reign. In his letters to Rome, Campion boasts of the welcome he met
with everywhere, the crowds that attended his preaching, the ardour of the
Catholics, and the disrepute into which Protestantism was falling. He had
evidently worked himself up to such a state of ecstasy that he was living in
a world of his own imagination, and was no competent witness of facts. He
crept about England in various disguises, and when he was in districts
where the nobles and gentry favoured the old religion, he preached with a
publicity which seems extraordinary to us in these days when the laws are
executed with prompt uniformity by means of railways, telegraphs, and a
well-organised police. In the sixteenth century England had nothing that can
be called an organised machinery for the prevention and detection of crime.
If an outbreak occurred the Government collected militia, and trampled it
out with an energy that took no account of law and feared no consequences.
But in ordinary times it had to depend on the local justices of the peace and
parish constables, and if they were remiss the laws were a dead letter. There
were no newspapers. The high-roads were few and bad. One parish did not
know what was going on in the next. Campion could be passed on from one
gentleman’s house to another on horses quite as good as any officer of the
Government rode, and could travel all over England without ever using a
high-road or showing his face in a town. If he preached to a hundred people
in some Lancashire village, Lord Derby did not want to know it, and before
the news reached Burghley or Walsingham he would be in another county,
or perhaps back in London—then, as now, the safest of all hiding-places.
Thus, though a warrant was issued for his arrest as soon as he arrived in
England, it was not till July in the next year (1581) that he was taken, after
an unusually public and protracted appearance in the neighbourhood of
Oxford.
He had little or nothing to show for his twelve months’ tour, and this
although the Government had, as Allen hoped, allowed itself to be provoked
into an increase of severity which seems to have been quite unnecessary.
The large majority of Catholic laymen would evidently have preferred that
both Seminarists and Jesuits should keep away. They did not want civil war.
They did not want to be persecuted. They were against a foreign invasion,
without which they knew very well that Elizabeth could not be deposed.
They were even loyal to her. They were content to wait till she should
disappear in the course of nature and make room for the Queen of Scots.
Mendoza writes to Philip that “they place themselves in the hands of God,
and are willing to sacrifice life and all in the service, but scarcely with that
burning zeal which they ought to show.”
By the bull of Pius V., Englishmen were forbidden to acknowledge
Elizabeth as their Queen; in other words, they were ordered to expose
themselves to the penalties of treason. If the Pope would be satisfied with
nothing less than this, it was quite certain that he would alienate most of his
followers in England. Gregory XIII. therefore had authorised the Jesuits to
explain that although the Protestants, by willingly acknowledging the
Queen, were incurring the damnation pronounced by the bull, Catholics
would be excused for unwillingly acknowledging her until some
opportunity arrived for dethroning her. Protestant writers have exclaimed
against this distinction as treacherous. It was perfectly reasonable. It
represents, for instance, the attitude of every Alsatian who accords an
unwilling recognition to the German Emperor. But the English Government
intolerantly and unwisely made it the occasion for harassing the
consciences of men who were most of them guiltless of any intention to
rebel.
Amongst other persecuting laws passed early in 1581, was one which
raised the fine for non-attendance at church to twenty pounds a month. Such
a measure was calculated to excite much more wide-spread disaffection
than the hanging of a few priests. It was not intended to be a brutum fulmen.
The names of all recusants in each parish were returned to the Council.
They amounted to about 50,000, and the fines exacted became a not
inconsiderable item in the royal revenue. That number certainly formed but
a small portion of the Catholic population. But if all the rest had been in the
habit of going to church, contrary to the Pope’s express injunction, rather
than pay a small fine, the Government ought to have seen that they were not
the stuff of which rebels are made.
Campion, after being compelled by torture to disclose the names of his
hosts in different counties, was called on to maintain the Catholic doctrines
in a three days’ discussion before a large audience against four Protestant
divines, who do not seem to have been ashamed of themselves. He was
offered pardon if he would attend once in church. As he steadfastly refused,
he was racked again till his limbs were dislocated. When he had partially
recovered he was put on his trial, along with several of his companions, not
under any of the recent anti-catholic laws but under the ordinary statute of
Edward III., for “compassing and imagining the Queen’s death”—such a
horror had the Burghleys and Walsinghams of anything like religious
persecution! Being unable to hold up his hand to plead Not Guilty, “two of
his companions raised it for him, first kissing the broken joints.” According
to Mendoza (whom on other occasions we are invited to accept as a witness
of truth), his nails had been torn from his fingers. Apart from his religious
belief nothing treasonable was proved against him in deed or word. He
acknowledged Elizabeth for his rightful sovereign, as the new interpretation
of the papal bull permitted him to do, but he declined to give any opinion
about the Pope’s right to depose princes. This was enough for the judge and
jury, and he was found guilty. At the place of execution he was again
offered his pardon if he would deny the papal right of deposition, or even
hear a Protestant sermon. He wished the Queen a long and quiet reign and
all prosperity, but more he would not say. At the quartering “a drop of blood
spirted on the clothes of a youth named Henry Walpole, to whom it came as
a divine command. Walpole, converted on the spot, became a Jesuit, and
soon after met the same fate on the same spot.”
