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2025 global
semiconductor
industry
outlook
Chip sales are set to soar in 2025, led by
generative AI and data center build-outs, even
as demand from PC and mobile markets may
remain muted

ARTICLE • 18-MIN • 04 • Deloitte Center for Technology, Media &  

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2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS
The semiconductor industry had a robust 2024, with expected double-digit (19%)
1 Generative AI chips
growth, and sales of US$627 billion for the year. But that’s even better than the earlier
2 Chip design process
Jeroen forecast of US$611 billion. And 2025 could be even better, with predicted sales of
further evolves,
Kusters 3
US$697 billion, reaching a new all-time high, and well on track to reach the widely enabled by AI
United States
accepted aspirational goal of US$1 trillion in chip sales by 2030. This suggests the Compounding talent
industry only needs to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 7.5% between 2025 challenges
4
and 2030 (figure 1). Assuming the industry continues to grow at that rate, it could Resilience amid
reach US$2 trillion in 2040. geopolitical tensions
Deb
Bhattacharjee Signposts of the
United States
The stock market is often a leading indicator of industry performance: As of mid- future

December 2024, the combined market capitalization of the top 10 global chip
companies was US$6.5 trillion—up 93% from US$3.4 trillion in mid-December 2023
5
Jordan Bish and 235% higher than the US$1.9 trillion seen in mid-November 2022. That said, it is
Netherlands worth noting that “average” chip stock performance in the last two years has been a
“tale of two markets”: Companies involved in the generative AI chip market
outperformed that average, while companies without that exposure (automotive,
computer, smartphone, and communications semiconductor companies, for example)
Jan Thomas 6
Nicholas underperformed.
Malaysia

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One driver of industry sales has been the demand for gen AI chips: a mix of CPUs,
GPUs, data center communications chips, memory, power chips, and more. Deloitte’s
Karthik 2024 TMT Predictions report predicted that those gen AI chips collectively would be
Ramachandran 7
India worth “more than” US$50 billion, which was a much too conservative forecast, as the
market was likely worth over US$125 billion in 2024—and represented over 20% of
8
total chip sales for the year. At the time of publication, we predict that gen AI chips
9
will be over US$150 billion in 2025. Further, Lisa Su, chief executive officer at AMD,
moved her estimate for the total addressable market for AI accelerator chips up to
US$500 billion in 2028—a number larger than sales for the entire chip industry in
10
2023.

In terms of end markets, after being flat at around 262 million units over 2023 and in
11
2024, PC sales are expected to grow in 2025 by over 4% to about 273 million units.
Meanwhile, smartphone sales are expected to grow at low single digits in 2025 (and
beyond) to reach an estimated 1.24 billion units in 2024 (6.2% year-over-year
12
growth). These two end markets are important for the semi industry: In 2023,
communication and computer chip sales (which include data center chips) made up
57% of overall semiconductor sales for the year compared to auto and industrial
13
(which accounted for only 31% of sales combined, for example).

One challenge for the industry is that while gen AI chips and associated revenues
(memory, advanced packaging, communications, and more) are responsible for
outsized revenues and profits, they represent a small number of very high-value chips,
meaning that wafer capacity—and therefore utilization—for the industry as a whole
isn’t as high as it might appear. In 2023, nearly a trillion chips were sold at an average
14
selling price of US$0.61 per chip. At a rough estimate, although gen AI chips might
15
account for 20% of revenues in 2024, they were less than 0.2% of total wafers. Even
though global chip revenues for 2024 were forecast to rise 19%, silicon-wafer
16
shipments for the year actually declined an estimated 2.4% for the year. That number
is expected to grow by almost 10% in 2025, fueled by demand for components and
technologies used largely in gen AI chips, such as chiplets, as mentioned in our 2025
17
TMT Predictions report. Of course, silicon wafers are not the only kind of capacity
to track: Advanced packaging is growing even faster. As an example, some analysts
estimate that TSMC’s CoWoS (chip-on-wafer-on-substrate) 2.5D advanced packaging
production capacity will reach 35,000 wafers per month (wpm) in 2024 and could
increase to 70,000 wpm (100% year-over-year) and further by 30% year-over-year to
18
90,000 wpm by end of 2026.