Mr. Froude’s comment is that “if it be lawful in defence of national
independence to kill open enemies in war, it is more lawful to execute the
secret conspirator who is teaching doctrines in the name of God which are
certain to be fatal to it.” It would perhaps be enough to remark that this
reasoning amply justifies some of the worst atrocities of the French
Revolution. Hallam and Macaulay have condemned it by anticipation in
language which will commend itself to all who are not swayed by religious,
or, what is more offensive, anti-religious bigotry.[4]
Cruel as the English criminal law was, and long remained, it never
authorised the use of torture to extract confession. The rack in the Tower is
said to have made its appearance, with other innovations of absolute
government, in the reign of Edward IV. But it seems to have been little used
before the reign of Elizabeth, under whom it became the ordinary
preliminary to a political trial. For this the chief blame must rest personally
on Burghley. Opinions may differ as to his rank as a statesman, but no one
will contest his eminent talents as a minister of police. In the former
capacity he had sufficient sense of shame to publish a Pecksniffian apology
for his employment of the rack. “None,” he says, “of those who were at any
time put to the rack were asked, during their torture, any question as to
points of doctrine, but merely concerning their plots and conspiracies, and
the persons with whom they had dealings, and what was their own opinion
as to the Pope’s right to deprive the Queen of her crown.” What was this but
a point of doctrine? The wretched victim who conscientiously believed it
(as all Christendom once did), but wished to save himself by silence, was
driven either to tell a lie or to consign himself to rope and knife. “The
Queen’s servants, the warders, whose office and act it is to handle the rack,
were ever, by those that attended the examinations, specially charged to use
it in so charitable a manner as such a thing might be.” It may be hoped that
there are not many who would dissent from Hallam’s remark that “such
miserable excuses serve only to mingle contempt with our detestation.” He
adds: “It is due to Elizabeth to observe that she ordered the torture to be
disused.” I do not know what authority there is for this statement. Three
years later the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin was puzzled how to torture
the Catholic Archbishop of Cashel, because there was no “rack or other
engine” in Dublin. Walsingham, on being consulted, suggested that his feet
might be toasted against the fire, which was accordingly done. Some of the
Anglican bishops, as might be expected from fanatics, were forward in
recommending torture. But Cecil was no more of a fanatic than his mistress.
What both of them cared for was not a particular religious belief—they had
both of them conformed to Popery under Queen Mary—but the sovereign’s
claim to prescribe religious belief, or rather religious profession, and they
were provoked with the missionaries for thwarting them. Provoking it was,
no doubt. But everything seems to show that it would have been better to
pursue the earlier policy of the reign; to be content with enacting severe
laws which practically were not put into execution.
The English branch of the Jesuit attack was, for political purposes, a
dead failure. A few persons of rank, who at heart were Catholics before,
were formally reconciled to the Pope. Mendoza claims that among them
were six peers whose names he conceals. These peers, if he is to be
believed, were treasonable enough in their designs. But, even by his
account, they were determined not to stir unless a foreign army should have
first entered England.
How far Mendoza’s master was from seeing his way to attack England at
this time was strikingly shown by his behaviour under the most audacious
outrage that Elizabeth had yet inflicted on him. Some twelve months before
(October 1580), Drake had returned from his famous voyage round the
world. That voyage was nothing else than a piratical expedition, for which it
was notorious that the funds had been mainly furnished by Elizabeth and
Leicester. On sea and land Drake had robbed Philip of gold, silver, and
precious stones to the value of at least £750,000. In vain did Mendoza
clamour for restitution and talk about war. Elizabeth kept the booty,
knighted Drake, and openly showed him every mark of confidence and
favour. When Mendoza told her that as she would not hear words, they must
come to cannon and see if she would hear them, she replied (“quietly in her
most natural voice”) that, if he used threats of that kind, she would throw
him into prison. The correspondence between the Spanish ambassador and
his master shows that, however big they might talk about cannon, they felt
themselves paralysed by Elizabeth’s intimate relations with France. She had
managed to keep free from any offensive alliance with Henry III. But at the
first sound of the Spanish cannon she could have it. She was, therefore,
secure. Probably the whole history of diplomacy does not show another
instance of such a complicated balance of forces so dexterously
manipulated.
The Irish branch of the Papal attack, the landing of the legate Sanders,
the insurrection of Desmond (1579-1583), the massacre of the Pope’s
Italian soldiers at Smerwick (1580), must be passed over here. It is enough
to say that, in Ireland, too, the Catholics were beaten. We turn now to their
attempt to get hold of Scotland (1579-1582).
 Scotland was in a state of anarchy, from which it could only be rescued
by an able and courageous king. The nobles, instead of becoming weaker,
as elsewhere, had acquired a strength and independence greater even than
their fathers had enjoyed. Thirty years earlier, the Church had possessed
quite half the land of the country, and had steadily supported the crown.
Almost the whole of this wealth had been seized in one form or another by
the nobles. And though, as compared with English noblemen, they were still
poor in money, they were much bigger men relatively to their sovereign.
The power of the crown was extensive enough in theory. What was wanted
was a king who should know how to convert it into a reality. That was more
than any regent could do. Even Moray had not succeeded. The house of
Douglas was one of the most powerful in Scotland, and Morton, who had
been looked on as its head during the minority of the Earl of Angus, was an
able and daring man. But he had not the large views, the public spirit, or the
integrity of Moray. He was feared by all, hated by many, respected by none.
As a mere party chief, no one would have been better able to hold his own.
As representing the crown, he had every man’s hand against him. To
subsidise such a man was perfectly useless. If Elizabeth was to make his
cause her own, she might just as well undertake the conquest of Scotland at
once.
The essence of the good understanding between England and France was
that both countries should keep their hands off Scotland. Elizabeth,
knowing that if worst came to worst, she could always be beforehand with
France in the northern kingdom, could afford to respect this arrangement,
and she did mean to respect it. France, on the other hand, being also well
aware of the advantage given to England by geographical situation, was
always tempted to steal a march on her, and even when most desirous of her
alliance, never quite gave up intrigues in Scotland. This was equally the
case whatever party was uppermost at the French court, whether its policy
was being directed by the King or by the Duke of Guise.
The Jesuits looked on Guise as their fighting man, who was to do the
work which they could not prevail on crowned heads to undertake. James,
though only thirteen, had been declared of age. It was too late to think of
deposing him. If his character was feeble, his understanding and
acquirements were much beyond his years, and his preferences were
already a force to be reckoned with in Scotch politics. His interests were
evidently opposed to those of his mother. But the Jesuits hoped to persuade
him that his seat would never be secure unless he came to a compromise
with her on the terms that he was to accept the crown as her gift and
recognise her joint-sovereignty. This would throw him entirely into the
hands of the Catholic nobles, and would be a virtual declaration of war
against Elizabeth. He would have to proclaim himself a Catholic, and call in
the French. It was hoped that Philip, jealous though he had always been of
French interference, would not object to an expedition warranted by the
Jesuits and commanded by Guise, who was more and more sinking into a
tool of Spain and Rome. A combined army of Scotch and French would
pour across the Border. It would be joined by the English Catholics.
Elizabeth would be deposed, and Mary set on the throne.
It was a pretty scheme on paper, but certain to break down in every stage
of its execution. James might chaffer with his mother; but, young as he was,
he knew well that she meant to overreach him. He would be glad enough to
get rid of Morton, but he did not want to be a puppet in the hands of the
Marians. He did not like the Presbyterian preachers; but the young pedant
already valued himself on his skill in confuting the apologists of Popery. He
resented Elizabeth’s lectures; but he knew that his succession to the English
crown depended on her good will, and he meant to keep on good terms with
her. No approval of the scheme could be obtained from Philip, and if he did
not peremptorily forbid the expedition, it was because he did not believe it
would come off. If a French army had appeared in Scotland, it would have
been treated as all foreigners were in that country. And finally, if, per
impossibile, the French and Scotch had entered England, they would have
been overwhelmed by such an unanimous uprising of the English people of
all parties and creeds as had never been witnessed in our history.
Historians, who would have us believe that Elizabeth was constantly
bringing England to the verge of ruin by her stinginess and want of spirit,
represent this combination as highly formidable. It required careful
watching; but the only thing that could make it really dangerous was rash
and premature employment of force by England—the course advocated not
only by Burghley, but by the whole Council. Elizabeth seems to have stood
absolutely alone in her opinion; but here, as always, though she allowed her
ministers to speak their minds freely, she did not fear to act on her own
judgment against their unanimous advice.