Further, driving innovation in the industry is not cheap. In 2015, the overall chip
industry average for spending on research and development was 45% of its earnings
19
before interest and taxes (EBIT), but by 2024, it was an estimated 52% of the same.
R&D seems to be growing at a 12% CAGR, white EBIT is only growing at 10%
20
(figure 2).

Finally, it’s worth reminding readers that the chip industry can be notoriously cyclical.
The industry has flipped from growth to shrinkage nine times in the last 34 years
21
(figure 3). So it may seem that the industry is seeing less extreme growth or shrinkage
in the last 14 years, compared to 1990 to 2010, but the frequency of contractions
seems to have increased. The year 2025 looks solid for now, it’s hard to tell what 2026
will bring.

These trends and others play into our 2025 semiconductor industry outlook, where we
drill down into four big topics for the year ahead: generative AI accelerator chips for
PCs and smartphones and the enterprise edge; a new “shift-left” approach to chip
design; the growing global talent shortage; and the need to build resilient supply chains
amid escalating geopolitical tensions.

About Deloitte’s TMT center outlooks

Deloitte’s 2025 global semiconductor industry outlook seeks to identify the strategic issues and opportunities for semiconductor companies
and other parts of the semiconductor supply chain to consider in the coming year, including their impacts, key actions to consider, and critical
questions to ask. The goal is to help equip companies across the semiconductor ecosystem with information and foresight to better position
themselves for a robust and resilient future.

Generative AI chips in PCs, smartphones, the

enterprise edge, and the Internet of Things
Many of the chips that are being used for training and inference of gen AI cost tens of
thousands of dollars and are destined for large cloud data centers. In 2024 and 2025,
these chips or lightweight versions of these chips are also finding homes in the
enterprise edge, in computers, in smartphones, and (over time) in other edge devices
such as IoT applications. To be clear, in many cases, these chips are being used for
either gen AI, traditional AI (machine learning) or, increasingly, a combination of both.

The enterprise edge market was already a factor in 2024, but the question in 2025 will
be about smaller, cheaper, less powerful versions of these chips becoming a key part of
computers and smartphones. What they lack in per-chip value, they can make up for in
volume: PC sales are expected to be over 260 million units in 2025, while smartphones
22
are expected to be over 1.24 billion units. Sometimes, the “gen AI chip” can be a
stand-alone single piece of silicon, but more commonly it’s a few square millimeters of
dedicated AI processing real estate that is tiny part of a much larger chip.

Enterprise edge: Although gen AI via the cloud will likely continue to be a dominant
option for many enterprises, about half of the enterprises worldwide are predicted to
add AI data-center infrastructure on-premises—an example of enterprise edge
23
computing. This could be, in part, to help protect their intellectual property and
sensitive data and comply with data sovereignty or other regulations, but also to help
24
them save money. These chips are largely the same as those found in hyperscale data
centers, with server racks costing millions of dollars and requiring hundreds of
kilowatts of power. Although smaller than hyperscale chip demand, we estimate the
chips for enterprise edge servers will likely be worth tens of billions of dollars globally
25
in 2025.

Personal computers: Sales of gen AI–powered PCs are predicted to comprise half of all
26
PCs in 2025, with some forecasts suggesting that almost all PCs will have at least
some onboard gen AI processing—also known as neural processing units (NPUs)—by
27
2028 (figure 4). These NPU-powered machines are expected to command a price
28
premium of 10% to 15%, but it’s important to note that not all gen AI PCs are
equal. There’s a dividing line at the 40 TOPS (trillion operations per second) level,
following a recommendation from major PC ecosystem companies that only computers
29
with more than 40 TOPS be considered true AI-enabled PCs. As at the time of
writing, some buyers are cautious about these new PCs, either unwilling to pay the
premium, or waiting until more powerful gen AI NPUs are introduced in the second
30
half of 2025.

Figure4 
AlmostallPCsareexpectedtohavesomegenAlprocessing-alsoknownasneural 
processingunits(NPUs)-by2028
ExpectedsalesofNPU-enabledPCsofallPCsworldwidefrom2024to2028
•None NPU:1<40TOPS NPU:40+TOPS

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

Note:TOPS=trillionoperationspersecond.
Source:InternationalDataCorporationWorldwideQuarterlyPersonalComputingDeviceTracker,September2024.
Deloitte.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/research-centers/center-for-technology-media-telecommunications.html

As of December 2024, many of the installed base of PCs were running on x86 CPUs,
with the balance being on CPUs based on the Arm architecture. MediaTek, Microsoft,
and Qualcomm announced in 2024 that they would make Arm-powered PCs,
31
specifically gen AI PCs. It’s unclear how successful these machines will be in the next
12 months, but it will likely be a key issue for the various chipmakers, with Qualcomm
32
predicting it will sell US$4 billion worth of PC chips annually by 2029.

Smartphones: Where PC NPUs might be worth tens of dollars in value, smartphone-

equivalent gen AI chips may be worth much less, and we estimate the silicon on next-
33
generation smartphone processors to be under US$1. Even though the smartphone
market is over a billion units sold annually, and even though we predict gen AI
34
smartphones will be 30% of phones sold in 2025, the semiconductor impact is likely
smaller than PCs in dollar terms. Instead, an interesting angle for chipmakers could be
to see if consumers are excited enough about new gen AI phones and features to
shorten the replacement cycle. Consumers have been keeping phones longer before
35
upgrading, and sales have been flat for years now. If gen AI enthusiasm causes an
uptick in smartphone sales, it could benefit all kinds of chip companies, not just those
that make the gen AI chips themselves.

IoT: A gen AI chip in a data center might cost US$30,000. A gen AI chip on a PC
might cost US$30. A gen AI chip on a smartphone might be US$3. For gen AI chips to
work on the low-cost IoT market, they should cost about US$0.3. That’s unlikely to
happen anytime soon, but with the possibility of tens of billions of IoT endpoints
needing AI processors, this is a market to watch for the longer term.

Strategic questions to consider

• Although gen AI chips for data centers are in demand now, given their importance

to industry growth, are there any signs that demand is weakening, or that processing
is moving away from data centers to edge devices?

• Given the success of gen AI chips in data centers, the market potential for various

edge chips may drive mergers and acquisitions and attract further private equity,
venture capital, and sovereign wealth fund interest: Chip companies are already
aligning with financial players. Could we see more of this in 2025?

• Some analysts expect the market for gen AI inference to grow faster than training

in 2025 and beyond: What implications could this have on various semiconductor
sectors and players? As the cost of AI inference reduces at a faster pace, how can it
affect semiconductor chips?

• With greater focus on sustainability and the heightening stress on power

consumption due to an AI-driven surge in electricity demand, how can the industry
strike a balance between power efficiency and performance in small form factors
including laptops, mobile phones, and IoT devices?

Chip design ‘shifts left’ and calls for a greater

collaboration across the industry
Deloitte predicted that, by 2023, AI would emerge as a powerful aid to human
semiconductor engineers, assisting them on extremely complex chip-design processes,
and enabling them to find ways to improve and optimize PPA (power, performance,
36
and area). As of 2024, gen AI has enabled rapid iterations to enhance existing designs
37
and discover entirely new ones that can do it in less time. In 2025, there will likely be
more emphasis toward “shift left”—an approach to chip design and development
where testing, verification, and validation are moved up earlier in the chip design and
38
development process —as optimization strategies could evolve from simple PPA
metrics to system-level metrics like performance per watt, FLOPs (or “floating point
39
operations per second”) per watt, and thermal factors. And the combination of
advanced AI capabilities—graph neural networks and reinforcement learning—will
likely continue to help design chips that are more power-efficient than typical chips
40
produced by human engineers.

Domain-specific and specialized chips are expected to continue to gain prominence

over general-purpose ones, as several industries (such as automotive) and certain AI
41
workloads would require customized approaches to designing chips. However, a
42
widespread adoption of application-specific integrated circuits remains less clear, as
the development and maintenance of such hardware can be costly and could divert
43
focus from other AI advancements. But here’s where gen AI tools can allow
companies to design more specialized and competitive products including custom
44
silicon.

3D ICs and heterogeneous architectures are introducing challenges related to

arranging, assembling, validating, and testing the various chiplets, which can
45
sometimes be preassembled. This shift toward system design over individual product
design can incorporate software and digital twins early on—stressing the importance of
46
early and frequent testing. By 2025, synchronizing hardware, system, and software
development upstream in the process will likely help redefine future systems
engineering and enhance overall efficiency, quality, and time to market.