To carry out their schemes, Guise and the Jesuits sent to Scotland a
nephew of the late Regent Lennox, Esmé Stuart, who had been brought up
in France, and bore the title of Count d’Aubigny (September 1579). He
speedily won the heart of the King, who created him Earl, and afterwards
Duke of Lennox. Elizabeth soon obtained proof of his designs, and urged
Morton to resist them by force. But the favourite, professing to be
converted to Protestantism, enlisted the preachers on his side, and, by this
unnatural coalition, Morton was brought to the scaffold (June 1581). During
the interval between his arrest and execution, the English Council were
urgent with Elizabeth to invade Scotland, rescue the Anglophile leader, and
crush Lennox. She went all lengths in the way of threats. Lord Hunsdon
was even ordered to muster an army on the Border. But this last step at once
produced an energetic protest from the French ambassador; and in Scotland
there was a general rally of all parties against the “auld enemies.” Elizabeth
had never meant to make her threats good, and Morton was left to his fate.
She was quite right not to invade Scotland; but, that being her intention, she
should not have tempted Morton to treason by the promise of her
protection. No male statesman would have been so insensible to dishonour.
The death of the man who, next to Moray, had been the mainstay of the
Reformation and the scourge of the Marian party, was received with a shout
of exultation from Catholic Europe. Already in their heated imaginations
the Jesuits saw the Kirk overthrown and the vantage ground gained for an
attack on England. Some modern historians—with less excuse, since they
have the sequel before their eyes—make the same blunder. The situation
was really unchanged. Morton, who had the true antipathy of a Scottish
noble to clerics of all sorts, had plundered the Kirk ministers, and tried to
bring them under the episcopal yoke. He had quarrelled with most of his old
associates of the Congregation. It was their enmity quite as much as the
attack of Lennox that had pulled him down. When he was out of the way
they naturally reverted to an Anglophile policy. The weakness of the
Catholic party was plainly shown by the fact that Lennox himself, the pupil
of the Jesuits, never ventured to throw off the disguise of a heretic.
The further development of the Jesuit scheme met with difficulties on all
sides. Most even of the Catholic lords were alarmed by the suggestion that
James should hold the crown by the gift of his mother, because it would
imply that hitherto he had not been lawful King; and this would invalidate
their titles to all the lands they had grabbed from Church and crown during
the last fourteen years. It would seem therefore that, if they had harassed the
Government during all that time, it was from a liking for anarchy rather
than from attachment to Mary. Two Jesuits, Crichton and Holt, who were
sent in disguise to Scotland, found Lennox desponding. He was obliged to
confess that, greatly as he had fascinated the King, he could not move him
an inch in his religious opinions. On the contrary, James imagined that his
controversial skill had converted Lennox, and was extremely proud of the
feat. The only course remaining was to seize him, and send him to France or
Spain, Lennox in the meantime administering the Government in the name
of Mary. But to carry out this stroke, Lennox said he must have a foreign
army. In view of the mutual jealousy of France and Spain it was suggested
that, if Philip would furnish money underhand, the Pope might send an
Italian army direct to Scotland, viâ the Straits of Gibraltar. Crichton went to
Rome to arrange this precious scheme, and Holt was proceeding to Madrid.
But Philip forbade him to come. If Lennox could convert James, or send
him to Spain, well and good. But until one of these preliminaries was
accomplished he was to expect no help from Philip. Nor were prospects
more hopeful on the side of France. Mary from her prison implored Guise
to undertake the long-planned expedition. But he would not venture it
without the assent of his own sovereign and the King of Spain. While he
was hesitating, the Anglophiles patched up their differences and got
possession of the King’s person (Raid of Ruthven, August 1582). His tears
were unavailing. “Better bairns greet,” said the Master of Glamis, “than
bearded men.” The favourite fled to France, where he died in the next year.
Thus once more had it been clearly shown that if the Anglophiles were
left to depend on themselves they would not fail to do all that was necessary
to safeguard English interests. “Anglophiles” is a convenient appellation.
But, strictly speaking, there was no party in Scotland that loved England.
There was a religious party to whom it was of the highest importance that
Elizabeth should be safe and powerful. She was therefore certain of its co-
operation. This party would not be always uppermost; for Scottish nobles
were too selfish, too treacherous, too much interested in disorder to permit
any stability. But, whether in power or in opposition, it would be able and it
would be obliged to serve English interests. There was only one way in
which it could be paralysed or alienated, and that was by a recurrence on
the part of England to the traditions of armed interference inherited by
Elizabeth’s councillors from Henry VIII. and the Protector Somerset.
Such is the plain history of this Jesuit and Papal scheme which we are
asked to believe was so dangerous to England and so inadequately handled
by Elizabeth. She had not shown much concern for her honour. But her
coolness, her intrepidity, her correct estimate of the forces with which she
had to deal, her magnificent confidence in her own judgment, saved
England from the endless expenditure of blood and treasure into which her
advisers would have plunged, and prolonged the formal peace with her
three principal neighbours, a peace of already unexampled duration, and of
incalculable advantage to her country.
The policy which Elizabeth had thus deliberately adopted towards
Scotland she persisted in. The successful Anglophiles clamoured for
pensions, and her ministers were for gratifying them. She was willing to
give a moderate pension to James, but not a penny to the nobles. “Her
servants and favourites,” she said, “professed to love her for her high
qualities, Alençon for her beauty, and the Scots for her crown; but they all
wanted the same thing in the end; they wanted nothing but her money, and
they should not have it.” She had ascertained that James regarded his
mother as his rival for the crowns of both kingdoms, and that, whatever he
might sometimes pretend, his real wish was that she should be kept under
lock and key. She had also satisfied herself that the Scottish noblemen on
whom Mary counted would, with very few exceptions, throw every
difficulty in the way of her restoration, out of regard for their own private
interests—the only datum from which it was safe to calculate in dealing
with a Scottish nobleman. She therefore felt herself secure. By
communicating her knowledge to Mary she could show her the
hopelessness of her intrigues in Scotland; while a resumption of friendly
negotiations for her restoration would always be a cheap and effectual way
of intimidating James. Thus she could look on with equanimity when his
new favourite Stewart, Earl of Arran,[5] again chased the Anglophiles into
England (December 1583). Arran himself urgently entreated her to accept
him and his young master as the genuine Anglophiles. Walsingham’s voice
was still for war. But, with both factions at her feet and suing for her favour,
Elizabeth had good reason to be satisfied with her policy of leaving the
Scottish nobles to worry it out among themselves.
 CHAPTER VIII

THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86

WE are now approaching the great crisis of the reign—some may think of
English history—the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle which, if
Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated
counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century earlier.
England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, the
legacy of three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was still
mainly Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match for the
crown, and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert their old
position in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. The poorer
classes were suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the hands of a
most dangerous enemy, whose title to the English crown was held by many
to be better than Elizabeth’s. Philip II., as yet unharassed by revolt, seemed
almost to have drawn England as a sort of satellite into the vast orbit of his
empire.
Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth ascended the
throne. Every year of it had seen some amendment in the condition of the
country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation had been light
beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry VIII., had been honourably
paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the richest
commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any terms, Elizabeth
could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she had ceased to
borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her treasury, a department of
the administration managed under her own close personal supervision. A
numerous militia had been enrolled and partially trained. Large magazines
of arms had been accumulated. A navy had been created; not a large one
indeed; but it did not need to be large, for the warship of those days did not
differ from the ordinary vessel of commerce, nor was its crew differently
trained. The royal navy could therefore be indefinitely increased if need
arose. Philip’s great generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the
conclusion that the conquest of England would be the most difficult
enterprise their master could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors
and traders had increased enormously. New manufactures had been started
by exiles from the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had
been opened up. The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it
would be impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that
matter, of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of
peace, prosperity, and good government extending over so many years.
Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength and security of
Elizabeth’s position had been immensely increased. Her ministers,
especially Walsingham—for Burghley in his old age came at last to see
more with the eyes of his mistress—believed that by a more spirited policy
Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable ally.
Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated, Scotland
would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what “the Spanish
ulcer” was afterwards to Napoleon—a fatal drain on her strength and
resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was so
handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its
condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be really
dangerous was locked up in England.
The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England was
postponed till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has been
asked, did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer is
a simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt would
have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the
events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to
intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the
Armada. If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune of
England might have been different.
Elizabeth’s foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by writers who
have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her relations with
France. Though her interests and those of Henry III. cannot be called
identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to keep up a good
understanding which was of the highest advantage to both countries. But to
maintain this good understanding there was need of the coolest temper and
judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two peoples were hopelessly
hostile. They were like two gamecocks in adjoining pens. The Spaniards
were respected and liked by our countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their
stiff assumption of intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake
a certain appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to
peasant would at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its
burdens began to be felt.