To evolve and keep pace with the changing face of design, the industry may want to
consider new ways to handle complex design processes. Already, the chip industry is
exploring digital twins to emulate and visualize complex design processes step by step,
including the ability to move around or swap chiplets to measure and assess
47
performance of a multi-chiplet system. And digital twins could increasingly be used
to give a visual representation (via 3D modeling) of the physical end-device or the
system to assist with all aspects of design, including mechanical as well as electrical
(software and hardware). Designers should work with electronic design automation
(EDA) and other hi-tech computer-aided design/computer-aided engineering companies
to strengthen design, simulation, and verification and validation tools and capabilities
48
for hybrid and complex heterogenous systems. And they also should consider using
and adapting model-based system engineering tools as part of the broader EDA “shift-
49
left” approach.

As design and software are expected to play crucial roles in the development of next-
generation advanced chip products, bolstering cyber defense becomes more important,
50
heading into 2025. To help align with the shift-left approach, chip designers should
integrate security and safety testing early in the chip-design process. They should
implement redundancy and error-correction and -detection mechanisms to help ensure
that systems can continue to operate even when some of the components fail, and
hardware-based security features such as secure boot mechanisms and encryption
51
engines.

Strategic questions to consider

• As AI in chip design becomes more prevalent and common and EDA becomes

more and more AI-enabled, how can the industry proactively ensure trust and
transparency in the complex design process by always keeping human engineers in
the loop and giving them a major role in the overall process?

• In the case of custom silicon design, what’s the nature of the relationship between

original equipment manufacturers for devices, product designers, and chip designers?
And what are some differentiating factors for chip companies and end customers?
Does increased customization give scale advantages in terms of product pricing, or
lower the cost to produce a prototype or accelerate prototype production?

• New tools and methodologies may require the broader chip industry, including

EDA and design houses, to consider long-term direction and goals. In this context,
what aspects should semi companies address from the standpoints of systems
engineering and chip development/R&D?

• How might the growing demand to more quickly design more complex chips and

at an increasingly faster pace affect manufacturing capabilities and capacity,

especially for the back-end players (advanced packaging foundries and outsourced
semiconductor assembly and test)?

The intensifying talent challenges in

semiconductor industry
In Deloitte’s 2023 semiconductor industry outlook, we estimated that the industry
52
needs to add a million skilled workers by 2030, or more than 100,000 every year.
Two years after, not only does that forecast hold good, but the talent challenge is
expected to intensify further in 2025. Globally, countries are not producing enough
53
skilled talent to meet their workforce needs.

From core engineering to chip design and manufacturing, operations, and maintenance,
AI may help alleviate some engineering talent shortages, but the skill gap looms (figure
54
5). Attracting and retaining talent will likely continue to be a challenge for many
organizations in 2025, and a big part of the problem is an aging workforce, which is
55
more prominent in the United States and even Europe. Add the complex geopolitical
landscape and supply chain fragility to this equation, and it becomes clear that the
56
availability of talent supply is under stress globally.

With onshoring and reshoring of fabrication, assembly, and test in the United States
and Europe, there will likely be pressure on chip companies and foundries as they
source more of the talent locally in 2025. For example, talent challenges are
57
contributing to delays in opening new plants. On a related note, “friendshoring”
(collaborating with companies from countries considered to be allies) can provide
stability and resilience to supply chains, especially for the United States and European
Union. But it also demands scouting for the right skills to help meet new capacity
58
demands and talent roles in destinations such as Malaysia, India, Japan, and Poland.

Chip companies can’t continue to wrestle over the same finite talent pool and still
expect to match up to the industry’s pace of technological advancement and capacity
expansion. So, what can semiconductor companies do in 2025 to address the talent
conundrum?

To help attract AI and chip talent, chip companies should consider offering a sense of
trust, stability, and projected market growth. With this, they can help make the
industry more appealing to recent high school grads and fresh entrants to help
59
reinvigorate talent pipelines.

Countries aiming to benefit from their respective domestic chips acts should consider
weaving in strategic goals and aspects related to workforce development and
activation. Some examples could include training programs, expanded vocational and
professional education, and employment opportunities that their local chip companies
would commit to in order to receive funding. Semi companies should consider
collaborating with educational institutions (high schools, technical colleges, and
universities) and local government organizations to leverage chip funds to develop and
curate targeted workforce training and development programs aligned with specific
industry needs in the region.

Semi companies should design flexible upskilling and reskilling programs for career
path flexibility to help address future workforce skills and gaps. Additionally, they
should implement and leverage advanced tech and AI-based tools to assess diverse
talent related factors such as supply, demand, and current and projected spend, to
perform complex workforce scenario modeling to support strategic talent decision-
60
making.