Henry III., with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire, was far
from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He had
good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough
comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well
conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading self-
indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary for
carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action were
succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous surrender.
Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser of the
Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like Elizabeth,
William of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make considerations of
religion subordinate to considerations of State. Both he and Navarre would
have been glad to throw over the fanatical or factious partisans by whom
they were surrounded, and rally the Politiques to their support. But it was a
step that neither as yet ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to
affect zeal for the old religion, the other for the new.
Elizabeth’s ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had been urging her
throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the Huguenots. She herself
took a broader view of the situation. She preferred to deal with the
legitimate government of France recognised by the vast majority of
Frenchmen. Henry III., as she well knew, did not intend or desire to
exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been openly abetted
in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have been obliged to
become the mere instrument of Elizabeth’s worst enemies, Guise and the
Holy League. France would have ceased to be any counterpoise to Spain.
The English Queen had so skilfully played a most difficult and delicate
game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep his head above water;
Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the royal authority, though
impaired, had still controlled the foreign policy of France, and so, since
1572, had given England a firm and useful ally. As long as this balanced
situation could be maintained, England was safe.
But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of forces
would be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else
could help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should
be gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the
Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay
north of the Pyrenees. Henry III. wished to recognise his right. But it was
impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should tolerate
this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth had so
carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The French
alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away with the
authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He would be
compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal party or to
combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, Guise, not Henry
III., would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth’s alliance would not be
with France but with a French faction. She would thus be forced into the
position which she had hitherto refused to accept—that of sole protector of
French and Dutch Protestants, and open antagonist of Spain. The more
showy part she was now to play has been the chief foundation of her glory
with posterity. It is a glory which she deserves. The most industrious
disparagement will never rob her of it. But the sober student will be of
opinion that her reputation as a statesman has a more solid basis in the skill
and firmness with which during so many years she staved off the necessity
for decisive action.
Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (Nov. 1583), and the
consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were not
immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the
course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth
immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance against
Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence. Orange met the
offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to accept the sovereignty of
Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was no former ruler of
England who would not have clutched at such an opportunity of territorial
aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no charms. Every sensible person now
will applaud the sobriety of her aims. But though she eschewed territory,
she desired to have military occupation of one or more coast fortresses, at
all events for a time, both as a security for the fidelity of the Dutch to any
engagements they might make with her, and to enable her to treat on more
equal terms with France or Spain, if the Netherlands were destined, after all,
to fall into the hands of one of those powers.
 While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange was
murdered (June 30/July 10, 1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The
sovereignty of the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth advised
a joint protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had small
confidence in protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What they wanted
was a sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as her subjects
they offered themselves to Henry III. But after nibbling at the offer for eight
months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly expressed intention to
recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had caused a revival of the Holy
League. During the winter 1584-5 its reorganisation was busily going on.
Philip promised to subsidise it. Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its
life and soul. The insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry III.
knew that the vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the
Dutch offer would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy
League. He therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation
that they should apply to England for protection (February 28/March 10,
1585).
The manifesto of the Leaguers appeared at the end of March (1585).
Henry of Navarre was declared incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to
the crown. Henry III. was summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these
demands the Leaguers flew to arms all over France. Had Henry III. been a
man of spirit he would have placed himself at the head of the loyal
Catholics and fought it out. But by the compact of Nemours he conceded all
the demands of the League (June 28/July 7, 1585). Thus began the last great
war of religion, which lasted till Henry of Navarre was firmly seated on the
throne of France.
Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the sheet-anchor of
her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand struggle which could
no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must make the best of the
Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that she would have to do
her share of the fighting. But she was determined that the Dutch should also
do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France they wished for
annexation to the English crown, because solidarity between the two
countries would give them an unlimited claim upon English resources.
Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that nothing should induce her
to accept that proposal. She would give them a definite amount of
assistance in men and money. But every farthing would have to be repaid
when the war was over; and in the meantime she must have Flushing and
Brill as security. They must also bind themselves to make proper exertions
in their own defence. Gilpin, her agent in Zealand, had warned her that if
she showed herself too forward they would simply throw the whole burden
of the war upon her. Splendid as had often been the resistance of separate
towns when besieged, there had been, from the first, lamentable selfishness
and apathy as to measures for combined defence. The States had less than
6000 men in the field—half of them English volunteers—at the very time
when they were assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their
assistance, they could and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in
regarding their fine promises with much distrust.
While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The blame of the
delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the bargainers.
The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the strength of the
English contingent was not the real object of concern to either of them.
Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth had so
peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United Provinces, they
were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the other hand, had not given
up the hope that her more decisive intervention would drive Philip to make
the concessions to his revolted subjects which she had so often urged upon
him. In her eyes, Philip’s sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They
were, perhaps, justified in asserting their ancient constitutional rights. But if
those were guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be criminal.
Moreover, she held that elected deputies were but amateur statesmen, and
had better leave the haute politique to princes to settle. “Princes,” she once
told a Dutch deputation, “are not to be charged with breach of faith if they
sometimes listen to both sides; for they transact business in a princely way
and with a princely understanding such as private persons cannot have.”
Her promise not to make peace behind their backs was not to be interpreted
as literally as if it had been made to a brother prince. It merely bound her—
so she contended—not to make peace without safeguarding their interests;
that is to say, what she considered to be their true interests. Conduct based
on such a theory would not be tolerated now, and was not tamely
acquiesced in by the Dutch then. But to speak of it as base and treacherous
is an abuse of terms.
It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace negotiations which
went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very sailing of the Armada
(1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to make peace never
varied substantially from first to last. We know very well what they were.
She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were a minority,
perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same degree of toleration
which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were not to be questioned
about their religion; but there was to be no public worship or proselytising.
The old constitution, as before Alva, was to be restored, which would have
involved the departure of the foreign troops. These terms would not have
satisfied the States, and if Philip could have been induced to grant them, the
States and Elizabeth must have parted company. But, as he would make no
concessions, the Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did, continue. The
cautionary towns she was determined never to give up to any one unless
(first) she was repaid her expenses for which they had been mortgaged, and
(secondly) the struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an end on terms
which she approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of their being
surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in Elizabeth’s hands till
her death.
Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester to command
the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was marked out by
public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen’s choice was heartily
approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who kept up the
most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him throughout.
Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, not by a
professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the nobility there
were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough way in Scotland or
Ireland, but no one who could be called a professional general. The
momentous step which Elizabeth was taking would have lost half its
significance in the eyes of Europe if any less conspicuous person than
Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was essential that the nobleman
selected should be able and willing to spend largely out of his own
resources. By traditional usage, derived from feudal times, peers who were
employed on temporary services not only received no salary, but were
expected to defray their own expenses, and defray them handsomely. Never
did an English nobleman show more public spirit in this respect than
Leicester. He raised every penny he could by mortgaging his estates. He not
only paid his own personal expenses, but advanced large sums for military
purposes, which his mistress never thought of repaying him. If he effected
little as a general, it was because he was not provided with the means.
Serious mistakes he certainly made, but they were not of a military kind.
Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and red-faced, but still
imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth he was dear as the
friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had loved her for herself
when they were both thirty years younger, and was still her most devoted
and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and trusted, and all the more
since he had become a more docile instrument of her policy. Walsingham, a
keener intellect and more independent character, she could not but value,
though impatient under his penetrating suspicion and almost constant
disapproval. Leicester was the intimate friend, the frequent companion of
her leisure hours. None of her younger favourites had supplanted him in her
regard. By long intimacy he knew the molles aditus et tempora when things
might be said without offence which were not acceptable at the council-
board. The other ministers were glad to use him for this purpose. There can
be no question that his appointment to the command in the Netherlands was
meant as the most decisive indication that could be given of Elizabeth’s
determination to face open war with Philip rather than allow him to
establish absolute government in that country.
Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the United
Provinces had been without a ruler. The government had been provisionally
carried on by the “States,” or deputies from each province. Leicester had
come with no other title than that of Lieutenant-General of the Queen’s
troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader as a
sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers and
title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the
representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and
practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip—in other
words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so
peremptorily refused.
The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after his arrival
(Jan. 14/24, 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a preconcerted plan
between the States and Elizabeth’s ministers, who had all along supported
the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it before
leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and
undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham
maintained that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her
not to undo it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the sort
would be attempted, and had strictly enjoined Leicester at his departure to
accept no such title. It was not that she wished his powers—that is to say,
her own powers—to be circumscribed. On the contrary, she desired that
they should in practice be as large and absolute as possible. What she
objected to was the title, with all the consequences it involved. And what
enraged her most of all was the attempt of her servants to push the thing
through behind her back, on the calculation that she would be obliged to
accept the accomplished fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on
her ministers, on the States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a
characteristic letter:—
“To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas Heneage.
“How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used by you, you shall by this
bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent unto you to charge you withal. We could
never have imagined, had we not seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by
ourself and extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this land, would have
in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken our commandment, in a cause that so
greatly toucheth us in honour; whereof although you have showed yourself to make but
little account, in most undutiful a sort, you may not therefore think that we have so little
care of the reparation thereof as we mind to pass so great a wrong in silence unredressed.