Strategic questions to consider

• How should the workforce be characterized and segmented based on specialization

areas, for example, design and intellectual property, and manufacturing, operator,
engineering, and technical roles? And how can the industry customize talent sourcing
and skill development strategies based on these roles, as well as based on specific
geographic regions where hiring takes place?

61
• An emerging trend is agentic AI: Could multimodal, multiagent AI be a partial

solution to the looming talent shortage?

• When integrating new talent into a mainstream workforce, what nuances and

factors should be considered to ensure a consistent corporate culture? And what

associated risks and pitfalls related to talent retention issues and talent pipeline
development gaps should be tackled?

• As part of future talent pipeline development, what adjacent skilled workforce

types should be considered and what should the overall talent mix be, including full-
time and gig workers, to help position the company strongly in the next one to two
years?


 Building resilient supply chains amid
geopolitical tensions
Deloitte’s 2024 semiconductor outlook already talked about geopolitical tensions in
depth, so what’s new for 2025?

The same … but even more. As one example, in December of 2024, the outgoing
administration issued a new list of US export restrictions mainly still focused on
advanced nodes (despite some speculation that restrictions might be broadened to
include some relatively less advanced nodes). These restrictions now include separate
62
additional categories around advanced inspection and metrology. Additionally, many
63
(over 100) new entities (mainly Chinese) have been added to the restricted entity list.

As part of these restrictions, the United States seems to be adopting the “small yard,
64
high fence” approach toward semiconductor export restrictions. This aims to impose
a high level of restrictions on a relatively small subset of chip technologies, with a focus
on those that defense, including advanced weapon systems, and advanced AI used in
65
military applications.

The new restrictions (if implemented by the new administration) go on to flag that AI
advancements are increasingly being viewed as matters of national security. The day
after those new restrictions, China announced further restrictions on the export of
gallium and germanium (as well as other materials), both key for the manufacture of
66
multiple semiconductors. As we predicted in 2024, ongoing materials restrictions will
likely pose a challenge for the chip industry, but also an imperative for the industry to
67
do more recycling of e-waste.

In mid-January 2025, the outgoing administration announced the Interim Final Rule
on AI Technology Diffusion. The Interim Final Rule will impose new controls for chip
68
exports.

At the time of writing, it is unknown whether the incoming administration will roll
back the December and January restrictions, modify them, or even propose additional
restrictions.

Additionally, the new administration has proposed increasing its use of tariffs,
69
including tariffs on goods from China, Mexico, and Canada. Given the global nature
of most semi supply chains, the proposed new AI-related chip-export controls (by the
outgoing administration) and the planned higher tariffs would likely have an impact
and could make supply chains more complex to administer, shifting profits, costs, and
more. And the impact could be felt across the supply chain—including R&D and
manufacturing—as well as affecting how industry policies are shaped across countries
and regions.

Of course, there are additional geopolitical risks or changes: Conflicts in

Ukraine/Russia and the Middle-East continue, potentially affecting semiconductor
manufacturing, supply chains, and critical raw materials. But the chip industry has
other vulnerable points: The December martial law order in South Korea highlighted
the global supply chain’s dependency on and concentration of certain types of
70
semiconductors, especially in the most advanced technologies. As an example of
concentration, almost 75% of DRAM memory chips globally are made in South
71
Korea.

It’s not just geopolitics that can interrupt key materials: 2024’s Hurricane Helene
briefly shut down two mines in North Carolina, which are sources for nearly all of the
world’s ultra-high-purity quartz, essential for making crucibles which are a key part of
72
the chipmaking process. With hurricanes, typhoons, and other extreme weather
events projected to become more frequent and intense due to climate change,
73
expanding sources for key materials is likely to remain a supply chain priority.

It is worth noting that, as of late 2024, a key part of the export restrictions from the
United States and allies is having an effect: The restrictions around extreme ultraviolet
lithography machines seem to be posing a barrier, preventing Chinese companies from
making advanced-node chips at scale and with acceptable yields. Although there are 7
nanometer and 6 nanometer chips being made in limited numbers using older deep
ultraviolet technology, the volumes are low, yields are uneconomical, and that situation
74
is expected to persist at least until 2026.

To be clear, semiconductor supply chains worked well in 2024, even as the industry
grew by almost 20%. At this time, there’s no reason to believe 2025 supply chains will
be less resilient, but as always, the risk is there. And given how important gen AI chips
75
are expected to be in 2025 and beyond (up to 50% of sales, perhaps ) and the
relatively higher concentration of processor, memory, and packaging required for
cutting-edge chips, the industry may be more vulnerable to supply chain disruptions
than ever before. Although the industry is likely to become less concentrated
geographically thanks to various chips acts—and initiatives like onshoring, reshoring,
nearshoring, and friendshoring are all still in their early days—the industry remains
highly vulnerable for the next year or two, at least.

Strategic questions to consider

• Given the fluid geopolitical environment and escalating export restrictions, what

should be the mix of reshoring versus offshoring? And how should the industry
factor potential disruptions to any existing supply chain channel partner
relationships in erstwhile friendly countries and allies—that is, friendshoring?

• As unpredictable climate-driven disruptions affect materials and components

supplies, how could this aspect—coupled with an already complex geopolitical

landscape—impact both the front-end wafer fab and back-end assembly and test,
and packaging plants that are being ambitiously planned and rolled out in dozens of
countries worldwide?

• If the trade wars continue to escalate, what could it mean for talent sourcing and

availability? Can export restrictions further extend to, and eventually cascade into a
much broader talent mobility challenge for countries locking horns in the chip race?

• How might countries with chip manufacturing capacity respond to potential

additional US tariffs, given the incentive to shift activities to the United States? Can
higher-value-add activities be ideal candidates to be shifted to the United States,
given the higher cost, and might US-based companies rethink their offshore
manufacturing investments and activities?

Signposts for the future

For 2025, semiconductor industry executives should be mindful of the following
signposts:

1. There is currently a mismatch between very high spending on semiconductors for

gen AI, and companies being able to monetize their gen AI offerings. For 2025, the
argument of “the risk of underinvesting is greater than the risk of overinvesting”
seems to be still dominant, but if that attitude shifts, demand for gen AI chips
could become weaker than predicted.

2. Competition from agile chip startups could intensify, challenging incumbents in the
broader semiconductor industry. Notably, AI chip startups secured a cumulative
US$7.6 billion in venture capital funding globally during the second, third, and last
76
quarter of 2024, and several of these startups offer specialized solutions including
customizable RISC-V-based applications, chiplets, LLM inference chips, photonic
ICs, chip design, and chip equipment.

3. With interest rates in the United States and other major markets likely to drop
77
further, a favorable credit environment could act as a tailwind for the chip
78
industry’s M&A scene, which has already seen an uptick in 2024. Moreover, with
two different chip markets evolving—one for AI chips and one for all other types
of chips—the industry may experience M&A and consolidation, especially if
companies with valuable IP lag their peers and are seen as attractive targets.
Nonetheless, potential tighter regulations and trade conflicts, globally, could
potentially dampen the deal environment.

4. As geopolitical challenges ripple across the globe, chip companies should brace
themselves for further disruptions. Traditional channel partner models and
allyships could get upended, even as reshoring, friendshoring, and nearshoring
have gained momentum. Prolonging regional conflicts and wars could further
impact the flow of vital materials and inventories. All of these could disrupt semi
companies’ demand planning, requiring them to be more agile and adapt supply
chain and sourcing contracts, and pricing terms.

5. A significant part of capex spending and revenues was driven by AI and the
advanced wafers needed to produce those highly advanced AI chips. However,
wafer demand from auto, industrial, and consumer segments continue to be
lackluster, while there’s some uptick in demand from mobile handset and other
consumer products. Through 2025 and 2026, though overall revenue and capex
seem to continue trending upward (at least for the next nine to 12 months), any
downward movement in AI-related spending and components shortage could have
an adverse impact ripping through the broader global semiconductor and
electronics supply chain.

Continue the conversation

Meet the industry leaders

Jeroen Kusters Deb Bhattacharjee

Managing Director | Supply Global Semiconductor Center
Chain & Network Operations of Excellence Leader

Jeff Loucks
Steve Fineberg
Executive director, Center for
Vice Chair and US Technology
Technology, Media &
Sector Leader
Telecommunications

Jan Thomas Nicholas

Jordan Bish Executive Director, Technology
Partner | Consulting & Transformation, Deloitte
Southeast Asia

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