And therefore our express pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses laid apart,
you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and fulfil whatsoever the bearer
hereof shall direct you to do in our name. Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary
at your uttermost peril.”

Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private perusal. She
severely rebuked the States for encouraging “a creature of her own” to
disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from him, she
required that he should make a public resignation of the government in the
place where he had accepted it.
It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the vindication of
her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of the moment.
But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition. The States
had conferred “absolute” authority upon Leicester, and would have thought
it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manœuvre, they had succeeded in
forcing the Queen’s hand. But they did not care to entrust absolute powers
to a mere general of an English contingent. After long discussion, Elizabeth
was at length persuaded that the least of evils was to allow him to retain the
title which the States had conferred on him (June 1586). But in the
meantime they had repented of their haste in letting power go out of their
own hands. Their efforts were thenceforth directed to explain away the term
“absolute.” The long displeasure of the Queen had destroyed the principal
value of Leicester in their eyes. He himself had soon incurred their dislike.
Impetuous and domineering, he could not endure opposition. Every man
who did not fall in with his plans was a malicious enemy, a traitor, a tool of
Parma, who ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed the favour of the
democratic and bigoted Calvinist party, especially in Utrecht, and he tried to
play them off against the States, thereby promoting the rise of the factions
which long afterwards distracted the United Provinces. The displeasure of
the Queen had taken the shape of not sending him money, and his troops
were in great distress and unable to move. Moreover, rumours of the secret
peace negotiations were craftily spread by Parma, who, knowing well that
they would come to nothing, turned them to the best account by leading the
States to suspect that they were being betrayed to Spain.
Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to Philip than
with a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to recover any of
the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain in her power.
She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics and royalists.
She knew also that Parma’s attenuated army was considerably outnumbered
by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress for food and
money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by the war. Their
commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their great rivers were
blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had largely migrated to
the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, notwithstanding the burdens of
war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. Their population was about two
millions. That of England itself was little more than four. Religion was no
longer the only or the chief motive of their resistance. For even the
Catholics among them, who were still very numerous—some said a
majority—keenly relished the material prosperity which had grown with
independence. Encouraged by English protection, the States were in no
humour to listen to compromise. But a compromise was what Elizabeth
desired. She was therefore not unwilling that her forces should be confined
to an attitude of observation, till it should appear whether her open
intervention would extract from Philip such concessions as she deemed
reasonable.
 Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly supported by
Walsingham. Burghley’s conduct was less straightforward. He had long
found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite. He had
probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. Even
now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry to see
him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with the
Dutch, he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in those
obscure peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from Leicester
and Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that or any other
subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at last to let him be
present at an interview with the agents employed by Burghley and Parma,
which brought their back-stairs diplomacy to an abrupt conclusion. “They
that have been the employers of them,” he wrote to Leicester, “are ashamed
of the matter.” The negotiations went on through other channels, but never
made any serious progress.
To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the same time
emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it—such was the problem
which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply pressure in
other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on the coast of
Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the Atlantic, he sacked and
burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in 1587, he forced his way into
Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping and the stores collected for the
Armada, and for two months plundered and destroyed every vessel he met
off the coast of Portugal.
Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many injuries and
indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not wonderful if she
had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to retaliate. This
time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had its place in
his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy ever-receding
future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion and neutralised
France. Elizabeth’s open intervention in the Netherlands at length induced
him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must be first dealt with.
In the meantime, Parma’s operations in the Netherlands were starved
quite as much as Leicester’s. Plundering excursions, two or three petty
combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns
captured on one side or the other—such is the military record from the date
of Elizabeth’s intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had
Welcome to Our Bookstore - The Ultimate Destination for Book Lovers
Are you passionate about testbank and eager to explore new worlds of
knowledge? At our website, we offer a vast collection of books that
cater to every interest and age group. From classic literature to
specialized publications, self-help books, and children’s stories, we
have it all! Each book is a gateway to new adventures, helping you
expand your knowledge and nourish your soul
Experience Convenient and Enjoyable Book Shopping Our website is more
than just an online bookstore—it’s a bridge connecting readers to the
timeless values of culture and wisdom. With a sleek and user-friendly
interface and a smart search system, you can find your favorite books
quickly and easily. Enjoy special promotions, fast home delivery, and
a seamless shopping experience that saves you time and enhances your
love for reading.
Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and
personal growth!

ebooksecure.com